Mar 23, 2016 · We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer.

In this paper, we provide a characterization of the revenue-optimal, ex-post IR, dynamic mechanism selling k items over k periods to a bidder whose values are ...

Jul 5, 2016 · In this paper, we provide a characterization of the revenue-optimal, ex-post IR, dynamic mechanism over k days and involving m bidders whose ...

Jul 21, 2016 · How should one sell an item to a buyer whose value for the item will only be realized next week? E.g. consider selling a flight to some ...

Nov 10, 2021 · Ex post participation constraints have also been studied for selling a single product. Krähmer and Strausz (2015) consider a problem where the ...

Jul 24, 2016 · In this paper, we provide a characterization of the revenue-optimal, ex-post IR, dy- namic mechanism selling k items over k periods to a bidder ...

Aug 13, 2018 · Bibliographic details on Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees.

We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation con- straints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions ...

We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation constraints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions.

The analysis here demonstrates that the agent can guarantee himself positive rents even in the absence of private information before the mechanism starts. For ...