How bad is America's obesity epidemic?

Slate Magazine claims overweight Soldiers aren't a problem. Personal experience, on the other hand, might indicate otherwise. How many Soldiers are actually being chaptered out for being obese?

Discuss. This is probably going to get ugly.

Edit: The Atlantic tackles the issue of societal change, evolution, and obesity. Of course, their journalistic standards are pretty low. After all, The Atlantic Wire did link to this site...

On Re-Enlistment (And your daily dose of Megan Fox)

I'm only five months or so into the fiscal year, and I have reached about 90% of the re-enlistment goals for my company, which is a great boon for any commander.  I'm sitting down with each Soldier in turn in order to talk with them about re-enlistment and I'm coming up some interesting responses (although they're not surprising to me).  Overall, I'm pleased that, in a time of war, so many Soldiers are deciding to re-enlist and even stay in Upstate NY.  Although the unit deploys so much that the good news is that they won't have to experience many Upstate NY winters.  Heh heh heh.  

I'll begin this segment by saying that every company commander likes to sit down in their meetings and see "green lights" next to their name in all sorts of areas:  "Green lights" in submitting awards and evaluations, "Green lights" in aircraft and vehicle maintenance, "Green lights" in property accountability, and so forth.  (In fact, one of the strange aspects of the alleged PowerPoint/Zero Defect military mentality that was pervasive in the 90s was the fact that work seemed to revolve around achieving "green lights" on Powerpoint slides)  

Re-enlistment is the same.  Of course, we all want to achieve a "Green light" when it comes to re-enlistment, but the fact of the matter is that you are dealing with a Soldier's future when you swear him in for another two to six years.  Soldiers who are barely 21 years old are on their second combat deployment and have never known a college lifestyle--and with a new Montgomery GI Bill, they can not only have their tuition paid for, but they can also have their living expenses paid for while they take some time off and achieve a college degree.  I do certainly believe in preserving our military force for the future by retaining the best Soldiers, especially in light of a disturbing trend of the best junior leaders leaving the Army  (for example, the Army only has, as of 2007, half of the post-command captains it needs). However, I also have to take into consideration that many Soldiers have bigger and better plans in life than the US Army, and in many ways, it would be selfish to hold them back just to get a "Green light" in an area.  

I sat down with a number of Soldiers, each with their own plans for the future--some staying, some leaving, some sitting on the fence.  Two in particular stuck out.

Soldier #1 has a wife who is also in the military and a daughter not even a year old.  He works in what the civilian community would call the Information Technology (IT) field.  With jobs at historic lows, the spectre of unemployment did little to change his mind about leaving the Army.  Why?  He was looking at getting a contractor job in Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, one of the bad side effects of the contractor culture is that a large number of Soldiers have seen contractors performing, in many cases, the same jobs that they do for a.) more money, b.) without being "stop-lossed", and c.) without having to shave, get a haircut, or wear bulky uniforms and body armour in 120F heat.  The money in particular is a sore subject, as Soldiers who are supporting families on $30,000 a year simply don't see the justice in staying in the military when contractors are making up to four times that for the same jobs.   There's also very little quality control when it comes to hiring as a contractor.  I think every aviatior knows of some crew chief who got kicked out of the Army (for obesity, drinking and driving, etc) and wound up getting hired for a contract maintenance service within a few weeks, working on the exact same aircraft, working fewer hours and being paid more money.  

While I tried to sway his mind by reminding him that contractor jobs would only be out there as long as there was a war going on--and with Iraq winding down and with Afghanistan being re-assessed with much more limited aims, that might not be that long--the prospect of a six-figure salary to tide him over until the economy got back on its feet was too promising to let go of.

Soldier #2 is another exceptionally bright Soldier who is roughly 22 years old.  He's one of the many who has heard of my tales of debauchery, many of which date from my college days.  Obviously influenced by my tales of close calls with the law, Slip and Slide Parties and whatnot, he wants to attain his college degree.  Well, for other good reasons, too, but I think ultimately because of what he's heard of the infamous Slip and Slide party.  He actually once asked me if college really was like Animal House, and I had to inform him that, yes, it was.

I asked him what his post-college plans were and he mentioned wanting to become a Foreign Service Officer with the State Department or even joining the Peace Corps.  I have to admit, I encouraged him to pursue these career fields.  As much as America is going to need more and more Soldiers, particularly with a planned increase in the Army's size, it is going to need those Soldiers in no small part because they're doing the jobs which once fell in the realm of the State Department.  At the end of the Cold War, America drastically cut the number of Foreign Service Officers, even as the total number of countries in the world increased.  America is going to have to hire far more Foreign Service Operatives in order to once again become viable in American foreign policy.  

