Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1981

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Operational Forces

Making appropriate and timely changes within the Army's operational forces to adapt their capabilities to new situations was a prominent guidepost this fiscal year. As summed up by the Chief of Staff, General Meyer, at the end of the year, the cumulative effect sought through such changes was the creation of forces flexible enough to respond to crises worldwide; forces capable of sustained operations under the most severe conditions of the integrated battlefield, which would involve the orchestrated application of chemical, nuclear, electronic, and modern conventional weapons; forces equally capable in all lesser conflicts; and forces developed wisely to make the best use of the nation's resources. Toward this end, several important changes were made or set in motion during the year; future changes designed to produce the cumulative effect described by the Chief of Staff were proposed in the Army's Program Objective Memorandum for fiscal years 1983-1987, submitted to the Secretary of Defense in June.

To reduce the number of units reporting directly to the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Army last year had begun grouping active Army divisions stationed in the United States under three corps headquarters. Two corps, the III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, and the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had received divisions at that time. Shortages of personnel and funds had forced the Army to delay establishing the third. In May of this year, the Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to establish the additional headquarters by reorganizing the I Corps, which in March 1980 had been reduced to zero strength after many years of operations in Korea. The corps was to be reorganized at Fort Lewis, Washington, on 1 October 1981 under the command of Lt. Gen. John N. Brandenburg, with its headquarters company to be furnished by the active Army and its other headquarters elements by the reserve components. The corps command was to include Fort Lewis, the 9th Infantry Division stationed at Fort Lewis, and other units as determined by FORSCOM after the corps was fully operational. Once established, the I Corps was to conduct contingency plan-

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ning in support of the Eighth Army in Korea and the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) in Hawaii. It was also to serve as a late-deploying corps for NATO.

Among internal changes affecting active Army divisions was a complete restructuring of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). During REFORGER 76, the eighth annual strategic mobility exercise to test U.S. and NATO plans and procedures, this division had introduced the airmobile concept to the training series when it deployed to Europe, transporting its personnel by air and its equipment by sea. Deficiencies noted in the airborne unit during that exercise prompted an extensive study and developmental process by which the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) produced a new table of organization and equipment (J-Series) for the division. The new table was designed to improve and modernize the division's forward support, communications, transportation, artillery, and antiarmor and air defense capabilities and thus dramatically increase its fighting capability and sustainability. But FORSCOM became concerned that weight and size factors inherent in the table would adversely affect the division's ability to deploy and recommended that the table be tailored to eliminate the potential problem. The Department of the Army approved the recommended adjustments, and the division was formally reorganized under the modified table in September.

In connection with the High Technology Test Bed project involving the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, the Chief of Staff approved the fielding of an air cavalry attack brigade with the division for testing and concept evaluation. FORSCOM activated the brigade and two attack helicopter battalions in June. The evaluation of the brigade's performance will be used in determining whether the air cavalry concept could be applied to other divisions.

In the continuing effort to upgrade the armament and firepower of divisions, the Army made changes in the artillery of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Two of the division's direct support battalions exchanged their 105-mm. towed howitzers for 155-mm. towed howitzers and modernized ammunition. Its general support battalion, which had been a composite unit using both 155-mm. towed howitzers and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, became a standard divisional 8-inch self-propelled battalion. The division's remaining direct support battalion will receive 155-mm. towed howitzers next year, at which time the division artillery's weapons will total fifty-four 155-mm. howitzers and twelve 8-inch howitzers. In another upgrading step, the Army

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activated a combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalion for the 2d Division in September.

Near the end of this fiscal year, President Reagan imposed a $13-billion reduction on planned military spending over the next three years. As part of the effort by the services to accommodate the cut, the Army would reduce the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, to cadre status, or by about 8,000 spaces, in fiscal year 1983. This cut in spaces would, in effect, protect Army equipment modernization programs against reductions. According to plans, the division would be restored to its original strength in fiscal years 1986 and 1987.

