ALLIED AASTP-1

AMMUNITION STORAGE AND Edition 1

TRANSPORT PUBLICATION DEFENCE INVESTMENT DIVISION
NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF –

MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION

AND EXPLOSIVES

MAY 2006
 AASTP-1
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ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE AND

TRANSPORT PUBLICATION 1

(AASTP-1)

MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

MAY 2006
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(Edition 1)
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

August 1997

1. AASTP-1 - MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR STORAGE OF

MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES is a NATO UNCLASSIFIED publication.
(The agreement of interested nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 4440
(Edition 1)).

2. AASTP-1 is effective upon receipt.

3. AASTP-1 contains only factual information. Changes to these are not subject to the
ratification procedures; they will be promulgated on receipt from the nations concerned.

A. GRØNHEIM
Major General, NOAF
Chairman, MAS

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RECORD OF CHANGES

DATE
CHANGE SIGNATURE REMARKS
OF CHANGE

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NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION ..................................................................................................................... III

RECORD OF CHANGES.............................................................................................................................................. IV

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................ VI

PREFACE.....................................................................................................................................................................VIII
1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................................ VIII
2. BASIS .................................................................................................................................................................. VIII
3. UPDATING ........................................................................................................................................................... VIII
4. CONDITIONS OF RELEASE .................................................................................................................................... VIII
5. INQUIRIES ........................................................................................................................................................... VIII

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

In this Manual the following abbreviations have been used, but not necessarily in all
places where the word combinations appear.

Depleted Uranium = DU
Electro-Explosive Device = EED
Exposed site = ES
Exterior Quantity-Distance = EQD
Hazard Division = HD
Inhabited Building Distances = IBD
Interior Quantity-Distance = IQD
Inter-Magazine Distance = IMD
Net Explosive Quantity = NEQ
Potential Explosion Site = PES
Public Traffic Route Distance = PTRD
Quantity-Distance = Q-D

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PREFACE
1. General
This Manual is in four parts. PART I sets out general principles, PART II gives
detailed information on above-ground storage, Part III deals with certain special types of storage,
such as underground storage, and Part IV deals with special circumstances where operational
effectiveness has to be taken into account when deciding on the quantity-distances to be used,
such as on military airfields and during the transfer of ammunition and explosives in naval ports.

2. Basis
The Manual is based on and supersedes NATO DOCUMENT AC/258-D/258
(1976) and its numerous corrigenda, but recognises the simultaneous preparation of AASTP-3,
which deals with classification of ammunition and explosives according to hazard.

3. Updating
The "Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of
Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)", as custodian of this Manual, intends to
maintain its value by publishing corrigenda.

4. Conditions of Release
The Nato Manual on Safety Principles for the Storage of Ammunition and
explosives (AASTP-1) is a NATO Document involving NATO property rights.
The understanding and conditions agreed for the release of the Manual are that it is released
for technical defence purposes and for the use by the defence services only of the country
concerned.
This understanding requires that the release of the whole, or any part, of the Manual must not be
undertaken without reference to, and the written approval of, NATO.

5. Inquiries
Any questions or requirements for further information should be addressed to the
Secretary of the AC/258 Group at NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium.

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NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED
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MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

PART I

MAY 2006

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... I-1-1

SECTION I – PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE MANUAL ........................................................................... I-1-1
SECTION II – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MANUAL............................................................... I-1-3
CHAPTER 2 – CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN
STORAGE............................................................................................................................................. I-2-1
SECTION I – HAZARD DIVISIONS………… .......................................................................................... I-2-1
SECTION II – COMPATIBILITY GROUPS................................................................................................ I-2-4
SECTION III - MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE ........................................... I-2-6
CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS .......................................................... I-3-1
SECTION I – PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTITY-DISTANCES .................................................................... I-3-1
SECTION II – DETERMINATION OF QUANTITY-DISTANCES .............................................................. I-3-14
SECTION III - QUANTITY-DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES . I-3-19
SECTION IV – QUANTITY-DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN EXPOSED SITES ............................................. I-3-22
SECTION V – STORAGE BUILDINGS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QUANTITY-DISTANCES ........I-3-25
SECTION VI – BARRICADES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QUANTITY DISTANCES. I-3-28
SECTION VII – INJURY AND DAMAGE TO BE EXPECTED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FOR HAZARD
DIVISION 1.1 AND GROUPING OF STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES ...................................................... I-3-32
SECTION VIII – Q-D RULES IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF AMMUNITION CLASSIFIED AS 1.6N ... I-3-44
CHAPTER 4 – UNDERGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS ......................................................... I-4-1
SECTION I – GENERAL……………...................................................................................................... I- 4-1
SECTION II – HAZARD DIVISION MATERIAL DEPENDENCE ................................................................ I-4-5
SECTION III – CHAMBER INTERVAL ..................................................................................................... I-4-6
SECTION IV – INHABITED BUILDING DISTANCE (IBD) ..................................................................... I-4-10
SECTION V – PUBLIC TRAFFIC ROUTE DISTANCE (PTRD) .............................................................. I-4-20
SECTION VI – EXPLOSIVES WORKSHOP DISTANCE (EWD) ............................................................. I-4-21
SECTION VII – ABOVE GROUND EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINE (ECM).......................................... I-4-22
SECTION VIII – ABOVE GROUND MAGAZINE DISTANCE (AGMD) ................................................. I-4-23
CHAPTER 5 - SEPARATION OF POL-FACILITIES WITHIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONSI-5-1

CHAPTER 6 – HAZARDS FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO AMMUNITION

CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES..................................................................... I-6-1

CHAPTER 7 –FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES ............................................................................. I-7-1

SECTION I – GENERAL……………....................................................................................................... I-7-1
SECTION II – FIRE DIVISIONS……. ...................................................................................................... I-7-2
SECTION III – FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES ......................................................................................... I-7-5
SECTION IV – FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES ....................................................................................... I-7-7
SECTION V – EMERGENCY PLANNING ................................................................................................ I-7-13
CHAPTER 8 – REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS.................................................... I-8-1

CHAPTER 9 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION.............................................................. I-9-1

ANNEX I-A – QUANTITY DISTANCE TABLES FOR ABOVE GROUND STORAGE ........ I-A-1
SECTION I – GENERAL NOTE AND EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS ........................................................ I-A-2
SECTION II – QUANTITY DISTANCES TABLES (Q-D TABLES)............................................................ I-A-8

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ANNEX I-B - EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF Q-D TABLES)...................................................... I-B-1

SECTION I – GENERAL.................... ...................................................................................................... I-B-2
SECTION II – EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF Q-D TABLES AT AN EXISTING STORAGE AREA................. I-B-4
SECTION III – EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF Q-D TABLES FOR PLANNING OF A NEW STORAGE AREAI-B-11

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Section I - Purpose and Scope of the Manual

1.1.1.1.

a) The primary object of this Manual is to establish safety principles to be used as a guide between host
countries and NATO forces in the development of mutually agreeable regulations for the layout of
ammunition storage depots and for the storage of conventional ammunition and explosives therein. These
principles are intended also to form the basis of national regulations as far as possible.

b) The Manual is intended to serve as a guide for authorities who are engaged in the planning and
construction of ammunition storage depots of a capacity of not less than 500 kg of Net Explosives Quantity
(NEQ) per storage site and for those who are responsible for the safe storage of ammunition. It also gives
principles and criteria for other related matters such as design environment criteria, etc. The Manual does
not authorize the use of the principles and criteria without consent of the host countries.

c) NEQ per storage site of less than 500 kg are given special treatment (see subparagraph 1.3.1.1.b)).

d) It is impracticable to prescribe distances which would be safe distances in the true sense, i.e. which would
guarantee absolute immunity from propagation, damage or injury. An attempt has therefore been made in
the recommendations in this Manual to allow for the probability of an accident and how serious the
resulting damage or injury would be. The separation distances (quantity distances) between a potential
explosion site and an exposed site recommended in this Manual therefore represent a compromise deemed
tolerable by AC/258 between absolute safety and practical considerations including costs and operational
requirements.

The risk deemed tolerable depends upon many factors, some of which are objective, such as the quantity of
explosives involved, the nature of the explosives, the packaging of dangerous items, their distribution
within premises or in the open air, distance, the nature of the terrain and its contours, etc. Other factors are
subjective to what extent are damage and injuries resulting from an explosive accident tolerable? For
example, how many deaths, how many serious injuries, how many buildings destroyed or damaged and
other costs are tolerable? It is therefore clearly essential to have a good knowledge of the nature of the
main hazard, namely blast or projections or fire, as well as the foreseeable development of the
accident: instantaneous, progressive, sporadic etc.

Consideration of these factors will yield the concept of hazard divisions, the net explosives quantity and the
mutual influence of potential explosion site and exposed site. Quantity-distances are proposed in each case
in the form of tables. These quantity distances imply a degree of harm or damage which is difficult to
quantify but which most NATO nations regard as tolerable.

There may be occasions when cogent economic or operational considerations, usually of a temporary
nature, warrant the acceptance of a significantly greater risk to life and property. The granting of waivers
or relaxations in such cases is outside the scope of this Manual. Nevertheless, it is stressed that a detailed
assessment of the risks involved must be made by a competent agency before the appropriate authorities
grant such dispensations. Conversely, authorities which might find unacceptable the risks deemed
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"tolerable" in this Manual can always reduce the risks by using suitable protective devices and/or by
increasing the recommended distances. However, this will be possible only with a higher operating cost.

e) Under certain circumstances operational requirements demand a degree of relaxation from the guidelines
given in Parts I-III of the Manual. This applies mainly to basic load holding areas, field storage and missile
installations. In the same way, problems connected with airfields used only by military aircraft and those
relating to transfer of ammunition in naval ports call for specific measures. The principles to be followed in
preparing flexible but consistent safety guidelines in those cases will be found in Part IV of the Manual.

f) A Manual of this type cannot provide the answers to all problems which arise. In circumstances where the
answer is not provided the problem should be submitted to the Secretary of the "NATO Group of Experts
on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)".

g) The users of this Manual are invited to communicate with the Secretary of the "NATO Group of Experts on
the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)",
when an accidental explosion has been thoroughly analysed, or trials have been staged, so that the validity
of the quantity-distance tables can be verified. For details of accident reports required: see Part I,
Chapter 8.
h) Since this Manual is a guide rather than a set of mandatory regulations the words "must", "should"
"may/can" and "is/are" are used in the following sense:

MUST - Indicates a technical requirement which is vital for the safety of a depot and the avoidance of a
catastrophe.

SHOULD - Indicates a safety requirement which is important but not essential.

MAY/CAN - Indicates optional courses of action and possibilities.

IS/ARE - Indicates a fact or a valid technique.

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Section II - Historical Background of the Manual

1.1.2.1.

This Manual is the result of successive revisions, over a period of 30 years, of a document (AC/106-D/5 dated
1st September 1963) drafted by an AC/106 Restricted Sub-Group consisting of representatives of France, Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States. These experts, meeting as specialists and not as national representatives, made
a study of the systems used in France, the United Kingdom and the United States which took into account national trials
and an analysis of archives relating to damage from accidental explosions or acts of war. This attempt at consolidation
involved each member waiving some of his own nation´s regulations. This difficulty was overcome by accepting that
each nation would be free when authorizing implementation of the NATO system in its territory to refrain from
applying any regulation relating to particular items for which, in its view, no compromise was possible. It was hoped,
however, that in view of the very abundant information which had been used to prepare the document new ideas would
become acceptable in the interests of NATO even if they were not always in accordance with host nation practice up to
that point.

1.1.2.2.

The four specialists from the AC/106 Restricted Sub-Group met again in 1964 to form the AC/74 Restricted
Group of Experts on Ammunition Storage in order to supplement the initial document. The resulting document,
AC/106-D/5 (revised), was published in 1965.

1.1.2.3.

The Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military Ammunition and
Explosives (AC/258) was created in 1966 to continue this work. A Storage Sub-Group, set up under its aegis with
broader representation, prepared a new revised version published under reference AC/258-D/70 dated December 1969.
This was a very full document, including both the basic principles from the original document and recommendations
dealing with special cases such as storage on military airfields, on board ship, underground, in the vicinity of petroleum
products or near radio transmitters.

1.1.2.4.

Detailed annexes were prepared at the same time, e.g. those describing tests to be applied to ammunition to
decide on its hazard classification. The quantity-distance tables were simplified and rationalized and expressed solely in
the metric system.

1.1.2.5.

In 1970, the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) officially invited nations, on a
recommendation by AC/258, to adopt the NATO principles to form the basis of their national regulations.

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During this period the United Nations Group of Experts on Explosives recommended a classification system for use
in the transport of explosives. In the interests of standardization, AC/258 in 1971 adopted the United Nations
classification system for storage of military ammunition and explosives.

1.1.2.6.

The reputation of the Manual grew with time: several no-NATO nations requested copies of it. Member
nations requested more and more information on the subjects covered.
In 1974, it was decided to carry out a general revision to consolidate the corrigenda which had been issued since the
beginning and to improve general presentation, as a Manual in three parts:

- Part I dealing with the general principles;

- Part II containing more detailed information on above-ground storage and the historical background of the
Manual;

- Part III dealing with special types of storage.

1.1.2.7.

During this period the Group was involved in designing and evaluating field trials, both on mockups and at
full scale, in order to improve its quantity-distance criteria (in particular the "ESKIMO" series of trials in the United
States). Group members also took part in several large-scale trials relating to underground explosions.
The resulting conclusions and recommendations were incorporated in the Manual which was revised once more
under the new reference AC/258-D/258.

1.1.2.8.

In 1981, the Group recognized the fact that in some circumstances the principles set out in Part I of the Manual
could not be applied without seriously affecting operational efficiency. It was therefore decided to instigate a new part,
Part IV, dealing with the principles to be applied in such cases. At the same time, some chapters (field storage, missile
installations and depots containing basic loads) which had been included in Parts II and III up to that time but were
better suited to Part IV were moved to part IV.

1.1.2.9.

Throughout ten years, since 1981, 23 corrigenda to the Manual were issued.
In addition, the idea grew that a presentation more in accordance with NATO standards should be adopted. This
was achieved by restructuring the Manual in the form of an Allied Publication (AP) and producing Standardization
Agreements (STANAG) with which to implement the AP.

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CHAPTER 2 - CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND

EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE

Section I - Hazard Divisions

1.2.1.1. General

In order to promote the safe storage and transport of dangerous goods, an International System for
Classification has been devised. The system consists of 9 classes (1-9) of which Class 1 comprises ammunition and
explosives. Class 1 is divided into divisions. The hazard division indicates the type of hazard to be expected primarily
in the event of an accident: mass explosion (Division 1.1), projection effects (Division 1.2), fire and radiant heat
(Division 1.3), no significant hazard (Division 1.4), mass detonation with very low probability of initiation (Division
1.5) and detonation of a single article, with low probability of initiation (Division 1.6). Ammunition and explosives
must be classified in accordance with STANAG 4123. National authorities competent for the classification of
ammunition and explosives are given in AASTP-3.

1.2.1.2. Definitions of the Hazard Divisions

a) Hazard Division 1.1

Substances and articles which have a mass explosion hazard (a mass explosion is one which affects the entire
load virtually instantaneously.)

1. The major hazards of this division are blast, high velocity projections and other projections of relatively low
velocity.

2. The explosion results in severe structural damage, the severity and range being determined by the amount of
high explosives involved. There may be a risk from heavy debris propelled from the structure in which the
explosion occurs or from the crater.

b) Hazard Division 1.2

Substances and articles which have a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard

1. The explosion results in items burning and exploding progressively, a few at a time. Furthermore
fragments, firebrands and unexploded items may be projected in considerable numbers; some of these
may explode on or some time after impact and cause fires or explosions. Blast effects are limited to the
immediate vicinity.

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2. For the purpose of determining quantity-distances a distinction, depending on the size and range of
fragments, is made between those items which give fragments of moderate range (classified as HD 1.2.2)
and those which give fragments with a considerable range (classified as HD 1.2.1). HD 1.2.2 items
include HE projectiles (with or without propelling charges) with an individual NEQ less than or equal to
0.71 kg and other items not containing HE such as cartridges, rounds with inert projectiles, pyrotechnic
items or rocket motors. HD 1.2.1 items are generally HE projectiles (with or without propelling charges)
with an individual NEQ greater than 0.71kg.

c) Hazard Division 1.3

Substances and articles which have a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection
hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.

1. This division comprises substances and articles:

(a) which give rise to considerable radiant heat, or

(b) which burn one after another, producing minor blast or projection effects or both.

2. This division includes some items which burn with great violence and intense heat emitting
considerable thermal radiation (mass fire hazard) and others which burn sporadically. Items in this
division may explode but do not usually form dangerous fragments. Firebrands and burning containers
may be projected.d) Hazard Division 1.4

Substances and articles which present no significant hazard

1. This division includes items which have primarily a moderate fire hazard. They do not contribute
excessively to a fire. The effects are largely confined to the package. No fragments of appreciable size
or range are to be expected. An external fire does not cause the simultaneous explosion of the total
contents of a package of such items.

2. Some but not all of the above items are assigned to Compatibility Group S. These items are so packed
or designed that any explosive effect during storage and transportation is confined within the package
unless the package has been degraded by fire.

e) Hazard Division 1.5

Very insensitive substances which have a mass explosion hazard

This division comprises substances which have a mass explosion hazard but are so insensitive that there is
very little probability of initiation or of transition from burning to detonation under normal conditions.

NOTE 1: The probability of transition from burning to detonation is greater when large bulk quantities are
transported or stored.

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NOTE 2: For storage purposes, such substances are treated as Hazard Division 1.1 since, if an explosion
should occur, the hazard is the same as for items formally assigned to Hazard Division 1.1 (i.e.
blast).

f) Hazard Division 1.6

Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard.

This division comprises articles which contain only extremely insensitive detonating substances and
which demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initiation or propagation.

NOTE: The risk from articles of Hazard Division 1.6 is limited to the explosion of a single article.

1.2.1.3.

All the information necessary for hazard classification of ammunition and explosives will be found in
AASTP-3. Ammunition which does not contain any explosive or other dangerous goods (for instance dummy bombs,
cartridges and projectiles) is excluded from the system of hazard classification.

1.2.1.4. Depleted Uranium (DU) Ammunition

Ammunition containing DU in the form of a penetrator or projectile is assigned to the Hazard Classification
appropriate to the explosives content of the ammunition only. The normal storage rules associated with the Hazard
Classification may need to be modified to take account of the slight radioactivity and chemical toxicity of DU and
therefore rules may be prescribed for DU ammunition as a separate class of ammunition, or for specific types of DU
ammunition (see Part I, Chapter 9).

1.2.1.5. Effect of Package on Classification

As the packaging may have a decisive effect on the classification, particular care must be taken to ensure that
the correct classification is determined for each configuration in which ammunition and explosives are stored or
transported. Therefore every significant change in the packaging (e.g. degradation) may well affect the classification
awarded.

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Section II - Compatibility Groups

1.2.2.1. General Principles

a) Ammunition and explosives are considered to be compatible if they may be stored together without
significantly increasing either the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the
effects of such an accident.

b) Ammunition and explosives should not be stored together with other goods which can hazard them. Examples
are highly flammable materials, acids, and corrosives.

c) The safety of ammunition and explosives in storage would be enhanced if each kind was kept separate.
However, a proper balance of the interests of safety against other factors may require the mixing of several
kinds of ammunition and explosives.

d) The principles of mixing compatibility groups may differ in storage and transport circumstances. Detailed
information on mixing compatibility groups is to be found in AASTP-3.

1.2.2.2. Determination of Compatibility Groups

On the basis of the definitions in paragraph 1.2.2.3. ammunition and explosives are formally grouped into
thirteen Compatibility Groups: A to H, J, K, L, N and S.

1.2.2.3. Definitions of the Compatibility Groups

Group A Primary explosive substance.

Group B Article containing a primary explosive substance and not containing two or more effective
protective features.

Group C Propellant explosive substance or other deflagrating explosive substance or article containing
such explosive substance.

Group D Secondary detonating explosive substance or black powder or article containing a secondary
detonating explosive substance, in each case without means of initiation and without a
propelling charge, or article containing a primary explosive substance and containing two or
more effective protective features.

Group E Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance, without means of initiation, with
propelling charge (other than one containing a flammable liquid or gel or hypergolic liquids).

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Group F Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance with its own means of initiation,
with a propelling charge (other than one containing a flammable liquid or gel or hypergolic
liquids) or without a propelling charge.

Group G Pyrotechnic substance, or article containing a pyrotechnic substance, or article containing both
an explosive substance and an illuminating, incendiary, tear- or smoke-producing substance
(other than a water-activated article or one containing white phosphorus, phosphides, a
pyrophoric substance, a flammable liquid or gel, or hypergolic liquids).

Group H Article containing both explosive substance and white phosphorus.

Group J Article containing both an explosive substance and a flammable liquid or gel.

Group K Article containing both an explosive substance and a toxic chemical agent.

Group L Explosive substance or article containing an explosive substance and presenting a special risk
(e.g. due to water activation or presence of hypergolic liquids, phosphides or a pyrophoric
substance) and needing isolation of each type.

Group N Articles which contain only extremely insensitive detonating substances and which demonstrate
a negligible probability of accidental initiation or propagation.

Group S Substances or articles so packed or designed that any hazardous effects arising from accidental
functioning are confined within the package unless the package has been degraded by fire, in
which case all blast or projection effects are limited to the extent that they do not significantly
hinder or prohibit fire-fighting or other emergency response efforts in the immediate vicinity of
the package.

1.2.2.4. Classification Code

The classification code is composed of the number of the hazard division (see Section I) and the letter of the
compatibility group (see this Section) for example "1.1 B". Guidance on the practical procedure of classifying an item
by hazard division and compatibility group is given in AASTP-3.

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Section III - Mixing of Ammunition and Explosives in Storage

1.2.3.1. Mixed Storage

Ammunition and explosives of different hazard divisions may be stored together if compatible. The required
quantity-distances and the permitted quantities must be determined in accordance with Part II of this Manual.

1.2.3.2. Storage Limitations

The rules which apply to the mixing of hazard divisions and compatibility groups in above ground storage are
detailed below. Special rules apply to underground storage. The basic rules are given in the form of three tables as
follows:

TABLE 4: Aboveground Storage, Mixing and Aggregation Rules for Hazard Divisions.

TABLE 5: Aboveground Storage of Explosive Substances. Rules for mixing of Compatibility Groups.

TABLE 6: Aboveground Storage of Explosive Articles. Rules for Mixing of Compatibility Groups.

Special circumstances are addressed at paragraph 1.2.3.3. and suspect ammunition and explosives at
paragraph 1.2.3.4.

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Mixed hazard divisions (HD) should be aggregated in the following table:

Table 4 - Aboveground Storage, Mixing and Aggregation Rules for Hazard Divisions

Hazard 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6

Division
1
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
2 1 3
1.2.1 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.1 1.1
2 1 3
1.2.2 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.1
2 2 1 3
1.3 1.1 1.3 1.1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1.4 1.4
1
1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
1.6 1.1 1.2.1 1.2.1 1.33 1
1.1 1.63

1
1.4 may be stored with any other HD without aggregation of the NEQ.

2
Mixed 1.2.1/1.2.2 will usually behave as aggregated 1.2 or 1.3. However, there is a significant risk that, in certain
circumstances, a mix of 1.2.1/1.2.2 and 1.3 will behave as an aggregated quantity of 1.1.

If any of the following circumstances exists, the mix must be aggregated as 1.1, unless relevant trials or analysis
indicate otherwise:
a) The presence of 1.2 shaped charges.
b) High energy propellants (e.g. as used in some tank gun applications).
c) High loading density storage of 1.3 in conditions of relatively heavy confinement.
d) 1.2.1 articles with an individual NEQ > 5 kg.
3
If demonstrated by testing or analogy. If not: 1.1.

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NOTES:
Substances may be mixed in aboveground storage as shown in the following table:

Table 5 - Aboveground Storage of Explosive Substances Rules for Mixing of

Compatibility Groups.

Compatibility

Group A C D G L S
A X
C X1) X1) 3)
X
D X1) X1) 3)
X
3) 3)
G X X
2)
L
S X X X X

LEGEND: X = Mixing permitted

NOTES:

1) Mixing permitted provided substances have all passed UN Test Series 3. Storage of substances of any
Compatibility Groups C, D or G which have failed UN Test Series 3 will require special consideration
by the National Competent Authority.

2) Compatibility Group L substances must always be stored separately from all substances of other
compatibility groups as well from all other substances of Compatibility Group L.

3) The mixing of Compatibility Group G substances with other compatibility groups is at the discretion of
the National Competent Authority.

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Articles may be mixed in aboveground storage as shown in the following table:

Table 6 - Aboveground Storage of Explosive Articles - Rules for Mixing of Compatibility Groups.

Compatibility

Group B C D E F G H J K L N S
B X X1) X1) X1) X
2) 4)
C X X X X5) X
1) 2) 4) 5)
D X X X X X X
1) 2) 4) 5)
E X X X X X X
1) 2) 2) 2) 4)
F X X X
4) 4) 4) 4)
G X X
H X X
J X X
K X
3)
L
N X5) X5) X5) X6) X7)
S X X X X X X X X X7) X6)

LEGEND: X= Mixing permitted

NOTES

1) Compatibility Group B fuzes may be stored with the articles to which they will be assembled, but the
NEQ must be aggregated and treated as Compatibility Group F.

2) Storage in the same building is permitted if effectively segregated to prevent propagation.

3) Compatibility Group L articles must always be stored separately from all articles of other compatibility
groups as well as from all other articles of different types of Compatibility Group L.

4) Mixing of articles of Compatibility Group G with articles of other compatibility groups is at the
discretion of the National Competent Authority.

5) Articles of Compatibility Group N should not in general be stored with articles in other compatibility
groups except S. However, if such articles are stored with articles of Compatibility Group C, D and E,
the articles of Compatibility Group N should be considered as having the characteristics of
Compatibility Group D and the compatibility groups mixing rules apply accordingly.

6) It is allowed to mix 1.6N munitions. The Compatibility Group of the mixed set remains N if the
munitions belong to the same family or if it has been demonstrated that, in case of a detonation of one
munition, there is no instant transmission to the munitions of another family (the families are then
called "compatible"). If it is not the case the whole set of munitions should be considered as having the
characteristics of Compatibility Group D.

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7) A mixed set of munitions 1.6N and 1.4S may be considered as having the characteristics of
Compatibility Group N.

1.2.3.3. Mixed Storage - Special Circumstances

a) There may be special circumstances where the above mixing rules may be modified by the National
Competent Authority subject to adequate technical justification based on tests where these are considered to be
appropriate.

b) Very small quantity HD 1.1 and large quantity Hazard Division 1.2.1/1.2.2.
It should be possible to arrange storage in such a manner that the mixture will behave as 1.2.1/1.2.2.

c) Mixing of Hazard Division 1.1, Hazard Division 1.2.1/1.2.2 and Hazard Division 1.3
The quantity distance to be applied in these unusual circumstances is that which is the greatest when
considering the aggregate NEQ as Hazard Division 1.1, Hazard Division 1.2.1, Hazard Division 1.2.2 or
Hazard Division 1.3.

d) With the exception of substances in Compatibility Group A, which should not be mixed with other
compatibility groups, the mixing of substances and articles is permitted as shown in Tables 5 and 6.

1.2.3.4. Suspect Ammunition and Explosives (Mixed storage)

Suspect ammunition and explosives must not be stored with any other ammunition and explosives.

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CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS

Section I - Principles of the Quantity-Distances

1.3.1.1. General

a) PES such as buildings, stacks and vehicles (trucks, trailers and railcars) present an obvious risk to personnel
and property. Such sites are located at carefully calculated distances from each other and from other buildings
and installations to ensure the minimum practicable risk to life and property (including ammunition). These
distances are called Quantity-Distances and are tabulated in Annex A, Section II.

b) The tables in Annex A, Section II are concerned with storage sites containing more than 500 kg NEQ. Storage
of NEQs less than 500 kg needs special consideration and nations requiring advice should contact the
Secretary of AC/258.

1.3.1.2. Basis of Quantity-Distances

The quantity-distances are based on an extensive series of trials and a careful analysis of all available data on
accidental explosions in different countries. However, quantity-distances are subject to uncertainty owing to the
variability of explosions. These quantity-distances are generated by distance functions subject, in certain cases, to fixed
minimum or maximum distances. The fixed values are independent of the NEQ because they are based on the
projection hazard from individual rounds or operational factors (see Part II, Annex A). As regards the rounding of
values of quantity-distances, see Annex A, paragraph 2. Criteria and formulae for quantity-distances are given in
Part II, Annex A.

1.3.1.3. Kinds of Quantity-Distances

a) There are two kinds of Interior Quantity-Distances for each hazard division:

1) Inter-Magazine Distances (see paragraphs 1.3.1.8. - 1.3.1.11)

2) Explosives Workshop Distances (see paragraphs 1.3.1.12. - 1.3.1.13)
b) There are two kinds of Exterior Quantity-Distances for each hazard division:

1) Public Traffic Route Distances (see paragraph 1.3.1.14)

2) Inhabited Building Distances (see paragraph 1.3.1.15)

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1.3.1.4. Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.1

Annex A, Table 1 gives Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances for ammunition and explosives of Hazard
Division 1.1. The Inter-Magazine Distances should not be used for packages of primary explosives and other very
sensitive explosive substances like blasting gelatine which require individual assessment when at an ES.

1.3.1.5. Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.2

a) General

Annex A, Table 2 gives Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances for ammunition and explosives of Hazard
Division 1.2 but before appropriate quantity-distances can be selected there are two factors to be
considered. The first is the range of fragments and lobbed ammunition which are projected from a PES.
The second is the total number of such projections likely to hazard an ES. If comprehensive data is
available for a particular item, then the quantity-distances for Hazard Division 1.2, which are based on
trials with individual rounds considered to be representative, may be replaced by this more appropriate data
taking into account the vulnerability of the ammunition, explosives and buildings at the Exposed Sites
under consideration (see Part II, Chapter 5, Section II.).

b) Fragments and Lobbed ammunition from Rounds greater than 0.71 kg individual NEQ.

This, the most hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2 comprises those rounds and ammunition which contain a
high explosive charge and may also contain a propelling or pyrotechnic charge. The total explosives content of
these rounds, etc will be greater than 0.71 kg. It is impractical to specify quantity-distances which allow for the
maximum possible flight ranges of propulsive items but the likely range of packaged items, if involved in an
accident during storage, is typical of this part of Hazard Division 1.2. Munitions which explode during an
accident will rarely detonate in their design mode. In a fire situation explosive fillings may melt and expand,
breaching their casings and then explode via cook-off or burning to detonation reactions. These explosions may
involve anything from 100% to very little of the fill dependent on the amount of the filling that has escaped
through the breach. The fragmentation produced by such reactions is totally different to that generated in a
design detonation. The case splits open producing large (for a 105mm shell, for example 2-3kg) but
comparatively few fragments with velocities of 100-500ms-1. These are likely to be projected further than the
smaller fragments from the full detonation of similar munitions in a HD 1.1 reaction. Quantities of unexploded
munitions, sub-assemblies or sub-munitions also may be projected to considerable ranges and will, due to
thermal or mechanical damage, be more hazardous than in their pristine state. Data on individual round
characteristics obtained from tests and accidental explosions may be used to determine the validity of including
a specific round in this category or to reduce it to the lesser category described in Paragraph c) below. These
items are hereafter called rounds of HD 1.2.1.

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(c) Fragments and Lobbed Ammunition from Rounds less than or equal to 0.71 kg individual NEQ.

This less hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2 comprises those rounds and ammunition which contain a high
explosive charge and may also contain a propelling or pyrotechnic charge. The total explosives content of these
rounds, etc will be less than or equal to 0.71 kg. It will also typically comprise ammunition which does not
contain HE and will include pyrotechnic rounds and articles, inert projectile rounds. Tests show that many
items of this type produce fragments and lobbed ammunition with a range significantly less than that of items in
b) above but of course greater than that of ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.4. These items are
hereafter called rounds of HD 1.2.2.

(d) Subdivisions for Storage

It is important not to exaggerate the significance of the value of 0.71 kg used in b) and c) above. It was based
on a break point in the database supporting the Quantity Distance relationships and tables and the NEQ of the
rounds tested. If comprehensive data is available for a particular item, then the item may be placed in that
category of HD 1.2 supported by the data and allocated the relevant Quantity Distances. It may also be
necessary to take into account the vulnerability of ammunition, explosives and buildings at the ES under
consideration, see Part II, Chapter 5, Section II.

(e) Number of Fragments and Lobbed Items at an Exposed Site

Following the initiation of an event in storage there will be a delay before there are any violent events and
projections. This delay will be highly dependent on the nature, dimensions and packaging of the items
involved. For 40mm HE rounds it can be as short as two or three minutes and for 105mm HE rounds 15-20
minutes. Once ammunition starts to react the rate of reactions increases rapidly and then decreases more slowly.
Reactions may still occur hours after the event. The ability of the storage structure at the PES to contain the
fragments etc will determine both in time and density the effects at the exposed site. For medium and lightly
constructed PES where, at some stage, walls and/or roofs will be destroyed, the modifying effect of the building
on the fragmentation is not taken into account. In the light of the indeterminacy of the fragmentation effects
both in time and quantity, fire fighting will, in general, be inadvisable. However the installation of automatic
fire-fighting arrangements could be invaluable from the stock preservation and event containment points of
view. Evacuation from PTR and beyond may be possible. However the quantity-distances given at Annex A
assume no amelioration from fire-fighting or evacuation. They are based on the total fragmentation at the
exposed site from the event at the PES.

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f) Arrangements for Fire-Fighting

The levels of protection afforded by the Inter-Magazine Distances in Annex A are based on the fragment
density at the Exposed Site for the total incident and the degree of protection afforded by the structure at
the Exposed Site. It is assumed that an incident involving Hazard Division 1.2 cannot be promptly curtailed
by fire-fighting. It is considered unlikely that any significant attempts could be made to fight a fire
involving Hazard Division 1.2 explosives as it is anticipated that such efforts would have to be made from
such a distance and from behind protective cover so as to make those efforts ineffective. In addition some
storage areas are too remote from professional fire-fighting services, and other lack suitable protective
cover from behind which firemen could even attempt to attack a fire involving ammunition of Hazard
Division 1.2. The levels of protection take into account the fact that the Explosives Area is endangered by
firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition which would most likely propagate fire or explosion if the
quantity-distances were insufficient. The available fire-fighting effort should be directed at preventing the
spread of fire and the subsequent propagation of explosions.
Fuller recommendations are given in Chapter 4, Part II of the Manual.

Situations which require no QDs

(g) Where either the PES or the ES is an earth covered building or a building which can contain the effects
generated in an accidental explosion of the HD 1.2 then, in general, no Q-Ds are necessary. The separation to
other explosive storehouses, explosive workshops, public traffic routes or inhabited buildings will be dependent
on constructional details, access for rescue and fire-fighting personnel or other administrative arrangements.
For public traffic routes and inhabited buildings consideration should be given to the use of fixed distances of
30 m for ammunition of HD 1.2.2 or 60 m for HD 1.2.1. However where there is an aperture such as a door in
the PES and the ES has either an unprotected and undefined door pointing towards the PES or offers little or no
protection to its contents then the Q-Ds recommended at Annex A Table 2 column b should be applied.

1.3.1.6. Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.3

a) General

Annex A, Tables 3A and 3B give Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances for ammunition and explosives
of Hazard Division 1.3 but the selection of appropriate quantity-distances requires separate consideration
of two types of explosives, namely propellants (Compatibility Group C) and other items (Compatibility
Group G). Although many hazardous effects are common to both types, the dominant hazards used as the
basis of certain quantity-distances are different in the two cases hence there are two tables.

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b) Explosives producing a mass fire effect

The explosives producing a mass fire effect are likely to be propellants which produce a fireball with
intense radiant heat, fire brands and some fragments. The firebrands may be massive fiery chunks of
burning propellant. (The effect of quite normal winds may augment a calculated flame radius by 50 %. A
building with marked asymmetry of construction such as an igloo or building with protective roof and
walls, but with one relatively weak wall or a door, induces very directional effects from the flames and the
projection of burning packages.)

c) Ammunition and Explosives not Producing a Mass Fire Effect

Items other than propellants produce a moderate fire with moderate projections and firebrands. The
projections include fragments but these are less hazardous than those which characterize Hazard Division
1.2.

1.3.1.7. Distances for Hazard Division 1.4

Separation distances from ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.4 are not a function of the NEQ.
Separation distances prescribed by fire regulations apply.

1.3.1.8. Inter-Magazine Distances - General Considerations

a) These distances are the minimum permissible distances between PES and storage sites containing ammunition
or explosives. These distances are intended to provide specified degrees of protection to the ammunition and
explosives at the ES. The degree of protection is highly dependent upon factors such as sensitiveness of
explosives, type of ammunition, type of packaging, and type and construction of building at the PES or ES or
both. In general the provision of stronger buildings allows the use of smaller quantity-distances for a given
degree of protection, or achieves a better standard of protection at a given distance, especially in the case of a
PES containing ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 or 1.2.

b) The selection of the optimum combination of types of construction of the buildings, quantity-distance and
degree of protection involves a balance between the cost of construction, the availability and cost of land,
and the value of the stocks of ammunition and explosives which might be rendered unserviceable at ES in
the event of an accident at the PES. The hazard divisions and compatibility groups of the ammunition and
explosives and the need for flexibility in the use of the sites should be taken into account.

c) The following paragraphs describe the levels of protection corresponding to common combinations of
buildings or stacks and quantity-distances for each hazard division as a guide for decisions on the optimum
solution. These levels of protection are incorporated in the Inter-Magazine Distances in Annex A, Tables 1
to 3. Some entries in the tables show only one level of protection owing to a lack of information at the
present time. In a few cases it is not possible to predict the level of protection as it depends on the type of

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structure at the ES and the sensitiveness of its contents. An indication of the full range of possibilities is
given in Part II, Chapter 5.

1.3.1.9. Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.1

a) Protection of Stocks

The observed damage to stocks at an Exposed Site from an accidental explosion varies widely and,
although detailed prediction of such effects is outside the scope of this Manual, a measure of guidance is
given here. Since an igloo is designed to resist external blast, primary fragments or secondary projections,
the design ensures that the stocks survive and would be expected to generally remain serviceable.
However, at the D3-distances the ground shock may render unserviceable sensitive electrical and electronic
components of guided missiles, etc. For open stacks and buildings, other than those covered with earth, a
general assessment is that for distances less than D5-distances it is probable that, even though propagation
may not have taken place, the stocks are likely to be unserviceable and covered by debris from the
collapsed building. Stocks at D7-distances and greater are only likely to be serviceable if the building has
not suffered serious structural damage although some structural damage at the D7-distances, dependent on
the type of building, can be expected.

b) Alternative Levels of Protection at an ES

As described above, the igloo design affords extremely good protection to its contents. Weaker buildings
and open stacks would not be expected to give such good protection although concrete structures are
considered to be superior generally to brick from an Exposed Site point of view. The level of protection
also depends on the vulnerability or robustness of the ammunition stored at the Exposed Site and the type
of traversing used. The following paragraphs describe the three levels of protection which are incorporated
in Annex A, Table 1 and which are intended to provide an adequate basis for the selection of a particular
quantity-distance. Some entries in the table show only one level of protection due to a lack of data. The
three levels of protection are:

1) There is virtually complete protection against practically instantaneous propagation of explosion by

ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections. There are unlikely to be fires or subsequent
explosions caused by these effects or by lobbed ammunition. The stocks are likely to be serviceable.
However, ground shock may cause indirect damage and even explosions among specially vulnerable
types of ammunition or in conditions of saturated soil. These exceptional circumstances require
individual assessment rather than use of the quantity-distances in Annex A.2)There is a high degree of
protection against practically instantaneous propagation of explosion by ground shock, blast, flame and
high velocity projections. There are occasional fires or subsequent explosions caused by these effects or
by lobbed ammunition. Most of the stocks are likely to be serviceable although some are covered by
debris.

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3) There is only a limited degree of protection against practically instantaneous propagation of explosion
by ground shock, flame and high velocity projections. There are likely to be fires or subsequent
explosions caused by these effects or by lobbed ammunition. The stocks are likely to be heavily
damaged and rendered unserviceable; they are sometimes completely buried by debris. This level of
protection is not recommended for new construction.

1.3.1.10. Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.2

The Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.2 relate essentially to three levels of protection of
ammunition and explosives at an ES:

1) There is virtually complete protection against immediate or subsequent fires and explosions caused by blast,
flame, firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition. The stocks are likely to be serviceable.

2) There is a high degree of protection against immediate propagation of explosion by blast, flame,
projections and lobbed ammunition. The larger the donor event the lower will be the degree of protection
given, particularly where ammunition with NEQ greater than 0.71 kg is involved, propagation becoming
more likely the longer the event continues. Local fire fighting measures may reduce stock losses. The use
of this level of protection is penalised in Table 2 by the imposition of D5 (for HD 1.2.2) and D6 (for HD
1.2.1) inter magazine separation distances between unprotected stacks of ammunition. It is likely that
stocks at the ES will not survive as a result of subsequent propagation.

3) There is only a limited degree of protection against immediate or subsequent propagation of explosion by
blast, flame and projections and lobbed ammunition. The protection afforded may be minimal when the
donor event involves large quantities of ammunition and continues for a prolonged period. Local fire
fighting measures will be essential to the preservation of stocks. The use of this level of protection is
penalised in the Table 2 by the imposition of D5 (for HD 1.2.2) and D6 (for HD 1.2.1) inter magazine
separation distances between unprotected stacks of ammunition. The stocks at the ES will not survive as a
result of subsequent propagation.

1.3.1.11. Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.3

The Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.3 relate essentially to two levels of protection of
ammunition and explosives at an ES:

1) There is virtually complete protection against immediate or subsequent fires among the contents of an ES
by flame, radiant heat, firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition. There may be ignition of

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combustible parts of the building but this is unlikely to spread to the contents even if it were not possible to
provide prompt and effective fire-fighting services.

2) There is a high degree of protection against immediate propagation of fire to the contents of an ES by
flame, radiant heat, firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition. There is a considerable risk that one or
more of these effects, especially lobbed ammunition, is likely to ignite the contents directly or as the result
of ignition of combustible parts of the building unless effective fire-fighting is able to prevent such
consequences.

1.3.1.12. Explosives Workshop Distances

a) General Considerations

These distances are the minimum permissible distances between Potential Explosion Sites and explosive
workshops. The distances are intended to provide a reasonable degree of immunity for personnel within the
explosives workshops from the effects of a nearby explosion, such as blast, flame, radiant heat and
projections. Light structures are likely to be severely damaged, if not completely destroyed. These
distances also provide a high degree of protection against immediate or subsequent propagation of
explosion.

b) Explosive Workshop Distance for HD 1.1

1) For HD 1.1 the standard Explosive Workshop Distance should be the D10 distances prescribed
in Annex A Table 1. At this distance the major effects to be considered are the peak side-on
overpressure, which is anticipated to be no greater than 20 kPa (3 psi) and debris, which is
extremely difficult to quantify, but would be a very significant effect.

2) When siting and designing explosive workshops the following effects should be borne in mind
amongst others. A person in a building designed to withstand the anticipated blast loading and
without windows would be merely startled by the noise of the explosion at an adjacent site
whereas a person in a brick building with windows might suffer eardrum damage or suffer
indirect injuries through his translation by blast and subsequent impact on hard objects or
through possible collapse of the building upon him.

3) Where the quantity-distance tables specify a Explosive Workshop Distance less than 270 m this
may not give protection to personnel in explosive workshops having light roofs from debris
projected from the Potential Explosion Site. Therefore consideration should be given to
maintaining this 270 m distance as the minimum separation from the nearest storage site
containing explosives of HD 1.1, in order to provide additional protection from debris.

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c) Explosive Workshop Distance for HD 1.2

1) Since debris and/or fragmentation hazards are considered to be dominant for HD 1.2 and the
Inhabited Building Distance is based on an appreciation of this hazard then the Explosive Workshop
Distance is generally determined as 36% of the IBD.

2) However where the PES is an earth covered building or a building which can contain the effects
generated in an accidental explosion of the HD 1.2 then no Q-Ds are necessary to adjacent explosive
workshops although the separation between them and the explosive storehouses will be dependent on
constructional details and access for rescue and fire-fighting personnel.

3) Where the PES is an earth covered building or a building which can contain the effects generated in
an accidental explosion of the HD 1.2 but has a door or other aperture in the direction of the ES then
the Explosive Workshop Distance is determined as 36% of the IBD.

4) Where the explosive workshop is protected by a traverse and has a protective roof it is considered
that the occupants are afforded a high degree of protection which decreases to limited if the building
is either not traversed or does not have a protective roof. In the absence of any protective features,
such as a traverse or a protective roof, not only is the level of protection limited but it is
recommended that such explosive workshops should only be sited at an increased separation
equivalent to PTR.

d) Explosive Workshop Distance for HD 1.3

1) For the more hazardous explosives of HD 1.3, the D2 distances prescribed at Annex A Table 3A
should be used.

2) For the less hazardous explosives of HD 1.3 the distances are fixed values given in Annex A Table
3B.

1.3.1.13. Separation of Explosives Workshops from Storage Sites

The D10-distances in Annex A, Table 1 less than 270 m may not give protection to personnel in Explosives
Workshops having light roofs. If greater protection is required against projections than that The D10-distances in
Annex A, Table 1 less than 270 m may not give protection to personnel in Explosives Workshops having light roofs. If
greater protection is required against projections than that provided by D10-distances for example to protect personnel
and valuable test equipment, then the workshop must be provided with a protective roof. If there is a possibility of a
serious fragment hazard then consideration should be given to observing a minimum separation distance of 270 m

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between Explosives Workshops having light roofs and storage sites containing ammunition and explosives of Hazard
Division 1.1 as is already required in certain circumstances.

1.3.1.14. Public Traffic Route Distances (PTRD)

a) General Considerations

1) These distances are the minimum permissible distances between a Potential Explosion site and routes
used by the general public, which are generically referred to as Public Traffic Routes. These routes
include :

Roads

Railways

Waterways, including rivers, canals and lakes, and

Footpaths

2) Where debris or fragmentation hazards are considered to be dominant and the Inhabited Building
Distance is based on an appreciation of this hazard then the PTR is determined as 67% (or 2/3) of the
IBD. This rule is applied to both HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 situations. Attempts have been made within
AC 258 to determine a relationship between debris hazards for IBD and PTR without success
primarily because the variation of hazard with distance is too dependent on the specific hazard
generator.

3) It is important to appreciate that PTR’s or common access areas should not be treated independently
of each other or of any other constraints around an explosives site. They should be viewed within the
overall picture and the above guidelines used to indicate whether a particular situation is likely to be
worth consideration. Ideally a full risk analysis should be conducted to ascertain how these
additional risks would fit into the overall risk picture. Only then can informed decisions be made
regarding the soundness of a particular license.

b) Traffic Density Considerations

1) Since the exposed sites presented by public traffic routes are so diverse three alternatives are
provided as follows :

The use of full IBD protection for heavily used routes

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The use of a reduced Public Traffic Route distance, generally 2/3 of the appropriate IBD for less
heavily used routes, and

The use of a lower distance for routes which are used intermittently or infrequently by low
numbers of people.

2) The dominant factors which determine the number and severity of road casualties are the traffic
speed and density, the width of traffic lanes and their number, the presence of crash barriers, the
surface condition and the radius of any curves. Factors of less importance are the presence or
absence of roadside trees and ditches and of separated carriageways for opposing traffic. For other
types of routes it is essentially the density and speed of the “traffic” which are the critical factors.

3) Because of the variety of waterway borne traffic some cognisance may need to be taken of special
factors, e.g. passenger carrying ferries which, although traversing the hazarded area much quicker
than other craft, may merit special consideration because of the number of passengers carried.

1.3.1.15. Inhabited Building Distances

a) General

These distances are the minimum permissible distances between PES and inhabited buildings or assembly
places. The distances are intended to prevent serious structural damage by blast, flame or projections to
ordinary types of inhabited buildings (23 cm brick or equivalent) or caravans and consequent death or
serious injuries to their occupants.

b) Inhabited Building Distances for Hazard Division 1.1.

1) The distances for Hazard Division 1.1 are based on tolerable levels of damage expected from a
side-on overpressure of 5 kPa. They are intended to ensure that the debris produced in an
accidental explosion does not exceed one lethal fragment (energy > 80 J) per 56 m² at the
Inhabited Building Distance. They are not sufficiently large to prevent breakage of glass and
other frangible panels or cladding used in the three types of buildings of vulnerable construction.
This broken glass, cladding etc. can cause injury to occupants and those in the immediate
vicinity of the buildings. Such buildings of vulnerable construction should be situated as
follows:

(a) Types 1 and 2: are considered to be of similar vulnerability and such buildings should
normally be situated at distances not less than two times Inhabited Building Distances (i.e.
> 44.4 Q1/3) (see paragraph 1.3.7.6.). However, such buildings, but probably not schools or
hospitals, may be acceptable within the 44.4 Q1/3 distances, particularly if the population
outside the building (on whom the displaced glass etc. would fall) is small or virtually nil.

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When vulnerable buildings have been allowed within the 44.4 Q1/3 distances on these
grounds, it will be necessary to check at regular intervals that the original conditions (i.e.
area around building free of people) have not changed.

(b) Type 3: presents a difficult problem and it is intended to cover the multiplicity of new
construction types which have been introduced since the curtain wall concept was first
thought of. Each such building has to be treated on its merits, the hazard assessed and an
appropriate quantity-distance selected. It is likely, however, that this will be in the 44.4 Q1/3
region.

2) The Australian/UK Stack Fragmentation trials in the late 1980s have demonstrated that, for a
Net Explosives Quantity of less than 5 600 kg, if the Potential Explosion Site is of light
construction, typically 230 mm brick or equivalent or less, and traversed, then the hazard from
projection is tolerable at D12-distances subject to a minimum of 270 m. However, if a medium
or heavy walled construction, typically 200 mm concrete or greater, is employed at the Potential
Explosion Site, then the hazard from projection requires a minimum separation distance of 400
m. For a Net Explosives Quantity greater than 5 600 kg, the prescribed Inhabited Building
Distance D13 will provide an acceptable degree of protection from both blast and projections.
These trials also demonstrate that the hazard from projections is not constant and shows a
marked directional effect. Basically, there is a very low density of projections in directions
directly away from the corners of the structure. The projection density rises almost as an
exponential function to a maximum in the direction normal to any face of the structure. This is
repeated on all sides of the structure irrespective of whether the structure is traversed or not. It is
extremely difficult to interpret the results to give general guidelines and it is advised that where
it is considered that siting of the Exposed Site with respect to the Potential Explosion Site might
be beneficial, then the Stack Trial results should be considered in detail for each specific case.

3) A 400 m minimum Inhabited Building Distance is required to protect against structural debris
from igloos, other earth-covered structures or untraversed buildings.

4) The distances for explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 are based on the behaviour of typical
packaged military explosives. They take account of trials using bulk demolition explosives in
wooden boxes or pallets in open stacks. In certain special circumstances, for Net Explosives
Quantities of less than 4 500 kg, these distances would be unduly conservative, since hazardous
projections cannot arise. Such circumstances may occur at test sites and factories where bulk
explosives, devoid of metal casing or components, are in fibreboard packagings, not on pallets,
and are either in open stacks or in light frangible buildings. In these special circumstances use
D13-distances, as appropriate, without any overriding minimum distance for projections.
5) There is a significant hazard even at 270 m from ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division
1.1 due to fragments and a considerable amount of debris unless these projections are

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intercepted by structural protection. This hazard may be tolerable for sparsely populated areas,
where there would be a small expectation of damage and injury from such projections, but in
densely populated areas considerations should be given to the use of a minimum Inhabited
Building Distance of 400 m. This distance is required for earth-covered magazines and for
heavy-walled buildings.

c) Inhabited Building Distances for Hazard Division 1.2.

The distances for Hazard Division 1.2 are based on an acceptable risk for fragments. Under normal conditions
D1- or D2-distances given in Annex A, Table 2 must be used for inhabited buildings. A fixed distance of 180
m or 270 m, as appropriate, independent of quantity, is permitted if arrangements are made to evacuate or
shelter in an emergency persons who may be located within the D1- or D2-distances as appropriate. However,
in any case, the D1- or D2-distances must be used for hospitals, schools, churches, factories etc..

d) Inhabited Building Distances for Hazard Division 1.3.

1) The distances for Hazard Division 1.3 are based on a thermal flux criterion of 1.5 cal per cm². It
is anticipated that occupants of traditional types of inhabited buildings would not suffer injury
unless standing in front of windows; such persons and other in the open are likely to experience
reddening of any exposed skin areas.

If venting from the Potential Explosion Site is directed towards the Exposed Sites at Inhabited
Building Distances, then a minimum distance of 60 m should be employed.

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Section II - Determination of Quantity-Distances

1.3.2.1. Quantity-Distances Tables

a) The quantity-distances required for each hazard division are given in tables in Annex A, Section II.

b) For an intermediate quantity between those given in the tables, the next greater distance in the tables
should be used when determining a quantity-distance. Conversely the next lesser quantity in the tables
should be used when determining an explosives quantity limit for a given intermediate distance,
alternatively, the distances corresponding to an intermediate quantity may be either calculated from the
distance function shown in the tables of Annex A or found by interpolation and then rounded up in
accordance with Annex A, Section I, paragraph 2.

c) Quantity-distances for a quantity of explosives greater than 250 000 kg are determined by extrapolation
using the appropriate formula in Part II, Annex A, as far as the explosives safety factors are concerned, but
adequate consideration should be given to the economic and logistic implications of such a large quantity
in a single storage site.

d) The tables in Annex A provide quantity-distances for an earth-covered magazine up to 250 000 kg NEQ.
However, certain designs of earth-covered magazines require a lower limit in the case of Hazard Division
1.1. The reason is that the blast load from an exploding earth-covered magazine is a function of the NEQ,
whereas the blast resistance of an exposed earth-covered magazine depends on its design. The limitation
for a particular earth-covered magazine must be obtained from the design authority.

e) Examples of the use of the quantity-distance tables are given in Annex A, Section III.

1.3.2.2. Measuring of Quantity-Distances

a) Quantity-distances are measured from the nearest point of the PES to the nearest point of the ES. Distances
are measured along a straight line without regard to barricades.

b) Where the total quantity of ammunition and explosives in a storage site or explosives workshop is so
separated into stacks that the possibility of mass explosion is limited to the quantity in any one stack,
distances are measured from the outside of the wall adjacent to the controlling explosives stack to the
nearest outside wall of another structure. If the separation to prevent mass explosion is provided by one or
more substantial dividing walls, then the distances are measured from these walls, if appropriate, instead of
from the outside walls of the building. Where not so separated the total quantity subject to mass explosion
is used for quantity-distance computations.

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1.3.2.3 Net Explosives Quantity

a) The total Net Explosives Quantity of ammunition in a single PES is used for the computation of quantity-
distances unless it has been determined that the effective quantity is significantly different from the actual
NEQ.

b) Where two or more PES are not separated by the appropriate Inter-Magazine Distances, they are
considered as a single site and the aggregate NEQ is used for determining Quantity-Distances. If two or
more hazard divisions are involved the principles in paragraph 1.3.2.5. apply.

c) The total explosives content of rounds or ammunition classified as HD 1.2 is used in the computation of the
NEQ for quantity-distance purposes.

d) The quantity of single base (NC) propellants, having a web size of 0.5 mm or more, in fixed or semifixed
ammunition and mortar ammunition in Hazard Division 1.1 is excluded from the total NEQ used for
computation of quantity-distances, except where this ammunition is stored underground or in an earth-
covered magazine. (Joint UK/US tests with small stacks of ammunition in the open have shown that such
propellants do not contribute significantly to the blast from the high explosives in the projectiles. The
effects of severe confinement as in underground storage or in an earth-covered magazine are not known).

e) The effects with double- or triplebase propellants require specific evaluation.

1.3.2.4. Determination of Quantity-Distances

a) The location of buildings or stacks containing ammunition or explosives with respect to each other and to
other ES is based on the total NEQ in the individual buildings or stacks unless this total quantity is so
subdivided that an incident involving any one of the smaller concentrations cannot produce a practically
instantaneous explosion of the whole contents of the building or stack.

b) The quantity-distances required from each of two or more nearby storage sites or explosives workshops to
contain ammunition and explosives of one hazard division are only determined by considering each as a
PES. The quantity of explosives permitted in the storage sites or explosives workshops is limited to the
least amount allowed by the appropriate table for distances separating the storage sites or explosives
workshops concerned.

c) The quantity-distances required from each of two or more nearby storage sites to contain given quantities
of ammunition and explosives of different hazard divisions at different times are determined as follows:

1. Consider each building or stack, in turn, as a PES.

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2. Refer to the table of each hazard division which can be stored in the building or stack considered as a
PES.

3. Determine the quantity-distances for each hazard division as the minimum to be required from the
building or stack.

4. Record the quantity-distances in terms of each hazard division in each instance as those to be required
from the building or stack.

d) Alternatively calculate the permitted quantity of each hazard division based upon the available distances.

1.3.2.5. Required Quantity-Distances of Ammunition or Explosives of more than one Hazard Division in a
Single Site

When ammunition or explosives of different hazard divisions are kept in a single site at the same time, the
required quantity-distances are determined as follows using the Q-D Tables in Annex A, Section II:

1) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Division 1.4 are kept in the same site as ammunition or
explosives of one or more other hazard divisions, the Hazard Division 1.4 is ignored subject to the
overriding requirement of 25 m where appropriate, see Annex A, Section II, paragraph 9.

2) When different types of ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 are kept in the same site, the required quantity-
distance is that given for the aggregate quantity taken as the more hazardous type (see subparagraph
1.3.1.5.b)).

3) When different types of ammunition of Hazard Division 1.3 are kept in the same site, the required quantity-
distance is that given for the aggregate quantity requiring the largest quantity-distance in Tables 3A or 3B
(see subparagraphs 1.3.1.6.a) - c)).

4) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 and 1.2 are kept in the same site, determine the
quantity-distance for the aggregate quantity (i.e. the total quantity of Hazard Divisions 1.1 and 1.2)
considered as Hazard Division 1.1. Next determine the quantity-distance for the aggregate quantity
considered as Hazard Division 1.2, taking account of 2) above, when appropriate. The required quantity-
distance is the greater of these two distances.

5) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 and 1.3 are kept in the same site, determine the
quantity-distance for the aggregate quantity considered as Hazard Division 1.1. Next, determine the
quantity-distance for the aggregate quantity considered as Hazard Division 1.3. The required quantity-
distance is the greater of these two distances.

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6) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Division 1.2 and 1.3 are kept in the same site, determine the
quantity-distance for the amount of Hazard Division 1.2. Next, determine the quantity-distance for the
amount of Hazard Division 1.3. The required quantity-distance is the greater of these two distances.

7) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are kept in the same site, determine
the quantity-distance for the aggregate quantity considered as Hazard Division 1.1, next as Hazard Division
1.2 and finally as Hazard Division 1.3. The required quantity-distance is the greatest of these three
distances.

1.3.2.6. Permissible Quantities of Ammunition or Explosives of more than one Hazard Division in a Single Site

When ammunition or explosives of different hazard divisions are kept in a single site at the same time the
permissible quantities are determined as follows using the Q-D Tables in Annex A, Section II:

1) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Division 1.4 are kept in the same site as ammunition or
explosives of one or more other hazard divisions, any quantity of Hazard Division 1.4 may be included
subject to the availability of the 25 m distance where appropriate, see Annex A, Section II, paragraph 9.

2) When different types of ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 are kept in the same site, the permissible
aggregate quantity is that given for the more hazardous type (see subparagraph 1.3.1.5.b)).

3) When different types of ammunition of Hazard Division 1.3 are kept in the same site, the permissible
aggregate quantity is the lower quantity in Tables 3A or 3B (see subparagraph 1.3.1.6.a) - c)).

4) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Divisions 1.1 and 1.2 are kept in the same site, the permissible
aggregate quantity of Hazard Division 1.2 is determined as described in 2) above. Next, determine the
permissible quantity of Hazard Division 1.1. The permissible quantity of the combined hazard divisions is
the smaller of these two quantities.

5) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Divisions 1.1 and 1.3 are kept in the same site, determine the
permissible quantity for each hazard division. The permissible quantity of the combined hazard divisions is
the smaller of these two quantities.

6) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Divisions 1.2 and 1.3 are kept in the same site, determine the
permissible quantity for each hazard division separately. The two quantities may be stored together
independently.

7) When ammunition or explosives of Hazard Division 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are kept in the same site, determine
the permissible quantity of Hazard Division 1.1 alone, next, the permissible quantity of Hazard Division

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1.2 alone, and finally the permissible quantity of Hazard Division 1.3 alone. The permissible quantity of
the combined hazard divisions is the smallest of these three quantities.

1.3.2.7. Relaxation of Quantity-Distances

a) Interior Quantity-Distances

1) Relaxation of Inter-Magazine Distances may result in the total loss of stocks in other buildings or stacks
or at least their being rendered unserviceable. Furthermore, a much larger explosion may result than
that used as basis for Exterior Quantity-Distances. Disastrous damage to property and injury to the
general public may be the consequence.

2) Relaxation of Explosives Workshop Distances may be permitted when a specially constructed building
is available to protect against blast and debris or where the number of persons in the workshop is small.

b) Exterior Quantity-Distances

Relaxation of Exterior Quantity-Distances may increase the hazard to life and property. Relaxation should
therefore be permitted only with the written consent of the appropriate authorities (see also subparagraph
1.1.1.1.d)).

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Section III - Quantity-Distances for Certain Types of Ammunition and Explosives

1.3.3.1. Barricaded Stacks of Ammunition

a) Stacks (Modules) of Bombs etc.

D1-distances up to 30 000 kg and D2-distances from 30 001 to 120 000 kg as shown in Annex A, Section II,
Table 1 may be used between unboxed bombs of Hazard Division 1.1 under the following conditions:

1) The stacks are to be separated by effective earth barricades.

2) The bombs must be relatively strong so as to withstand intense air shock without being crushed.

3) There should be the minimum of flammable dunnage etc., which could catch alight and lead to
subsequent mass explosion of a stack.

4) When the D1-distances are used then the stacking height must not exceed 1 m.

In the event of an explosion in one stack the distances will provide a high degree of protection against
simultaneous detonation of bombs in adjacent stacks. Some of the bombs in the ES may be buried and not
immediately accessible, some may be slightly damaged. There may be occasional fires and delayed low
order explosions, particularly if the bombs are stacked on concrete storage pads.

b) Other Unpackaged Ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1

In principle, the foregoing distances and conditions may be applicable to other kinds of unboxed ammunition of
Hazard Division 1.1 and Compatibility Group D. An example is the 155 mm shell M107 which has a robust steel
casing and a relatively insensitive high explosive filling. Each case must be judged on its merits, using ad hoc tests
or analogy with existing test data as requisite.

c) Cluster Bomb Units

Tests have shown that certain packaged cluster bomb units (CBU) may be stored safely in accordance with
subparagraph a) above. In this case, it is the robust containers rather than the heavy casings which prevent
sympathetic detonation between stacks. Each type of bomblet and container must be carefully assessed to
ensure a satisfactory combination for the application of this modular storage.

d) Buffered Storage

1) Tests have shown that stacks of certain types of bombs can be stored in the same facility in such a
manner separated by using buffer materials (ammunition as well as inert materials), that even though a
high order detonation will propagate through one stack it will not propagate to the second stack.
Storage under these conditions presents the risk of explosion of a single stack only, rather than a mass

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risk involving all the stacks in one module, cell, or building. Hence, the Net Explosives Quantity
(NEQ) of the larger stack plus the NEQ of the "buffer" material, if any, may be used to determine the
quantity-distances requirement for each entire module or building so used.

2) The storage of bombs using the buffered storage concept and basing the NEQ of storage on the NEQ of
the largest stack plus the buffer material is authorized provided nationally approved storage
arrangements are used. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section I.

1.3.3.2. Unbarricaded Stacks of TNT or Amatol Filled Shell

Certain types of TNT or Amatol filled projectiles of Hazard Division 1.1 may be stored in stacks which
comply with the principle that, although a high order detonation would propagate throughout a stack, it would be
unlikely to propagate from stack to stack. Storage under these conditions presents the risk of explosion of a single stack
only, rather than a mass risk involving all the stacks in one module or building. Hence the NEQ of the appropriate
single stack may be used to determine the quantity-distances for each entire module or building so used. The special
types of projectiles and the conditions are given in Part II, Chapter 3, Section I.