And, since I'm bad at writing conclusions, here's your Megan Fox of the day:

Lateral entry

Kings of War hosted a good point/counterpoint session between two people regarding the merits and drawbacks of "lateral entry" into the military--that is to say, joining the military from the outside world, and starting off at the rank of, say, captain or major.

It's not entirely without precedent, particularly in wartime. Note the extremely rapid advancement (by today's standards) of many officers in the US military upon the outbreak of World War Two. Additionally, Dr. David Betz of King's College in London uses T.E. Lawrence, who first joined the British Army in 1915 and attained the rank of lieutenant colonel by war's end, as an example of a successful lateral entry into the British military.

Indeed, Lawrence seems to have greatly benefited from not having experience in the British Army; he was free of the terrible preconcieved notions of warfare which plagued many British officers. Lawrence based his guerrilla campaign against the Turks on his in-depth reading of military history, rejecting the conventional military wisdom of the day.

However, we must acknowledge that Lawrence was truly an exceptional case. Lawrence's upbringing, education, and archaeological work prepared him for guerrilla war in Arabia. Although Lawrence lacked many "military" qualities, most notably the spit-and-polish look of a British officer (even when he wasn't dressed in Arab garb), he made up for his shabby appearance in other areas. Lawrence spent a great deal of time before the war excavating ruins in modern-day Jordan and Syria, becoming familiar with much of the territory in which he would later fight. During his travels, Lawrence became a decent shot with his pistol, learned to speak Arabic fluently, and developed such incredible stamina that he could cross the Nefud desert on camel alongside experienced Bedouin tribesmen. Such skills were hardly commonplace in British officer training programs. Indeed, many descriptions of cadet life at Sandhurst place much more emphasis on playing sports than learning languages.

Moreover, Lawrence' skills--language, physical conditioning, exceptional knowledge of military history--would be even more rare among civilians today. In fact, a recent study indicated that over 70% of Americans would be unfit to even enlist as a private in the first place, due to factors such as obesity, medical waivers, mental health, educational requirements, family readiness, or criminal records.

Even if one does find exceptional leaders who pass the basic requirements for entering the military, there's also a few more hurdles to overcome. These leaders must first be trained in their warrior tasks. For example, picking up a Bell 206 pilot off the street doesn't mean he can be thrown into an OH-58D as a fully-rated combat pilot. The basic warrior skills and tactical leadership take years to hone.

Last but not least, commanders at all levels need experience in mastering the ins-and-outs of military bureaucracy in order to be successful. They need to know the things that you won't read in a military history book: how to coordinate with the civilians at Range Control for training resources and ammunition, how to apply for on-post housing, military legal matters, developmental timelines, property book issues, office politics, additional duties, and last but not least, how to write in the Army writing style.

Indeed, the sheer magnitude of bureaucracy generated by a modern military organization would serve as a near-insurmountable goal for a commander, should he or she have a year or less experience. Lawrence could afford to not have as much bureaucratic experience--his Bedouin army had no payrolls, minimal property, no formations or duty rosters, and most importantly, few individuals capable of reading and filling out paperwork in the first place.

While some can transfer into the military from the outside world, let's face it, it's a rare individual that can do so in a rare situation.

Enough complaining, what do we actually do about suicides?

Update:  Fabius Maximus has more.

Seems my last post evoked quite a response.

There's no easy way to quell the Army-wide rise in suicides; the problem is simply larger than the Army's senior leadership.  Dar too much has been asked of too few for too long.  Yet, I do see two ways the Army's senior leadership can help commanders prevent suicides.  And they're not that difficult.

1.) A Permanent Counseling Packet.  With manning shortfalls, commanders are often forced to deal with a "shell game", swapping soldiers around from position to position, and transferring soldiers from overmanned units to undermanned ones.  This is only exacerbated by the fact that the Army has the dubious habit of transferring problem soldiers as opposed to nipping them in the bud (e.g.,  Major Nidal Hassan, the Fort Hood shooter).  Not to mention, first-term soldiers--one of the most at-risk groups--sometimes arrive at their first units with documented issues from Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training, none of which are passed on to their commanders.