Last year, the multiservice Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, as a joint headquarters under a Marine Corps commander, who was subordinate to the U.S. Readiness Command and its Army commander. Under the supervision of the Army commander, the RDF would prepare to respond to contingencies threatening American interests in Southwest Asia. Designated units of all four services could be placed under RDF command if needed. Considerable controversy over whether a force so constituted was workable led to a decision by the Secretary of Defense this year to make the RDF a separate unified command and to establish it in or near the Persian Gulf area. He originally scheduled the change to take place over the next three to five years, but in June he shortened the transition period to eighteen months.

In presenting his vision of the Army of the 1980s last year, the Chief of Staff, General Meyer, stressed that "developing cohesive units over time must be the central focus" of the Army's manpower efforts. Toward that end, the Army took steps this year to reduce personnel turbulence and its deleterious effect on unit stability by moving toward a unit replacement system instead of the existing individual replacement system. The change was essential, the Chief of Staff emphasized, if the Army was to achieve its readiness goals.

To test the unit system, the Army began forming special companies under Project COHORT (cohesion, operational readiness, and training). As planned, individuals would be recruited specifically for each of these companies and would train and serve together as a unit for the duration of their three-year enlistments; each company would retain the same commissioned and noncommissioned officers throughout the three years. After at least eighteen months in the United States, the COHORT companies would move overseas as replacement units and there serve the remainder of the period. By the close of this fiscal year, the Army

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had formed twenty COHORT companies, all of which were still in training. Their movement overseas was scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1983.

Taking a much broader approach to improving unit cohesion and stability as the COHORT project got under way, the Chief of Staff directed a special task force to produce a regimental system under which infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, and aviation battalions would be assigned to regiments at permanent home bases in the United States and thereafter would serve alternating tours of duty between the home bases and overseas stations. Such a system would resemble the British regimental system and, in effect, would be an extension of the Army's Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) introduced in 1957. The target date set for putting the system into operation was 1 October 1982.

Having some bearing on the prospective regimental rotation and replacement system was a new organizational standardization policy for similar MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) units placed in effect in February. Organizational standardization, which had previously been handled independently within each major command, must now be done on an Armywide basis and must conform to precise levels of the appropriate base TOES. Any modifications must have the approval of Headquarters, Department of the Army. The advantages of the new policy include the establishment of a single readiness standard for similar units, improved management of the procurement and distribution of resources, and the proper alignment of the units for rotation and replacement under the regimental system. Ground combat units were the first to be standardized under the new policy. The entire process should be completed by fiscal year 1985.

Affected by changes as a whole has been the Military Police Corps, whose structure during the past four years has been reduced by 1,995 spaces. Because of this substantial loss, the Army has had to make changes in organizational and operational concepts in order to maintain an effective military police force emphasizing the combat support role. With further space reductions scheduled for the corps during the next five fiscal years, the Army has programmed structural changes that will increase the number of combat support forces through the reorganization of specialized combat service support and general support units.

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The significant challenge to U.S. security posed by the USSR has been sustained in Europe by a decade of enlargement, reorganization, and vigorous modernization among Warsaw Pact forces. They have emerged from this decade of change with a more balanced structure for conventional warfare and with both conventional and nuclear firepower greatly increased.

Among NATO forces facing the Warsaw Pact contingents at the end of this fiscal year were 208,948 members of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Under the command of General Frederick J. Kroesen, these troops were assigned to two corps-each composed of two divisions and one armored cavalry regiment-to four separate brigades, and to a complement of combat support and combat service support organizations. As evaluated by General Kroesen before the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services in February, these units satisfactorily met readiness standards. They were adequately manned at current authorized levels; were well equipped, although not with all the products of modern technology; and were well trained. But he pointed out an important limitation. While his command could "initiate effective and successful combat operations to defend the NATO sectors assigned" to it, it was a "high risk force" not manned at wartime strength, lacking reserves and without sufficient support forces to guarantee its staying power. Beyond that, and as a matter of greatest concern, he said that "the inadequacies of troop housing, the shortage of family housing, the makeshift, unsatisfactory, unhealthy working conditions for large segments of the command, the exorbitant backlog of maintenance and repair projects all contribute to a cancerous drain on the morale and commitment of the force as a whole."

