Police Access to

Communications
Data
How UK Police Forces requested access to communications
data over 700,000 times in 3 years.
A Big Brother Watch Report
June 2015

Contents

Executive Summary.................................................................................................................... 2
Key Findings ............................................................................................................................... 4
Table 1: Highest number of Requests for Communications Data ............................................. 5
Table 2: Highest number of Refusals ......................................................................................... 5
Table 3: Lowest number of Refusals .......................................................................................... 6
What is Communications Data?............................................................................................... 10
Table 4: Requests, Rejections and Approvals Police Forces .................................................... 16
Appendix 1: Methodology ....................................................................................................... 20
Appendix 2: Original Freedom of Information Request .......................................................... 20
About Big Brother Watch ......................................................................................................... 21

Executive Summary
Communications Data details the who, where and when of any text, email, phone call or
web search. Law enforcement regularly state that Communications Data have become an
essential tool in criminal investigations. The intrusive nature of Communications Data
however has ensured that it is now a highly contentious political, legal and policing issue in
the UK and around the world.
Police Access to Communications Data is part of Big Brother Watchs ongoing call for greater
transparency for the use of our personal data. Focusing on the use of Communications Data
by police forces, this report shows that between 2012 and 2014, 733,237 requests for
Communications Data were made. The equivalent of 670 requests a day or 28 requests
every hour.
Despite persistent claims that the polices access to Communications Data is diminishing,
this report shows that the police are continuing to access vast amounts of data on citizens.
Indeed, this report shows that on average 96% of all requests are internally approved with
an average of only 4% being refused. Claims of a 25% capability gap - the gap between the
amount of Communications Data created and the ability for the police to access it - are
therefore clearly overstated.
It is clear from the reports findings that disparity exists amongst police forces on what is
considered necessary and proportionate for a request for Communications Data and why a
refusal for access is given. If law enforcement persists with calls for greater access, internal
procedures will need to be clarified, transparency about the process published and
independent judicial approval brought in as part of the authorisation process.
As a result of these findings, Big Brother Watch remain concerned about the excessive
access and use of Communications Data. We propose a number of recommendations which
would increase transparency, encourage better safeguards and create a clearer application
process.
Recommendations:
1. Police forces should be required to publish transparency reports detailing how
requests are approved, the number of individuals affected and the type of crime
Communications Data is used for.
2. Proof that data of more than 6 months old is regularly used in order to establish a
proportionate approach to data retention.
3. A clear, standardised procedure for the access of Communications Data, which all
police forces, telecommunications and internet service providers must adhere to.

4. Judicial approval should be the final step in any request for Communications Data.
5. New definitions for Communications Data should be adopted.
Should the government adopt these recommendations, the general public will be better
informed about how their communications can be obtained, analysed and used. It will also
provide the much needed clarity on how police and other organisations work with the
technology companies to access this information.

Key Findings
All figures are for 1st January 2012-31st December 2014 unless otherwise stated. A table of all
police forces and a breakdown of their requests, rejections and approvals is available on
p.15.

There have been 733,237 applications to access Communications Data by police

forces. This is equivalent to:
o
o
o
o
o
o

244,412 requests every year.

20,368 requests every month.
4,700 requests every week.
670 requests every day.
28 requests every hour.
1 request every 2 minutes

Of this total figure:

o 679,073 of the requests were granted internally
o Meaning that 54,164 of were rejected.

On average 96% of all requests are approved, with just 1 in 25 (4%) of requests
being rejected.

Across police forces that could provide yearly breakdowns:

o 26 showed increasing numbers of requests.
o 11 showed falling numbers.

Table 1: Highest number of Requests for Communications Data

No.