When a soldier moves from one job to another, his or her problems transfer with them.  However, those problems are not always apparent to commanders.  As much as the Army preaches "engagement" with peers and subordinates, it takes time to truly know a soldier.  Moreover, a crafty soldier can easily conceal problems with drugs, alcohol, sexual misconduct, or criminal behavior.    

One of the most important tools in curbing dangerous behavior--and eliminating problem soldiers--is counseling paperwork (the Army's DA Form 4856).  However, the fine print on the counseling form stipulates that it should be destroyed upon reassignment.

Wouldn't it be useful to be aware of high-risk behavior, which often goes unnoticed as soldiers move about? In a digital Army, it should be easy enough for commanders to access previous counseling records, letters of reprimand, and evaluations.  

This isn't a revolutionary idea, either:  it was mentioned during the DoD's review of the Fort Hood shooting.

2.) Reduce the Separation Authority.  I think it's time to admit that we face a mounting discipline problem which will require years to fix.  The instances of misdemeanor activity among soldiers has nearly doubled over the past five years.  In almost a third of those cases, no disciplinary action was taken whatsoever.

Certainly, company commanders need to take action to either rehabilitate or get rid of problem troops.  But this is easier said than done.  For example, the Army has seen a precipitous decline in the number of soldiers chaptered out for obesity in recent years.

Don't think for a moment it's because we have fewer obese soldiers, either.

Part of the problem, in my humble opinion, lies with the fact that separation authority has been taken from battalion commanders and raised to the "special court-martial convening authority" (in many cases, a two-star general)--a full two levels of command. Why?  Because commanders were doing exactly what they should have been doing--kicking sub-par first-term soldiers out of the Army.  According to ALARACT message 110/2005:

WE ARE AN ARMY AT WAR AND INCREASING LEVELS OF ATTRITION OF FIRST-TERM ENLISTED SOLDIERS IN BOTH THE TRAINING BASE AND UNITS IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN. WE NEED YOUR CONCERTED EFFORT TO REVERSE THE RECENT NEGATIVE TREND IN FIRST-TERM ATTRITION. BY REDUCING ATTRITION ONE PERCENT, THE ARMY CAN SAVE UP TO 3,000 INITIAL-TERM SOLDIERS THAT'S 3,000 MORE SOLDIERS IN OUR FORMATIONS. EACH SOLDIER RETAINED REDUCES THE STRAIN ON RECRUITING COMMAND AND OUR RETENTION PROGRAM, WHICH MUST REPLACE EVERY SOLDIER WHO DEPARTS THE ARMY EARLY.

AS AN ADDITIONAL MEANS OF REDUCING ATTRITION, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY SEPARATION AUTHORITY FOR FIRST-TERM ENLISTED SOLDIERS IS ELEVATED FROM THE BATTALION COMMANDER TO THE SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY (SPCMCA) FOR THE FOLLOWING SEPARATION CATEGORIES PRESCRIBED BY AR 635-200: FAILURE TO MEET PROCUREMENT MEDICAL FITNESS STANDARDS (PARAGRAPH 5-11); PREGNANCY (CHAPTER 8); ALCOHOL OR OTHER DRUG ABUSE REHABILITATION FAILURE (CHAPTER 9); ENTRY LEVEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT (CHAPTER 11); UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE (CHAPTER 13); SELECTED CHANGES IN SERVICE OBLIGATIONS (CHAPTER 16, PARAGRAPHS 16-4 THRU 16-10); AND FAILURE TO MEET BODY FAT STANDARDS (CHAPTER 18). WITHHOLDING OF SEPARATION AUTHORITY FROM BATTALION COMMANDERS, AND ELEVATING IT TO SPCMCA LEVEL, IS DIRECTED BY HQDA PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 1-19E, AR 635-200. SEPARATION AUTHORITY FOR CHAPTERS 5, 10, 14, AND 15 REMAIN AT THE SPCMA LEVEL

With the clear link between substance abuse and suicide, why have we taken away the right of battalion commanders to chapter soldiers under the provisions of Chapter 9, ""Alcohol or Other Drug Abuse Rehabilitation Failure"?

If we acknowledge that the brigade combat team is the US Army's unit of action, why not at least give brigade commanders the authority to seperate problem soldiers from the service?  Or return the authority to battalion commanders?  Not having to go all the way to the two-star level would help company and battalion commanders quickly eliminate troublemakers.

If anything, policies such as this send a mixed signal throughout the ranks.  On one hand, commanders are told they're not doing enough to curb risky behavior; on the other hand, the authority to actually do something about it has been taken away from them.