Reflecting General Kroesen's assessment, the Army continued to increase USAREUR manning levels in logistical elements this year. It allotted 1,500 more spaces for combat service support units and programmed the activation of fifty-five additional logistical units. The filling of pre-positioned materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) reached a new high with the addition of a fourth division set in the Northern Army Group. POMCUS eventually will consist of seven major packages: enough sets to eliminate current shortages in the combat support and combat service support required by forward deployed forces and six division sets.

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In 1978 USAREUR developed the concept of "US Army, Europe — An Army Deployed (UAD)," the objective of which is to have the command become a field army deployed at the highest possible level of combat readiness. The main features of the concept include relieving USAREUR of peacetime base support functions, placing troops in rehabilitated and modernized facilities, and acquiring additional facilities as needed, all to be achieved primarily through German host nation support. But while the Germans this year indicated a willingness to provide wartime host nation support, they showed little inclination to favor the features of UAD.

REFORGER 81, the thirteenth in the series of annual strategic mobility exercises, took place in September as part of the AUTUMN FORCE series of NATO multinational readiness exercises. Designed in part to provide experience in deploying reinforcements to Europe, the REFORGER exercise this year involved the movement of approximately 15,000 Army troops from the United States. Deployed units included elements of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), a brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), a brigade of the 7th Infantry Division, a battalion of the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion of the 38th Infantry Division (Indiana ARNG), a company of the 82d Airborne Division, six tactical operations center groups, and about thirty combat support and combat service support units of both the active Army and the reserve components. The bulk of these units deployed personnel only-these by air-and received POMCUS equipment in Germany. The remainder moved personnel by air and equipment by air and sea. On arriving in Europe, the units moved through four aerial ports of debarkation and two seaports of debarkation to exercise positions previously determined in connection with wartime plans.

Over 50,000 USAREUR troops participated with the forces deployed from the United States in three joint and combined exercises. Exercise CERTAIN ENCOUNTER was a field training exercise in the central and eastern parts of the Federal Republic of Germany involving more than 70,000 NATO personnel; Exercise CARRIAGE CLOCK was a command post exercise involving about 8,000 NATO personnel; and Exercise SCHARFE KLINGE was a field training exercise in the Black Forest involving over 20,000 NATO personnel. Altogether the forces of NATO nations participated in twenty-eight exercises.

As the first of the NATO exercises was getting under way, terrorists attempted on 15 September to assassinate General Kroesen while he, accompanied by Mrs. Kroesen, was en route

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by automobile to his headquarters in Heidelberg. The general and Mrs. Kroesen suffered minor cuts when an antitank grenade, fired from a nearby wooded hillside, exploded in the trunk of the automobile and shattered the rear window. The assassination attempt was the tenth attack made on American personnel and installations in West Germany in 1981. Suspected of making the attacks was the Red Army Faction, a left-wing terrorist group. It was also possible that the acts of terrorism involved a militant peace movement which had been spurred by reports of NATO plans to deploy a new generation of American-made nuclear weapons in western Europe.

In November, forces designated for the Rapid Deployment Force participated in a training exercise in Egypt. Called BRIGHT STAR, the exercise involved some 1,400 troops, including more than 900 men of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), a New Mexico Air National Guard A-7 attack aircraft unit, and members of the RDF headquarters. The RDF commander, Lt. Col. Paul X. Kelly of the U.S. Marine Corps, was in overall charge of the exercise. Deploying from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the home station of the 10lst Airborne Division, were the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry; part of one troop of the 17th Cavalry and of one company of the 101st Aviation Battalion; and a mix of support elements. Also deployed from Fort Campbell were UH60A Black Hawks, the Army's newest troop transport helicopter; AH-1S TOW Cobras; and OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopters. Forty-five flights by C-5A and C-141 transports were needed to move the troops and equipment to Egypt. Egyptian troops were integrated into American units for the exercise, which included air assaults, day and night attacks, and defensive operations.

At the Army's request, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to develop plans for acquisition of basing rights and for related construction in Southwest Asia for the years 1985 through 1987. Congress, in the meantime, allocated funds to support military construction planning in fiscal year 1982 for an RDF base at Ras Banas, on the Red Sea coast of lower Egypt. Such planning will further involve the Corps of Engineers in Middle East projects. In support of the RDF this year, the engineers established an area office in Oman. At the beginning of next fiscal year, they will establish an area office in Egypt to support the RDF base at Ras Banas, if construction funds are appropriated.

