Chapter 3 - 1990 & 1991 DAHSUM

The primary goal in personnel management set by HQDA, as the 1980s ended and the 1990s began, was a smaller but high-quality force. This goal originated in the realization that the level of funding that had facilitated the military buildup of the Reagan administration was not available by the late 1980s. The expectation of reduced funding was already evident in Army personnel planning when international events underlined the trend. In particular, the weakening of the Warsaw Pact, represented most dramatically by German reunification, and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union removed the major threats that had justified large military expenditures for more than four decades.

Faced with the virtual certainty of declining congressional appropriations, the Department of the Army undertook a series of force structure and personnel staffing studies that addressed several possible draw down scenarios. General guidance for the Army draw d own was provided by the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), an instrument of the Department of Defense program management system. For the Army, the POM prescribed deep budget cuts that translated to a reduction of approximately 200,000 soldiers and civilians during six fiscal years beginning in 1992. If all implicit milestones were met, active Army strength would reach 580,000 by the end of FY 97. This POM draw down target, though subject to revision, represented an organizational blueprint for the Army as it entered the last decade of the twentieth century.

To prepare for the severe personnel cuts laid out by the POM, the Secretary of the Army initiated Project QUICKSILVER in late 1989. The QUICKSILVER report, delivered in February 1990, recommended meeting the POM personnel goal by reducing the Table of Organization (T/O) Army by 160,000 Army personnel between FY 89 and 97. QUICKSILVER proposed meeting the balance of the POM goal by reducing Army table of distribution and allowances (TDA) organizations by 40,000 military personnel and 57,000 civilian man-years. Missing from the QUICKSILVER report were detailed recommendations for institutional realignments and

consolidations of TDA organizations. To address these TDA details, HQDA convened Project VANGUARD in April 1990, and concept teams met at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to study possible TDA savings.

The VANGUARD Task Force compiled a list of thirty initiatives or recommendations for TDA savings for implementation beginning in FY 92. The concept teams estimated that the initiatives would save $191.96 million by the end of FY 92 and $1.5 billion by the end of FY 97. By November 1990 affected organizations had accepted twenty-three initiatives, which were grouped under the heading Band 1. Initiatives not yet concurred in were termed Band 2 proposals. On 21 November the Band 1 initiatives were submitted to the Select Committee (SELCOM) headed by the Army Under Secretary and the Vice Chief of Staff. The SELCOM approved Band 1, and the Under Secretary forwarded the list to the Defense Department Comptroller who, in turn, approved it as Program Budget Decision 945. Band 1 projected $106.8 million in savings by the end of FY 92 and $1.3 billion in cumulative savings by the end of FY 97.

The VANGUARD Band 2 initiatives were scheduled for submission to the SELCOM on 28 November, but DESERT SHIELD priorities prevented this second briefing. An even more dramatic event affected the personnel reduction process when Operation DESERT STORM began on 17 January 1991. Faced with the need to reinforce medical manpower in the wake of mobilization for Southwest Asia, the Secretary of the Army approved in March 1991 a blanket exception to the drawdown imperative in order to achieve continuous fill of 1,100 medical positions. Despite the onset of combat operations in Southwest Asia, implementation of VANGUARD Band 1 initiatives went forward.

The VANGUARD initiatives dealt with both uniformed and civilian personnel, but in different ways, because strength accounting was done differently in each group. For active component personnel, the Army monitored the number of soldiers in each rank and MOS monthly and could easily translate a dollar reduction into a personnel reduction. Army civilian personnel accounting, however, was based on a total expense unrelated to personnel strength. For example, the Army had no single personnel accounting system to determine whether a function was performed by ten GS-15 civilians or by one GS-15 and twenty or more lower-graded civilians. VANGUARD proposed adoption of a cost reduction approach to civilian personnel strength, Managing Civilians to Budget (MCB), a decentralized budgeting system then being tested by the Army. Implemented in CONUS in FY 91 and scheduled for implementation elsewhere the following fiscal year, MCB allowed MACOM commanders increased discretion to cut their operations and maintenance budgets. MCB allowed MACOMs to reduce expenses by either shifting the workloads of lower-graded employees to a smaller number of higher-

graded career employees, or to private contractors. MACOMs achieved short-term civilian strength reductions by releasing temporary employees by the end of FY 90 and expected longer- term reductions when career status employees retired.