Force

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Metropolitan Police
West Midlands Police
Police Scotland
Northumbria Police
West Yorkshire Police
Devon and Cornwall Police
Essex Police
Greater Manchester Police
Avon and Somerset
Constabulary
Thames Valley Police

10

No. of
Requests
177,287
99,4441
62,075
21,345
19,757
19,731
19,541
19,037
18,923
17,562

Table 2: Highest number of Refusals

This table shows the police forces that have had the highest number of refused requests.
The percentage of the requests submitted and the refusals received is also included.
The average refusals for police forces is 4.1%
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Force
Essex Police
Kent Police
Metropolitan Police
North Yorkshire Police
Police Service of
Northern Ireland
Derbyshire
Constabulary
Merseyside Police
Avon and Somerset
Constabulary
Cambridgeshire
Constabulary
Northamptonshire
Police

No of Requests
19,541
15,566
177,287
3609
15,166

No. of Refusals
5,560
3,715
32,879
496
1,079

Percentage Refused
28%
23%
18%
13%
7.1%

4,406

272

6.1%

12,746
18,923

731
904

5.7%
4.8%

2,385

114

4.7

3,374

148

4.3%

Total refers to the Total number of Notices and Authorisations to acquire communications data under Part I
Chapter II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).

Table 3: Lowest number of Refusals

This table shows the police forces that have had the lowest number of refused requests. The
percentage of the requests submitted and the refusals received is also included.

No.

Force

1
2
3
3
4
5
6
7
7
8
8
9
10

Cheshire Constabulary2
Warwickshire Police
Cleveland Police
Northumbria Police
Hertfordshire Constabulary
British Transport Police
Durham Constabulary
Cumbria Constabulary
West Mercia Police
Leicestershire Police
South Wales Police
Gwent Police
Police Scotland

No. of
Requests
5,848
1,807
4,276
21,345
13,914
3,539
6,812
9,805
11,233
9,438
2,801
12,449
62,075

No. of
Refusals
7
4
14
54
58
16
41
74
88
87
24
119
1,080

Percentage
Refused
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.8%
0.8%
0.9%
0.9%
1%
1.7%

This figure refers to work flow packages. It adds that Each work flow package can contain anything up to 40
separate requests.

Policy Recommendations
1. Police forces should be required to publish transparency reports detailing how
requests are approved, the number of individuals affected and the type of crime
Communications Data is used for.
Police forces and other organisations, such as the National Crime Agency and the
intelligence agencies that use Communications Data should be required to publish annual
transparency reports detailing how data is accessed, the number of people affected and a
clear breakdown of the type of crime for which all Communications Data requests are made.
Currently, if the public want to know about how their communications can be accessed by
law enforcement, their only source of information is from the transparency reports
published by a handful of technology companies. It is unacceptable that law enforcement
agencies that access and use our personal data are so lacking in transparency and are so
reluctant to express the purpose and process of this element of policing.
A statistical analysis of how often these powers are requested, how often they are refused
and how effective they are when used, would assist in increasing public understanding of
why Communications Data plays a crucial role in 21st century policing.
A requirement to publish this information in an easily accessible and understandable format
would ensure that the agencies would adhere to strict record keeping processes and
establish a uniform procedure for requesting data, working with communications
companies in a standardised format and establishing a clear data trail. This should help
combat the disparity of the approval/refusal process which our data reveals is occurring
amongst police forces.
The publication of this information should not be left to the Interception of Communications
Commissioners Office (IOCCO). This would risk turning the IOCCO into a statistical bulletin,
when their focus should be on commenting on the legality and robustness of the actions
revealed.

2. Proof that data of more than 6 months old is regularly used in order to establish a
proportionate approach to data retention.
Transparency reports should include detail on how long the data has been held for prior to a
request being made by law enforcement. In light of the Data Retention and Investigatory
Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) clarity is required to understand whether data under 6 months old
is used more frequently than data exceeding 6 months. This would further assist in the
debate on these powers. This is of particular importance in light of DRIPAs December 2016
sunset clause.
3. A clear, standardised procedure for the access of Communications Data which all
police forces, telecommunications and internet service providers must adhere to.
There are currently three ways in which law enforcement are able to request data from
telecommunications and internet service providers:

Direct request to the company

Emergency procedure for use purely when there is a threat to life
Through a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), issued from government to
government.

Whilst many of the larger telecommunications and internet service providers have
departments purely to assist with requests, smaller companies are less likely to have a
standardised procedure or team of specialists on hand. It is critical that there is a
standardised and regulated process which law enforcement and the companies, regardless
of size, know to follow. This should ensure that there is no room for error, confusion or
time delays in urgent cases.
4. Judicial approval should be the final step in any request for Communications Data.
If an organisation wants to access Communications Data it should, as a final step, obtain
approval from a national independent judicial body.
Currently the system culminates with the sign-off from an internal Single Point of Contact
(SPoC). Whilst law enforcement have worked hard at promoting the benefit of the internal
SPoC system, based on the findings of our report and the sheer volume of communications
data requests approved, we believe that a further independent level of approval is
necessary to ensure that a standardised procedure exists across all police forces.

