Last updated 30 October 2003
Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1993
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Reserve Forces
In FY 1993 the Army National Guard's (ARNG) major combat force structure included 8 divisions (3 infantry, 3 mechanized infantry,1 light infantry, and 1 armored); 19 separate brigades (7 infantry, 6 mechanized infantry, 5 armored, and 1 light infantry); 2 armored cavalry regiments;2 special forces groups; 1 infantry group; 1 aviation brigade headquarters; 3 air defense artillery brigade headquarters; and 1 corps and 18 field artillery brigade headquarters. The ARNG provided a number of support units, such as headquarters for 3 medical brigades, 4 engineer brigades,3 military police brigades, 1 transportation brigade, 1 military intelligence brigade, and 1 chemical brigade. The National Guard also provided headquarters for both a signal and a support command.
During the fiscal year the ARNG responded to calls for increased unit readiness and created a strategy to deal with problem organizations. The Guard identified units that were chronically unable to meet the minimum personnel readiness standards and made these units primary candidates for force structure reductions. More than 72 Unit Status Reporting (USR) units were added to the ARNG force structure, but at the same time another 106 units were removed. With all Army components downsizing, the ARNG expected to lose approximately 58,000 positions to meet the target end strength established by the Army, but Congress intervened and reduced the ARNG force structure by only approximately 19,000 positions. The most significant force structure reorganizations resulted in the loss of two ARNG divisions. The 26th Infantry Division (Massachusetts ARNG) became the 26th Infantry Brigade, and the 50th Armored Division (New Jersey ARNG) became the 50th Brigade, 42d Infantry Division. The Guard used elements from the 26th Division that were not needed in the separate brigade to bring the 42d Infantry Division up to strength. Other Army-wide modernization and reorganizations, such as the Engineer and Aviation restructure initiatives and Medical Force 2000, also continued to influence and shape units to help correlate ARNG force structure with active Army organization during the fiscal year.
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Command and control of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) was a long-standing problem until the creation of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) in 1990. USARC was designed to streamline the command of the Army Reserve by assuming many of the responsibilities previously exercised by FORSCOM's numbered continental armies. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), commanded the USARC, which was a subordinate command of Headquarters, FORSCOM. The CAR maintained a position on the HQDA staff as the CSA's principal adviser on the USAR but also served as the Deputy Commanding General, FORSCOM. The Army provisionally organized the USARC in October 1990 and gave the command a two-year test period, which it successfully completed during FY 1993. An independent commission chartered in December 1991 to examine the USARC issued its final report in October 1992, which the Secretary of the Army largely approved. He deferred making the USARC a MACOM and disapproved the proposal to make its commander a lieutenant general. Also during the year, the USARC headquarters moved from Fort McPherson, Georgia, to leased facilities near Atlanta's international airport.
Army-wide downsizing affected USAR strength and units during FY 1993. The Army inactivated 160 USAR units during the fiscal year, while those not inactivated were gradually scheduled to reorganize under modernized and more deployable Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). More than 700 unit reorganizations were programmed to convert the USAR force structure to the L-series TOEs. Even amid budget cutbacks, FY 1993 force structure changes resulted in the activation of more than sixty units to meet new mission requirements that were identified and assigned to the USAR to support the Total Army, and another 200 units were reorganized or converted to fill the need for specialized organizations. When the Secretary of Defense announced the 1993 plan for inactivating 830 reserve component units, there were six field artillery battalions on the list, but the inactivations were postponed for all but one of these battalions. The 5th Battalion, 28th Field Artillery (8-inch, self-propelled), based at Cincinnati, Ohio, inactivated in September because the battalion's personnel and equipment were needed to convert the 3d Battalion, 92d Field Artillery (8-inch, self-propelled), to its new 24-gun configuration. To facilitate the transition, the 3d Battalion, 92d Field Artillery, which was headquartered in Akron, Ohio, relocated two firing batteries to Cincinnati.
Strength and Personnel Management
In FY 1993 the Army National Guard included 358,149 soldiers, plus an additional 27,084 military technicians and 24,686 active Guard/Reserve personnel. The ARNG's programmed end strength of
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422,725 consisted of 46,500 commissioned and warrant officers and 376,225 enlisted personnel. The Guard's actual end strength of 409,919, 97 percent of the objective, included 46,656 officers and 363,263 enlisted personnel. A lower number of enlisted accessions and an unexpected increase in enlisted losses accounted for the shortfall. ARNG planners sought to obtain 68,177 enlistments but by the end of the fiscal year had reached only 67,366, or 98.8 percent of the programmed accession objective. Enlisted losses exceeded anticipated projections by more than 13,000. The FY 1993 attrition rate of 21 percent created an enlisted loss of 83,700. Announced force structure reductions appeared to create much uncertainty within the eligible ranks. Many soldiers left the ARNG because they perceived a significant curtailment in their career and advancement opportunities. Officer end strength, although 156 higher than projected, still reflected a decrease of 968 positions from the previous fiscal year.