In another step taken this year to support Army, Air Force, and Marine elements of the RDF, equipment and supplies were loaded on ships for deployment to the Indian Ocean. These items

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included ammunition, wheeled and tracked vehicles, artillery, food, and medical supplies. Some of the vessels were of the lighter-aboard-ship (LASH) type, carrying loaded barges in their compartments. These barges could be pulled ashore by tugboats, which were also carried aboard the LASH ships.

The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (Camp David accords) signed in March 1979 called for a United Nations peacekeeping force to be established as a buffer in the eastern regions of the Sinai Peninsula during the final phase of the Israeli withdrawal from the peninsula in April 1982. But the U.N. Security Council, anticipating a Soviet veto of a United Nations force, indicated in May of this year that it could not provide the force. This situation led to trilateral negotiations among Egypt, Israel, and the United States, which resulted in a decision to establish a multinational force and observers (MFO) for the mission. As programmed in July, the U.S. contribution to the force will be 1,164 Army personnel constituting an infantry battalion task force and a logistical support element for the entire MFO. The United States would also provide thirty-six military personnel for duty on the MFO staff. By the end of this fiscal year, other nations agreeing to provide forces included Fiji and Colombia, each of which offered a 500-man light infantry battalion, and Uruguay, which consented to contribute a 70-member transportation company. Stemming from provisions of the earlier Camp David accords, the Army Corps of Engineers meanwhile established the Sinai Construction Management Office in preparation for building facilities for the peacekeeping force on the peninsula.

A highlight of the year for the entire nation was the release in January of the Americans held against their will in Iran since November 1979. In anticipation of the release of the hostages, each military service had worked closely with the others and with the Department of State to develop a reception plan by which its returning members could be given immediate medical care and administrative support and could be rapidly reunited with their families. Under the prepared plans, the U.S. Air Force Hospital located in Wiesbaden, Germany, handled the medical processing. From there, the returning Americans were flown to Stewart Air Field at Newburgh, New York, and then taken to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for a private reunion with immediate family members. Following that occasion, they were flown to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, for an official welcoming ceremony. Military members of the group were then released to their respective services and, after further processing, were placed on leave.

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In assessing the military situation in Korea near the beginning of this fiscal year, General John A. Wickham, Jr. -who since 1979 has been the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command; the Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea; and the Commander of the Eighth Army-stated his belief that "the forces we have in place here, plus those that are planned for reinforcement, are capable of defeating any North Korean attack." He acknowledged the substantial capabilities of the North Korean armed forces: they had three times the number of tanks possessed by the combined ROK-U.S. forces; twice as much artillery, most of which had longer range; twice the number of armored personnel carriers; twice as many aircraft; and four times the number of ships; and they had submarines, which the ROK Navy did not. Further, the North Koreans were continuing to build their armed forces in terms of quality and somewhat in size. He nevertheless estimated that his combined forces, augmented as planned, could win the battle, and without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. His forces, too, he pointed out, were being steadily improved.

For six years, ROK and U.S. Forces have participated in combined training under the TEAM SPIRIT series of exercises. This year's exercise was the most comprehensive yet staged. It involved more than 160,000 ROK (Republic of Korea) and U.S. troops, including nearly 30,000 U.S. participants deployed from outside Korea. Five divisions maneuvered against each other as units practiced defense against chemical warfare, sophisticated electronic jamming, live-fire air-to-ground and air-to-air maneuvers, and amphibious operations. As summed up by General Wickham, "TEAM SPIRIT is an essential training tool to improve our operations, logistics, interoperability of forces and interservice coordination. It helps assure that our forces would not have to respond to the real experience of combat on an ad hoc basis."