Another aspect of civilian reductions came into play through the BRAC Act, the law that mandated the realignment or closure of more than a hundred Army installations between 1 January 1990 and 30 September 1995. During the first stage of BRAC, a model, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), was developed to translate civilian employee responses to BRAC into expenses/savings. According to COBRA, if a hundred civilian positions were moved elsewhere as part of a base consolidation, only thirty-two affected employees would agree to relocate. If that experience held true as BRAC proceeded, the Army would achieve a significant reduction in civilian personnel strength. Cost savings, however, would not appear quickly, since the Army would pay permanent change-of-station costs for those who relocated and either reduction-in-force (RIF) or terminal leave pay for those who did not relocate.

Army active component strength stood at 765,287 at the beginning of FY 90, and at 728,252 at the end of the same year, and at 706,160 by the end of FY 91. To achieve the goals of strength reduction and quality enhancement as well as acceleration of the FY 90 and 91 reduction, the Army addressed policies to two populations, personnel in uniform and recruit prospects. The VANGUARD Task Force had begun reducing personnel in uniform by identifying 12,750 military positions for conversion to civilian positions. To achieve a greater strength reduction, however, the Army confronted the major risk to morale posed by involuntary separations. To minimize involuntary separations, HQDA initiated the several programs discussed below during FY 90 and 91.

Enlisted force totaled 623,523 in FY 90, and the Army applied both voluntary and involuntary policies to reduce it. Among the involuntary policies was the bar to reenlistment, a measure whereby soldiers who lacked the requisite qualifications for reenlistment were placed on probation. These soldiers could opt for voluntary separation at any time during a six-month review period, or attempt to correct performance deficiencies. If a soldier had not made acceptable progress toward correcting an identified deficiency by the first six-month review, the soldier's commander had two options: initiate separation on grounds of unsatisfactory performance or misconduct, or grant a second six-month review period. If the soldier did not make acceptable progress during the second six-month review, the commander was required to initiate separation proceedings. Application

of bars to reenlistment, in addition to other separation routes (resignation, retirement, and court-martial) reduced enlisted strength to 602,542 by the end of FY 91.

The active component officer corps, which totaled 104,735 in FY 90 and included 89,599 commissioned officers and 15,136 warrant officers, was also subjected to voluntary and involuntary strength reduction policies. To minimize the negative impact of a possible RIF and to eliminate 2,600 officers by the end of FY 90, the Army convened the first Regular Army (RA) Probationary/Conditional Voluntary Indefinite (CVI) Selection Board in March 1990. The CVI board considered first lieutenants of year groups 1986 and 1987, if not already on a promotion list for captain and for retention on active duty. These two year groups were selected primarily because losses from them would not cause severe undersizing among company-grade officers, and affected officers were young enough to convert to civilian occupations. From the two-year groups, the CVI board reviewed the files of approximately 4,950 officers, who had a choice to apply for voluntary early separation during the process, and selected approximately 85 percent for retention. The 15 percent not retained totaled 750 officers. RIF proceedings were planned for both company- and field- grade officers, but manpower needs for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM forced their suspension. The cumulative result of officer accessions, separations, and operations in Southwest Asia, brought active component officer corps strength at the end of FY 91 to 103,611, or 88,665 commissioned officers and 14,946 warrant officers.

In an effort to minimize involuntary separations, HQDA planned to offer both officer and enlisted personnel a package of economic incentives. Two economic incentives were approved in FY 91-Voluntary Separation Incentives (VSI) and Special Separation Benefits (SSB). Officers and enlisted soldiers with more than six, but less than twenty years of service had the choice of either incentive. Different formulas determined the amount of each incentive. VSI provided for one payment a year equal to 2.5 percent of the separating member's final monthly basic pay multiplied by twelve and multiplied again by the member's years of active service. The once-a-year payment was to be made for twice the number of years of service. Partial years, measured in twelfths, also affected the annual payments. SSB provided a lump-sum payment upon separation equal to 15 percent of the separating member's final monthly basic pay multiplied by twelve and multiplied again by the member's years of active service. Partial years also affected SSB payments.

VSI and SSB also conveyed benefits in-kind and contained certain stipulations. Soldiers who elected VSI were eligible for all benefits, including preseparation counseling, job placement services, and transition health insurance, authorized for members who separated voluntarily.