The percentage of minorities in the ARNG declined during the fiscal year, with 101,575 minorities forming 24.8 percent of the total strength. Continuing a trend that started in FY 1988, total African-American strength continued to decline. There were 64,379 African-American personnel, or 15.7 percent of assigned strength, in the ARNG in FY 1993- 2,203 personnel fewer than the previous fiscal year. The African-American guardsmen included 2,964 officers, who composed 6.4 percent of the officer strength, and 61,415 enlisted personnel, who composed 16.9 percent of the enlisted strength.
The percentage of females in the ARNG remained fairly stable during the fiscal year. The 31,386 females in the ARNG in FY 1993 comprised 7.7 percent of the ARNG's assigned end strength. There were 3,694 female officers, representing 7.9 percent of assigned end strength, and 27,692 enlisted personnel, representing 7.6 percent of assigned end strength.
The ARNG's Full-Time Support Program employs full-time personnel to support Guard programs and units. There were 24,686 active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel and 27,084 military technicians (MT) in the Full-time Support Program in FY 1993. During the fiscal year these full-time support positions were authorized at 66.5 percent of the workload-based requirements. Congress decreased authorizations for AGR soldiers by 1,513 between FY 1991 and FY 1993 and in December 1991 established a hiring freeze, which continued through FY 1993, to meet the authorized levels. Many reduction programs, such as early retirement and other separation incentives, lacked appropriate funding, and the National Guard held a number of AGR job fairs to help cross-level the force by voluntarily transferring personnel from states with overstrengths to states that were below their AGR authorizations. The job fairs successfully attracted
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230 personnel to move and helped downsize the force by the end of FY 1993. While the MT force decreased by 855 authorizations during the fiscal year, requirements for military technicians increased. This shortfall affected ARNG maintenance efforts already strained by the growing number of equipment modernization programs. In FY 1993 the number of MT authorizations as a percentage of requirements was 60.6 percent, and the number is expected to continue to decline during FY 1994.
U.S. Army Reserve AGR end strength in FY 1993 numbered 12,637 positions, down from 13,146 positions in FY 1992. The decline resulted from congressionally mandated reductions in USAR AGR authorizations. In determining which positions to eliminate, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), solicited Army agencies and MACOMs utilizing USAR AGRs for input and established a program to prioritize all USAR AGR positions. The OCAR program outlined the reductions and eliminated the authorizations-but not the position requirements-within various commands. There were 7,339 USAR AGR military techncians and 3,633 Department of the Army civilians (DAC) authorized by the end of FY 1993. Projections for FY 1994 predict a downward trend toward 7,159 authorized military technician positions and no predicted change to authorized DAC positions.
In FY 1993 the USAR end strength for the Selected Reserve (regularly drilled USAR members serving in troop program units and as Individual Mobilization Augmentees) was 279,615 personnel; for the Individual Ready Reserve (trained USAR personnel not assigned to troop program units but available to serve as reinforcements for units), 279,600 personnel; and for the Retired Reserve (primarily personnel receiving retirement pay after service with the armed forces), 599,965 personnel.
In FY 1993 the Army expanded the BOLD SHIFT program, instituted in FY 1992 to address reserve component pre- and post-mobilization training problems at the level of the individual soldier, the leader, and the unit. The BOLD SHIFT initiatives involved streamlining U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and FORSCOM command schemes. Under BOLD SHIFT, active Army units develop associations with Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units and assist with reserve component training and evaluations. Reserve component soldiers are evaluated using the active Army's Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE). The focus of maneuver unit training is on gunnery and crew/platoon proficiency. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units focus on proficiency at the company level. The Army plans to use additional annual training and active duty training time for reserve component leaders to improve leadership and leader develop-
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ment initiatives. The Army also plans to fund full-time administrative personnel in high-priority USAR and ARNG units to help these units remain ready for deployments. In FY 1993 the Army expanded the BOLD SHIFT program to include all Roundout (RO), Roundup (RU), and CFP units. The ORE initiative also covered selected active component units. Although the Army wanted to institutionalize BOLD SHIFT methodologies for all reserve component units, scarce resources required that priorities be set for some initiatives for Enhanced Brigade and CFP units. The Army continued redistributing existing resources to fund BOLD SHIFT during the fiscal year. Projected BOLD SHIFT requirements for the FY 1994-99 POM were funded at 63 percent in FY 1993.