At the end of the year, the combined forces in Korea remained at a high state of readiness. The Republic of Korea was completing one program to raise the quality of its armed forces and had established a five-year plan for making further improvements. As the fiscal year ended, the Eighth Army numbered 25,808 members, about 15,000 of whom were in the 2d Infantry Division. Also in the division were some 2,100 South Korean troops, who had been provided under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, which dated from the early days of the Korean War. Besides the upgrading of artillery

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and the organization of the CEWI battalion in the division during the year, it was now scheduled to exchange its gunship helicopters for the newer S-model Cobras. The division was somewhat light in strength because of the loss of two battalions when a withdrawal of the entire division was begun during President Jimmy Carter's administration. The withdrawal was subsequently canceled, and President Reagan has announced that the U.S. Forces in Korea would be increased over the next two or three years.

With the objectives of improving plans for operations throughout the Pacific and increasing the capability of the Army to go to war in that region, the Department of the Army Pacific Operations-Logistics Conference convenes periodically, usually annually, to consider a wide range of operational and logistics issues. Courses of action are decided on the spot where possible, and specific tasks are assigned to commands for longer-term actions. This fiscal year, the Commander, U.S. Army Western Command, hosted the conference at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. It was cochaired by officials from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and was attended by representatives of all major Army commands in the Pacific, U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, and U.S. Army Forces Command.

The Army expanded its contacts with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) during the year. At the ninth in a series of logistics talks, Army representatives gave their Japanese counterparts the latest information regarding the Army's wartime standard support systems for foreign army forces and briefed them on rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. The Japanese valued these talks as a means of maintaining the prestige of the JGSDF vis-a-vis the U.S. Army and as a source of information useful in improving their defense force. In other contacts, mainly through U.S. Army, Japan, but also involving WESTCOM and FORSCOM, JGSDF members participated on a bilateral basis for the first time in an Army command post exercise, GOPHER BROKE X, for the defense of Japan. An Army - JGSDF Military History Conference held in July was another first. The principal participants were members of the Army's Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute and their counterparts from the faculty of the JGSDF Staff College. Covered at the conference were the experiences of the Japanese Army in fighting Soviet forces during the Nomonhan border incident in 1939 and the Manchurian campaign in 1945. In addition, the conferees developed the basis for future dialogue

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between the Army and the JGSDF on ground tactical issues of current importance in Northeast Asia.

For the first time in more than thirty years, an official U.S. defense delegation composed exclusively of military personnel, half of whom were Army members, traveled to China in May to visit schools and units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). The goals of the visit were to learn about the Chinese military education and training system; to exchange views on strategy, doctrine, and training; and to assess the potential value of future contacts. Visited schools included entry-level Army, Air Force, and Navy schools; an Air Force technical college; a military medical college; mid-level Army schools; and the PLA military academy. Units on the itinerary included an infantry division and elements of the East Sea Fleet. The visit was of particular significance because it provided U.S. military personnel with extensive access to leading members of the PLA. If sustained, such contacts may contribute to a better understanding of the requirements of a modern battlefield, especially as these relate to the Soviet threat.

The U.S. Army Forces Command, headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and commanded by General Robert M. Shoemaker, remained the largest of the Army's major commands. Its primary mission was to organize, equip, train, and maintain the combat readiness of assigned units and soldiers in the event of their mobilization and commitment. Included in its mission was the supervision of the training and readiness of the Army National Guard. In addition, General Shoemaker served as the component commander of all Army forces designated for deployment to the U.S. Readiness Command and, for planning purposes, as commander of any Army forces assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Command.

Assigned to FORSCOM were forces of the active Army and U.S. Army Reserve located in the continental United States (CONUS), Puerto Rico, Alaska, the Virgin Islands, and Panama. The year-end authorized strength of its active Army forces was 278,200; that of its U.S. Army Reserve forces was 256,815; and the Army National Guard forces supervised by FORSCOM numbered 424,400. The active Army forces included 3 armies, 3 corps, 10 divisions, 3 separate infantry brigades, 1 armored brigade, 1 air combat cavalry brigade, I armored cavalry regiment, and numerous separate combat, combat support, and combat

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service support units. The U.S. Army Reserve units included 19 U.S. Army Reserve commands, 28 general officer commands, 12 training divisions, 3 separate infantry brigades, and 2 maneuver area commands. The National Guard forces under supervision constituted 8 divisions, 22 separate brigades, 4 armored cavalry regiments, and 16 other major units.