1.3.3.3. Unbarricaded Storage of Fixed Ammunition with Robust Shell

Trials show that ammunition comprising robust shell with an explosive content not exceeding about 20 % of the
total weight (excluding propelling charges, cartridge cases and weight of packages) and with shell-walls sufficiently
thick to prevent perforation by fragments produced by ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1 may be stored without
barricades without the risk of practically instantaneous explosion provided an increased quantity-distance is used.

1.3.3.4. Complete Rounds

Complete rounds of fixed or semifixed ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1 involve also the risk of Hazard
Division 1.2. Therefore, the greater of the distances given in Annex A, Table 1 or Table 2 is observed.

1.3.3.5. Propulsive Rockets

Rockets stored in a propulsive state (i.e. unpackaged propulsive rockets and missiles in the assembled
condition, waiting to be placed upon a tactical launcher or vehicle) present special problems in which the flight range of
the rocket is the main safety criterion rather than the explosive content. Consequently the rockets should be stored in
special buildings or held by devices to prevent their flight (see Part II, Chapter 3, Section II). The quantity-distances for
the appropriate hazard division apply only when these conditions are met, except for the special case of missiles on the
launchers at a missile installation (see Part IV, Chapter 3). Rockets or missiles in either an assembled or unassembled
condition, when packaged as for storage and transport, do not in practice present the risk of significant flight.

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1.3.3.6. Storage of Very Sensitive Explosives

It is possible for the blast at an ES to cause practically instantaneous initiation of packaged primary explosive
substances and certain other very sensitive explosive substances like blasting gelatine even when barricaded at the D4-
distances in Annex A, Table 1. Storage conditions for such explosives are assessed individually taking account of the
protection afforded by packaging and the building at the ES.

1.3.3.7. Storage of Depleted Uranium (DU) Ammunition

Quantity-distances will, in general, be those appropriate to the Hazard Classification of the particular
ammunition stored. In some cases a special radiological safety distance may be required between a storehouse and the
nearest point of public access if it is estimated that the adverse radiological/toxic effects of an atmospheric dispersion of
DU could give rise to a possibility of injury to a member of the public comparable to that caused by the explosive
components of the ammunition. In such a case the more restricted of the two distances, the radiological safety distance
or the explosives quantity-distance, shall be the one applied.

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Section IV - Quantity-Distances for Certain

Exposed Sites

1.3.4.1. Separation of Miscellaneous Occupied Buildings and Facilities

in an Explosives Area

Buildings containing empty packages or other inert materials should be separated from a PES by a distance
based on the risk to the ammunition and explosives from a fire in the empty packages or other inert materials (minimum
distance 25 m). Special consideration should be given to the separation of high value packages from a PES.

1.3.4.2. Criteria for Siting of Holding, Marshalling and Interchange Yards

a) Holding Yards

Each holding yard is considered to be a PES. Quantity-Distances and/or explosive limits are
determined as for storage sites.

b) Marshalling Yards

1) Appropriate Inter-Magazine Distances must be applied to protect a marshalling yard from

external explosions.

2) It is not necessary to treat a marshalling yard as a PES provided the vehicles are moved
expeditiously from the yard. If a yard is used at any time for purposes other than marshalling,
e.g. holding, it is considered to be a PES and appropriate quantity-distances as for storage site
applied.

c) Interchange Yards

It is not necessary to treat an interchange yard as a PES, provided the vehicles are moved
expeditiously from the yard. However, if a yard is used at any time for a purpose other than
interchange, it is considered to be a PES and appropriate quantity-distances applied.

1.3.4.3. Separation of Pipelines etc from an Explosives Area

a) Aboveground Facilities

For the separation of POL facilities: see Chapter 5.

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b) Underground Pipelines

For the separation of underground pipelines: see Chapter 5.

1.3.4.4. Separation of Electric Supply and Communications Systems from an Explosives Area

There may be mutual hazards created by siting an explosives area near to high voltage transmission lines,
powerful transmitters, vital communications lines etc. Each case must be assessed individually to take account of the
voltage and power involved, the importance of the transmission lines, the time for the necessary repairs and the
consequences of losing communications at a time when assistance may be required following an explosion. The
assessment should be based on the following factors:

1) Hazard from the Ammunition or Explosives

The Public Traffic Route Distance is a reasonable separation, subject to a minimum of 60 m, to protect
public service or military emergency communication lines and overhead electrical power transmission lines
exceeding 15 kV or associated substations. Particularly important installations such as the lines of a
supergrid network should be given greater protection from fragments and debris by affording them one or
even one and a half times the Inhabited Building Distance. This increased separation is also appropriate for
microwave, ultra high frequency (UHF) reflectors which would be vulnerable to damage by air shock or
debris and fragments. Minor transmission and communication lines such as those serving the buildings of
the explosives area, may be sited in accordance with subparagraph 2) below.2)Hazard to the Ammunition
or Explosives

The quantity-distances determined on the basis of 1) above should be reviewed in the light of a possible
hazard from electrical lines and transmitters to the ammunition and explosives themselves. If any overhead
transmission line approaches nearer to a building containing ammunition or explosives than one span
between the poles or pylons, consideration should be given to the consequences of mechanical failure in
the line. Arcing and large leakage currents may be set up before the supply could be isolated. An
overriding minimum separation of 15 m is prudent. Generating stations and substations should be at least
45 m from any building containing ammunition or explosives in view of the small but real risk of fire,
explosions or burning oil in such electrical equipment. Powerful transmitters of electromagnetic energy
may hazard electrically initiated ammunition. See Chapter 6.

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1.3.4.5. Explosives Storage Site/Depot Safety

a) Protective Zones Around a Depot or Storage Site.

Subject to national regulations it is advisable that any depot or Potential Explosion Site be surrounded by
zones, out to the distance at which the hazard is considered tolerable, within which construction is
controlled or made subject to special authorization.

b) Procedures for Safety Site Plans.

1) Since all explosives areas require quantity-distance (QD) separations, a safety site plan
is necessary to demonstrate these separation distances are provided before construction
commences, or explosives are deployed into any given area. Maps and drawings will
demonstrate graphically that separation distances are in compliance with appropriate
tables in this Manual. The damaging effects of potential explosions may also be altered
by barricades and specialized construction features. Site plan submissions will also
demonstrate when these features exist and provide details for review by safety
authorities. The following kinds of information constitute a safety site plan:(a) A Q-D
schedule providing the hazard division and net explosive quantity (NEQ) assigned to
each potential explosion site (PES).

(b) A map of the explosives area in relation to other internal facilities and buildings,
surrounding villages, highways and cities (exterior Q-D).

(c) Drawings showing the location of explosives buildings in relation to one another
(interior Q-D).

(d) Drawings showing details of construction features which affect quantity-distances

2) The NATO force sponsoring the new facility should require the preparation of a safety site plan
and its submission through appropriate military and national authorities for review and approval.
Normally, the military command planning to use the new facility will provide the specific details
to support preparation of the site plan document. However, administrative details are properly
the business of individual member nations. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that
documentation is provided for competent review before funds are committed.

1.3.4.6. Levels of Protection

A more detailed examination of the levels of protection afforded by the quantity-distances given in Annex A,
Tables 1-3B, and of the structures and activities considered acceptable at each protection level is given in Section VII
for Hazard Division 1.1.

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Section V - Storage Buildings: General Principles and Influence on Quantity-Distances

1.3.5.1. General

a) It is not considered practicable to construct surface buildings which withstand direct attack by hostile
activities but in order to reduce the hazards and the quantity-distances as far as practicable, certain
precautions in building construction should be observed.

b) The construction of buildings for one hazard division only is uneconomic. Buildings may be used for
storage of different hazard divisions because storage requirements vary in the course of time.

c) The distances in Annex A, Tables 1 to 3 are based on explosives safety. They do not take account of
structural requirements, space for roads and access for fire-fighting. These practical considerations may
require greater distances than given in the tables. Guidance on structural requirements is given in Part II,
Chapter 3, Section II.

1.3.5.2. Igloos

a) A storage site comprising igloos gives the simplest and safest set of Inter-Magazine Distances when it is a
rectangular array with the axes of the igloos parallel and the doors all facing in one direction. A front-to-
front configuration should be avoided since this requires a very large separation of the igloos. It may be
expedient to arrange the igloos back-to-back in two rows, but this configuration may be less flexible for
further development of the storage area.

b) Igloos which conform to the minimum design criteria in Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.2. qualify for reduced
Inter-Magazine Distances compared with other types of aboveground magazines and open stacks. Igloos of
a strength exceeding the minimum prescription may warrant further reductions in Inter-Magazine
Distances. Conversely, the earth-covered buildings described in Annex, subparagraph 6.d) require larger
Inter-Magazine Distances. It is for the National Authority to balance the cost of various types of
construction against the cost and availability of real estate and to determine the optimum balance in any
particular situation.

1.3.5.3. Blast Resistance of Structures at Exposed Sites

It may be possible for a structure at an ES to fail under blast loading so that its contents are initiated practically
instantaneously. This may be the result of major internal spalling from walls, implosion of the door(s) or catastrophic
failure of the entire structure. The quantity-distances in Annex A, Table 1 presume that a structure at an ES is designed
either to be strong enough to withstand the blast or to be so light that secondary projections from the structure do not

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initiate the contents taking account of their sensitiveness. An ES containing ammunition vulnerable to attack by heavy
spalling (e.g. missile warheads filled with relatively sensitive high explosives) requires special consideration, see Part
II, Chapter 5.

1.3.5.4. Influence of Protective Construction upon Quantity-Distances

a) A building with marked asymmetry of construction, such as an igloo or another building with protective
roof and walls, but with one relatively weak wall, induces very directional effects from the flames and the
projection of burning packages containing ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3. However, it
is assumed for simplicity that the effects from Hazard Division 1.3 are symmetrical about a PES, although
it is known that other structural characteristics and the wind can be significant.

b) Roofs may be designed to have special functions, such as:

1) Containment of fragments and prevention of lobbing of ammunition (the roof on a PES).

2) Shielding against blast, projections and lobbed ammunition (the roof on an ES).

The quantity-distances for buildings which contain fragments etc. depend upon the particular
design specifications. The reduced quantity-distances resulting from shielding roofs are
incorporated in the Tables in Annex A.

c) Walls may be designed to exclude firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition. The resultant reduced
quantity-distances are incorporated in the Tables in Annex A. However, a reduction often depends also on the
provision of shielding roofs

1.3.5.5. Construction to Contain Fragments and to Prevent Lobbing

a) The design of structures to contain projections or lobbed ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1 is an
extremely complicated procedure and, unless warranted due to other special circumstances, is prohibitive
in cost.

b) In practice, it is generally only feasible to design a structure when the NEQ is small or when the total
content of the building is divided into smaller units by dividing walls which prevent the mass explosion of
the entire content of the building in the event of explosion of one of the units. The design of a structure to
contain projections and lobbed ammunition represents a more stringent requirement than that for dividing
walls to prevent propagation.

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1.3.5.6. Structures to Protect from Flame, Projections and Lobbed Ammunition

a) Protection from Effects of Ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1

1) Protection against High Velocity Projections from the Explosion of Stacks of Ammunition
Ammunition stacks in the open or in buildings can produce high velocity projections during an
explosion. These projections may penetrate storage buildings and retain sufficient energy to
initiate the contents practically instantaneously. Certain of the Q-Ds in Annex A (igloos, rows 7,
8 and 9) presume that the roof, headwall and door(s) of igloos at the ES will arrest these high
velocity fragments. The presence of a barricade around the stack or building is always preferred
because of the increased protection given against attack by high velocity projections.

2) Protection against the Explosion on Impact of Lobbed Ammunition

In the case of accident or fire, ammunition may be lobbed from any of the PES in Table 1.
Ammunition is least likely to be lobbed from the PES described in columns a and b and more likely
to be lobbed as the PES description changes from c to f. These lobbed items may explode on impact
(see subparagraph 1.2.1.2.b)). The fragments from these may penetrate stacks in the open or in a
storage building and retain sufficient energy to initiate the stacks practically instantaneously.
Certain of the quantity-distances in Annex A (igloos, rows 7, 8 and 9) presume that the roof,
headwall and door(s) at the ES will arrest these high velocity fragments, but not necessarily
lobbed items larger than 155 mm shell (see subparagraph 1.2.1.2.b)). The presence of a
barricade around a building is always preferred and gives increased protection against the high
velocity projections, with the exception of those arising from items lobbed over the barricade.

b) Protection from Effects of Ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3

Certain types of construction provide a reasonable degree of protection against firebrands, comparatively
low velocity projections, and lobbed ammunition (see Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.3.). Examples are:

1. An earth-covered building with a headwall and door(s) of 15 cm reinforced concrete or equivalent.

2. A heavy-walled building.

3. A barricaded explosives workshop with a protective roof.

In such cases the smaller Interior Quantity-Distances in Annex A, Table 2 or Table 3 are used. If the door
or one weak wall etc. does not completely conform to the above requirements, such smaller distances
should only be authorized after a special assessment of the relative orientation of the weak elements and
the hazards involved.

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Section VI - Barricades: General Principles and Influence on Quantity-Distances

1.3.6.1. Functions of Barricades

a) An effective barricade arrests high velocity projections at low elevation from an explosion which otherwise
could cause direct propagation of the explosion.

b) A vertical faced barricade close to a PES also reduces the projection of burning packages, ammunition and
debris.

c) A barricade may also provide limited protection against blast and flame arising either from an external or
from an internal explosion when the quantity of explosives is relatively small as it usually is in explosives
workshops.

1.3.6.2. Influence of Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.1

a) Inter-Magazine Distances

An effective barricade avoids the use of very large Inter-Magazine Distances around a site containing
ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1. This is a significant factor in the cost of a depot. The reduced
quantity-distances are given in Annex A, Table 1.

b) Explosives Workshop Distances

An effective barricade avoids the use of large Explosives Workshop Distances from PES containing
ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1. A barricade or heavy wall around an explosives workshop considered
as an ES may provide some protection for personnel in the lee of the barricade.

c) Exterior Quantity-Distances

Investigation of damage caused by blast and projections in recorded accidents and trials shows that, in the
case of Hazard Division 1.1, the difference between the Exterior Quantity-Distances required for
barricaded and unbarricaded buildings or stacks respectively, is too small to be taken into account.

1.3.6.3. Influence of Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3

A barricade, other than a door barricade, does not itself generally provide sufficiently effective protection
against flame, radiant heat, projections and lobbed ammunition to justify a reduction of the Inter-Magazine Distances
around a PES containing Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3. However, to achieve flexibility in the use of sites, each one should
be effectively barricaded.

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1.3.6.4. Influence of Door Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.1

A door barricade is superfluous, as far as the use of Inter-Magazine Distances is concerned, when igloos or
other earth-covered buildings are sited side-to-side or rear-to-rear. When the front of such a building at an ES faces the
side or rear of an earth-covered building at a PES, a door barricade may intercept concrete debris but the major
consideration is the blast resistance of the headwall and door(s) at the ES and this is not much affected by the barricade.
When such buildings are sited front-to-front, a door barricade may be ineffective. As regards personnel hazards, a door
barricade of reasonable height does not intercept debris which is lobbed or projected at a high elevation.

1.3.6.5. Influence of Door Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.2

A fire in an earth-covered building containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 produces a serious hazard
through the doorway from fragments and ejected ammunition. This hazard is reduced by providing a separate barricade,
with a vertical wall facing the door. Such a barricade at an ES permits reduced distances shown in Annex A, Table 2.

1.3.6.6. Influence of Door Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.3

a) The deflagration of propellants in an igloo or similar earth-covered building produces marked directional
effects in the hazardous sector which is taken to be the area bounded by lines drawn from the centre of the
door and inclined 30° on either side of a perpendicular to the door. This hazard is reduced by a door
barricade, at the PES, which has a vertical wall facing the door and is preferably backed with earth. Such a
barricade permits the use of the reduced quantity-distances in Annex A, Table 3A. This door barricade is
not necessary when the door of the building at the PES faces an earth-covered rear or side wall of a
building at an ES, or faces an explosives workshop which has both a barricade and a protective roof.

b) The burning of items other than propellants in an igloo or similar earth-covered building produces a hazard
from fragments and projected items in the sector in front of the door. This hazard is reduced by providing a
separate barricade, with a vertical wall facing the door. Such a barricade at both a PES and at an ES
permits reduced distances shown in Annex A, Table 3B.

1.3.6.7. Quantity-distances between earth-covered buildings with common earth cover

a) In the case of a detonation, the type of earth cover between earth-covered buildings affects the load on the
acceptor igloo. The earth cover should be at least 0,6 m in depth. A slope of two to one, meaning one unit
of vertical rise for every two units of horizontal run is recommended for the earth cover. The earth should
comply with Part II, Para 2.3.3.3. An earth-covered building often provides virtually complete protection to
its contents from the effects of an incident at a potential explosion site (PES) containing ammunition and

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explosives of Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3. When two or more buildings share a common earth cover, the
amount of ammunition and explosives permitted in them is less than it would be if the buildings had
separate earth cover. This is due to the earth couple between the two PES´s, meaning the earth will transmit
the explosive shock loading with greater efficiency than air. In order to accommodate various types of
earth, the following Q-D is applied:

1) If the two earth covers intersect at a point 3/4 the height of the structures or higher, Column D5
distances apply.

2) If the two earth covers intersect at a point between 3/4 and 1/2 the height of the structures,
Column D4 distances apply.

3) If the two earth covers intersect at, or below, a point 1/2 the height of the structures, there is no
Q-D reduction and Column D3 applies.

These distances refer to earth-covered buildings as specified in Annex II B. In the case of unspecified
earth-covered buildings in principle Column D6 distance applies.

b) When earth-covered buildings, which meet the requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.7.a) and have an
internal volume exceeding 500 m3, are considered as PES, then for NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1
ammunition not exceeding 45 000 kg the following quantity-distances should be applied to side- and rear-
configurations only:

1) Inhabited Building Distances

D15-distances in Table 1 may be used from the sides of the earth-covered building (PES) and
D14-distances from the rear of the same building, but in no case must the quantity-distance be
less than 400 m. Definitions of front/rear/side configurations are given in Annex A, Section I,
Note 1.

2) Public Traffic Route Distances

The Public Traffic Route Distances may be reduced to 2/3 of the Inhabited Building Distances
(D14- and D15-distances respectively) as calculated in subparagraph 1), with a minimum of 270

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m. These distances (D16- and D17-distances) are shown in Table 1. However, the full Inhabited
Building Distances (D14- and D15-distances) with a minimum distance of 400 m should be
used, when necessary, in accordance with subparagraph 1.3.1.15.b).

1.3.6.8. Partly Barricaded Buildings or Stacks

Partly barricaded buildings or stacks are considered effectively barricaded only when both ends of the
barricade extend 1 m beyond the ends of the protected sides of the buildings or stacks.

1.3.6.9. Natural Barricades

It is acceptable to take advantage of natural terrain where this provides protection equivalent to that of
artificial barricades. However, it is found that hills are usually insufficiently steep or close to the ammunition or
explosives and woods cannot usually be relied upon to provide the required protection.

1.3.6.10. Barricade Design Criteria

The details of what constitutes an effective barricade are given in Part II, Chapter 3, Section III.

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Section VII - Injury and Damage to be Expected at Different Levels of Protection for Hazard Division 1.1 and
Grouping of Structures and Facilities

1.3.7.1. Introduction

a) The purpose of applying Hazard Division 1.1 quantity-distances between PES and ES is to ensure that the
minimum risk is caused to personnel, structures and facilities. In principle, those functions and facilities not
directly related to operating requirements or to the security of ammunition and explosives should be sited at
or beyond the Inhabited Building Distance.

b) In practice, it may not always be possible to provide this level of protection and some activities and
facilities will of necessity be sited at less than the Inhabited Building Distance. In other cases, the nature of
the facility or structure requires that greater protection than that afforded by the Inhabited Building
Distance, should be provided.

c) Damage to buildings and injury to personnel can result from either blast overpressure effects or from
projections (ammunition fragments and building debris from the PES). The severity of the effects will be
dependent on both the type of structure at the PES and at the ES. The levels of damage considered in this
section are when the PES is an:

1) Open or lightly confined stack of ammunition and explosives.

2) Earth-covered building containing ammunition and explosives.

d) The blast overpressure predictions in this section are relevant for quantities in excess of 4 500 kg. For
smaller quantities the damage and injury levels may be pessimistic.

1.3.7.2. Purpose of the Section

The aim of this section is to provide guidance on the kind of injuries and damage which can be expected at
different levels of protection and to propose typical personnel or facilities for which these levels of protection might
be considered acceptable. The standard base line for predicting blast parameters is that outlined in Part II, Chapter
5, Section III, modified as appropriate for the charge configuration, suppression by earth-cover or other technical
consideration.s

1.3.7.3. Levels of Protection

a) The blast overpressure effects to be expected at a given scaled distance can be predicted with a high degree
of confidence. The technique is fairly well developed and the effects of blast may be treated
deterministically, however, the techniques for determining the hazards from projections are considerably
less developed and the effects require a probabilistic approach.

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b) Blast Effects - Open Stacks and Light Structures

It can be assumed that the blast overpressure from a light structure is the same as that to be expected from a
bare charge. This assumption is especially true as the scaled distance increases. The following levels of
protection (scaled distances) are considered:

Scaled Distance Peak Incident (Side-on)

(Q in kg, distance in m) Overpressure Expected
(bar)
55.5 Q1/3 0.015
44.4 Q1/3 to 33.3 Q1/3 0.02 to 0.03
1/3
22.2 Q 0.05
14.8 Q1/3 0.09
1/3
9.6 Q 0.16
1/3
8.0 Q 0.21
1/3
7.2 Q 0.24
1/3
3.6 Q 0.70
1/3
2.4 Q 1.80

c) Blast Effects - Earth-Covered Magazines

Earth-covered magazines will generally attenuate the blast overpressure, although in the near field
enhanced overpressure can be expected from the front of an earth-covered magazine. The degree of
reduction in blast overpressure from the sides and rear of the magazine decreases as the scaled distance
and/or as the NEQ increases. In general the greatest reduction will be obtained from the rear of the earth-
covered building. The following levels of protection (scaled distance) are considered:
Direction Scaled Distance Peak Incident (Side-on)
(Q in kg) Overpressure Expected
(distance in m) (bar)
Side 18.0 Q1/3 0.05
Rear 14.0 Q1/3 0.05
1/3
Side 12.0 Q 0.09
1/3
Rear 9.3 Q 0.09

These overpressures do not apply when the NEQ is greater than 45 000 kg and when the volume of the
building is less than 500 m3.

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d) Projection Hazards - All Types of Potential Explosion Sites

The projection hazard from a PES cannot be related to the scaled distance. However, for all practical
purposes, there is likely to be a hazard from projections at all scaled distances less than 14.8 Q1/3, this
hazard will be greater when the PES is not barricaded. Unless the ES has been provided with protection
against all projections, including high angle missiles, then minimum distances at which the projection
hazard is considered to be acceptable for a particular situation, have been introduced as follows:

1) 180 m

There is a significant hazard from projections at 180 m. This hazard is tolerable for:

- Public traffic routes when the traffic is not dense and when the PES is an open stack or a light structure.

- The protection of unbarricaded ammunition i.e., to prevent propagation from low trajectory high
velocity projections.

2) 270 m

There is a significant hazard from projections at 270 m. The hazard is tolerable for:- Main public traffic
routes or when the traffic is dense and when the PES is an open stack or light structure.

- Public traffic routes when the traffic is not dense and when the PES is a heavy-walled or earth-
covered building.

- Sparsely populated areas when the PES is an open stack or a light structure; there would be a
small expectation of damage or injury from projections.

3) 400 m

There is a minor hazard from projections at 400 m. This hazard is tolerable for:

- Main public traffic routes or when the traffic is dense and when the PES is a heavy-walled or
earth-covered building

- Built-up areas when the PES is an open stack or a light structure.

- All "Inhabited Buildings" when the PES is a heavy-walled or earth-covered building.

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1.3.7.4. Reduction of the Hazard

Strengthening of buildings to prevent or reduce the hazard is feasible and may not be prohibitively expensive.
The hazard may be reduced by:

1) Suitably designed suppressive construction at the PES, this is only practicable when the NEQ is relatively
small for example reinforced concrete cubicles used in explosive process building construction have a
maximum practical limit of about 250 kg. Standard NATO igloos can suppress about 100kg as a PES.

2) By designing the structures at the ES to withstand the overpressures and the debris and fragment attack.

3) The use of light structures for ES which although they will be severely damaged by the overpressure will
not produce hazardous debris. In this case protection from high velocity debris and fragments by receptor
barricades is essential.

1.3.7.5. Protection Level 55.5 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) The overpressure expected at this distance ( 55.5 Q1/3 ) will cause little or no damage to
unstrengthened structures.

2) Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast effects. There may be a
minor hazard from broken glass or cladding falling from a considerable height so as to strike
people.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

At this distance and beyond there is no restriction on personnel, activities or facilities.

1.3.7.6. Protection Level 44.4 Q1/3 to 33.3 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Unstrengthened structures are likely to suffer only superficial damage.

2) When large panes of glass are exposed so as to face the PES, 50 % or more breakages may
occur.

3) Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast effects. Injuries that do
occur will be caused principally by flying glass.

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b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

Because even superficial damage may in some instances be unacceptable, National Authorities may require
siting at these distances for facilities of especially vulnerable construction or public importance. Examples
are:
1) Large facilities of special construction of importance including:

- Large factories of vulnerable construction.

- Multi-storey office or apartment buildings of vulnerable construction.
- Public buildings and edifices of major value.
- Large educational facilities of vulnerable construction.
- Large hospitals.
- Major traffic terminals (e.g. large railway stations, airports etc.)
- Major public utilities (e.g. gas, water, electricity works).

2) Facilities of vulnerable construction used for mass meetings:

- Assembly halls and fairs.

- Exhibition areas.
- Sports stadiums.

3) Built-up areas which are both large and densely developed.

1.3.7.7. Protection Level 22.2 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

The equivalent protection levels in respect of earth-covered buildings greater in volume than 500 m3 and when
containing a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 less than 45 000 kg are:

- From the side: 18.0 Q1/3

- From the rear: 14.0 Q1/3

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Unstrengthened buildings will suffer minor damage, particularly to parts such as windows, door
frames and chimneys. In general, damage is unlikely to exceed approximately 5 % of the
replacement cost but some buildings may suffer serious damage.

2) Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast effects. Injuries that do occur
will be caused principally by glass breakage and flying/falling debris.

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b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This distance is termed "Inhabited Building Distance" and is the minimum distance, in conjunction with the
overriding minimum distances given in paragraph 1.3.7.3., at which inhabited buildings not directly
connected with the functions of the Explosives Area should be sited. This level of protection is proposed as
acceptable for the following kinds of facility:

1) Unbarricaded stacks of ammunition and explosives.

2) Structures and facilities in the administration area of a depot or factory with a considerable
number of occupants (more than 20), examples are:

- Main office buildings.

- Non-explosives workshops.
- Mess halls and kitchens.
- Main canteens.
- Main shower and changing facilities.

3) Structures and facilities in the administrative area of a depot or a factory which are important for
the functioning of the installation, examples are:

- Manned fire stations.

- Central heating plants.
- Main vehicle pools.
- Gasoline storage and dispensing facilities.
- Unprotected water supply and power installations.

4) Inhabited buildings (as defined by the National Authority), whether single buildings,
communities or areas of scattered habitations.

5) Structures and facilities in which people assemble, except as indicated in

subparagraph 1.3.7.6.b) above.

6) Facilities serving the safety and needs of the general public, examples are:

- Gas, water and electricity supply installations.

- Radar and communications stations.

7) Important lines of transport, examples are:

- Main railway lines.

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- Motorways and major roads.
- Major navigable waterways.

1.3.7.8. Protection Level 14.8 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

The equivalent protection levels in respect of earth-covered buildings greater in volume than 500 m3 and when
containing a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 less than 45 000 kg are:

- From the side: 12.0 Q1/3

- From the rear: 9.3 Q1/3

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Unstrengthened buildings will suffer average damage costing in the range of 10 % of the total
replacement costs to repair.

2) Personnel in the open are not likely to be seriously injured by blast.

3) There is a fairly high probability that injuries will be caused by glass breakage and flying/falling
debris.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This distance is termed the "Public Traffic Route Distance" and is the minimum distance, in conjunction
with the overriding minimum distances given in paragraph 1.3.7.3., at which routes used by the general
public, for purposes unconnected with the explosives facility, should be sited (except when the PES is a
heavy-walled building and when the route is a main route or when the traffic is dense). This level of
protection is proposed as acceptable for the following kinds of facility:

1) Structures and facilities within an administration area connected with the explosives installation
with a limited number of occupants (less than 20).

2) Facilities in which people assemble only temporarily and which can be quickly cleared.
Examples are:

- Public paths.
- Recreational areas where no structures are involved.
- Parking places.
- Small arms ranges.

3) Railways, public roads and navigable waterways of minor to medium importance. (For public
roads the risk of secondary injury can be reduced by ensuring that the road sides are free from

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obstacles which are likely to result in injuries to the occupants of vehicles leaving the road as a
result of the driver's reaction to the explosion).

1.3.7.9. Protection Level 9.6 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Buildings which are unstrengthened can be expected to suffer damage to main structural
members. Repairs may cost more than 20 % of the replacement cost of the building.
Strengthening of buildings to prevent damage and secondary hazards is feasible and not
prohibitively expensive.

2) Cars may suffer some damage to metal portions of the body and roof by blast. Windows facing
the blast may be broken, however, the glass should not cause serious injuries to the occupants.

3) Aircraft will suffer some damage to appendages and sheet metal skin. They should be
operational with only minor repair (see also Part IV, Chapter 5).

4) Cargo type ships will suffer minor damage from blast to deck houses and exposed electronic
gear (see also Part IV, Chapter 6).

5) Personnel may suffer temporary loss of hearing, permanent ear damage is not to be expected.
Other injuries from the direct effects of blast overpressure are unlikely, although there are likely
to be injuries from secondary effects, i.e. translation of objects.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This should normally be the minimum distance at which unprotected duty personnel (troops, military and
civilian maintenance and security personnel and crews of ships) should be permitted when their duties are
not closely and specifically related to the PES. Examples are:

1) Open air recreation facilities used only by military personnel and where dependants and the
general public are not involved.

2) Training areas for unprotected military personnel.

3) All military aircraft when the PES is not for the immediate service of the aircraft.

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1.3.7.10. Protection Level 8.0 Q1/3 - Open stacks and Light Structures

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Buildings which are unstrengthened can be expected to suffer serious damage which is likely to
cost above 30 % of the total replacement cost to repair.

2) Serious injuries to personnel, which may result in death, are likely to occur due to building
collapse or loose translated objects.

3) There is some possibility of delayed communication of the explosion as a result of fires or

equipment failure at the ES, direct propagation of the explosion is not likely.

4) Cargo ships would suffer damage to decks and superstructure. In particular doors and bulkheads
on the weather-deck are likely to be buckled.

5) Aircraft are expected to sustain considerable structural damage.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This distance is termed "Explosives Workshop Distance", the level of protection is proposed as acceptable
for the following kinds of facility:

1) Explosives workshops in which the personnel present are kept to the minimum essential for the
task.

2) Packing and shipping (transit) buildings in the Explosives Area.

3) Minor transmission and communication lines.

1.3.7.11. Protection Level 7.2 Q1/3

This distance is used by US Authorities to define explosives workshop separation in the US and is comparable
to Protection Level 8.0 Q1/3. However, a great deal of information is available in the US for Protection Level 7.2 Q1/3
and is included in this section for completeness.

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Damage to unstrengthened buildings will be of a serious nature. Repair is likely to cost 50 % or

more of the total replacement cost.

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2) Personnel injuries of a serious nature or possible death are likely from debris of the building at
the ES and from translation of loose objects.

3) There is a 1 % chance of eardrum damage to personnel.

4) Some possibility of delayed communication of explosion as a result of fires or equipment failure

at the ES. There is a high degree of protection against direct propagation of an explosion.

5) Cargo ships would suffer some damage to decks and superstructure by having doors and
bulkheads buckled by overpressure.

6) Aircraft can be expected to suffer considerable structural damage from blast overpressure.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

1) Workers engaged in major construction in the vicinity of ammunition production areas,

waterfront areas where ammunition is being handled or areas used for the loading of aircraft
with explosives.

2) Labour intensive operations closely related to the PES, including inert supply functions serving
two or more identical or similar PES.

3) Rest and buildings for light refreshment for use of workers in the immediate vicinity. Such
facilities will normally only be used when work is stopped in the nearby explosives buildings
and should be limited to a maximum of 6 persons.

4) Area offices with a permanent occupancy of not more than 6 persons directly supporting the
work of the Explosives Area or process buildings.

5) Guard buildings in which those security personnel directly responsible for the security of the
Explosives Area are housed when not on patrol.

6) Unmanned buildings containing immediate reaction fire-fighting appliances.

7) Operations and training functions that are exclusively manned or attended by personnel of the
unit operating the PES. This includes day rooms, squadron operations offices and similar
functions for units such as individual missile firing batteries, aircraft squadrons, or ammunition
supply companies. Manoeuvre area, proving grounds tracks and similar facilities for armoured
vehicles together with the armoured vehicles themselves may provide adequate protection to the
crew from fragment and debris.

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8) Areas used for the maintenance of military vehicles and equipment (trucks, tanks) when the PES
is basic load or ready storage limited to 4 000 kg or less at each end when the maintenance work
is performed exclusively by and for military personnel of the unit for which the basic load of
ammunition is stored.

9) Auxiliary power and utilities functions, inert storage and issue sites and mechanical support at naval
dock areas when not continuously manned, when serving only the waterfront area, and when the
PES is a ship or an ammunition handling location atthe waterfront. When loss of the facility
would cause an immediate loss of a vital function, Inhabited Building Distance must be used.

10) Minimum distance between separate groups of explosives loaded combat-configured aircraft or
between aircraft and a PES such as a preload site which serves to arm the aircraft. The use of
intervening barricades is required to further reduce communication and fragment damage and
eliminate the necessity for totalling the NEQ. The loading of ammunition and explosives aboard
aircraft can be accomplished within each group of aircraft without additional protection.

11) Parking lots for privately owned automobiles belonging to the personnel employed or stationed
at the PES.

12) Separation of naval vessels from PES consisting of other naval vessels to which quantity-
distance standards apply. When the PES is an ammunition ship or an ammunition activity, the
separation will be determined by reference to special regulations established for piers and
wharves of ammunition shiploading activities.

13) Container "stuffing" and "unstuffing" operations which are routine support of the PES. When the
PES is a magazine in a storage area, containerizing operations may be considered as part of the
magazine and separate quantity-distance rules will not be applied.

1.3.7.12. Protection Level 3.6 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

a) Expected Blast Effects

1) Unstrengthened buildings will suffer severe structural damage approaching total demolition.

2) Severe injuries or death to occupants of the ES are to be expected from direct blast effects,
building collapse or translation.

3) Aircraft will be damaged by blast to the extent that they will be beyond economical repair. If
aircraft are loaded with explosives, delayed explosions are likely to result from subsequent fires.

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4) Explosions may occur in ES containing ammunition as a result of fire spread by lobbed debris or
blast damage. A high degree of protection against direct propagation of an explosion is to be
expected providing direct attack by high velocity fragments is prevented.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

1) Buildings housing successive steps of a single process in an explosives factory.

2) Separation of buildings for security guards from explosives locations, provided the risk of the
personnel becoming militarily ineffective in the event of an explosive accident can be accepted.

3) Separations among buildings and facilities of a tactical missile site where greater distances
cannot be provided due to technical reasons.

4) Temporary holding areas for trucks or railcars containing explosives to service production or
maintenance facilities provided barricades are interposed between the explosives locations.

5) Unmanned auxiliary power facilities, transformer stations, water treatment and pollution
abatement facilities and other utility installations which serve the PES, and loss of which will
not create an immediate secondary hazard or prejudice vital operations.

1.3.7.13. Protection Level 2.4 Q1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

a) Expected Blast Effects

Unstrengthened buildings will almost certainly suffer complete demolition.

b) Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

1) Personnel stationed in magazine areas for one or two men.

2) Crews performing storage and shipping functions in the magazines may operate for short periods
of time at adjacent magazines. In large magazine areas controls should be exercised by
management to reduce the length of time that unrelated operations are exposed to one another at
distances less than 9.6 Q1/3

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Section VIII - Q-D Rules in the Particular case of Aboveground Storage

of Ammunition Classified 1.6N

1.3.8.1. Preliminary remark

This section of the Manual is reserved for ammunition classified 1.6N. It was written at a time when very few
statistical data were known on the behaviour of these articles in transport and in storage. Therefore it was difficult to
derive from experience what should be the behaviour of a set of 1.6N ammunition of the same family in case of an
accidental stimulus.
Among several options, the AC/258 Group took the decision to choose a middle way solution which leads to the
recommendations listed below. In the future when the behaviour in storage of 1.6N ammunition will be better known it
may be necessary to revise this decision.

1.3.8.2. Most credible accidental event

During storage of 1.6N ammunition belonging to the same family the most credible accidental event resulting
from an accidental stimulus is the detonation of a single munition without instant transmission of the detonation to other
munitions of the same family and/or moderate combustion of the whole quantities of ammunition.

1.3.8.3. Q-D rules

The Q-D distances between an ES and a PES which are given by the Q-D rules, are derived from the above-
mentioned "most credible accidental event". The assessment of the hazard generated by the detonation of a single
munition takes into account only the blast effect and neglects the projection effect of a single munition.
The Q-D distances are obtained by taking, for a given configuration "ES, PES" the largest distance determined by
applying

a) the Table 1 (1.1 Q-D rules) to a single munition

b) the Table 3B (1.3 Q-D rules) to the whole quantities of ammunition with aggregation of the NEQ.

Table 4 (Annex I-A) hereafter has been built by applying these rules. It gives the Q-D distances of a stock
of 1.6N ammunition (single family or compatible families as defined hereafter) in the case where theNEQ of a
single munition is 1 000 kg. Tables can of course also be constructed to better cater for the storage of 1.6N
ammunition where the HD 1.1 NEQ of a single munition is other than 1000 kg.

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CHAPTER 4 – UNDERGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS

Section I - General

1.4.1.1. Types and Effects

a) Types

1. This section details how to predict QD based on criteria given in para 3.1.1.2. for the
underground storage of military ammunition and explosives. Underground storage typically
includes natural caverns and excavated chambers. Recommendations in this section shall only be
used when the minimum distance from the perimeter of a storage area to an external surface
exceeds 600 mm and 0.1·Q1/3 (m, kg). Otherwise, use aboveground siting criteria. This section
addresses explosives safety criteria both with and without rupture of the cover.

2. Ground shock, debris, and air blast from an accidental explosion in an underground storage
facility depend on several variables, including the local geology and site-specific parameters.
These parameters vary significantly from facility to facility. Consequently, distances other than
those listed below may be used provided approved experimental or analytical data indicate that
the desired protection can be achieved. See below for default methods to determine QD.

3. The QD for tolerable ground shock is the same in all directions for homogeneous, geological
media, whereas QDs for other hazards (blast, thermal, impulse, etc.) vary markedly in different
directions. Variations in QDs in different directions arise from configuration-specific features
such as the locations of adits and ventilation shafts, hazards mitigating designs, and terrain. The
acceptable QD in a given direction is generally taken as the maximum QD determined for the
various hazards.

4. QD siting requirements of this section may be determined from the applicable equations or by
interpolating between figure entries.

b) Effects

The following effects, peculiar to underground storage sites, must be taken into consideration for quantity-
distance purposes:

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1. Inside the Underground Installation:

The volume available to an expanding shock front is less in an underground configuration than it
is in an aboveground configuration. Because of this limited space, an explosion in an
underground facility typically results in long-duration, high pressures and temperatures that
spread throughout the entire volume available to the shock front. Unless robust engineered
designs (doors and/or other closing devices) are used to separate various parts of the facility,
these long-duration blast effects spread throughout the entire underground complex. Doors or
other closing devices must be properly designed and, in the case of doors, closed to provide the
desired separation.

An initial event in Hazard Division 1.2 and 1.4 materials usually starts a fire, which is sustained
by burning packages and components of the ammunition. This process causes additional
explosions, likely at increasing frequency, until combustible materials in the site have been
consumed. The results of these repeated explosions in the confined space underground will
depend on the type and quantity of the substances in each unit of ammunition and the type of
explosion produced.

2. Outside the Underground Installation:

Blast waves from adits exhibit highly directional flow-fields along the extended centerline of the
passageway. Consequently, the blast wave effects (overpressure and impulse) do not attenuate as
rapidly along the centerline axis as they do off the centerline axis.

The following effects should be considered for an external ES:

(1) Blast from tunnel adits

(2) Blast from craters, if the rock cover is insufficient.

(3) Debris from tunnel adits

(4) Debris from cratering

(5) Ground Shock

(6) Flame and hot gases

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1.4.1.2. Quantity-Distances

a) Inside the UG Installation

QD should be determined for the following:

1. Chamber Intervals

2. Loading/Unloading Dock

3. Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)

4. Inspection

b) Outside the UG Installation

QD should be determined for the following:

1. Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)

2. Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD)

3. Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)

4. Earth-covered Magazine Distance (ECMD)

5. Aboveground Magazine Distance (AGMD)

1.4.1.3. Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ)

For siting purposes, the NEQ is the total quantity of explosives material that must be included in defining a
potential event. Part I, paragraph 1.3.2.5. provides guidance for finding the appropriate NEQ for sites containing
materials with different Hazard Classes.

1.4.1.4. Measuring Quantity-Distances

a) Inside the Underground Installation.

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The Chamber Interval is the shortest distance between the walls of two adjacent chambers. The subdivision of a
cavern requires construction of massive barricades to close the gaps in the natural rock and to isolate one site or
chamber from any other. The thickness of these barricades should be equal to the chamber intervals.

b) Outside the Underground Installation.

Distances to ESs outside the underground facility are normally measured as radial distances (see below) unless
conditions make such a procedure clearly unreasonable:

1. Distances determined for airblast, debris, and thermal effects issuing from tunnel openings shall
be the minimum distance measured from the openings to the nearest wall or point of the location
to be protected. Extended centerlines of the openings should be used as reference lines for
directional effects.

2. A distance determined by ground shock should be measured from the nearest wall of a chamber
or a cavern containing ammunition or explosives to the nearest wall or point of the location to be
protected.

3. A distance determined for air blast and debris from a breached cover shall be the minimum
distance from the centre of the breach (CCB), at ground surface level, to the location to be
protected (See Annex IIIB, Figures 3-Ia and 3-Ib.).

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Section II - Hazard Division Material Dependence

1.4.2.1. Hazard Division 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 materials

a) Distances shall be determined from the total quantity of explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, and incendiary
materials in the individual chambers, unless the total quantity is subdivided to prevent rapid communication of
an incident between subdivisions. All Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6 material subject to involvement in
a single incident shall be assumed to contribute to the explosion yield.

b) A connected chamber or cavern storage site containing Hazard Division 1.1 or 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 materials shall
be treated as a single chamber site, unless explosion communication is prevented by adequate subdivision or
chamber separation.

c) HD 1.3 material should be treated as HD 1.1 material when it is stored underground.

1.4.2.2. Hazard Division 1.2 materials

a) The hazard to exterior ESs from primary fragments where a line-of-sight path exists from the detonation point to
the ES is the only explosives safety hazard of concern for HD 1.2 materials.

b) When line-of-sight conditions exist, use distances common to aboveground situations.

c) QD requirements do not apply if the exterior ES is located outside the line-of-sight or if barricades (constructed
or natural) intercept fragments issuing from an opening.

1.4.2.3. Hazard Division 1.4 materials

Exterior: Exterior explosives safety hazards are not normally significant for Hazard Division 1.4 materials.
Accordingly, QD requirements do not apply for Hazard Division 1.4 materials.

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Section III - Chamber Interval

References [7-10] deal with chamber intervals.

1.4.3.1. Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6

a) Three modes by which an explosion or fire can be communicated are rock spall, propagation through cracks or
fissures, and airblast or thermal effects travelling through connecting passages. Minimum storage chamber
separation distances are required to prevent or control the communication of explosions or fires between donor
and acceptor chambers.

The minimum chamber separation (Dcd) is 5 m for HD 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6 materials.

b) Prevention of major damage by rock spall.

The chamber separation distance is the shortest distance (rock/concrete thickness) between two chambers. When
an explosion occurs in a donor chamber, a shock wave propagates through the surrounding rock. The intensity
of the shock decreases with distance. For small, chamber separation distances, the shock may be strong enough
to spall the rock/concrete walls of acceptor chambers.

For hard rock with no specific protective construction, the minimum, chamber separation distance, Dcd, required
to prevent major damage by spall depends on the chamber loading density (γ) as:

Dcd =1.0 ⋅ Q1 / 3 ( γ ≤ 50 kg / m )
3
Eq. 1.4.3-1
and
Dcd = 2.0 ⋅ Q1 / 3 ( γ > 50 kg / m )
3
Eq. 1.4.3-2

Example ( γ ≤ 50 kg / m ):
3

Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 1.0 · 58.48 = 58.5 m

For soft rock (See para 1.4.4.3.a), at all loading densities, the separation distance is:

Dcd =1.4 ⋅ Q 1 / 3 Eq. 1.4.3-3

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Example:

Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 1.4 · 58.48 = 82 m

c) Prevention of propagation by rock spall

If damage to stored munitions in the adjacent chambers is acceptable, the chamber separation distance can be
reduced to the distance required to prevent propagation of the detonation by the impact of rock spall against the
munitions. For smaller distances, propagation is possible. Propagation by rock spall is practically instantaneous
because time separations between donor and acceptor explosions may not be sufficient to prevent coalescence
of blast waves. Unless analyses or experiments indicate otherwise, explosives quantities subject to this mode
must be added to other donor explosives to determine NEQ. For loading densities up to 270 kg/m³, when no
protective construction is used, the separation distance, Dcd, to prevent explosion communication by spalled
rock is:

Dcd = 0.6 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 1.4.3-4

Example:

Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 0.6 · 58.48 = 35 m

When the acceptor chamber has protective construction to prevent spall and collapse (into the acceptor
chamber) the separation distance must be determined on a site-specific basis but may be as low as:

Dcd = 0.3 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 1.4.3-5

Example:

Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 0.3 · 58.48 = 17.5 m

d) Prevention of propagation through passageways

Blast, flame and hot gas may cause delayed propagation. Time separations between the original donor event and
the potential explosions of this mode will likely be sufficient to prevent coalescence of blast waves.

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Consequently, for purposes of Q-D siting, only the maximum credible explosives quantity need be used to
determine NEQ.

In order to protect assets, blast and fire resistant doors must be installed within multi-chambered facilities.
Evaluations of design loads on doors must be made on a site-specific basis.

e) Propagation by Flame and Hot Gas through Cracks and Fissures

Consideration must be given to the long-duration action of the explosion gas. These quasi-static forces might
form cracks in the rock that extend from the donor to an adjacent (acceptor) chamber, thus making it possible
for hot gases to flow into this chamber and initiate an event. Significant factors for this mode of propagation
include the strength of rock, the existence of cracks formed before the explosion incident, the type of barriers in
cavern storage sites, the cover and the loading density in the chamber. This mode of propagation must be
considered when final decisions about chamber separation distances are made.

Thus, because of these cracks and fissures, propagation may occur beyond

Dcd = 0.3 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 1.4.3-6

Example:

Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 0.3 · 58.48 = 17.5 m

but not likely beyond;

Dcd = 2.0 ⋅ Q1 / 3 Eq. 1.4.3-7

Example:

Q = 200,000 kg
Dcd = 2 · 58.48 = 117 m

Site-specific analyses, using a sound geological survey, should be made to determine proper intervals between
chambers.

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1.4.3.2. Hazard Division 1.2

Intervals between a chamber containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 and adjacent chambers should
be at least 5 m of competent rock unless structural considerations apply. This applies also to barriers used to isolate
chambers in a cavern storage site.

1.4.3.3. Hazard Division 1.4

Intervals between chambers containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.4 should be determined from
structural considerations with no regard to the content of ammunition. This applies also to barriers used to isolate
chambers in a cavern storage site.

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Section IV - Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)

IBD must be the largest of the distances for protection against airblast, debris, and ground shock [1, 7].

1.4.4.1. Airblast [8-15]

a) The side-on overpressure of 5 kPa defines IBD.

b) An explosion in an underground storage chamber may produce external airblast from two sources; the exit of
blast from existing openings (tunnel entrances, ventilation shafts, etc.) and the rupture or breach of the chamber
cover by the detonation. Required IBDs are independently determined for each of these airblast sources, with
the maximum IBD used for siting.

1. A breaching chamber cover will produce external airblast. Use the following table to site for
IBD due to airblast produced by breaching of the chamber cover. Values of IBD for airblast
through the ruptured cover are:

CoverThickness IBD Equation

Cover≤ 0.1⋅Q1/ 3 IBD for SurfaceBurst Eq.3.3.4 − 1(a)
1/ 3
0.1⋅ Q < Cover≤ 0.2 ⋅Q 1/ 3 1/ 2 IBD for SurfaceBurst Eq.3.3.4 − 1(b)
2. This
1 / 3
0.2 ⋅ Q < Cover≤ 0.3⋅Q 1 / 3 1/ 4 IBD for SurfaceBurst Eq.3.3.4 − 1(c) paragraph
Cover> 0.3⋅Q1/ 3 NegligibleAirblastHazard Eq.3.3.4 − 1(d) defines
airblast IBDs from openings in an underground storage facility. The IBD for airblast must be
considered for any opening.

(a) To a first approximation, distance and overpressure along the extended centerline axis
of an opening may be estimated with an algorithm of the form:

0.5 −n
⎡Q ⎤ ⎡ r ⎤
pSO = 1900 ⋅ ⎢ ⎥ ⋅ ⎢ ⎥ Eq. 1.4.4-2
⎣VE ⎦ ⎣ DHYD ⎦

where:

k: constant, kPa
r: radial distance from opening, m
pSO: overpressure at distance r, kPa

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DHYD: effective hydraulic diameter that controls the dynamic flow from the opening, m
[A robust constriction within five tunnel diameters of an exit defines the hydraulic
diameter used for predicting overpressures outside the underground facility.],
Q: Mass of explosives material, kg
VE: Total volume inside the underground facility that is engulfed by blast waves at
the time the blast arrives at the location of interest (m3) (VE is often the total volume of
the underground complex.)
n: measure of attenuation rate of pSO vs r (no units).

Site-specific analyses should be conducted where there are complex tunnel systems,
tunnel constrictions, or significant tunnel roughness.

The value n for pressures between 200 Pa and 20 kPa varies from 0.91 to 0.66. The
value of n that best fits available data over the range of interest for Workshops to IBD
is 1/1.4. For the overpressure of interest at IBD, pSO = 5 kPa, so:

1
⎡ Q ⎤ 2.8
IBD = 70 ⋅ DHYD ⋅ ⎢ ⎥ Eq. 1.4.4-3
⎣VE ⎦

(b) For a simple horizontal geometry (no barricade, a rapidly rising rock face, an extended
centerline normal to the rock face) the following equation for off centerline axis can be
used.

[
IBD(θ ) = IBD(θ = 0)⋅ 1 + (θ / 56) ]
2 −1/ 1.4
Eq. 1.4.4-4

where:

θ: horizontal angle off centerline in degrees

Large variations in directivity have been observed (Annex IIIB Figure 3-II). Therefore,
it is recommended that carefully constructed models and realistic exit pressures should
be used to investigate directivity for an actual site.

(c) High-Pressure Closure Block Designed to Remain Intact

References [4, 5] contain illustrative examples of a closure block designs.

For chamber loading densities greater than or equal to 10 kg/m3, IBD may be reduced

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by 50% when a high-pressure closure block, designed to remain intact in case of an
explosion, is used.

For chamber loading densities lower 10 kg/m3 (but greater than 1.0 kg/m3), determine
the reduction by the formula:

y (%) = 50 ⋅ log10 (γ ) Eq. 1.4.4-5

where, y is the percentage reduction in IBD, and γ is loading density in kg/m3. For
loading densities lower than 1.0 kg/m3, use y(%) = 0.

(d) Portal Barricade

When a properly designed and located portal barricade [5, 7] is in front of the opening,
IBD for airblast along the extended tunnel axis may be reduced up to 50 percent.
Although the total airblast hazarded area remains almost unchanged, its shape, for
explosives safety applications, becomes more circular.

1.4.4.2. Debris

Debris from an explosion in an underground facility may issue from adits or other openings; failure of
nearby structures (portal, barricades, etc.); and breaching of the geological cover over the PES (crater debris).

a) Adit Debris [16-17, 20]:

Recommended distance for IBD is based on a few data points from accidents and large-scale tests. IBD is
defined as that distance where the fragment density is one hazardous fragment (energy greater than 79 Joules)
per 56 m2. If the ratio of the length of the main passageway to its diameter is greater than or equal to 11 (i.e. L/D
11) the dispersal angle should be taken as ± 10 degrees. If the ratio of the length of the tunnel is less than 11, i.e.
L/D < 11, the dispersal angle should be taken as ± 20 degrees. Annex IIIB, Figure 3-III illustrates this.

1. ES Located Within the Sector Defined by the Maximum Angles of Dispersion:

Annex IIIB, Figure 3-IV contains IBD versus NEQ recommendations for this situation.
Recommended distances are valid for storage facilities with:

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(a) ES located within the sector defined by the maximum angles of dispersion. This sector
is defined by two horizontal rays from the outer edges of the adit with angles equal to
the maximum angle of dispersion relative to the extended centerline.

(b) relatively long, straight access tunnels (For installations where the tunnel is not
relatively long and the dispersal angle is ± 20 degrees, a site-specific analysis may
result in a reduced IBD.)

(c) total loading densities (storage chamber + tunnel volume) between 1 and 100 kg/m3,
and

(d) an NEQ less than or equal to 500,000 kg.

Example:

Given:
NEQ = 200,000 kg
ES is within the sector defined by maximum angles of dispersion.

Solution:

IBD = 79 ⋅ Q 0.233 = 1360 m

A portal barricade [5, 7] provides a means of reducing IBD due to adit debris by intercepting the
debris as it exits the tunnel. However, to ensure that debris is not simply redirected around the
barricade, two debris-mitigating designs should be used in series, one inside the underground
facility together with the portal barricade outside the facility. For this debris-mitigating
configuration, IBD distance may be negligible but IBD must be determined on a site-specific
basis.

2. ES Located Outside the Sector Defined by the Maximum Angles of Dispersion:

Debris from the adit need not be considered for IBD siting.

(a) Debris from Nearby, Failed Structures:

The dynamics of this debris will be highly dependent on site-specific parameters. Site-
specific analyses should be done when this type of debris is of concern.

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(b) Debris Arising from Failure of Cover, Crater Debris [18-22, 34]

1. The chamber cover thickness is the shortest distance between the natural rock surface at
the chamber ceiling (or in some cases, a chamber wall) and the ground surface. If the
cover consists of part rock and part soil, the effective thickness of the cover is
determined based on mass. A conservative estimate is to treat soil as having one-half
the mass of rock. Therefore, 10 m of rock and 2 m of soil, with one-half the density of
the rock, equals 11 m of equivalent rock cover. If the percentage of soil to rock exceeds
20% a site-specific analysis should be conducted.

Unless the cover is adequate, an underground explosion will cause breaching of the
cover. Rock, and to a lesser degree structural material, is projected as debris in all
directions from the breached cover into the surroundings.

The hazard from this type of debris depends on the quantity of explosives (Q) involved,
the scaled cover depth (C/Q1/3), the chamber loading density (γ), and the slope angle of
the overburden (α) and the type of rock.

2. The rock overburden of an underground installation is sufficient for a scaled cover

depth (C/Q1/3) equal to 1.2 m/kg1/3. For larger values, the debris throw from the
overburden can be neglected. This does not mean that the surface is undisturbed after
an accident. It simply means that a crater is negligible and ejecta are unlikely. For more
information, see Part III, paragraph 3.2.1.1 and Figures 3-Ia and b. For smaller values
the hazardous distance (Inhabited Building Distance) for installations in hard and
moderately strong rock can be calculated with the following formula:

IBD = 38.7 ⋅ Q1 / 3 ⋅ f y ⋅ f c ⋅ fα Eq. 1.4.4.6

where:

IBD =Inhabited Building Distance [m]

Q =explosives quantity (effective NEQ) [kg]
fγ =loading density parameter [.]
fc =cover depth parameter [.]
fα =overburden slope angle parameter [.]

The loading density parameter, fγ, can be taken from the graph in Annex IIIB, Figure 3-
V and the cover depth parameter, fc, from Annex IIIB Figure 3-VI. Both values can also
be calculated with the corresponding formula in Annex IIIB, Figures 3-V and 3-VI. To
simplify the calculation processAnnex IIIB, Figure 3-VII contains tables for Q1/3, fγ

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and fc over a wide range of commonly required values.

The loading density parameter, fγ, and the Inhabited Building Distance increase with an
increase in loading density. The cover depth parameter (fc) is maximum at a scaled
depth of C/Q1/3 = approx. 0.5. The biggest crater is formed and the largest amount of
crater debris is thrown out into the surroundings at this scaled depth, so the largest IBD
results. As the scaled overburden thickness increases above or decreases below the
optimum depth of burst, both the cover depth parameter (fc) and Inhabited Building
Distance decreases.

The influence of the slope angle of the overburden on the Inhabited Building Distance
is shown in Annex IIIB, Figure 3-VIII.

Annex IIIB, Figures 3-Ia and 3-Ib show in general how the final IBD contour line has
to be established and the consideration of the overburden slope angle parameter fα.

Annex IIIB, Figure 3-IX, which is an example, illustrates a quantitative determination

of IBD for crater debris.

3. IBD should be increased by 15 % for an installation built in soft rock.

4. Additional information:

The Inhabited Building Distance (IBD) has to be measured as a horizontal distance

from the crater-centre at the bottom of the crater (CCB), at the level of the installation
(Annex IIIB, Figure 3-Ia).

The slope angle α shall be established in the area where the crater-centre at the surface
(CCS) has to be expected.

An average value for the slope angle α over the whole crater area shall be taken in case
the surface is not plain in this area.

The increase (fαI) and the decrease (fαD) factor must be applied to the IBD in direction
of the line with the largest gradient intersecting the centre of the crater (CCB). This line
does not necessarily coincide with the axis of the adit tunnel.

No increase or decrease factors need applied to the side of the crater.

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The shape of the IBD contour is elliptical.

In cases where more than one crater-centre is possible (e.g. in cases of a flat rock
overburden surface), the IBD has to be applied from each possible crater-centre. The
IBD contour shall be the outer connection of the single lines (Annex IIIB, Figure 3-Ib).

5. Limitations:

This crater debris throw model is based on an empirical evaluation of the available data
and engineering judgment of a comparatively small number of tests and accidents. The
overall accuracy is therefore limited to the range of the investigated cases. Thus, the
crater debris throw model may be used only within the following boundaries:

quantity of explosives NEQ = 1 t - 2000 t

chamber loading density γ =1 kg/m - 300 kg/m3
3

scaled cover depth C/Q1/3 > 0.1 m/kg1/3

In case of parameters exceeding these values it is appropriate to take special care when
applying the model.

1.4.4.3 Ground Shock

References [2, 23-33] deal with ground shock.

a) General
Damage to a building at IBD is limited so that personnel are protected to desired levels. Siting requirements are
based on tolerable particle velocities whose magnitudes depend on the robustness of the facility to be protected
and on the geological media in which the structure is located. Algorithms for predicting particle velocity and
distance are from Reference [32].
The foundation geology of buildings may be divided into the following three categories:

Hard rock: Granite, gneiss, diabase, quartzite sandstone, and hard limestone

Soft rock: Firm moraine slate, shale stone, and soft limestone

Soil: Sand, gravel and clay

Descriptive parameters for various geological media are:

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P wave Velocity S wave Velocity

Material Density (g/cm3)
(m/s) (m/s)
Granite 2.5-2.8 5500-5900 2800-3000
Basalt 2.7-3.1 6400 3200
Sandstone 2.0-2.6 1400-4300 700-2800
Limestone 2.5-2.8 5900-6100 2800-3000
Sand 1.7-2.3
200-1000 80-400
(Unsaturated)
Sand (Saturated) 2.71 800-2200 320-880
Soil 1.7-2.3 300-900 120-360

b) Criteria for Ground Shock at IBD.

Criteria for Ground Shock are listed in para 3.1.1.2., where ranges for particle velocities are displayed. The
smallest values, in a given range, are default particle velocities. Values for particle velocities other than the
default values may be used only when supported by facility-specific analyses.

1. Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6

(a) Factors governing the response and damage of buildings include the NEQ, chamber
loading density, distance, structure type, foundation geology, and the frequency
contents of the ground shock.

(b) Particle velocity and distance relationships for charges buried in soil or rock (tamped)
are taken from Reference 33.

u p ( tamped ) 1 / 2
⎡ 0.006169 ⋅ Q0.8521 ⎤
⋅P = ⎢ bar ⎥ Eq. 1.4.4-7 (a)
cp bar ⎢ tanh ( 26.03 ⋅ Q0.30 ) ⎥
⎣ bar ⎦
where
P0
Pbar = Eq. 1.4.4-7 (b)
2
ρs ⋅ c p

EQ ⋅ Q
Qbar = 2 Eq. 1.4.4-7 (c)
3
ρs ⋅ c p ⋅ r

and:

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up(tamped) = ....................................... peak particle velocity, (m/s)
r = ....................................................................... radial distance (m)
EQ =...........effective energy/mass [3] for explosives material (J/kg)
Q = ...................................................... net explosives quantity (kg)
ρs = .........................................mass density of soil or rock (kg/m3)
cp = ...............................................seismic velocity of p-wave (m/s)
P0 = .................................................... atmospheric pressure (N/m2)

Particle velocities based on Equations 1.4.4-7 together with test results are shown in
Annex IIIB, Figure 3-X.

(c) Equation 1.4.4-8 applies for charges that are buried in soil or rock (tamped) with an
estimated loading density (γ) of about 1600 kg/m3. Based on this limited set of data, the
IBD over the range of loading densities up to 50 kg/m3 is almost constant and equal to
about 50% of the IBD for a tamped charge. Following are recommendations for particle
velocity versus loading density:

γ ≤ 50 kg / m 3 u p = 0.6 ⋅ u p (tamped )
γ > 50 kg / m 3 u p = u p (tamped ) ⋅ e 0.00048⋅(γ − 1600 )

where:

up(tamped) is from Equation 1.4.4-7.

Example:

Given: Q = 200,000 kg of TNT-equivalent material (EQ = 4.56 X 106 joules/kg).

γ = 60 kg/m3
Geology = soil (ρ = 2800 kg/m3, P-wave velocity = 5900 m/s)
P0 = 1.01 X 105 kg/m2

Criteria chosen:

Dry sand: ..............................................................................up = 0.06 m/s

Weak rock: .........................................................................up = 0.115 m/s
Strong rock:...........................................................................up = 0.23 m/s

Solution for IBD:

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Iterative techniques are required to solve the ground shock algorithms for distance. The
following table lists the results of an iterative solution for the parameters assumed. EQ is
the heat of detonation for TNT (4.56E6 J/kg) as listed in Reference [3]. Note that the
particle velocities are the default acceptable values for their associated geological
media. Therefore, the listed, scaled IBDs are the default acceptable values for the
geological media listed.

MEDIA Dry Sand Weak Rock Strong Rock Units

up 0.06 0.115 0.23 m/s
ps 2000 2200 2800 kg/m3
cp 600 2850 5900 m/s
Pbar 1.408E-04 5.674E-06 1.040E-06
Qbar 3.785E-05 6.656E-07 1.408E-07
Scaled IBD (tamped) 5.5 7.3 6.9 m/kg1/3
Scaled IBD (γ ≤ 50 kg/m3) 2.8 3.7 3.5
CONSTANTS EQ = 4.56 E+06 Joules/kg
p0 = 1.01E+05 Newton/m2

Example:

Given:.....................................................................................Strong Rock

Q = 125,000 kg at a loading density of 40 kg/m3

Solution: The required, scaled IBD is 3.5 m/kg1/3 from the preceding table, so
IBD = 3.5 ⋅ Q1/3 = 3.5 ⋅ 50 = 165 m

1. Hazard Division 1.2

Siting for ground shock is not required for HD l.2 materials.

2. Hazard Division l.4

Siting for ground shock is not required for HD l.4 materials.

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Section V - Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD)

1.4.5.1 Public traffic route distance (PTRD) (For all Hazard divisions)

1. Ground Shock QD is 2/3 of IBD for ground shock.

2. Debris QD is 2/3 of IBD for debris.

3. Airblast QD is 2/3 of IBD for airblast.

4. For heavy traffic use the maximum IBD determined in the previous three paragraphs.

5. Because of the hazards arising from the strong on-axis jetting, special considerations should be given when
ES is on the extended centreline of the main passageway.