Soldiers who elected SSB were eligible for benefits provided for members involuntarily separated: preseparation counseling, job placement services, transition health care, two-year commissary and exchange privileges, relocation assistance, extended use of military family housing and overseas schools, permissive temporary duty (TDY) for relocation transition, and priority affiliation with U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) units. Soldiers who elected either VSI or SSB agreed to serve in the Ready Reserve of any armed service, the length of service determined by the option selected. VSI obligated the soldier to serve in a reserve component for the duration of the payment period, while SSB carried a minimum three-year reserve obligation. The VSI/SSB incentives would be offered initially only to soldiers in overstrength career fields, pay grades, or year groups. HQDA planned to offer the incentives to more than 90,000 enlisted soldiers and 42,400 officers in FY 92 and expected 27,000 enlisted and 4,300 officers to accept them.

The companion policy to a reduction of active component strength was a down ward adjustment of recruiting goals, a policy that benefited from an already positive recruiting environment. Army recruiting personnel had achieved remarkable success in the 1980s and consistently met or exceeded their objectives in both numbers and quality of recruits. This success was due in large part to policies and attitudes following termination of the draft in 1973. The most significant among these were a compensation schedule closer to the private sector than at any time in half a century, and the most favorable image of military service among civilians in two decades. This positive recruiting environment enabled recruiters to obtain the most motivated soldiers since the early years of the Vietnam War.

Army recruiters achieved even greater success in securing high-quality personnel when draw down became an imperative. HQDA reduced the total active component enlisted recruiting objective from 119,901 in FY 89 to 87,000 for FY 90 but raised its quality objective. New accessions had to meet several standards — at least 95 percent of them had to have high school diplomas, at least 67 percent had to score in the upper half of the AFQT, and no more than 2 percent could score in the lowest AFQT category, Category IV. In FY 91 the Army reduced its active component enlisted recruiting objective to 78,241 and retained the same quality objectives.

The Army's new recruiting objectives produced exceptionally high quality enlisted new accessions in FY 90 and 91. In FY 90 the active component recruited 89,617 men and women, which represented 103 percent

of the objective. The quality of FY 90 enlisted personnel was the highest in more than a decade — 95.2 percent had high school diplomas; 66.9 percent scored in the top half (Category I through IIIA) of the AFQT; and only 1.8 percent scored in Category IV. In FY 91 the active component recruited its precise objective, 78,241 men and women. The quality of FY 91 enlisted new accessions was more impressive than the preceding year — 97.7 percent were high school graduates, while 74.5 percent scored in the top half of the AFQT, and only 0.9 percent scored in Category IV. Retention rates for enlisted personnel indicated a high level of satisfaction with uniformed service. In FY 90, 40.7 percent, who completed their initial term of service, chose to reenlist. The midcareer (personnel with at least one reenlistment but less than ten years of service) retention rate stood at 74.6 percent, and the career (personnel with more than ten years service) rate was 82.1 percent. In FY 91 the Army achieved an initial term enlisted retention rate of 41.4 percent, a midcareer rate of 72.0 percent, and a career rate of 70.6 percent. The career retention rate was abnormally high in FY 90 because the Army retained those career enlisted personnel who had intended not to reenlist for the manpower needs of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Total officer recruiting fell in FY 90 and 91. Commissioned officer accessions in FY 90 totaled 6,915 and warrant officer accessions numbered 1,350, while the respective figures for FY 91 were 5,484 and 1,150. The Army obtained most of its officers from five sources: The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) commissioned 3,797 officers in FY 90 and 3,125 in FY 91, while the figures for direct appointment commissions were 1,339 and 1,169. Other commissioning sources experienced modest increases. The United States Military Academy commissioned 928 and 977 officers in the two years; officer candidate schools produced 288 and 320; and the Health Services Command commissioned, through professional scholarship programs, 345 and 375 in the two fiscal years.