Under guidance contained in the FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army must implement eighteen sections of Title XI, Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA) of 1992. During FY 1993 the Title XI Task Force fully or partially implemented twelve of the sections and developed programs for the remaining six. The task force will continue during the next fiscal year to develop plans to fund new and additional programs for the FY 1996-2001 POM. Provisions of the law specifically addressing the ARNG were written prior to the formation of the CFP and completion of the Bottom-Up Review and the Defense Planning Guidance. During the fiscal year the Army leadership applied the policy provisions of the law equally to the USAR and the ARNG and sought to prioritize resources for the early-deploying CFP units and for Enhanced Brigades.
Title XI of the FY 1993 DOD Authorization Act mandated training and readiness enhancements for all ARNG combat units. The Army planned to meet this requirement through BOLD SHIFT initiatives, more rigorous inspections and assessments, and expanded training of RO/RU units. The Army designated the ORE to meet the requirements of Title XI, Section 1122 (Inspections), for priority units in the CFP and the Enhanced Brigades. Closely linked to BOLD SHIFT and the Title XI training initiatives was FORSCOM's Total Army Training Study Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE). During the fiscal year FORSCOM planned to field the GFRE with six Regional Training Brigades and fifty-one Regional Training Battalions to conduct advanced tactical training under field conditions (lanes training) for ARNG and USAR units beginning in FY 1995. The plans call for USAR Divisions (Exercise) to supplement the GFRE for exercises supported by simulations and for selected CS and CSS lanes training events. The Army programmed full implementation through FY 1997.
The Army National Guard's Project STANDARD BEARER is part of the National Guard Bureau's deployability enhancement program. The ARNG established Project STANDARD BEARER in November 1991 to support the Army's BOLD SHIFT Program. STANDARD BEARER aims to maintain C-1
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(category 1, the highest standard) in personnel readiness for CFP and Enhanced Brigade units through increased recruiting and retention resources and implementation of a documented overstrength policy. In FY 1993 the deployability rate for CFP units in categories one through four was 97 percent, and the mission capability of these units continues to improve.
During the fiscal year the Operational Unit Program made the fifty-five earliest-deploying ARNG units in the CFP available for deployment in a volunteer federal status within seven days of an alert. This program, which is not contingent upon the President's Selected Reserve Callup authority, provides fully mission-capable units for short-notice contingency operations. The ARNG Overstructure Program deliberately authorized an overstrength of 15 to 20 percent in critical MOSs and skill levels to maintain 95 percent directed military overstrength in Enhanced Brigade and CFP units. During the fiscal year the Army adjusted authorization documents to add overstructure paragraphs to unit MTOEs through FY 1994.
STANDARD BEARER initiatives for later-deploying ARNG units include the Humanitarian Support Unit Program. The Guard developed this program in response to the Army Chief of Staff's request that as the active Army downsizes, the ARNG assume missions traditionally performed by active forces, including short-notice worldwide humanitarian missions. In FY 1993 the ARNG selected nineteen units from eighteen states for the Humanitarian Support Unit Program. These units were selected to support Humanitarian Support Unit Program missions in a volunteer status, within seventy-two hours of notification, for up to forty-five days. Units nominated but not selected are expected to be available for follow-on rotations if required.
In the Operational Integration Program (OIP), based on the Canadian Legion Model, ARNG volunteers can serve in an all-component Multinational Force and Observers Sinai Pilot Initiative. In FY 1993 OIP plans called for guardsmen from Maryland and Virginia's 29th Infantry Division (Light) to begin volunteering for an extended active duty tour with an active Army infantry battalion task force and then deploy to the Sinai peninsula. This task force is expected to form during the spring and summer of 1994 and continue training until it deploys to the Sinai in January 1995. ARNG volunteers are expected to form 75 percent of the battalion task force, including half of the leadership positions, and to serve a six-month active duty tour in the Sinai.
The Army introduced the Robust Test Unit Program to determine the effects of increased full-time manning and additional training man-days on readiness in selected later-deploying test units. In FY 1993, in conjunction with BOLD SHIFT, a Wisconsin ARNG armor battalion and a North Carolina ARNG mechanized battalion were selected to participate
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in the $1.5 million test of the concept. Preliminary data indicated promising results and no significant problems. The test is scheduled to conclude in May 1994, and OREs are expected to be administered to all units for comparison with the test units' ORE results from May 1993.