This system would ensure an independent assessment of the necessity and proportionality
of the request. It would act as an extra safeguard. Should a problem occur during an
investigation external approval will be of benefit in ensuring that independence was
maintained whenever a request for personal data was made.
Concerns regarding time constraints which further oversight may bring we believe are
unfounded. The creation of a specialist system able to receive and respond to requests
quickly and efficiently 24/7 would ensure that a trained, specialised legal figure would be on
hand whenever a request was made to offer completely independent oversight. This would
create a further level of reassurance for law enforcement that their request is valid.
5. New definitions for Communications Data should be adopted.
The current definition of Communications Data bundles a broad range of information under
a single category.
The Intelligence and Security Committees 2015 report Privacy and Security: A modern and
transparent legal framework acknowledged this as a concern and recommended that more
intrusive elements of Communications Data be re-defined as Communications Data Plus
and other information, such as the accent of a speaker, as Content Derived Information.3
They recommended that Communications Data Plus be granted additional safeguards
whilst Content Derived Information would be subject to the same protections as
intercepted content of a message.4
This would provide additional clarity and is a sensible recommendation that should be
adopted into any new legislation.

th

th

Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, 12 March 2015,
p. 53: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20150312_ISC_P%2BS%2BRpt%28web%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7
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directs=0
Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, 12 March 2015,
p. 53: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20150312_ISC_P%2BS%2BRpt%28web%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7
cqLKesyC8EvkWtAIyEeM1P6Caya1Eg9Y31l4fVTE9MUrtDF6ioZe1_97BbSeXKcTnRX_c2J6zjKXEBXlf_zB2co_wjJ8nUmGldw5hrhl61tZKhhf7kXFvAkwcdckE_GrGda35osPgM4s_0KVCAB92gulMu_HaUJ8_EOJgyvZ
aqJjy8J3Go0mCexYZL_aL0Z_FlodlWXqAt38can2ANyIYPRCmCobImx7l8OWpzihAx133h9lDjcOMTI6VND1WXx2RzexR2&attre
directs=0

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What is Communications Data?

How Are Communications Data Used?
We understand that Communications Data are an important tool for law enforcement and
the security agencies and are widely used during investigations.
The Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, commented that communications data has played a
significant role in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation in the last decade.5
Sir Jonathan Evans, former Director General of MI5, echoed this sentiment, arguing that
there are no significant investigations that we undertake across the service that dont use
communications data.6
The Home Offices impact assessment which accompanied DRIPA cited murder, sexual
exploitation and door step fraud, as crimes which would be harder or impossible to
investigate without the proper access to Communications Data. It also highlighted the
importance of Communications Datas in locating missing persons.7
Are Communications Data Intrusive?
The public is repeatedly told that Communications Data are simply the who, what, where
and when of a communication and are therefore not as intrusive as the content of a
message.
Yet that information can paint a vivid and intrusive picture of our lives, including who our
friends, family and work colleagues are, where we travel, live, work, socialise and holiday,
and the websites we visit online. Communications Data can include:

Who we call, text or email

Our location using the GPS of our mobile telephone or the IP address of our home
computer.
The method of communication we use
The websites we visit
th

T. May, Speech to RUSI: Home Secretary Theresa May on counter-terrorism, 24 November 2014:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-theresa-may-on-counter-terrorism
6
Intelligence and Security Committee, Access to communications data by the intelligence and security Agencies, February
2013, p. 9: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20130205_ISC_CD_Report.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7coDAMcUdPloI0
gFSWEMzI24vXdOunxALyJ8y3Xiu85Jtsf_wZ0t6Xeab7tBQpryfSpp9xFszP1I_e85odnithSawJZQQeLuRlKjXTJhMmB7lwdOVxfGc
dva57kJNdfw1_O0FGCrjvnk1E9LIpz1AqaPTrh7jwAsa4u4reSScsnpb3brg6_aPk6Mkv5p8FJDMxsN0eWM9hkWlBy4G8qMIbHCf-e-ukGM8n5ZbcQxRJFqV7mHt4%3D&attredirects=0
7
th
Home Office, Impact Assessment: Data Retention Legislation, 27 June 2014, p. 5:
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-assessments/IA14-15A.pdf