Army Nurse Corps (ANC) recruiting presented a special case during FY 90 and 91. Shortly after the Defense Department hiring freeze became effective on 11 January 1990, it became clear that the Army could not maintain an adequate pool of nurses and other medical personnel if their numbers were reduced in the same way as other Army personnel. Accordingly, medical specialists were exempted from draw down targets, and their numbers were based on projected mobilization needs. Despite competing against Civilian institutions with a higher compensation schedule and during a national shortage of nurses, ANC met most recruiting targets. Trained or aspiring nurses could take one of four routes to ANC commissions in FY 90 and 91. Persons having a nursing degree could receive direct commissions in either the active or reserve components through the Recruiting Command. In FY 90 the Recruiting Command exceeded its active compo-

nent goal of 385 by making enlistment contracts with 402 men and women. Also that year, the Recruiting Command exceeded its reserve component goal of 1,750 by enlisting 2,001 persons. In FY 91 the Recruiting Command fell short of its active component target of 440 by enlisting 393 persons but exceeded its reserve component goal of 1,100 by signing up 1,129 persons.

Persons who had not begun or were in the process of nurse's training could take one of three other routes to an ANC commission-ROTC, an enlisted commissioning program, or the new nurse candidate program. In FY 90 ROTC fell short of its mission of 185 new nurses with a total of 163 accessions. In FY 91 ROTC fell short of the 310 it sought with a total of 134 accessions. The Army Medical Department Enlisted Commissioning program (AMEDDECP), inaugurated in FY 90, made full scholarships at accredited institutions available to enlisted personnel in exchange for a specified period of Army service. Because AMEDDECP was an incentive program in which applicants could pace their progress within liberal time lines, annual progress reports were not applied as measures of effectiveness. In FY 90, 139 soldiers applied for the program, and the AMEDDECP board selected 87. In FY 91, 404 soldiers applied, and 100 were selected. In the last quarter of FY 91, the ANC initiated another incentive program, the Army Nurse Candidate Program, to civilians without nurse's training.

The active component in FY 90 was augmented by the Ready Reserve which consisted of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard. About 307,000 members of the USAR and 444,000 ARNG personnel were assigned to the Selected Reserve. The IRR contained 322,000 Army Reservists, and about 9,000 National Guardsmen were assigned to the Inactive National Guard. USAR recruiting in FY 90 and 91 fell slightly short of objectives. For FY 90 HQDA set a total USAR objective of 65,957 recruits, but accessions totaled 65,075, for an achievement rate of 98.6 percent. The next year the USAR objective was much lower — 52,500, but accessions reached only 50,847, an achievement rate of 96.9 percent. ARNG recruiting results varied even more. With an objective of 70,668 for FY 90, recruiters contracted 77,853 men and women, a rate of 110.2 percent. Results fell considerably the next year as recruiters contracted only 68,150 of an anticipated 86,370, for a rate of 78.9 percent. The USAR/ARNG recruiting effort, when balanced against other factors of accession and separation, actually increased the total Ready Reserve at the end of FY 91.

In FY 90 the Army employed 455,776 civilians in four categories: U.S. citizens, direct hire foreign nationals, indirect hire foreign nationals,

and those hired with nonappropriated funds (NAF). Direct hire refers to foreign nationals employed and fully compensated by the Army at any location, while indirect hire denotes foreign nationals employed at overseas bases and compensated under one of several host nation agreements. These agreements called for reimbursement, in varying proportions, of host nation and U.S. funds rather than from the Army budget exclusively. In FY 90 indirect hires totaled 53,370, or about one-eighth of the Army's civilian work force.

In January 1990 the Office of the Secretary of Defense imposed a total hiring freeze. The freeze contributed to a reduction of more than 18,000 Army civilians by October 1990. Some 12,000 individual exception requests were received from the field, and more than half were approved. The Army reduced its civilian (military funded) strength by 22,500 during FY 90 and an additional 14,900 in FY 91. Reductions resulted from CFE drawdowns, CONUS forces downsizing, Defense Management Review initiatives, base consolidations or closures, and extension of the FY 90 hiring freeze into FY 92 and beyond. Projected separations were minimized by advance planning, comprehensive outplacement assistance programs, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA), and attrition due to pre-RIF hiring freezes. Notable outplacement efforts were conducted in many MACOMs. These included outplacement assistance teams, job fairs, and workshops for managers, personnelists, and employees. As a result of these efforts, only 521 employees were actually separated in FY 91.

A total of 6,236 Army civilians retired in FY 90 and 7,289 the next year. The 48,947 civilian separations in FY 90 and 73,413 in FY 91 from all sources — resignations, transfers, reductions-in-force, removals, deaths, retirements, and displacements — enabled the Army to achieve progress ahead of schedule toward its personnel reduction goals. By the end of FY 91 the civilian work force had a net reduction of more than 20,000 from the previous year to 435,195.