Last year, the Army rated six of FORSCOM's ten active Army divisions as not being combat ready. As a result of advances in manning, equipping, and training, all ten divisions at the end of this year were pronounced "capable of deploying or executing their operational contingency missions." So, too, were FORSCOM's five separate brigades and its armored cavalry regiment.

FORSCOM's three armies-the First U.S. Army at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland; the Fifth U.S. Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; and the Sixth U.S. Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, California-commanded and trained assigned U.S. Army Reserve units and supervised the training and readiness of the Army National Guard, which it did through nine subordinate U.S. Army readiness and mobilization regions, each of which was commanded by an active Army general officer. These regions were further subdivided into twenty-eight readiness groups, each of which provided assistance to assigned reserve component units. This year, special programs to improve readiness in the reserve components were reinforced and new ones initiated with the aim of overcoming lagging strength levels among reserve component units. These actions along with an improved reserve component recruiting climate, brought about by Selective Service registration requirements and worsening economic conditions, produced a substantial increase in reserve component strength. This development was especially noteworthy considering that in the event of total mobilization, the reserve components were scheduled to provide some 53 percent of the Army's combat battalions, 65 percent of its deploying forces, and 60 percent of its logistical and combat service support units.

In addition to their normal duties, the commanders of the First U.S. Army and Fifth U.S. Army functioned in a special chain of command reaching from FORSCOM headquarters to the refugee processing centers established last year to handle the massive influx of Cubans that had begun in April 1980. At the end of last year, about 10,000 refugees remained at the center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, which had become the single facility for handling them. This year, the Cuban population at Fort Chaffee declined to around 500, but the illegal alien problem was exacerbated by the arrival of Haitians in southern Florida. Called

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upon to provide facilities for detaining the Haitians, the Army made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service a former air defense site, Krome North, in southern Florida and Fort Allen in Puerto Rico.

Concern over the disparity between U.S. and Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, with the Soviet Union having a decided edge, has led the Army to make concerted efforts to upgrade both its defensive and offensive capacities. As set by the Chief of Staff, "the Army's objective with respect to chemical warfare is to achieve both a credible retaliatory capability and a defensive posture which would deter enemy use of chemicals against U.S. Forces and our allies."

In raising the level of chemical defense, the Army has for obvious reasons given priority to equipping its forward combat forces and those forces scheduled to be deployed early from the United States in the event of a crisis. Chemical defense units activated this year included three NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) companies to support the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 9th Infantry Division, and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). These additions raised the number of NBC companies in the Army to twelve. Other units that were activated included a chemical (smoke) battalion, the first such battalion to be in the active force since 1973, and four smoke companies. Small NBC decontamination and reconnaissance teams were also activated to support separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments. In continuation of a program begun last year to establish NBC defense expertise in all types of units, a chemical officer (lieutenant) was added this year to the TOE of each field artillery battalion, as had already been done for infantry and armor battalions. The total number of chemical specialists authorized in the Army grew from 3,600 last year to 5,600 this year and is programmed to reach 9,800 by fiscal year 1987. The U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama, increased its enrollment this year to more than 3,000 students.

Besides such chemical defense improvements in force structure and training, the Army, as pointed out by the Chief of Staff, needed to acquire "adequate war reserve stocks of protective clothing and equipment and develop new items which will reduce the operational degradation associated with protective ensembles." Required items included more efficient decontamination devices, more sensitive alarms, more effective antidotes, and

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cooler and less cumbersome protective clothing. Fielded this year was an improved personal decontamination kit, the M258A1, which was simple to use and also provided the means for facial decontamination. About 100,000 of the new kits were issued to the forces in Europe and to early deploying forces in the United States. An in-process review of a new chemical agent alarm, the M8A1, that was more sensitive resulted in a recommendation that it be accepted as standard equipment. From another review came a recommendation, which the Army staff supported, that new chemical-agent-resistant coatings be adopted as a topcoat for mobile tactical equipment and other selected materiel. Plans call for the application of the coatings first to developmental items and next to fielded equipment.