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Section VI - Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)

1.4.6.1 General Considerations

An Explosives Workshop (EW) may be either an aboveground structure or an underground chamber with its
own entrance tunnel. Except for HD 1.4 ammunition, an underground EW should not be connected (air ducts,
passageways, etc.) to other underground storage chambers. Otherwise, an underground ES should be sited as a storage
chamber. Distances between PES and EW are intended to provide a reasonable degree of personnel protection within the
EW from the effects of a nearby explosion (blast, flame, debris, and ground shock).

1.4.6.2 Impulsive Load

An explosion in an underground facility produces a directional impulsive load along the extended centerline
axis of an adit. This impulsive load is considerably more intense at a given distance than that from a comparable above
ground detonation. Little work has been done to quantify the on-axis impulsive load as a function of distance.

1.4.6.3. Potential Crater

An Aboveground EW should be sited so it is at least outside the potential crater of an underground explosion.

1.4.6.4. Aboveground EW Located within the Maximum Dispersal Angle

An unhardened EW should be sited at the corresponding IBD found above.

1.4.6.5. Aboveground EW Located Outside the Maximum Angle of Dispersal

An EW may be sited at 1/3 of the corresponding IBD found above.

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Section VII – Above Ground Earth-Covered Magazine (ECM)

1.4.7.1. Site-Specific Analysis

A site-specific analysis should be conducted and siting decisions should be based on the protection the
ECM provides.

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Section VIII – Above Ground Magazine Distance (AGMD)

1.4.8.1. Siting

An unbarricaded AGM should be sited at 2/3 of the corresponding IBD found above.
A barricaded AGM should be sited at 1/3 of the corresponding IBD found above.

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CHAPTER 5 - SEPARATION OF POL-FACILITIES WITHIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

1.5.0.1. Separation of Small Quantities of POL

Small quantities (not exceeding 100 litres) of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) held as immediate reserves
for operational purposes within a military installation require no specific quantity-distances from buildings or stacks
containing ammunition or explosives.

1.5.0.2. Separation of Unprotected Aboveground POL Tanks and Drums

If required, unprotected aboveground POL steel tanks and drums are separated from buildings or stacks
containing ammunition or explosives by the Inhabited Building Distance (Annex A, Section II). Where the POL-
facilities are vital a minimum distance of 450 m must be observed from buildings or stacks containing ammunition or
explosives of Hazard Divisions 1.1 and 1.2.

1.5.0.3. Separation of Protected Aboveground POL Tanks and Drums

a) If required, quantity-distances less than those for unprotected tanks and drums (see paragraph 1.5.0.2.) may
be used where a surface storage tank or a drum storage area is provided with structural protection against
blast and fragment hazards. For purposes of applying this paragraph, "protected" will be considered to
mean that the POL storage tank or drum as an ES is provided with structural protection sufficient to ensure
that the POL storage tank or drum and contents will experience no more damage than if sited at inhabited
building distance.

b) The criteria specified for the separation of POL from explosives areas are intended primarily for use in
determining separations at large permanent ammunition depots. For basic load sites, missile sites and
similar small tactical installations, it may be desirable to weigh the cost of distance/protective construction
against strategic value of the POL supplies and the ease of replacement in the event of an incident.
Reduced distances may be approved if the POL loss can be accepted, and if the POL-facilities are sited and
provided spill containment so as not to endanger the explosives. Such reduced distances must be acceptable
to both host and user nations.

1.5.0.4. Separation of Buried POL Tanks

Buried POL tanks should be separated from buildings or stacks containing ammunition or explosives of
Hazard Divisions 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 by a minimum distance of 25 m. The distances from ammunition in Hazard Division
1.1 are given in Annex A, Table 1 (½ D7-distances) with a minimum of 25 m.

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1.5.0.5. Separation of Buried POL Pipelines

Buried POL pipelines should be separated from buildings or stacks containing ammunition or explosives of
Hazard Divisions 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 by a minimum distance of 25 m. The distances from ammunition in Hazard Division
1.1 are given in Annex A, Table 1 (½ D7-distances) with a minimum of 25 m.

1.5.0.6. Separation of POL-facilities from Underground Storage Sites

It is not practical to specify quantity-distances to cover all cases of underground ammunition storage and POL-
facilities. Each case must be assessed to take account of the crater, blast, ground shock, debris and possible seepage of
fuel.

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CHAPTER 6 - HAZARD FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO AMMUNITION

CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
1.6.0.1. Introduction

a) Over recent years there has been a significant increase in the use of communications equipment throughout
the military and civil environment including all forms of transportation in support of management
functions, control of resources and area security. These equipments produce electro-magnetic radiation of
varying intensity according to their output and antenna gain and are potentially hazardous when used in
close proximity to explosive devices which have an installed electrical means of initiation known as
electro-explosive devices (EED).

b) The advice contained in this chapter represents the minimum precautions to be observed in order to prevent
hazard to EED resulting from exposure to the radio frequency (RF) environment at frequencies up to 40
GHz. It is intended that this chapter should provide guidance of officials concerned with the storage,
movement and processing of EED or stores containing EED and the control of RF equipment which may
be used within, or enter, those establishments/vehicles used for these purposes.

c) Consideration is not given to the precautions to be taken with regard to lightning and electrostatic
discharge. These areas are covered by other chapters in AASTP-1 Part II and are also considered by
AC/310 Sub-Group 3 and published in STANAGs 4235 and 4236.

1.6.0.2. General

a) Any firing circuit associated with an EED, or other electrical conductors such as wires, tools and fingers in
contact with the EED, when placed in a RF field will act as an antenna with the inherent capability of
picking up some electrical energy from the field.

b) When the leading wires of an EED are separated they could form a dipole antenna and provide an optimum
match between the dipole and the EED leading to maximum transfer of power to the EED from the radiated
source. Unseparated (short circuited) leading wires could form circular antennae which may also constitute
good receiving systems.

c) Unless appropriate precautions are taken, the power/energy levels induced into the firing circuits from the
standing RF fields may be sufficient to inadvertently initiate the EED.d)Design criteria for the modern
EED when installed in weapon systems require electromagnetic (EM) screening and specified orientation
of firing leads to reduce the RADHAZ. For this reason, EED separated from their parent system are
regarded as less safe than when installed into the system with all leads connected as intended by the
designer.

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e) The attachment of external cables and test sets to systems containing EED will usually increase their
susceptibility to EM energy pick-up.

f) The protective switch in a circuit which prevents the initiation of an EED by direct current until the desired
time is not an effective barrier to electromagnetic (EM) energy.

1.6.0.3. Electro-Explosive Devices

a) An EED is a one shot explosive or pyrotechnic device used as the initiating element in an explosive or
mechanical train and which is designed to activate by application of electrical energy. In present use four
techniques of electrical initiation are employed:

1) Bridge-wire (BW) and Film bridge (FB) EED.

2) Conducting Composition (CC) EED.
3) Exploding Bridge-wire (EBW) EED.
4) Slapper Detonator.

b) In general EED in Service use fall into two broad categories:

1) Those with long thermal time constants (typically 10 ms - 50 ms) such as BW which are known
commonly as "slow responding power sensitive" EED.
2) Those with a short thermal time constant (typically 1 µs - 100 µs) such as FB and CC which are
known commonly as "fast responding energy sensitive" EED. These techniques are described in
greater detail at Part II, Chapter 7 of AASTP .

c) In determining hazard thresholds (known as No-Fire Thresholds (NFT)) both types of reactions are
considered in relation to statistical sampling based on 0.1% probability of firing at a single sided lower
95% confidence level.

d) The electrical characteristics and behaviour of EED in an RF environment are further described in Part II,
Chapter 7, Section I.

1.6.0.4. RF Environment

a) Radio and radar transmitters operate over a wide spectrum as shown in Figure 6-1. The minimum level CW
of RF intensity in which all systems incorporating EED should be designed and proved to remain safe is
given in Table 6-1. Where these levels are not met restrictions will be imposed or the equipment must be
protected by other means.

b) The system should be designed and proved to remain safe and serviceable when subjected to self generated
RF fields and those which might be generated by a weapon platform (eg, ship, aircraft or vehicle) and
platforms likely to be in close proximity and which may exceed the field intensity given in Table 6-1.

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1.6.0.5. Storage and Transport

a) EED are encountered in a variety of configurations between their manufacturing stage and their ultimate
disposal. These configurations range from trade packaging in bulk, military packaging and sub-packages,
and installed in munitions, to various stages of separate and exposed states which occur in processing and
training.

b) It is important for users to understand how these configurations can influence the basic precautions to be
adopted in storage and transportation. Precautions in transport should include measures to be covered in
emergencies from straightforward vehicle breakdown to accidents involving fire and/or casualty
evacuation.

c) Process and Storage Building

1) Building materials are generally ineffective in affording EM protection to EED. Structures

provide no protection at all in transmission loss from frequencies below 1 MHz but may provide
some protection in the form of reflection loss if the polarization and angle of incidence of the
EM energy happens to be favourable, although this is rarely the case. Also, bars in reinforced
concrete do not provide any significant degree of protection.

2) For all practical purposes, it should be assumed that the field strength which exists inside a building
is as high as it would be if the building did not exist. However, if the protection level across the
frequency spectrum for a specific building has been determined (screened room) then this level
may be used to determine a safe distance from sources of electromagnetic radiation although it
should be borne in mind that, if doors or windows are opened, the screening integrity may be
adversely affected.

3) EED and systems containing EED should be stored/processed in authorized depot and unit
process and storage areas. These areas should be sited taking into account the following:

- The susceptibility of the EED, store or weapon system during processing or storage as
appropriate.
- The radiated power of transmitters in the area related to the susceptibility radius of the
most sensitive EED present.

d) Transport

1) It is not practical to ensure the safety of an EED during transport through the observance of safe
distances. For this reason all EED and systems containing EED offered for transportation must
be safe in the power density likely to be encountered, see Table 6-1.

2) Systems containing EED and which have not been cleared to the EM environment in Table 6-1
must be protected during transport by carriage in a closed metal box or by screening materials

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which afford adequate attenuation to the external RF environment. Primers fitted to rounds or
cartridges are, for example, to be protected by felt pads or cartridge clips.

3) When it is considered necessary to transport systems containing EED whose susceptibility is

unknown, advice is to be obtained from the National Authority.

4) All personnel engaged in the carriage of such articles should be made aware of the hazard that
may be caused by RF and observe fully the consignor´s instructions. Note should be made of
any special instructions required during loading/unloading and during handling when EED are
most vulnerable to EM radiation.

e) Emergency Transport Procedures

1) In the event of an incident/accident during the transport of munitions, items which do not normally
present a high RADHAZ risk may become susceptible if there is damage to their inherent
protection, ie structural or packaging. Pending a detailed inspection, the undermentioned
restrictions on RF transmissions in the immediate vicinity should be imposed:

- No radio to be allowed within 2 metres.

- No radio to be allowed within 10 metres unless authorised as being intrinsically safe.

- No radio with an ERP greater than 5 watts to be allowed within 50 m.

Table 6-1 - The Minimum Service Radio Frequency Environment

Field Strength/
Serial Frequency Power Density
(V/M rms) (Wm -²)

(a) (b) (c) (d)

1 200 kHz - 525 kHz 300

2 525 kHz - 32 MHz 200

3 32 MHz - 150 MHz 10

4 150 MHz - 225 MHz 100

5 225 MHz - 790 MHz 50

6 790 MHz - 18 GHz 1000

7 18 GHz - 40 GHz 100

1.6.0.6. Assessment of Hazard

a) It will be evident from the previous paragraphs that degrees of risk of unintended operation arise in any
situation in which EED are introduced into close proximity with RF fields. The degree of risk ranges from

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negligible to acute in terms of both the susceptibility of the EED and the power output of the transmitters
creating the RF field.

b) There are no simple rules or procedures for assessing risk. Each situation requires individual examination
which must consider the:

1) Susceptibility of EED whether:

- Installed.
- Exposed.
- Packaged.
- Specifically protected.

2) Characteristics of transmitters.
3) Distance between the EED and radiating systems such as radios etc.

c) System Susceptibility

1) Using the NFT parameters described in paragraph 1.6.0.3), the assessment of the EED firing
circuit susceptibility to induced pick up from RF radiation and the method of calculating the
resulting degree of risk are described in Part II Chapter 7.

2) For systems with an unknown susceptibility, the maximum safe power density in the vicinity of
CW or pulsed transmission sources pulsed at more than 666 pulses per second (pps) can be
determined from the graph at Figure 6-II. The electrical characteristics of the US MK 114
Primer, UK Fuzehead Type F 120 and the FRG EL 37 cap together with a safety factor (Table 6-
2) for a system with a 5 metre firing line was used to calculate the maximum safe power
density.

3) This will enable a worst case CW assessment to be made and used until appropriate advice can
be obtained from National Authorities.

4) Where RF pulse environments are encountered, special care should be taken of energy sensitive
EED whose susceptibility changes significantly according to the emitter's pulse and time
constant. In the absence of specific advice, a 20 times multiple of the distance calculated for CW
should be applied.

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TABLE 6-2 - EED Electrical Characteristics

EED Resistance No-Fire Threshold Values Typical

Type Range Safety
Ω Factor
dB
Energy Current Power
MJ A mW
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

US Mk 3–7 0.19 0.05 7.5 -4

114 Primer

UK 10 – 16 0.2 0.045 26 -7

F120

FRG 0.8 - 1.7 0.3 0.015 20 -10

EL 37

d) Safe Distance

1) Unless otherwise directed by the appropriate National Authority, it is accepted that the following
basic far field formula should be used for safety evaluations:

which rearranges to:

..................................................................................................where:

S = Safe Power Density (Wm-2) as shown in Figure 6-II

G= Antenna gain relative to an isotropic (numerical ratio not dB)P =Mean power fed to antenna (W)
d = Safe distance (m)

1.6.0.7. Management Radios

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a) For VHF/UHF transmitters, ie management radios, where the antenna gain in dB and the power in watts is
known, safe distances can be established for known EED by reference to look-up graph at Figure 6-III.

b) The example below illustrates how this graph can be used:

Equipment Data Graph Line System

(Figure 6 - 2) Susceptibility

Antenna Gain 3dB 6 5.0 Vm -1

Transmitter Power 20W

Procedure: Read across from the right to left at 5.0 Vm-1 co-ordinate to graph line No. 6.
Read downwards vertically to the X axis (distance in metres).
This shows that the Safe Distance = 7 metres.

1.6.0.8. Summary

Where a worst case theoretical approach is considered restrictive, advice should be sought from National
Authorities.

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CHAPTER 7 - FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

Section I - General

1.7.1.1. Introduction

The aim of these principles is to establish measures and procedures to ensure a minimum practicable risk in
fighting fires involving ammunition and explosives at explosives areas.

These identification measures are based on the classification of fires into four fire divisions according to the
hazard they present. This Chapter also establishes minimum guidelines for the development of emergency plans,
including safety, security, and environmental protection, which have to be coordinated with local authorities.

Firefighting procedures, training of firefighting personnel, the use and maintenance of firefighting
equipment and vehicles, the provision of water supply and alarm systems, the first aid measures, and other measures
required in firefighting are outside the scope of this Chapter and shall be the responsibility of the national authority.

The ammunition hazard symbols and supplemental symbols including chemical agent symbols (see Figure
F.2 below) are for firefighting situations only and are not necessarily applicable to normal operating conditions.

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Section II - Fire Divisions

1.7.2.1. Hazard Divisions involved:

1.1 Mass explosion

1.2 Explosion with fragment hazard

1.3 Mass fire

1.4 Moderate fire

1.5 Mass explosion (blasting agents)

1.6 Non-mass explosion (EIDS article)

Fire division 1 indicates the greatest hazard. The hazard decreases with ascending fire division numbers as
follows:

Hazard Division Fire Division Hazard involved

1.1; 1.5 1 Mass explosion
1.2; 1.6 2 Explosion with projection
1.3 3 Mass fire, or fire with minor blast or projections
1.4 4 No significant hazard

The fire divisions are synonymous with the Storage Hazard Divisions 1.1 through 1.4 ammunition and
explosives. But in this case, as described in AASTP-1, Part I, Chapter 3, the HD 1.5 belongs to Fire Division 1
(mass expl) and HD 1.6 belongs to Fire Division 2 (non mass expl).

Each of the Fire Divisions is indicated by distinctive symbols in order to be recognized by fire fighting
personnel approaching a scene of fire.

1.7.2.2. Fire Division Symbols:

Each of the four fire divisions is indicated by distinctive symbols (see Figure F.1) in order to be recognized
by fire-fighting personnel approaching a scene of fire. To assist with identifying at long range, the symbols differ in
shape as follows:

Shape Fire Division

Octagon 1

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Cross 2
Inverted triangle 3
Diamond 4

- The colour of all four symbols is orange in accordance with the colour on UN and IMCO labels for Class 1
(Explosives).

- The use of the specified fire division numbers is left to the discretion of national authorities. When numbers are
used they are painted in black.

1.7.2.3. Supplementary Symbols:

a) Due to the peculiarity of hazardous substances in certain types of ammunition (Compatibility Groups G,H,J
and L), the storage of this ammunition requires supplementary symbols. Those supplementary “Chemical
Hazards Symbols“ are used to indicate the precautions to be taken against the additional hazards
proceeding from the chemical agents of that ammunition (see Figure F.2). The Chemical Hazard Symbols
indicate the following precautions:
b) wear full protective suit,
c) wear respirator facepiece,
d) apply no water.
e) All three Chemical Hazard Symbols are circular in shape. They correspond to the ISO 3864 "Safety
colours and safety signs". The symbols, their meanings and their sizes are shown in Figure F.2.
f) The prohibiting the use of water in fire-fighting (symbol No. 3 of Figure F.2) may be placed together with
one of the other if required.
g) The indicating the requirement to wear full protective clothing should also indicate the type of full
protective clothing to be worn, as the different kinds of chemical agents demand different protective
measures. The type of full protective clothing to be worn at a chemical ammunition storage site and the
method by which this is indicated are the responsibility of the nation concerned.
h) The chemical agents mostly used in ammunition, the compatibility groups of that ammunition and the
required in storage are specified in Table T.1

1.7.2.4. Protective Clothing:

The following sets of full protective clothing are recommended:

- Protective clothing against casualty agents, consisting of protective respirator facepiece, impermeable
suit, hood and boots, protective footwear and splash suit.
- Protective clothing against harassing agents, consisting of protective respirator facepiece.

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- Protective clothing against white phosphorus (WP) smoke, consisting of fire-resistant gloves, chemical
safety goggles and respirator facepiece.

The different sets of full protective clothing to be worn may be indicated by:

- a white number, corresponding to the set-no., on the blue background of the symbol, or
- a white rectangular plaque placed below the symbol listing in black letters the components of
protective clothing to be worn.

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Section III - Firefighting Principles

1.7.3.1. Fire Prevention (preventive fire protection)

Preventive fire protection comprises all measures suited to prevent the development and spreading of a fire.
These are to develop a plan based on an estimate of the hazards and risk.. This analysis should comprise:

- employees,
- infrastructure and stockpile,
- exposed sites,
- public and the local environment.

The following measures are to addressed in all cases:

1.7.3.2 Constructional Fire Prevention Measures

The following basic criteria apply:

- Buildings designed for the processing or storage of ammunition shall be built of non-combustible or at
least fire-resistant., (according to national standards) construction material. Supporting and
surrounding structural elements shall resist to fire for at least 30 minutes in accordance with national
standards.
- Chimneys in an explosives area must be provided with a trap to prevent flying sparks.
- Heating systems must not have uncovered glowing parts. The temperatures of exposed heating
surfaces and lines must not exceed 120° C.
- An efficient fire alarm system shall be installed and maintained.
- Ammunition sites are to be equipped with an adequate fire fighting water supply according to national
standards. Fire fighting water supply points shall not be sited closer than 25m to any process or storage
building. They are to be positioned beside
-not in - roads or traffic-ways and be provided with an area of clearance, such that vehicles will not
cause an obstruction. Where alternative water supply points are not available, protection should be
provided for the fire fighting vehicle and it's crew (e. g. barriers or traverses).
- Type, quantity and locations of fire fighting equipment are determined according to facility-related
assessments and shall be adapted to the local conditions during annual fire fighting demonstrations.
- Fire prevention also includes lightning protection.

1.7.3.3 Organizational Fire Prevention Measures:

These are to be organized according to national regulations within the scope of general fire protection

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taking into account the following criteria:

- order and cleanness as well as strict observance of safety precautions count among the most effective
fire prevention measures, equal to prohibition of smoking, fire and naked light,
- handling of flammable substances,
- prevention of additional fire loads such as stacking material, packaging material and the like,
- fire hazards of machines, equipment and tools during ammunition operations or in the case of
overload of electrical lines,
- inflammable undergrowth, laying out fire lanes,
- clear zones, trimming of branches and the like,
- regular instruction of the personnel about actions to be taken in case of fire and in the use of first aid
fire fighting equipment,
- preparation of an emergency planning4 and an emergency map5:

4
emergency planning: see section V
5
emergency map: a map containing the essential details of a facility or an installation from the point of view of
fire protection.

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Section IV - Fire- Fighting Procedures

1.7.4.1. General

a) According to the stage of the fire, ammunition fires are divided into:

b) The following regulations deal with the special hazards connected with ammunition fires.

- developing ammunition fires and

- established ammunition fires.

Developing ammunition fires are fires in the vicinity of ammunition, but which do not immediately hazard
it.

Established ammunition fires are those which are hazarding or about to hazard the explosives.

The term 'established ammunition fire' will be applied to all fires which cannot be positively identified as
'developing ammunition fires'.

Firefighters of ammunition and explosives fires shall have a thorough knowledge of the specific reactions
of ammunition and explosives exposed to the heat or to the fire itself. The firefighting forces and other
essential personnel shall be briefed before approaching the scene of the fire. They shall be informed of the
known hazards and conditions existing at the scene of the fire before proceeding to the location of the fire.

Fire involving ammunition and explosives shall be fought according to the hazard classification, fire
division, the stage of the fire, and the procedures specified by the Defense Component concerned. Special
firefighting instructions addressing ammunition hazards shall be developed according to the needs of the
Defense Components.

All fires starting in the vicinity of ammunition or explosives shall be reported and shall be fought
immediately with all available means and without awaiting specific instructions. However, if the fire
involves explosive material or is supplying heat to it, or if the fire is so large that it cannot be extinguished
with the equipment at hand, the personnel involved shall evacuate and seek safety.

Before fighting ammunition fires in an unknown situation, the fire brigade has to analyze the situation.

Therefore it is suitable to use a car or a van, in order to provide those first at the scene a rapid means of
escape if necessary.

The presence of buildings, earth barricades etc. to protect fire-fighting personnel during operations is a
crucial factor for effective fighting of fires involving ammunition or explosives. The fire-fighting
personnel, their vehicles and equipment must not be endangered unnecessarily.

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1.7.4.2. Detailed Fire Fighting Procedures

Fires of ammunition and explosives are fought according to their classification in fire divisions and the
stage of the fire.

(a) Fire Division 1

1. Developing fire: immediately sound the fire alarm, call the fire brigade, evacuate non-essential
personnel and fight the fire for as long as it is safe to do so, in accordance with the prearranged plan.
On arrival of the fire brigade, the competent person will advise them of the state of the fire. Provided
that the explosives are still not hazarded, they will take immediate action to fight it. A close watch
must be kept upon the fire, so that evacuation can be ordered immediately if it appears that the
explosives are about to become hazarded.

2. Fully developed fire: these must not be fought. The fire alarm will be sounded and all personnel must
evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take cover, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. The
fire brigade will be called from the vicinity of this point, giving its location and emphasizing that the
fire is fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g. from the incident site during
the developing stage), a further call must be made to warn the fire brigade the fire is now fully
developed. The brigade will rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.

3. Once the mass explosion has taken place, fire fighters should assess the situation and extinguish any
secondary fires, concentrating upon those which hazard other explosives stores, as advised by the
Control Officer, who should be available by this time.

(b) Fire Division 2

1. Developing fire: immediately sound the fire alarm, call the fire brigade, evacuate all non-essential
personnel and fight the fire for as long as it is safe to do so, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan.
On arrival of the fire brigade, the competent person will advise them of the state of the fire. Provided
that the explosives are still not hazarded, they will take immediate action to fight it. A close watch
must be kept upon the fire, so that evacuation can be ordered immediately if it appears that the
explosives are about to become hazarded.

2. Established ammunition fire: In the case of earth covered or heavy walled ammunition storage
magazines the effects of the exploding ammunition will be contained within the magazine except
possibly for those in the direction of the headwall or doors. Therefore external fires can be fought in
close proximity of the magazines except in the direction of the head-wall or doors. An established fire
must not be fought inside such a magazine nor external fires in front of it and no firefighting at all in
case of light structure magazines. In all cases the fire alarm will be sounded, all personnel must
evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take cover, in accordance with the pre-arranged that may

I-7-8
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(Edition 1)
take account of the above. The fire brigade is to be withdrawn behind the front wall line of the
magazine or completely from the vicinity of this point, giving its location and emphasizing that the fire
is fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g. from the incident site during the
developing stage), a further call must be made to warn the fire brigade that the fire is now fully
developed. The brigade will rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.

3. Once the explosives have become involved, lobbed and self propelled items can be expected, some of
which may function on impact. Secondary fires may be started. Where these hazard other explosives,
attempts should be made to extinguish them without exposing crews to undue risk.

c) Fire Division 3

1. Developing fire: immediately sound the fire alarm, call the fire brigade, evacuate all non-essential
personnel and fight the fire for as long as it is safe to do so, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan.
On arrival of the fire brigade, the competent person will advise them of the state of the fire. Provided
that the explosives are still not hazarded, they will take immediate action to fight it. A close watch
must be kept upon the fire, so that evacuation can be ordered immediately if it appears that the
explosives are about to become hazarded.

2. Fully developed fire: these must not be fought. The fire alarm will be sounded and all personnel will
evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take cover in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. The
fire brigade is to be called from the vicinity of this point, giving its' location and emphasizing that the
fire is fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g. from the incident site during
the developing stage), a further call must be made to warn the fire brigade that the fire is now fully
developed. The brigade will rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.

3. Once the explosives have become involved a particularly intense fire can be expected, with high levels
of radiant heat, probably with flame jets from openings in the building. Packages may burst, some
violently, but there will be no explosions. Secondary fires may be started by radiation or projected fire
brands. Once the main fire is seen to be reducing to a level that enables these to be fought, action
should be taken to extinguish them, keeping crews away from openings in the building. Visors and
gloves are advised.

(d) Fire Division 4

1 Fires involving items of Fire Division 4 may be fought as dictated by the situation.

2 After an extended period of time the ammunition may explode sporadically. For protection against
fragments and missiles the fire-fighting forces should not approach the scene of fire any closer than
necessity dictates, certainly not any closer than 25 m. When possible the fire should be fought from a
protected location.

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(e) Ammunition requiring Supplementary Symbols

Ammunition containing explosives and additional hazardous agents (see Figure F.2) requires
special attention and precautions in fire-fighting. Such ammunition belongs to different fire
divisions depending on the kind and quantity of explosives contained in the ammunition. Such
fires are fought in accordance with the fire division(s) involved taking into account the
precautions indicated by the supplementary l. The issue of the corresponding special fire-
fighting regulations is left to the discretion of the national authorities.

(f) Ammunition Containing Depleted Uranium:

1. Combustion of DU

i) The combustion properties of DU metal must be taken into account when dealing with a
fire involving DU ammunition.
(ii) The colour of smoke produced by burning DU may be yellow but the absence of colour
is not a reliable indication that DU metal is not involved; therefore it is prudent to
assume from the outset that DU is burning and that DU oxide smoke is being produced
and to apply the appropriate precautions, as follows.

2. Precautions

Once uranium metal has ignited and a vigorous self-sustaining oxidation reaction is started, the
application of small quantities of conventional extinguishing agents is likely to be ineffective
and may even add to the spread of the fire by dispersing the burning uranium. For example,
insufficient water to cool the fire would react with hot uranium metal to form hydrogen. For a
small fire involving uranium and no explosives, the most effective extinguishing agent is one of
the inert powdered smothering agents (e. g. Pyromet) but when explosives are present the
closeness of approach necessary to deliver such an extinguishing agent to the seat of the fire
would be hazardous to the firefighters. In particular, propellants, the most likely explosives to be
closely associated with the DU, may produce intense radiant heat, firebrands and some ejected
fragments. The firebrands may be only small glowing of packaging materials but it is possible
that they could be fiery fragments of burning propellant

2. Fire Fighting Methods

i) In all cases, treat as a radiological risk - i. e. wear respirator facepiece, ensure all parts
of the body are covered and fight fire from up-wind direction. Put down smoke with
spray jet. Prevent water from flowing-off, if possible (dikes).

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(ii) DU without an explosive component. Use copious water at optimum jet/spray range.
Do not use halons. No projections are likely, other than the minor spallations associated
with metal fires hit by water.
(iii) DU with an explosive component. Fight in accordance with the fire division concerned.

(g) Underground Storage Sites

Fire precautions

In view of the confined nature of underground sites, the increased problems associated with access and the
large quantities of explosives that could be held, special attention must be given to fire safety measures,
pre-planning and the adequate provision and efficient maintenance of fire fighting equipment. It must be
considered that local fire brigades may not be willing to commit personnel to fire fighting in such locations.
This will include circumstances regarding any suspected fire, details of which are not known or
corroborated by automatic telemetry or monitoring systems such as : close circuit television, automatic heat
and humidity sensors, infra red/ ultra violet sensors, emergency lighting systems, water suppression/
drencher systems and alternative access points.

Fire prevention at underground storage sites requires special preplanning and in each individual case
should be supported by facility-related emergency response plan.

The probability of a fire that could cause an "initial event" will be reduced substantially by installing an
automatic smoke-detecting and fire-extinguishing system. Reserve water tanks should be aboveground
well clear of a possible crater area and if water is carried to hydrants underground, consideration should be
given to alternative supply.

An alarm system should be provided to operate throughout the whole area, both above and below ground.
The system should be connected to a central control point, manned at all times, located where additional
resources can be speedily summoned and the pre-arranged fire plan set in action.

In air-conditioned sites or in sites provided with forced ventilation, the need to shut these down on an
outbreak of fire will have to be considered.

Fire-fighting equipment retained underground should be positioned where it is most likely to be accessible
when an outbreak of fire is detected.

Self-contained breathing apparatus and training in its use are essential for underground fire-fighting. No
person or volunteer fire fighter unless equipped with such apparatus, is to enter an underground site in
which fire has broken out until the area has been certified free from noxious gas.

Special consideration should be given to the following aspects:

- installation of automatic fire-detecting and fire-extinguishing systems;

- assurance of fire fighting water supply under worst-case conditions;

- adequate means of escape, well signposted and lit, together with fire brigade access;

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- assurance of an efficient alarm system - both above and below ground.

All personnel must be trained in the use of fire equipment and fire parties must be detailed, trained
and practiced.

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Section V - Emergency Planning

1.7.5.1. Standard Operating Procedures

Installations or responsible activities shall develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) or plans
designed to provide safety, security and environmental protection. Plans shall be coordinated with the applicable
national, regional and local emergency response authorities (e.g. law enforcement, fire departments and hospitals
etc.) and any established Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC).

At a minimum, those SOPs or plans shall include the following:

- Specific sections and guidance that address emergency preparedness, contingency planning and security. For
security, those SOPs or plans shall limit access to trained and authorized personnel.

- Procedures that minimize the possibility of an unpermitted or uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge or
migration of military munitions or explosives out of any storage unit when such release, discharge or migration
may endanger human health or the environment.

- Provisions for prompt notification to emergency response and environmental agencies and the potentially
affected public for an actual or potential detonation or uncontrolled release, discharge or migration (that may
endanger human health or the environment).

To produce the necessary SOP's is in the responsibility of national authorities.

The commanding leaders of the installations are responsible for the training of their personnel and the
coordination with the LEPC. They also have to ensure that all SOP's and Emergency Plans belonging to the special
installation are reachable to external security and emergency authorities.

Competent persons belonging to the depot or to an external fire brigade are regularly be trained to be
available to advise the fire chief and external fire fighters.

Emergency withdrawal distances for nonessential personnel are intended for application in emergency
situations only and are not to be used for facility siting.

Emergency withdrawal distances depend on fire involvement and on whether or not the hazard
classification, fire division and quantity of explosives are known. The withdrawal distance for essential personnel at
accidents shall be determined by emergency authorities on site. Emergency authorities shall determine who are
essential personnel.

If a fire involves explosives or involvement is imminent, then the initial withdrawal distance applied shall
be at least the inhabited building distance while the appropriate emergency withdrawal distance for nonessential
personnel is being determined. When emergency authorities determine that the fire is or may become uncontrollable
and may result in deflagration and/or detonation of nearby ammunition or explosive material, all nonessential
personnel shall be withdrawn to the appropriate emergency withdrawal distance listed in Table.T.2

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Table T.1 Compatibility Group and Chemical Hazard Symbols Required

for Storage of Chemical Ammunition and Substances.

Breath-
Compati- Apply
Chemical Ammunition and ing
bility Full Protective Clothing No
Substances 2
Appara-
Group Water
tus
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Toxic Agents1 K X
Tear Gas, O-Chlorobenzol G X
Smoke, Titanium Tetrachloride
G X
(FM)
Smoke, Sulpher trioxide-
chlorosulphonic acid solution G X
(FS)
Smoke, Aluminum-zinc oxide-
G X X
hexachloroethane (HC)
White Phosphorous (WP) H X
White Phosphorous plasticized
H X
(PWP)
Thermite or Thermate (TH) G X X
Pyrotechnic Material (PT) G X X
Calcium Phosphide L X X
Signaling Smokes G X
Isobutyl methacrylate with oil
J X
(IM)
Napalm (NP) J X X X
Triethylaluminim (TEA)(TPA) L X X

Notes:
1 Toxic Agents without explosives components that normally would be assigned to Hazard Division 6.1
may be stored as compatibility group K.
2 See Chapter 3.

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Table T.2 Emergency Withdrawal Distances for Nonessential Personnel.

HD Unknown Quantity Known Quantity

Unknown, located in facility, truck
1250m 1250m
and or tractor trailer
Unknown, located in railcar 1500m 1500m
For transportation,
≤ 7500kg Æ 870m;

7500<NEM≤16000 kg Æ1120m

Same as unknown
1.11 and 1.5 1.5 Æ 1100m
facility, truck trailer or
For facilities,
railcar as appropriate
≤7000kg Æ 850m

7000 <NEM≤ 25000kg Æ1300m

>25000kg Æ 1300m – 44,4 Q1/3

1.21 and 1.6
560m 560m

1.32 405m 6,4 Q1/3 with a 120m minimum.

1.4 100m 100m

Notes:
1 For HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 AE, if known, the maximum range fragments and debris will be thrown (including the
interaction effects of stacks of items, but excluding lugs, strongbacks, and/or nose and tail plates) may be used
to replace the distances given.
2 Emergency withdrawal distances do not consider the potential flight range of propulsion units.

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Figure F.1 Fire Division Symbols

Fire Division 1 Fire Division 2

Fire Division 3 Fire Division 4

Sizes large small

[mm] [mm]
a 600 300
b 200 100
c ~424 ~212
Letters (height) ~315 ~158
Letters (width) ~50 ~25

Colours*
Background orange
Numbers black

* The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
(Specification of signs and colours – except orange – is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and safety signs")

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Figure F.2 Chemical Hazard Symbols

Symbol 1 Wear full protective clothing Symbol 2 Wear breathing apparatus

Colours:* Colours:*
Background is blue Background is blue
Figure and rim are white
Figure, rim and number are white when
set-no. is indicated by number;

Figure and rim when used to indicate

set-no. by colour:
• Red for Set 1 Protective Clothing
• Yellow for Set 2 Protective Clothing
• White for Set 3 Protective Clothing

Symbol 2 Apply no water

Colours:*
Background is white
Circle and diagonal are red
Figure is black

* The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
(Specification of signs and colours – except orange – is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and safety signs")

Sizes Large small

[mm] [mm]
a 630 315
b 12 6
c 63 32

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Figure F.3 Supplemental Chemical Hazard Symbols.6

G – Type Nerve Agents VX Nerve Agents H – Type Mustard Agents

Colours:*
Background: yellow
Letters: black
*The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.
(Specification of signs and colours – except orange – is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and safety signs")

large small
[mm] [mm]
Diameter 630 315
Letters (height) 315 158
Letters (width) 50 25

6
Given as an example; Nations may use additional symbols which may differ in size, form and
colour.

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CHAPTER 8 - REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS

1.8.0.1. Information Required

In order that reports on damage resulting from accidental explosions be of value to the "NATO Group of
Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)" and
useful in verifying the safety principles, the information should include the following:

1) Type and quantity of ammunition or explosives in the stack or building where the accident occurred.

2) NEQ and name of filling and weight of filled items.

2) Method of packing of the ammunition or explosives where the initial accident occurred and material of
packages.

4) Distances between the articles in the packages.

5) Method of storing the ammunition or explosives where the initial accident occurred.

6) Information as above for neighbouring storage places of ammunition and explosives stating whether such
neighbouring stacks were set off or otherwise affected.

7) The thickness of walls and roofs if ammunition or explosives were stored in buildings and whether there
were windows through which fragments or debris got into the buildings.

8) Distances between buildings, or stacks, if buildings were not used.

9) The presumed influence of barricades upon the protection of neighbouring buildings and stacks.

10) Fire-fighting measures (attempts to fight fire).

11) The time between the first and last propagation from stack to stack.

12) The general effect on inhabited buildings in the vicinity and their inhabitants.

13) A map indicating the size and distribution of fragments and debris.

14) A brief summary of the causes and the effects.

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1.8.0.2. Summary Report

A summary report is first required for translation and distribution by NATO. A full report should be
forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. This report would be available on loan to NATO-countries in the language of
the country of origin.

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CHAPTER 9 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION

1.9.0.1. Use of Depleted Uranium

Ammunition containing depleted uranium (DU) has been developed as an improved armour piercing weapon,
mainly for anti-tank warfare. A round of DU ammunition may consist of a DU penetrator made of DU metal (or of a
DU alloy) and a propellant charge which may be integral with the penetrator or loaded into the gun separately. The use
of DU in armour piercing ammunition exploits the high density of the metal, which, when propelled at high velocity,
results in the delivery of sufficient kinetic energy to effect penetration. The penetration is accompanied by
disintegration of the projectile and a violent combustion of the fragments thus formed.

1.9.0.2. Radioactivity

a) DU is slightly radioactive and, if ingested, has a chemical toxicity about the same as lead. DU is not a fissile
material and cannot be used in the absence of fissile material to construct a nuclear weapon. Therefore DU
ammunition is in no sense, and cannot be described as, a nuclear weapon, a radiological, a chemical weapon or
a weapon of mass destruction.

b) The radioactivity of DU results in the emission of low levels of ionising radiation from DU ammunition.
The radiation levels external to bulk quantities of DU ammunition are not likely to be more than ten times
the natural radiation background provided actual contact with the metal is avoided; therefore even
prolonged personal exposure to the external radiation field does not constitute a significant hazard.
Because the radiation levels from DU metal are so low, this material is used in civil applications requiring a
high density metal, e.g. yacht keels, aircraft balance weights, machinery ballast, flywheels and gyro rotors.
Although the radiation levels expected in the vicinity of stored quantities of DU ammunition are too low to
present a significant risk of harm to personnel, the principle of keeping exposures of people to radiation as
low as reasonably practicable should be followed by adopting simple precautions such as monitoring the
radiation levels and keeping exposure times to the minimum.

1.9.0.3. Effects of Fire and Explosion

a) DU metal when subjected to a sustained high temperature in a copious supply of air will ignite and burn. A
small fraction of the material may be dispersed into the atmosphere as a DU oxide fume or smoke and
hence could be inhaled by persons situated downwind of an accidental fire or explosion involving DU

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ammunition. The risk of consequent damage to the health of members of the public would be very low
indeed at the safety distances required to protect against the explosives hazards associated with the
ammunition but the risk should be assessed for each type of DU ammunition in the proposed storage
conditions. The existing safety procedures for the storage of ammunition generally will also apply to DU
ammunition according to its hazard classification, but simple additional precautions may be needed in some
instances to ensure that in the event of an accident any additional risk of harm to people due to the
atmospheric dispersion of a DU oxide smoke will be small compared with the risk arising from the
explosive content of the ammunition.

b) In Part II, Chapter 8 of this Manual a more detailed account is given of the properties of DU and their
relevance to the storage of DU ammunition.

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QUANTITY-DISTANCE TABLES FOR ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

Net Explosives Quantities in Kilograms

Quantity-Distances in Metres

It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3

when using this Annex since they are complementary.

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SECTION I : GENERAL NOTES AND EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS

A.1.1 Quantity-Distance Criteria
Quantity-Distance criteria and the formulae used to generate values in the Q-D Tables are given
in Part II Annex A.
A.1.2 Rounding of Quantity-Distances
The values of quantity-distances in the Q-D Tables 1 to 3 have been calculated using the
formulae at the foot of the tables rounded up to the nearest metre.
A.1.3 Determination of Quantity-Distances or Permissible Quantities
The method of determining quantity-distances for different Potential Explosion Sites is given in
Sections 1.4.2.4 – 1.4.2.6.
A.1.4 General Note on Pictographs
The pictographs in the following paragraphs are introduced to simplify the presentation of
information in the Q-D Tables. The tables are intended to be used in conjunction with the
principles given in the text of this Leaflet. The pictographs are purely diagrammatic; their shapes
do not imply that actual structures should have similar shapes and proportions. The orientation
shown is intended to indicate the direction of principal concern for blast, flame, radiant heat and
projections as shown by arrows. In an actual situation every direction must be considered in turn.
At a Potential Explosion Site there are relatively few significant variations but at an Exposed Site
it is necessary to distinguish among different types of construction and among different functions
of buildings. For these reasons a given building may require one symbol when it is being
considered as a Potential Explosion Site and another symbol when it is considered as an Exposed
Site.

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A.1.5 Symbols for Potential Explosion Sites (PES)

a. General
These descriptions are merely for easy identification of the pictograph used in the Q-D Tables.
An Exposed Site is assumed to exist to the left of each pictograph.
b. Earth-covered Building (see NOTE 1 overleaf)
(1) Building with earth on the roof and against three walls. Directional
effects through the door and headwall are towards an Exposed Site
(2) The same building as (1) but the directional effects through the door
and headwall are away from an Exposed Site
(3) The same building as (1) but the directional effects through the door
and headwall are perpendicular to the direction of an Exposed Site
c. Heavy-Walled Building
Building of non-combustible construction with walls of 30 cm reinforced
concrete with or without a protective roof, a protective roof being defined
as constructed of 15 cm reinforced concrete with suitable support. The
door is barricaded if it faces a PES
d. Barricaded Site
(1) Open-air stack or light structure, barricaded
(2) Truck, trailer, railcar or freight container loaded with ammunition,
barricaded
e. Unbarricaded Site
(1) Open-air stack or light structure, unbarricaded
(2) Truck, trailer, railcar or freight container loaded with ammunition,
unbarricaded
A.1.6 Additional Symbols for Potential Explosion Sites (PES) for HD 1.2
a. General
These descriptions are merely for easy identification of the pictograph used in the Q-D Tables.
An Exposed Site is assumed to exist to the left of each pictograph. The descriptions are only
valid for HD 1.2 purposes.
b. Earth-covered Building
(1) Building with earth on the roof and against three walls. Directional
effects through the door and headwall are towards an Exposed Site. (see
NOTE 2 overleaf)
c. Hardened Building
(1) A building of non-combustible construction with walls of 30 cm
reinforced concrete with a protective roof of 15 cm reinforced concrete
with suitable support which will effectively contain the effects from HD
1.2 ammunition (except through the door). The building may or may not
be barricaded.

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(2) The same building as (1), Directional effects through a door or other
large aperture, frangible or venting panel are towards an exposed site. .
(see NOTE 2 overleaf)

NOTE 1 (See figure below)

The directional effects for HD 1.1 from buildings which meet the design criteria for standard
igloos are considered to occur :
a. through the front in the area bounded by lines drawn at 150o to the front face of the PES from
its front corners.
b. through the rear in the area bounded by lines drawn at 135o to the rear face of the PES from its
rear corners.
c. all area around a PES not included in a. or b. above are considered to be to the side of the PES.
In those cases where an Exposed Site (ES) lies on the line separating rear/side etc. of a PES, the
greater quantity-distance should be observed.

1500

FRONT

REAR

1350

NOTE 2 (See figure below)

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The directional effects for HD 1.2 from buildings which meet the design criteria for standard
igloos or HD 1.2 containment buildings are considered to occur through the front in the area
bounded by lines drawn at 100o to the front face of the PES from its front corners.

1000

Door or other
aperture

A.1.7 Symbols for Exposed Sites (ES)

a. General
These descriptions are merely for easy identification of the pictographs used in the Q-D tables.
A Potential Explosion Site is assumed to exist to the right of each pictograph.
b. Igloo designed for 7 bar
(1) Igloo designed in accordance with Part II, subparagraphs 2.3.2.2.a) and
2.3.2.2.b)2), with the door towards a PES.
(2) The same igloo as (1) but the door faces away from a PES.

(3) The same igloo as (1) but the door faces perpendicular to the direction
of a PES.
c. Igloo designed for 3 bar
(1) Igloo designed in accordance with Part II, subparagraphs 2.3.2.2.a) and
2.3.2.2.b)1), with the door towards a PES.
(2) The same igloo as (1) but the door faces away from a PES.

(3) The same igloo as (1) but the door faces perpendicular to the direction
of a PES.

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d. Other earth-covered buildings

(1) Earth-covered building not complying with Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.2,
but with a headwall and door(s) resistant to high velocity projections,
subparagraph 1.3.5.6.a). The door faces a PES.
(2) Earth-covered building not complying with Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.2,
but with a headwall and door(s) resistant to fire and low velocity
projections, subparagraph 1.3.5.6.b). The door faces a PES.
(3) Earth-covered building not complying with Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.2,
but with a door barricade, paragraphs 1.3.6.4 – 1.3.6.6. The door faces a
PES.
(4) Earth-covered building not complying with Part II, paragraph 2.3.2.2,
with the door facing a PES.
(5) The same building as (4) but the door faces away from a PES.

(6) The same building as (4) but the door faces perpendicular to the
direction of a PES.

e. Heavy Walled Building

(1) Building of non-combustible construction with walls of [30 cm]

reinforced concrete and protective roof of 15 cm reinforced concrete with
suitable support. The door is barricaded if it faces a PES.

(2) The same building as (1) but without protective roof. The door is
barricaded if it faces a PES.

f. Barricaded Site

(1) Open air stack or light structure, barricaded.

(2) Truck, trailer, railcar or freight container loaded with ammunition,
barricaded.

g. Unbarricaded Site

(1) Open air stack or light structure, unbarricaded.

(2) Truck, trailer, railcar or freight container loaded with ammunition,
unbarricaded

h. Process Building (Explosives Workshop)

(1) Process Building with protective roof, barricaded (a heavy wall may
constitute a barricade).

(2) Process Building without protective roof, barricaded (a heavy wall may
constitute a barricade).

(3) Process Building with or without a protective roof, unbarricaded.

I-A-6
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

A.1.8 Symbols for Exposed Sites frequented by the general public

a. General

These descriptions are merely for easy identification of the pictographs used in the Q-D tables.
A Potential Explosion Site is assumed to exist to the right of each pictograph. The descriptions
are valid for all Hazard Division purposes

b. Exterior Site

(1) Public traffic Route.

(2) Inhabited Building.

I-A-7
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

SECTION II : QUANTITY-DISTANCE TABLES (Q-D TABLES)

A.2.1 General Instruction

This section presents tables which contain information to determine suitable quantity-distances
between sites except for a Potential Explosion Site containing ammunition and explosives of HD
1.4 or inert ammunition. Each Q-D table comprises two pages. The left hand page presents a
matrix in which each cell represents a combination of a Potential Explosion Site and an Exposed
Site and refers to one or more D-distances or constant values of distance. The right hand page
presents columns of tabulated values of D-distances generated from the distance function shown
at the foot of each column, subject to any overriding minimum or maximum fixed distances.
Where a cell in the matrix shows more than one option the selection is made on the basis of
special conditions and the desired level of protection. References to specific subparagraphs
appear for Table 1 at the foot of the matrix and for Tables 2 and 3 at the right hand pages.

A.2.2 HD 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3

See the corresponding Q-D Table 1, 2, 3A or 3B. Table 3A is used for the more hazardous items,
mainly propellants (1.3) and Table 3B for the less hazardous items (1.3 *), see Section 3.5.

A.2.3 HD 1.4

Separation distances from ammunition or explosives of HD 1.4 are not a function of the Net
Explosives Quantity. Separation distances prescribed by fire regulations apply. Stacks or non
fire-resistant buildings should normally be separated by 10 m to prevent ignition by radiant heat.

A.2.4 Inert Ammunition

Separation distances from inert ammunition are determined by fire regulations. Stacks or non
fire-resistant buildings should normally be separated from one another by 10 m to prevent
ignition by radiant heat.

I-A-8
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary
TABLE 1 Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.1
PES
ES
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

1 D3ag D3ag D5a D5a D5a D4ag

2 D3ag D3ag D5b D5b D5b D4ag

3 D4agh or D5ag D4agh or D5ag D6be D6be D6be D4bghe or D6ae

4 D3ag D3ag D5b D5b D5b D5ag

5 D3ag D3ag D6b D6b D6b D5bg

6 D4bgh or D6a D4bgh or D6a D6ce D6ce D6ce D6ce

D8bde, D9bje
7 D4ag D4b or D5a or D12ae D8be D8bde D8bde

D9bde, D9bje
8 D6a D6a or D12ae D8be D8bde D8bde

9 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9ce D4cghe or D9ce D9ce D9ce

10 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9b D9b D9b D9b

11 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9cje D4cghe or D9ce D9cje D9cje

12 D4cgh or D7b D4cgh or D7b D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D5cghe or D7be

13 D4cgh or D7b D4cgh or D7b D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D5cghe or D7be

D1bie, D2bie D1bie, D2bie

14 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D4bghe or D7be D4bghe or D7be D4bghe or D7be D4bghe or D7be

D1bie, D2bie
15 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9cje or D12fe D4bghe or D7be D9cje or D12fe D9cje or D12fe

16 D10 D10 D10 D10 D10 D10

17 D10 (∃270m) D10 (∃270m) D10 (∃270m) D10o D10o D10 (∃270m)

18 D10 (∃270m) D10 (∃270m) D13 D10o D13 D13

D11 (∃270m)k D11 (∃270m)k

D16 (∃270m)kn D17 (∃270m)kn
19 D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m) D11 (∃270m)k D11k D11k D11 (∃270m)k
D14 (∃400m)n D15 (∃400m)n D13 (∃400m) D13 D13 D13 (∃400m)

l l l l
D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m) D13 D13
20 D14 (∃400m)ln D14 (∃400m)ln D13 (∃400m)l D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m)l

I-A-9
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

TABLE 1 (PAGE 1) - Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.1

Net Quantity-Distances in metres

Explosives
Quantity in D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12
kg

500 3 4 7 9 15 20 29 39 64 180 180

600 3 5 7 10 16 21 31 41 68 180 190
700 4 5 8 10 16 22 32 43 72 180 200
800 4 5 8 11 17 23 34 45 75 180 210
900 4 5 8 11 18 24 35 47 78 180 215

1 000 4 5 8 11 18 24 36 48 80 180 225

1 200 4 6 9 12 20 26 39 52 86 180 240
1 400 4 6 9 13 21 27 41 54 90 180 250
1 600 5 6 10 13 22 29 43 57 94 180 260
1 800 5 7 10 14 22 30 44 59 98 180 270

2 000 5 7 11 14 23 31 46 61 105 180 280

2 500 5 7 11 15 25 33 49 66 110 185 305
3 000 6 8 12 16 26 35 52 70 120 205 325
3 500 6 8 13 17 28 37 55 73 125 220 340
4 000 6 8 13 18 29 39 58 77 130 235 355

5 000 6 9 14 19 31 42 62 83 140 255 380

6 000 7 10 15 20 33 44 66 88 150 270 405
7 000 7 10 16 22 35 46 69 92 155 285 425
8 000 7 10 16 22 36 48 72 96 160 300 445
9 000 8 11 17 23 38 50 75 100 170 310 465

10 000 8 11 18 24 39 52 78 105 175 320 480

12 000 9 12 19 26 42 55 83 110 185 340 510
14 000 9 13 20 27 44 58 87 120 195 360 540
16 000 9 13 21 28 46 61 91 125 205 375 560
18 000 10 14 21 29 48 63 95 130 210 390 590

20 000 10 14 22 30 49 66 98 135 220 405 610

25 000 11 15 24 33 53 71 110 145 235 435 650
30 000 11 16 25 35 56 75 115 150 250 460 690
35 000 15 17 27 36 59 79 120 160 265 485 730
40 000 16 18 28 38 62 83 125 165 275 510 760

50 000 17 19 30 41 67 89 135 180 295 550 820

60 000 18 20 32 44 71 94 145 190 315 580 870
70 000 19 21 33 46 75 99 150 200 330 610 920
80 000 19 22 35 48 78 105 160 210 345 640 960
90 000 20 23 36 50 81 110 165 220 360 670 1000

100 000 21 24 38 52 84 115 170 225 375 690 1040

120 000 22 25 40 55 89 120 180 240 395 730 1100
140 000 26 42 58 94 125 190 250 420 770 1160
160 000 28 44 60 98 135 200 265 435 810 1220
180 000 29 46 63 105 140 205 275 455 840 1260

200 000 30 47 65 110 145 215 285 470 870 1300

250 000 32 51 70 115 155 230 305 510 940 1400

D1= D2=0. D3=0. D4= D5=1. D6= D7=2. D8= D9=4. D10= D11=3.6 D12=22.2
0.35 44Q1/ 5Q1/3 0,8 1Q1/3 1.8Q 4Q1/3 3.6Q 8Q1/3 8.0Q1/ Q1/2 for Q1/3
Q1/3 3
Q1/3 1/3 1/3 3 Q<4500
D11=14.8
Distance Q1/3 for
Functions Q∃4500

a. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)1) - virtually complete protection against instan- h. see 1.4.5.3. - excluding items at the ES vulnerable to
taneous propagation attack by heavy spalling

b. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)2) - high degree of protection against instan- i. see 1.4.3.1. - modular storage of bombs in open stacks
taneous propagation

c. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)3) - moderate degree of protection against in- j. see 1.4.3.3. - untraversed stacks of robust shell
stantaneous propagation

d. see 1.4.5.6.a)1) - effect of high velocity projections k. see 1.4.1.14.b) - reaction of drivers on busy roads

e. see 1.4.5.6.a)2) - effect of lobbed ammunition l. see 1.4.1.15.b) - flying and falling glass, etc.

f. see 1.4.1.8.c) - degree of protection depends on structure m. see 1.4.1.15.c) - 400 m minimum to built up areas
at ES and sensitiveness of its contents

g. see 1.4.3.6. - excluding very sensitive explosive sub- n. see 1.4.6.7.b) - reduced Q-D for large earth-covered buil-
stances dings containing NEQ<45 000kg

o. see 1.4.1.13. - serious fragment hazard

I-A-10
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
It is ennential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary

TABLE 1 Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.1

PES
ES
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

1 D3ag D3ag D5a D5a D5a D4ag

2 D3ag D3ag D5b D5b D5b D4ag

3 D4agh or D5ag D4agh or D5ag D6be D6be D6be D4bghe or D6ae

4 D3ag D3ag D5b D5b D5b D5ag

5 D3ag D3ag D6b D6b D6b D5bg

6 D4bgh or D6a D4bgh or D6a D6ce D6ce D6ce D6ce

D8bde, D9bje
7 D4ag D4b or D5a or D12ae D8be D8bde D8bde

D9bde, D9bje
8 D6a D6a or D12ae D8be D8bde D8bde

9 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9ce D4cghe or D9ce D9ce D9ce

10 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9b D9b D9b D9b

11 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9cje D4cghe or D9ce D9cje D9cje

12 D4cgh or D7b D4cgh or D7b D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D5cghe or D7be

13 D4cgh or D7b D4cgh or D7b D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D4cghe or D7be D5cghe or D7be

D1bie, D2bie D1bie, D2bie

14 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D4bghe or D7be D4bghe or D7be D4bghe or D7be D4bghe or D7be

D1bie, D2bie
15 D4bgh or D7b D4bgh or D7b D9cje or D12fe D4bghe or D7be D9cje or D12fe D9cje or D12fe

16 D10 D10 D10 D10 D10 D10

17 D10 (∃270m) D10 (∃270m) D10 (∃270m) D10o D10o D10 (∃270m)

o
18 D10 (∃270m) D10 (∃270m) D13 D10 D13 D13

k k
D11 (∃270m) D11 (∃270m)
D16 (∃270m)kn D17 (∃270m)kn
19 D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m) D11 (∃270m)k D11k D11k D11 (∃270m)k
D14 (∃400m)n D15 (∃400m)n D13 (∃400m) D13 D13 D13 (∃400m)

D13 (∃400m)l D13 (∃400m)l D13l D13l

20 D14 (∃400m)ln D14 (∃400m)ln D13 (∃400m)l D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m) D13 (∃400m)l

I-A-11
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
TABLE 1 (PAGE 2) – Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.1
Net Explosives Quantity-Distances in metres
Quantity in kg
D13 D14 D15 D16 D17

500 270 400 400 270 270

600 270 400 400 270 270
700 270 400 400 270 270
800 270 400 400 270 270
900 270 400 400 270 270

1 000 270 400 400 270 270

1 200 270 400 400 270 270
1 400 270 400 400 270 270
1 600 270 400 400 270 270
1 800 270 400 400 270 270

2 000 270 400 400 270 270

2 500 280 400 400 270 270
3 000 305 400 400 270 270
3 500 330 400 400 270 270
4 000 350 400 400 270 270

5 000 380 400 400 270 270

6 000 405 400 400 270 270
7 000 425 400 400 270 270
8 000 445 400 400 270 270
9 000 465 400 400 270 270

10 000 480 400 400 270 270

12 000 510 400 415 270 275
14 000 540 400 435 270 290
16 000 560 400 455 270 305
18 000 490 400 475 270 315

20 000 610 400 490 270 330

25 000 650 410 530 275 355
30 000 690 435 560 290 375
35 000 730 460 590 305 395
40 000 760 480 620 320 415
45 000 500 640 335 430

50 000 820
60 000 870
70 000 920
80 000 960
90 000 1000

100 000 1040

120 000 1100
140 000 1160
160 000 1220
180 000 1260

200 000 1300

250 000 1400

Distance D13=5.5Q1/2 for Q<4500 D14=14.0Q1/3 D15=18.0Q1/3 D16=9.3Q1/3 D17=12.0Q1/3

Functions D13=22.2Q1/3 for Q∃4500

a. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)1) - virtually complete protection against instan- h. see 1.4.5.3. - excluding items at the ES vulnerable to
taneous propagation attack by heavy spalling

b. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)2) - high degree of protection against instan- i. see 1.4.3.1. - modular storage of bombs in open stacks
taneous propagation

c. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)3) - moderate degree of protection against j. see 1.4.3.3. - untraversed stacks of robust shell
instantaneous propagation

d. see 1.4.5.6.a)1) - effect of high velocity projections k. see 1.4.1.14.b) - reaction of drivers on busy roads

e. see 1.4.5.6.a)2) - effect of lobbed ammunition l. see 1.4.1.15.b) - flying and falling glass, etc.

f. see 1.4.1.8.c) - degree of protection depends on structure m. see 1.4.1.15.c) - 400 m minimum to built up areas
at ES and sensitiveness of its contents

g. see 1.4.3.6. - excluding very sensitive explosive sub- n. see 1.4.6.7.b) - reduced Q-D for large earth-covered buil-
stances dings containing NEQ<45 000kg

o. see 1.4.1.13. - serious fragment hazard

I-A-12
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

It is essential to study the foregoing text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary

QUANTITY-DISTANCE MATRIX FOR HD 1.2 – TABLE 2

Potential
Explosion
Site

Exposed Site (a) (b)

1 No QDai No QDai

2 No QDai No QDai

3 No QDai No QDai

4 No QDai D5bg or D6bh

5 No QDai D5cg or D6ch

6 No QDei D3eg or D4eh

7 No QDei D3fg or D4fh

8 No QDei D5fg or D6fh

9 No QDI D5gk or D6hk

D1gl or D2hl
10 No QDI D1g or D2h

a. see 1.4.1.10.1) virtually complete protection against g. see 1.4.1.5.c) PES contains only the less hazardous
propagation items classified HD 1.2.2
b. see 1.4.1.10.2) high degree of protection against h. see 1.4.1.5.b) PES contains the more hazardous items
propagation classified HD 1.2.1
c. see 1.4.1.10.3) limited degree of protection against i. see 1.4.1.5.g) practical considerations will dictate
propagation specific separation distances
d. unallocated j. see unallocated
e. see 1.4.1.13.c)4) high degree of protection for personnel k. see 1.4.1.14.b) low density traffic
f. see 1.4.1.13.c)4) limited degree of protection for l. see 1.4.1.14.b) high density traffic
personnel

I-A-13
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
QUANTITY-DISTANCE MATRIX FOR HD 1.2 – TABLE 2
It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary

NEQ Quantity-Distances
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
Kg m M m m M M

10 30 60 20 20 30 60
20 36 60 20 20 30 60
50 44 88 20 32 30 60
70 47 108 20 39 32 73
80 49 116 20 42 33 78
90 50 123 20 45 34 83

100 51 129 20 47 35 87
120 53 140 20 51 36 94
140 55 149 20 54 37 100
160 57 156 21 57 39 105
180 59 163 22 59 40 110

200 60 169 22 61 41 114

250 64 182 24 66 43 122
300 66 192 24 70 45 129
350 69 200 25 72 47 134
400 71 208 26 75 48 140

500 75 220 27 80 51 148

600 78 230 29 83 53 155
700 81 238 30 86 55 160
800 83 245 30 89 56 165
900 86 251 31 91 58 169

1000 88 257 32 93 59 173

1200 91 266 33 96 61 179
1400 94 274 34 99 63 184
1600 97 281 35 102 65 189
1800 100 287 36 104 67 193

2000 102 292 37 106 69 196

2500 107 303 39 110 72 204
3000 111 313 40 113 75 210
3500 114 320 42 116 77 215
4000 118 327 43 118 80 220
4500 120 332 44 120 81 223

5000 123 337 45 122 83 226

6000 127 346 46 125 86 232
7000 131 354 48 128 88 238
8000 135 360 49 130 91 242
9000 138 365 50 132 93 245

10000 141 370 51 134 95 248

12000 146 379 53 137 98 254
14000 150 386 54 139 101 259
16000 154 392 56 142 104 263
18000 157 397 57 143 106 266

20000 160 402 58 145 108 270

25000 166 412 60 149 112 277
30000 172 420 62 152 116 282
35000 177 426 64 154 119 286
40000 181 432 66 156 122 290
45000 184 437 67 158 124 293

50000 188 441 68 159 126 296

60000 194 449 70 162 130 301
70000 199 455 72 164 134 305
80000 203 461 74 166 137 309
90000 207 466 75 168 139 313

100000 210 470 76 170 141 315

120000 217 477 79 172 146 320
140000 222 483 80 174 149 324
160000 227 489 82 177 153 328
180000 231 493 84 178 155 331

200000 235 497 85 179 158 333

250000 243 506 88 183 163 340

I-A-14
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
NEQ Quantity-Distances
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
D1 = 28.127-2.364*LN(NEQ)+1.577*((LN(NEQ))^2) D3 = 0.36*D1 D5 = 0.67*D1
D2 = -167.648+70.345*LN(NEQ)-1.303*((LN(NEQ))^2) D4 = 0.36*D2 D6 = 0.67*D2

I-A-15
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary

TABLE 3A Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.3

PES
P
ES E
S (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

1 2mag 2mag 2mag 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25ma

2 2mag 2mag 2mag 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25ma

3 2mag 2mag 2mag 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25m a D1a

4 2mag 2mag 2mag 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25ma

5 2mag 2mag 2mag 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25m a 10mad or 25ma

6 10mb or 25ma 10mb or 25ma 10mb or 25ma D1b D1b D1b

D1ad, D1bf
7 2madg or 25ma 2madg or 25ma 2madg or 25ma 25mad or D1a 25mad or D1a or 240mb

D1ad, D1bf
8 2madg or 25ma 2madg or 25ma 2madg or 25ma 25mad or D1a 25mad or D1a or 240mb

9 2mag 2mag 2mag 25m a 25ma D1a

10 10mb or 25ma 10mb or 25ma 10mb or 25ma D1a D1a D1bf or 240m a

11 25m a D1a D1a D1b D1b 240m b

12 2mag 2mag 2mag 10mb or 25m a 10mb or 25m a D1a

13 25m a D1a D1a D1b D1b 240m a

14 25m a D1a D1a D1b D1b 240m a

15 25m a D1a D1a D1b D1b 240m a

16 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2

D2f or
17 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 240m

240mf or
18 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 D4 (∃240m)

D3 (∃160m)h or
19 D3h or D4 D3h or D4 D3h or D4 D3h or D4 D3h or D4 D4 (∃240m)

D4 (∃240m)
20 D4 D4 D4 D4 D4

I-A-16
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
TABLE 3A - Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.3

Net Quantity-Distances in metres

Explosives
Quantity Q D1 D2 D3 D4
in kg
500 25 60 60 60
600 25 60 60 60
700 25 60 60 60
800 25 60 60 60
900 25 60 60 62

1 000 25 60 60 64
1 200 25 60 60 69
1 400 25 60 60 72
1 600 25 60 60 75
1 800 25 60 60 78

2 000 25 60 60 81
2 500 25 60 60 87
3 000 25 60 62 93
3 500 25 60 65 98
4 000 25 60 68 105

5 000 25 60 73 110
6 000 25 60 78 120
7 000 25 62 82 125
8 000 25 64 86 130
9 000 25 67 89 135

10 000 25 68 92 140
12 000 25 74 98 150
14 000 27 78 105 155
16 000 28 81 110 165
18 000 30 84 115 170

20 000 32 87 120 175

25 000 35 94 125 190
30 000 39 100 135 200
35 000 42 105 140 210
40 000 44 110 150 220

50 000 50 120 160 240

60 000 54 130 170 255
70 000 59 135 180 265
80 000 63 140 185 280
90 000 66 145 195 290

100 000 70 150 200 300

120 000 77 160 215 320
140 000 83 170 225 335
160 000 88 175 235 350
180 000 94 185 245 365

200 000 99 190 250 375

250 000 110 205 270 405

Distance D1 = 0.22 Q1/3 D2 = 3.2 Q1/3 D3 = 4.3 Q1/3 D4 = 6.4 Q1/3

Functions

a. see 1.4.1.11.1) - virtually complete protection e. - (reserved)

b. see 1.4.1.11.2) - high/limited degree of protection f. see 1.4.6.6.a) - door barricade at PES

c. - (reserved) g. see 1.4.5.1.c) - practical considerations may require a

greater distance

d. see 1.4.5.6.b) - resistance of headwall and door(s) at ES h. see 1.4.1.14.b) - reaction of drivers on busy roads

I-A-17
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary

TABLE 3B Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.3

PES

ES
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

1 2m ag 2m ag 2m ag 2mag 2mag 2mag

2 2m ag 2m ag 2m ag 2mag 2mag 2mag

3 2m ag 2m ag 2m ag 2mag 2mag 2mag

4 2m ag 2m ag 2m ag 2mag 2mag 2mag

5 2m ag 2m ag 2m ag 2mag 2mag 2mag

6 2m ag 2m ag 2m ag 2mag 2mag 2mag

7 2m ag 2m ag 10mad or 25ma 10m ad or 25mb 25m ad or 60ma 25mad or 60ma

8 2m ag 2m ag 10mad or 25ma 10m ad or 25mb 25m ad or 60ma 25mad or 60ma

9 2m ag 2m ag 10ma 10ma 25ma 25m a

10 2m ag 2m ag 10mb or 25ma 25m b or 60ma 25m be or 60mae 25mbe or 60mae

25mbh, 60m ahf

11 25m b or 60ma 25mb or 60m a or 60mbf 60mb 60mb 60m b

12 2m ag 2m ag 10ma 10ma 10ma 10m a

25mbh, 60m ahf

13 25m b or 60ma 25mb or 60m a or 60mbf 60mb 60mb 60m b

25mbh, 60m ahf

14 25m b or 60ma 25mb or 60m a or 60mbf 60mb 60mb 60m b

25mbh, 60m ahf

15 25m b or 60ma 25mb or 60m a or 60mbf 60mb 60mb 60m b

16 25m 25m 25m 25m 25m 25m

17 60m 60m 60m 60m 60m 60mf

18 60m 60m 60m 60m 60m 60mf

60mhi or
19 60mf or D4 60mf or D4 60mf or D4 60mf or D4 60mf or D4 D4 (∃60m)f

20 D4 D4 D4 D4 D4 D4 (∃60m)f

I-A-18
 ANNEX I-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

TABLE 3B - Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.3

Net Quantity-Distances in metres

Explosives
Quantity Q
D1 D2 D3 D4
in kg
500 25 60 60 60
600 25 60 60 60
700 25 60 60 60
800 25 60 60 60
900 25 60 60 62

1 000 25 60 60 64
1 200 25 60 60 69
1 400 25 60 60 72
1 600 25 60 60 75
1 800 25 60 60 78

2 000 25 60 60 81
2 500 25 60 60 87
3 000 25 60 62 93
3 500 25 60 65 98
4 000 25 60 68 105

5 000 25 60 73 110
6 000 25 60 78 120
7 000 25 62 82 125
8 000 25 64 86 130
9 000 25 67 89 135

10 000 25 68 92 140
12 000 25 74 98 150
14 000 27 78 105 155
16 000 28 81 110 165
18 000 30 84 115 170

20 000 32 87 120 175

25 000 35 94 125 190
30 000 39 100 135 200
35 000 42 105 140 210
40 000 44 110 150 220

50 000 50 120 160 240

60 000 54 130 170 255
70 000 59 135 180 265
80 000 63 140 185 280
90 000 66 145 195 290

100 000 70 150 200 300

120 000 77 160 215 320
140 000 83 170 225 335
160 000 88 175 235 350
180 000 94 185 245 365

200 000 99 190 250 375

250 000 110 205 270 405

Distance D1 = 0.22 Q1/3 D2 = 3.2 Q1/3 D3 = 4.3 Q1/3 D4 = 6.4 Q1/3

Functions

a. see 1.4.1.11.1) - virtually complete protection e. see 1.4.6.6.b) - door barricades at both PES and ES

b. see 1.4.1.11.2) - high/limited degree of protection f. see 1.4.1.14.c) - traffic is stopped promptly to avoid
worst attack

c. - (reserved) g. see 1.4.5.1.c) - practical considerations may require a

greater distance

d. see 1.4.5.6.b) - resistance of headwall and door(s) at ES h. see 1.4.5.4. - building (PES) with heavy walls with
protective roof

i. see 1.4.5.4. - building (PES) with heavy walls

without protective roof

I-A-19
 ANNEX I-A
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(Edition 1)
It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this Annex since they are complementary
Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.6
TABLE 4 STORAGE OF 1.6N AMMUNITION WITH A UNIT NEQ EQUAL TO 1000 Kg
PES

ES

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

1 5m 5m 11m 11m 11m 8m

2 5m 5m 11m 11m 11m 8m

3 8m 8m 8m 18m 18m 8m

4 5m 5m 11m 11m 11m 11m

5 5m 5m 18m 18m 18m 11m

6 8m 8m 18m 18m 18m 18m

7 8m 8m 36m 25m 25m 25md or 60m

8 18m 18m 36m, 48m i 36m 36m 36md or 60m

9 8m 8m 48m 10m 48m 48m

10 8m 8m 48m 48m 48m b or 68m 48mb or 68m

11 25m b or 60m 25mb or 60m 48mb or 60m 60mb 60mb 60m b

12 8m 8m 10m 10m 10m 10m

13 25m b or 60m 25mb or 60m 25m bh or 60mhbi 60mb 60mb 60m b

14 25m b or 60m 25mb or 60m 25m bh or 60mhbi 60mb 60mb 60m b

15 25m b or 60m 25mb or 60m 48m bh or 60mhbi 60mb 60mb 60m b

16 80m 80m 80m 80m 80m 80m

17 80m 80m 80m 80m 80m 80m

18 80m 80m 174m 80m 174m 174m

107k, 174m 107k, 174m 107k 107k 107k 107k

19 93m kn, 140mn 93mkn, 180m n 174m 174m 174m 174m

20 D4 > 174m D4 > 174m D4 > 174m D4 > 174m D4 > 174m D4 > 174m

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 ANNEX I-A
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(Edition 1)

TABLE 4- Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.6

STORAGE OF 1.6N AMMUNITION WITH A UNIT NEQ EQUAL TO 1000 Kg

REMARKS

1. Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)

Line 20 gives the Inhabited Building Distance (IBD).