During FY 90 the Army deployed the Army Civilian Personnel System ( ACPERS) to 110 installations worldwide and activated Headquarters, ACPERS, on 1 October 1990. The implementation of ACPERS brought the Army closer to a single civilian personnel system by replacing several other similar systems: the Standard Civilian Management Information System (SCIPMIS), the Corps of Engineers Management Information System (COEMIS-PA), the Civilian Personnel Accounting System (CPAS), and other MACOM systems used to account for appropriated funds, nonappropriated funds, and local and national civilian employees. ACPERS deployment was completed in FY 91, and the emphasis then shifted from bringing activities onto the system to assuring the accuracy of the data in the new system.

Leadership by Army civilians had been a special concern of HQDA since a 1985 study revealed deficiencies in this area. To address this and other personnel issues, the Civilian Personnel Modernization Project (CPMP) was created. A major result of this project was the development of a standardized, sequential, and progressive system, Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS), which provides leadership training and leader development. On 10 April 1990, the Chief of Staff, Army, approved the Army Civilian Leader Development Action Plan (CLDP), a cohesive plan to provide direction for leader development. Following the approval and implementation of CLDP, the officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and civilian leader development systems became parallel systems for America's Army. The centrally managed mandatory leader training courses are designed and delivered by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and the Army Management Staff College (AMSC). CAL delivers formal training at three career stages: intern, supervisor, and manager. The AMSC provides the Army's premier course for leader development.

In the Senior Executive Service (SES) newly appointed Executive s were required to attend the SES Orientation Conference (the civilian counterpart to the Brigadier General Orientation Conference) and the Force Integration for General Officers and Senior Executives Course. The Civilian Executive Resources Board approved one additional leadership program, the Leadership Development Program at the Center for Creative Leadership. This action achieved nearly parallel Executive training for newly appointed general officers and senior Executives. Senior Executive attendance at the CAPSTONE Program also was sought, but without success. The Army Center for Civilian Human Resource Management ( ACCHRM), established in FY 90, offered the Personnel Management for Executives course to 1,259 students, GS-13 through SES. During its early existence, ACTEDS primarily addressed career employees. The long-range ACTEDS plan, however, provided training opportunities for noncareer employees as well; to improve their skills, in FY 91 ACCHRM conducted 23 classes in civilian personnel administration and graduated 780 students.

To ensure access to ACTEDS by all Army civilian employees despite declining budgets, the ACTEDS Steering Committee, composed of civilian career program functional chiefs and the commanders of USAREUR and FORSCOM, reaffirmed their commitment in FY 91. The committee approved nine more ACTEDS plans, which brought the total number of plans to twenty-three by the end of FY 91. Tailored to each MACOM, the ACTEDS plan identifies formal training, operational assignments, and self-development opportunities to maximize declining resources. In FY 90, 1,580 interns, 2,478 supervisors, and 280 managers graduated from the first three ACTEDS training levels. Although SES training was not

fully operational, 41 executives received some advanced management training. AMSC graduated 177 persons. In FY 91, 1,674 interns, 3,097 supervisors, and 1,640 managers completed ACTEDS. AMSC graduated 243 civilians and 31 military personnel.

Concurrent with its concerted efforts to improve training and education for civilians since the mid-1980s, the Army studied improvement of civilian personnel accounting and management. The Civilian Personnel Modernization Project recommended integration of the Army civilian workforce into the Army Personnel Proponent System used for uniformed personnel. Acting on this recommendation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) directed establishment of the Civilian Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS) in 1987. CIPPS established comprehensive personnel management that included structure, accession of personnel, professional development, and personnel separations. Implementation of CIPPS occurred in three phases. In Phase I, accomplished during FY 88, the Army grouped civilian occupations by career field and identified proponents for each. In Phase II, FY 89-90, the CIPPS pilot program began and was critiqued at a series of in-progress reviews. In Phase III, started in FY 91, civilian proponent off ices were established or existing personnel offices reconfigured to accommodate civilian responsibilities, and AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Proponent System, was revised.