Last year, the Surgeon General of the Army discontinued the use of TAB-a mixture of oxime, TMB4 atropine, and benactyzine-as the chemical nerve agent antidote in favor of a combination of atropine and oxime. TAB was dropped because it did not contain enough atropine and oxime and because it was itself incapacitating. This year, the TAB antidote was withdrawn from Army units, the fielding of a new atropine autoinjector was completed, and the fielding of the oxime component as a separate autoinjector was begun in Europe.

In an effort to improve protective clothing, the Army has developed a camouflaged overgarment designed with the same woodland pattern as the battle dress fatigue uniform. Plans call for its adoption next fiscal year. In search of even better protection, the Army funded an accelerated exploratory research project to develop new fibers and fabrics for a lightweight overgarment that would have reduced heat stress, longer shelf life, and longer wear life.

While it planned and funded the development of still other new items of defensive equipment, the Army judged its most serious chemical warfare deficiency to be in its ability to retaliate. The current stockpile of toxic chemical munitions, which was deteriorating through age and obsolescence, had to be modernized before it could be an effective deterrent to Soviet use of chemical weaponry. The Army believed that binary munitions for 155-mm. weapons were the best answer to the modernization requirement. These munitions form a lethal chemical agent from two nonlethal agents when they are combined, which occurs only after the artillery shell containing them has been fired. In addition to the safety afforded by binary munitions during production, storage, and movement, they would be, in the Army's judgment, the best weapon and agent mix for achieving a cred-

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ible retaliatory capability. By the end of the fiscal year, the Congress had appropriated funds for construction and plant processing equipment for a binary munitions production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. Construction was scheduled to start in October 1981.

Provisions of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1981 required the Army to remove all chemical munitions from Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, by 10 October 1981. The Army safely transferred these munitions to Tooele Army Depot, Utah, through a combination of air and ground movements between 12 and 28 August. A total of 888 Weteye bombs containing GB agent and three one-ton containers of bulk GB agent were relocated during the operation.

Among defoliants used in Vietnam during the war to kill vegetation and thus deprive enemy forces of concealment, the main one was a herbicide known as Agent Orange. In recent years, allegations that exposure to Agent Orange has resulted in a variety of maladies-cancer among them-have generated intense concern among veterans of the war. To date, these allegations have not been substantiated, but, as mandated by Congress, the Veterans Administration this year began an epidemiological study of the possible health effects of the herbicide. The study is designed to determine not only whether the agent can produce an adverse effect on human health but also whether a given veteran was actually exposed to the herbicide and, if so, to what degree. The Army will support the study by providing detailed records of herbicide spraying, troop movements, and unit membership during the war.

The Army periodically conducts formal system program reviews (SPR) as a means of bringing to the attention of senior management critical issues requiring special consideration. A chemical SPR was conducted last year under the chairmanship of the Vice Chief of Staff; in December of this year, a general officer in-process review, also chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, was conducted to ensure that the recommendations resulting from the SPR were being translated into adequate action. For management purposes, the in-process review included the tactical nuclear program with the chemical program. Major chemical issues were addressed including training and doctrinal developments, munitions demilitarization, medical aspects, and equipment. Tasks were assigned to appropriate commands and agencies on those matters that needed new or improved action.

At last year's chemical SPR, the Vice Chief of Staff directed the preparation of an Army chemical action plan that would be

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a comprehensive, time-phased blueprint for chemical warfare and for nuclear, biological, and chemical defense efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. The plan that was developed provided directions for near-term actions having a limited impact on resources that would rapidly improve readiness, such as training, and supplied guidance for mid- and long-range requirements that would have a significant impact on budgets, as in the case of stockpile modernization. The Chief of Staff approved the plan in June of this year.

Consideration of the tactical nuclear program at the combined nuclear and chemical in-process review conducted in December resulted in new directives for TRADOC and DARCOM. The Training and Doctrine Command was directed to accelerate its development of integrated battlefield models and scenarios to reflect current doctrine. DARCOM was assigned to review its nuclear survivability programs to ensure that automated data processing equipment and data storage devices could survive. Progress in accomplishing these tasks will be measured at the next in-process review, tentatively scheduled for October 1981.