11

This level of detail has led to some, including Edward W. Felton, Professor of Computer
Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University to comment that it is no longer safe to
assume that this summary or non-content information is less revealing or less sensitive
than the content it describes.8
Communications Data are also known as metadata. Metadata is viewed as highly
controversial. Speaking about its value, the former head of the CIA Michael Hayden stated
that we kill people based on metadata.9
The Intelligence and Security Committees 2015 report highlighted that certain aspects of
Communications Data have the potential to reveal details about a persons private life that
are more intrusive [than conventional Communications Data]10
The Information Commissioners Office has argued that Communications Data can be very
revealing and intrusive in a wide range of contexts.11
Is there a Capability Gap?
During the debate regarding Communications Data in 2013, we heard many political claims
that there is a capability gap between the amount of communications being created and
the amount which are accessible to law enforcement.
The Intelligence and Security Committees 2013 report Access to Communications Data by
the Intelligence and Security Agencies quoted a Home Office estimate which put the
potential gap at around 25%.12
8

E. Felton, Written Testimony of Edward W. Felton to US Senate, Committee on the Hearing on Continued Oversight of the
nd
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2 October 2013: http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/testimony-2013-10-02.pdf?
9
th
Wired, NSA Doesnt Need to Spy on Your Calls to Learn Your Secrets, 25 March 2015:
http://www.wired.com/2015/03/data-and-goliath-nsa-metadata-spying-your-secrets/
10
th
Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, 12 March 2015,
p. 6: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20150312_ISC_P%2BS%2BRpt%28web%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7
cqLKesyC8EvkWtAIyEeM1P6Caya1Eg9Y31l4fVTE9MUrtDF6ioZe1_97BbSeXKcTnRX_c2J6zjKXEBXlf_zB2co_wjJ8nUmGldw5hrhl61tZKhhf7kXFvAkwcdckE_GrGda35osPgM4s_0KVCAB92gulMu_HaUJ8_EOJgyvZ
aqJjy8J3Go0mCexYZL_aL0Z_FlodlWXqAt38can2ANyIYPRCmCobImx7l8OWpzihAx133h9lDjcOMTI6VND1WXx2RzexR2&attre
directs=0
11
Information Commissioners Office, submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, p. 7:
https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/publicevidence/12march2015/20150312-P%2BS-004%20Information%20Commissioner.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7crW9DfIO6ZuQQ9t0LucfrvC5HwnMeQZRiYriXCa5r94HYYsQV7DpGwx
seoKBSmpTMVWwgbwvj4iHsMOn9d5EEhuicAP9R_uzy4bOjxdn0wlpPas7bkLb5LLL1Bsn1Uhs0sbt_BNNVKrcGbhzMBXzSnVAL4bqI4qjSnAZC5B7AT0EAD
brFICFBlVuQVj1foQdRcsWg_X92Taf6doQtqC7iu_vhwgzWBRxYDjhqprQPhBxSGUF5qPChauZtSV3aTQ9A2yW5FFeoTCK58D9w1cdVebps20CXL5wGV_fr0iugAIH-tKA%3D&attredirects=0
12
Intelligence and Security Committee, Access to communications data by the intelligence and security Agencies, February
2013, p. 11: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20130205_ISC_CD_Report.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7coDAMcUdPloI0