The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA), enacted 5 November 1990, brought about a significant change in the white-collar pay system. The legislation included several provisions that came out of the Army's Civilian Personnel Modernization Project. The FEPCA authorized advanced in-hire rates based on superior qualifications for all positions, as opposed to the previous limit of GS-11 and above. It allowed dual compensation restrictions waivers and the three Rs — recruiting bonus, relocation bonus, and retention allowance. All features would provide managers with pay flexibilities to improve recruitment and retention of high quality employees in diverse labor markets. Implementing Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations, and corresponding Army guidance, have been issued for most features of the act. The Army participated with the DOD and OPM in an effort to shape the design of those provisions.

Although there was a continuing decline in civilian employment during FY 90-91, progress was made in affirmative action. The percentage of women in grades GS-5 through SES level increased, and the percentage of minorities increased in every pay category except federal wage system and SES. A review of the representation of minorities and women in the SES and the feeder group positions of grades GS/GM-14 and -15 revealed a need to take more affirmative actions to develop and mentor Army employees effectively. Top Army management approved an action plan to

support initiatives at all command and management levels to improve significantly the quality and representation in these important career paths. The accession rate for employment of individuals with disabilities continued to increase in FY 91, but there was no change in the rate of employment of individuals with severe disabilities. The DOD has established a 2 percent employment goal for civilians with severe disabilities by 1 December 1992. The FY 91 program performance suggested that commanders should continue to work toward building a balanced team, despite declining resources.

By the beginning of FY 90, the Department of the Army active component had consisted of 10 percent or more female soldiers for 5 years. For FY 90 the Army set an active component recruiting objective of 12,600 women with NPS; recruiters had an achievement rate of 100.1 percent. For FY 91 the objective was lowered to 11,062, and recruiters accessioned exactly that number. These recruiting results brought the female end-strength percentages of the active component for FY 90 and 91 to 11.4 and 11.3. Female recruiting for the USAR and ARNG yielded results more variable and below expectations. For the USAR in FY 90, HQDA set an objective of 7,567 NPs females; recruiters attracted 8,357 women for an impressive achievement rate of 110.4 percent. The next year, however, working toward a higher objective of 8,210, recruiters attracted only 6,658 for a rate of 81.1 percent. For the ARNG in FY 90, HQDA set an objective of 7,000 NPs females; recruiters contracted only 4,855 women, or a rate of 69.4 percent. The next year, with an objective of 6,999, recruiters contracted only 3,765 women, a rate of 53.8 percent.

The number of females in the Army had risen steadily since abolition of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) in 1978, an event regarded as a major turning point in the integration of women in the Army. Assignment policies, however, had continued to concentrate all but a few female soldiers in combat support and combat service support MOSs. During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, 20 December 1989 through 31 January 1990, women in aviation, military police, transportation, and medical support Moss found themselves involved in combat in the streets of Panama City. This development attracted widespread attention in the public news media and in Congress, so the Army then reexamined its MOs policy for women.

The Army policy on female soldier assignment at the time of Operation JUST CAUSE excluded women from serving in units whose mission was direct combat. Direct combat units were defined as those whose missions were to find, fix, and destroy the enemy by direct fire, and maneuver while being exposed to enemy fire, with a high probability of

direct physical contact with the enemy and the substantial risk of capture. The policy was implemented through the Direct Combat Position Coding (DCPC) system, which evaluated each occupational specialty in terms of proximity to the battlefield according to AirLand Battle doctrine. While the exclusion policy limited high casualty risk for women, it neither insulated women from exposure to combat situations nor ensured that women would not become casualties.

In FY 90 and 91, 90 percent of military occupational skills (Moss) in the Army were open to women. Application of the exclusion policy and DCPC criteria in these two years resulted in the following rates of female soldier participation by occupational group-2 percent of all soldiers in the combat arms, 5 percent in combat support, and 10 percent in combat service support. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 8.6 percent of all soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf were women. The course of deployment and combat in Southwest Asia illustrated well the difficulties of limiting risk and preventing casualties among female soldiers. In each of the four major casualty categories-killed-in-action, nonbattle deaths, wounded-in-action, and nonbattle wounded-female soldiers accounted for 5 percent of Army totals. The experiences of female soldiers in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM did not cause HQDA to change its combat exclusion policy. The Defense Authorization Act for FY 92, however, established a presidential commission to study the assignment of women in the armed services and report to the president by November 1992.