IBD is equal to D4 or to 174m if D4 < 174m.

D4 = 6.4 Q1/3 and D4 ≥ 60m (For values of D4 according to values of Q: see Table 3B).
Q is the aggregated NEQ of the PES.

2. Legend

b. see 1.4.1.0.2. High/limited degree of protection against thermal flux

d. see 1.4.4.0.b. Resistance of headwall and door(s) at ES
h. see 1.4.3.8. Building (PES) with heavy walls with protective roof
i. see 1.4.3.8. Building (PES) with heavy walls without protective roof
j. see 1.4.3.3. Untraversed stacks of robust shells
k. see 1.4.1.14.b) Reaction of drivers on busy roads
l. see 1.4.1.15.c) Flying and falling glass
n. see 1.4.6.7.b) Reduced Q/D for large earth-covered
buildings containing NEQ < 40 000 kg

I-A-21
 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)

EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF Q-D TABLES

SECTION I GENERAL

SECTION II EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF Q-D TABLES AT AN

EXISTING STORAGE AREA

SECTION III EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF Q-D TABLES FOR

PLANNING OF A NEW STORAGE AREA

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)

Section I - General

1. Introduction

This annex gives examples intended only as a guide to the use of Q-D tables. The size of buildings and their
arrangement are not significant.

Net Explosives Quantities are in kg.

Quantity-Distances are in m.

2. Definitions

a) For the purposes of the examples only (see Sections II-III) the following definitions are used (see also
subparagraph b) below):

1) Sparsely Populated Area

An area populated by maximum 25 persons (see subparagraph 1.3.1.15.b)5).

2) Light Traffic Route

A route that carries maximum 60 vehicles per hour (see subparagraph 1.3.1.14.b)).

3) Curtain Wall Building

A building of skeleton frame construction, with exterior walls that carry no load other than their own
weight. These non-load bearing walls are inherently weak to lateral forces associated with blast loads and
when so stressed may shatter or be displaced as units, endangering exposed personnel both inside and
outside the building (see paragraphs 1.3.7.5. and 1.3.7.6.).

b) It is emphasized that the definitions of sparsely populated area and light traffic route are for the purposes
of the following examples only. In practice National Authorities will define these terms.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)

3. Symbols

a) The symbols below are used in the AC/258-FORM X (see Figure B-I) related to the examples which
follow in Sections II-III.

1)

Sparsely populated area .....................................

2)

Densely populated area ...........................................

3)

Light traffic route

4)

Heavy traffic route ....................................

5)

Curtain wall building ...................................................

b) The arrows on AC/258-FORM X are used in the same way as in the Q-D tables.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)

Section II - Example of the Use of Q-D Tables at an existing Storage Area

4. Introduction

In the following diagrammatic plan of a small storage complex, determine the NEQ of each hazard division
for the Explosives Storage House (ESH), the Explosives Storage Location (ESL) and the Ammunition Process Building
(Workshop) (APB).

5. Layout of Storage Complex

(NOTES to layout: see next page)NOTES:

(1) All distances are in metres.

(2) ESH 1 and ESL 2 size is 20 m x 13 m.

(3) IHB 4 is a curtain wall building; an office in which 50 people work.

(4) ESH 1 is barricaded and with an unspecified door and headwall (the symbol above represents ESH
1 considered as a PES, see subparagraph 7.a)).

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
(5) Fire-fighting arrangements are adequate.

(6) ESL 2 - the open stack - is barricaded on all sides.

(7) APB 3 is of light construction.

(8) ROAD 5 carries 40 vehicles per hour, e.g. a light traffic route.

6. Procedure

a) The procedure is basically to consider each PES in turn with relation to all ES. From this consideration will
emerge which ES limits the NEQ in the particular PES being considered.

b) In this example intermediate distances between those given in the tables are treated in accordance with
subparagraph 1.3.2.1.b) (in each case the NEQ has been rounded down).

7. Consider ESH 1 as a PES

a) ESH 1 is barricaded and has an unspecified door and headwall. The presence of a barricade is irrelevant
when considering ESH 1 as a PES and in spite of subparagraph 1.3.6.1.b) is never taken into account for
quantity-distances when considering igloos as PES.

b) The orientation of ESH 1 relative to ES must be considered. Reference to the layout shows that:

1) ESH 1 has its door and headwall facing both ESL 2 and ROAD 5.
2) ESH 1 is side-on to APB 3.
3) ESH 1 has its door and headwall away from the inhabited building IHB 4.

c) It follows that (see pictograms in Annex A, Section I):

Pictogram 5.b.1. applies to 1) above.

Pictogram 5.b.3. applies to 2) above.
Pictogram 5.b.2. applies to 3) above.
Draw these pictograms in the "PES column" of AC/258-FORM X (see Figure B-II).

d) Next consider the ES relative to ESH 1, these are:

1) APB 3 which is of light construction and unbarricaded, therefore pictogram 6.h.3 applies and the
word "APB 3" should be written in the appropriate space on the "ES No./Name on Area Plan"
line of AC/258-FORM X.

2) IHB 4 is a densely populated curtain wall building, pictogram 3.a.5 (see paragraph 3) applies. It
should be noted that there are three columns in "No. 18" of AC/258-FORM X, the one with a
single house indicates a single building or a sparsely populated area; the one with three houses

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
indicates a densely populated area and the last symbol indicates a curtain wall building with an
appreciable number of occupants. In this case the curtain wall symbol applies and the word
"HOUSE" should be written in the appropriate space on the "ES No./Name on Area Plan" line of
AC/258-FORM X. Attention is drawn to paragraphs 1.3.7.5., 1.3.7.6. and 1.3.7.7. which
recommends that with appreciably populated curtain wall buildings, a minimum quantity-
distance of 400 m or 1 ½ to 2 times D13-distances should be used. Although not applicable in
this case attention is also drawn to subparagraph 1.4.1.15.b)5), which recommends consideration
being given to using a minimum of 400 m for densely populated areas for ammunition and
explosives of Hazard Division 1.1.

3) ROAD 5, this is a light traffic route, pictogram 6.i.1 applies, but it should be noted that there are
two columns on AC/258-FORM X, the one with a single car indicates a light traffic route, whilst
the column with three cars indicates a heavy traffic route. In this case the column with a single
car applies and the word "ROAD" should be written in the appropriate space on the "ES
No./Name on Area Plan" line of AC/258-FORM X. Paragraph 1.3.1.14. should be noted with
regard to the need for greater distances if there is heavy traffic on the road.

4) ESL 2 (the open stack) is barricaded on all sides and measures 20 m x 13 m, pictogram 6.f.1
applies. Write "ESL 2" in the appropriate space on the "ES No./Name on Area Plan" line of
AC/258-FORM X.

e) Enter - in metres - the distances of the four ES listed above from the considered PES, i.e. ESH 1, in the
appropriate spaces in the AC/258-FORM X. These distances are taken from the layout and are:
1) ESH 1 to ESL 2 ............................................................................................................: 065 m
2) ESH 1 to APB 3 ............................................................................................................: 260 m
3) ESH 1 to ROAD 5 : ............................................................. 485 m (i.e. 400 + 65 + 20) *)
4) ESH 1 to IHB 4 ............................................................................................................: 900 m

*) 20 is the width of the open stack

f) Now no. 19 (the grid) of AC/258-FORM X can be completed for each of the hazard divisions in turn.

8. Calculations for Hazard Division 1.1

Refer to Table 1 and consider each of the ES in turn, in each case the relevant PES column has to be used.

1) ESH 1 - ESL 2: column f, row 14 gives for D7-distances (without restriction of types of
ammunition and explosives being stored) 18 000 kg for a distance of 65 m. Enter "D7/18" in the
appropriate space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
2) ESH 1 - APB 3: column b, row 18 gives for D10-distances (minimum 270 m), it means no
ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 may be stored in ESH 1. Enter "270 m/nil" in
the appropriate space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

(NOTE: Since the NEQ is found as NIL, in practice there would be no need to continue the calculations
for Hazard Division 1.1. For the purpose of this exercise the calculations are continued to show
the method of work for the other ES).

3) ESH 1 - ROAD 5: column f, row 19 gives D11-distances since the road only has light traffic.
Reference to D11 gives 35 000 kg for a distance of 485 m. Enter "D11/35" in the appropriate
space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

4) ESH 1 - IHB 4: the separation distance is 900 m, but since an appreciably populated curtain wall
building is involved, a distance of 900 m x ½ = 450 m must be used in the calculation of the
permissible NEQ. Column a, row 20 gives D13-distances with a minimum of 400 m. Reference
to D13 gives 8 000 kg for a distance of 450 m. Enter "D13/8" in the appropriate space in no. 19
of AC/258-FORM X.

Hereafter it only remains to complete no. 20 of AC/258-FORM X in respect of "Maximum NEQ permitted"
for Hazard Division 1.1. Enter "NIL" in the Hazard Division 1.1 space.

9. Calculations for Hazard Division 1.2

a) Subparagraph 1.2.1.2.b) states that, for the purpose of determining quantity-distances a distinction, depending
on the site and range of fragments, is made between those items which give small fragments of moderate range
and those which give large fragments with a considerable range. Paragraph 1.3.1.5. states that the more
hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2 includes most rounds and projectiles exceeding 60 mm calibre (HE),
some pyrotechnic or lachrymatory rounds and many rockets and rocket motors, whilst the less hazardous part
includes most rounds up to 60 mm calibre (HE), pyrotechnic or lachrymatory, rounds of any calibre with inert
projectiles, fragmentation hand grenades, and fuzes with boosters.

b) For the purposes of AC/258-FORM X this sub-division of Hazard Division 1.2 is identified by

1. HD 1.21 - the more hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2

2. HD 1.22 - the less hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2

Attention is drawn to subparagraph 1.3.2.6.2) which states that when both types of Hazard Division 1.2
items are stored in the same site, and this is perhaps the most common situation, the aggregate NEQ is to be

I-B-7
 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
treated as of the more hazardous type of Hazard Division 1.2. For the purposes of this example the
calculations have been made on the basis of ESH 1 containing either HD 1.21 or HD 1.22.

c) Hazard Division 1.2: refer to Table 2 and consider each of the ES in turn, in each case the relevant PES
column has to be used. It is assumed that ESH contains either HD 1.21 or HD 1.22.

1) ESH 1 - ESL 2: column f, row 14 gives 90 m which means, since separation between ESH 1 and
ESL 2 is only 65 m, that no ammunition and explosives of HD 1.21 may be stored in ESH 1.
Table 2 does not in this instance differentiate between HD 1.21 and HD 1.22 and therefore "90
m/NIL" should be entered in the appropriate spaces in no. 14 of AC/258-FORM X.

(NOTE: Since the NEQ is found as NIL, in practice there would be no need to continue
the calculations for Hazard Division 1.2. For the purpose of this exercise the
calculations are continued to show the method of work for other ES).

2) ESH 1 - APB 3: column b, row 18 gives 90 m minimum for HD 1.22 and 135 m minimum for
HD 1.21. Since 260 m are available, enter "135/250" and "90/250" in the appropriate spaces in
no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

3) ESH 1 - ROAD 5: column f, row 19 gives, assuming traffic can be stopped promptly, 90 m
minimum for HD 1.22 and 135 m minimum for HD 1.21. Enter "135/250" and "90/250" in the
appropriate spaces of no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

4) ESH 1 - IHB 4: column a, row 20 gives, assuming the building is isolated and can be evacuated
promptly, 180 m minimum for HD 1.22 and 270 m minimum for HD 1.21. Enter "270/250" and
"180/250" in the appropriate spaces in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

10. Calculations for Hazard Division 1.3

a) Paragraph 1.3.1.6. states that for quantity-distance purposes Hazard Division 1.3 is divided into two sub-
divisions, a sub-division for propellants (Compatibility Group C) covered by Table 3A and other items
(mainly Compatibility Group G) which are covered by Table 3B.

b) These sub-divisions are identified in AC/258-FORM X as follows:

1. HD 1.33 - propellants
2. HD 1.34 - other than propellants

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
In the case of a mixture of both sub-divisions of Hazard Division 1.3 in one ESH, the most common case,
the NEQ are aggregated and the worst case is used (see paragraphs 1.3.2.5. and 1.3.2.6.). For this example,
both sub-divisions of Hazard Division 1.3 are calculated.

c) Hazard Division 1.3: refer to Tables 3A and 3B and consider each of the ES in turn, in each case the
relevant PES column has to be used.

1) ESH 1 - ESL 2: Table 3A, column f, row 14 gives a minimum of 240 m, since only 65 m are
available, ammunition and explosives of HD 1.33 may not be stored in ESH 1. Enter "240/NIL" in
the appropriate space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

(NOTE: Since the NEQ is found as NIL, in practice there is no need to continue the
calculations for HD 1.33. For the purposes of this exercise the calculations are
continued to show the method of work for other ES).

Table 3B, column g, row 14 gives 60 m minimum. Enter "60/250" in the appropriate space in no.
19 of AC/258-FORM X.

2) ESH 1 - APB 3: Table 3A, column b, row 18 for D2-distances over 250 000 kg for a distance of
260 m. Enter "D2/250" in the appropriate space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X. Table 3B,
column b, row 18 gives a minimum of 60 m. Enter "60/250" in the appropriate space in no. 19 of
AC/258-FORM X.

3) ESH 1 - ROAD 5: Table 3A, column f, row 19 gives distances to Public Traffic Routes. Since
the road is a light traffic route, footnote h can be applied and D3-distances used. D3-distances
give over 250 000 kg for a distance of 485 m. Enter "D3/250" in the appropriate space in no. 19
of AC/258-FORM X. Table 3B, column g, row 19 gives a fixed distance of 60 m because traffic
can be stopped promptly (see subparagraph 9.c)3)), this gives over 250 000 kg for a distance of
485 m. Enter "60/250" in the appropriate space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM X.

4) ESH 1 - IHB 4: Tables 3A and 3B, columns g, rows 20 both give for D4-distances over 250 000
kg for a distance of 900 m. Enter "D4/250" in the appropriate space in no. 19 of AC/258-FORM
X.

11. Further Calculations

The above are the complete calculations for ESH 1 regarded as PES. Calculations now need to be done for
ESL 2 and APB 3 as PES. These are carried out in a similar manner, but the calculations are not detailed in this

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
example. Completed AC/258-FORM X's in respect of ESL 2 and APB 3 are, however, attached (see Figures B-III and
B-IV) to enable anybody carrying out such calculations to check their result.

12. Hazard Division 1.4

Hazard Division 1.4 items may, of course, be added to the stocks in either ESH 2 or ESL 2 (in the case of ESH
1 up to its physical capacity) without affecting the quantity-distance requirement (see subparagraph 1.3.2.5.1)).

NOTE: It is again emphasized that this is only an example. The storage site is obviously uneconomic as
only Hazard Division 1.34 in ESH 1 is allowed and this is a waste of an earth-covered,
barricaded building, see subparagraph 1.3.5.1.b).

I-B-10
 ANNEX I-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Section III - Example of the Use of Q-D Tables for Planning of a new Storage Area

13. Introduction

The aim of this example is to demonstrate the use of the Q-D Tables in the design of a new small ammunition
depot.

14. Background

a) A plot of ground is owned by the Government and the intention is to use it for a small ammunition depot.
A sketch of the ground available and of neighbouring facilities is shown at Figure B-V.

b) The depot is required to hold

Hazard Division NEQ kg

1.1 40 000
1.2 10 000
1.3 (propellants) 35 000
1.3 (other than propellants) 35 000
1.4 20 000

c) In addition two Explosives Workshops (barricaded, with protective roofs) each with an explosives limit of
500 kg NEQ are required in the depot.

15. Task

The requirement is to design a depot using earth-covered magazines or barricaded light structures and to
compare the two.

16. Introduction to Calculations

There is no "correct" solution to a problem of this type. There are many alternative solutions, all of which are
satisfactory and the one adopted will depend on the circumstances pertaining at the time. In consequence the example
only indicates the principles which must be considered and draws attention to many of the factors which influence the
selection of the final solution.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
17. Considerations Related to the Choice of Number of ESH

The holdings of the depot are detailed in paragraph 14 above. The number of ESH required to hold these
amounts of ammunition will depend on many factors including:

1) Dispersion

The degree to which operational staff wish stocks to be dispersed within the depot in order to
prevent the loss of the complete depot stocks of specific natures in the event of one ESH being
destroyed.

2) Types of ESH

The size and type of ESH to be used will often depend on economical factors and the availability
of standard approved designs of ESH.

3) Terrain

Suitability of the area allocated for the construction of various types of ESH and routes, rail etc.

18. Number of ESH in the Example

a) For the purpose of this example only it is assumed that:

1) Stocks are to be dispersed two ways within the depot.

2) Either standard igloos designed to 7 bar or standard barricaded, light structures both of capacity
25 000 kg NEQ are to be used.

3) The terrain imposes no particular restriction on construction.

b) It follows that the stocks of individual hazard divisions must each be divided between at least two ESH as
shown below:

1) Hazard Division 1.1

2 ESH each containing 20 000 kg NEQ.

2) Hazard Division 1.2

2 ESH each containing 5 000 kg NEQ.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)

3) Hazard Division 1.3 (propellants)

2 ESH each containing 17 500 kg NEQ.

4) Hazard Division 1.3 (other than propellants)

2 ESH each containing 17 500 kg NEQ.

5) Hazard Division 1.4

2 ESH each containing 10 000 kg NEQ.

c) For economy by keeping the number of ESH required to a minimum, it will be necessary to mix
the hazard divisions within ESH. The mixing rules are given in paragraph 1.3.2.6. and Annex C.
There are a number of different ways of mixing the stocks, but for the purpose of this example the
following will be adopted:

1) ESH No. 1 and 2

Each containing 20 000 kg NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 and 5 000 kg NEQ of Hazard Division
1.4. Effective NEQ of each ESH is 20 000 kg of Hazard Division 1.1 since the NEQ of Hazard
Division 1.4 is irrelevant (see subparagraph 1.3.2.6.1)).

2) ESH No. 3 and 4

Each containing 17 500 kg NEQ of Hazard Division 1.3 (propellants) and 5 000 kg NEQ of
Hazard Division 1.2. Subparagraph 1.3.2.6.6) states that the quantity-distance for Hazard
Division 1.2 and 1.3 must be calculated separately and the greater distance applied. The Hazard
Division 1.2 includes ammunition of calibre both greater and smaller than 60 mm and therefore
the quantity-distances to be used is that for the full NEQ of the more hazardous type (see
subparagraph 1.4.2.6.2)).

3) ESH No. 5 and 6

Each containing 17 500 kg NEQ of Hazard Division 1.3 (other than propellants)

19. Exterior Quantity-Distances

a) The results of these calculations for both types of constructions (i.e. igloos and barricaded light structures)
are shown in Table B-I.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)

b) A study of Table B-I shows that no major advantages accrue in terms of reduced exterior quantity-
distances from the use of igloos rather than barricaded, light structures. Light structures may therefore at
first glance appear attractive because of their reduced costs in construction, but interior quantity-distances
must always be considered before any decision is made and this topic is considered further below.

20. Interior Quantity-Distances

a) The interior quantity-distances between magazines and explosives workshops need to be considered. These
distances are designed to prevent propagation and to reduce damage to stocks and injuries to personnel
working in such places in the event of an accidental explosion. It is rarely necessary to consider a
workshop as a PES, because the NEQ in a workshop is normally so small that the quantity-distance
between a workshop and a storage site is determined by the contents of the storage site, when this is
regarded as a PES. This is true in this example and in consequence no calculations for the workshops as a
PES have been done.

b) The necessary distances are detailed in Annex A, Tables 1-3B. A study of Table 1, or indeed of any of the
tables, shows that the interior quantity-distances are in the case of igloos dependent on the relative
orientation of the igloo as a PES to the igloo or workshop as an ES. For example in Table 1 an igloo as a
PES with the door facing (column f):

1) Door of igloo (7 bar) as ES requires, at row 7, D12-distances (22.2 Q1/3) for virtually complete
protection.

2) Side of igloo (7 bar) as ES requires, at row 5, D5-distances (1.1 Q1/3) for virtually complete
protection, if primary explosives are excluded, and

3) Rear of igloo (7 bar) as ES requires, at row 1, D4-distances (0.86 Q1/3) for virtually complete
protection, if primary explosives are excluded.

c) It follows that in order to obtain full advantage from the use of igloos in terms of reduced areas of real
estate required for a depot, igloos must never be sited so that they have doors facing each other. For the
purpose of this example, therefore, it is assumed that igloos will be sited with doors facing rear of adjacent
igloos.

d) The interior quantity-distances are shown at Table B-II for both types of construction.

e) A study of Table B-II begins to reveal the advantages of using igloos. For example in the case of ESH 1
and 2 containing 20 000 kg NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 only 22 m separation from other igloos is required

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 ANNEX I-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
for virtually complete protection for stocks in ES, whilst in the case of barricaded, light structures a
separation of 66 m is required for less protection of stocks. It is this reduced separation with increased
protection which is the main attraction of using igloos. The economics will have to be calculated for each
individual site as the additional cost of construction of igloos must be balanced against the reduced length
of routes, perimeter fences etc.

21. Conclusion

Tables B-I and B-II give in broad terms the applicable Exterior and Interior Quantity-Distances for both igloos
and light structures. The decision on which type of structure to use depends on many factors beyond the scope of this
example, such as detailed study of the land, availability of material and labour, and perhaps above all the economics of
the alternatives.

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 ANNEX I-B
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(Edition 1)
Figure B-I

NOTE: see subparagraphs 9.b) and 10.b) respectively for explanation of Hazard Divisions 1.21/1.22 and
1.33/1.34Figure B-II

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Figure B-III

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Figure B-IV

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Figure B-V - Sketch of Ground available and surrounding facilities

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TABLE B-I

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TABLE B-I (PAGE 1)

EXTERIOR QUANTITY-DISTANCES
ESH No. NEQ
(PES) Exterior Quantity-Distance to ES in metres
TYPE kg/HD

Inhabited Reference Public Traf- Reference Railway Reference

Building Column/- fic Route Column/- Light pas- Column/
Distance Row Heavy Row sen- Row
Traf.1) ger Traf.2)

IGLOOS

1&2 20 000/1.1
Table 1 Table 1 Table 1
Face on 610 f/20 610 f/19(D13) 405 f/19(D11)
Rear on 610 a/20 610 a/19(D13) 405 a/19(D11)
Side on 610 b/20 610 b/19(D13) 405 b/19(D11)

3&4 17 500/1.3
(prop.) Table 3A Table 3A Table 3A
Face on 240 f/20 240 f/19(D4) 160 f/19(D3)
Rear on 170 a/20 170 a/19(D4) 115 a/19(D3)
Side on 170 b/20 170 b/19(D4) 115 b/19(D3)
5 000/1.2 Table 2 Table 2 Table 2
Face on 320 f/20(D2) 320 f/20(D2) 135 f/193)
Rear on 320 a/20(D2) 320 a/20(D2) 135 a/193)
Side on 320 b/20(D2) 320 b/20(D2) 135 b/193)
* * * * ** **

5&6 17 500/1.3
(other than
prop.)
Table 3B Table 3B Table 3B
Face on 170 f/20 170 f/19 60 f/193)
Rear on 170 a/20 170 a/19 60 a/193)
Side on 170 b/20 170 b/19 60 b/193)

NOTE 1: Heavy traffic on road - therefore full Inhabited Building Distance.

NOTE 2: Light passenger traffic, the railway can be easily stopped - therefore use 2/3 Inhabited Building
Distance.

NOTE 3: Traffic is stopped promptly to avoid worst attack.

*) HD 1.2 Q-Ds govern.

**) Except for face on HD 1.2 Q-Ds govern.

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TABLE B-I (PAGE 2)

EXTERIOR QUANTITY-DISTANCES

ESH No. NEQ

(PES) Exterior Quantity-Distances to ES in metres
TYPE kg/HD

Inhabited Reference Public Traf- Reference Railway Reference

Building Column/ fic Route Column/ Light Pas- Column/
Distance Row Heavy Row senger Row
Traffic 1) Traffic 2)

LIGHT
STRUC-
TURES,
BARRICA-
DED
Table 1 Table 1 Table 1
1&2 20 000/1.1 610 d/20 610 d/19 405 d/19

Table 3A Table 3A Table 3A

3&4 17 500/1.3 170 d/20 170 d/19 115 d/19
(prop.)

Table 2 Table 2 Table 2

5 000/1.2 320 d/20 320 d/19 135 d/19 3)
* * * * * *

Table 3B Table 3B Table 3B

5&6 17 500/1.3 170 e/20 170 e/19 60 e/19 3)
(other than
prop.)

Explosives The workshops are light structures barricaded and with protective roofs. These equate to a column
Workshops C in Tables 1 and 2 as PES. Table 1 gives a minimum exterior quantity-distance of 400 m to an In-
No. 1 & 2 habited Building or major Public Traffic Route and 270 m to a minor Public Traffic Route.

NOTE 1: Heavy traffic on road – therefore use full Inhabited Building Distance.

NOTE 2: Light passenger traffic, the railway can be easily stopped - therefore use 2/3 Inhabited Building
Distance.

NOTE 3: Traffic is stopped promptly to avoid worst attack.

*) HD 1.2 Q-Ds govern.

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TABLE B-II

INTERIOR QUANTITY-DISTANCES

ESH No. NEQ Interior Quantity-Distances to ES in metres

(PES)
TYPE Kg/HD

Reference Other Reference Workshop Reference

Table/column ESH Table/row Table/row

Igloo (7 bar)

ESH 1 & 2 20 000/1.1 1/f 22 1/1 220 1) 1/16

(virtually
complete
protection)

ESH 3 & 4 17 500/1.3 3A/f 25 3A/1 84 3A/16

(prop.) (high/limited
degree pro-
tection)

5 000/1.2 2/f 2 2/1 25 2/16

* *

ESH 5 & 6 17 500/1.3 3B/g 2** 3B/1 25 3B/16

(other than
prop.)

Light struc-
ture, barri-
caded

ESH 1 & 2 20 000/1.1 1/d 66 1/14 2201) 1/16

(High degree
protection)

ESH 3 & 4 17 500/1.3 3A/d 32 3A/14 84 3A/16

(prop.)

5 000/1.2 2/d 90 2/14 25 2/16

(limited de-
gree of pro-
tection)
*** *** *** ***

ESH 5 & 6 17 500/1.3 3B/c 60 3B/14 25 3B/16

(other than
prop.)

NOTE 1: Attention is drawn to paragraph 1.3.1.13. regarding separation of Explosives Workshops from storage
sites containing HD 1.1 ammunition.
*) HD 1.3 Q-Ds govern.
**) Virtually complete protection - considerations may require greater distance.
***) HD 1.2 Q-Ds govern for ESH and HD 1.3 Q-Ds for workshops.

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MANUAL OF

NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE

STORAGE OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

PART II

MAY 2006

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Section I - Preliminary

2.1.0.1. Purpose and Scope of Part II

This part of the Manual provides technical details to supplement the principles in Part I concerning
aboveground storage in depots. This additional information includes design criteria, formulae and bibliography.

2.1.0.2. Conditions of Release

The NATO Manual on Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AASTP
1) is a NATO Document involving NATO property rights.
The understanding and conditions agreed for the release of the Manual are that it is released for technical defence
purpose and for the use by Defence services only of the country concerned.
This understanding requires that the release of the whole, or any part, of the Manual must not be undertaken without
reference to, and the written approval of, NATO.

2.1.0.3. Inquiries

Any questions or requirements for further information should be addressed to the Secretary of the AC/258
Group at NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium.

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Section II – Notes on the Historical Background of the Manual

2.1.2.1.
The forerunner of this Manual was a document (AC/106-D5 dated 1st September 1963) drawn up by a
Restricted Sub-Group AC/106 with members from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.
These members met as specialists rather than as national representatives and made a study of the sustems in use in
France, the United Kingdom and the United States. This included the national trials and recorded analuses of
damage resulting from accidental explosions and war damage. It con be said that never before had such awide range
of information on this subject been available to any single nation. In order to make the production of AC/106-D/5 at
all practicable, it was essential that each of the members of the Restricted Sub-Group should agree to depart form
some of the long established rules of his national system. This was sometimes found to be difficult but agreement
was reached on the understanding that each country in authorizing the use of the system for NATO purposes within
its territory would be free to exclude any practice on particular points where strong views were held. In reaching
agreement on this basis the members hoped that in view of the wide range of information on which the document
was based, new ideas would be accepted in te interests of NATO even if they were not in accordance with the
normal national practice of the host country.

2.1.2.2.
The four specialists of the Restricted Sub-Group who drew up the original document were reconstituted in
1964 as the AC/74 Restricted Sub-Group of Experts on the Storage of Ammunition (STORAM) to supplement the
document. This task included revision of the original document and completion of annexes on hazard calssification
tests, storage on military airfields. Storage in ships and barges and underground storage. AC/106-D5(Revised) was
issued in 1965.

2.1.2.3.
The work was in 1966 allocated to the „Group of Experts on Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage
of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)“. Under this Group a Strage Sub-Group with wider representation
was set up which produced a further revision, published as document AC/258-D70 in December 1969. The principal
changes were radical re-arrangement and clarification of the text and the addition of recommendations on storage
near POL facilities and near radio-frequency transmitters.

2.1.2.4.
The quantity-distance tables were produced in a new format, using metric units only, in order to simplify
the presentation. Certain corrections and rationalisations were intrduced in the tables and in the criteria for quantity-
distances. Smaller intervals than hitherto were introduced in the values of explosives quantity to eliminate the need
for frequent interpolation and the consequent risk of mistakes. Values of quantity-distance were rounded off to give

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uniform precision of about 1 %. This eliminated cases of unduly large errors in the small distances in the original
tables.

2.1.2.5.
The provisions for underground storage were completely re-written in the light of recent advances in this
field of exploives technology. However, certain underground explisives starage criteria still remained to be
formulated.

2.1.2.6.
The AC/258 Group had always hoped that the various national storage regulations would be harmonized on
the basis of the principles in its own storage document (AC/258-D/70). Therefore in 1970 the Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) on the recommendation of the Group formally invited nations to adopt the
principles, in whole or in part, as the basis of their national regulations as a matter pf policy. Over the next few years
member nations made declarations of intent or firm commitments. In many cases the timing of the change was
linked to another innovation, the adoption of the International System of Classification of Explosives formulated by
the United Nations Group of Experts on Explosives which dealt with the safety of both military and civil explosives
during transport. The AC/258 Group adopted the UN system of compatibility groups as an amendment to the
storage document in 1971. Evidently the ultimate degree of standardization could not be achieved until the
Internation System of Classification as a whole was incorporated in the storage document. This involved replacing
the NATO hazard classes by the divisions of the UN explosives class.

2.1.2.7.
Meanwhile interest in the storage document was growing as several nations outside NATO requested
copies. The requests were usually granted by the appropriate authority. Member nations asked for additional topics
related to storage to be included in the document or in supplements. Therefor an Editorial Sub-Group of AC/258
was set up in 1971 to promote consistent style and format in all the texts the Group adopted on these topics and to
consider how best to publish the information.

2.1.2.8.
In 1974 the Group, nothing that the corrigenda which had been published (totally 14) had modified
considerably the original text of AC/258-D/70, decided to publish a completely revised edition as a Manual in three
parts: Part 1 dealing with general principles, Part II containing more detailed information on aboveground storage
and on the historical background of the Manual, and Part III dealing with special types of storage.

2.1.2.9.
During the period of this major revision - where further two corrigenda were published to AC/258-D/70 –
the Group participated in the design and assessment of field tests, both on scaled models and at full scale, to

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improve its criteria for quantity-distances. These tests resulted in more economical methods of storage in depots and
more reliable assessment of the inherent risks of such storage. Members of the Group also participated in several
international tests at a large scale to acquire better data on underground explosions. The conclusions and
recommendations from all this experimental work were incorporated in the Manual.

2.1.2.10.
In 1981 during the work related to updating the chapter dealing with quantity-distance critaria for airfield,
the Group found thad under certain circumstances it was not possible, without seriously prejudicing operational
effectiveness, to apply the normal principles detailed in Part I of the Manual. As a consequence therefore, it was
decided to publish a new part of the Manual – Part IV- where advice on safety principles under circumstances is
ginven. At the same time it was decided that certain chapters (Field Storage, Missiles Installations and Basic Load
Ammunition Holding Areas), which until then had been published in Parts II and III, rightly belonged to the
contents of Part IV. Consequently they have been transferred to the new part of the Storage Manual. The safety
principles which form the basis for the recommendatons are found in Part IV, Chapter 1.

2.1.2.11.
Almost the whole of Part I of the Manual was published in 1976 followed by certained chapters of Part II
and Part III in 1977. In the period 1976 to 1982 new chapter and sections have been added and corrections have
been made to Parts I to III. Part IV was in the main published in 1982. The „Group of Experts on Safety of
Transportation and Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)“ as custodian of theManual intends to
maintain its value by publishing from time to time further chapters and requisite amendments to extend and update
the guidance. It is even more important that the Group should maintain the reputation of its Storage Manual now
that it is being used as the basis of national regulations as well as for its original purpose of giving guidance to
NATO Infrastructure Staff.

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CHAPTER 2 – RESERVED

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CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

Section I - Special Storage Configurations

2.3.1.1. Storage in Open Stacks/Buffered Storage

a) Storage in Open stacks

The storage of shell in open stacks is described in paragraph 1.3.3.2. The special types of projectiles and
the conditions for this type of storage are as follows:

1) The projectiles should be filled only with TNT or Amatol. RDX/TNT is unsuitable.

2) The projectiles should have walls generally similar to the 155 mm M107 and the 8 inch Howitzer
projectiles as regards robustness and ability to withstand fragment attack. In particular, projectiles
with thin noses (HESH or HEP) are unsuitable.

3) The projectiles should be unfuzed or should be fitted with nose plugs of a substantial design. The
thickness of the plug must be at least 25 mm.

4) Each stack should be restricted to 6 800 kg NEQ and to 1 000 projectiles.

5) The projectiles in a stack should be arranged with axes parallel and noses in the same direction.

6) The separation of adjacent stacks of the maximum size should be 1.3 m between nearest parts
(nose-plug rings or projectiles' bases). The separation of smaller stacks should be that indicated in
Figure 3-I. Adjacent stacks may present the projectiles either nose-to-nose or base-to-base, but not
nose-to-base nor vice versa.
7) At the ends of each stack the side-walls of projectiles will be exposed. These side-walls are
relatively vulnerable to attack by fragments from another stack. Care must be taken to ensure that
the arrangement of the stacks on a site (module) or in a building provides adequate protection
against the risk of propagation by this means. One method is to ensure that all stacks are parallel
and have the same dimensions, thus forming a
rectangular arrangement. Another method is to use the walls of the storage building or the traverse
to protect the ends of stacks. A third method is to observe the D9-distances in Part I, Annex A,
Table 1 but such a large separation is rarely practical.

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8) These stacks should be restricted to open sites (modules) with minimal weather protection or to
aboveground buildings with walls and roofs of light construction. Exceptionally existing buildings
with light roofs but solid walls may be used provided that these solidly constructed walls do not
exceed 3 m in height. The stacking technique is based on US and UK tests in the open air and is
not necessarily valid in an earth-covered building or an underground storage site which imposes a
much greater confining effect.

9) An accidental explosion of one stack would scatter and disarrange the neighbouring stacks thus
destroying the critical geometry upon which this stacking technique relies. To minimise any risk
of subsequent fires which could cause the "cook-off" of one of these disarranged projectiles, and
the resultant mass explosion of many other projectiles, softwood should be avoided in any pallets
and dunnage. Combustible materials should be avoided as far as possible in the structure of a
building used for such stacks.

10) The total NEQ on a storage site (module) or in a building should be restricted to 110 000 kg.

11) Each module or building should be surrounded by a barricade substantially of earth. This may be
the double-slope type or the single-slope with one vertical wall type. The foot of the barricade
should not be less than 2.4 m from the nearest stack. In establishing the height of the barricade the
"2° rule" should be observed (see Section III).

12) Where adjoining modules or buildings are separated by a shared barricade, its thickness together
with the distances from the stacks to that barricade are considered to provide adequate protection.
Normal Inter-Magazine Distances do not apply.

13) The minimum Explosives Workshop Distance is 150 m in the case of barricaded workshops with
protective roofs. Workshops without such protection should not be sited within the zone of severe
debris risk, deemed to be the sectors lying within 30° on each side of those sides of the module or
building which are parallel to the projectiles and extending to a distance of 600 m. Outside this
zone, unprotected explosives workshops should be sited in accordance with Table 1 of Part I,
Annex A.

14) A minimum Inhabited Building Distance and Public Traffic Route Distance of 600 m should be
observed because of the severe risk from numerous whole projectiles likely to be projected from
the upper tiers of stacks near an exploding stack. Such projectiles are not expected to explode
upon impact but present a serious debris hazard. This debris would be projected all at once and

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possibly without warning, unlike explosions involving ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 where
there usually is time for evacuation.

b) Buffered Storage

The storage of bombs using the buffered storage concept is briefly described in Part I, Paragraph 1.3.3.1.
d). This concept can be used in all types of above-ground storage facilities. The special conditions for this
type of storage are as follows:

1) The geometry of bomb and buffer stacks is critical and must be maintained at all times. (The
buffer stack must preclude any direct line of sight between stacks of bombs.)

2) Vertical and horizontal offsets of rows and columns of containers in the buffer stacks are to be
used to prevent alignments of the containers which would allow line of sight spaces through which
fragments of a detonating bomb stack could pass unimpeded to the other stack of bombs in
storage.

3) Bombs must be orientated nose to nose in those portions of the stacks which face each other.
Metal nose and tail plugs must be used in all bombs.

4) In computing the maximum amount of explosives which could be involved in an accidental

explosion in a bufferd storage arrangement, Hazard Division 1.4 munitions are not included in the
total net explosives quantity.

5) The largest stocks of MK82/84 bombs authorized for buffered storage are

27 000 kg NEQ. Bomb stacks will be separated by a minimum of 11.6 metres.

6) When otherwise authorized, inert material or Division 1.4 munitions may be stored in the same
structure or facility where buffered storage is in use.

Note: Use of buffered storage concept with MK82/84 bombs and the specific arrangement and types of
buffer material is to be determined in the national area of responsibility. Inquiries regarding this
concept and its implementation may be directed to the Secretary of AC/258.

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Section II - Storage Buildings and their Construction

2.3.2.1. Structural Materials

a) Non-combustible materials must be used in the construction of buildings for storage of ammunition and
explosives.

b) Buildings for the storage of bulk explosives relatively sensitive to spark or friction should not have any
exposed iron, steel, aluminium or any aluminium alloy containing more than 1 % of magnesium where it
may come into contact with explosive substances.

c) Buildings for the storage of ammunition with a toxic chemical hazard should be provided with a non-
absorbing material on the floors and the walls to a height at least equal to the top of the stack. The building
should have a barricade (see Section III). The building must be well ventilated.

2.3.2.2. Protection of Igloos against Blast

a) Performance Criteria

1) The primary objective is to prevent initiation of the contents. In order to qualify for the reduced
Inter-Magazine Distances (see subparagraph 1.3.5.2.b)) an igloo at an ES must be designed to a 90
% confidence level that it does not collapse and its door(s)/door-freame does not fail although
substantial plastic deformation of the arch or portal, the head-wall, the rear-wall, the side-wall, and
the door(s) may occur. Deflection should be limited within the air gap around the contents so that
the deformed structure and door(s) do not strike the contents. Major spalling into the igloo must be
prevented. For spall with velocity exceeding 50 m/s the kinetic energy should not exceed 2 500 kg
m2/s2; for spall with velocity not exceeding 50 m/s the momentum should not exceed 100 kg m/s.
These values would not suffice for packaged primary explosive substances.

2) Ideally model or full-scale tests should be performed on a prototype structure or the design should
be compared analytically with the strength of igloos which have been proof tested. In the case of
model techniques, to assess structural response, it is important that models accurately scale the
actual conditions with a linear scale of not less than 1 to 10. When reliance is completely placed
on testing, then it is important that all structural elements (i.e. roof, front-wall, rear-wall and side-
wall) are subjected to the anticipated blast loading. Igloos should be constructed in reinforced
concrete or with corrugated steel arches.

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b) Design Load for Head-Walls and Doors

Measurements on model and full-scale igloos indicate that design loads should be based upon the following
values:

1) When igloos are constructed in parallel and subjected only to the risk from another igloo at the
side-to-side Inter-Magazine Distance of 0.5 Q1/3, the expected peak positive overpressure is 3 bar,
the positive duration (ms) is 1.0 Q1/3 and the positive impulse per unit area (bar ms) is 1.0 Q1/3.

2) When the head-wall and door(s) of an igloo are exposed face-on to the blast from the rear-wall of
another igloo at an Inter-Magazine Distance of 0.8 Q1/3, the peak positive (reflected) overpressure
is at least 7 bar, the positive duration (ms) is 1.0 Q1/3 and the positive impulse per unit area (bar
ms) is 2.0 Q1/3. The value of 7 bar is suitable for the design of head-walls and doors at an ES when
the donor is similar to one of the igloos described in Annex B, Section I and contains a NEQ not
exceeding 75 000 kg. The actual value in a particular case is a complex function of the disposition
and loading density of the explosives in relation to the magazine at the PES, the type and
proportion of explosive substance in the ammunition, the mass and strength of the structure, and
the mass and type of its earth-cover. It should be noted that close to the PES the blast wave is
extremely complex and it is possible that a higher degree of loading on the head-wall or other
structural elements may occur with a NEQ exceeding 75 000 kg. These factors may require
consideration in the design.

3) Consideration of rebound conditions must be given in the design of the door(s). Attack on the
steel-door(s) and the head-wall of an exposed igloo which is barri- caded or faces the earth-
covered side of another igloo is not expected to be significant (hard rocks not exceeding 1 kg at
300 m/s).

c) Design Load for Roof and Earth-Covered Walls

1) The arch of a circular arch igloo should be statically designed to support the dead load pressure
from the earth-cover by methods adapted from US highway design and should be compared with
structures previously tested under blast loading. The rear-wall should be designed with reference
to the dead load and, in addition, the anticipated dynamic loading in accordance with
subparagraph 2) below.

2) An igloo which is not a true arch, such as a portal type or "flat arch" structure, should be designed
for the likely blast loading on the earth-cover. Each structural element (roof, side-wall or rear-

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wall) may require consideration depending upon the type and orientation of the structure. Owing
to the dearth of data on the loading beneath the earth-cover, it may be necessary to design for the
anticipated worst case similar to the design loads for head-walls and doors, see subparagraph b)
above. Design authorities should base their work upon applicable blast parameters from test
references cited in Annexes A and B taking into account the maximum NEQ expected for the
proposed facility and consulting at the earliest practicable date with national explosives safety
authorities of the host and user nations.

d) Ventilation Openings

1) Igloo ventilation is commonly provided by an airtake opening below mid height in the front wall
with an air outlet through the rear-wall above mid height into a vertical shaft to induce natural
draught and take air out above the earth mound. These openings can be weak points in an igloo
structure and consideration should be given to validating the design of openings by testing or other
suitable means.

2) The design of openings should take account of potential ingress of direct blast, fireballs, primary
and secondary fragments from a PES as well as the hazards from a slow burning fire. Some
protection against physical entry or sabotage should also be incorporated.

2.3.2.3. Protection against Projections

a) Buildings should preferably be constructed in such a manner that they give protection against penetration
by debris, comparatively low velocity fragments and lobbed ammunition. This may be obtained by a
building with protective roof and 15 cm reinforced concrete walls without windows, or a building of
equivalent construction. The windows of heavy-walled workshops must be effectively barricaded for the
application of quantity-distances in the tables.

b) When earth-covered buildings with one relatively weak wall, designed to vent (see paragraph 2.3.2.4.) are
exposed to the effects from an explosion or a fire in ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 in neighbouring
buildings or stacks, it is necessary that this relatively weak wall is constructed in accordance with the
requirements of subparagraph a) to give protection against penetration by debris, comparatively low
velocity fragments and lobbed ammunition. The door must also provide this equivalent protection for the
application of the reduced Inter-Magazine Distances in Table 2 of Part I, Annex A.

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2.3.2.4. Pressure Release

Buildings for ammunition or explosives involving a mass fire risk should be constructed with a relatively
weak section to permit the release of internal pressure. In the case of an earth-covered building the roof or one end-
wall or side-wall should be designed to permit this pressure release. An earth-covered building with a weak side-
wall must not be sited with this wall facing a stack or a building unless the separation is large enough to prevent
propagation of explosion by directional projection of burning propellants if the earth-covered building is used for
ammunition of Hazard Division 1.3. This does not apply when the second building is also an earth-covered building
whose weak side-wall is not exposed to this directional projection.

2.3.2.5. Lightning Protection

All permanent storage buildings and workshops for ammunition and explosives should be provided with
lightning protection. The method of assessment of need for such protection and the details of suitable systems are
given in Section IV.

2.3.2.6. Rocket Storage Buildings

Buildings utilised for the storage of rockets in a propulsive state (i.e. unpackaged rockets or missiles in the
assembled condition) should be of sufficient strength to withstand their thrust. Alternatively the rockets should be
provided with devices to secure them and thereby eliminate the additional hazard arising from the flight of the
rocket (see paragraph 1.3.3.5.).

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Section III - Barricades: Design Criteria

2.3.3.1. Functions of Barricades

a) General

The design criteria for a barricade depend on its location and the intended function.

b) Interception of High Velocity Projections

1) An effective barricade intercepts high velocity projections from a PES which otherwise may cause
practically instantaneous propagation of explosion to ammunition and explosives at an ES; the
barricade therefore has sufficient resistance to high velocity projections to reduce their speed to a
tolerable level. The geometry of the barricade in relation to the PES and the ES is such that it
intercepts the projections through a sufficient, solid angle. When the barricade is subject to
destruction by blast from the PES, it is designed to remain substantially intact for a sufficient time
to achieve its purpose.

2) An effective barricade reduces the number of high velocity projections which otherwise may
endanger personnel and ES inside and outside the explosives area, but this is usually a secondary
function.

c) Lobbed Ammunition and Fragments

An effective barricade also intercepts some lobbed items of ammunition and lobbed fragments but this is an
incidental benefit. It is not usually practical to intercept items projected at a high elevation.

d) Modification of Blast and Flame

1) A barricade at a PES may induce directional effects of the blast and flame or it may merely
perturb them. This is a secondary function of a barricade, unless it is especially designed to
achieve one or more of these purposes.

2) A barricade between a PES and an ES may shield the ES from blast and flame. In order to have a
marked shielding effect, the barricade is located close to the ES. The barricade may be part of the
building-wall at the ES.

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2.3.3.2. Geometry of Earth Barricades

a) General

Proper barricade geometry is necessary to reduce the risk that high velocity projections escape above or
around the ends of the barricade and so produce an explosion in an adjacent site. Since such projections do
not move along perfectly linear trajectories, reasonable margins in barricade height and length must be
provided beyond the minimum dimensions which block lines of sight.

b) Height of Barricade

1) Line AB
(a) On level terrain point A is chosen as a reference on either of two stacks (see Figure 3-II).
If the stacks have different heights, point A is on the lower stack. Point A is at the top of
that face of the chosen stack which is remote from the other stack. If the stacks are
covered by protective roofs, point A may be at the top of that face of the chosen stack
which is nearer to the other stack (see Figure 3-II).

(b) On sloping terrain point A is on the stack whose top face is at the lower elevation (see
Figure 3-III). Point A is at the top of that face of the chosen
stack which is remote from the other stack. If the stacks are covered by protective roofs,
point A may be at the top of that face of the chosen stack which is nearer to the other
stack. Point B is on the top face of the other stack (see Figure 3-III).

(c) Line AB must pass through at least 2.4 m of barricade material or undisturbed natural
earth between the two stacks, whether or not they are contiguous.

2) Line AC (2° Rule)

(a) Point A is chosen in accordance with subparagraph 1) above.

(b) On level or sloping terrain a second line (AC) is drawn at an angle of 2° above line AB.

(c) On level terrain, when stacks are separated by less than 5 Q1/3 whether or not they are
contiguous, line AC must pass through at least 1.0 m of barricade material or undisturbed
natural earth.

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(d) On sloping terrain when the stacks are contiguous line AC must pass through at least 1.0
m barricade material or undisturbed natural earth.

(e) On sloping terrain when two stacks are not contiguous but the quantity-distance between
them is less than 5 Q1/3, the 2° rule is not applicable.

3) Stacks separated by at least 5 Q1/3

When stacks, contiguous or not, are separated by the quantity-distance 5 Q1/3 or more, barricade
requirements are assessed individually with respect to each stack.

c) Length of Barricade

The barricade length is determined by extending the barricade exclusive of the end slope to 1.0 m beyond
lines between the extremes of the two stacks of ammunition under consideration. These lines must pass
through at least 2.4 m of barricade material or undisturbed natural earth (see Figure 3-IV).

d) Distance from Stack to Barricade

1) The distance from a stack to the foot of a barricade is a compromise. Each case is considered
individually to achieve the optimum solution taking account of the following factors.

2) A barricade close to a stack results in smaller dimensions for the barricade to intercept high
velocity projections through a given solid angle. However, on sloping terrain the minimum
separation may not result in the smallest barricade.

3) A barricade further away from the stack results in easier access for maintenance and for vehicles,
and the possibility to site the barricade outside the predicted crater, when the PES contains
ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.1. Avoidance of the crater is an advantage in
some circumstances, see subparagraph 2.3.3.3.c). The barricade must be sited so that the crater
does not undermine it more than one third of its thickness at ground level.

2.3.3.3. Material for Earth Barricades and for the Cover of Buildings

a) Earth for barricades and for cover of buildings should be made of material as prescribed below. When
concrete or brick is used in conjunction with earth, either of these materials may be taken as equivalent to 4
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to support the earth or it may be those parts of the roof and walls of a building which intercept the high
velocity projections.

b) There are two types of precaution which are necessary in the construction of earth barricades or the earth-
cover for buildings used for storage of ammunition and explosives. One type relates to the potential hazards
to other ammunition and to personnel in the event that the material is dispersed by an accidental explosion
in the contained building. The other type relates to the precautions necessary to ensure structural integrity
of the earth barricades or cover.

c) There is no need to consider the first type of precaution if it can be predicted that the material would not be
dispersed by the postulated explosion. This will be the case if the barricade is sited beyond the crater
radius. Scouring of the top surface by air blast can be neglected. The crater dimensions would be
determined by the geometry of the stored explosives, their height above ground or depth of burial, and the
nature of the ground. Unless the arrangement is particular asymmetrical, a good working estimate of the
crater radius can be calculated from the formula:

Crater radius (m) = ½ (NEQ (kg))1/3

This radius is measured from the centre of the explosives. In certain soil conditions (saturated soil or clay)
the crater may be larger than calculated from the above formula (more complete information on cratering
phenomenology is given in paragraphs 2.5.6.1. and 2.5.6.2.). In such conditions consideration should be
given to increasing the Inter-Magazine Distances.

d) Where it is possible that the material would be dispersed by an explosion, precautions should be taken to
reduce the hazard of large stones causing initiation by impact upon ammunition or explosives in adjacent
storage sites. Where the storage site under consideration is near a densely occupied area, such as a group of
explosives workshops, consideration should also be given to the hazard to personnel from flying stones etc.
The selection of material and its use should be governed by the following prescriptions which represent a
reasonable compromise between undue hazards and excessive costs of construction:

1. Do not deliberately use rubble from demolished buildings.

2. Ensure that stones larger than 0.3 m girth (about the size of a man's clenched fist) are removed
during construction. Other deleterious matter should also be eliminated.

3. In climates where the ground becomes severely frozen, consideration should be given to the
provision of an impermeable cover over the material or drainage to keep out excessive moisture.

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e) The second type of precaution mentioned in subparagraph b) above, relating to structural integrity, applies
in all cases. For this purpose the material should be reasonably cohesive and free from excessive amounts
of trash and deleterious organic matter. Compaction and surface preparation should be provided as
necessary to maintain structural integrity and avoid erosion. Where it is impossible to use a cohesive
material, for example at a site in a sandy desert, the earth-works should be finished with either a layer of
cohesive soil or an artificial skin. On the other hand one should avoid solid, wet clay during construction
since this is too cohesive and would result in an excessive debris hazard.

2.3.3.4. Walls as Barricades

a) A building without windows and with walls with a thickness of 45 cm reinforced concrete (70 cm of brick)
or its equivalent is acceptable as a barricaded building with regard to stopping fragments from an explosion
in an adjacent building or stack. However, consideration must be given to the necessary blast resistance of
such walls, see subparagraph 2.3.3.1.b)1). Furthermore account should be taken of the increased debris
hazard from such walls at a PES. A 23 cm brick wall protected by a 45 cm brick wall is preferable to a
single wall of about 70 cm brick. These buildings need not necessarily have a protective roof.

b) Walls can often be used to divide a building into individual rooms or compartments in accordance with
subparagraph 1.3.2.2.b). The function of each dividing wall is to prevent, or at least delay substantially,
transmission of explosion between explosives on opposite sides of the wall. the main advantage is that
quantity-distances can then be based on the NEQ in one compartment instead of the aggregate amounts in
the building. A second advantage is that an accidental explosion is less likely to render unserviceable all the
stocks in the building. The specification of such a wall depends upon the quantity, proximity and type of
ammunition or explosives on each side. The design must take into account the likely blast loading,
including the effect of reflections, and the flame, ground shock, primary fragments and secondary missiles
(spalling and scabbing from the remote face of the wall). In order to achieve an efficient and economical
design for a particular situation, expert advice is essential. Information on the scope and state of the art of
designing dividing walls is given in the technical manual "Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental
Explosions, US Army TM 5 -1300, June 1969" or a newer edition.

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Section IV - Lightning Protection

2.3.4.1. Definitions

In addition to the definitions given in Part I, Chapter I, Section II the following definitions are used in
connection with protection against lightning.

2.3.4.2. Air Termination Network

The part of a lightning protection system that is intended to intercept lightning discharges.

2.3.4.3. Bond

A conductor intended to provide electrical connection between the protective system and other metal work.

2.3.4.4. Down Conductor

A conductor which connects the air termination network with the earth termination network.

2.3.4.5. Earth Termination Network

The part of the lightning protection system which is intended to discharge lightning currents into the
general mass of earth. All parts below the lowest test joint in a down conductor are included in this term.

2.3.4.6. Joint

The junction between portions of the lightning protection system.

2.3.4.7. Ring Conductor

The ring conductor is that part of the earth termination network which connects the earth electrodes to each
other or to the down conductors.

2.3.4.8. Test Joint

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A joint designed and situated to enable resistance or continuity measurements to be made.

2.3.4.9. Zone of Protection

The zone considered to be protected by a complete air termination network.

2.3.4.10. General

a) This chapter covers the particularities of lightning protection for ammunition handling installations and
facilities. An effective lightning protection is part of the overall safety concept for the handling of
ammunition and explosives.

b) Lightning protection systems are to be designed and constructed in a way which ensures an effective and
long-term protection of the ammunition against lightning discharges. Lightning protection systems must be
constructed by specialist personnel and according to the state-of-the-art of lightning protection technology.

c) As a matter of principle, installations and facilities used for handling ammunition must be equipped with
lightning protection systems. Whether such systems can be omitted in individual cases is to be decided by
the nations. The hazard of lightning discharges and possible consequences are to be assessed within the
scope of a facility-related safety analysis.

d) A distinction must be made between "external" and "internal" lightning protection. External lightning
protection forms the basis of an effective lightning protection consisting of

- air termination network,

- down conductors, and
- earth termination network.

For internal lightning protection a lightning protection equipotential bonding must be established between
the lightning protection system of a building and the metallic installations and electrical systems of the
building.

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2.3.4.11. Lightning Protection Systems for Buildings

a) As a rule, buildings for the handling of ammunition and explosives (explosive workshops, magazines) are
equipped with two external lightning protection systems, one lightning protection system which is insulated
against the building and one lightning protection system for the building itself.
The insulated lightning protection system is designed to intercept high-current lightning discharges in order
to keep them away from the lightning protection system of the building itself.

b) The lightning protection system for buildings designed for ammunition handling is to be arranged in such a
way that an electroconductive cage is established. This cage must surround the building on all sides
(ceiling, walls, ground). The design of the cage depends on the construction of the building.

2.3.4.12. Insulated Lightning Protection System for Buildings

a) As a rule, fixed air termination networks with a roof conductor in form of a mesh are applied in insulated
lightning protection systems.

- The fixed air termination network is to be supported by supporting poles.