In FY 1993 the U.S. Army Reserve introduced the Priority Reserve Initiatives in Mobilization Enhancement (PRIME), also called USAR PRIME or Project PRIME, a deployability enhancement program. The PRIME is primarily used to provide mission-capable troop program units (TPU) and individual volunteers for short-notice Army contingencies. OCAR manages PRIME enhancements through the U.S. Army Reserve Command for CFP units and through U.S. Army Special Operations Command for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. PRIME provides CONUS-wide focus and centralized management to fix high-priority TPUs.
To attain the unit readiness levels required for contingency operations, the Army established a four-tier resourcing system. Troop program units designated for early mobilization and deployment had priority resourcing. Tier 1 units were resourced at 100 percent of authorized equipment and full-time support and manned at 115 percent strength to ensure full directed military overstrength. PRIME's focus includes CFP, ARSOF, CA, and PSYOP units. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Terminal Transport, Deployment Control, and Railway Service units and Port Security Detachments were also intensively managed to ensure that they could support contingency deployments.
During FY 1993 the readiness levels of the TPUs managed by PRIME increased by 20 percent, and this trend is expected to continue into FY 1994. In addition, during the fiscal year the Army enhanced flexibility in manning fully mission-capable units by targeting Moss in the CFP for filling by the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) developed a program for the IRR to identify members as replacements or fillers to support contingency operations.
Downsizing in the active Army continued to benefit ARNG equipment modernization in FY 1993. Radios, maintenance kits, and tanks we re among the excess items that were no longer needed to supply the active component and could be transferred to Guard units. Guard roundup and roundout brigades continued to modernize and improve readiness with M1A1 Abrams tanks and HMMWVs. Following the Army's modernization schedule, ARNG aviation units received the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache helicopters, and some mechanized infantry units acquired the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Additional purchases under the congression-
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al Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) eased equipment shortages in generators, forklifts, radios, night vision devices, and other items that affected ARNG operations and training. DPP helped the ARNG modernize faster than it would have had it depended solely on the Army's regular budget and procurement system. Modern equipment was in some cases lent back to the active component. The ARNG loaned equipment to the 10th Mountain Division for the Somalia humanitarian relief effort during Operation RESTORE HOPE. By the end of the fiscal year, 90 percent of the equipment loaned to the 10th Division had been returned to the ARNG.
In FY 1993 USAR equipment modernization included the 9-mm. pistol, the palletized loading system, the deployable medical systems (DEPMEDS) program, night vision devices, tug boats, wheeled vehicles, and SINCGARS. The USAR also received older Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and UH-60 and AH-64 helicopters. USAR mechanized forces were equipped with the M113A2 and M113A3 armored personnel carriers (APC) to operate as infantry and engineer squad carriers, medical evacuation carriers, and maintenance support vehicles and for other missions. In FY 1993 the USAR continued to convert M113A2 APCs to M113A3s to upgrade its assets. Congress directed the upgrades and modifications to increase the survivability of the APC. Upgrades included armored external fuel tanks, an upgraded engine and transmission to accommodate the added weight, and fixing points for bolt-on armor. Even with the upgrades, the M113A3 has limited mobility, firepower, and armor protection compared to the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which is programmed to replace the APCs in mechanized infantry units as soon as possible.
USAR modernization efforts in FY 1993 included reorganizing field artillery battalions equipped with 8-inch self-propelled howitzers to increase the number of howitzers in each of the battalion's three firing batteries from four to eight. With eight howitzers in each battery, the new 3X8 organization increases the number of howitzers from twelve to twenty-four in each battalion. During the fiscal year the 8th Battalion, 40th Armor, received fifty-eight M1 Abrams tanks to replace its M60A3 main battle tanks. The 84th Division (Training) also received twenty Abrams tanks as part of its modernization. Other equipment upgrades included replacing three CH-47C helicopters with new CH-47D models; fielding new chemical agent monitors to five chemical decontamination units; and continuing delivery of six LCU 2000 utility landing craft to two heavy boat companies. The Army also made a commitment to modernize the 8th Battalion, 229th Aviation, an attack helicopter battalion, with eighteen AH-1F Cobras and to reequip the unit with eighteen AH-64 Apache helicopters sometime during FY 1994.
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Last updated 30 October 2003
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