12

This figure has never been proven. During an Intelligence and Security Committee evidence
session, Sir Jonathan Evans, then the Director General of MI5, also questioned the veracity
of the figure, arguing that it rested on some pretty heroic assumptions.
The Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill has argued that part of the
capability gap was down to a lack of ability of law enforcement agencies to make effective
use of the data that is available13 and that the figure was an unhelpful and potentially
misleading figure14
This report shows that the vast majority of requests made by police forces are approved,
with the average percentage refusals being 4%, potentially giving law enforcement access to
a vast amount of information.
When you compare the figures in this report with the evidence provided by US technology
companies in their annual transparency reports, it shows that when they receive a request it
is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, complied with. It is critical therefore that a
standardised understanding of what defines necessary and proportionate is applied.
Using Facebook as an example, their report shows that the number of requests that were
rejected has gone down 29% being rejected in Jan-Jun 2013 compared to 25% in Jul-Dec
2014.15 16 Commenting on when requests are rejected, Facebook said:
We respond to valid requests relating to criminal cases. Each and every request we
receive is checked for legal sufficiency and we reject or require greater specificity on
requests that are overly broad or vague.
This would echo the comments made by the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications
Data Bill.
Similarly research by the NSPCC found that although police forces often seize hundreds of
computers each year, they lack the resources to properly investigate what data is held on
them.17 This is a clear example that access to the data is not the problem, but the lack of
resources and manpower to effectively deal with the demand.
gFSWEMzI24vXdOunxALyJ8y3Xiu85Jtsf_wZ0t6Xeab7tBQpryfSpp9xFszP1I_e85odnithSawJZQQeLuRlKjXTJhMmB7lwdOVxfGc
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13
th
Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill, Draft Communications Data Bill, 28 February 2012, p. 16:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtdraftcomuni/79/79.pdf
14
Ibid, p. 16
15
Facebook, Global Government Requests Report: July 2013-December 2013,
https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20Kingdom/2013-H2/
16
Facebook, Global Government Requests Report: July 2014-December 2014:
https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20Kingdom/2014-H2/

13

Transparency of the Use of Communications Data

The reports findings show disparity between police forces on how many requests are
internally rejected/approved. If police forces persist with calls for greater access to our
communications, procedures will need to be standardised, transparency about the process
published and independent judicial approval brought in as part of the authorisation
procedure to ensure that requests for Communications Data are always necessary and
proportionate.
Big Brother Watch has previously criticised the lack of information available to the public
about how surveillance is conducted. In our 2014 report Off the Record it was noted that all
police forces failed to comply with two thirds of the request; refusing to release information
about the use of covert human intelligence and intrusive surveillance.
US based technology companies currently publish far more information on the use of
surveillance powers in the UK than the agencies who use them. This makes it difficult to
properly assess the scale of use of effectiveness of use of Communications Data. Without
this information it is impossible to begin a sensible or informed debate.
It is anticipated that legislation relating to the now severely outdated Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and forms of surveillance including Communications Data will
feature prominently during the early days of this Parliament. Even if this does not happen,
with DRIPAs sunset clause timed for December 2016, a debate will occur.
For there to be a considered debate, accurate evidence such as that provided in this report
will be key in framing any argument for or against surveillance legislation.
In 2012 under Freedom of Information law we asked police forces for information about
how they use Communications Data. Humberside Police were the only force which were
able to provide a breakdown of the offence categories it had used Communications Data
for:

17

Daily Mail, Police struggling to cope with soaring number of child abuse images circulating online warns
rd
NSPCC, 3 October 2014: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2779459/Police-struggling-soaringnumber-child-abuse-images-online-warns-NSPCC.html

14

Communications Data Requested

under RIPA
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 Total
Humberside
Police

2,007

1,811

2,316

6,134

Requests rejected internally

2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 Total
129

110

102

341

Humberside Police Communications Data Breakdown

2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Total
Assault
51
43
96
190
Auto Crime
10
8
20
38
Burglary
121
118
223
462
Criminal Damage
7
15
25
47
Drugs
544
445
371
1360
Missing Persons
100
49
84
233
Murder
196
165
183
544
Organised
28
56
43
127
Immigration Crime
Other Crime
340
385
458
1183
Other Non-Crime
64
35
98
197
Rape
24
36
26
86
Robbery
99
98
195
392
Sex Offences
227
198
201
626
Theft
125
90
239
454
Traffic Offences
71
70
54
195
Recent Communications Data Developments
The Intelligence and Security Committees 2015 report, recommended new categories of
information relating to a communication be created.
The Committee found the current definitions to be unclear, due to the potential for
information to be described as content as well as communications data. The report put
forward a solution; the creation of a Communications Data Plus and Content Derived
Information. These new categories would go further than the who, when and where.
Communications Data Plus would include information such as:

The web domains visited by a user.

The location of the individual(s) involved.