- The poles shall be positioned at least 3 m from the building.
- The mesh size must not exceed 10 m.
- Roof edges, projections, etc. shall be located at a maximum distance of 0.3 m from the network.
- Even if the network sags, the minimum distance from the roof of the building must be 1.5 m.

b) If vertical air termination networks are used, their height and zone of protection shall be such as to ensure
that the entire surface of the building will be situated within this zone of protection (see Figure 3-V). The
vertical air termination networks shall be positioned at least 3 m from the site. In case there should be a
barricade, the vertical air termination networks may be mounted thereupon.
Instead of vertical air termination networks trees may be used and equipped with air termination networks
if they are located in an appropriate position.
c) In buildings with a complete earth of at least 0.5 m, insulated lightning protection can be omitted; this
applies also to earth covers with vent pipes.

2.3.4.13. Lightning Protection Systems for Buildings

a) Fixed air termination networks are to be arranged on the building with a mesh size not exceeding 10 m x 10
m. Parts of the building made of nonconductive material which protrude from the network are to be
equipped with suspended air termination networks and pointed conductors. Superstructures made of metal

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are to be bonded to the suspended air termination networks. The air termination networks of the lightning
protection system of the building must be installed in the middle between the conductors of the insulated
lightning protection system (top view). Each building must have one down conductor for 10 m each of the
circumference of the building with four down conductors being the minimum number. Those down
conductors should be positioned at least 0.5 m from windows, doors, and other openings. Aboveground
pipelines leading up to the buildings are to be bonded to the down conductor next to them. In the case of
reinforced concrete buildings which have connected reinforcing rods, these can be used as down
conductors; these buildings only require air termination networks but not separate down conductors.
Reinforced concrete buildings without connected reinforcing rods are to be equipped with air termination
networks and down conductors. In any case the reinforcement is to be bonded to the internal ring conductor
at intervals not exceeding 10 m.

b) For earth-covered buildings (e.g. igloo) with an earth-cover of at least 0.5 m a fixed air termination network
having a mesh size not exceeding 10 m x 10 m and installed within or on the earth-cover is a sufficient
lightning protection (see Figure 3-VI). For buildings with a lateral length of less than 10 m two conducturs
in a diagonal arrangement are sufficient. Those conductors are to be bonded to a ring conductor. Metal
venting systems which protrude from the earth-cover are to be equipped with down conductors which must
be bonded to air termination networks or the ring conductor. Venting systems made of non-conductive
material must be equipped with air termination networks and down conductors. In buildings made of
reinforced concrete the connected reinforcement can be used as down conductor; it must be bonded to the
ring conductor in at least two opposing locations. Suspended air termination networks are necessary here as
well. Instead of a fixed air termination network, a space screen (e.g. as alternative upgrading measure) may
be inserted into the building. The space screen consits of a network of band steel having a mesh size not
exceeding 2 m x 4 m on which a fine grid (5 cm x 10 cm) is installed. The space screen must surround
ceilings, walls, and columns; it is to be connected to the ring conductor.

2.3.4.14. Earth Termination Networks

Each lightning protection system must be grounded with an earth termination network. In most cases closed
ring conductors or grounding circuits are used for that purpose.

- The total earth resistance of the earth termination network shall not exceed 10 Ω for buildings or groups of
buildings.

- The earth termination network and the lightning protection system are to be appropriately connected.

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- Earth termination networks of adjoining buildings within a radius of 20 m are to be connected

underground.

- Ammunition and packagings containing ammunition are usually not grounded.

- Test joints are to be integrated into the lightning protection system between down conductor and earth
termination network for test and measuring purposes. They are to be situated approximately 0.5 m above
ground; below the test joint only parts of the earth termination network are permissible.

2.3.4.15. Equipotential Bonding in Lightning Protection

All essential conductive elements of a building such as machines, equipment, radiators, pipelines as well as
large metal items (metal doors and windows, conductive floors) are to be bonded to the lightning protection system
via lines.

2.3.4.16. Lightning Protection Systems for Open-air Stacks of Ammunition

a) Ammunition stacks endangered by lightning, especially those containing mass-detonating ammunition, are
to be protected by a lightning protection system.
Ammunition stacks are particularly endangered by lightning discharge if they are situated.

- on mountain tops, hills,

- at the edges of woods, or
- under isolated trees.

b) In general, four horizontal aerial conductors of a rectangular shape (e.g. zinc-coated steel rope with a cross
section of 50 mm2 mounted on insulated supports (e.g. made of wood) at least 0.5 m above the upper edges
of the ammunition stack are sufficient to provide lightning protection. On each of the four corners one
down conductor which is to be bonded to the ring conductor shall be installed at least 0.5 m from the stack.
The ring conductor is to be buried at least 0.5 m below ground with a minimum lateral distance of 1 m
round the perimeter of the stack (see Fig 3 - VII). If the stacks are positioned on floor plates the latter are to
be connected with the ring conductor on the four corners of the stack.

c) For ammunition stacks established temporarily a makeshift lightning protection is sufficent which is
arranged as follows:

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A zinc-coated steel rope of at least 50 mm2 in cross section or a copper rope of at least 35 mm2 in cross
section which is to be supported by 2 supports made of wood or metal is to be tensioned across the stack.
Outside the supports the rope is to be secured in the ground with metal stays.

Additionally, each support has two stay wires with metal stays. The distance between the rope tensioned
across the stack and the supports to the stack is to be 3 m; in case of deviations it must be ensured that the
complete stack lies within the protected zone (see Fig 3 - V and 3 - VIII).

2.3.4.17. Lightning Protection Systems for Ammunition Bins

a) In ammunition bins made of concrete the reinforcement forms a conductive cage which is to be grounded
using two earth electrodes (50 cm deep into the ground).

b) If ammunition bins made of wood are to be equipped with a lightning protection system, they must be
provided with suitable suspended air termination networks and the conductive roof decks are to be included
in the lightning protection system.

2.3.4.18. Minimum Distances of Ammunition from Lightning Protection Systems

Ammunition and packaging containing ammunition are to be stored so as to prevent flash over the lightning
stroke from the lightning protection system to the ammunition or the packaging. Ammunition stacks in a magazin or
an explosives workshop are to be positioned at a distance to walls, support, ceilings, beams, metal parts, and
electrical installations which shall be:

- 10 cm at least if the lightning protection system is properly designed and meets the requirements
of this chapter,

- 50 cm at least if the lightning protection system does not meet the requirements of this chapter.

2.3.4.19 Testing of Lightning Protection Systems

a) Each lightning protection system is to be tested upon completion. The result shall be recorded. The
established values for the earth resistance are to be used as comparative values for future tests.

The proper condition of the lightning protection system is to be ensured by regular inspections and
measurements.

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Section V - Standard of Internal Lighting in Explosives Storage Buildings

2.3.5.1. General

In all explosives storage buildings there is a need to identify accurately stocks from markings and to carry
out documentation. This requires a minimum standard of illumination.

2.3.5.2. Minimum Standard

Where fixed lighting is provided, the minimum acceptable standard for internal lighting in explosives
storage buildings is 75 lux, measured at floor level.

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Figure 3 - I Minimum Separation of Adjacent Stack of Certain Projectiles.

Nose-to-Nose or Base-to-Base distances in m

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Figure 3 -II Determination of Barricade Height on Level Terrain

Figure 3 -III Determination of Barricade Height on Sloping Terrain

Figure 3 -IV Determination of Barricade Lenght

Figure 3 - V Zone of protection of a horizontal suspended air termination network (ridge network)

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Figure 3 - VI
Schematic presentation of an earth-covered magazine with interconnecting reinforced steel

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Figure 3 - VII
Lightning protection system for open stacks of ammunition

Figure 3 - VIII

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Lightning protection system for open stacks of ammunition with an expected short-term deployment (up to one
year)

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CHAPTER 4 - FIRE-FIGHTING PROCEDURES

Section I - Symbols

2.4.1.1. Fire Division Symbols

a) Each of the four fire divisions is indicated by distinctive symbols (see Figure 4-I) in order to be recognized
by fire-fighting personnel approaching a scene of fire. For the purpose of identifying these symbols from
long range, the symbols differ in shape as follows:

Shape Fire Division

Octagon 1
Cross 2
Inverted triangle 3
Diamond 4

b) The colour of all four symbols is orange in accordance with the colour on UN and IMO labels for Class 1
(Explosives).

c) The use of the specified fire division numbers is left to the discretion of National Authorities. When
numbers are used they are painted in black.

d) The shape and size of the four division symbols are shown in Figure 4-I.

2.4.1.2. Supplementary Symbols

a) Toxic and pyrotechnic ammunition storage require supplementary symbols in addition to the fire division
symbols. The supplementary symbols are used to indicate the precautions to be taken against the additional
hazards proceeding from the chemical agents of that ammunition
(see Table 4-I). The supplementary symbols indicate the following precautions:
- wear full protective clothing,
- wear breathing apparatus,
- apply no water.

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b) All three supplementary symbols are circular in shape. They correspond to the ISO Recommendations No.
408 (Safety Colours) and No. 457 (Safety Symbols) of the Technical Committee ISO/TC80. The
supplementary symbols, their meanings and their sizes are shown in Figure 4-II.

c) The supplementary symbol prohibiting the use of water in fire-fighting (symbol No. 3 of Figure 4-II) may
be placed together with one of the other supplementary symbols if required.

d) The supplementary symbol indicating the requirement to wear full protective clothing should also indicate
the type of full protective clothing to be worn, as the different kinds of chemical agents demand different
protective measures. The type of full protective clothing to be worn at a chemical ammunition storage site
and the method by which this is indicated are the responsibility of the nation concerned.

e) The following sets of full protective clothing are recommended:

Set 1: Protective clothing against casualty agents, consisting of protective gas mask, impermeable suit,
impermeable hood, impermeable boots, undergarments, coveralls, protective footwear and
impermeable gloves.

Set 2: Protective clothing against harassing agents, consisting of protective mask, coveralls and
protective gloves.

Set 3: Protective clothing against white phosphorus (WP) smoke, consisting of flameproof coveralls,
flameproof gloves and chemical safety goggles.

The different sets of full protective clothing to be worn may be indicated by:

- a white number, corresponding to the set-no., on the blue background of the symbol, or
- a white rectangular plaque placed below the symbol listing in black letters the components of
protective clothing to be worn.

f) The chemical agents mostly used in ammunition, the compatibility groups of that ammunition and the
supplementary symbols required in storage are specified in Table 4-I.

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Section II - Detailed Procedures

2.4.2.1. General

Fires of ammunition and explosives are fought according to their classification in fire divisions and the
stage of fire.

2.4.2.2. Fire Division 1

a) A fire involving items of Fire Division 1 is fought during the developing stage with all available means and
without awaiting specific instructions. If, in the developing stage, the fire cannot be controlled, the scene of
fire is evacuated at once. In general, ammunition without its means of initiation and ignition can be
exposed to a fire for several minutes before it explodes. Initiators, igniters, propelling charges, and rocket
motors are extremely sensitive to fire.

b) A fully developed fire is not fought unless it is known:

- what types of ammunition or explosives are stored at the scene of fire;

- how long the ammunition or explosives may be exposed to a fire before they explode;

- how long the ammunition or explosives have been exposed to the fire.

c) If the fire-fighting forces cannot fight the fire, they must stay away from the scene of fire sufficiently to be
protected from hazards. If possible, they should move to a protective site from behind which to fight the
fires propagated in the vicinity of the original fire. If no adequate protective site is available, the fire-
fighting forces should retreat from the scene of fire to a sufficiently remote site. A separation such as
Explosives Workshop Distance is suitable.

d) After an explosion the fire-fighting forces may approach the scene of fire only if the ammunition or
explosives have been completely destroyed by the explosion (mass explosion) so that only debris is left
burning.

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2.4.2.3. Fire Division 2

a) A fire involving items of Fire Division 2 is fought at once during the developing stage with all available
means and without awaiting specific instructions. Fire Division 2 ammunition does not explode
immediately after fire reaches it. Usually explosions from these fires can be expected only after the
ammunition has been heated for an extended period of time (10 to 40 minutes).

b) If such a fire cannot be extinguished before the first explosions are to be expected, the scene of fire is
abandoned and fire-fighting efforts are concentrated on preventing the spread of fire. The fire may be
fought from a nearby protective site if protection from fragments and missiles is provided by that site.

c) A fully developed fire is not fought. The fire-fighting efforts are confined to protection of the vicinity. If no
adequate protective site is available, the fire-fighting forces should retreat from the scene of fire to a
sufficiently remote site. A separation such as the Explosives Workshop Distance is suitable. The fire-
fighting equipment is kept operational at a protected location.

d) Such a scene, once evacuated, must not be entered again so long as the fire continues burning, not even for
the purpose of defining the extent of fire.

2.4.2.4. Fire Division 3

a) A fire involving items of Fire Division 3 is fought at once during the developing stage with all available
means and without awaiting specific instructions. If, in the developing stage, the fire cannot be controlled,
the scene of fire is evacuated at once.

b) A fully developed fire is not fought from nearby because of the hazards of explosion and intense heat. If no
adequate protective site is available, the fire-fighting forces should retreat from the scene of fire to a
sufficiently remote site. A separation such as the Explosives Workshop Distance is suitable. Efforts are
confined to fighting and containing propagated fires so as to prevent their spreading further. Whenever
practicable, the fires should be fought from behind protective sites.

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2.4.2.5. Fire Division 4

a) Fires involving items of Fire Division 4 are fought in all cases and with all available means.

b) After an extended period of time the ammunition may explode sporadically. For protection against
fragments and missiles the fire-fighting forces should not approach the scene of fire any closer than 25 m.
When possible the fire should be fought from a protected location.

2.4.2.6. Ammunition requiring Supplementary Symbols

Ammunition containing explosives and toxic or pyrotechnic agents (see Table 4-I) requires special
attention and precautions in fire-fighting. Such ammunition belongs to different fire divisions depending on the kind
and quantity of explosives contained in the ammunition. Such fires are fought in accordance with the fire division(s)
involved taking into account the precautions indicated by the supplementary symbols. The issue of the
corresponding special fire-fighting regulations is left to the discretion of the National Authorities.

2.4.2.7. Fire-Fighting: Ammunition Containing Depleted Uranium

Details are given in Chapter 8, Section VI.

NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED
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TABLE 4-I

Chemical Agents contained in Ammunition and

the Supplementary Symbols required in Storage

Serial Chemical Agents con- Comp. Supplementary Symbol

No. tained in Ammunition Group
Wear Full Protective Wear Breathing Apply no
Clothing Apparatus Water

Set 1 Set 2 Set 3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1 Casualty Agents (1) K X

2 Tear Gas, O-Chloro- G X

benzolmalononitrile
(CS)

3 Smoke, Titanium tetra- G X

chloride (FM)

4 Smoke, Sulphur trioxide G X

chlorosulphonic acid
solution (FS)

Smoke, Aluminium zinc X

5 oxide hexachloro- G X
ethane (HC)

White Phosphorus (WP) X

6 White Phosphorus H X
plasticized (PWP)

7 Thermite or Thermate H X X
(TH)

8 Pyrotechnic Mate- G X X
rial (PT)

9 Calcium Phosphide G X X

Signalling smokes X
10 L
Isobutylmethacry- X
11 late with oil (IM) G

12 Napalm (NP) J X

13 J

(1) The storage of ammunition containing these agents is the responsibility of the authorized nations. Detailed
statements of the agents concerned are beyond the scope of this table.

NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED
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FIGURE 4-I FIRE DIVISION SYMBOLS

FIGURE 4-I SYMBOLES DE DIVISIONS D‘INCENDIE

COLOUR OF SYMBOLS:
The background of all symbols is orange, the numbers are black.

COULEUR DES SYMBOLES:

Le fond de tous ces symboles est de couleur orange, les numéros sont en noir.

NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED
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FIGURE 4-II SUPPLEMENTARY SYMBOLS

FIGURE 4-II SYMBOLES SUPPLEMENTAIRES

1. Wear full protective clothing 2. Wear breathing apparatus

Port d’un éguipment complet Port dún masque respiratoire
de protection

COLOUR OF SYMBOLS:
The background of the symbols above is blue, the figures and the rim are white.

COULEUR DES SYMBOLES:

Le fond des symboles ci-dessus est bleu, les figures et la bordure sont blanches.

3. Apply no water – Défence dútiliser de léau

COLOUR OF SYMBOL:
The background of the symbol is white, the circle and the diagonal stripe are red, the figures are black.
(The colour specifications are those of ISO Recommendation No. 408 of the ISO Committee TC 80).

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COLEUR DU SYMBOLE:
Le fond du symbole est blanc, le cercle et la bande diagonale sont rouges, les figures sont noires.
(Les spécifications de couleur sont celles de la recommandation ISO No. 408 du Comité ISO TC 80).

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CHAPTER 5 - DESIGN ENVIRONMENT CRITERIA

Section I – List of Symbols

SYMBOL DIMENSION DESCRIPTION

A (m2) Area
AT (m2) Area of target
A(x) (m2) Specifically defined area
Af (m2) Projected area of a projectile/fragment
AD (m2) Drag area
Av (g) Maximum vertical acceleration (shock)
Aw (m2) Area of wall
Av , Ah (m/s2) . (g) Maximum vertical/horizontal acceleration
a (m/s2) Acceleration
ao (m/s) Speed of sound
α (o) Angle
B, Bx (√kg/m7/6) Mott constant for explosives
bf (m) Fragment width
β (-) Pressure drop constant in Friedländer function
CD (-) Drag coefficient
CE (-) Equivalent load factor
CL (-) Confidence level
CP (m/s) Seismic velocity in the ground
D (m) Distance
D (m) Blast wave position at maximum loading of
structural element
D (kg/m3) Density/caliber density
D (N) Attenuation force
DIF (-) Dynamic increase factor
DLF (-) Dynamic load factor
Da, Dt (m) Depth of apparent/true crater
Dv, Dh (m) Maximum vertical/horizontal displacement
D/L (-) Blast wave position factor
DOB (m) Depth of burst
d (s) Duration
di (m) Mean inner diameter of ammunition case
E (J) Energy
E, Ec, Em, Es (Pa) Modula of elasticity for concrete, masonry, steel
Ekin (J) Kinetic energy
Ecr (J) Critical energy
ES (-) Exposed site
F (N) Force
FD (N) Drag force
F (Hz) Frequency
fr (-) Reflection factor
F1 (kg/m3) Ammunition storage building density factor
G √(2·E) Gurney constant
GOF Terrain surface
g (9.81 m/s2) Gravity acceleration
H (m) Height
Hs (m) Height of building
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SYMBOL DIMENSION DESCRIPTION

Hw (m) (Height of wall
HOB Height of burst
I (Ns) Shock impulse
I (m4) Moment of inertia
Is (Pa-s) Positive side-on impulse
Ir (Pa-s) Normally reflected positive impulse
Iq (Pa-s) Dynamic impulse
ig (Pa-s) Gas impulse
is (Pa-s/kg1/3) Scaled positive side-on impulse
ir (Pa-s/kg1/3) Scaled positive reflected impulse
k (-) Shape factor/ballistic density factor
L (m) Span of structural element under consideration
L (m) Length of flight path traveled after which the
fragment trajectory velocity drops to the (1/e)th part
of the fragment departure velocity
L^ (m/kg) L related to the unity mass
LH, LL (m) Span in transverse/longitudinal direction
Lw (m) Blast wave length, positive phase
LS (m) Width of structural element strip
Lw/L (-) Ratio between blast wave length and span of the
structural element under consideration
ld (m) Length of debris (average value of sphere and cube)
M (kg) Mass
M (kg) Static/dynamic system mass
M (Nm) Moment
MA (-) Fragment distribution factor
Me (kg) Effective mass
Mej (kg) Crater ejecta mass
Mex (kg) Explosive mass
Mc (kg) Total mass of ammunition case
Md (kg) Design fragment mass
Mf (kg) Mass of the fragment under consideration
Mo (kg) Average fragment mass
Mp (kg) Projectile mass
Mstr (kg) Mass of structure/structural component
Mt (kg) Total fragment mass
max (-) Maximum
min (-) Minimum
N (-) Geometrical constant
Nf (-) Number of fragments with masses higher than Mf
Nt (-) Total number of fragments
Nd (-) Number of fragments with masses higher than Md
NEQ (kg) Net explosives quantity
NEQTNT (kg) Net explosives quantity; TNT equivalent

PES (-) Potential explosion site

Po (Pa) Peak overpressure
Pso (Pa) Peak side-on overpressure
Ps (Pa) Side-on overpressure
Pa (Pa) Atmospheric pressure; ambient pressure
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SYMBOL DIMENSION DESCRIPTION

Pa,s (Pa) Atmospheric pressure at standard sea level
Pr (Pa) Peak reflected overpressure
P (Pa) Pressure
P(t) (Pa) Time-Dependent pressure
Pi (Pa) Pressure inside of building
P (%) Probability
Q, Qexp (kg) Charge mass
QTNT (kg) Equivalent TNT charge mass
Qo (kg) Reference charge, usually expressed at TNT
equivalent
Qo (-) Total number of fragments per unit solid angle
emitted in target direction by ammunition item
Qx (kg) Actual charge mass, usually expressed as TNT
equivalent
q (Pa) Dynamic pressure
qo (Pa) Peak dynamic overpressure
q (kW/m2) Thermal radiation flux/radiation density
qf (1/m2) Fragment density
R (m) Separation/radius/distance
Ra, Rt (m) Radius of apparent / true crater
Re (m) Effective projection distance
Rf (m) Fragment distance
RG (m) Ground distance
Rm (N) Maximum resistance of system
Ro (m) Reference distance from center of charge Qo, for a
defined overpressure or dynamic pressure
Rx (m) Distance from center of charge Qx (kg) at which the
explosion of the charge Qx produces the same
pressure as that caused by the reference explosion
with the parameters Ro and Qo
r (Pa) Unit resistance
rho (kg/m3) Soil density
rho (kg/m3) Air density
S (-) Position index/center of element strip
SGZ Surface ground zero (point of burst)
TAG (s) Arrival time of ground shock wave
To, to (s) Duration of positive air blast phase
tof (s) Fictitious duration of positive airblast phase
Ta, ta (s) Arrival time of shock front
Ta (oC) Ambient temperature
Ta,s (oC) Ambient temperature at standard sea level
Tc, tc (s) Clearing time of blast wave at target
To (K) Temperature
Tr, tr (s) Time of load increase
t (s) Time
tw (s) Duration of loading
ta,a (s) Arrival time of blast wave
ta,s (s) Arrival time of direct ground shock wave
tc (m) Mean thickness of ammunition case
tc (s) Clearing time
ts (s) Time at point of intersection between reflected
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SYMBOL DIMENSION DESCRIPTION

pressure and combined side-on / drag pressure
tr (s) Duration of reflected pressure
U (m/s) Shock front velocity
u (m/s) Particle velocity behind shock front
Va, Vt (m3) Volume of apparent/true crater
V (m/s) Velocity
Vcr (m/s) Critical velocity
Vf (m/s) Final velocity of projections
Vm (m/s) Mean impact velocity
Vo (m/s) Departure/initial velocity
Vr (m/s) Residual velocity
Vs, Vi (m/s) Impact velocity
Vv, Vh (m/s) Maximal vertical/horizontal velocity
W (N) Weight
W (J) Work
Wf (N) Fragment weight (mass)
Ws (m) Width of structure
X, x (m) Deformation
x (-) Position index
Xel, Xp (m) Elastic/plastic deformation
Yel (m) Elastic deformation of system
Ym, Yp (m) Plastic deformation of system
Z (m/kg1/3) Scaled distance
ZA (m/kg1/3) Scaled normal distance
ZG (m/kg1/3) Scaled distance above ground

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Section II - General

2.5.1.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the effects of an accidental explosion or fire in an aboveground ammunition
storage site on persons or surrounding buildings and other engineering works. The magnitude of the effects
constitute the design environment criteria.

2.5.1.2 General Principles

a) Design Environment Criteria

The design environment criteria serve the purpose of …

- . . . preparing risk analyses;

- . . . designing and dimensioning ammunition storage facilities;

- . . . defining quantity distances;

- . . . determining hazard parameters in terms of quality and quantity;

Note:

The quantity distances are based on design environment criteria, threat spectrum as well as performance
and safety requirements.

- . . . verifying design drawings and detail specifications for facilities of a particular site
in order to assure compliance with the safety regulations;

- . . . modifying buildings originally constructed for other purposes to ammunition

storage buildings and explosives workshops;

- . . . planning damage control, fire-fighting and rescue operations.

b) Basic Data

There is further basic research to be done in order to complete the technological basis required for
exploiting all conceivable uses of explosives and ammunition storage buildings. The technological
developments with respect to ammunition types, building materials as well as design and dimensioning
make it necessary to constantly improve the relevant data and knowledge base. For the economical
handling of the problem fields, special data banks with constant updating are required. Carefully
prepared scaled model and full-scale tests will provide these data, constitute the basis for realistic risk
analyses and help saving costs.

2.5.1.3 General Design Aspects

a) Design Principles

To ensure compliance with the safety requirements for exposed sites, the design methods applied must
be selected according to the following basic conditions.

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(1) No Design Environment Criteria Available (Standardized Construction)

When no design environment and performance criteria are given, the building shall conform
to a standard construction which, in former explosion events, has proved to be satisfactory for
a given Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) at a specific distance or has been proof-tested,
preferably in full-scale tests.

With this approach, additional design calculations are not required, and deviations from
applicable construction specifications and quantity distance requirements are not permitted
since the consequences are not predictable.

Note:
This method is inflexible and does no longer constitute a state-of-the-art approach.

(2) Limited Design Environment Criteria Available

In case only a few quantity distance values are available as design environment criteria,
design and construction will be based on analytical calculations supported by model or full-
scale tests. The construction may be safely used over the full range proved by the
calculations. Appropriate consideration of design criteria (e.g. specified quantity distance)
provided, modifications to the original construction are permissible since consequences of
such modifications can be predicted to a large extent.

Note:
This method constitutes a compromise between empirical and analytical approaches.

(3) Complete Design Environment Criteria Available

When design environment criteria are available as continuous functions of net explosives
quantity and distance from the Potential Explosion Site (PES), there is complete freedom to
choose both the distance and the type of construction in order to obtain the most economical
solution. Design and construction are based on analytical calculations supported by model or
full-scale tests. The construction may be used over the full range proved by the calculations.
Modifications may be made provided the design environment criteria are taken into account.

Note:
This is the ideal case giving complete freedom with respect to design and modifications.

When seeking the optimum combination of construction type, required quantity distance, and
degree of protection, the following parameters shall be taken into account:

- Availability of land for building purposes;

- Costs of land;
- Construction costs;
- Value of ammunition and explosives stored in the Exposed Site (ES) which would
become unserviceable in case of an explosion in the potential explosion site.

For ammunition storage facilities exceeding the minimum strength and blast resistance
requirements the quantity distances may be reduced provided qualified evidence has been
furnished.

When designing a building for the storage of ammunition, in almost all cases the
donor/acceptor conflict has to be solved.

- A building with donor function should be of lightweight in order to minimize the size
and mass of projections.
- A building with acceptor function must have a relatively high strength in order to
avoid sympathetic detonation due to airblast, projections, shock or collapse of
buildings
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b) Degrees of Protection

As it is uneconomical to use a building for only one hazard division, it is common practice to store
ammunition of different hazard divisions in one storage facility.

The degrees of protection define the expected or required extent of protection against the effects of an
accidental explosion for each hazard division.

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The degrees of protection are distinguished as follows . . . .

Degrees of Hazard Protection Criteria Remarks

Protection Division
Virtually 1.1 - Against: Practically instantaneous propagation of explosion by
Complete ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections.
Protection - Result: - Immediate sympathetic detonation not to be
expected.
- Stored items largely remain serviceable.
- Individual evaluation required for sensitive
stored items.
1.2 - Against: Immediate or subsequent fires and explosion caused by
blast, flame, firebrands protections and lobbed
ammunition.
- Result: - Immediate or delayed sympathetic detonation not
to be expected.
- Stored items probably remain serviceable.
1.3 - Against: Immediate or subsequent fires among the contents of an
ES by flame, radiant heat, firebrands, projections and
lobbed ammunition.
- Result: - Immediate or delayed burning, deflagration or
explosion of stored items not to be expected.
- Inflammation of burnable external parts of the
building.
- No propagation of fire to stored items.

Degrees of Hazard Protection Criteria Remarks

Protection Division
High Degree 1.1 - Against: Practically instantaneous propagation of explosion by
of Protection ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections.
- Result: - High protection against immediate sympathetic
detonation.
- Delayed fire and sympathetic detonation to be
expected.
- Bulk of stored items probably remains
serviceable.
1.2 - Against: Immediate propagation of explosion by blast, flame and
projections.
- Result: - High protection against immediate sympathetic
detonation.
- Delayed fire and sympathetic detonation to be
expected.
- Loss of stored items depends on effectiveness of
fire fighting.
1.3 - Against: Immediate propagation of fire to the contents of as ES by
flame, radiant heat, firebrands, projections and lobbed
ammunition.
- Result: - Delayed burning, deflagration or explosion of
stored items cannot be excluded.
- Inflammation of burnable internal and external
parts of the building.
- Stored items may catch fire.

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Degrees of Hazard Protection Criteria Remarks

Protection Division
Limited 1.1 - Against: Practically instantaneous propagation of explosion by
Degree of ground shock, flame and high velocity projections.
Protection - Result: - Immediate sympathetic detonation to be
expected.
- Stored items severely damaged and
unserviceable.
1.2 - Against: Immediate or subsequent fires among the contents of an
ES by flame, radiant heat, firebrands, projections and
lobbed ammunition.
- Result: - Limited protection against immediate
sympathetic detonation.
- Fire and sympathetic detonation to be expected.
- Loss of stored items in case of ineffective fire
fighting.

Due to the high costs involved, virtually complete protection will only be reasonable, if the net
explosives quantity is small or if the total quantity of the items stored inside the building is divided by
walls into smaller portions thus avoiding immediate sympathetic detonation.

c) Protection Against Sympathetic Detonation

Ammunition storage buildings shall be designed in such a way as to reliably prevent sympathetic
detonation of stored explosives.

Thus, the primary design objective must be to prevent destruction or collapse of the building.

Plastic deformation of structural parts shall be acceptable as long as the stability of the building is not
impaired. Deformation, however, shall be less than the separation distance between the deformed part
and the stored items so that no shock propagation is possible.

Proper design of the exposed site and adequate quantity distance from the potential explosion site are
essential factors to prevent immediate sympathetic detonation which may be initiated by high-energy
projections, spalling, torn-off structural parts (e.g. pillars, doors etc.), or by the collapse of the building.

Degree of hazard, type of stored items, design, and environment of the ammunition storage facility are
critical parameters for the evaluation of the sympathetic detonation load case.

It is impossible to specify quantity distances which provide complete safety from sympathetic
detonation, damage or injury. Economical and internal operational reasons may temporarily justify a
calculated risk to personnel and material. It also may be necessary under certain circumstances to
deviate from regulations due to tactical requirements. Design measures should be taken to prevent
spalling inside the building. This applies primarily to buildings which are not earth-covered. Tests have
demonstrated that spalling velocities are usually overestimated except when caused by contact
detonations. Dangerous spalling effects are not to be expected with earth-covered buildings.

Lobbed ammunition may explode upon impact. The explosion of ammunition with a caliber of more
than 155 mm impacting close to the wall or on the roof of an exposed storage building may cause a
sympathetic detonation.

Ammunition storage buildings shall provide full protection against projections of any kind, such as
fragments, structural debris, lobbed ammunition and spalling. The limits for spalling, below which no
firing of packaged initiating devices will be caused, are specified in AASTP-1, 2.3.3.2.
According to this paragraph, for the different spalling velocities the following criteria shall apply
(-->> Table [5.27]) . . .

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For velocities ≥ 50 m/s the kinetic energy shall be Ekin ≤ 2500 Js

For velocities ≤ 50 m/s the impulse shall be I ≤ 100 Ns

Penetration by projections shall only be acceptable if the residual velocity (Vr) of the penetrating
projectile is below the critical velocity (Vcr) at which sympathetic detonation is induced.

For Vr ≤ 50 m/s Vcr = 100 / Mp (m/s)

For Vr ≥ 50 m/s Vcr = √ (5000/Mp) (m/s)

d) Loads / Design Loads

As a rule, ammunition storage buildings should be individually designed according to local design
environment criteria. Existing design formulations and data will allow the sufficiently safe
determination of the various loads to be expected.

An accidental explosion or fire in an aboveground ammunition storage site constitutes a hazard to

personnel, buildings, facilities, and other material due to airblast, fragments, structural debris, shock and
thermal radiation. These effects, which occur almost simultaneously, define the design environment
criteria for planning and designing ammunition storage buildings. The design loads for an exposed
building or structural part of a building are functions of these effects as well as of geometrical and
material conditions at the exposed site.

(1) Rebound of Closure Components

An airblast acting on closures, such as doors and gates, will produce extreme rebound loads
on the latches and hinges. In order to ensure security of building closures, the ability of the
construction to withstand these rebound loads must be mathematically proven.
The parameters of a blast wave due to an accidental explosion depend upon the complex
conditions at the explosion site.
These include:

- Distribution of explosives at the storage site;

- Loading density;
- Types of explosives;
- Explosives content of the stored ammunition;
- Mass and type of earth cover and building;
- Constructional stability of the building.

e) Design Details

(1) Aboveground Ammunition Storage Buildings

For a storage site with earth-covered or detached uncovered aboveground ammunition

storage facilities (e.g. igloos), the most straightforward and safe quantity distances will result
if the storage area has a rectangular shape, the axes of the ammunition storage buildings are
parallel to each other, and all doors face in the same direction.

An arrangement with the front walls of the buildings facing each other should be avoided for
economical (area required) and safety reasons.

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Due to its type of design, an earth-covered ammunition storage building (igloo type) will
effectively withstand external effects such as airblast, fragments, and exploding lobbed
ammunition, provide protection of the stored items and prevent sympathetic detonation.

(2) Ammunition Stacks

Exploding ammunition stacks in the open or inside storage buildings may produce highly
effective projections, such as fragments, structural debris, and lobbed ammunition, which
may penetrate into a storage facility and immediately ignite the stored explosives and
ammunition. Ceilings, doors, and closures must be designed in such a way as to intercept
projections of any kind or reduce their velocity to a safe residual value. As an additional
safety measure, barricades may be retrofitted, which, however, will provide no protection
against projections from above.
(-->> AASTP-1, 1.4.6.1. to 1.4.6.10.)

(3) Walls

The minimum thickness required for wall and ceiling slabs affording adequate protection
against fragments, structural debris, detonating lobbed ammunition and firebrand, will
depend upon the type of the stored ammunition.
Table [5-1] contains reference values for various construction materials related to selected
ammunition types.
(-->> Ref [1], [2])

(4) Roofs and Ceilings

Roofs and ceilings may be designed such as to perform the following functions:

- Contain fragments and prevent emission of projections.

- Provide shielding against airblast, projections, and lobbed ammunition.

(5) Pressure Relief Walls

An explosion in an asymmetrical ammunition storage building with a weak wall or roof

(frangible cover) will produce directed effects (airblast, flames, projections).

Pressure relief walls (frangible covers) as well as doors and other closures shall be designed
fragment-proof and debris-proof. With standard earth covers, there will be no problems
except in case of a contact hit.

In case of not earth-covered ammunition storage buildings, the conflict between pressure
relief and fragment resistance requirements has to be solved. These requirements lead to
contrary design solutions. An approach to this problem is the erection of barricades to shield
the pressure relief component against fragments and debris.
(-->> AASTP-1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3)

(6) External Walls

Experience has shown that for not earth-covered buildings two-leaf external walls provide a
high degree of protection against airblast, fragments and debris. The outer leaf which is
considerably thinner must be separated from the inner main leaf by an air gap of
approximately 0.10 m. The outer leaf, which serves to absorb the airblast, should consist of
lightly reinforced concrete or masonry with a thickness of at least 0.10 m.
(-->> AASTP-1, 2.3.3.)

(7) Internal Walls and Dividing Walls

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Structures required to contain fragments, debris and lobbed ammunition necessitate a more
sophisticated design than dividing walls to prevent sympathetic detonation. A double-leaf
construction should always be taken into consideration.

(8) Doors and Gates

Doors and gates constitute weak points in terms of safety. As they have to be relatively large
and must be movable in addition, their design tends to become very complex to ensure
adequate resistance to explosion effects.

Doors and gates should be single-piece structures.

If a door is not part of a so-designed structural weak wall (frangible cover), it shall resist the
airblast to be expected and be fragment-proof and debris-proof.

The following essential criteria shall be considered for the design of doors . . .

- Dynamic design with respect to airblast loading;

- Assessment of rebound loads and appropriate design of door hinges and latches;
- Proof of resistance to fragments;
- Proof of resistance to high impulse loads due to impact of debris;
- Ease of use.

(9) Barricades

Barricades are structures suitable to intercept directed projections and to a limited extent to
constrain the effects of airblast and flames.

Above all, barricades reduce the effects of fragments and other projections ejected out of
openings.

Note:
- Efficiency of protection and employment range of barricades are described in detail in
AASTP-1, 1.4.6.
- Details on the design of effective barricades are given in AASTP-1, 2.3.3.

An earth-covered building may be considered equivalent to a building with barricades if, for
example, the thickness and slope of the earth cover comply with the requirements of AASTP-
1, 1.4.6, or meet the other criteria stated there.

Natural terrain features, such as wood, elevations, soil etc., may be regarded as "natural
barricades" if they have proven to provide the required protection. It must be considered,
however, that the natural environment and thus the protection it provides may change in the
course of time.

(10) Ventilation

When designing the ventilation system, preference should be given to natural ventilation for
economical reasons. The ventilation system must be designed such as to prevent ingression of
airblast, primary and secondary projections as well as thermal radiation and flames or reduce
their effects to a safe level.

f) Construction Materials for Ammunition Storage Buildings

Basically, fire-resistant or at least fire-retardant materials should be used.

Typical materials for the construction of aboveground ammunition storage buildings are concrete,
reinforced concrete, masonry, corrugated steel liners or steel arches. In addition, soil material with a
special consistency is normally used for the earth covers.

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Exposed parts made of iron, steel, aluminum or aluminum alloys, which might come into contact with
explosives, shall not contain more than 1 % of magnesium.

The walls and floors of rooms intended for the storage of chemical agents shall be lined with chemical
agent-repellent material at least up to the height of the stacks. Adequate ventilation of the storage area
shall be ensured.

2.5.1.4 References

Essential references -->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [2], [3], [4], [76], [77], [78], [79], [83], [89], [102]

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Section III - Airblast

2.5.2.1 Introduction

g) General

Airblast parameters have been thoroughly investigated in the course of data collections carried out for
weapons effects analyses. Open air and open surface detonations have been the subject of complex
experiments and scientific research providing the data basis to determine the relevant airblast loads.
Furthermore, a lot of experimental data and experiences from explosions are available covering the
airblast loads occurring after accidental explosions in ammunition storage facilities. The scientific
evaluation of these data as well will provide the necessary design basis.

Intensity, waveform and interaction of an airblast with persons, structures and equipment items are
important factors in establishing the quantity distances for ammunition and explosives, especially such
of hazard division 1.1.

In case standard quantity distance tables are not applied (or cannot be applied), potential explosion sites
and exposed structures must be designed and calculated individually. Under certain circumstances, this
procedure may lead to considerable cost savings in the design of ammunition storage facilities, e.g. in
terms of material and land requirements.

h) Problem Description

The airblast load due to an explosion may be readily simplified for design purposes. It is characterized
by a relatively flat blast wave, whose peak overpressure and variation with time essentially are
functions of distance and charge, and the dynamic pressure variation with time. It must be noted that
deviations from the model explosion environment will change the airblast parameters.

i) Assumptions and Definitions

Design and calculation methods for ammunition storage facilities are mainly based on modeling and
practice-oriented assumptions.

In general, the following assumptions are introduced in order to simplify calculation of airblast loads
and reduce input data.

(1) Charge Shape

The charge is assumed to be hemispherical and placed directly on the ground at sea level.

Note:

Other charge shapes and positions cause asymmetrical propagation of blast and, in part,
considerable deviations of blast parameters.
(-->> Ref [3], [45], [52], [53], [62], [66])

(2) Reference Explosion

The reference explosion is taken to be the high order detonation of an exposed bare charge of
TNT. In case of explosives other than TNT or different explosion environments, the TNT
equivalent mass must be calculated using a conversion factor.

Note:

The TNT equivalent factor is not a constant value. Usually, a practicable value is used.
(-->> Table [5-2])
(-->> Ref [1], [3], [4], [55])

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(3) Blast Attenuation by Donor Structure

The attenuation due to the external walls or the earth cover can be taken into account as
follows:

- Proceeding from the basic assumption that a hemispherical charge explodes on the
ground in the open, an empirical attenuation factor is introduced to extrapolate a
fictitious explosives quantity inside the storage building.
- The maximum permissible explosives quantity for the storage building is determined
using empirically developed and up dated regression equations for particular building
types.
- The airblast loads are determined using empirically developed formulations.

Note:

All methods are based on empirical data.

(-->> Ref [65], [76], [87], [88], [101], [127], [133])

(4) Terrain and Vegetation

- All assumptions relate to flat terrain without obstacles and vegetation.

- Rising slops cause an increase of pressure.
- Falling slopes cause a decrease of pressure.
- A narrow valley with steep sides causes concentrated directional blast.
- Significant vegetation, such as wood with a tree top height of more than 3.5 m,
consumes blast energy.

j) Properties of an Airblast Wave

An airblast wave due to an explosion consists of an incident blast wave and a dynamic blast wave.
(-->> Figure [5-1])

The incident peak overpressure is significantly higher than the dynamic peak overpressure.

For design purposes, the duration of the incident blast wave and the dynamic blast wave may be taken
to be equal although the pressure drops behind the respective shock fronts differ considerably and the
dynamic pressure normally takes longer to decrease to the ambient pressure level. The pressure drop of
the incident blast wave is much steeper.

The negative overpressure phase (suction phase) may be neglected for design purposes.

2.5.2.2 Physical Relations Between Airblast Parameters

The characteristic parameters of a blast wave with a sudden pressure discontinuity at the shock front are
as follows:

- Overpressure;
- Dynamic pressure
- Reflected pressure;
- Density;
- Shock front velocity;
- Particle velocity.

These parameters are derived using the Rankine-Hugoniot equations. When one of the shock front parameters of
the incident blast wave has been determined as a function of the scaled distance, the other parameters can be
calculated using the Rankine-Hugoniot equations and a simple integration procedure. The Rankine-Hugoniot
equations are based on the principles of conservation of mass, energy and momentum.
(-->> Ref [3], [72])
Restrictions:

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- The Rankine-Hugoniot equations are only applicable under the condition that the
particle velocity ahead of the shock front is zero ( uo = 0 ) and that the air behaves like an ideal gas with a
specific heat ratio of τ = 1.4.
- It is further assumed that there is one single shock front caused by a surface explosion
of a hemispherical shaped charge.

k) Rankine-Hugoniot equations

(1) Shock front velocity U

┌ ┐ 1/2
U = ao · │ 6 · Pso eq [5-01]
1+ │
7 · Pa
└ ┘
(2) Particle velocity u

u= 5 · Pso ·· ao
7 · Pa (1 + 6 · Pso / 7 · Pa)1/2
eq [5-02]
(3) Air density behind the shock front rho

7 + 6Pso/Pa
Rho = · rho,a
7 + Pso/Pa
eq [5-03]

(4) Dynamic pressure qo

qo = 0.5 · rho · u2 eq [5-04]

┌ ┐
5 Pso2
qo = │ │
2 7 · Pa + Pso
└ ┘ eq [5-05]

(5) Normally reflected pressure Pr

┌ 7 · Pa + 4 · Pso ┐
Pr = 2 · Pso · │ │
7 · Pa + Pso eq [5-06]
Note: └ ┘

For an ideal gas ( τ = 1.4 ) and high shock front pressure Pso, Pr approaches the limit
8·Pso. For air, this limit can be exceeded. For low shock front pressures, the reflection
factor approaches the value of 2.
(Detailed formulations: -->> Ref [1], [3], [102])

(6) Pressure-Time Variations of Incident Airblast and Dynamic Pressure

The time-dependent variation of the incident (side-on) pressure Ps(t), and the dynamic
pressure q(t) may be realistically represented using the modified Friedländer equation:
(-->> Ref [3])

t
Ps(t) = Pso · (1 - ) · e(-β·t/to) 0 ≤ t ≤ to eq [5-07]
to

t
q(t) = qo · (1 - ) · e(-β·t/to) 0 ≤ t ≤ to eq [5-08]
to

(Empirical values for β are given in Table [5-3])

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(7) Positive Impulse

The decisive parameter for the damage caused by airblast is the positive overpressure
impulse. It may be determined by integration of the positive overpressure phase, i.e. it is
defined by the total area below the pressure-time curve.

t
General impulse equation: is = ∫ Ps(t) · dt
o

Pso · to
Is = ·(1- 1 - e-β )
β β
eq [5-09]
qo · t o ┌ 2 1 2 ┐
Iq = · │ 1- · (1 - )- · e-β │
β β β β2
└ ┘

eq [5-10]
l) Scaling Laws

(1) General

The conversion of airblast parameters, distances and explosive charge masses from
parameters of a known explosion environment may be accomplished using scaling laws.

(2) Cube-Root Law

Theoretically, the relation between distance, pressure, and explosive charge mass may be
expressed by a cube-root law. Full scale tests have shown that this proportionality between
distance and charge mass applies to quantities up to the megaton range.

(3) Scaling

- Distance - Charge Mass

1/3
Rx ┌ Qx ┐
= │ Qo │ eq [5-11]
Ro
└ ┘

1/3
┌ Qx ┐
Rx = Ro · │ Qo │
└ ┘ eq [5-12]

- Dynamic impulse:

Time - Charge Mass:

1/3
Rx ┌ Qx ┐
tItttpulse
tx = to · - arge Mass:
= to ·
Ro │ Qo │
└ ┘
eq [5-13]
Impulse - Charge Mass:

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Rx ┌ Qx ┐ 1/3
Ix = Io · = Io · │ Qo │
Ro
└ ┘ eq [5-14]

Airblast parameters measure for different charge masses and at different atmospheric
conditions may be converted to standard conditions applying the Hopkinson-Cranz cube-root
law and the Sachs scaling laws. The latter is only applicable to ideal gases, i.e. it is not suited
for air and high shock front pressures.

- Scale Factors …

… for Pressure P

┌ Pa ┐ eq [5-15]
SP = │ │
Pa,s
└ ┘

… for distance R

eq [5-16]

… for time t

eq [5-17]

… for impulse I

eq [5-18]

--> Index Xa,s …. standard conditions at sea level

(4) TNT equivalent

For determining the characteristic airblast parameters, it is advisable to convert the actual
charge mass to the equivalent TNT charge mass in order to make use of the various existing
design diagrams which are usually related to TNT. For design purposes, the values given in
Table [5-2] may be used.

The majority of measurements of airblast parameters so far has been carried out using pure
TNT charges. For calculations related to other explosives with or without confinement and
different explosion environments, it is advisable to use the respective TNT equivalents for
these conditions. These equivalents are individually determined with respect to pressure and
impulse by means of tests or defined using the specific detonation energy of the explosive.
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┌ Edexp ┐
QTNT,e = │ │ · Qexp
EdTNT
└ ┘ eq [5-19]
QTNT,e (kg) equivalent TNT charge mass

Qexp (kg) actual explosive charge mass

EdTNT (J/kg) specific detonation energy of TNT

Edexp (J/kg) specific detonation energy of the actual explosive

2.5.2.3 Determination of Characteristic Airblast Parameters for Surface Detonations of

Hemispherical Explosive Charges in the Open

m) Characteristic Airblast Parameters

- Peak side-on overpressure Pso MPa

- Dynamic overpressure qo MPa
- reflected overpressure Pr MPa
- Scaled positive side-on impulse is MPa-ms/(kg)1/3
- Scaled positive reflected impulse ir MPa-ms/(kg)1/3
- Positive airblast duration to s
- Arrival time ta s
- Shock front velocity U m/s
- Particle velocity behind shock front u m/s

Note:
The scaled parameters must be multiplied by the cube root of the TNT equivalent mass.

n) Design Fundamentals

(1) Design Diagrams

For design and damage assessment purposes, the characteristic airblast parameters may be
determined from Figure [5-2a] and [5-2b] taking into account the assumptions previously
established. The diagrams are based on numerous tests and apply to charge masses from 1 kg
up to 400 000 kg.
(-->> Ref [5])

The curves shown in Figure [5-2a] and [5-2b] may be programmed as polynomial equations
on a personal computer. The respective data are summarized in Table [5-5].
(additional information: -->> Ref [3])

(2) Common Formulas

The formulations described in Table [5-5] are not suited to be used with pocket calculators.
Therefore, the following formulas are recommended for quick calculations with acceptable
accuracy.
(-->> Ref [133 revised]) …

Explosive : TNT, TNT - equivalent

Type of detonation : surface detonation
Place of detonation : in the open

Scaled distance : z = R / (Q)1/3 (m / (kg)1/3)

Charge mass : Q (kg)
Distance : R (m)
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- Peak Side-On Overpressure Pso (MPa)

Range Function
0.50 ≤ Z < 0.75 Pso = 1.313137 . Z(-1.910441)
0.75 ≤ Z < 3.50 Pso = 1.330026 . Z(-2.218832)
3.50 ≤ Z < 8.50 Pso = 0.724571 . Z(-1.726565)
8.50 ≤ Z < 30.00 Pso = 0.293592 . Z(-1.295654)

- Scaled Side-on Impulse is (MPa-ms/(kg1/3))

Range Function
0.50 ≤ Z < 1.0 is = - 41.2564 · Z5 + 144.608 · Z4
- 198.8880 · Z3 + 134.238 · Z2
- 44.3554 · Z + 5.8956
1.0 ≤ Z ≤ 30.0 is = - 0.254674 · Z(-0.918606)

- Positive Pressure Duration To (ms)

Linear pressure waveform: ┌ 2 · Is ┐

To = │ │
Pso
└ ┘ eq [5-20]

Is = is · NEQ(1/3) eq [5-21]
Exponential Pressure Waveform:

-->> Figure [5-2a], [5-2b]

- Pressure Drop Constant β

The pressure drop constant β is determined by iteration of the following equation:

Pso · to
= β2
Is β - (1 - e(-β)) eq [5-22]
2.5.2.4 Determination of Characteristic Airblast Loads due to an Explosion Event in an Ammunition
Storage Facility

o) Earth-Covered Aboveground Storage Buildings

(1) General

Blast pressure and impulse are attenuated by the encasement of the potential explosion site.
The degree of pressure and impulse reduction depends on the mass of the covering or
shielding material (e.g. ammunition confinement, building encasement, earth cover) as well
as the loading density. The attenuation effect may be observed mainly in the near field close
to the explosion site, whereas in the far field the values approach and partly even exceed
those for an open surface detonation of a hemispherical shaped charge. At these large
distances, however, the pressure values are already on a comparatively low level. The
attenuation effect is of particular importance for the prevention of sympathetic detonation
between ammunition storage buildings.

(2) Attenuation Effect

- Attenuation by Donor Buildings

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The degree of attenuation by donor buildings must be expected to differ for the main
directions of blast (frontward, sideward and rearward) (Ref [133 (revised)], [65]). With
standard earth-covered ammunition storage buildings, the highest pressure attenuation occurs
in rearward direction. Since the front faces are usually uncovered, the near-field pressure
acting in frontward direction is normally higher than that of an open surface detonation while
it is considerably lower in the far field.

Test evaluation (Ref [65], [87], [88], [133]) have shown that for scaled distances in excess of
Z ≈ 10 to 15 m/kg^1/3 the blast pressure in sideward direction is usually higher than that in
frontward direction. In practice, this phenomenon has no considerable effect since the
pressure level at these distances is already below ≈ 0.01 MPa. The blast wave acting in
rearward direction shows a different behavior from that acting in side-ward direction. Its
pressure values approach those of the front wave; pressure equalization, however, happens at
a considerably slower rate. The above observations may be transferred to the impulse
behavior.

- Attenuation by Acceptor Buildings

The earth covers of ammunition storage buildings considerably reduce the airblast loads
acting upon the external parts of the structures (soil berm shielding effect). The soil pressure
loading at the soil-structure interface is significantly smaller than the loading due to a blast
wave impacting directly. Peak overpressure and reflection factors are reduced whereas the
loading duration increases. Thus, the probability of spalling at the inside surface of the walls
is reduced, and the peaks of the dynamically relevant motion parameters are flattened.

Figure [5-2g] (-->> Ref [59]) shows a comparison of the airblast wave peak overpressure
normally reflected at an external wall with the normally reflected peak pressures of various
soil types at the soil-structure interface.

(3) Type of Construction

The individual construction of earth-covered ammunition storage buildings corresponding to

an established standard type does not significantly influence the donor-specific attenuation
effect. The decisive parameter with respect to blast attenuation in the near field is the mass to
be moved which usually consists of approximately 80-90% earth cover material.

The essential factors at to acceptor-specific attenuation are the geometry and the material of
the earth cover. Earth covers of low-density materials, such as loose sand or a loose gravel-
sand mixture, are most effective in reducing airblast loads.
(-->> Figure [5-2g])

(4) Formulations for Characteristic Airblast Parameters

Test evaluations provided the following formulas for calculating the characteristic airblast
parameters taking into account the attenuation effect of a standard earth cover.
(-->> Ref [133] / Figure [5-2c] and [5-2e])

- Side-On Peak Overpressure Pso (MPa) eq [5-23]

Airblast Function
Direction
Front Pso = 0.435 · z(1-541)
Side Pso = 0.301188 · z(1.364270)
Rear Pso = 0.300052 · z(1.513182)

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- Scaled Side-On Impulse is (MPa-ms/ (kg1/3)) eq [5-24]

Airblast Function
Direction
Front is = 0.263627 · z(-1-027171)
Side is = 0.191082 · z(-0.922905)
Rear is = 0.120419 · z(-0.888696)

- Calculation of the Remaining Parameters -->> eq [7-13], [-714]

p) Detached Uncovered Ammunition Storage Buildings

(1) General

After an explosion event in a detached uncovered ammunition storage building as well,

airblast, peak overpressure and impulse will be considerably attenuated as compared with a
free field detonation. The attenuation, however, is not as high as with earth-covered
ammunition storage buildings since the masses to be moved are significantly smaller.

q) Ammunition Storage Structures Protected by Earth Mounds or Barricades - Magazines, Ammunition

Stacks

(1) General

Tests have demonstrated that earth mounds or barricades have no significant blast attenuation
effect. A load reducing effect due to interference with the airblast may only be observed in
the near field (scaled distance Z ≈ 1 m/kg1/3). This effect, however, cannot exactly be
quantified and thus should be disregarded in the calculations. There are graphical prediction
methods for estimating the blast loads behind barricades. (-->> Ref [211])

(2) Characteristic Airblast Parameters

For the assessment of exposed buildings in the vicinity, airblast loads similar to those of a
free field detonation should be assumed.

2.5.2.5 Airblast Loading of Exposed Sites (ES)

r) General / Load Model

The interaction between airblast loads and complex structures is a complicated process the treatment of
which requires a high standard of knowledge and experience. Buildings for the storage and handling of
ammunition usually are simple structures. Typical features are:

- Flat or arched roof;

- Closed Regular, clear contours, usually box-like shape;
- construction; openings, such as windows, hatches and doors, constitute less than 5% of the
total area;
- Approximately uniform strength, i.e. resistance, of all structural elements.

For practical purposes (explosions at a large distance from the structure), it may be assumed that the
airblast strikes the structure as a planar wave front and that the time-dependent pressure level is thus
evenly distributed over each surface of the structure.

In the case of a close-in detonation, this approach would be to conservative since the varying pressure
levels of the blast wave strike the various regions of the structure at different times.

In principle, the structural elements exposed to an airblast should be individually designed with respect
to the incident blast loading acting directly upon them.
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Sometimes, it may be required to demonstrate the stability of a structure as a whole. In such cases, it
must be taken into consideration that - similar as with a close-in detonation - the blast acts on the
various structural elements at different times and with varying intensity.

The blast loading of a structure depends on the following characteristics:

- Load parameters: - - Pressure-time variation -->> Reflected pressure

-->> Side-On pressure
-->> Dynamic pressure

- Positive impulse

- Structure parameters - Dimensions

- Shape
- Design
- Material strength

- Orientation with respect to airblast

s) Determination of Relevant Load Waveforms

(Figure [5-4], [5-5] and [5-6])

(1) General

A fully developed and largely undisturbed airblast wave is most exactly expressed by an
exponential function (Friedländer function).
(-->> Ref [3])

Triangular or bilinear blast waveforms used so far in order to simplify calculations usually
provide results which are conservative.

For structural elements with span directions perpendicular to the shock front of a blast wave,
a step-by-step analyses of the time-dependent blast loading would be required. This
procedure is simplified by the use of an equivalent load model which represents the
instantaneous element loading by a time-dependent evenly distributed loading producing the
same stresses (inter-sectional forces) in the element. Details on this subject are given in Ref
[3] for instance.

The above mentioned analyses will be applied to reinforced concrete structures provided
upper and lower reinforcements extend across the entire span.

t) Basic equations

(1) Symbols
(-->> List of Symbols)

S Building height Hs or 0.5 · building width, whichever is the smaller value

Lw,x/L Ratio between blast wave length and span of the structural element under
consideration
X Position index
S Centre of element strip; relevant shock front position

(2) Airblast Duration and Blast Wave Length

2 · Is,x
tof,x eq [5-27]
Pso,x

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Lw,x = U,x · to,x (approximate value) eq [5-28]

(3) Equivalent Load Factors and Blast Wave Position Factor

The equivalent load factors and the blast wave position factor may be derived from Figure [5-3]
or determined using the following polynomial functions ….

C = Lw,x / L

Cx = 0.0048 · C5 - 0.0584 · C4 + 0.2817 · C3 - 0.6963 · C2 +

0.9551 · C + 0.2433 eq [5-29]

D/L = 0.0098 · C5 - 0.1203 · C4 + 0.5682 · C3 - 1.3207 C2 +

1.6217 · C - 0.0774 eq [5-30]

D = L · D/L eq [5-31]

(4) Determination of Characteristic Airblast Parameters

Pos Pso,x Is,x Pr x Ir,x ta,x to,x U,x Lw,x

(x) MPa MPa-ms MPa MPa-ms ms ms m/s m
1 + + + + + + + +
2 + + - - + + + +
3 + + - - + + + +
Determination of parameters: (+) yes / (-) no
using: -->> Figure [5-2a] through [5-2f]

Front Face

- Bilinear Load Waveform:

(-->> Figure [5-4], [5-5], [5-6])

- Pressure duration, side-on overpressure:

2 · Is
tof = (ms)
Pso
eq [5-32]

- Pressure duration, reflected overpressure:

2 · Ir eq [5-33]
tr = (ms)
Pr
- Dynamic impulse:

┌ qo ┐
Iq = 0.5 · qo · tof = Is · │ Pso │ (Mpa-ms)
└ -II-5-25-
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tof
Id = CD · qo · = CD · Iq (Mpa-ms)
2

- Duration of peak reflected overpressure:

(ms)

- Total impulse:

I = Is + Id + Ir* ≤ Ir (Mpa-ms)

Ir* = 0.5 · (Pr - Pso - CD · qo) · ts (Mpa-ms)

- Pressure waveforms: P(t) in (MPa)

- Exponential Load Waveform /Modified Friedländer equation:

(-->> Figure [5-5])

The bilinear pressure-time waveform may be transformed into an equivalent exponential

function which, from experience, has proved to correspond to the real airblast waveform.

- Pressure waveform:

Ps(t) = Po · (1 - t/to) · e(-β · (t/to)) (Mpa) eq [5-34]

- Pressure drop constant:

β ≈ Po / Io (---) eq [5-35]

Peak Overpressure

Total Impulse

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Roof and Side Walls

Direction of Span of Relevant Element is Perpendicular to the Shock Front, i.e. in Blast
Direction

td = D / U,2

t2,eff = (ta,2 - ta,1) + tof,2

- Procedure:

. . . Determination of required airblast parameters from Figure [5-2a] through [5-2f]:

Pso,2 ; Is,2 ; U,2 ; to,2

. . . Determination of Lw,2 using eq [5-28]

. . . Determination of CE and D/L or D as functions of Lw,2 / L using Figure [5-3] or eq [5-29]

through [5-31]

. . . Determination of dynamic pressure qo,2 as a function of CE · Pso,2 using Figure [5-2b] or eq

[5-4] and [5-5]

. . . Determination of drag coefficient Cd related to qo,2 using Table [5-4]

. . . Calculation of peak overpressure and total impulse:

Po = CE · Pso,2 + CD · qo,2

Is = 0.5 · Po · t2,eff

- Pressure waveform for t = 0 at front edge of structure:

t
0 ≤ t ≤ td Ps(t) = Po ·
td

┌ t · td ┐
td ≤ t ≤ t2,eff Ps(t) = Po · │ 1- │
t2,eff - td
└ ┘

Direction of Span of Relevant Element is Parallel to the Shock Front;

Considering a Loaded Element Strip
(-->> Figure [5-5])

Assumption: Uniform time-dependent pressure loading of an element strip

2 · Is -II-5-27-
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Pso,s CHANGE 2
 AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Ls
td =
U,s

- Procedure:

. . . Determination of airblast parameters . . .

Pso,s ; Is,s ; U,s ; to,s

at position s, i.e. at the center of the element strip using Figure [5-2a] through [5-2f]

. . . Determination of dynamic pressure qo,s using Figure [5-2b] or eq [5-4] and [5-5]

. . . Determination of drag coefficient CD related to qo,s using Table [5-4]

. . . Determination of peak overpressure Po:

┌ 0.5 · td ┐
Po = (Pso,s + CD · qo,s) · │ 1- │
tof,s
└ ┘

. . . Determination of total impulse Is:

Is = 0.5 · Po · (0.5 · td + tof,s)

- Pressure waveform for t = o at front edge of element strip

0 ≤ t ≤ td = Ls/U,s t
Ps(t) = Po
td
┌ t - td ┐
td ≤ t ≤ 0.5 · td + tof,s Ps(t) = (Po · │ 1- │
tof,s - 0,5 · td
└ ┘

Rear Wall

As soon as the shock front passes the rear edge of the roof or the side walls, the blast wave
expands and produces secondary waves which propagate across the rear wall and will partly be
reflected by the ground.

An equivalent uniform time-dependent pressure load is calculated for the rear wall as well.

2 · Is,3
tof,3 =
Pso,3

D
td
U,2

t3,eff = [ 2 · Hs / (U,2 + U,3) ] + tof,3 (rough)

t3,eff = (ta,3 - ta,2) + tof,3 (exact)

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Lw,3 = U,3 · tof,3 (rough)

- Procedure:

... Determination of required airblast parameters from Figure [5-2a] through [5-2f] ...

Pso,3 ; Is,3 ; U,3 ; U,2 ; to,3

. . . Determination of factors CE and D/L or D as functions of the ratio Lw,3 / Hs using eq [5-
28] or Figure [5-3]

. . . Determination of td

. . . Determination of dynamic pressure qo,3 as a function of CE · Pso,3 using Figure [5-26] or eq

[5-4]

. . . Determination of drag coefficient CD as a function of qo,3 using Table [5-4]

. . . Determination of peak overpressure and total impulse at position -3- . . .

Peak overpressure: Po = CE · Pso,3 + CD · qo,3

Total impulse : Is = 0.5 · Po · (t3,eff)

- Pressure variation for t = 0 at rear edge of structure:

t
0 ≤ t ≤ td Ps(t) = Po ·
td

td ≤ t ≤ t3,eff
┌ t - td ┐
Ps(t) = (Po · │ 1- │
t2,eff - td
└ ┘
2.5.2.6 References

Essential references -->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [3], [4], [5], [17], [45], [52], [53], [54], [62], [65], [72], [73], [76], [77], [78], [81], [82],
[83], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [101], [102], [128], [133]

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Section IV - Projections
- Fragments, Debris, Lobbed Ammunition -

2.5.3.1 Introduction

u) General

An explosion of an ammunition storage site produces the following four types of projections:

- Ammunition fragments
- Debris from earth cover
- Structural debris
- Crater ejecta

The following discussion attempts to set forth principles and guidelines which may be useful for the
proper design of shelters and layout of safe ammunition and explosives storage areas when standard
quantity distance tables cannot be applied. Effective administrative safety provisions and, in particular,
structural measures against fragment and debris hazards may permit the reduction of quantity distances,
thereby lowering the costs for the construction and maintenance of ammunition storage facilities to a
considerable extent.

v) Problem Description

The assessment of fragment and debris hazard is for the most part based on probabilistic approaches.
The reason for this is the fact that fragmentation and debris forming is a random process occurring
under physical environmental conditions which are not exactly definable.

w) Proposed Solution

Ballistic and distribution parameters form the basis for the damage assessment of projections, i.e. for
establishing their hazard characteristics and hazard potentials. Ballistic parameters are initial velocity,
horizontal and vertical angles of departure as well as mass whereas distribution is determined with
respect to number and mass of projections.