During FY 90 and 91, the Army categorized its military personnel within six ethnic groups-white, black, Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska native, Asian/Pacific islander, and other-based on the volunteered responses of its soldiers. The "other" category consisted of those soldiers either who chose not to participate or who did not fit any of the other five categories. In FY 90 total active component ethnic group representation was as follows — white, 62.34 percent; black, 29.06 percent; Hispanic, 4.25 percent; American Indian/Alaska native, 0.42 percent; Asian/Pacific islander, 1.37 percent; and other, 2.57 percent. In FY 91 the percentages for the ethnic groups were white, 62.38 percent; black, 28.72 percent; Hispanic, 4.36 percent; American Indian/Alaska native, 0.43 percent; Asian/Pacific islander, 1.40 percent; and other, 2.71 percent.

The major implication of DESERT SHIELD for Army personnel was the introduction of new imperatives which, if diplomacy failed and the

National Command Authority (NCA) resorted to combat in Southwest Asia, would freeze or even reverse the measures planned to achieve a smaller but high quality Army. The Army leadership decided to prepare for the military option while diplomacy ran its course. This meant that Army personnel strength would, for the duration of the crisis, be largely determined by the possibility of combat rather than the desirability of economy.

On 22 August 1990, President Bush authorized activation of the Selected Reserve under provisions of the 200,000 call-up rule (Section 673b, Title 10, U.S. Code). This action allowed the Army to activate 25,000 members of the Selected Reserve for ninety days, with a presidential option for a ninety-day extension. It became necessary to increase the Army authorization to 80,000 soldiers on 19 November and to 115,000 on 1 December, and to extend the period of the call-up for an additional ninety days as of 13 November. Also in November, the Army suspended retirements and resignations. On 19 January 1991, the president exercised his authority to order partial national mobilization of 1 million members of the reserve components for all armed services for as long as two years.

The Army contribution to the mobilization for Southwest Asia totaled 145,071 USAR and ARNG troops. Most of these soldiers were mobilized with one of 391 ARNG or 626 USAR units called to active duty; however, 20,540 served individually, and 5,990 of this number volunteered. Of the total reserve component mobilization, 36,800 ARNG troops and 38,733 USAR soldiers were deployed to Southwest Asia. Army support to military operations in Southwest Asia also included civilian specialists. In FY 90 the Army deployed 195 civilians from the AMC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE). In FY 91 the Army civilian contingent deployed to Southwest Asia grew to more than 3,000. All of these individuals lived and worked under the same conditions as soldiers and were equipped and trained for wartime contingencies.

A welcome reflection of improved personnel quality in the Army was the general reduction of disciplinary infractions during FY 90 and 91. In nine of ten discipline indicators, the recent trend of falling rates continued. Based on the rate per 1,000, the rate for crimes of violence fell only slightly, from 2.45 in FY 90 to 2.44 in FY 91. The rate for crimes against property dropped from 7.30 to 6.41. Marijuana possession or use fell from 3.63 to 2.34, and other drug offenses dropped from 3.08 to 2.18. The rate of courts-martial moved downward from 4.34 to 3.53, and for nonjudicial punishments from 96.04 to 78.05. Separations other than honorable was the only indicator that broke the pattern of consistent fall

from the previous fiscal year. The FY 89 rate of 5.93 increased to 6.13 in FY 90, but then declined to 4.47 in FY 91. The absent-without-leave rate fell from 8.50 to 5.50, while desertion dropped from 4.80 to 3.50. Finally, the rate for driving under the influence of alcohol or other impairment fell from 13.50 to 10.69.

Army personnel experienced dramatic institutional developments during FY 90 and 91. New programs were implemented to enhance the management and quality of both the uniformed and the civilian populations. ACPERS, CIPPS, and ACTEDS, as well as the continuation of affirmative action, promised to shape the Total Army into a more efficient executor of national defense policy. Affecting, if not driving, these developments were the Army imperatives of personnel drawdown and quality enhancement. The continuation of drawdown planning during a period of mobilization differed from previous American military experience wherein military mobilization ended immediate consideration for economy in the nation's armed forces. As the mobilization for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM continued, so too did planning for personnel drawdown and quality enhancement. As combat in Southwest Asia concluded, the prewar spectrum of personnel initiatives resumed.

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