15

The new category of Content Derived Information would include information that could be
obtained through analysing the content of a communication but is still separated from the
content itself. This means information such as the accent of a caller would fall into the
category.
By adding the two new categories it would become easier to understand the increasing level
of intrusiveness that is posed by accessing the following types of information. The
safeguards for each would also be more easily applicable:

Communications Data Existing safeguards under RIPA.

Communications Data Plus greater safeguards required.
Content- Derived Information The safeguards already applied to content would be
applied.
Content Existing safeguards under RIPA.18

As well as the Committees report, two further reviews are set for imminent publication.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QCs, review of

investigatory powers and
The Royal United Services Institutes independent surveillance review.

All three of these reviews will help shape the debate around how law enforcement and
intelligence agencies use their powers and how transparent they should be.

18

th

Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, 12 March 2015,
p. 53: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20150312_ISC_P%2BS%2BRpt%28web%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7
cqLKesyC8EvkWtAIyEeM1P6Caya1Eg9Y31l4fVTE9MUrtDF6ioZe1_97BbSeXKcTnRX_c2J6zjKXEBXlf_zB2co_wjJ8nUmGldw5hrhl61tZKhhf7kXFvAkwcdckE_GrGda35osPgM4s_0KVCAB92gulMu_HaUJ8_EOJgyvZ
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directs=0

16

Table 4: Requests, Rejections and Approvals Police Forces

Police Force
Avon and Somerset
Constabulary
Bedfordshire Police19
British Transport Police
Cambridgeshire
Constabulary
Cheshire
Constabulary20
City of London Police
Cleveland Police
Cumbria Constabulary
Derbyshire
Constabulary
Devon and Cornwall
Police21

Communications Data Requested under RIPA

Total
Approved

Requests Rejected Internally

2012

2013

2014

Total

2012

2013

2014

Total

6,561

6,852

5,510

18,923

346

330

228

904

18,019

1,437
1,070

1837
1,251

1,895
1,218

5,169
3,539

27
8

49
7

49
1

125
16

5,044
3,523

681

909

795

2,385

27

50

37

114

2,271

1,691

1,822

2,335

5,848

5,841

3,541
1,438
3,098

4,468
1,493
3,077

5,501
1,345
3,630

13,510
4,276
9,805

76
4
33

102
3
11

90
7
30

268
14
74

13,242
4,262
9,731

1,137

1,681

1,588

4,406

68

144

60

272

4,134

7,361

7,142

5228

19,731

128

148

121

397

19,334

19

Number returned with advice by SPOC or AO: 2012 - 474, 2013 - 411, 2014 - 922.

20

The response notes that these figures refer to work flow packages. It adds that Each work flow package can contain anything up to 40 separate requests.

17

Dorset Police
Durham Constabulary
Dyfed Powys Police
Essex Police
Gloucestershire
Constabulary
Greater Manchester
Police
Gwent Police
Hampshire
Constabulary
Hertfordshire
Constabulary
Humberside Police
Kent Police
Lancashire
Constabulary
Leicestershire Police
Lincolnshire Police
Merseyside Police
21

1928
1196
1110
5700

2828
1016
900
7234

2831
4600
1149
6607

7,587
6,812
3,159
19,541

4
6
48
1655

45
19
39
1971

68
16
33
1934

117
41
120
5560

7,470
6,771
3,039
13,981

869

1338

1295

3,502

45

49

29

123

3,379

N/A

18,29322

119

12,330

19,037
1,826

4,616

6,007

744
12,449

47

60

11,75023

12
259

11,750

4,034

5,036

4,844

13,914

29

12

17

58

13,856

2,942
5,099

2,407
5,389

3,020
5,078

8,369
15,566

134
1,279

127
1,165

84
1,271

34524
3,715

8024
11,851

4,316

4,810

4,499

13,625

53

225

72

350

13275

3217

3437

9438

27

26

34

87

9,351
2,341
12,015

4,543

2784
2,418
4,312
3,891

12,746

266

77
212

253

731

Response notes that due to a change in working practices within the force applicants can now put multiple requests on one application whereas previously a subscriber
application would have to be submitted separately before further applications were submitted. The response therefore continues that in 2014 the 5228 authorisations
resulted in 10,055 requests.
22
The response notes that the figures dont include the number that could have been re-submitted and subsequently approved.
23
Response notes: These figures are based on applications authorised rather than applications originally submitted as some these may have been returned for rework by
the applicant and never resubmitted.
24
Response notes: Our level or rejections can in part be due to administrative error where the applicant launched an incorrect application type. In March 2014 due to
modification of the software this significantly reduced the rejections but still launch the incorrect application.