The vulnerability of the respective target is related to the damaging effect of the projections in order to
determine the hazard level.

2.5.3.2 Fragments

x) General

An explosion event in an ammunition storage building involves a hazard from emitted fragments
generated by detonating ammunition items in the Potential Explosion Site (PES).
Fragment generation essentially takes place in two phases:

- During the explosion

- After the explosion event due to detonation of ammunition items being ejected from the
potential explosion site or impacting on a hard surface

With cylindrical ammunition items, most of the fragments are projected in radial direction while only a
few heavy fragments are emitted from the nose and base at a low velocity. For worst case
considerations, it is assumed that the ammunition item detonates with its longitudinal axis parallel to the
respective structural component.

The emission of direct fragments from a potential explosion site depends on the properties of the
respective structural components as well as on the time relation between fragment movement, airblast
propagation, and build-up of chamber pressure.

The decisive parameters are …

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- Loading density;
- Arrangements of stored ammunition;
- Ammunition type.

For aboveground storage of ammunition, the following hazard levels are distinguished depending on the
type of storage.

- Open storage

Full fragment hazard

- Ammunition storage building without earth cover

Reduced fragment hazard.

High fragment absorption by structural components.
The velocity of impeded fragments is reduced by approx. 85% (energy absorption ≈ 95%).
Locations of high fragment hazard are the front area and the doors of the ammunition storage
building.

- Earth-covered ammunition storage building

Little to no fragment hazard.

Due to the inert behavior of the structure and earth cover mass, the high velocity fragments are
almost completely absorbed.

y) Fragment Mass Distribution

(1) Constant

MA = Bx · tc5/6 · di1/3 · ( 1 + tc/di) (kg)1/2 eq [5-36]

Bx (kg1/2) / ( m7/6) explosive constant in accordance with Table [5-6]

tc (m) casing thickness
di (m) inner casing diameter

(2) Number of Fragments

Fragment mass distribution is represented in the form of the cumulative distribution of the
number of fragments Nf, individually heavier than a defined mass Mf, as a function of Mf.
Such a function may be derived directly from the results obtained by testing or determined
analytically using the Mott distribution:

eq [5-37]

Formulation according to Ref [2], [3], [4]

eq [ 5-38]

Total number of fragments:

Nt = Mc / (2 . MA2) eq [5-39]

Mass of nominal fragment for design purpose:

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Md = MA2 . In2(1 - CL) for … 0.9500 ≤ CL ≤ 0.9999

for … 0.9999 ≤ CL ≤ 1.0000

Number of fragments individually heavier than Mf :

Detonating stacks of ammunition tend to produce mass distributions with a relatively higher
percentage of heavy fragments than single items detonating individually.

For practical purposes, the number of heavy fragments is the most important parameter, since
they are the most effective fragments with regard to ballistics and energy content.

A distribution of the form given above (Mott distribution), but with its main emphasis on the
heavier portion of the fragment spectrum, is useful for representing test results and defining
hazard levels.

z) Fragment Ballistics

If the mass distribution, angles of departure and initial velocities of fragments at the point of origin are
known, trajectories, impact parameters and distribution density of the fragments can be determined.
Gravity and atmospheric drag are essential parameters affecting the trajectory, which should be taken
into account, at any rate, in order to find a safe and economical solution.

(1) Ballistic Properties

Preformed and irregular fragments may be assumed to be geometrically similar.

Fragment mass Mf and presented area Af are proportional and related by the shape factor
k...

Mf = k · Af 3/2 eq [5-40]

This shape factor or ballistic density is determined empirically from ballistic tests and
depends on the type of ammunition.
(-->> Table [5-7])

(2) Initial Velocity

Besides field measurements during fragmentation trials, the initial velocity of a fragment may
be estimated from the . . .

. . . Gurney formula :

Vo = G / ((Mc/Mex) + (n/ (n+2)))1/2 eq [5-41]

G = √(2·E) Gurney velocity, a constant for a given explosive Values:

-->> Table [5-6]
n Geometrical constant:
-->> Table [5-8]

The basis for the equation above is an analysis of the behavior of a cylindrical or spherical
casing subjected to an internal gas pressure. For projectiles, the formula may only be applied
to fragments emitted radial from the casing.

Note:
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The Gurney formula is not mass-dependent and applies primarily to fragments of up

to 150 g, approximately. For heavier fragments, the formula gives a conservative result, since
lower initial velocities are to be expected. The Gurney formula is adapted to different types
of ammunition. Thus, there are different Gurney constants and geometrical constants. The
literature referenced below contains details and additional formulations for the determination
of initial velocities.
Ref [164 et al] -->> additional formulations:
. . Modified Gurney formula
. . Lukanow-Molitz formula
. . Swedish formula
. . Allison-Schriempf formula
. . Gabeaud formula

(3) Angle of Departure

Fragments from individual items of ammunition normally depart radial from the casing.
Depending upon the type of ammunition, the area fragment distribution varies along the
projectile axis.

For details and modeling procedures refer to the literature reference in Section VIII.
- e.g. Ref [171], [173], [174]

(4) Trajectory

For design purposes in the far-field range (with regard to the explosion site) the influence of
gravity is essential. When designing shelters, or if the near field is concerned, the effect of
gravity is negligible and straight trajectories may be assumed.
Non-linear fragment trajectories are very important for safety-related analyses of
ammunition.

(5) Trajectory Calculation

Fragment trajectories are usually calculated with computers using numerical formulations
since closed solutions are impossible due to the complex parameters such as wind,
atmospheric drag etc. influencing the trajectory.

For this purpose, efficient programs considering the essential parameters affecting the
trajectory are available.
(-->> ref [201], [203])

Trajectory Calculation Procedures and References :

Subject Matter References

(1) Exterior Ballistics of Fragments [164]
CD Values for Irregular Fragments
(2) Mass and Shape Distribution [163]
Laws for Irregular Fragments [4]
(3) SIACCI Method [165]
(4) Primary and Secondary Fragments [211], [4]
(5) Fragmentation [211], [1]
(6) Fragment Protection [3]

(6) Trajectory Velocity

For the practically relevant range, the fragment velocity as a function of distance can be
estimated from the exponential function below, assuming a constant drag coefficient and
disregarding gravity.
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The CD-value can be obtained from Figure [5-7] or Table [5-9] :

V(R) = Vo . e(-R/L) eq [5-42]

2 · (k2 · Mf)(1/3)
L= eq [5-43]
(CD · rho)
(7) Impact Velocity

The impact velocity varies between the near-field limits (low-angles of departure) according
to eq [5-44] and the far-field limits (long fragment distance) according to eq [5-45], with the
latter physically representing the terminal velocity in free fall.

- Conservative formulas for the estimation:

. . . near field: Vi = Vo · e(-(Re/L)) (m/s) eq [5-44]

. . . far field: (m/s) eq [5-45]

- According to Ref [1], [3] . . .

Vi = Vo · e(-(0.004·Re·/Mf(1/3)) (m/s) eq [5-46]

(8) Impact Angle

The fragment impact angle depends upon the departure parameters and other external
conditions (wind, air density, fragment parameters etc.).

For design purposes, normal impact, i.e. ai = 90o, is to be assumed.

(9) Impact Energy/Impact Impulse

Impact energy and impact impulse, respectively, are decisive parameters for the assessment
of fragment hazard levels.

The fragment mass Mf and the impact velocity Vi are essential parameters.

Impact energy: Ekin = Ei =

Mf · Vi2
(J) eq [5-47]
2

Impact impulse: Ii = Mf . Vi (Ns) eq [5-48]

(10) Fragment Number Density

The probability of fragments striking a target (ES) at a given position is determined by the
area density of flux of fragments, through the target area projected on a plane normal to the
fragment trajectory at impact. When gravity effects are considered, numerical calculation
techniques must be utilized even if simplifying assumptions have to be made regarding
atmospheric drag and the mass distribution of the fragments. If gravity is ignored, however,
the fragment flux with respect to distance follows an inverse-square law.

Assuming:

- The Mott fragment mass distribution;

- Fragment masses greater than the defined mass Mf ;
- A target area normal to the fragment trajectory at a distance R.

The area density qf of fragments is given by:

Qo
qf = e(-(2Mf/Mo)1/2)
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Determination of Qo on the basis of the individual fragment distribution curves for

ammunition or according to
-->> Ref [1], [3], [4]

In this approximation, consideration of the influence of gravity refers to its effect on impact
velocity but not to the terminal phase of the trajectory.

The effective value of Qo , Qo,eff depends upon the prevailing storage conditions. The
effective value for fragments from a stack of ammunition is estimated by multiplying the
value for a single ammunition item by the effective number of items NE.

Qo,eff = Qo · NE eq [5-50]
- For a stack in the open, NE is derived from:

NE = 0.9 · Ns + 0.1 · NT eq [5-51]

- For a stack in an earth-covered magazine NE is:

NE = 0.7 · Ns + 0.1 · NT eq [5-52]

Where

NE Effective number of items of ammunition

Ns Number of items of ammunition on the side of the stack facing the
potential target
NT Number of items of ammunition in the top layer of the stack.
aa) Hazard Potential

(1) Probability of Impact

The probability of impact Pf of an individual fragment or a fragment flux is calculated using

the area density qf .

The impact process is assumed to be uniformly random in the vicinity of the target point, so
that fragment impact is equally probable on all equal area elements in the vicinity of the
point. The probability of impact Pf of one or more fragments of a mass Mf or greater on a
given target area is thus given by:

Pf = 1 - e(-qf·AT) eq [5-53]

qf (Number/m2) ... with eq [5-49]

AT (m2) ... target area

For a standing man, e.g., facing the explosion:

. . . AT ≈ 0.56 m2

(2) Hazard Criteria / Hazard Levels

Fragment hazard levels for a given target are determined using the essential parameters
below:

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- Fragment density at the target or hit probability of the individual fragment or the
fragment flux;

- Impact energy - kinetic energy - of the individual fragment:

Ekin = Ei = (Mf · Vi2) / 2 (Nm) eq [5-54]

- Impact impulse of the individual fragment:

Ii = Mf · Vi (Ns) eq [5-55]

- Vulnerability / destructibility criteria of the target in question.

(3) Injury Criteria / Casualty Criteria

A variety of functions of impact velocity and fragment mass have been proposed as injury
criteria. NATO-wide, a lethal fragment is defined as a fragment with a kinetic energy
exceeding the critical value of 79 Joules. This limit applies to fragment masses ranging from
a few grams to several kilograms. In most cases, severe injuries will be caused.

Further details -->> Section VII

bb) Fragment Calculation Procedure

(1) Calculation of the initial fragment velocity

using the . . .

- GURNEY-Constant Table [5-6]

- GURNEY-Formula eq [5-41]
- with n = 2 for cylindrical projectiles

(2) Calculation of the number of fragments

. . . per unit solid angle based on the number of fragments Qo or Qo,eff emitted from an item
of ammunition or ammunition stack in the direction of interest. This is usually the direction
perpendicular to the ammunition axes.

(3) Determination of the average fragment mass Mo

using . . .

- Available data bases;

- The average mass Mo of an individual item of ammunition, obtained by fitting a
Mott distribution to data from a single item, emphasizing the heavier fragments within the
mass spectrum.

In order to account for the greater ballistic and energetic effectiveness of fragments from
stacks of ammunition, a shape factor k = 4.74 g/cm3 will be assumed.

(4) Determination of the mass Mf of the lightest hazardous fragment

Reaching a specified distance R using a parameter for the critical kinetic energy of a
hazardous fragment.

Formulation 1: The terminal energy of a fragment of mass Mf in free fall is less

than the critical energy.

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Ecr
Mf = 2 · (kg) eq [5-56]
V i2
Vi = Vo · e(-R / L) (m/s)

2 · k(2/3)
L= · Mf(1/3) (m)
CD · rho

Formulation 2: The terminal energy of a fragment of mass Mf in free fall is greater

than the critical energy.
3/4
┌ 2 · Ecr ┐ (kg) eq [5-57]
Mf │ │
g · L1
└ ┘
Notes:

- Whichever gives the smaller value of Mf will be used.

- For Ecr = 79 Joules and k = 4.74 g/cm∧3 the transition occurs at Mf = 0.1 kg, approximately.

(5) Calculation of the area fragment density

For fragments heavier than Mf and distance R in accordance with eq [5-49].

Alternatively, the distance R at which the critical density qcr (1/56 m2) for hazardous
fragments is exceeded will be determined iterative using eq [5-49], [5-56] and [5-57].

Note:
The result is the larger of the two values of R so obtained.

(6) Determination of the injury probability

The determination of the injury probability p at distance R from eq [5-53].

For small values of qf , the following approximation applies:

p ≈ q · AT eq [5-58]

Notes:
- The procedure above can be adapted for use with an injury criterion other than impact
energy.
- Ballistic terminal parameters from other calculations may of course be introduced.

(7) Stacks Effects

There are strong indications that the fragmentation characteristics of stacks of ammunition
differ significantly from those of a single detonating item.

- Detonating stacks emit a higher number of larger or heavier fragments.

This effect is influenced by the charge-to-metal (casing) ratio. Ammunition with small values
of this ratio (e.g. artillery projectiles) generally produce fragments of greater individual mass.

- The initial fragment velocities for stacks of ammunition have been observed to be
almost twice as high as for fragments from single items of ammunition.

- In the case of mass detonations, only the items of ammunition on the sides and top of
a rectangular stack appear to contribute to the far-field area density of hazardous fragments.

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2.5.3.3 Debris and Crater Ejecta

cc) Structural Debris

(1) General

An accidental explosion in an ammunition storage facility produces an impulsive peak

overpressure leading to the shattering of or heavy damage to the structure. The resulting
structural debris generally come from walls, foundation, bottom slab, ceiling, piers, screens,
and fixtures.

The subsequent 'quasi-static' internal pressure ruptures the building and vents through newly
created or existing openings. Shattered structural components and other objects located on or
within the building are accelerated by the releasing overpressure and projected from the
explosion site. Main debris distribution is approximately normal to or at an acute angle to the
original building walls or main axes.

These debris constitute a substantial hazard to objects and personnel in the vicinity.

The size of the structural debris depends upon the . . .

- . . . Construction of the building,

- . . . Material of the building and the strength of the material,
- . . . Type of ammunition,
- . . . Loading density.

Small structural debris are to be expected in the case of . . .

- . . . Increasing loading density,

- . . . Brittle material,
- . . . Low-strength material,
- . . . Thin-walled structural component,
- . . . A small percentage of reinforcement,
- . . . Pre-damaging due to fragment impact.

Larger structural debris are to be expected in case of . . .

- . . . A solid, heavy construction,

- . . . Strong reinforcement,
- . . . Tough material,
- . . . Low loading density,
- . . . A blast effect alone.

(2) Debris Mass Density

Detached Ammunition Storage Building

The debris/fragment departure from a detached ammunition storage building depends on

several parameters, i.e . . .

- . . . Loading density,
- . . . Type of ammunition/casing factor,
- . . . Geometry and strength of the building,
- . . . Direction of debris departure with regard to the building.

In Ref [76] the debris mass density is given by the following equation . . .

(-0.29)
(0.58) (-0..047·R·Q )
rho,deb = 0.36 · Ma · ·e (kg / m2) eq [5-59]

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all masses are in tons (to) = 1,000 kg

R (m) distance from the building center
f1 -->> Figure [5-8]
Vi (m3) internal volume of building
Q (to) = NEQTNT (to)

- Ma . . . Total mass of ejecta

Ma = Mo + Mg + Mm (to)

- Mg . . . Mass of building

Mg = f1 . Vi (to)

- Mo . . . Ejected earth mass of apparent crater

Mo ≈ 100 · NEQTNT (to)

- Mm … mass of ejected ammunition components in (to)

Estimates: Mm ≈ 0.0 mines and high explosive

Mm ≈ 0.25 · Vi cased ammunition

Earth-Covered Ammunition Storage Building

In addition to the parameters decisive for the debris projection from detached ammunition
storage buildings, in this case also the type, geometry and mass of the earth cover are of
importance
(-->> Ref [75]) …

rho,deb = 0.036 · Ma · e(-0.015·R) ) (kg / m2) eq [5-60]

all masses are in tons (to) = 1,000 kg

R (m) distance from the building center
f1 -->> fig/[5-8]
Vi (m3) internal volume of building

- Ma . . . Total mass of ejecta

Ma = Mo + Mg + Mm (to)

- Mg . . . Mass of building

Mg = f1 · Vi (to)

- Mo . . . Ejected earth mass of apparent crater and earth cover (standard)

empirical hypothesis:
mass of standard earth cover ≈ 4 to 5 · Mg

Mo ≈ 100 · NEQTNT + 4 · Mg (to)

- Mm . . . mass of ejected ammunition components (to)

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Estimates: Mm ≈ 0.00 mines and high explosive

Mm ≈ 0.25 · Vi cased ammunition

(3) Ballistics

Because of the high complexity of the event, it is very difficult to reliably determine the
ballistic parameters of structural debris or crater ejecta resulting from an accidental
explosion. There are not as many fundamental and other basic data available as is the case for
fragments.

The departure parameters - velocity, angle, and mass - may vary substantially with the
explosion environment. The engineer de-signing potentially exposed sites must, under these
conditions, normally rely on threshold functions.

Velocity of Departure

The velocity of departure is dependent upon the loading density, the type of explosive, the
structural strength, and the point of departure of the debris.

The full scale tests described, e.g., in Ref [86], [106], where fragments and debris have been
thoroughly recorded and evaluated, confirm the above statements. Normally, fragments are
accelerated more effectively than building debris or crater ejecta because of the higher
loading density.

Depending upon the structure of the building and the loading density, more or less massive
structural debris nevertheless can achieve velocities of departure of up to Vo = 1,000 m/s.

Since their mass is generally greater than that of fragments, they must be considered to have
a higher energetic effectiveness in the far field.

Angle of Departure

Generally, structural debris will depart at an angle normal to the structure surface. Vertical
and horizontal angles of departure vary from approximately ±10o to ±20o. Depending upon
the loading density and the structural design of the building at intersections and junctions of
components, angles of departure of up to approximately 30o from the normal may occur due
to angular moments at the time of departure.
(-->> Ref [155], [157], [200], [211])

(4) Hazard / Damage Predictions

The hazard level with respect to personnel or material depends upon the local situation and
the predominant type of load. Debris impact density and impact energy constitute essential
hazard parameters.

Detailed Hazard Data -->> Section VII

Inside inhabited buildings situated at the required quantity distance to the explosion site, the
hazard to persons is mainly due to secondary debris formed in the close vicinity by the air-
blast. The limit pressure currently specified for inhabited buildings is approximately 5 kPa.
(-->> Section VII).
This overpressure causes minor structural damage such as glass breakage, cracks in plaster,
and damage to the exterior wall lining.

dd) Debris from Earth Covers and Crater Ejecta

(1) General

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Soil and rock material being ejected from the explosion crater is defined as "crater ejecta".
In the case of accidental explosions involving only individual ammunition components or
small quantities of explosives, the load case "crater ejecta" generally constitutes a minor
potential hazard as compared to the other effects such as airblast, fragments, structural debris
and shock.

In the case of surface bursts of larger quantities of explosives, however, a substantial debris
hazard has to be assumed, and the load case "crater ejecta" has to be taken into account in the
safety-related assessment of ammunition facilities and their surroundings.

The cover material of earth-covered ammunition storage facilities produces additional ejecta.
With standard installations, this covering material should consist of fine-grain particles with a
relatively small mass. Projection distance and impact energy of this material are generally
less than that of structural debris.

(2) Mass Density

In Ref [31], the mass density of the crater ejecta for an open surface burst is given by the
following mean relationship. .

rho,ej = 27 · NEQTNT1.4 · R(-3.6) (kg / m2) eq [5-61]

NEQ (kg) ; R (m)

(3) Ballistics

The ballistic performance of crater ejecta is similar to that of structural debris.

Formulations for ballistic parameters of crater ejecta have been examined and developed.
-->> Ref [31], [32], [33], [76], [77].

Ejecta Range

In the case of explosions on the surface of or inside cohesive soil, the total mass of ejecta is
to be found within the following range . . .

Rej ≈ 30 · Ra eq [5-62]

The maximum projection distances of crater ejecta are determined by an NEQ0.4 - law and
depend upon the type of soil . . .

. . . for rock : Rej,max = 30 m/kg 0.4

. . . for soil : Rej,max = 12 m/kg 0.4

(4) Hazard Area (estimated)

Explosions on the surface of or inside cohesive soil or rock lead to longer ejecta distances.
The data from Table [5-10] may be used as estimates for these cases.

(5) Hazard Criteria

The hazard from ejecta (crater, earth cover) is due to their kinetic energy (impact force) upon
impact and due to their penetration or punching capability. This primarily affects weaker
structural components such as roofs, ceilings and large walls of relatively low thickness.

Whereas less solid ejecta material (gravel, sand, clayey sand, clay, etc.) crumbles upon
impact or is subjected to heavy deformations, solid, practically undeformable material (e.g.
rock, broken stone, gravel) has a hazardous penetration and punching capability.

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Penetration by "Undeformable" Ejecta

"Quasi-undeformable" ejecta transfer high, short shock impulses to the target material
exposing it to risk of punching or perforation.

The penetration capability of high-strength rock (basalt, granite) as compared to soft rock
(friable standstone, slate) may be assumed to be 7 to 1 .

Figure [5-9] shows the penetration of mild steel plate by hard rock ejecta.

Figure [5-10] shows estimates of the perforation threshold of non reinforced concrete slabs
for the impact of hard rock ejecta.

The diagrams are based on the conservative assumption of an impact of "undeformable"

ejecta in a realistic velocity range.

Hazard thresholds for persons and material -->> Section VII

(6) Load Assumptions for Structural Component Design

Undeformable Crater Ejecta

The design of structural components assuming dynamic loads can be facilitated in the case of
solid ejecta using the "impulse formulation".
(-->> Ref [7 (2.3 and 5.5)], [3])

Shock Impulse: I = Mej · Vi (Ns) eq [5-63]

I2 yel
Maximum Deformation: ym = + (m) eq [5-64]
2 · Mstr · Rm 2
Deformable Crater Ejecta

Moist, cohesive ejecta is deformed upon impact and acts as solid ejecta with a lower peak
impulse, but a longer effective duration.

Building damages are caused less due to punching than to local bending failures.

A simplified structural component design assuming a dynamic load can be carried out with
the following formulations . . .

Vf = 0

1d ≈ 1.12 · (Mej / rho) 1/3 (m)

Vm = (Vi + Vf) / 2 (m/s)

Mean shock impulse: Im = Mej · Vm (Ns)

Deformation assumption (empirical) : xpl = 2/3 · 1d (m)

Shock period:
xpl 2 · ld
td = +
Vm 2 · vm

Load:
. . . Peak load for triangular load history:
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2 · ldm
Fmax = (N)
td

. . . Peak load for constant load history:

Im
Fd = (N)
td

Figure [5-10] shows estimates for the maximum shock loads of long distance ejecta.
(-->> Ref [1])

Dynamic Strength Increase

The short-time loading of protective structures - ammunition storage magazines, aircraft

shelters, etc. - involves an increase in strength of the loaded material as a function of loading
rate.

For the load cases described, the "Dynamic Increase Factor" (DIF) should be selected from
the values given in Table [5-11] and Ref [1], [4] respectively.

2.5.3.4 References

Essential references -->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [3], [4], [7], [31], [32], [33], [41], [76], [77], [78], [83], [84], [86], [96] [128], [155], [156],
[157], [158], [159], [160], [161], [162], [163], [164], [165, [166], [167], [168], [171], [173], [174], [181], [182],
[183], [189], [192], [199], [200], [201], [202], [203], [204]. [211]

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Section V - Ground Shock

2.5.4.1 General

Ground shock constitutes a grave danger to structures and their contents. In general, however, ground
shock is no critical parameter in the design of airblast and fragment resistant buildings.

Ground shock effects are very dependent on various charge configurations (e.g. sphere tangent to and
above ground surface, half-buried or hemispherical charges).

This paragraph describes the ground shock effects of surface and near-surface bursts.

Test detonations in the order of . . .

0.5 kg ≤ NEQTNT ≤ 500 000 kg

. . . have been evaluated and have supplied data for scaled distances.

0.2 ≤ z (m/kg.1/3) ≤ 24

2.5.4.2 Phenomenology

ee) General

Ground shock is a result of energy imparted to and propagating within the ground. Sources of energy
may be shocks due to explosions or mechanically produced shocks. In the event of an explosion, the
shock loads generated in the vicinity of the point of burst are transmitted directly through the ground as
well as in-directly by means of the airblast wave.

According to the manner of induction, two types of ground shocks are distinguished:

- DI-Ground Shock / Direct-Induced Ground Shock

- AI-Ground Shock / Airblast-Induced Ground Shock

ff) Direct-Induced (DI) Ground Shock

The DI ground shock comprises the original, directly induced ground motions as well as those induced
by cratering. The latter are generally of longer duration and are the result of cratering explosion events.
In general, both phenomena are of longer duration than the AI ground shock. The shock waveform is
usually sinusoidal. Although the dominant motions are vertical, a DI ground shock may have strong
horizontal components, especially at close-in distances.

gg) Airblast-Induced (AI) Ground Shock

The airbast wave compresses the ground surface and transfers the shock impulse to the adjacent
medium. Magnitude and duration of the shock impulse depend upon the progression of the blast wave
and the characteristics of the ground medium. In general, the induced ground motions are directed
downwards. Starting with maximum intensity at the ground surface the motions attenuate with depth.
Discontinuities of the ground material and stratifications, e.g. groundwater, rock layers, may change the
attenuation process. In general, however, the surface soil layer is the decisive factor.

Both types of shock act independently of each other. The decisive shock (motion) parameters -
displacement, velocity and acceleration of the soil particles - depend upon the super-position and the
time of arrival of the different shock waves. Primarily, this time is determined by the shock front
velocity or the peak overpressure of the airblast wave, respectively, by the seismic velocity, and the
distance between the point of burst and the exposed site.
In the vicinity of the point of burst, the airblast shock front velocity is substantially higher than the
seismic velocity within the ground. Within this "superseismic region", the air-blast reaches the
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exposed site before the DI ground shock wave. With increasing distance from the point of burst the
velocity of the airblast wave decreases and the DI ground shock wave finally catches up with and
outruns the blast wave within the "out-running region", resulting in the superposition of both shock
waves. At greater distances, the two waves may separate again, with the DI wave leading the AI wave.

2.5.4.3 Physical Fundamentals for Ground Shock Computation

hh) General

Literature analyses show that, in fact, on the AI ground shock correlates quantitatively with the test
results. The acoustic impedance 'cp · rho' and the pore volume of the soil seem to be the important
material parameters in this context.

Formulations for the computation of DI ground shock parameters for three essential types of soil - dry
soil, saturated soil, and rock - are given in Table [5-14]. Generally, further subdivisioning does not
result in substantially greater accuracy.

ii) AI Ground Shock

The AI ground shock can be determined by means of a one-dimensional wave propagation theory.

For surface structures with a response behavior unaffected by seismic wave reflected from soil layers,
simple empirical conditional equations will result.

The equations given in Table [5-12] provide reasonable estimates of the AI ground shock at the soil
surface, assuming a homogeneous soil structure for a distance corresponding to the wavelength of the
blast wave.
For design purposes, the overall motions of structures with shallow foundations may be considered to
be similar to the motions described.

jj) DI Ground Shock

For the determination of DI ground shock, empirical equations have been developed (-->> Table [5-
14]), which may be applied to TNT surface or near-surface bursts.

The equations are given for 3 selected types of soil . . .

. . . dry soil,
. . . saturated soil,
. . . rock.

2.5.4.4 Design Implications

kk) General

The effects of ground shocks have to be considered in connection with safety and design requirements.
There are safety problems for or hazards to personnel, traffic routes, inhabited buildings, installations of
ammunition storage facilities and equipment. Therefore, the consideration of shock processes in the
design is imperative. The designing engineer certainly requires suitable basic design data, e.g. in the
form of permissible limits of motion parameters in the vicinity of the exposed site.

ll) Personnel

Personnel is subjected to shock effects via the ground itself or the structure in which they are staying at
the time of an explosion. The human body will be exposed to accelerations and vibrating loads. The
hazards to personnel are: impact on hard surfaces or edges, distortion of limbs or possibility of being hit
by objects which have been accelerated as a result of the shock.

mm) Inhabited Buildings

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Referenced sources derive the vulnerability levels of inhabited buildings and other unhardened
inhabited facilities from the motion parameters of the ground medium exposed to the ground shock
load.

nn) Magazines

When determining the permissible minimum distances between ammunition storage buildings such as
magazines and explosives workshops, the ground effect is an important factor. In general, the buildings
concerned are massive and solid structures with shallow foundations which must be capable of
withstanding a relatively high airblast as well as the impact of debris and fragments. The destruction of
aboveground ammunition storage facilities by a DI ground shock is thus quite improbable. The deeper a
building extends into the ground, though, the stronger is the effect of the DI ground shock.

Although at common inter-magazine distances small explosives quantities cause high accelerations of
the soil particles, there are practically no damages because of the slight soil displacements and the small
quantity of energy imparted.

In the case of large explosives quantities, the accelerations are relatively low, but high ground motion
velocities and large displacement may however constitute a substantial hazard to external connections
and joints of the building, which may be torn off. Usually, suitable design is an easy way to counteract
that hazard. For closely situated magazines, the AI ground shock is negligible.
(-->> Ref [4])

oo) Equipment

In general, equipment and explosives located in ammunition storage facilities are highly vulnerable to
shock effects. Electric and electronic installations, in particular, have to be shock-hardened.

The shock is imparted either directly through the structure itself or indirectly by way of displacement
(falling down, impact etc.) of equipment.

The hazards described can be avoided by the following design measures:

- Determination of the shock response spectrum (SRS) for the soil-structure interaction
at a specified shock loading.
- Determination of the shock tolerance spectrum (STS) for essential pieces of
equipment;
- Performance of a shock analysis;
- Installation of dynamically loadable mounting elements;
- Installation of dampers and isolators with mathematically proven performance
characteristics;
- Purposive shock tests for the determination of the specific shock effects.

Hazard limits: -->> Section VII

2.5.4.5 Design Procedure

For the protection of personnel and equipment against ground shock effects the design procedure
described below is recommended:

- Determination of the relevant soil characteristics and detonation parameters;

- Computation of the motion parameters of the ground using specified formulas;

(-->> Table [5-12], [5-14]; -->> Ref [1], [3])
- Comparison of the maximum motion parameters to be encountered with the limits
specified in Section VII;

- Application of shock-hardening measures, if the limits are exceeded;

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- Assessment of the potential damage to sensitive equipment by means of a Shock

Response Spectrum (SRS) and an equipment-specific Shock Tolerance Spectrum
(STS);
Detailed information on simple methods for preparing SRS or STS are given in Ref
[1], [3], [4];

- Superposition of the two shock spectra; if the values of the SRS exceed those of the
STS, the equipment concerned must be shock-hardened; specific analyses/tests may
be required in order to determine the tolerance of specific equipment.

2.5.4.6 References

Essential references -->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [3], [4], [76], [77], [78], [150], [151], [153]

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Section VI - Cratering

2.5.5.1 General

This section describes the cratering process and the essential relevant parameters, depicts the spectrum
of effects and the hazard potential and specifies formulations for the determination of the decisive crater
dimensions - diameter, depth and volume.

In comparison with the other hazards resulting from an accidental explosion, cratering effects are
usually of minor importance. In certain situations, however, cratering may cause severe damage because of
excavation, subsurface disturbances or surface heaves. Under certain conditions, the propagation of detonation to
an adjacent magazine is also possible.

Hazards from crater ejecta and structural debris have to be taken into consideration, particularly for
larger quantities of stored ammunition and explosives.

These hazards are detailed in Section VII.

2.5.5.2 Phenomenology

A Crater is a hole in the ground resulting from mechanical displacement of the adjacent ground material
in the course of an explosion of demolition charges.

Primarily, a crater is defined by the following parameters:

(-->> Figure [5-12])

- The "apparent crater" is the visible cavity left after an explosion and is defined by the "apparent radius"
and the "apparent depth".

- The "true crater" is the entire cavity formed by an explosion part of which is being filled up again by the
fallback (fallen back ground material). The "true crater" is defined by the "true radius" and the "true depth".

- The "rupture zone" is that region at the crater flanks, where the ground material remains in place, but its
inner structure is substantially disturbed by the forces of the explosion.

- The "plastic zone" is the area adjacent to the "rupture zone" and is less disturbed than the latter.

- The "upthrust zone" is the original ground above the rupture and plastic zones that has been
permanently elevated. The "upthrust zone" is usually covered by the crater ejecta.

- The "Crater lips" is the material around the crater that lies above the original surface elevation and is
formed by upthrust and ejecta. The "Crater lips" may extend to widths of several crater radii.

2.5.5.3 Crater Computation

pp) Decisive Parameters

The crater size depends mainly upon the following parameters:

- Type of explosive;
- Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ;
- Depth of Burst (DOB) / Height of Burst (HOB)
- Stratification and type of soil.

qq) Depth of Burst (DOB)

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Figure 5-13 illustrates the variation in crater size and formation as a function of the DOB. Cratering is
described here from a classical context and no direct account is taken of the inefficiency associated with
accident explosions in most storage situations when compared with the standard, buried charge
situation.

Accidental explosions which are large enough to form craters originate from concentrations of
explosives in a number of different configurations, typically:

- On or just above the ground surface, e.g. in transport vehicles (-->> Figure 5-13a).

- In deep-buried magazines where the explosions are less efficient in producing craters
ad ejecta than the standard buried charge from which most cratering data has been
obtained (-->> Figure 5-13b). The difference is mainly one of degree related to the
free volume inside the magazine and the mechanics of the crater formation and throw-
out of ejecta / debris is essentially the same.

- Underground magazines where the depth of cover is such that no external crater is
formed as a result of an explosion (-->> Figure 5-13e).

For constant explosive quantity and type of explosive, crater size increases with depth of burst until the
maximum crater size is reached at the optimum DOB.

When the DOB is further increased, soil resistance exceeds the explosion energy; cratering is
suppressed and fallback of the crater ejecta increases, thus constantly reducing the visible crater size.
Beyond a certain DOB, there is no cratering at the surface any more.

Finally, complete confinement of the ground burst occurs. This results in surface heaves and soil
disturbances as well as in the forming of subsurface craters or camouflage craters.

rr) Stratification and Type of Soil

Cratering is mainly determined by the type of soil, the stratification near the ground surface and the
water content of the soil.

Important relevant findings are:

- Craters in sandy soil are smaller than those in clay soil. Other types of soil, such as
clayey sand, silt or loam, fall in between these two extremes.

- Craters in moist or saturated soil are larger than in dry soil. This applies, in particular,
to clay soil.

- Subsurface layers such as groundwater-saturated soil or rock may strongly influence

the crater size. This applies when the distance in depth to the layer concerned is less
than 1.5 Ra (Ra for layer free soil), and results in more shallow but wider craters. If
the layer is intersected by crater, the variation in size may be up to 50 % below or
above the corresponding undisturbed crater parameter (depth, radius). In cases where
the groundwater level lies approximately 2 m below the surface, a large explosion
may form a crater with twice the diameter of a crater in soil without groundwater.

- In the case of saturated soil of relatively low density, there may be soil liquefaction
effects causing a slump of the crater walls. The resulting crater is very wide and
shallow, with a radius several times that of a normal crater. The liquefaction effects
may endanger the stability of structures at distances of 20 to 30 times the crater
radius.

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ss) Crater Dimensions

The results of many tests have been evaluated and prepared for practical use in the form of
compensation functions or design diagrams.

Figure [5-14] shows the "apparent crater" dimensions for three types of soil.

For the determination of the "true crater" sizes for all DOB less than the optimum DOB, the
following rule of thumb applies:

Rt ≈ 1.10 to 1.15 · Ra (m) eq [5-65]

Dt ≈ 0.16 · NEQ 1/3 + DOB (m) eq [5-66]

On the case of a surface or air burst, the crater is "blown clear" so that the "true crater" is
approximately the same as the "apparent crater".

For DOB greater than the optimum, the diameter of the "true crater" corresponds largely to that for
optimum DOB, whereas the depth of the "true crater" increases with DOB.

The rupture zone extends to approximately 1.5 to 2 times the radius of the "true crater" and 1.3 to 2
times the depth of the "true crater".
Generally, the plastic zone is twice as large as the rupture zone.

tt) Ammunition Storage Facilities

For determining the decisive crater parameters for a major accidental explosion inside an aboveground
storage facility, the diagrams in Figure [5-14] to [5-19] or regression equations may be used.
It must be taken into account, though, that in the case of explosions inside structures the foundation or
bottom slab-depending upon the loading density - either prevents the forming of a typical crater
(loading densities in the order of 10 to 20 kg/m3 (-->> Ref [77]) or, at higher loading densities, more
shallow craters with greater diameters are formed.

The coupling factor "fo" is used for converting the data of an underground storage facility completely
filled with explosives to that of a partially filled one. For the specified loading densities, the coupling
factor is . . .

...τ ≈ 1600 kg / m 3 --->> fo = 100% = 1.0

...τ ≈ 10 kg / m 3 --->> fo = 10% = 0.1

Coupling factor 'fo' :

-->> Figure [5-20]

Depending upon the loading density, the coupling factor reduces the ground shock, cratering and
ejecta/debris effects. The effective or calculated explosives quantity results from the following product:

NEQeff = fo · NEQTNT

uu) Crater Parameter Formulas

(1) Symbols

Ra, Rt (m) radius of apparent/true crater

Da, Dt (m) depth of apparent/true crater
Va, Vt (m 3) volume of apparent/true crater
Rsl (m) fictitious crater radius for completely symmetrical explosive charge
Lsl (m) crater length for oblong explosive charge *)
Bsl (m) crater width for oblong explosive charge *)
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Dsl (m) crater depth

Vsl (m) volume of apparent crater
sl with bottom slab
a,f apparent parameters; open surface burst without bottom slab

*) Here, " oblong explosive charge " means the usual distribution of explosives in an
oblong ammunition storage building.

(2) Open Surface Burst Without Bottom Slab

According Ref [32] for sandy, gravely soil . . .

Ra,f = 0.400 · NEQ 0.333 (m)

Da,f = 0.200 · NEQ 0.300 (m) eq [5-67]

Va,f = 0.042 · NEQ 0.960 (m 3)

According to Ref [1], [2], [3] . . .

Ra,f = A · NEQ B (m)

eq [5-68]
Da,f = A · NEQ B (m)

Basalt Granite Sandstone

high-strength high-strength medium-strength
A B A B A B
Ra,f 0.330 0.330 0.510 0.330 0.360 0.313
Da,f 0.120 0.330 0.170 0.330 0.200 0.315
Sandstone Gravelly Sand Coarse Sand
slate dry dry
Ra,f 0.760 0.294 0.590 0.294 0.570 0.294
Da,f 0.320 0.294 0.200 0.294 0.220 0.294
Sand-Clay Fine-Grained Silt, Clay
coarse, dry Wet Clay saturated
Ra,f 0.400 0.333 0.510 0.333 0.830 0.333
Da,f 0.190 0.333 0.260 0.333 0.500 0.333

According to Ref [1], [2] . . .

- Crater radius:

x = DOB / NEQTNT 1/3 (m/kg) 1/3

C = c6 · x 6 + c5 · x 5 + c4 · x 4 + c3 · x 3 + c2 · x 2 + c1 · x + c0

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Clay Clayey Sand Sand

wet dry wet dry wet dry
c6 - 0.9138 3.4296 1.5254 6.6138 5.3895 3.9615
c5 4.5971 -14.1268 - 7.5848 -21.6824 -19.9765 -13.9722
c4 - 9.6611 20.7724 13.5517 25.5991 25.9610 17.1007
c3 10.6273 12.7799 -10.4240 -13.2913 -13.6946 - 8.7749
c2 - 7.0956 1.1501 1.4237 1.5053 0.7827 0.3314
c1 3.1878 2.2545 2.2503 1.7332 2.1788 1.7526
c0 1.7470 1.1539 1.2592 0.9416 1.0426 0.8610

C eq [5-69]
Ra,f = · NEQTNT 1 / 3 (m)
2

- Crater depth:

x = DOB / NEQTNT 1/3 (m/kg) 1/3

C = c6 · x6 + c5 · x 5 + c4 · x 4 + c3 · x 3 + c2 · x 2 + c1 · x + c0

Clay Clayey Sand Sand

wet dry wet dry wet dry
c6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.9156 0.0000 0.0000
c5 - 0.5074 - 0.5634 0.1109 -10.6347 - 1.7342 - 2.1635
c4 1.8409 1.4661 - 0.5177 9.7514 4.6696 4.0866
c3 - 2.0285 - 1.5432 0.7502 - 3.9218 4.6469 - 3.1802
c2 - 0.3971 - 0.2424 - 1.4739 - 0.0049 0.8813 0.3980
c1 1.4481 1.0880 1.3841 0.8711 0.9596 0.6974
c0 0.5446 0.4125 0.4561 0.3016 0.3414 0.2616

Ra,f = C · NEQTNT 1/3 (m) eq [5-70]

(3) Burst Inside a Detached Aboveground Magazine

According Ref [77], [32] . . .

Rs1 ≈ 1.5 · Ra,f (m)

Ds1 ≈ 0.8 · Da,f (m) eq [5-71]
Vs1 ≈ 1.5 · Va,f (m)3

with eq [5-67] . . .

Rs1 ≈ 0.600 · NEQTNT 0.333 (m)

Ds1 ≈ 0.160 · NEQTNT 0.300 (m) eq [5-72]
Vs1 ≈ 0.063 · NEQTNT 0.960 (m) 3

(4) Burst Inside an Earth-Covered Aboveground Magazine

For the derivation of universal crater parameters for earth-covered magazines only very few
basic data are available.

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The evaluation of a full-scale test with NEQTNT = 75 (to) according to Ref [86] results in the
formulations below, which are in reasonable relation to the above-mentioned explosion
conditions and can therefore be recommended for estimation purposes . . .

Rs1 ≈ 0.40 · NEQTNT 0.333 (m)

Ls1 ≈ 0.43 · NEQTNT 0.333 (m)
Bs1 ≈ 0.33 · NEQTNT 0.333 (m) eq [5-73]
Ds1 ≈ 0.06 · NEQTNT 0.300 (m)
Vs1 ≈ 0.05 · NEQTNT 0.960 (m) 3

2.5.5.4 References

Essential references -->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [2], [3], [4], [17], [18], [19], [27], [163], [164], [165], [166], [167], [169], [170], [171],
[172], [173], [174], [175]

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Section VII - Thermal Radiation

2.5.6.1 General

Detonation of an explosive typically results in the production of a relatively short flash accompanied by
high thermal radiation.

Normally, the radiation from this short-lived flame constitutes a negligible hazard in comparison with
blast and projection effects. Propellants and pyrotechnic substances of Hazard Division 1.3 differ from
detonating explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 in that, unless heavily confined, their reaction does not result in the
generation of high blast pressures.

Although the energy per unit mass of these explosives is comparable, they differ in the duration of
energy release. The energy of detonating explosives is released within a time scale of a few milliseconds,
whereas energy from an unconfined propellant or a pyrotechnic substance is released over a period measured in
seconds or longer. The energy is released in the form of an intense, very hot flame. The potential hazard is due to
thermal radiation and the direct impingement of the flame.

As compared to blast and fragment/debris effects, there are only few studies on the effects of thermal
radiation available which offer quantifiable formulations.

Thus, the statements below are coarse, conservative guidelines for determining the decisive hazard
parameters of ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3 in the case of fire during storage and transport.

2.5.6.2 Fireball Computation

The development and the behavior of a fireball as well as the decisive parameters - dimensions,
temperature, and duration - are generally varying and strongly affected by the environment (e.g. wind, buildings,
vegetation etc).

Therefore, the formulations below may only be used as rough estimates:

vv) Burning of Propellant Powder in the Open

(-->> Ref [30])

(1) Radius of Fireball

. . . Maximum radius of fireball few meters above the ground

Rmax, a = 2.8 · NEQ0.28 (m) eq [5-74]

. . . Maximum radius at ground level

Rmax, s = 0.45 · NEQ0.44 (m) eq [5-75]

(2) Duration of Fireball

teff,50 = 0.93 · NEQ 0.21 (s) eq [5-76]

Note:
After ignition, the fireball expands and reaches a maximum within a period of about 2
seconds. After several seconds of intense radiation, depending upon the quantity of propellant
involved, the fireball collapses. In general, the actual extinction of the visible flame occurs
not until after thermal radiation has decreased to comparative insignificance. The effective
duration of thermal radiation teff,50, thus is de-fined by the time required for the fireball to
shrink to ≈ 50% of its maximum radius.

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ww) Explosion of Explosives Inside an Earth-Covered Magazine

(-->> Ref [78]; -->> Figure [5-21])

(1) Radius of Fireball

Rmax ≈ 1.9 · NEQ 1/3 (m) eq [5-77]

(2) Temperature Inside Fireball

T ≈ 5000 (°C)

(3) Maximum Duration

dmax ≈ 0.17 · NEQ 1/3 eq [5-78]

xx) Thermal Radiation Energy

The thermal radiant power of burning or exploding high explosives, propellants or liquids is difficult to
measure or determine otherwise. Thermal radiant power, fireball geometry and duration are strongly
affected by the type of packaging used, the direction and speed of the wind and the storage conditions.

Tests with bulk (unpacked) propellant powder (worst case) for an energy flux of . . .

q = 4 cal/cm2 = 40 kcal/m2 = 167 kWs/m2

. . . resulted in a formulation for the following limiting radius, at which the above value is reached . . .

Rmax ≈ 1.0 · NEQ 0.44 (m) eq [5-79]

This value will generally not be exceeded.

yy) Thermal Radiation Flux of Burning Propellant Powder

Thermal radiation flux of burning propellant powder is represented by the relationship below.
(-->> Ref [23])

q ≈ 19 · NEQ 0.82 / R 2 (kW/m 2) eq [5-80]

where
NEQ (kg) = quantity of propellant powder
R (m) = distance from the radiation source

2.5.6.3 Barriers to Resist Thermal Radiation and Flame from Ammunition and Explosives of Hazard
Division 1.3

Normal construction materials such as steel, concrete or brick as well as earth-covered structures can be
used for the protection against thermal radiation and direct flame impingement.

Wooden or light metal doors and windows are structural weak points. Unless these doors/windows face
away from the external source of thermal radiation, they must be considered non-resistant or vulnerable.
Windows are diathermy and not resistant to direct flame impingement.

Heavy metal covers and closures resist thermal radiation and flame impingement.

Closures must be sealed as to prevent the entry of flames.

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2.5.6.4 Design and Construction of Storage Buildings for Ammunition and Explosives of Hazard
Division 1.3

Storage buildings shall be constructed of non-combustible materials such as steel, concrete, brick or
natural stone. A standard earth cover may be considered as fireproof.

Buildings containing ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 situated in the vicinity of
storage buildings containing Hazard Division 1.3 ammunition and explosives must be built of non-combustible
materials.

Buildings for the storage of ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3 must not contain any
exposed components made of steel, iron, aluminum or aluminum alloy with magnesium content exceeding 1%.

The ceiling or roof should be made of concrete, reinforced concrete or steel plate and be designed as
light as possible (frangible cover).

Unless these requirements are met, flame jets ejected from openings (doors, windows) of the building
have to be expected that might ignite e.g. opposite buildings.

In the case of opposite building entrances, these should be offset by a minimum distance of one (1)
fireball diameter (eq [5-77]) or a barricade capable of stopping or deflecting a flame jet should be erected across
the line of sight to the adjacent building entrance.

Windows and/or wooden doors and other openings in unbarricaded storage buildings should be covered
using heavy steel plate backed up with thermal insulation material. The cover must be large enough to cover all
combustible structural components such as wooden frames.

Air vents and air shafts must be designed in such a way as to prevent the fireball, flame jet or burning
debris from entering the interior of the building.

If buildings for the storage of ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3 are equipped with a
blow-out wall (frangible cover), this weak wall must not face any stack or storage building, unless the distance is
great enough to prevent sympathetic detonation due to directed burning debris.

2.5.6.5 Hazards form Fire Involving Ammunition and Explosives of Hazard Division 1.3

Thermal radiation from the fireball produced by burning ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division
1.3 is capable of causing injury to personnel and of communicating the fire to other buildings and explosives
storage facilities. This hazard may be substantially increased by even normal winds, which will deflect the upper
parts of the fireball away from the seat of fire. This may cause the thermal radiation source to be moved closer to
the exposed site in the order of one radius of the fireball.

Ammunition and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3 are normally packaged before storage or transport.
A typical storage arrangement would place the ammunition or explosives in buildings of different construction.
The confinement produced by even a weak building is sufficient to significantly affect the mode of burning of
stacks of propellant powder. The range of a directed high-energy jet of flame which may emerge through
openings or frangible covers will be much longer than the comparable flame radius of the unconfined explosive.
Furthermore, direct impingement of such a jet of flame will impart a greater heat dose to an exposed object than
radiation from a fireball, and may also eject burning stored items and other burning material.

In strong storage buildings a fire can lead to the buildup of high pressure generating effects comparable,
after all, with those of a detonating explosive, i.e. cratering, airblast and debris projection.
(-->> Ref [23])

Confined explosions constitute the hazard of a cone of flame being ejected through destroyed openings
(doors, etc.) which may extend beyond the permissible quantity distance for Hazard Division 1.1.
(--->> Ref [23])

2.5.6.6 References

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Essential references --->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [4], [20], [21], [22], [23], [78]

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Section VIII - Damage Criteria / Hazard Limits

- Risk Assessment Guidelines -

2.5.7.1 Personnel

zz) Airblast

Airblast caused by an explosion endangers personnel in different ways through:

- The shock wave and the time-depending overpressure;

- The debris from destroyed structures or accelerated objects;
- The impact of the accelerated human body on obstacles or on the ground.

The body regions most endangered by airblast are:

- The respiratory system with lungs and trachea;

- Head;
- Ears and ear-drums;
- Spleen, liver, heart.

The extent of the injuries caused directly by airblast is strongly affected by:

- The rate of pressure increase within the shock front;

- The peak overpressure within the shock front;
- The duration of the positive pressure phase.

Damage thresholds according to literature analyses:

(1) Direct Airblast Effect

Type of P To Ps Is Ref
Injury / Position % ms Mpa MPa-ms
1 3 2.00 [18]
1 5 0.90 [207]
1 100 0.25
1 > 1000 0.28 [207]
50 3 3.00 [18]
LETHALITY 50 5 1.20
50 100 0.35
50 > 1000 0.35 [207]
99 3 4.00 [18]
99 5 1.70
99 100 0.50
99 > 1000 0.50 [207]

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(-->> Figure [5-27])

Type of P To Ps Is Ref
Injury / Position % ms Mpa MPa-ms
1 0.382
HEAD REGION 50 0.527 [149]
99 0.676

(-->> Figure [5-22] and [5-23]

1 0.13 [149]
LUNGS 50 0.144 [18]
99 0.28 [74]
1 3-5 0.21-0.28 [4]
99 3-5 0.58-0.63

1 2 0.56
1 20 0.22
LUNGS 1 100 0.21
50 2 0.88
-Lethality 50 20 0.32 [207]
- Standing Person 50 100 0.28
99 2 1.05
99 20 0.42
99 100 0.38

1 2 1.13
1 20 0.35
1 100 0.28
LUNGS 50 2 1.76
50 20 0.56 [207]
-Lethality 50 100 0.44
- Prone Person 99 2 2.81
99 20 0.81
99 100 0.70

UPPER RESPIRATORY 1 4 0.070

SYSTEM 1 10 0.035 [47]
99 10 0.127

(-->> Figure [5-24])

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1 0.035 [74]
EARDRUM 50 0.044 [4]
99 0.086

-Temporary loss of < 0.035

hearing
-Threshold inside a > 0.017
shelter
1 4 0.1200
GASTROINTESTINAL 1 10 0.135 [74]
TRACT 99 4 0.250
99 10 0.250

(2) Indirect Airblast Effect

(-->> Figure [5-25] and [5-26])

Type of P Vcr Ref

Injury / Position % m/s
LETHALITY FOR IMPACT OF WHOLE BODY 0 3.0
ON HARD SURFACE (CONCRETE) 1 6.5
50 16.5 [144]
99 42.0

STANDING PERSON, STIFF-LEGGED

No Effect 2.4
Injury 3.0-3.6 [19]
Fracture 3.6-4.8

SITTING PERSON
No Effect 2.4 [19]
Injury 4.5-7.8

PUNCH against entire ABDOMINAL WALL 1 3.0

50 7.8 [19]
Injury 99 9.0

(-->> Figure [5-27]

SKULL INJURY; FRACTURED SKULL BASE 1 3.0

50 5.5
Blunt Impact 99 9.0 [4]
Edgewise Impact < 3.0

aaa) Projections
- Fragments, Debris and Ejecta -

Because of the complexity of the process, the reliable determination of the ballistic parameters of
projections from accidental explosions is difficult. Basic data and information on structural debris and
crater ejecta are limited as compared to fragment data.

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The hazards to the different regions of the human body - depending upon their respective sensitivity -
are listed below in descending order:

- Head region : fractured skull

- Chest region : fractured rip, pneumorrhagia, cardiac damage
- Abdominal region : damage to liver, spleen
- Limbs : bone fracture and secondary damage

The unprotected area of a standing person is defined to be . . .

AT = 0.56 m 2

The currently accepted limit values for hazards to persons due to projections are as follows:-

- Mass density : 1 projection / 56 m 2 (1/600 ft 2)

- Impact energy (Ekin = M · V 2 / 2) : 80 Joule (58 ft/lbf)

With projections as described above, severe to lethal injuries have to be expected as a rule.

Table [5-15] lists discriminating limits for blunt impact injuries based on empirical tests with animals
and corps.
(-->> Ref [4], [19], [31], [206])

Table [5-15]

LETHALITY DUE TO IMPACT ENERGY

LETHALITY IMPACT ENERGY / KINETIC ENERGY
(p in %) (Joule)
HEAD CHEST ABDOMEN LIMBS
1 55 58 105 155
5 65 90 140 240
20 79 140 200 380
50 100 230 280 620
99 200 850 850 2500

Note:
Figure [5-29] and [5-30] show lethality as a function of impact energy

Using the Walker-Duncan-method, formulas to calculate the probability of penetration of human and
animal skins by projectiles have been developed.
(-->> Ref [136], [137], [139], [144])

Probability of penetration of human skin:

Pi = 1
1 + e(-(A + B · In C))

eq [5-81]

TARGET A B Ref
Bare Skin - 28.42 2.94 [144]
Bare Skin - 27.35 2.81 [136]
Uniform, 2 Layers -48.47 4.62 [159]
Uniform, 6 Layers - 50.63 4.51

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Constant C :

C= Mp · Vi2
10 · Af
Mp (kg) mass of projectile
Vi (m/s) impact velocity
Af (m 2) projection area of projectile

bbb) Shock

The following shock loading threshold values for personnel are commonly accepted.
(-->> Ref [4], [144])

Table [5-16]

THRESHOLD FOR SHOCK LOADING ON PERSONNEL

DAMAGE CRITICAL IMPACT
VELOCITY
Vi.cr (m/s)
Minor 3.0
Threshold 4.0
50% Skull Injury 5.5
100% Skull Injury 7.0

THREAT ACCELERATION
a (g)
Loss of Balance
- nuclear, horizontal 0.5
- nuclear, vertical 1.0

CRITICAL OSCILLATION TOLERANCES FOR PERSONNEL

Acceleration (g) Frequency (Hz)
2 < 10
5 10 - 20
7 20 - 40
10 > 40
ccc) Thermal Radiation

Burns may be classified in ascending order of severity as:

- First degree burn : reddening and swelling of the affected skin region, pain, healing
without scarring;

- Second degree burn: (a) reddening, swelling, pain, blistering, healing

without scarring;

(b) anemic skin / no coetaneous

circulation/leatherlike white necrosis, pain,
blistering, scarring (necrosis = devitalized tissue)
;

- Third degree burn : total necrosis, destruction of skin to the point of charring, open
flesh, no pain.

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The degree of burn is a function of the total dose of radiation energy received and of the
radiant power, i.e. the radiation energy received per unit of time.
(-->> Figure [5-31])

Table [5-17] ; Ref [89]

RADIANT ENERGY REQUIRED TO CAUSE FLASH BURNS
PERIOD RADIATION ENERGY DEGREE OF BURN
2 2
tw (s) (kWs/m ) (cal/cm )
62.8 1.0 1
tw < 1 125.6 3.0 2
188.4 4.5 3
125.6 3.0 1
tw ≈ 5 251.2 6.0 2
376.7 9.0 3
Source: AASTP - 1 Corr No 7

Ref [140] specifies the radiant power or radiation energy of burning fuel - as an equivalent of burning
propellants or pyrotechnic substances - required for causing the different degrees of burn on human
bodies as follows . . .

Table [5-18]

RADIATION INTENSITY q / tw (kW · s / m 2

DEGREE OF BURN PROBABILITY OF INCIDENT
tw (s) 1% 50% 99%
1st degree 38.5 68.8 122.7
2nd degree 87.8 156.4 278.6
3rd degree 92.8 184.5 364.1
tw = active duration of the radiation

2.5.7.2 Damage Criteria for Structures and Materials

ddd) Airblast

Damage to structures caused by conventional ammunition and explosives:

Table [5-19]

Symbols: X occasional C heavy damage

A minor damage D destruction
B medium damage Pressure: Pso [kPa]

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DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURES / COMPONENTS DUE TO PRESSURE

OBJECT X A B C D
glass, large window 0.2 - - - -
glass, typical - 1.1 - - 3.5-7.0
window frame 0.5 - - - -
window frame - 10.6 - - -
door frame - 10.6 - - -
door, window - - - - 6.0-9.0
plaster - 3.5-7.0 - - -
tiles (roof) - 3.0 - 5.3 - 0%-50%
dwelling house - 3.0*) 8.1**) 36.6**) 80.9**)
wall, ceiling - - - 14.1 - partial
concrete wall, 0.3 m - - - 14-21 - plain
unreinforced build. - - - - 70.3 cd
brick wall - - - 56.3 70.3
brick wall, 20-30 cm - - - - 56.3 flexure
brick wall, 45 cm - - - - 91.4 cd
steel building - 9.1 14.0 17.6 21.1
wooden building - - 12.0 17.0 28.0
building, block - - 70.0 - -
factory chimney - 14.0 - - -
industrial building - - 28.0 - -
administr. building - - 38.0 - -
brick building - - 28.0 - -
RC-structures - - 38.0 53.0 -
steel girder build. - - - 31.6 63.3
cladding of build. - 7.0 - - 14.1
heavy bridge - - - - 492.3
steel truss bridge - - - - 63.3 coll.
motor vehicle - 28.2 35.2 70.3 - crushed
rail car - 18.3 39.4 60.5 77.4
wooden utility pole - 28.0 - - - snapped
power mast - 28.0 - - - snapped
radio mast - 14.0 - - - snapped
oil storage tank - 6.3 21.0 24.6 28.1
tree - - - 21.1 175.8 90%
*)
inhabitable cd completely demolished
**)
uninhabitable coll. collapsed

Damage limits for brick buildings:

-->> Figure [5-32]

eee) Projections

The impact of hard projections at relatively high velocities results in extremely high local load peaks at
the target (ES) with relatively short impulse duration. In general, hazards are presented due to the
perforation or punching of the affected structural component. Spalling involving high secondary
projection velocities may occur at the backside of the target. The hard projections often ricochet off the
target and cause damage in the vicinity. The extent of the damage depends upon the geometry and
material properties of the target and has to be analyzed in detail.

Figure [5-10] and [5-11] show approximate data for the thickness of unreinforced concrete slabs
required in the case of hard projection impact.

Normally, deformable projections transfer their entire kinetic energy to the target or break upon impact.
The longer shock pulse duration resulting from the deformation leads to a reduced peak load. As
compared to the impact of hard projections, the punching and perforation hazard to the target is
substantially reduced. The structural component affected is, however, subjected to a higher bending
load.

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Figure [5-10] shows approximate data for load peaks due to the impact of deformable projections
(ejecta).

fff) Shock

(1) Inhabited Buildings

The damage threshold values below are recommended for inhabited buildings . . . .

Table [5-20]

DAMAGE THRESHOLD FOR DIRECT-INDUCED GROUND SHOCK / Ref[89]

DAMAGE max. VELOCITY SCALED DISTANCE
vertical/horizontal
Vmax (m/s) Z (m/kg 1/3)
No ≤ 0.05 6.6
minor/medium 0.05 - 0.14 3.6
heavy 0.14 - 0.19 2.9

Note:
All the scaled distances above are shorter than the inhabited building quantity
distance. They are also within the airblast and projection hazard zones.

Table [5-21]

DAMAGE THRESHOLD for AIRBLAST-INDUCED GROUND SHOCK

( for -3- selected soils) Ref [89]
DAMAGE Vv/h,max SCALED DISTANCE
Z (m/kg∧1/3)
(m/s) soil -1- soil -2- soil -3-
No ≤ 0.05 5.7 3.4 2.9
Minor/medium 0.05 - 0.14 2.7 1.7 1.5
heavy 0.14 - 0.19 1.5 1.0 0.8

No TYPE OF SOIL DENSITY SEISMIC VEOLOCITY

Rho Cp
(kg/m 3) (m/s)
1 Soil 1520 460
2 Saturated soil 2000 1520
3 Rock 2560 4000

For similar damage levels, the scaled distances for AI ground shock are shorter than those for
DI ground shock. Therefore, it is not likely for the AI ground shock to be used as a measure for
the determination of critical inhabited building quantity distances.

Other threshold values for comparison:

- For buildings required to retain their useable condition, German Standard DIN 4150,
Part 3, specifies the following max. oscillating velocities resulting from a short shock
load.

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Table [5-22]

CRITICAL OSCILLATING VELOCITY

- dwelling and business building 0.008 m/s
- braced buildings with heavy components;
braced skeleton buildings 0.030 m/s
- historical buildings/monuments 0.004 m/s

- Ref [10] specifies the threshold values below for normal buildings in good condition:

Table [5-23]

CRITICAL OSCILLATING VELOCITY ON BASE Ref [10]

- individual, minor damage 0.070 m/s
- damage threshold ≈ 0.140 m/s
- 50% structural damage ≈ 0.180 m/s

(2) Magazines

Ref [78] specifies the limiting criteria below for damage to or destruction of earth-covered
magazines:

Table [5-24]

CRITICAL SOIL PARTICLE VELOCITIES FOR AMMUNITION

STORAGE BUILDINGS
Ref [78]
QUANTITY OF STRUCTURE max. VELOCITY of
soil particles
V (m/s)
- no damage < 0.2
- rigid frame prefabricated 0.2 - 1.5
concrete buildings
- heavy reinforced concrete magazines 3.0

(3) Equipment

Shock tolerance limits -->> Ref [1], [3], [4] et al.

Some selected examples . . . . . .

Table [5-25]

SHOCK TOLERANCES FOR SELECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT DAMAGE FREQUENCY
a (g) fmin
no heavy (Hz)
- Heavy weight machinery 10 80 5
. engines, generators,
. transformers
M > 2000 kg
- Medium weight machinery 15 120 10
. pumps, condensers,
. air conditioners
M ≈ 500 - 2000 kg
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SHOCK TOLERANCES FOR SELECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT DAMAGE FREQUENCY
a (g) fmin
no heavy (Hz)
- Light Weight machinery 30 200 15
. small engines > 500 kg
- Duct work, piping, 20 280 5
storage batteries
- Electronic equipment, 2 20 10
relays, magnetic drum
units, racks of
communication equipment
a (g) acceleration ; fmin. (Hz) minimum natural frequency

ggg) Thermal Radiation

Thermal radiation can damage or destroy buildings. The damages range from scorching to complete
burning of structures. Heating of non-combustible materials may result in reduced strength and stiffness
and thus in the collapse of the building.

On principle, there are two (2) different damage classes resulting from thermal radiation.
(-->> Ref [140])

Class -1- : - burning of a building or of essential structural components

- collapse of a building or of essential structural components
Class -2- : - heavy scorching of the building surface and deformation of non-
combustible structural components without collapse

For different materials, critical radiation flux values are specified. This critical intensity is defined as
that value which causes no ignition even after prolonged exposure.

Table [5-26]

CRITICAL RADIATION INTENSITY

kW / m 2
MATERIAL CLASS -1- CLASS -2-
Wood 15 2
Plastics 15 2
Glass 4 -
Steel 100 25

Hazardous radiation flux limits: -->> ref [21]

The estimated limits below may be used for determining the maximum acting thermal radiation flux q .
..