In 1977 and 1978, public controversy over the Army's development of new nuclear weapons with "enhanced radiation" characteristics extended around the world and was particularly intense in Europe. Their development grew out of the Army's search for a nuclear means of stopping a massed tank or armored vehicle attack without unnecessary collateral damage and casualties to nonmilitary structures and personnel. Opponents of the new weapons believed that their reduced collateral damage feature increased the likelihood of their being used in battle, thus increasing the probability of nuclear warfare. In response to the opposition, President Carter deferred their production. This year, President Reagan announced that enhanced radiation warheads would be produced and assembled. They will be stockpiled only in U.S. territory, and any decision to deploy them will be made only after full consultation with the countries in which they would be based.

The Long Range Security Program (LRSP) is the European portion of the Army's worldwide Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Storage Site Upgrade Program. The upgrading of 102 Army storage sites in Europe under LRSP criteria involves the replacement, construction, or installation of security control centers fully protected against small arms fire as well as perimeter fencing, additional guard towers, igloo doors, security lighting, intrasite communications, and an intrusion detection system. The required upgrading is being achieved through a combination of

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U.S. prefinancing and NATO funding. The improvements prefinanced by the United States are well on the way to completion; but those to be funded by NATO are scarcely beyond the planning stage because national concerns of various members have repeatedly clogged the funding approval process of NATO.

In April, a Nuclear Weapons Accident Exercise (NUWAX-81) was conducted jointly by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) at the DOE's Nevada test site, in which the Army was the primary military player. The major objectives were to exercise and evaluate the Federal Emergency Management Agency's interface with DOD, the command and control of the joint DOD-DOE response forces, and the coordination of their technical and logistical support. These objectives were achieved, and the exercise also aroused greater awareness within federal and state governments of the need to plan and coordinate response procedures and to practice these procedures.

The presidential campaign of 1980 and inauguration of 1981 created extensive requirements for Army support in communications and protection. For communications support, Signal Corps personnel were placed in a staging area at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and, from there, were dispatched in small teams to install and maintain radio equipment, to order commercial telephone service, and to provide communications support required by U.S. Secret Service protective details. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel also assisted the U.S. Secret Service in over 1,250 bomb searches throughout the United States and in several foreign countries. Following the election of President Reagan, the Army assisted both the outgoing and incoming administrations to ensure a smooth transition of the government's leadership. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army was the Army's Coordinator for Transition. Army actions included the preparation of orientation materials for the Reagan DOD transition team, special debriefings and information for outgoing Army secretariat officials, and orientation materials and briefings for nominees to Army secretariat positions.

The Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic Program, better known as MAST, began its second decade of service shortly before the start of this fiscal year. During the year Louisville, Kentucky, became a MAST operating site when the 316th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) began providing emer-

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gency medical helicopter transport services in the Louisville area. With this addition, there was a total of twenty-nine operating MAST sites supported by thirty-one units representing both the active and reserve components of the Army and Air Force. During the year, these units flew 3,326 missions, evacuated 3,284 patients, and logged 7,638 hours. Since MAST operations began in 1970, Army aeromedical units and Air Force rescue and recovery units have flown more than 54,000 hours to complete some 24,000 missions. These missions included transporting a total of 25,000 patients plus medical personnel, blood, and human organs for transplant.

When civilian air traffic controllers of the Federal Aviation Administration went on strike and were later dismissed from their jobs by President Reagan, the military services were called upon to fill the void until the air traffic control system could be rebuilt. A total of 1,248 controllers from all services were provided for duty with the Federal Aviation Administration, of which 315 were from the U.S. Army Communications Command. It is expected that their support will be needed through June 1983.

There was little demand this year for military support in either domestic or foreign disaster relief. Of eighteen domestic disasters and emergencies declared by the President, only two required support, and this amounted to only minor logistical and troop support. In Italy, the strongest earthquake in sixty-five years occurred southeast of Rome on 23 November 1980, killing over 3,000 people, injuring over 5,000, and leaving more than 250,000 homeless. In response to requests from the Italian government, the Army provided 130 men, 4 UH-1 helicopters, 1,000 tents, and other equipment to assist in relief operations.

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