18

Metropolitan Police
Service
Norfolk Constabulary
North Wales Police
North Yorkshire Police
Northamptonshire
Police
Northumbria Police
Nottinghamshire
Police25
Police Scotland26
Police Service of
Northern Ireland
South Wales Police
South Yorkshire
Police28
Staffordshire Police
Suffolk Constabulary
Surrey Police
25

57,710

59,946

59,631

177,287

8,861

12,141

11,877

32,879

144,408

2,143
1,424
1,096

2,036
1,103
1211

2,414
1,228
1302

6,593
3,755
3,609

67
19
176

37
26
136

41
6
184

145
51
496

6,448
3,704
3,113

863

1,038

1473

3,374

30

56

62

148

3,226

7,649

6,817

6,879

21,345

24

20

10

54

21,291

2,546

2,872

4,071

9,489

39

31

58

128

9,361

18,382

19,390

24,303

62,07527

451

347

282

1,080

62,075

4,939

5,543

4,684

15,166

401

484

194

1,079

14,087

963
Informatio
n withheld
6,039

727

1111
2801
5
10
9
24
Informatio
6,801
6,801
See footnote29
n withheld
5,272
5,162
16,473
78
183
72
333
Joint response with Norfolk Constabulary due to "ongoing collaboration"
2,828
86

2777

16,140
2,742

th

Figures relating to 2012 and 2013 were provided through a previous FOI response, dated 13 November 2014.

26

Formed in April 2013 - previous figures were provided as totals of the now defunct forces.
This figure represents the total numbers of authorisations and notices approved, not applications (or requests). There can be a number of authorisations that emanate
from one application.
27

28

A previous FOI request revealed the lines of data requested for each year: 2011-2012: 8921, 2012-2013: 7184 and 2013-2014: 8770.

29

A previous FOI request provided the following figures for rejections by an approving officer: 2011-2012: 237, 2012-2013: 33 and 2013-2014: 8.

19

Sussex Police
Thames Valley Police30

Did not respond

6,567

5,897

5,098

Warwickshire Police

973

834

See West
Mercia
Constabul
ary's
response.

West Mercia Police

3,617

3,533

4,08331

West Midlands Police

31,065

31,074

37,305

West Yorkshire Police

6,807

6,712

6,238

Wiltshire Police
Total
Grand Total

1317
219,487

30

1614
1402
229,474
246,329
733,237

17,562

1,807

11,233
99,44432
19,757
4,333
733,237

180

144

104

428

17,134

See West
Mercia
Constabul
ary's
response.

1,803

20

13

55

88

11,145

323

443

583

1,349

98,095

274

280

261

815

18,942

98
54,164

4,235
679,073
679,073

46
15307

40
12
19188
18261
54,164

Response included the following figures for data acquisitions: 2012 - 7531, 2013 - 5897, 2014 6661.
2014 figures - Joint with Warwickshire Police: Part of the "West Mercia Police and Warwickshire Police Alliance".
32
Total refers to the Total number of Notices and Authorisations to acquire communications data under Part I Chapter II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
(RIPA).
31

20

Appendix 1: Methodology
A Freedom of Information request was sent to all local authorities beginning on the 30 th
January 2015.
We asked for the number of times each force had requested access to communications data
as well as the number of occasions a request had been refused.
We received a 92% response rate. For the purposes of this report responses were included
until 22nd May 2015.

Appendix 2: Original Freedom of Information Request

Dear Sir or Madam
I am writing under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to request information relating to
your Forces acquisition of communications data under the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers 2000, specifically I am requesting;
1. The number of times your force has requested communications data under the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
2. The number times a request was rejected internally.
I request that the time period covered is 1st January 2012- 1st January 2015.
I further request that the information be broken down by either calendar year or financial
year, whichever is most easily accessible to you.
I understand under the Freedom of Information Act that I am entitled to a response within
twenty working days. I would be grateful if you could confirm this request in writing as soon
as possible.

21

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