5 kW/m 2 breaking of windowpanes sensation of pain due to thermal radiation burn

10 kW/m2 occurrence of scorching possible ignition of combustible material
15 kW/m2 spontaneous ignition of material, e.g. wood

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hhh) Sympathetic Detonation

(1) General

As for the sympathetic detonation as a function of different detonation effects, only

insufficient quantitative limits are available. Several studies have attempted the formulation
of such limits.

Airblast involving high peak overpressure, shock and the impact of projections may result in
the sympathetic detonation of high explosives. The individual tolerance thresholds of the
high explosives, however, are varying.

(2) Airblast

Except for extremely high pressures, the majority of high explosives are insensitive to
airblast effects. In most cases, the sympathetic detonation is caused by secondary effects,
such as the projection of the high explosive against a hard impact surface.

(3) Shock

The shock-induced motion of the storage building or the displacement of the explosive and
the resulting impact on a hard surface may lead to a sympathetic detonation.

Ref [78] specifies critical soil particle velocities. According to this reference, the propagation
of detonation will be 1.5 m/s for prefabricated, solid concrete structures and 3 m/s for heavy
reinforced concrete storage buildings.

(4) Fragments

Because of their high kinetic energy, fragments can cause the sympathetic detonation of
adjacent ammunition components. Therefore, buildings or structural components should be
designed fragment-proof and open-storage stacks should be separated by the required
quantity distances.
(-->> Ref [4])

Protective roofs and barricades are important means for preventing sympathetic detonation
due to fragment impact.

The limits below may be used as estimates for the impact energy and the critical impact
impulse.
(-->> Ref [89])

Table [5-27]

CRITICAL PROPAGATION IMPACT PARAMETERS

IMPACT VELOCITY ENERGY IMPULSE
Vi (m/s) Ekin (J) I (Ns)
≤ 50 m/s ---- 100
≥ 50 m/s 2500 ----

(5) Craters

The radius of the crater to be expected should be used as the relevant assessment parameter.
If the acceptor magazine (ES) is located within the area defined by the radius of the crater,
sympathetic detonation has to be expected.

(6) Thermal Radiation

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Adjacent ammunition storage buildings are normally located within the fireball area. The
burning gas or the extreme heat may cause a fire inside the storage facility and thus a
subsequent sympathetic detonation if the openings and entrances are destroyed. This can and
should be prevented by an appropriate design.

2.5.7.3 References

Essential references -->> Section VIII

Ref [1], [3], [4], [9], [10], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [31], [33], [118], [119], [135], [136],
[137], [138], [139], [140], [141], [142], [143], [144], [145], [146], [147], [148], [149], [157], [203], [205], [206]

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Section IX - References/Figures/Tables

2.5.8.1 References

[ 1] TM 5-855-1 FUNDAMENTAL OF PROTECTIVE DESIGN

USAWES/CoE
U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station
Vicksburg, Mississippi USA November 1986

[ 2] TM 5-855-1 /FUNDAMENTAL OF PROTECTIVE DESIGN / Edition 1991, PC-Programm

Hyde,David,W
USAWESCoE /Department of the Army
Washington DC USA October 1989

[ 3] PROTECTIVE CONSTRUCTION DESIGN MANUAL / ESL-TR-87-57 Final Report

Drake,J.L;Twisdale,R,A;Frank,W,C;Dass,C,E; et al
AFESC / Engineering & Services Laboratory
Tyndall AFB,FL USA November 1989

[ 4] STRUCTURES TO RESIST THE EFFECTS OF ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS / TM 5-1300

Department of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force
TM 5-1300, NAVFAC P-397, AFR 88-22
Washington DC USA November 1990

[ 5] AIRBLAST PARAMETERS FROM TNT SPHERICAL AIR BURST AND HEMISPHERICAL

SURFACE BURST /ARBRL-TR-02555
Kingery,C,N; Bulmash,G
Ballistic Research Laboratory, ARBRL-TR-02555
Aberdeen ProvGr,MD USA April 1984

[ 6] ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOK - PRINCIPLES OF EXPLOSIVE BEHAVIOR

US Army Materiel Command, Headquarters
US Army Materiel Command, AMCP 706-180
Washington DC USA April 1972

[ 7] STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS
Biggs,John,M
McGraw Hill, ISBN 07-005255-7
New York USA 1964

[ 8] DESIGN OF STRUCTURES TO RESIST NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

ASCE
American Society of Civil Engineers ASCE No 42
USA

[ 9] SCHWEDISCHES SCHUTZBAUHANDBUCH / FORTH 1

FORTF
Schwedische Schutzbauverwaltung /Fortifikationsförvaltningen, Forskningsbyran
Stockholm Sweden 1987

[ 10] MILITÄRISCHE SPRENGTECHNIK - LEHRBUCH -

Autorenkollektiv
Militärverlag DDR
Berlin Germany 1984

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[ 11] JOINT MUNITIONS EFFECTIVENESS MANUAL - AIR TO SURFACE - TARGET

VULNERABILITY (U)
- BOOK 1 OF 2
US DOD -SECRET-
US Department of Defense
USA 1986

[ 12] STRUCTURAL DESIGN FOR DYNAMIC LOADS

Norris,C,H et al
McGraw-Hill
USA 1959

[ 13] DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF RESIDENTAL STRUCTURES SUBJECTED TO BLAST

LOADING
Dowding,C,H
Journal for the Hydraulic Division,ASCE, Vol 107, ST7
USA 1981

[ 14] PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR DESIGN OF HARDENED STRUCTURES

Newmark,N,M et al
US Department of Commerce, AB-295 408,
USA 1962

[ 15] DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURES

Clough,R,W;Penzien,J
McGraw-Hill
USA 1975

[ 16] APPROXIMATE FORMULATE FOR PERIOD OF VIBRATIONS OF BUILDING SYSTEMS

Adeli,H
Civil Engineering for Practising and Design Engineers, Vol 4
USA 1985

[ 17] THE DYNAMICS OF EXPLOSION AND ITS USE

Henrych,Josef
Technical University of Prague, Building Research Institute
New York USA 1979

[ 18] HANDBUCH DER WAFFENWIRKUNGEN FÜR DIE BEMESSUNG VON SCHUTZBAUTEN

Schindler,G;Haerter,A
Arbeitsgruppe für den baulichen Zivilschutz
Bern Switzerland 1964

[ 19] VAPENVERKAN FORTH 1 - SCHWEDISCHES HANDBUCH FÜR WAFFENWIRKUNGEN -

MOD Schweden
Schwedische Schutzbauverwaltung / MOD Schweden
Stockholm Sweden June 1973

[ 20] FEUERBALLMESSUNGEN UND FEUERBALLDAUER

Janser,P
Basler & Partner, Gruppe für Rüstungsdienste
Zürich Switzerland May 1981

[ 21] THERMAL RADIATION FLUX OF FIREWORKS

Harmanny,A
Prins Maurits Laboratorium, Report Nr T 1022 / 02/84
Den Haag Netherlands February 1984

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[ 22] DESIGN AND SITING OF BUILDINGS TO RESIST EXPLOSIONS AND FIRE

Oyer Publishing Limited
London United Kingdom 1980

[ 23] COMBUSTION OF GUN PROPELLANT IN IGLOO - THERMAL FLUX MEASUREMENTS

Allain,L
SNPE-Defense Espace-Direction de la Technologie et de la
Recherche;NT153/91/CRB-S/TS/NP
Vert-le-Petit France December 1991

[ 24] PROJECTILE PENETRATION IN SOIL AND ROCK. ANALYSIS FOR NON-NORMAL

IMPACT. - TECHREP SL-79-15 -
Bernard,R,S
USAEWES, VICKSBURG, MS
Vicksburg, MS USA 1979

[ 25] DEPTH AND MOTION PREDICTION FOR EARTH PENETRATORS - TECHREP S-78-4 -
Bernard,R,S
USAEWES
Vicksbury,MS USA 1978

[ 26] PENETRATION DEPTH OF CONCRETE FOR NONDEFORMABLE MISSILES.

Haldar,A;Miller,F,J
School of Civil Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta USA 1982

[ 27] ASSESSMENT OF EMPERICAL CONCRETE IMPACT FORMULAS.

Sliter,G
Journal of the Structural Division
USA 1980

[ 28] CRATERING BY EXPLOSIONS - A COMPENDIUM AND AN ANALYSIS

Rooke,A,D; Carnes,B,L; Davis,L,K
US Army Waterways Experiment Station, TR-N-74-1
Vicksburg,MS USA January 1974

[ 29] DIAL PACK : CRATER AND EJECTA

Rooke,A,D; Meyer; Conway
US Army Waterways Experiment Station, MP-N-72-9
Vicksburg,MS USA December 1972

[ 30] EXPLOSIVE EXCAVATION TECHNOLOGY

Johnson,S,M
US Army Engineer Nuclear Crater Group, NCG TR-Nr 21
USA June 1971

[ 31] LETALITÄT VON PERSONEN INFOLGE KRATERAUSWUFS

Basler & Partner
Basler & Partner, B 3113-2,Grp Für RüDst
Zürich Switzerland October 1984

[ 32] GRÖSSE UND AUSWURFMASSEN VON KRATERN IN LOCKERGESTEIN BEI

OBERFLÄCHENDETONATIONEN
Basler & Hofmann
Baserl & Partner
Zürich Switzerland April 1979

[ 33] TRÜMMERMASSENDICHTE UND MAXIMALE TRÜMMERFLUGWEITE BEIM

KRATERAUSWURF
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Basler & Hofman

Basler & Partner
Zürich Switzerland January 1980

[ 34] ESTIMATES OF CRATER DIMENSIONS FOR NEAR-SURFACE EXPLOSIONS

Copper,H,J
R & D ASSOCIATES - RDA-TR-2604-001
USA 1976

[ 35] DEFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVE LARGE-SCALE

CRATERS
Tremba,E
US Air Force Weapons Laboratory - AFWL-TR-79-159
USA 1981

[ 36] DIAL PACK: CRATER AND EJECTA. MEASUREMENT FROM A SURFACE-TANGENT

DETONATION ON A LAYERED MEDIUM. * PAPER N-72-9 *
Rooke;Meyer:Conway
U.S. AWEWS
Vicksbury, MS USA 1972

[ 37] CRATER AND EJECTA DATA FROM THE DETONATION OF A 100 TON SPHERICAL
CHARGE OF TNT TANGENTIAL TO THE SURFACE.
Diehl,C,H,H;Pinnell,J,H;Jones,G,H,S
Canada Defence Research Establishment Suffield
Ralston,Alberta Canada 1968

[ 38] CRATER AND EJECTA DATA FROM THE DETONATION OF A 40 000 LB SHERICAL
CHARGE OF TNT TANGENTIAL TO THE SURFACE
Diehl;Pinell
Canada Defence Research Establishment Suffield
Ralston,Alberta Canada 1968

[ 39] THE FORMATION OF A CRATER AS OBSERVED IN A SERIES OF LABORATORY-

SCALE CRATERING EXPERIMENTS
Bening,R,B;Kurtz,M,K
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Livermore,CA USA 1967

[ 40] KRATERVERSUCHSREIHE - MIDDLE COURSE II - AUSWERTUNG

Sprague,K,E
USAEWES, VICKSBURY, MS
Vicksbury,MS USA 1973

[ 41] FRAGMENT AND DEBRIS HAZARDS

Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
DODESB
USA 1975

[ 42] RESPONSE OF BURIED STRUCTURES TO EARTH-PENETRATING CONVENTIONAL

WEAPONS / ESL-TR-85-09
Baylot,J,T;Kiger,S,A;Marchand,K,A;Painter,J,T
USAWES / AFESCS
Tyndal AFB,FL USA November 1985

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[ 43] BLAST RESPONSE TESTS OF REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES / METHODS

FOR REDUCING SPALL
Cotharp,D,R;Kiger,S,A;Vitayandon,K,P
2nd Symposium on Interaction of Non-Nuclear Munitions with Structures 1985
Panama City, Florida USA April 1985

[ 44] THE DEPENDENCE OF BLAST ON AMBIENT PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

Sachs,R,G
Ballistic Research Laboratory, Report 466
Aberdeen ProvGrd,MD USA 1944

[ 45] BLAST PARAMETERS FROM CYLINDRICAL CHARGES DETONATED ON THE

SURFACE OF THE GROUND
Guerke,G;Schecklinski-Glück,G
Ernst Mach Institut
Freiburg Germany June 1983

[ 46] SOME EFFECTS OF LIGHT SURROUNDS AND CASINGS ON THE BLAST FROM
EXPLOSIVES
Dewey,J,M; Johnson,O,T; Patterson,J,D
Ballistic Research Laboratories Report No 1218
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA September 1963

[ 47] AN IMPROVED COMPUTER PROGRAM TO CALCULATE THE AVERAGE BLAST

IMPULSE LOADS ACTING ON A WALL OF A CUBICLE.
Levy,S
TR 4070
Dover,NJ,Picatinny Arsen. USA May 1970

[ 48] EFFECTS OF FRANGIBLE PANELS ON INTERNAL GAS PRESSURES

Tancreto,J,E; Helseth,E,S
21st Explosives Safety Seminar, DODESB
USA August 1984

[ 49] EFFECTS OF COMBUSTIBLES ON INTERNAL QUASI-STATIC LOADS

Sandoval,N,R; Hokanson,J,C; Esparza,E,D; Baker,W,E
21st Explosives Safety Seminar, DODESB
USA August 1984

[ 50] BARRICADED AND UNBARRICADED BLAST MEASUREMENTS

Wentzel,A,B; Bessey,R,L
Southwest Research Institute, Contract No DAHC04-69-C-0028
USA October 1969

[ 51] AIRBLAST LOADING OF WALL PANELS

Forsén, Rickard
Försvarets Forskningsanstalt FOA Rapport C20586-D6
Stockholm Sweden 1985

[ 52] OBERFLÄCHENDETONATIONEN VON EXPLOSIVSTOFFLADUNGEN

Gürke,G; Schecklinski-Glück,G
EMI-Berichte 6/82,12/85,15/85,16/85,17/85,19/85
Freiburg Germany 1985

[ 53] DER LUFTSTOSS VON HEXOGENZYLINDERN MIT STAHLHÜLLEN - Casing Faktoren

Gürke,G
EMI-Bericht 13/88
Freiburg Germany 1988

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[ 54] TNT-ÄQUIVALENTFAKTOREN FÜR PROJEKTILE UNTER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG VON

FORM- UND CASINGFAKTOREN
EMI-Bericht V 2/84
Freiburg Germany 1984

[ 55] TNT-ÄQUIVALENT
Held,M
Pyrotechnics 8 pp. 158-167 (1983)
Schrobenhausen Germany 1983

[ 56] THE EFFECTS OF EARTH COVER ON THE RESPONSE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE

SLABS
Kiger,S,A
US Army Waterways Experiment Station
Vicksbury,MS USA September 1984

[ 57] ULTIMATE CAPACITY OF EARTH-COVERED SLABS

Kiger,S,A
Journal of Structural Engineering 114(1988)10
Vicksburg USA October 1988

[ 58] THE RESPONSE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES UNDER IMPULSIVE

LOADING
Millavec,W,A; Isenverg,J
Weidlinger Associates
Menlo Park,CA USA

[ 59] SYSTEMS FOR SHIELDING ABOVEGROUND STRUCTURES FROM NEAR-HIT BOMB

DETONATIONS
McVay,Mark,K
US Army Division, West Germany, ESL-TR-88-83
USA January 1989

[ 60] BLAST LOADING OF CLOSURES FOR USE ON SHELTERS - PART I -

Coulter,G,A
Ballistic Research Laboratories,ARBRL-MR-03279
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA June 1983

[ 61] UNTERSUCHUNG DER DETONATIONSÜBERTRAGUNG MITTELS DES

BLASTMESSVERFAHRENS DER WTD91-DEZ 334. - SPRENGUNG MATRA UND MK82 -
Böhlke
BWB / WTD91
Meppen Germany 1987

[ 62] AIR BLAST PARAMETERS VERSUS DISTANCE FOR HEMISPHERICAL TNT SURFACE
BURSTS
Kingery,C,N
Ballistic Research Laboratories BRL-Report No 1344
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA September 1966

[ 63] BLAST ENVIRONMENT FROM FULLY AND PARTIALLY VENTED EXPLOSIONS IN

CUBICLES
Keenan,W,A;Tancreto,J,E
CEL Technical Report R-828
Port Hueneme,CA USA November 1975

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[ 64] EXPERIMENTS USED FOR COMPARISON OF BLAST DAMAGE TO FULL SCALE AND
ONE FOURTH SCALE REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES
Forsén,R
PAPER DODES Seminar
St. Louis USA August 1990

[ 65] REVISED AIRBLAST PREDICTIONS FOR EARTH-COVERED IGLOOS

Swisdak,M jr
Naval Surface Warfare Center, 9 January, 1992
USA November 1982

[ 66] BLAST EFFECTS FROM CYLINDRICAL EXPLOSIVE CHARGES; EXPERIEMENTAL

MEASUREMENTS
Plooster,M,N
Naval Weapons Center, NWC TP 6382
USA November 1982

[ 67] EFFECTS OF TERRAIN ON BLAST PREDICTION METHODS AND PREDICTIONS

Scientific Services Inc.
Ballistic Research Laboratories, ARBRL-CR-00355
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA January 1978

[ 68] EFFECTS OF TERRAIN ON BLAST WAVES

Keefer,J,H;Watson,G,T;Coulter,G,A;King,V,L
Ballistic Research Laboratories, ARBRL-MR-02949
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA August 1979

[ 69] EXPLOSION AIR BLAST PREDICTIONS ON A PERSONAL COMPUTER AND

APPLICATIONS TO THE HENDERSON, NEVADA, INCIDENT
Reed,J;W
23rd DOD Explosives Safety Seminar
USA August 1988

[ 70] REFLECTED OVERPRESSURE IMPULSE ON A FINITE STRUCTURE

Kingery,C,N
Ballistic Research Laboratories ARBRL-TR-02537
Aberdeen, PrvGrd,MD USA 1983

[ 71] TEST DATA REPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CRITERIA FOR DESIGN BLAST LOADS -
BEHIND A BLAST DEFLECTOR WALL -
Beyer,B
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory/NCEL TM 51-8605
USA 1986

[ 72] EXPLOSIONS IN AIR

Baker,W,E
University of Texas Press
Austin,Texas USA 1973

[ 73] AIRBLAST MEASUREMENTS AND EQUIVALENCY FOR SPHERICAL CHARGES AT

SMALL SCALED DISTANCES
Esparza,E,D
22 nd Department of Defense Explosives Safety Seminar
San Antonio,Texas USA August 1986

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[ 74] DAMAGE-RISK CRITERIA FOR PERSONNEL EXPOSED TO REPEATED BLASTS

Richmond,D,R et al
20th DODES Seminar
Norfolk,VA USA August 1982

[ 75] MODEL STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE CUBICLES

Altman,F,D
Naval Weapons Laboratory, Report 1917
USA May 1964

[ 76] TECHNISCHE RICHTLINIEN FÜR DIE SICHERHEITSBEURTEILUNG VON

MUNITIONSLAGEREINRICHTUNGEN
Basler und Partner
Ernst Basler und Partner
Zürich Switzerland December 1983

[ 77] MODELLVERSUCHE FÜR OBERIRDISCHE EXPLOSIVSTOFFMAGAZINE, Teil III -

Auswertung und Resultate -
Basler & Partner
Amt für Bundesbauten, Abt. Ingenieurwesen, Bern
Zürich Switzerland March 1980

[ 78] PROPAGATION AMONG EARTHCOVERED MAGAZINES

Basler & Partner
Basler & Partner
Zürich Switzerland January 1986

[ 79] BLAST LOADING ON ABOVE GROUND BARRICADED MUNITION STORAGE

MAGAZINES
Kingery, Bulmash, Muller
Ballistic Research Laboratories, ARBRL-TR-02557
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA May 1984

[ 80] ANALYSIS AND DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HAYMAN IGLOO

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITY
Lawoer,D,J
4th International Symposium on Interaction of Non-Nuclear Munitions with Structures 1989
Panama City,Florida USA April 1989

[ 81] EFFECT OF LOW LOADING DENSITY ON BLAST PROPAGATION FROM EARTH

COVERED MAGAZINES
Kingery,C; Coulter,G
Ballistic Research Laboratories, ARBRL-TR-02453
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA December 1982

[ 82] BLAST LOADING IN EARTH COVERED MAGAZINES

Kingery,C
Ballistic Research Laboratories, ARBRL-TR-02092
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA August 1978

[ 83] DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SOIL COVER OVER BOX MAGAZINES

Keenan,W,A
DODES 19th Explosives Safety Seminar
Los Angeles,CA USA September 1980

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[ 84] BLAST PARAMETER FROM EXPLOSIONS IN MODEL EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINES

Kingery,C; Coulter,G; Watson,G,T
Ballistic Research Laboratories, ARBRL-MR-2680
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA September 1976

[ 85] EXPLOSIVE SAFETY SITING OF CORPS OF ENGINEERS STANDARD IGLOO DESIGNS

Williams,Earl,H; Farsoun,Adib; Watanabe,Wallace
DODES, Minutes of 24th Explosives Safety Seminar
St Louis,Missouri USA August 1990

[ 86] JOINT AUSTRALIAN/UK STACK FRAGMENTATION TRIALS - PHASE 4, Test 1 -

Henderson,J
ESTC Report No. 1/91
London UK November 1990

[ 87] BLAST PRESSURE QUANTITY DISTANCE REDUCTIONS FOR DOUBLE BAY UK RC-
BOX IGLOOS
Connell,M; Poynton,J
Ref UB 822/12/1/3 MC, DCES,EEB
Croydon CR9 3RR UK January 1991

[ 88] A REEXAMINATION OF THE AIRBLAST AND DEBRIS PRODUCED BY EXPLOSIONS

INSIDE EARTH-COVERED IGLOOS
Swisdak,Michael,M jr;
Naval Surface Warfare Center / Explosion Dynamics Branch
White Oak,MD USA January 1991

[ 89] MANUAL ON NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF AMMUNITION AND
EXPLOSIVES 1976/77 /AC/258-D/258
NATO Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Mil.Ammo and
Explosives
Brussels Belgium October 1976

[ 90] MUNITIONSLAGERUNG - AC/258 (ST) WP/154 (2nd REVISE)

AC/258
NATO / North Atlantic Council, Working Paper 154
Brussels Belgium 1988

[ 91] REDUCED QUANTITY DISTANCES FROM EARTH-COVERED IGLOOS

NATO
Ref: NATO/AC258-US (ST) IWP/13-82, 8 October 1982
Brussels Belgium October 1982

[ 92] DATA SUPPORTING REDUCED QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR EARTH-COVERED

IGLOOS
NATO
Ref: NATO/AC258-US-(ST) IWP78-83, 3 August, 1983
Brussels Belgium August 1983

[ 93] IGLOO TRIAL (45000 KGS COMP B IN 8 x 18M STEEL ARCH IGLOO)
NATO
TRP401 NOTS3843 (TEST 6)
Brussels Belgium July 1965

[ 94] REDUCED QUANTITY DISTANCES (QDs) FROM EARTH-COVERED IGLOOS, FAR

FIELD BLAST DATA FROM UK MODEL TRIALS IN 1976 AND 1971
NATO
Ref: NATO/AC258-UK (ST) IWP 144, 18.Juni 1984
Brussels Belgium June 1984

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[ 95] NEW MODEL IGLOO TRIALS

UK MOD
P&EE REPORT NO SXR/662/013,30.12.1971
London UK December 1971

[ 96] BLAST AND PROJECTIONS FROM MODEL IGLOOS

UK MOD
P&EE REPORT NO ETN 124/76, 25.03.1977
London UK March 1977

[ 97] WES AIR BLAST DIAGNOSTIC MEASUREMENTS USING HDAS SELF-RECORDING

TECHNOLOGY
Ingram,J;Franco,R jr
SFTP4S1 EVENT, WES AIRBLAST RECORDS FOR STACK TRIALS PHASE 4-TEST1
Woomera Australia August 1990

[ 98] COALESCED DEFENCE TRIALS 6/445 EXPLOSIVE STOREHOUSE DESIGN AND 6/447
STACK FRAGMENTATION PHASE 4-STAGE ONE, 22.MAY-5.JUNE 1990
OSD-WSR Laboratory Australia 18 October, 1990, OSD Results, Stage 2, bare Stack Far Field pressure
Australia October 1990

[ 99] ESKIMO IV TEST RESULTS

Tafoya,P,E
NCEL TR R889
Port Hueneme USA November 1981

[100] MODULAR IGLOO TEST

Lewis,M et al
SWRI No 06-247D, THE HAYMAN IGLOO TEST
USA March 1989

[101] AN AUDIT OF THE QDs TO EXPOSED SITES AT DISTANCES BETWEEN 8Q^1/3 AND
22.2Q^1/3 FROM EARTH-COVERED BUILDINGS CONTAINING AMMUNITION AND
EXPLOSIVES OF HAZ.DIV 1.1
Cantrell,F LtCol
Ref: NATO AC/258-UK (ST) IWP 195, RMCS TR DR/9
Brussels Belgium November 1987

[102] AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES SAFETY STANDARDS, DOD 6055.9-STD

US MOD
DOD 6055.9-STD, change 2, 28 October, 1988
Washington USA October 1988

[103] SCALE MODEL IGLOO MAGAZINE TESTS

ASESB Technical Paper No 4, AD 223 342

USA August 1946

[104] IGLOO AND REVETMENT TESTS

ASESB Technical Paper No 5
USA October 1946

[105] SUMMARY REPORT OF EARTH COVERED, STEEL-ARCH MAGAZINE TESTS

Sound,A,R
NOTS TP 3843, AD 619 241
USA July 1965

[106] ESKIMO I MAGAZINE SEPARATION TEST

Weals,F,H

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NWC TP 5430, April 1973

USA April 1973

[107] ESKIMO II MAGAZINE SEPARATION TEST

Weals,F,H
NWC TP 5557, September 1974
USA September 1974

[108] ESKIMO III MAGAZINE SEPARATION TEST

Weals,F,H
NWC TP 5771, February 1976
USA February 1976

[109] ESKIMO IV MAGAZINE SEPARATION TEST

Weals,F,H;Wilson,C,H
NWC TP 5873, March 1977
USA March 1977

[110] ESKIMO V MAGAZINE SEPARATION TEST

Weals,F,H;Finder,B
NWC TP 6076, February 1979, AD A070 918
USA February 1979

[111] ESKIMO VII: TEST DATA REPORT

Murtha,R,N;Beyer,M,E
NCEL TM 51-86-26
USA December 1986

[112] MK82 BUFFERED STORAGE TEST SERIES:PART I -- TECHNICAL REPORT

Lewis,M,J;Friesenhahn,G,J;Nash,P,T
MMW-TR-87-C77865A
USA December 1988

[113] MK82 BUFFERED STORAGE TEST SERIES:PART II -- TECHNICAL REPORT

Lewis,M,J;Friesenhahn,G,J;Nash,P,T
MMW-TR-87 C77865A
USA December 1988

[114] MK84 BUFFERED STORAGE TEST SERIES: PART I -- TECHNICAL REPORT

Lewis,M,J;Friesenhahn,G,J;Nasch,P,T
MMW-TR-87-50102AC
USA December 1988

[115] MK84 BUFFERED STORAGE TEST SERIES: PART II - TECHNICAL REPORT

Lewis,M,J;Friesenhahn,G,J;Nasch,P,T
MMW-TR-87-50102AC
USA December 1988

[116] MODULAR IGLOO TEST : DATA REPORT

Lewis,M,J;Friesenhahn,G,J;Nsh,P,T
MMW-TR-88-71002 AC
USA December 1988

[117] HASTINGS IGLOO HAZARDS TESTS FOR SMALL EXPOSIVE CHARGES

Reeves,H;Robinson,W
Ballistic Research Laboratories ARBRL-MR-03356
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA May 1984

[118] RESULTS OF AN EXPLOSION IN A SWEDISH MUNITION STORAGE

Vretblad,Bengt;Eriksson,Siwet

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FORTF,Sweden, Report C5:88

Stockholm Sweden August 1988

[119] THE EXPLOSION IN THE ABOVEGROUND MAGAZINE AT SAIGNELEGIER ON

OCTOBER 1, 1987
Swiss Source
Schweizer Quelle
Switzerland 1988

[120] QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINES

AstudÜbBw/BerSdAufgInfrastr
Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr, Bericht (Report)
Bergisch-Gladbach Germany August 1981

[121] VERSUCHE ZUR ERMITTLUNG DER BELASTUNG ERDEINGEDECKTER

MUNITIONSLAGERHÄUSER (MLH)
BMVg
Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Versuchsbericht (Test Report)
Bonn Germany 1981

[122] EXPLOSIVE SAFETY REGULATIONS

ESTC
ESTC Leaflet No 5 to 6
London UK December 1979

[123] DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SOIL COVER OVER BOX-SHAPED AMMUNITION MAGAZINES
Keenan,W,A;Nichols,L,C
CEL Technical Report R-878
Port Hueneme,CA USA May 1980

[124] UNTERSUCHUNG DER BELASTBARKEIT VON MUNITIONSLAGERHÄUSERN (MLH-

TYP CC) DER EHEMALIGEN WEHRMACHT IM MUNDP D.BW HOHENBRUNN
Mett, Hans-Georg
Technischer Bericht des AStudÜbBw/BerSdAufgInfrastr (Technical Report)
Cologne Germany March 1990

[125] VERSUCH DES NACHWEISES DER TRÜMMER-,SPLITTER- UND

LUFTSTOSSGEFÄHRDUNG AUSSERHALB EINES FSB-GE 3.GEN NACH DETONATION
KONVENTIONELLER MUNITION IM SHELTERINNENRAUM
Mett, Hans-Georg
Technische Untersuchung (Technical Analysis)
Cologne Germany December 1987

[126] UK (ST) IWP 240 - QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR STANDARD IGLOOS

Henderson,J
UK-MOD; Explosives Storage and Transport Committee; AC 258 Storage Sub-Group
Bromley, Kent United Kingdom March 1992

[127] UK (ST) IWP 241 - FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF QD REDUCTIONS FOR IGLOOS

Henderson,J
UK-MOD; Explosives Storage and Transport Committee; AC 258 Storage Sub-Group
Bromley, Kent United Kingdom March 1992

[128] JOINT AUS/UK STACK FRAGMENTATION TRIALS PHASE 3 REPORT

Henderson,J
ESTC-REPORT No 2/90
Bromley, Kent United Kingdom November 1990

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[129] MODELLVERSUCHE FÜR OBERIRDISCHE EXPLOSIVSTOFFMAGAZINE, TEIL II -

Daten und Fotodokumentation
Basler & Partner
Amt für Bundesbauten, Abt. Ingenieurwesen, Bern
Zürich Switzerland August 1979

[130] MODELLVERSUCHE FÜR OBERIRDISCHE EXPLOSIVSTOFFMAGAZINE, TEIL I -

Konzeption und Durchführung
Basler & Partner
Amt für Bundesbauten, Abt. Ingenieurwesen, Bern
Zürich Switzerland November 1979

[131] ERMITTLUNG DER AUSWIRKUNGEN VON DETONATIONEN IM INNERN EINES

FLUGZEUGSCHUTZBAUS DER 3. GENERATION - MODELLVERSUCHE M 1:3
(Teilberichte I bis III)
Glaser; Wilkens et al
Wehrtechnische Dienststelle 91, Dezernat 131, Contr. No E/K47C/I1009/G5125
dated 12 July, 1988
Meppen Germany July 1988

[132] UNTERSUCHUNG DER DETONATIONSÜBERTRAGUNG MITTELS DES

BLASTMESSVERFAHRENS DER WTD 91
Bölke et al
Wehrtechnische Dienststelle 91, Dezernat 334, Report No 14/87/91-334 dated 14 October, 1987
Meppen Germany October 1987

[133] LUFTSTOSSBELASTUNG NACH EINEM EXPLOSIONSUNFALL IN EINEM

ERDEINGEDECKTEN MUNITIONSLAGERHAUS / Gebrauchsformeln für Entwurf und
sicherheitstechnische Untersuchung
Mett,Hans-Georg
Amt für Studien and Übungen der Bundeswehr/Bereich Sonderaufgaben-Infrastruktur
Cologne Germany May 1992

[134] BELASTUNG ERDEINGEDECKTER MUNITIONSLAGERHÄUSER DURCH

MUNITIONSUNFÄLLE
WTD 131
Wehrtechnische Dienststelle 131, A0201/A61110
Meppen Germany September 1989

[135] EXPLOSION HAZARDS AND EVALUATION

Baker,W,E;Cox,P;Westine,P;Kulesz,J;Strehlow,R
Elseviers Scientific Publishing Company (1983)
USA 1983

[136] PREDICTION OF INJURY LEVELS FOR HUMANS IN THE VICINITY OF AN

ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION INSIDE A THIRD GENERATION NORWEGIAN SHELTER
Moseley,Patricia,K;Whitney,Mark,G
SwRI Project 02-6863 -Final Report-
Oslo Norway September 1982

[137] HANDBOOK OF HUMAN VULNERABILITY CRITERIA -Chapter 9- Projectile-Induced Blunt

Trauma
Clare,Victor,R;Lewis,James,H;Mickiewicz,A,P;Sturdivan,L,M
Handbook
Edgewood Arsenal USA May 1976

[138] AN EMPIRICAL/MATHEMATICAL MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE PROBABILITY OF SKIN

PENETRATION BY VARIOUS PROJECTILES
Lewis,James,A;Coon,Phillip,A;Clare,Victor,R;Sturdivan,L,M
ARRADCOM Technical Report ARCSL-TR-78004

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Edgewood Arsenal USA April 1978

[139] BALLISTIC LIMITS OF TISSUE AND CLOTHING

Butler,Stanley,C;
Addendum to BRL Technical Note No 1645 / AMSAA Technical Report No 230
USA July 1978

[140] METHODS FOR CALCULATION OF DAMAGE RESULTING FROM PHYSICAL EFFECTS

OF THE ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF DANGEROUS MATERIALS
Opschoor,G; Loo, R,O,M van;Pasman,H,J
TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment
Rijswijk Netherlands 1990

[141] SUMMARY OF THE STATISTICAL-MODEL FOR INJURY WITH HEAT RADIATION

TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, AC/258 (NL) (ST) IWP/5-92
Rijswijk Netherlands January 1992

[142] METHODS FOR ESTIMATING THE PHYSICAL EFFECTS OF THE ESCAPE OF

DANGEROUS MATERIALS (TNO YELLOW BOOK)
Publication of the Directorate General of Labour, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
Netherlands 1979

[143] THE IMPACT OF EXPLOSION-EFFECTS ON STRUCTURES

Mercx,W,P,M
Prins Maurits Laboratorium TNO
Rijswijk Netherlands June 1988

[144] THE EFFECT OF EXPLOSION PHENOMENA ON HUMANS

Mercx,W,P,M
Prins Maurits Laboratorium TNO
Rijswijk Netherlands June 1988

[145] STRUCTURAL VIBRATION AND DAMAGE

Steffens,R,J
Department of the Environment, Building Research
London United Kingdom 1974

[146] GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS BROKEN BY AIR BLAST

Fletcher,E,R;Richmond,D,R
Lovelance Biomedical and Environmental Research Institute
Albuquerque, NM USA 1980

[147] THE INFLUENCE OF THE WINDOW-FRAME ON THE DYNAMIC FAILURE LOAD OF

WINDOWS
Nowee,J;Harmanny,A
PML-TNO USA 1983

[148] DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS RESULTING FROM THE EXPLOSION OF A GAS-CLOUD

Dragosvic et al
IBBC-TNO
Netherlands 1976

[149] CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE FROM ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS

DODESB
DODESB, Technical Paper No 11
USA May 1975

[150] A SIMPLIFIED METHOD FOR THE PREDICTION OF THE GROUNDSHOCK LOADS ON

BURIED STRUCTURES
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Drake,J.L;Frank,R,A;Rochefort,M,A
Int. Symposium on Interaction of Conventional Munitions with Shelters
Mannheim Germany March 1987

[151] FREE-FIELD GROUND SHOCK PRESSURES FROM BURIED DETONATIONS IN

SATURATED AND UNSATURATED SOILS
Westine,P,S; Friesenhahn,G,J
San Antonio,Texas USA May 1983

[152] GROUND SHOCK FROM PENETRATING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Drake,J,L; Little,C jr
US Army Waterways Experiment Station
Vicksburg USA May 1983

[153] GROUND SHOCK FROM THE DETONATION OF BURIED EXPLOSIVES

Westine,Peter,S
Journal of Terramechanics, Vol 15 No 2
USA 1978

[154] IMPACT EFFECTS OF FRAGMENT STRIKING STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS

Williamson,R,A;Alvy,R,R
Holmes and Narver Inc
USA 1973

[155] UNTERSUCHUNGEN DER TRÜMMER- UND SPLITTERWIRKUNGEN BEI

EXPLOSIONSEREIGNISSEN IN MUNITIONSLAGERHÄUSERN
EMI-Bericht (Report) E 16/83
Freiburg Germany 1983

[156] PROCEDURES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE DEBRIS PRODUCED BY EXPLOSION

EVENTS
Swisdak,Michael,M Jr
DODES, Minutes of 24th Explosives Safety Seminar
St Louis,Missouri USA August 1990

[157] BUILDING DEBRIS HAZARD PREDICTION MODEL

Bowles, Patricia; Oswald,Charles,J;Vargas,L,M;Baker,W,E
Southwest Research Institute Project 06-2945, Government Contract DE-AC04-76DP-00487
USA November 1990

[158] DRAG COEFFICIENT MEASUREMENTS FOR TYPICAL BOMB AND PROJECTILE

FRAGMENTS
Miller, Miles,C
DODES, Minutes of 24th Explosives Safety Seminar
St Louis,Missouri USA August 1990

[159] A COMPARISON OF TWO PERSONELL INJURY CRITERIA BASED ON

FRAGMENTATION
McCleskey, Frank
DODES, Minutes of 24th Explosives Safety Seminar
St Louis,Missouri USA August 1990

[160] AN INVESTIGATION OF FRAGMENT STOPPING BARRICADES

McCleskey, Frank
DODES, Minutes of 24th Explosives Safety Seminar
St Louis,Missouri USA August 1990

[161] PREDICTION OF BUILDING DEBRIS FOR QUANTITY DISTANCE SITING

DODESB-Paper
DODESB Technical Paper No 13

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Alexandria,VA USA April 1991

[162] DRAG COEFFICIENTS FOR IRREGULAR FRAGMENTS

McCleskey,F
Naval Surfaces Weapons Center, NSWC-TR-87-89
USA February 1988

[163] GESETZE FÜR DIE MASSEN. UND FORMENVERTEILUNG VON NATÜRLICHEN

SPLITTERN
Heiser,R,Dr.
Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung WM VI 2, Handbuch Munitionsbewertung
Weil am Rhein Germany 1979

[164] AUSSENBALLISTIK DER SPLITTER

Heiser,R,Dr
Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung WM VI 2, Handbuch Munitionsbewertung
Germany 1979

[165] APPLICATION OF SIACCIS METHOD TO FLAT TRAJECTORIES

Hitchcock,H, P;Kent,R,H
Ballistic Research Laboratories, BRL Report No 114
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA August 1938

[166] THE INITIAL VELOCITIES OF FRAGMENTS FROM BOMBS, SHELLS AND GRENADES
Gurney
Ballistic Research Laboratories, BRL-R-405
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA 1943

[167] FRAGMENTATION OF SHELL CASES

Mott
Proceedings of the Royal Society
London UK 1947

[168] FRAGMENTATION HAZARDS FROM DETONATIONS OF MULTIPLE MUNITIONS IN

OPEN STORES
Feinstein,Nagacka
Armed Services Explosives Safety Board
USA 1971

[169] THE GURNEY FORMULA: VARIATIONS ON THEME BY LAGRANGE

Jacobs,S,J
Naval Ordnance Laboratory,NOLTR 74-36
White Oak,MD USA 1974

[170] METAL ACCELERATION BY CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVES

Kury,J et al
4th Symposium on Detonation, NOL
USA 1965

[171] AN IMPROVED EQUATION FOR CALCULATING FRAGMENT PROJECTION ANGLES

Randers-Pehrson,G
2nd International Symposium on Ballistics
Daytona Beach USA March 1976

[172] ÜBER DIE ZERLEGUNG VON SPRENGGESCHOSSEN

Lukanow,H;Molitz,H
Wehrtechnische Monatshefte 10/1959, p.334ff.
Germany October 1959

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[173] METODER FOR BESTÄMNING AV EN GRANATS FRAGMENTERING OCH SPLITTERNS

HASTIGHET OCH RIKTNING
Hörner,S;Kemgren,E
FOA Rapport C 2196-44
Stockholm Sweden 1967

[174] SPLITTERBALLISTIK
Held,M
Explosivstoffe 12/1967,3/1968,4/1968
Schrobenhausen Germany April 1968

[175] FRACTURE AND FRAGMENTATION UNDER SHOCK LOADING

Seaman,L
The Shock and Vibration Information Center, Pilkey "Shock and Vibration Computer Programs"
Washington USA 1975

[176] CALCULATION OF FRAGMENT VELOCITIES FROM FRAGMENTATION MUNITIONS

Karpp,R,R;Predebon,W,W
First International Symposium on Ballistics
Orlando,FL USA November 1974

[177] AIR DRAG MEASUREMENTS OF FRAGMENTS

Dunn,D,J;Porter,W,R
Ballistic Research Laboratories BRL Memorandum Report No 915
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA 1955

[178] RETARDATION OF FRAGMENTS

Braun,W,F;Charters,A,C;Thomas,R,N
Ballistic Research Laboratories BRL Report No 425
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA 1943

[179] A THEORY OF FRAGMENTATION

Mott,N,F;Linfoot,E,H
Bristol University, Extra-Mural-Group,MOS-AC-3348
USA January 1943

[180] FRAGMENTATION OF H.E. SHELLS, A THEORETICAL FORMULA FOR THE

DISTRIBUTION OF WEIGHTS OF FRAGMENTS
Mott,N,F
A.O.R.G. Memo Report No 24, MOS-AC-3642
USA March 1943

[181] EINIGE BEMERKUNGEN ZU DEN VERTEILUNGSFUNKTIONEN DER

SPLITTERGRÖSSEN
Molitz,H
Explosivstoffe 21, p.33ff.
Germany 1973

[182] THE MASS DISTRIBUTION OF FRAGMENTS FROM BOMBS, SHELLS AND GRENADES
Gurney,R,W;Sarmousakis,J,N
Ballistic Research Laboratories, BRL Report Nr 448
Aberdeen PrvGrd,MD USA 1944

[183] FRAGMENT MASS DISTRIBUTION

Huygen,R,W,G
Technologisches Laboratorium (TNO), TL 1974-15
Rijswijk Netherlands 1974

[184] FRAGMENT WEIGHT DISTRIBUTIONS FROM NATURALLY FRAGMENTING

CYLINDERS LOADED WITH VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES
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Sternberg,H,M
Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) TR 73-83
White Oak,Silv Spring,MD USA 1973

[185] MASSEN- UND FORMENVERTEILUNGEN VON SPLITTERN DER STATISCH

GESPRENGTEN 155 MM SPRENGGRANATE M 107
Senf,H
Arbeitsgruppe für ballistische Forschung ABF V 6/75
Weil am Rhein Germany 1976

[186] FRAGMENTATION DATA ANALYSIS- I. COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR MASS AND

NUMBER DISTRIBUTIONS AND EFFECTS OF ERRORS ON MASS DISTRIBUTION
Krauklis,P;Bedford,A,J
Australian Defence Scientific Service, Materials Research Laboratories (AMRL)
Report 549
Maribyrnong,Victoria Australia 1974

[187] COMPUTATION OF WEIGHT, VELOCITY AND ANGULAR DISTRIBUTIONS OF

FRAGMENTS FROM NATURALLY FRAGMENTING WEAPONS
Sternberg,H,M
Naval Ordnance Laboratory NOL TR 74-77
USA 1974

[188] SPLITTERMASSENVERTEILUNG UND SPLITTERGESCHWINDIGKEIT VON 105 MM

GRANATEN
Husman,R,E;Thomas,G,G
TNO
Netherlands 1971

[189] DARSTELLUNG DER GRÖSSENVERTEILUNG VON SPLITTERN NACH DER ROSIN-

RAMMLER-SPERLING-VERTEILUNG
Busch
Erprobungsstelle 91, E/Bal III,1,1966
Meppen Germany 1966

[190] EINE BEMERKUNG ZUR VERTEILUNGSFUNKTION DER SPLITTERGRÖSSEN

Molitz, H
ISL N 16/70
Saint Louis France 1970

[191] EINE NEUE METHODE ZUR BESTIMMUNG DER SPLITTERMASSENVERTEILUNG VON

SPLITTERMUNITION
Lindeijer,E,W;Leemans,J,S
Explosivstoffe 16,1968, S.145ff
Germany/Netherlands 1968

[192] BERECHNUNG DER SPLITTERMASSENVERTEILUNG VON SPLITTERMUNITION

Held,M
Explosivstoffe 16,1968, S.241ff
Germany 1968

[193] CONSIDERATION TO THE MASS DISTRIBUTION OF FRAGMENTS BY NATURAL-

FRAGMENTATION ON COMBINATION WITH PREFORMED FRAMGENTS
Held,M;Kühl,P
Propellants and Explosives 1, p.20ff.
Germany 1976

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[194] PHAENOMENOLOGIE DER NATÜRLICHEN SPLITTERBILDUNG

Freymond,P,H
Vortragsmanuskript im Carl-Cranz-Lehrgang "Splitterballistik" 4. -8.10.1976
(Script)
Weil am Rhein Germany 1976

[195] ENDBALLISTISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN MIT GESCHOSSSPLITTERN

Senf,H
Ernst-Mach Institut E 3/70
Weil am Rhein Germany 1970

[196] ENDBALLISTISCHE WIRKUNG VON MODELLSPLITTERN VERSCHIEDENER L/D

VERHÄLTNISSE UND SPITZENFORMEN GEGEN PANZERSTAHLPLATTEN
Rothenhäusler,H;Senf,H
ABF V 7/75
Weil am Rhein Germany 1976

[197] STATISTISCHE SPLITTERAUSWERTUNG DER SPRENGGRANATE 105 MM HE/FH 155-1,

UK-SERIE 204
Schneider,E
Ernst-Mach Institut V 7/78
Freiburg Germany 1978

[198] PRIMARY FRAGMENT CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPACT EFFECTS ON PROTECTIVE

BARRIERS
Healey,J;Werner,H;Weismann,S;Dobbs,N;Price,P
Picatinny Arsenal Technical Report No 4903
Dover USA December 1975

[199] DEBRIS HAZARDS FROM EXPLOSIONS IN ABOVE-GROUND MAGAZINES

Merz,Hans
Minutes of the 19th Explosives Seminar
Los Angeles,C USA September 1980

[200] TRÜMMERWURF BEI EXPLOSIONEN IN OBERIRDISCHEN MUNITIONSMAGAZINEN

Basler & Partner
TM 3113-34
Zürich Switzerland 1984

[201] THEORY AND COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR THE MULTIPLE DEBRIS MISSILE IMPACT
SIMULATION (MUDEMIMP)
Huang,L,C,P
Naval Facilities Engineering Command,NCEL, Program No Y0995-01-003-331
USA June 1984

[202] EXPLOSIVE FRAGMENTATION OF DIVIDING WALLS

Vargas,L,M;Hokanson,J,C;Rinder,R,M
Southwest Research Institute Project 02-5793
USA August 1980

[203] QUANTITY-DISTANCE FRAGMENT HAZARD COMPUTER PROGRAM (FRAGHAZ)

McCleskey,F
NSWC TR-87-59, Kilkeary, Scott & Associates Inc
USA February 1988

[204] PREDICTION OF CONSTRAINED SECONDARY FRAGMENT VELOCITIES

Westine,P,S;Kineke,J,H
The Shock and Vibration Bulletin, Bulletin 48, Part 2
USA September 1978

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[205] EJECTA HAZARD RANGES FROM UNDERGROUND MUNITIONS STORAGE

MAGAZINES
Joachim,Charles,E
DODES, Minutes of 24th Explosives Safety Seminar
St. Louis,Missouri USA August 1990

[206] LETHALITY OF UNPROTECTED PERSONS DUE TO DEBRIS AND FRAGMENTS

Janser,Paul,W
Basler & Partner
Zürich Switzerland August 1982

[207] DIREKTE LUFTSTOSSVERLETZUNGEN

Werner, Frank
Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg;Seminarvorträge (Seminar Presentation)
Hamburg Germany 1984

[208] HARD MISSILE IMPACT ON REINFORCED CONCRETE

Hughes,Gareth
Nuclear Engineering and Design 77 (1984)
Slough UK January 1984

[209] PENETRATION DEPTH IN CONCRETE FOR NONDEFORMABLE MISSILES

Haldar,A;Miller,Frank,J
Nuclear Engineering and Design 71 (1982)
Atlanta USA July 1982

[210] PERFORMATION OF REINFORCED CONCRETE SLABS BY RIGID MISSILES

Degen,Peter,P
Journal of the Structural Division, 106 (1980)
USA July 1980

[211] MANUAL FOR THE PREDICTION OF BLAST AND FRAGMENT LOADING ON

STRUCTURES
DOE/TIC-11268
USA 1992

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2.5.8.2 PC - Codes

[ 1] AMMORISK
NDRE
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment - Division for Weapons and Equipment Analysis of
explosion effects on all kinds of ammunition installations; lethality calculation; analysis of exposure;
risk calculation
Kjeller N

[ 2] BLASTINW
Britt,Drake et al
U.S. Army Engineers Waterways Experiment Stations (USAE WES)
Calculation of combined shock wave (multiple reflections off walls) and explosive gas pressure by HE
in a closed, non-responding, rectangular box-shaped room
Vicksburg,MS USA April 1986

[ 3] BREACH
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Calculation of required thickness of reinforced structures (aboveground and underground) due to nearby
or contact detonations; empirical findings
Cologne GE Jun 1988

[ 4] CONWEP
Hyde, David
U.S. Army Engineers Waterways Experiment Station (USAE WES)
Complex calculations of most conventional weapons effects as described in the Army TM 5-855-1 for
protective design of structures
Vicksbury,MS USA

[ 5] DISPRE
Bowles, P,M et al
Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
Calculations of initial debris parameters for accidental detonations in magazines; debris and fragment
distribution; only for small quantities, NEQ= 150 kg
San Antonio,TX USA November 1990

[ 6] FRAGHAZ
McCleskey,F
Naval Surface Warfare Center and DoDESB
Estimation of the fragment hazards produced by the inadvertent detonation of munitions stacks;
Silver Spring,MD USA February 1988

[ 7] FRANG Vers 1.0

Wager,P;Connett,J
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Calculation of a time history of gas pressure and impulse which result from an explosion inside a room;
Constant and variable venting is included.
Port Hueneme,CA USA May 1989

[ 8] FRCO_84
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Calculation of the pressure history from internal explosion considering constant and variable venting;
plot of the pressure history and the cover movement
Cologne GE January 1993

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[ 9] GASEX
Kulez,Moseley,Baker
Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
Calculation of change in velocity of each surface of a structure due to the expansion of gaseous
explosion products following a detonation within a structure
San Antonio,TX USA November 1978

[10] HEXDAM-III
Tatom,F,B;Roberts,M
Engineering Analysis Inc
Prediction of building damage to a limited range of structures, all of which are up to 200 US defined
structures
Huntsville,AL USA November 1989

[11] L_STO2
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Calculation of characteristic airblast parameters in a tunnel system from an explosion of HE in the main
tunnel entrance; plot of pressure history
Cologne GE June 1989

[12] M_EC-DET
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Prediction of pressure and impulse due to an accidental explosion in an earth-covered magazine; a
reexamination and data regression of relevant events
Cologne GE April 1992

[13] MUDEMIMP
Huang,L,C,P
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Calculation of debris dispersion including the max debris distance and the hazardous debris distance
Port Hueneme,CA USA June 1984

[14] PROMIX
Forsen,Jonasson
National Defence Research Establishment
Computation of the effects of explosions in a multi-room structure; gas pressure, leakage, venting,
building damage
Stockholm S September 1989

[15] REDIPT
Tancreto; Helseth
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Calculation of pressure-time history by simulating a variable vent opening; no calculation of shock
pressure;pre-runner of FRANG
Port Hueneme,CA USA March 1987

[16] REICON
Ross et al
USAF Armament Laboratory
Determination of response, through a variety of failure mechanisms, of a reinforced concrete structure
subjected to an explosion load;based on energy principles
Eglin AFB,FL USA December 1981

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[17] RISKANAL
TNO
TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory
Handling of the internal safety as well as the external safety for an ammunition or explosive storage
site; performance of risk or effects analysis respectively
Rijswijk NE 1990

[18] SDOF
SwRI
Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
Calculation of the response of an equivalent single-degree-of-freedom system with the resistance-
deflection characteristics determined by TMSLAB
San Antonio,TX USA

[19] SHOCK Vers 1.0

NCEL
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Calculation of blast impulse and pressure on all or part of a surface, which is bounded by one to four
non-responding reflecting surfaces
Port Hueneme,CA USA January 1988

[20] SOILCOVER
Wager
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Calculation of the soil-covered roof and one other panel (door or wall) as they break away and move out
from a structure;similar logic as in FRANG code
Port Hueneme,CA USA

[21] SPLIBALL
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Two dimensional numeric computation of final ballistic parameters and trajectories of irregular
fragments considering atmospheric drag and density
Cologne GE January 1988

[22] TMSLAB
SwRI
Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
Calculation of the resistance-deflection curve of a two-way slab following the method described in TM
5-1300
San Antonio,TX USA

[23] TRADIA
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Reproduction of the 'Debris-Energy-Number' Diagramm; Computation of ballistic parameters of debris
in case of an accidental explosion in an EC-AMMO Storage
Cologne GE September 1993

[24] TRAJ
Porzel,F,B
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Two dimensional trajectory program; prediction of the trajectories of individual fragments and debris;
ricochet; terrain effects
Port Hueneme,CA USA September 1980

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[25] TRBALL
Mett, H-G
FAF of Germany / Armed Forces Office - Infrastructure Division
Two dimensional numeric computation of final ballistic parameters and trajectories of debris
considering atmospheric drag and density
Cologne GE January 1988

[26] VAULTVENT
Oswald, Ketchum,White
Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
Calculation of pressure history of a gasoline vapor explosion within a rectangular vault by considering
the combustion process and the vault structural response
San Antonio, TX USA January 1991

[27] WATOMA
Basler & Partner
Basler & Partner
Calculation of the fragmentation of a build□rom an internal explosion; fragments distribution
Zürich CH 1984

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2.5.8.3. Figures

FIGURES

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2.5.8.4 Tables
TABLE [5-1]

FRAGMENT PERFORATION THROUGH WALL AND ROOF

(calculation with Ref [1])
AMMUNITION R(m) REQUIRED MEMBER THICKNESS (m)
concrete/brick steel sand wood
GP-Bomb 500 kg 5 0.29 0.070 0.78 1.31
20 0.23 0.058 0.77 1.23
GP-Bomb 250 kg 5 0.20 0.052 0.55 0.73
20 0.15 0.040 0.51 0.66
Art Round 5 0.12 0.030 0.59 1.08
155 mm 20 0.10 0.025 0.55 1.02

TABLE [5-2]

-TNT- EQUIVALENT WEIGHT FACTORS FOR FREE AIR EFFECTS

Ref [1], [3], [89]

MATERIAL PEAK PRESSURE IMPULS PRESSURE RANGE

Equivalent Mass [MPa]
ANFO (9416 Am/Ni/
Fuel Oil 0.82 0.82 0.007 - 0.700
Composition A-3 1.09 1.07 0.035 - 0.350
Composition B 1.11 0.98 0.035 - 0.350
Composition C-4 1.37 1.19 0.070 - 0.700
1)
Cyclotol 70/30 1.14 1.09 0.035 - 0.350
Comp B / TiH2 70/30 1.13 1.13 -
Explosive D 0.85 0.81 -
HBX-1 1.17 1.16 0.035 - 0.140
HBX-3 1.14 0.97 0.035 - 0.176
H-6 1.38 1.15 0.035 - 0.700
Minol II 1.20 1.11 0.021 - 0.140
2)
Octol 70/30 1.06 1.06 e)
Octol 75/25 1.06 1.06 e)
Pentolite 1.42 1.00 0.035 - 0.700
Pentolite 1.38 1.14 0.035 - 4.219
PETN 1.27 - 0.035 - 0.700
Picratol 0.90 0.93 -
RDX 1.14 1.09 -
RDX/5 Wax 1.19 1.16 -
RDX/Wax 98/2 1.19 1.16 -
Tetryl 1.07 - 0.021 - 0.140
3)
Tetrytol 75/25 1.06 - e)
Tetrytol 70/30 1.06 - e)
Tetrytol 65/35 1.06 - e)
TNETB 1.36 1.10 0.035 - 0.700
TNT 1.00 1.00 Standard
Torpex II 1.23 1.28 -
TRITONAL 80/20 1.07 0.96 0.035 - 0.700

1)
RDX / TNT
2)
HMX / TNT
3)
TETRYL / TNT
e) estimated
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TABLE [5-3]

BLAST WAVE ATTENUATION CONSTANT VS. NORMALISED SIDE-ON PRESSURE

(Pso/Pa) 1) ß (Pso/Pa) 1) ß (Pso/Pa) 1) ß

67.90 8.90 3.46 3.49 0.161 0.382
37.20 8.75 2.05 2.06 0.062 0.098
20.40 9.31 1.38 1.58 0.037 0.117
11.90 10.58 0.77 0.32 0.026 0.111
7.28 7.47 0.51 1.05 0.020 0.149

Ref [3]
1)
Pa = Ambient Pressure

TABLE [5-4]

RECOMMENDED VALUES FOR 'SIDE-ON'

DRAG COEFFICIENTS
Ref [1], [3]

PEAK DYNAMIC PRESSURE DRAG

COEFFICIENT
[MPa] [psi] [--]
0 - 0.18 0 - 25 - 0.4
0.18 - 0.35 25 - 50 -0.3
0.35 - 0.70 50 - 100 -0.2

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TABLE [5-5]

POLYNOMINAL EQUATIONS FOR COMPUTING AIRBLAST PARAMETERS

Ref [3]

HEMISPHERICAL SURFACE BURST

Functions to represent the airblast parameters versus distance in meters for a 1-kilogram
TNT hemispherical surface burst are presented in the following equations. The values in
parentheses convert the equations to English units. Substituting the parenthesized values
for the constants Ko and Co, convert the equations to provide the surface burst parameters
for a one pound TNT hemispherical charge versus distance in feet.

In general,

T = common logarithm of the distance in meters

U = Ko + K1T

Y = common logarithm of the airblast parameter in metric units

Y = Co + C1U + …CNUN

1. Incident Pressure (kPa, psi)

(0.170 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.0674 - 40.0 meters

(-0756579301809)
U = -0.214362789151+ 1.35034249993T

(1.9422502013)
Y = 2.78076916577 - 1.6958988741U - 0.154159376846U2
+ 0.514060730593U3 + 0.0988534365274U4
- 0.293912623038U5 - 0.0268112345019U6
+ 0.109097496421U7 + 0.00162846756311U8
- 0.0214631030242U9 + 0.0001456723382U10
+ 0.00167847752266U11

2. Incident Impulse (kPa - msec, psi - msec)

Two funktions are required:

Function I

(0.170 - 2.41 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.0674 - 0.955 meters

(0.832468843425)
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U = 2.06761908721 + 3.0760329666T

(1.57159240621)
Y = 2.52455620925 - 0.502992763686U + 0.171335645235U2
+ 0.0450176963051U3 - 0.0118964626402U4

Function II

(2.41 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.955 - 40.0 meters

(-2.91358616806)
U = 1.94708846747 + 2.40697745406T

(0.719852655584)
Y = 1.67281645863 - 0.384519026965U - 0.0260816706301U2
+ 0.00595798753822U3 + 0.014544526107U4
- 0.00663289334734U5 - 0.00284189327204U6
+ 0.0013644816227U7

3. Reflected Pressure (kPa, psi)

(0.170 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.0674 - 40.0 meters

(-0.789312405513)
U = 0.24657322658 + 1.36637719229T

(2.56431321138)
Y = 3.40283217581 - 2.21030870597U - 0.218536586295U2
+ 0.895319589372U3 + 0.24989009775U4
- 0.569249436807U5 - 0.11791682383U6
+ 0.224131161411U7 + 0.0245620259375U8
- 0.0455116002694U9 - 0.00190930738887U10
+ 0.00361471193389U11

4. Reflected Impulse (kPa - msec, psi - msec)

(0.170 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.0674 - 40.0 meters

(-0.781951689212
U = -0.246208804814 + 1.33422049854T

(1.75291677799)
Y = 2.70588058103 - 0.949516092853U + 0.112136118689U2
- 0.0250659183287U3

5. Shock Front Velocity (m/msec, ft/msec)

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 AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

(0.170 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.0674 - 40.0 meters

(-0.755684472698)
U = -0.202425716178 + 1.37784223635T

(0.449774310005)
Y = -0.06621072854 - 0.698029762594U + 0.158916781906U2
+ 0.443812098136U3 - 0.113402023921U4
- 0.369887075049U5 + 0.129230567449U6
+ 0.19857981197U7 - 0.0867636217397U8
- 0.0620391900135U9 + 0.0307482926566U10
+ 0.0102657234407U11 - 0.00546533250772U12
- 0.000693180974U13 + 0.0003847494916U14

6. Arrival Time (msec)

(0.170 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.0674 - 40.0 meters

(-0.755684472698)
U = -0.202425716178 + 1.37784223635T

(-0.173607601251)
Y = -0.0591634288046 + 1.35706496258U + 0.052492798645U2
- 0.196563954086U3 - 0.0601770052288U4
+ 0.0696360270981U5 + 0.0215297490092U6
- 0.0161658930785U7 - 0.00232531970294U8
+ 0.00147752067524U9

7. Positive Phase Duration (msec)

Three functions are required:

Function I

(0.450 - 2.54 feet)

Range of applicability: 0.178 - 1.01 meters

(-0.1790217052)
U = 1.92946154068 + 5.25099193925T

(-0.728671776005)
Y = -0.614227603559 + 0.130143717675U + 0.134872511954U2
+ 0.0391574276906U3 - 0.00475933664702U4
- 0.00428144598008U5

Function II
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 AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

(2.54 - 7.00 feet)

Range of applicability: 1.01 - 2.78 meters

(-5.85909812338)
U = -2.12492525216 + 9.2996288611T

(0.20096507334)
Y = 0.315409245784 - 0.0297944268976U + 0.030632954288U2
+ 0.0183405574086U3 - 0.0173964666211U4
- 0.00106321963633U5 + 0.00562060030977U6
+ 0.0001618217499U7 - 0.0006860188944U8

Function III

(7.00 - 100.0 feet)

Range of applicability: 2.78 - 40.0 meters

(-4.92699491141)
U = -3.53626218091 + 3.46349745571T

(0.572462469964)
Y = 0.686906642409 + 0.0933035304009U - 0.0005849420883U2
- 0.00226884995013U3 - 0.00295908591505U4
+ 0.00148029868929U5

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TABLE: [5-6]

FRAGMENTATION RELATED EXPLOSIVE CONSTANTS

EXPLOSIVE DENSITY Bx G
MOTT-Constant GURNEY-Constant
1b/ft3 k/m3 √1b/ft7/6 √kg/m7/6 ft/s m/s
AMATOL 106.74 1710 1.589 4.279 6190 1886
BARATOL 164.17 2630 2.324 6.260 5200 1585
COMPOSITION A-3 (RDX/WAX) 99.88 1600 0.998 2.688 8629 2630
COMPOSITION B (RDX/TNT/WAX) 106.74 1710 1.007 2.712 9100 2774
COMPOSITION C-3 99.88 1600 - - 8800 2682
COMPOSITION C-4 106.74 1710 - - 8300 2530
CYCLONITE (RDX) 106.74 1710 - - 9300 2835
CYCLOTOL (75/25) (RDX/TNT) 109.49 1754 0.895 2.410 8900 2713
CYCLOTOL (20/80) (RDX/TNT) 106.74 1710 - - 8380 2554
CYCLOTOL (60/40) (RDX/TNT) 106.74 1710 1.226 3.301 7880 2402
H-6 (RDX/TNT/AL/WAX) 106.74 1710 1.253 3.375 8600 2621
HBX-1 (RDX/TNT/AL/WAX) 106.12 1700 1.161 3.127 8100 2469
HBX-3 (RDX/TNT/AL/WAX) 112.98 1810 1.466 3.949 6509 1984
HMX 106.74 1710 - - 9750 2972
HTA-3 106.74 1710 - - 8500 2591
MINOL II (AN/TNT/AL) 104.86 1680 - - 8300 2530
NITROMETHANE 106.74 1710 - - 7900 2408
OCTOL (75/25) 113.67 1821 - - 9500 2896
PBX-9404 (Plast.Bonded HMX) 106.74 1710 - - 9500 2895
PENTOLITE (50/50) (TNT/PETN) 104.24 1670 1.126 3.032 8400 2560
PETN 106.74 1710 1.126 3.033 9600 2926
PICRATOL 106.74 1710 - - 7600 2316
PTX-1 (RDX/TETRYL/TNT) 106.74 1710 1.007 2.712 - -
PTX-2 (RDX/PETN/TNT) 106.74 1710 1.031 2.778 - -
RDX 106.74 1710 0.963 2.594 9600 2926
TACOT 106.74 1710 - - 7000 2134
TETRYL 106.74 1710 1.236 3.329 8200 2499
TETRYTOL 106.74 1710 - - - -
TNT 106.74 1710 1.416 3.815 8000 2438
TORPEX-2 (RDX/TNT/AL) 106.74 1710 1.415 3.811 8800 2682
TRIMONITE No 1 106.74 1710 - - 3400 1036
TRITONAL 106.74 1710 - - 7600 2316

TABLE [5-7]

BALLISTIC DENSITY FACTOR -k- / Ref[89]

k (g/cmˆ3) Type of Ammunition
2.61 forged steel projektiles
fragmentation bombs
2.33 demolition bomb
4.27 steel cube
5.89 steel sphere

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TABLE [5-8]

GEOMETRICAL CONSTANT -n- / Ref [3]

1 for planar geometry
2 cylindrical geometry
3 spherical geometry

TABLE [5-9]

BALLISTIC DRAG COEFFICIENT CD

Ref [164]

DRAG COEFFICIENTS DRAG COEFFICIENTS

for SPHERE for ROTATING CYLINDER (h=D)
v [m/s] CD M CD
0 0,46 0,1 - 0,6 0,80
100 0,48 0,6 - 0,8 0,82
170 0,50 0,8 - 0,9 0,86
255 0,62 0,9 - 1,0 0,915
340 0,80 1,0 - 1,1 1,035
425 0,96 1,1 - 1,2 1,18
510 1,00 1,2 - 1,3 1,265
680 1,02 1,3 - 1,4 1,315
1020 0,98 1,4 - 2,8 1,195
1430 0,92 2,8 - 5,6 1,065
3060 0,92 5,6 - 11,2 1,04

DRAG COEFFICIENTS DRAG COEFFICIENTS

for ROTATING CUBE for CUBE
M CD v [m/s] CD
0,1 - 0,2 0,80 0 0,78
0,2 - 0,4 0,82 170 0,80
0,4 - 0,6 0,845 272 0,92
0,6 - 0,8 0,88 340 1,14
0,8 - 0,9 0,975 408 1,26
0,9 - 1,0 1,075 476 1,28
1,0 - 1,1 1,16 613 1,22
1,1 -1,2 1,225 680 1,16
1,2 - 1,3 1,245 783 1,12
1,3 - 1,4 1,245 1500 1,08
1,4 - 2,8 1,175 3060 1,08
2,8 - 5,6 1,12
5,6 - 11,2 1,11

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DRAG COEFFICIENTS DRAG COEFFICIENTS

for IRREGULAR FRAGMENTS for IRREGULAR FRAGMENTS
M CD v [m/s] CD
0,1 - 0,2 0,85 0 1,08
0,2 - 0,4 0,86 204 1,08
0,4 - 0,6 0,90 272 1,12
0,6 - 0,8 1,10 340 1,24
0,8 - 0,9 1,25 408 1,36
0,9 - 1,0 1,33 476 1,40
1,0 - 1,1 1,385 544 1,40
1,1 -1,2 1,415 680 1,36
1,2 - 1,3 1,42 1020 1,28
1,3 - 1,4 1,40 1700 1,20
1,4 - 2,8 1,29 3060 1,12
2,8 - 5,6 1,15
5,6 - 11,2 1,115

TABLE [5-10]

DOB EJECTA WITHIN CRATER LIP AREA Ref [89]

mass distribution distance from SGZ
GOF 40% 2 to 4 · Ra
Optimal 90% 2 to 4 · Ra

SGZ surface ground zero

Ra apparent crater radius
GOF ground surface

TABLE [5-11]

DYNAMIC INCREASE FACTOR DIF

Material DIF
RC - slabs 2.5
steel plate 2.5
wood 1.75

TABLE [5-12]

PREDICTION EQUATIONS FOR AIR-BLAST-INDUCED GROUND SHOCK

direction displacement velocity acceleration
max. D (m) max. U (m/s) max. A (g)
Is Pso 1) 122·Pso
vertical Dv = cp·rho VV=
cp·rho A V = cp·rho

horizontal Dh = Dv·F1 Vh = Vv·F1 Ah = Av·F1

F1 = tan· [ sin-1 · (cp / U ) ]

Notes:
1) - The equation for maximum vertical acceleration is valid for dry soil. For saturated soils
and rock doubling of the acceleration values is recommended.

2) - For all cases > F1 = tan · [ sin-1 · ( cp / U) ] ≥ 1 the horizontal quantities of motion will be
equated with the vertical quantities.
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- Seismic velocities and soil densities are presented in TABLE [7-13]. For conservative
estimation of the quantities of motion the minor values of the velocity should be taken.

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TABLE [5-13]

SOIL AND ROCK PROPERTIES FROM EXPLOSIONS TESTS

Ref [1], [3], [30]

SOIL DESCRIPTION DRY TOTAL AIR SEISMIC ACCOUSTIC Attenuation

UNIT UNIT FILLED VELOCITY IMPEDANCE Coefficient
MASS MASS VOIDS
Dry desert alluvium and playa 1394 1490 >25 640 a) 954 3 - 3.25
Partially cemented 1394 1602 >25 1280 2051 3 - 3.25
Loose, dry, poorly graded sand 1282 1442 >30 183 264 3 - 3.5
Loose, dry sands and gravels with -- 1490 - 183 273 3.1
low relative density
Loose, wet, poorly graded sand 1554 1858 10 152 283 3
with free standing water 1554 1858 10 183 340 3
Dense dry sand, poorly graded 1586 1666 32 274 457 2.5 - 2.75
" 1586 1666 32 396 660 2.5 - 2.75
Dense wet sand, poorly graded, with 1730 1986 9 305 605 2.75
free-standing water
Very dense dry sand, relative density 1682 1746 30 488 852 2.5
= 100%
Dense sand (high relative density) -- 2030 - 488 991 2.5
Sandy loam, loess, dry sands, and -- 1630 - 305 498 2.75
back fill
Silty clay, wet 1522 1922 9 213 410 2.75 - 3
" 1602 2003 9 274 549 2.75 - 3
Moist loess, clayey sand 1602 1954 5-10 305 596 2.75 - 3
Wet sandy clay with >4% air voids -- 1990 >4% 549 1093 2.5
Wet sandy clay, above water table 1522 1922 4 549 1055 2.5
" 2003 -- 4 - - 2.5
Saturated sand-below water table -- -- 1-4 b) 1494 - 2.25 - 2.5
(b.w.t.) in marsh
Saturated sandy clay - b.w.t c) 1250 1762 1-2 1524 2686 2 -2.5
" 1602 1986 1-2 829 3633 2 -2.5
Saturated sandy clays and sands -- 1920 <1% 1524 2926 2.4
with 1% air voids
Saturated sandy clay - b.w.t. c) 1602 2003 <1 1524 3052 1.5
" 1602 - <1 2017 - 1.5
Saturated stiff clay, saturated clay- -- 1922 0 1524 2930 1.5
shale
" -- 2083 0 1524 3174 1.5
Heavy saturated clays and clay -- 2030 - 1829 3712 1.5
shales
Shale and marl -- 2320 - 1800-5300 4175-12296
Basalt -- 2740 - 5400 14796
Granite -- 2640 - 5100 13464
Cointed Granite -- 2640 - 2400-4600 6336-12144
Limestone -- 2400 - 5200 12480
Limestone-chalk -- 2100 - 2100-6400 4410-13440
Sandstone -- 2400 - 5760 13824
Volcanic rock -- 2400 - 3000-6700 7200-16080
Sound plutonic rocks -- 2700 - 4000-7600 10800-20520
Weathered rocks -- 2300 - 600-3100 1380-7130
Concrete -- 2400 - ≈3500 8400
Water -- 1000 - 1460 1460
a) High because of cementation b) Estimated c) b.w.t. - below water table

rho,deb = 0.36 · Ma · (0.58) · e(-0..047·R·Q ) (kg / m2) eq [5-59]

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TABLE [5-14]

PREDICTION EQUATIONS for DIRECT-INDUCED GROUND SHOCK

medium displacement Velocity Acceleration
max. D (m) max. V (m/s) max. A (g)
vertical parameters of motion: Dv (m), VV (m/s), AV (g)
ROCK (RG·Q)^1/3 - -
37000·ZG^1/3
SOIL (RG·Q)^1/3 - -
1000·ZG^2.3
ALL - 0.95 1200
ZG^1.5 ZG · RG
horizontal parameters of motion: Dh (m), Vh (m/s), Ah (g)
ROCK 0.5 · DV VV AV
SOIL DV VV -
DRY SOIL - VV 0.5 · AV
WET SOIL - VV AV
& ROCK - VV AV

RG = ground range ZG = scaled distance above ground

TABLE [5-15]

LETHALITY DUE TO IMPACT ENERGY

LETHALITY IMPACT ENERGY / KINTETIC ENERGY
p (Joule)
% HEAD CHEST ABDOMEN LIMBS
1 55 58 105 155
5 65 90 140 240
20 79 140 200 380
50 100 230 280 620
99 200 850 850 2500

TABLE [5-16]

THRESHOLD FOR SHOCK LOADING ON PERSONNEL

DAMAGE CRITICAL IMPACT
VELOCITY
Vi,cr (m/s)
Minor ≤ 3.0
Threshold 4.0
50% Skull Injury 5.5
100% Skull Injury 7.0

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THREAT ACCELERATION
a (g)
Loss of Balance
- nuclear, horizontal 0.5
- nuclear, vertical 1.0

CRITICAL OSCILLATION TOLERANCES for PERSONNEL

Acceleration (g) Frequency (Hz)
2 < 10
5 10 - 20
7 20 - 40
10 > 40

TABLE [5-17] ; Ref [89]

RADIANT ENERGY REQUIRED TO CAUSE FLASH

BURNS
PERIOD RADIATION ENERGY DEGREE OF
tw (s) (kWs/m2) (cal/cm2) BURN
tw< 1 s 62.8 1.5 1
125.6 3.0 2
188.4 4.5 3
tw ≈ 5 s 125.6 3.0 1
251.2 6.0 2
376.7 9.0 3
Source: AC/258 Corr No 7

TABLE [5-18]

q
RADIATION INTENSITY (kW·s / m2)
tw
DEGREE OF PROBABILITY OF INCIDENT
BURN 1% 50% 99%
1st degree 38.5 68.8 122.7
2nd degree 87.8 156.4 278.6
3rd degree 92.8 184.5 364.1
tw = active duration of the radiation

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TABLE [5-19]

Symbols: X occasional C heavy damage

A minor damage D destruction
B medium damage
DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS DUE TO OVERPRESSURE
[kPa]
OBJECT X A B C D
glass 0.2 - - - - large window
glass, typical 1.1 - - 3.5-7.0
window frame 0.5 - - - -
window frame - 10.6 - - -
door frame - 10.6 - - -
door, window - - - - 6.0-9.0 distorted
plaster - 3.5-7.0 - - -
tiles (roof) - 3.0 - 5.3 - 0%-50% tiles displaced
dwelling house - 3.0*) 8.1**) 36.6**) 80.9**)
wall, ceiling - - - 14.1 - partial
concrete wall - - - 14-21 - Plain concrete, s=0.2-0.3 m
unreinforced build. - - - - 70.3 completely demolished
brick wall - - - 56.3 70.3 completely demolished
brick wall, 20-30 cm - - - - 56.3 fail by flexure
brick wall, 45 cm - - - - 91.42 completely demolished
steel building - 9.1 14.0 17.6 21.1
wooden building - - 12.0 17.0 28.0
building - - 70.0 - - block building
factory chimney - 14.0 - - -
industrial building - - 28.0 - -
administr. building - - 38.0 - -
brick building - - 28.0 - -
RC-structures - - 38.0 53.0 -
steel girder build. - - - 31.6 63.3
cladding of build. - 7.0 - - 14.1
heavy bridge - - - - 492.3 masonry or concrete
steel truss bridge - - - - 63.3 collapse
motor vehicle - 28.2 35.2 70.3 - severe displacement,
crushed
rail car - 18.3 39.4 60.5 77.4
wooden utility pole - 28.0 - - snapped
power mast - 28.0 - - snapped
radio mast - 14.0 - - - snapped
oil storage tank - 6.3 21.0 24.6 28.1
tree - - - 21.1 175.8 90% blown down
*)
inhabitable **) uninhabitable

TABLE [5-20]
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DAMAGE THRESHOLD for DIRECT-INDUCED GROUND SHOCK / Ref [89]

DAMAGE max. VELOCITY SCALED DISTANCE
vertical/horizontal
Vmax (m/s) Z (m/kg^1/3)
no ≤ 0.05 6.9
minor/medium 0.05 - 0.14 3.6
heavy 0.14 - 0.19 2.9

TABLE [5-21]

DAMAGE THRESHOLD for AIR-BLAST-INDUCED GROUND SHOCK

( for -3- selected soils ) Ref [89]
DAMAGE SCALED DISTANCE
VV/h,max
Z (m/kg^1/3)
(m/s) soil -1- soil -2- soil -3-
no ≤ 0.05 5.7 2.7 1.5
minor/medium 0.05-0.14 3.4 1.7 1.0
heavy 0.14-0.19 2.9 1.5 0.8

No TYPE OF SOIL DENSITY SEISMIC VELOCITY

rho cp
(kg/m^1/3) (m/s)
1 soil 1520 460
2 saturated soil 2000 1520
3 rock 2560 4000

TABLE [5-22]

CRITICAL OSCILLATING VELOCITY

- dwelling and business building 0.008 m/s
- braced buildings with heavy
components
braced skeleton buildings 0.030 m/s
- historical buildings/monuments 0.004 m/s

TABLE [5-23]

CRITICAL OSCILLATING VELOCITY ON BASE Ref [10]

- individual, minor damage 0.070 m/s
- damage threshold = 0.140 m/s
- 50% structural damage = 0.180 m/s

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TABLE [5-24]

CRITICAL SOIL PARTICLE VELOCITIES FOR AMMUNITION

STORAGE BUILDINGS Ref [78]
QUALITY OF STRUCTURE max. VELOCITY of
soil particles
V (m/s)
- no damage < 0.2
- rigid frame prefabricated concrete 0.2 - 1.5
buildings
- heavy reinforced concrete 3.0
magazines

TABLE [5-25]

SHOCK TOLERANCES FOR SELECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT DAMAGE FREQUENCY
a (g) fmin
no heavy (Hz)
- heavy weight machinery 10 80 5
· engines, generators,
· transformers
M > 2000 kg
- medium weight machinery 15 120 10
· pumps, condensers,
· air conditioners
M ≈ 500 - 2000 kg
- light weight machinery 30 200 15
· small engines
M > 500 kg
- duct work, piping, 20 280 5
storage batteries
- electronic equipment, relays, 2 20 10
magnetic drum units, racks of
communication equipment

a (g) acceleration ; fmin (Hz) minimum natural frequency

TABLE [5-26]

CRITICAL RADIATION INTENSITY

q (kW / m2)
MATERIAL CLASS -1- CLASS -2-
wood 15 2
plastics 15 2
glass 4 -
steel 100 25

TABLE [5-27]

CRITICAL PROPAGATION IMPACT PARAMETERS

IMPACT VELOCITY ENERGY IMPULS
Vi (m/s) Ekin (J) I (Ns)
≤ 50 m/s ---- 100
≥ 50 m/s 2500 ---

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CHAPTER 6 - OPERATIONS IN AN EXPLOSIVES AREA

Section I - Introduction

2.6.1.1. General

The purpose of this chapter is to provide management and administration considerations for the guidance of
National Authorities in the promotion of safe and efficient operations in explosives areas. This chapter contains a list of
considerations which may serve as an aid to users in the preparation of national regulations on the subject.

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Section II - General Safety Precautions

2.6.2.1. Responsibilities of Commanding Officers/Superintendents

The Commanding Officer/Superintendent of an ammunition facility has primary responsibility for safe
working and storage conditions within the facility. The following actions should normally be taken:

1. Establish and enforce personnel limits for explosives facilities.

2. Establish and enforce explosives limits for all magazines, transit sheds/areas, outside stacks or
hardstands, workshops, laboratories and proof areas.

3. Ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are prepared, displayed in buildings and
enforced for all examination, repair, renovation, modification, disassembly, assembly, proof and
disposal (by breakdown, burning, or demolition) of ammunition and explosives.

4. Review periodically working conditions within the explosives area.

5. Maintain blueprints, maps, or drawings showing the locations of all buildings in the explosives
area, and the distances to public traffic routes, inhabited and uninhabited buildings on and off
defence property.

6. Maintain Standing Orders to take account of local conditions and supplement national or other
orders pertaining to the operation of the facility.

7. Implement an ammunition safety programme with a system of accident, incident, defect and
malfunction reports and investigations.

2.6.2.2. Safety Responsibilities

a) All personnel in the course of their duty who are required to handle ammunition or explosives should have a
detailed knowledge of orders or directives issued to reduce the inherent hazards associated with the work.

b) A high degree of care must be demanded of personnel who are in charge of, or are handling ammunition,
where even a slight degree of negligence involves danger to life or damage to property.

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c) It is the responsibility of all personnel to maintain vigilance to improve and develop safe practices, methods
and attitudes.

2.6.2.3. Admission to Explosives Areas

a) No person shall enter an explosives area except by authorized entrances and only then under authority of a
pass issued by the Commanding Officer, Superintendent or Officer in charge.

b) Any person showing the least signs of intoxication or impairment from drugs shall not be admitted to
explosives areas.

2.6.2.4. Personnel Employed in Explosives Areas

A person should not be employed in the explosives area unless the Commanding Officer/Superintendent is
satisfied that the person is suitable for such employment.

2.6.2.5. Prohibited and Restricted Articles

a) No stores, other than explosives, which have been properly classified and authorized for storage therein, and
such tools, appliances and materials as are authorized from time to time, are to be permitted into an
explosives area.
b) In particular admission of the following is to be prohibited or strictly controlled:

1. Oil or gas filled lighting, heating or burning appliances and all flame, spark or fire producing
appliances.
2. Matches, cigarettes and other portable means of producing spark or flame.
3. Radio transmitters and receivers.
4. Tobacco in any form and any article used for the purpose of smoking or carrying tobacco.
5. Beers, wines and alcoholic liquor.
6. Motor spirit, flammable oils and solvents not contained in the fuel tank of a vehicle or in a sealed
container.
7. Fire arms.
8. Cameras.
9. Drugs and medicines.
10. Food and drink unless for sale or consumption in official canteens or refreshment areas.
11. Battery operated equipment e.g. hearing aids, calculators.

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2.6.2.6. Food and Drink

When approved by national regulations canteens or lunch rooms may be located within the explosives area.
These may, under stringent controls, be authorized as smoking areas.

2.6.2.7. Smoking

a) Smoking inside explosives areas is strictly forbidden except in authorized smoking areas.

b) Prominent signs should be displayed at each exit from the smoking area with the wording "NO SMOKING
BEYOND THIS POINT". A sign with the wording "WARNING NO LIVE AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES ARE PERMITTED IN THIS AREA" should be placed on or near the doors leading into the
smoking area.

2.6.2.8. Employee Working Alone

No one person should be permitted to work alone (where another person cannot provide immediate assistance
in case of an accident) in explosives workshop or laboratory operations which involve the assembly or breakdown of
ammunition or the exposure of explosive fillings, or in any other operation which involves the opening of packages and
the exposure of loose ammunition.

2.6.2.9. Photography

Photographs taken within the explosives area should be restricted to those required for official purposes.
Where explosives are exposed, electro-explosive devices (EED) are involved or explosive or flammable gases may be
present, the use of cameras with electrically operated equipment should be avoided unless specially approved for the
purpose.

2.6.2.10. Portable Hand Lights

Portable hand lights may be used within the explosives area if they are of a design that meets the national
electrical requirements for the particular building/area in which they are to be used.

2.6.2.11. Wearing of Rings and Other Jewellery

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It is general good industrial safety practice to discourage the wearing of rings and other jewellery by personnel
employed in explosives workshops.

2.6.2.12. Battery Operated Devices

Battery operated devices may be used in locations within the explosives area at the discretion of the
Commanding Officer/Superintendent. Only "intrinsically safe" devices should be approved for use in those areas where
EED, explosive dust or other conditions which might give rise to an explosion are present. To be "intrinsically safe" the
device should be incapable of producing sufficient energy to initiate an explosion.

2.6.2.13. Thunderstorms

a) At the discretion of National Authorities, work involving explosives and in buildings containing explosives
should cease during thunderstorms and personnel evacuated to a suitable location at the appropriate distance
from PES.

b) Truck loads of ammunition should be moved under cover. Loads which must be left in the open should be
covered with tarpaulins.

2.6.2.14. Private Motor Vehicles

Standing Orders should include regulations to cover local conditions for the certification, control and use of
private vehicles in the explosives area.

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Section III - Arrangement of Ammunition and Explosives in a Building or Stack

2.6.3.1. Ammunition and Explosives Storage - General

Ammunition and explosives should be stored only in locations designated for that purpose. The types and
quantities of materiel which may be stored in these locations must be in accordance with the quantity-distance
requirements prescribed in this Manual or appropriate national publications.

2.6.3.2. Use of Magazines

a) Magazines are intended for the storage of ammunition and explosives including explosive components and
should not be used for the storage of non-explosive stores unless no other suitable accomodation is
available. Explosive items and their related non-explosive components may be stored together in the same
magazine, for example, aircraft bombs and their tail units. To preclude errors when issuing, dummy, display
and other inert ammunition should not be stored in the same building with their live counterpart. Inert
ammunition should normally be stored in non-explosive storehouses.

b) Ammunition and explosives, packages and containers should be properly marked, in good repair and free
from loose dirt, grit or other contamination before being stored in magazines. Any broken or damaged
packages or containers should be repacked, before being accepted into a magazine, unless the damage is
slight and does not adversely affect the protective qualities of the package. Repacking should not be carried
out in the magazine.

2.6.3.3. Ammunition Stacking

a) Ammunition and explosives should be stored in stable stacks in magazines in an approved manner which
precludes toppling or collapse of the stacks, or the crushing or deforming of the containers in the lower tiers.
Dunnage should be used to secure the stacks. When a specified method of stacking a particular item is not
prescribed, explosives and ammunition should be stacked in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Ammunition and explosives should be stored in their approved ontainers and should be separated
in stacks by nature, type, and lot number. All containers should be closed and sealed by suitable
means.

2. Sufficient space should be left between ammunition stacks and the floor, ceiling and walls of the
magazine to permit air circulation. Additional space may be provided for inspection etc., as
required by national regulations.

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3. Ammunition stacks should be placed at least 1 m from doorways to provide protection from
direct sunlight, rain etc. when doors are open.

4. Light cased phosphorus filled ammunition should be in double rows to permit rapid identification
and removal of leaking packages. Stack heights should not exceed 2 m or one pallet. Pallets
should be arranged in single lines with sufficient room between each line to permit the removal of
any container showing signs of leakage. Suitable tools to cut the strapping should be readily
available in the building.

5. Partly filled boxes should have a fraction tag attached, or be otherwise marked, and the box
placed conspicuously on the stack. There should be only one fraction box per lot.

6. Ammunition stacks should be placed at an appropriate distance from heating devices.

b) Records of storage arrangements should be maintained to aid in space control and to ensure the authorized
explosives limits are not exceeded.

2.6.3.4. Ventilation of Magazines

Magazines should be kept as dry and temperate as possible. To assist in the reduction of condensation,
magazines should be fitted with a ventilator; where the climate warrants, power ventilators or dehumidification
equipment may be necessary. The ventilators should be designed to prevent the insertion into the magazine of any
extraneous object, and to close automatically in the event of a fire either inside or on the outside of the magazine. Older
magazines, or magazines with ineffective ventilating systems should be ventilated by opening the doors and ventilators
when atmospheric conditions and temperatures are favourable.

2.6.3.5. Temperature

a) Temperature control is important in magazines used for the storage of those types of ammunition which are
adversely affected by extremes of temperature.

b) Magazine temperature records should be maintained when:

1. Such records are useful for the selection of lots for proof or test.

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2. Ammunition in the magazine has published temperature limitations which are liable to be
exceeded under prevailing climatic conditions.

2.6.3.6. Authorized Stores and Equipment

Only stores, tools and equipment authorized and required for use should be permitted in magazines. A list of
stores, tools and equipment approved for use should be displayed in the building. In particular, empty pallets and
dunnage should not be allowed to accumulate in magazines containing ammunition.

2.6.3.7. Aisles and Safety Exits

Aisles and safety exits in magazines containing ammunition should not be blocked or obstructed. When work
is being conducted doors should not be fastened with other than approved quick-release devices which shall be
maintained in good working order. Where quick-release devices are not fitted the doors shall be unlatched or open. All
doors should be outward opening.

2.6.3.8. Isolation Magazines

a) Condemned or unserviceable ammunition presenting more than a normal storage hazard should be removed
to an isolation magazine pending destruction. In the absence of an isolation magazine, outside storage may
be used if national regulations permit.

b) Condemned or unserviceable ammunition not presenting more than normal storage hazards may be stored in
magazines with serviceable stores but should be clearly marked as condemned or unserviceable to prevent
inadvertent use or issue.

c) Ammunition and explosives of different compatibility groups may be mixed in isolation magazines. Such
mixing in isolation magazines should only be permitted when it is unavoidable and does not significantly
increase either the probability or severity of an accident. An effective control when storing condemned or
unserviceable ammunition is required.

2.6.3.9. Transit Magazines

A transit magazine is defined as a magazine used for:

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1. The receipt of small consignments which may be mixed prior to being placed in permanent
storage.

2. The assembly of small issues which may be mixed prior to dispatch.

In buildings authorized as transit magazines, ammunition and explosives of different compatibility groups
may be mixed in the same way as is permitted for the appropriate mode of transport. If it is necessary to open packages,
for acceptance, receipt or issue inspections or for identification, verification of quantity, repack or other process, this
should be done in an adjacent building or separate compartment of the same building; only one nature should be
present in this building or compartment at any time. Remarking of the outer packages and sorting of packages may be
carried out in the main transit magazine. Irrespective of the quantities of each hazard division present at any time the
overall explosive limit applied to the building should be that for the hazard division which permits the least NEQ for
the available quantity-distances.

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Section IV - Handling of Ammunition and Explosives

2.6.4.1. Cleanliness of Buildings

The cleanliness of all magazines and other buildings containing explosives should be maintained at a high
standard. The following precautions shall be taken:

1. Dangerously combustible materiels, such as paper, oily rags, cotton waste, paints, solvents,
volatile liquids, and painting cloths required for use in an explosives storehouse or explosives
workshop should be removed to a safe storage place when not actually in use.

2. Particular care should be exercised to avoid the presence of steel wool, sand, gravel, or any other
abrasive substance upon the floors, tables, or other working places where explosives are being
handled.

3. Explosive dusts or vapours should not be allowed to accumulate inside or outside a building.

4. Electrical fixtures and motors should be kept free from dust.

5. Special precautions (see paragraph 2.6.5.4.) should be observed when packages containing
explosives liable to initiation by spark or friction are stored and are not in dust tight containers.

2.6.4.2. Electrical Extensions

When not specifically prohibited and when it is necessary to use extension lights during the handling, loading,
or unloading of explosives or ammunition in magazines or other buildings or on board vessels, lighters, railroad cars,
trucks, or other vehicles, portable electric extension lights may be used provided they are in accordance with the
national electrical code for use in such locations. In the case of visiting forces the electrical code of the host nation
should be the minimum standard.

2.6.4.3. Handling Equipment

Handling equipment should be in accordance with approved specifications, used in accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions, and maintained and inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended
maintenance schedules.
2.6.4.4. Parking of Vehicles, Railcars and Barges

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Vehicles, railcars and barges should be parked in the vicinity of magazines and workshops only for the period
of time required for loading or unloading; at all other times designated holding or marshalling areas should be used for
parking purposes. When such vehicles/vessels are moving through explosives areas appropriate routes should be used
to minimize the risk of an explosion and propagation between PES.

2.6.4.5. Ammunition Returned from Bases or Units

a) All ammunition received from user units should be given an inspection to ensure that it is suitable for
storage and subsequent re-issue. The inspection sample size will depend upon national practices.

b) All empty ammunition containers, packaging materials, empty cartridge cases, empty ammunition
components etc., received from user units should be given a 100 % inspection and certified free from
explosives before being declared as scrap, government provided material as aids to production, or otherwise
disposed of.

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Section V - Repair, Modification, Inspection and Proof of Ammunition

2.6.5.1. Introduction

This section contains special requirements for the repair, modification, inspection and proof of ammunition
and explosives in explosives workshops. These activities should only be conducted in the locations designated. The
NEQ of ammunition permitted in an explosives workshop should be governed by the quantity-distances in Part I,
Chapter 4 of the Manual.

2.6.5.2. Workshop and Laboratory Working Conditions

a) Clean conditions should pertain to explosives workshops only when explosive contents are exposed. See
subparagraph 2.6.5.5.a) for the definition of clean conditions.

b) Each work area should be thoroughly cleaned daily and each time work is changed from one nature of
explosives to another.

c) Before any article is taken into an explosives workshop operating under clean conditions, it should be
examined externally and any grit or objectionable substance removed.

d) Work benches on which explosives are likely to be exposed should be so situated that nothing can
accidentally fall on the explosives; this is particularly important when dealing with detonators or other
sensitive materiel.

e) Work should be arranged so that explosives are never exposed to direct sunlight.

f) Explosives not being worked upon should be kept covered.

g) In explosives workshops, oils, spirits, paint, etc. should be in sound containers, which in turn should be kept
in a metal tray the size of, which should be adequate to contain spilling. The quantity should be kept to a
minimum and during non-working hours should be kept in a metal locker outside the building or special
fireproof room approved for this purpose. These lockers should be included in the daily security check.

h) All doors in explosives workshops not equipped with quick release hardware shall be unlocked when work
is in progress.

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i) Appropriate protective shieldings should be erected around assembly or disassembly apparatus, as required,
to protect operators against flash and splinters in case of accident. Protective shields should be proof-tested
prior to initial use and only used for the purpose for which they have been proof-tested.

j) When movement of unpacked ammunition is necessary care must be taken to ensure that it is securely held
and is protected against damage and dislodgement.

k) Ammunition containing exposed percussion caps or primers should have the caps protected from accidental
striking by means of the appropriate cartridge clips, or other means.

l) Ammunition containing EED should not be removed from its package for longer than is essential, so as to
minimize the time during which it may be susceptible to electromagnetic pick-up. Whenever it is necessary
to remove ammunition of this kind from its package the safe distances from RF-sources specified, in
national regulations, should be fully observed.

m) Grenades, and other similar small stores, which are potentially dangerous when fitted with initiators, should
be dealt with in a room provided with a disposal chute or equivalent facility.

n) Workshops or parts of workshops used for paint or rust removal should not be considered as clean areas
while being so employed. They should be thoroughly scrubbed and cleaned before being included in the
clean area.

o) Paint or rust removal and painting operations should not be conducted in the same workshop room.

p) Ovens for drying non-explosive components should not be located in clean areas or explosives workshops.

q) Non-ferrous metal receptacles should be appropriately located at workplaces when there is a possibility of
loose explosives or propellants being scattered on floors or work benches.

2.6.5.3. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

a) A SOP should prescribe step-by-step procedures to control operations and the precautions to be taken in the
course of workshop and laboratory operations. They should be available in the building for the operation in
progress.

b) A SOP should be approved by the Commanding Officer/Superintendent and include as applicable:

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1. Drawings, specifications, gauge schedules, tools, apparatus, and restriction lists.

2. Static electricity grounding (earthing) requirements.
3. Maximum and/or minimum humidities.
4. Clothing and foot-wear requirements.
5. The maximum number of personnel to be in the workshop or laboratory at any one time.
6. The maximum quantity of explosive items permitted in the building and/or to be worked on at
any one time.
7. Any additional safety precautions necessary for the ammunition being worked on.

c) Operations may proceed while the SOP are being printed provided a draft has been approved by the
Commanding Officer/Superintendent and is posted in the working area.

2.6.5.4. Personnel and Explosive Limits

To reduce the risk of injury of personnel and damage to property the number of personnel employed, and the quantity
of ammunition within an explosives workshop should be kept to the minimum required to maintain the operation.
Dividing the overall quantity into separate bays or rooms, with substantial internal walls or barricades, will reduce the
risk of explosive propagation and probably reduce the effects of an explosives accident. The personnel and explosive
limits vary with each operation and should be included in the SOP.

b) A personnel limit is to be assessed for each building, room or area in accordance with the following
principles:

1. The number of persons employed should be the minimum compatible with the highest standards
of safety, quantity and an even flow of work.

2. The personnel limit should include all persons employed including those employed on the
movement of the ammunition or other tasks in the immediate vicinity.

3. The limit may include up to two supervisors or inspectors even though their presence is not
continuous.

4. The limit should be related to the size of the building and number of exits. Irrespective of other
considerations, each person is to have ample working space and suitable evacuation routes.

c) A working explosive limit for each building, room or area should be assessed in accordance with the
following principles:

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1. It should not exceed the quantity permitted by available quantity-distances.

2. The limit should represent the minimum number of containers or rounds required to maintain an
even and continuous flow of work.

3. The working limit should include all ammunition held within the building and the immediate
vicinity. It should also include ammunition that has been processed or waiting to be processed,
whether on vehicles or on the ground.

4. The possibility of reducing the hazard presented both inside and outside the building by the use of
adequate internal traverses should be considered.
d) Signs should be conspicuously posted to provide the following information:

1. The nature and type of ammunition being processed.

2. Details of the operation i.e. re-boostering.

3. The compatibility group, hazard division and fire class of ammunition.

4. Personnel and explosive limits.

This information should be repeated as necessary for rooms or confined areas where special working
conditions are prescribed. The explosive limits may be stated in terms of NEQ and/or number of rounds or
containers.

2.6.5.5. Clean Working Areas

a) Clean conditions may be described as a set of precautions that are taken in explosives laboratories,
workshops, proof areas, and certain magazines, to prevent the introduction of, or the contact of explosives
with, extraneous matter such as ferrous metals, aluminium or aluminium alloys or grit which might cause an
explosion through friction or spark.

b) Working areas that are required to be maintained under clean conditions should be provided with a changing
lobby. The lobby should be divided by a barrier to indicate the clean area.

2.6.5.6. Clothing for Clean Conditions

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Clothing used for wear in explosives workshops or laboratories maintained under clean conditions should be
specified by the appropriate National Authority, and will normally include items such as spark-proof conductive
footwear, flameproofed smocks or coveralls and suitable hair covering.

2.6.5.7. Static Electricity Precautions

a) Ammunition workshops should be provided with conductive or anti-static flooring. Conductive flooring is
designed to provide a path of conductivity for the free movement of electrostatic charges, thereby preventing
a charge accumulation.

b) Anti-static flooring differs from conductive flooring in that it offers greater resistance to the passage of
electrical current.

c) Grounding (earthing) points should be available for equipment, tools and ammunition in explosives
workshops, to prevent a difference of electrical potential between operators and the material that they must
handle.

d) Conductive flooring and grounding (earthing) systems should be tested for continuity in accordance with
national specifications.

e) Personnel working in explosives workshops should wear conductive footwear or copper chain, when
conductive flooring is present. Such safety devices should be tested frequently.

2.6.5.8. Painting Operations

a) Painting and stencilling operations should only be conducted in well ventilated rooms or outdoors.

b) Spray painting operations, when conducted indoors, should be done in spray painting booths, except for
minor touch-up or stencilling using low pressure spray markers or aerosol containers.

c) Operators and helpers should wear protective masks while spray painting is in progress, unless the spray
booths are properly exhausted so as to preclude exposure of personnel to toxic atmosphere.

2.6.5.9. Heat Sealing Equipment

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a) The use of heat sealing equipment for packaging of ammunition in polyethylene is permitted under the
following conditions:

1. The ammunition is suited to heat sealing.

2. The heat sealing apparatus is approved.

3. It is used in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

4. It is properly maintained and inspected for serviceability and cleanliness before initial use and at
the beginning of each shift, and should be checked for cleanliness (absence of any spillings)
before each operation.

b) The sealing equipment should be restricted for use as permitted by the host country within a transit
magazine or explosives workshop in a room or segregated area apart from other activities. However, heat
sealing equipment must not be permitted in a room maintained under clean conditions.

c) Items to be heat sealed should be in serviceable condition and free of defects.

d) Detonators and heat sensitive items such as propellants or explosive samples should be suitably packaged
before heat sealing.

2.6.5.10. Tools

a) Only non-sparking tools should be used in direct contact with exposed explosives or in rooms maintained
under clean conditions.

b) Special or locally designed tools and equipment should not be used in ammunition operations nor should
modifications or alterations to approved tools or equipment be made without prior approval.

c) Tools and appliances designed and provide for particular explosives operations should not be used for other
purposes without approval.

d) Only those tools authorized for use by the applicable SOP for the operation being performed should be
permitted in the room or area.

2.6.5.11. Closedown of Explosives Workshops

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a) When an explosives workshop is vacated all electrical installations and powered equipment other than
essential services should be switched off or disconnected. At the end of each working day the building
should be secured.

b) Ammunition remaining in the building should be subject to the following:

1. During temporary breaks within the course of a working day, the ammunition may be left in
position provided it is safely stowed, and the explosive is not exposed.

2. At the end of each working day ammunition may be left in the work area providing it is
packaged, (except for ammunition which is not normally stored in packages) and placed on the
floor. Items should be grounded (earthed) as applicable.

2.6.5.12. Supervision

Constant supervision should be maintained by supervisory staff and all personnel should be safety conscious.
Each operator should be fully acquainted with any hazards associated with the ammunition on which he is required to
work. Before commencing an operation each operator should be familiarized with the particular task that he will
perform.

2.6.5.13. Accident Involving Ammunition

a) In the event of an accident or incident involving ammunition, all operations shall cease immediately and the
situation shall be reported to the Commanding Officer/Superintendent. Nothing shall be disturbed, except in
the interest of safety or as may be necessary to give assistance to injured persons. Precautions should be
taken to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the area.

b) Accidents involving ammunition shall be reported in accordance with national regulations.

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Section 6 – Destruction of Ammunition and Explosives

2.6.6.1 Introduction

a) This section contains advice pertaining to the destruction (by open burning/open detonation) of ammunition
and explosives which has deteriorated or which has been declared surplus or obsolete. These
recommendations establish measures and procedures for minimizing the risk in destroying unwanted
ammunition and explosives. All destruction operations must be carried out in accordance with rules and
regulations established by the competent National Authority.

b) This section does not deal with matters pertaining to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) emergency
actions.

2.6.6.2 Selection Of Destruction Areas For Open Burning/ Open Detonation

The ideal destruction area is one with deep soil, free from loose rocks, where trenches and pits can be dug
easily and in which the risk of fire is negligible. In the selection of a permanent destruction area, the land should be
above rather than below the surrounding area, naturally drained. The destruction area must be as far as possible
from:

a) magazines and other buildings in the explosives area;

b) administration buildings and depot offices;

c) public or inhabited buildings;

d) overhead and underground cables;

e) land drainage systems, water mains, sewers and underground pipelines;

f) railway and highway cuttings, tunnels and embankments where earth shocks might undermine or cause
debris to fall on the tracks or roads;

g) airfields and

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h) environmentally sensitive areas; such as areas containing wetlands, endangered species, or threatened
plants.

2.6.6.3 Explosive Limits For Destruction Areas

a) Explosives limits for destruction areas will vary because of local conditions. In establishing limits for items
of Hazard Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 involved in individual destruction operations, the maximum
quantity to be destroyed at any time must be determined carefully by the competent National Authority.

b) When determining these limits, consideration must be given to:

1. the maximum radius of fragment and debris hazards;

2. the maximum radius of blast effects;

3. shock transmission through the particular ground strata (e.g. high water tables or rock
formations);

4. the effects of overcast weather conditions; and

5. the effects of wind.

2.6.6.4 Destruction Area Maintenance

a) Fire breaks must be maintained around and within destruction areas as required.

b) All trees, dry grass and underground within a radius of 60 m from the destruction point must be removed.

c) The area should be restricted and marked as required by the competent National Authority.

2.6.6.5 Splinter-proof Shelters

Where Ammunition is being destroyed by detonation, a splinter-proof shelter should be provided as a

control point and to provide protection for personnel. Where provided, it must be located not less than 90 m from
the actual destruction point. Where a splinter-proof shelter is not provided, the Control Point should be located at a
sufficient distance from the destruction point in order to provide adequate safety to personnel.

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2.6.6.6 Record Keeping

A record keeping system should be maintained that includes location of destruction, summary of items
destroyed, date of operation and other data required by the competent National Authority.

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CHAPTER 7 - DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO HAZARDS FROM ELECTRO

MAGNETIC RADIATION TO AMMUNITION CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES

Section I - Characteristics of Electro-Explosive Devices

2.7.1.1. General

Electro-Explosive Devices (EED) are used to produce an explosive response by conversion of chemical energy into
heat following their electrical initiation.

EED are designed to be initiated by the application of suitable electrical stimuli, but unintentional initiation may occur
if the EED or its associated circuitry is exposed to electromagnetic radiation. Unintentional initiation can also occur if
any electrically charged body is allowed to discharge trough the EED

2.7.1.2. Types of Electro-Explosive Devices

At present and in the envisaged future four types of EED are employed:

Bridge-wire and Film bridge EED

These devises are activated by passing a current through a resistive bridge (wire, film or tape)
which is in close thermal contact with an explosive charge. Power dissipation in the bridge
produces a temperature rise at the explosive, which if high enough will lead to a self-sustaining
thermal reaction, causing initiation. Functioning time for these devices varies from a few
microseconds for the faster film bridge (FB) devices to a few milliseconds for typical bridge-wire
(BW) EED.

2. Conducting Composition EED

The priming layer of a conducting composition (CC) EED consists of a primary explosive mixed
with a small proportion of finely divided graphite which forms a number of conducting chains.
Application of a voltage across the chains leads to power concentrations at one more critical
graphite-graphite junctions and the sputtering of graphite on the neighbouring explosive crystals
causes then to ignite the concentration of electrical energy into a few low mass graphite-graphite
junctions resulting in CC devices being sensitive to low energy levels and functioning time can
be in the microsecond region.

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3. Exploding Bridge-wire EED

Exploding bridge-wire (EBW) detonators require a dissipation of 0.25 J or more in a low

resistance BW in a period of less than a microsecond to cause initiation. The high instantaneous
power results in the explosion of the BW, inducing detonation in a relatively insensitive low
density secondary explosive which in turn initiates a high density output pellet. The main safety
characteristics inherent in the EBW concept is that it requires the high and rapid energy input
from a specialised power source in order to function. EBW EED can be initiated by the
application of other energy inputs eg, AC mains electricity, but the main charge in unlikely to
detonate.

4. Slapper Detonator

Slapper detonators (SD) (sometime called an exploding foil initiator (EFI) operate by applying a
high energy impulse to a foil or film bridge causing it to explode. This explosion punches a flyer
from a plastic disc and propels it analog a barrel section to impact a secondary explosive charge
thereby causing detonation. Slapper detonators are similar to EBW in terms of sensitivity and
functioning times but are less prone to dudding by low currents than EBW since the bridge is
separated from the explosive charge. These devices provide an alternative to EBW particularly in
high temperature and high shock applications.

2.7.1.3. EED Sensitivity Thresholds

In general EED in Service use fall into two broad categories:

Those with long thermal time constants (typically 10ms – 50 ms) such as BW which are known commonly as “slow
responding power sensitive “ EED.

Those with a short thermal time constant (typically 1us – 100 us) such as FB and CC which are known commonly as
“fast responding energy sensitive” EED.

As consequence BW EED tend to integrate transient energy and, in the case of repetitively pulsed radars will respond
as though to continous wave (CW) (mean or average) power levels. Whereas energy sensitive devices tend to respond
to the peak power level and this must be taken into account when determining the susceptibility of such devices.

Whilst the above groups describe the salient characteristics of each type of EED it should not be inferred that they react
exclusively to either power or energy impuls

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It is impractical to attempt to define uniquely the stimulus level at which none of a paricular batch of EED will fire.
The threshold sensitivity of the EED is usually derived from statistical measurements, an assumption being made that
the probability distribution of sensitivity obeys a normal law, when the logarithm of applied stimulus is taken as the
independent variable.

In determining hazard tresholds (known as No-Fire Tresholds (FT)) both the power and the energy are considered and
defined in terms of the 0.1% probability of firing at a single sided lower 95% confidence level.

To illustrate the results of such sampling on the worst cast BW EED (Igniter Type F 120) the NFT figures are indicated
in the following example:

Resistance No-Fire Tresholds Values Time

Range Energy Current Power Constant
Ω mJ A mW ms
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
10-16 0.2 0.045 26 8

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Section II - Nature of the Radiated Field and Transmitter Antennas

2.7.2.1. Nature of the Radiated Field

a) In the far-field the electromagnetic field radiating from a transmitting antenna consists of an electric (E) and
a magnetic (H) component, which are in phase and mutually perpendicular to each other and to the direction
of propagation. The strength of the field is measured in volts per m for the electric component and in amps
per m for the magnetic component. The power density (S) is the power present in a unit area perpendicular
to the direction of propagation and is an expression of the strength of the radiated far-field. It is measured in
watts per m2 and is related to the electric and magnetic components by:

2
S = E = 377 H 2 (eq 7 - 1)
377

where 377 Ω is the impedance of free space.

b) Within the near-field or Fresnel Region, the magnitudes of the H and E components vary and one or the
other can exceed the values they assume at the perimeter. Starting at the perimeter of the Fresnel Region the
power density falls off inversely with the square of the distance.

2.7.2.2. Transmitter Antennas

a) Unipole and dipole antennas are commonly used for communications in the frequency range below 300
MHz. The radiation from this type of antenna falls into two basic regions:

1. The near-field region which extends out to a distance of 2-3 wavelengths from the antenna. In this
region the E and H components of the radiated field have not established their correct phase
relationship.

2. The far-field region extends beyond the near-field and as for directional antenna, the power
density is given by:

GP
S= (eq 7 - 2)
4π d2

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where
G = Power ratio gain of the transmitter antenna
P = The mean power in watts fed to the transmitting antenna (peakpower x pulses per
second x pulse width)
d = The distance in m from the antenna to where the field is under consideration.

b) The radiation pattern from a highly directional radar antenna falls into two main regions as follows:

1. A Fresnel Region which extends from the aperture of the antenna to a distance in front of the
antenna dependent on the physical area of the dish.

2. The Frauenhofer Region or far-field. This extends beyond the Fresnel Region.

c) The end of the Fresnel Region and the start of the Frauenhofer Region is not well defined but is arbitrarily
taken to be at a distance of 2 L2/λ , where L is the largest dimension of the antenna. Within the Fresnel
Region the maximum power density is given by:

16 π P
S= (eq 7 - 3)
G λ2

This is the worst case; if an unacceptable hazard is indicated then a more detailed calculation should be
carried out by the competent National Authority. Beyond the Fresnel Region in the far-field or Frauenhofer Region, the
maximum mean power density is given by:

GP
S= (eq 7 - 4)
4π d2

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Section III - Conditions for Maximum Pick-Up in an EED

2.7.3.1. General

a) Relatively little power is required to fire most EED which are normally operated by a direct or alternating
current firing pulse. Whether fitted to ammunition, connected to firing leads or held as separate components,
EED respond and may fire when subjected to EM energy propagated from antennas of radio and radar
transmitters.

b) Energy from the EM environment can enter an ammunition item through any discontinuity in its skin, e.g.
joints, inspection windows, etc. The energy may be conducted into the EED via its firing leads or other
electrical conductors such as wires, tools and fingers.

c) The protective switch in a circuit which prevents the initiation of an EED by direct current until the desired
time, is not an effective barrier to EM energy.

d) In general, ammunition containing EED are more susceptible to EM energy pick-up during assembly,
disassembling, testing, handling, loading and unloading into weapons. The attachment of external cables and
test sets to such ammunition usually increases its susceptibility to EM energy pick-up.

e) The ability of a firing circuit to pick up sufficient energy to cause an EED to operate depends on many
factors. These include the electrical characteristics of the EED installed, the nature of the firing line, its
length and geometry, ambient EM field strength and frequency. The EM field strength is dependent on the
power output of the transmitter, the characteristics of the system and the distance between the antenna and
the firing circuit. It is not the position of the EED that is important but the position of the whole firing circuit
in relation to the EM field.

2.7.3.2. Maximum Energy Pick-Up

The maximum energy pick-up in an EED is dependent on:

1. the physical and electrical parameters of the firing circuit;
2. the frequency of the transmitter;
3. the power density of the EM field in the vicinity of the receiving antenna, i.e. the firing circuit.

2.7.3.3. Types of Antennas

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a) To evaluate the maximum gain, the EED firing circuit can be considered to be one of several types of
antennas, namely:

1. Dipole
2. Loop
3. Long Wire
4. Rhombic

b) Depending on the actual firing circuit design one or more of the above configurations can be considered a
reasonable approximation as the receiving antenna. For example, placing a short circuit across the firing
lines would make it equivalent in performance to either a loop or rhombic antenna.

c) In practice, for weapon systems less than 5 m in length, the dipole antenna is a good approximation. Long
wire and rhombic antenna configurations can be applicable, but not generally while the weapon is in the
transport and storage mode. For missiles in excess of 5 m in length and when missiles are attached to test
facilities with long leads, long wire or rhombic configurations may have to be considered. The technical
basis for the assumption that in the general case the receiving antenna will act as a dipole is given in Section
IV.

2.7.3.4. Conditions for Maximum Pick-Up

a) Assuming that the receiving antenna (EED circuitry) approximates a dipole maximum pick-up will be
attained under the following conditions:

1. - The lead wires to the EED opened out straight, their combined length equal to half the
transmitted EM wavelength or an odd multiple thereof and the EED at the centre of the
leads
or
- one lead wire (or case) of the EED grounded and the other lead wirestraight and its
length equal to one-quarter of the transmitted EM havelength or an odd multiple
thereof.

2. The lead wires parallel to the electrical field vector.

3. The antenna configuration and the EED in the zone of maximum radiation.

b) It should be noted that any electrically conductive component forming the structure of a system may present
a halfwave antenna or a loop or a rhombic antenna and the resultant circulating currents can induce EM

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energy into EED circuits in the vicinity of such structures. In practice it can be considered worst case when a
long wire or rhombic antenna is formed. In those cases, the amount of EM pick-up could increase
approximately 10 dB relative to the pick-up in a dipole antenna.

2.7.3.5. Effect of a Metal Container

a) An EED assembly incorporating a firing connector which is mounted through a metal container, such as a
cartridge case, is less sensitive to EM energy when it is not connected to the firing lines due to the inefficient
antenna the assembly presents. During handling, however, if contact is made between the connector and an
external body such as the system structure, a length of wire, screwdriver, or the finger of an operator then a
more efficient antenna may be formed.

b) A receiving antenna is most effective when situated in free space and unobscured from the source of
radiation. In general, the presence of obstructions in the vicinity of the receiving antenna (EED circuitry)
will reduce the power picked up by the antenna. However, under certain conditions the EM field reflected
from such obstructions could increase the incident field at the receiving antenna. In ammunition where the
EED and firing lines are mounted within the metal skin or situated within a metal container, then the EM
pick-up may be reduced by a factor up to 20 dB relative to that from a matched antenna in free space.

2.7.3.6. Impedance of the Antenna

a) Although it is unlikely that the impedance of the antenna configuration formed will match that of the EED,
the possibility remains that this may occur at some frequencythroughout the spectrum.

b) Firing lines disconnected from the firing supply and short circuited will form a loop antenna and as such are
more likely to pick up EM energy at lower frequencies. In addition, the impedance of a loop antenna is more
likely to match the impedance of a bridgewire EED than that of a halfwave dipole; consequently more RF
power will be fed to the EED.

2.7.3.7. Rhombic or Long Wire Configurations

The EM energy pick-up with rhombic or long wire configurations can in practice be up to 10 dB greater than
that picked up by a dipole configuration. If the firing lines to an EED are open-circuited as close to the EED as possible
the susceptibility of the EED to EM fields will be reduced where the wavelengths are large compared to the EED lead
dimensions. For example, if the EED lead(s) are less than 100 mm in length, EED susceptibility will be reduced
significantly at frequencies less than 750 MHz. Placing broadband RF filter(s) in the firing line(s) as close to the EED
as possible will also reduce the susceptibility of the system.

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Section IV - Consideration of the Pick-Up in Different Types of Antenna

2.7.4.1. Efficiency of the Circuit

The maximum efficiency of the circuit connected to the EED, a part of which acts as an antenna, is dependent
on four electrical properties:

1. Ra (radiation resistance of antenna) (Ω)

2. Ro (ohmic resistance of the lines) (Ω)
3. Xa (reactive impedance of antenna) (Ω)
4. G (gain of antenna relative to an isotropic (a dimensionless ratio)
antenna)

These properties are dependent upon geometry, dimensions, and materials of the antenna, the frequency, and
the proximity to ground and other nearby objects.

2.7.4.2. Maximum Power

a) The maximum power that is induced in the antenna at a given frequency is dependent upon Ra and G and is
attained at optimum orientation.

When the circuit which plays the part of the antenna has been determined, the classical theory can be used to find the
energy distribution. The electrical representation is as follows:

Firing line
Za Ra

Va ZL

c) Va is the voltage induced in the antenna. Maximum voltage is dependent upon the external field intensity
and effective height of the antenna.

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The impedance of the EED and the antenna are given by:

Z L = RL + j X L (eq 7 - 5)

Z a = Ra + j X a (eq 7 - 6)

d) It can be easily shown that the maximum power is dissipated in the EED when

RL = Ra + Ro and Xa = - XL

then

λ 2 RL G (eq 7 - 7)
Amax =
4 π ( R L + Ro )

where Amax is the maximum aperture of the antenna.

Generally Ro is negligible and the maximum aperture obtained is

G λ2
Amax = (eq 7 - 8)
4π

thus the maximum power is then only dependent on the gain and the wavelength.

e) The value of G that should be used and which gives Amax is dependent on the length of the lead wire L:

1) When L ≤ ¼ λ the dipole antenna should be considered and the maximum value of gain can be
taken as G = 1.64.

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2) When ¼ λ < L ≤ λ the long wire antenna configuration should be considered and the maximum
value of the gain will be given by:

L
G = 1.4 + (eq 7 - 9)
λ

3) When L > λ the rhombic configuration should be considered and the maximum value of the gain
will be given by:

10 L L
G= when ≤ 20 (eq 7 - 10)
4λ λ

f) The formulae given in subparagraph e) above show that the rhombic and long wire configurations have a
gain larger than a dipole. However, for the frequency range in which the circuit is very large in respect to λ,
the radiation resistance, Ra does not present the most favourable value and when Ra becomes very large, it
can be assumed that Ra >> Ro + RL

G λ2 K G λ2
Ae = R L = (eq 7 - 11)
π Ra 4π
where Ae is the effective aperture and

4
K = RL (eq 7 - 12)
Ra

g) When L >> λ, Ra is normally high. However, there is a small possibility that wiring between the antenna
configuration and the EED may act as an impedance matching transformer. Therefore, the most conservative
assumption is made when RL = Ra and

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10 L
G= (eq 7 - 13)
4λ

2.7.4.3. Conclusions

a) In practice, however, for weapon systems the length of which are less than 5 m, a matched half wave dipole
is a good approximation of the worst case configuration.

b) Long wire and rhombic configuration should however be used for EED on launchers and attached to test
facilities and for very long missiles.

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CHAPTER 8 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION

2.8.1. General

Depleted Uranium (DU) is mildly radioactive at a level that is low enough to permit handling and
transportation with simple precautionary measures. DU has a chemical toxicity at the same level as other heavy
metals such as Lead, allowing handling and transportation in authorized packaging without abnormal risk. The
mechanisms whereby radioactivity and toxicity might lead to harmful effects are if:
(1) Personnel are in close contact with DU over extended periods, or
(2) If DU is involved in a fire or explosion in which Uranium Oxides from the ammunition could be
dispersed and inhaled by personnel sited downwind from the event.

For detailed information on DU, refer to the United Nations Website:

http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/env/du/en.
Also refer to World Health Organisation (WHO) Guidance on Exposure to Depleted Uranium:
(WHO/SDE/OEH/01.12.2001):
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/en/Recommend_Med_Officers_final.pdf.

2.8.2. Storage Facilities

Storage facilities for DU ammunition will usually be located in military controlled sites, at distances from the
nearest point of public access beyond which the predictable explosive, inhalation and surface contamination effects
would be acceptable. Thus, any accidental contamination requiring remedial action should be confined to areas under
military control and therefore restriction of access necessary during such action should not interfere significantly with
normal public life.

2.8.3. Principles of Segregation

The separate storage of the DU and explosive components of the ammunition, or, at least, the separate storage
of DU ammunition from other types must be regarded as offering positive safety advantages and should be adopted
whenever practicable.

2.8.4. Fire-fighting

2.8.4.1. Combustion of DU

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The combustion properties of DU metal should be taken into account when dealing with a fire involving DU
ammunition. It is prudent to assume from the outset that DU is burning and that DU oxide smoke is being produced
and to apply the appropriate precautions, as follows:

2.8.4.2. Precautions

Once uranium metal has ignited and a vigorous self-sustaining oxidation reaction has commenced, the
application of small quantities of conventional extinguishants is likely to be ineffective and may even add to the spread
of the fire by dispersing the burning uranium. For example, insufficient water to cool the fire would react with hot
uranium metal to form hydrogen gas. For a small fire involving uranium and no explosives, the most effective
extinguishant is an inert powdered smothering agents, but when explosives are present the closeness of approach
necessary to deliver such an extinguishant to the seat of the fire would be hazardous to the fire fighters. In particular,
propellants, the most likely energetic material to be closely associated with the DU, may produce intense radiant heat,
firebrands and some ejected fragments. The firebrands may be only small pieces of packaging materials but it is
possible that they could be fiery fragments of burning propellant.

2.8.4.3. Fire-Fighting Methods

a) The most practicable method is to drench the fire with copious quantities of water delivered from a safe
distance with the aim of rapidly cooling the combustibles. Normal precautions in dealing with an explosives
fire such as the fire crew sheltering behind protective barriers should be observed. Self-contained breathing
apparatus should be worn and, where practicable, the fire should be tackled from the windward side. Care
should be taken to ensure that the fire is completely extinguished and that the remaining ashes and debris are
cold and thoroughly saturated with water.
b) Disposition of water contaminated with DU particulates should be based on the advice of the local National
Authority.

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QUANTITY-DISTANCE CRITERIA FOR

ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

(See also Part I, Annex I-A)

SECTION I GENERAL
SECTION II CRITERIA FOR Q-D TABLE 1
SECTION III CRITERIA FOR Q-D TABLE 2
SECTION IV CRITERIA FOR Q-D TABLE 3A
SECTION V CRITERIA FOR Q-D TABLE 3B

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Section I - General

1. Purpose and Content of the Annex

This annex gives the criteria and the formulae used to generate values in the Q-D Tables in Part I, Annex I-
A. For each distance function, constant distance and minimum value in the tables there is a paragraph or
subparagraph in the appropriate section of this annex. Each one records the basis of the Group's decision (specific
experimental observation or value judgement) and indicates by a number the appropriate reference in the
bibliography (e.g. "Ref.1" means reference number 1 in Annex II-C).

2. Conversion Factors

Length : 1m = 003.2808 ft
Area : 1 m2 = 010.7639 sqft
Mass : 1 kg = 002.2046 lb
Energy : 1 kgm = 007.2330 ftlb
= 009.8066 Joule
Pressure : 1 kg/cm2 = 014.2233 psi
= 980.665 mb

Length : 1 ft = 000.3048 m
Area : 1 sqft = 000.0929 m2
Mass : 1 lb = 000.4536 kg
Energy : 1 ftlb = 000.1383 kgm
= 001.3558 Joule
Pressure : 1 psi = 000.0703 kg/cm2
= 068.948 mb

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3. Conversion of American and British Formulae

American and British Units Metric Units

H
d=kW d = 0.3967 k Q H

d=kW d = 0.4526 k Q 

d=kWI d = 0.5136 k Q I

American and British Units

d = quantity-distance in feet (ft)

W = Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) in pounds (lb)

RB = radius of B damage in feet (ft)

Metric Units

d = quantity-distance in metres (m)

Q = Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) in kilogrammes (kg)
RB = radius of B damage in metres (m)

B damage is such severe damage to domestic constructions of 9 inch (23 cm) brickwork as to necessitate demolition.

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4. Mathematical Signs and Symbols Used to Determine Mechanical Magnitudes

Designation Formul Unit Name Unit Conversion

a Symbol
Symbol
Force F Newton N

Mass m Kilogram kg

Velocity v Metre per m

second s

Kilometre km
per Hour h

Acceleratio a Metre per m

n square s2
second
Pressure p Pascal Pa

Bar bar

Energy/Wor E Joule J
k

Power P Watt W

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Section II - Criteria for Q-D Table 1

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Inter-Magazine Distances : paragraphs 5 - 12

- Explosives Workshop Distances : paragraph 13
- Inhabited Building Distances : paragraphs 14 - 16
- Special Distances : paragraphs 17 - 18

1. D1-Distances and D2-Distances

a) Distance Functions

1) D1 = 0.35 Q1/3 Valid for Q ≤ 30 000 kg

2) D2 = 0.44 Q1/3 Valid for 30 001 ≤ Q ≤ 120 000 kg

b) Explanation

The D1- and D2-distance functions are based on UK trials (Ref. 1) with barricaded open stacks of aircraft
bombs, subsequently reviewed (Ref. 2) in the light of US trials on modular storage. The distances prevent
simultaneous propagation of detonation to adjacent stacks beyond the earth barricades (see paragraph
1.3.3.1.) though some damage to bombs and occasional fires or delayed explosions may occur.
The use of D2-distances is limited to situations not involving combustible materials and with only
lightweight weather protection (i.e. metal shed roof or tarpaulin). Delayed propagation by fire should not
occur.

2. D3-Distances

a) Distance Function

D3 = 0.5 Q1/3

This formula gives the normal minimum separation between the walls of adjacent igloos when the relevant
roof and wall of the igloo at the PES and that at the ES are both protected by the prescribed amount of earth
(Ref. 3-14, 17).

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b) Explanation

The D3-distances apply to any combination of rear-walls and side-walls. Thus the head-wall and door(s) of
the acceptor igloo, at the ES, would not be exposed face-on to the blast from an explosion at the PES. This
minimum separation should not be used in wet sand or wet clay which is associated with unusually large
crater size and ground shock effects.

3. D4-Distances

a) Distance Function

D4 = 0.8 Q1/3

This formula is based upon French (Burlot) (Ref. 15) and US trials (Ref. 8, 13, 16). D4-distances prevent
propagation of an explosion by flame through the crater and by blast. Barricades give protection against
propagation by projections.

b) Explanation
The D4-distances give normal minimum separation between the walls of adjacent igloos when either the
relevant wall of the igloo at the PES or that at the ES is protected by the prescribed amount of earth, but not
both. The D4-distances apply when the front of the one igloo faces the rear-wall of another provided the
construction of the head-wall and door(s) are of sufficient quality. Thus the head-wall and door(s) of the
acceptor igloo would be exposed face-on to the blast from an explosion at the PES. This is why the peak
overpressure specified in subparagraph 2.3.2.2.b)2) is greater than that in subparagraph 2.3.2.2.b)1) despite
the greater distance. The use of igloos with their axes perpendicular presents special problems which
require individual assessment. The D4-distances are not sufficient when the front of one igloo faces the
side-wall of another (see paragraph below).

4. D5-Distances

a) Distance Function
D5 = 1.1 Q1/3

This formula is used when the front of one igloo faces the side-wall of another.

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b) Explanation
The D5-distances give the normal minimum separation between the side of a donor igloo (PES) and an
acceptor head-wall (ES) without significant risk of explosion communication (by impact of ejecta and
structure debris) (Ref. 8).

5. D6-Distances

a) Distance Function
D6 = 1.8 Q1/3

This formula is based upon US trials (Ref. ). D6-distances prevent propagation of an explosion by flame
and blast when the walls of the ES are of reinforced concrete at least 25 cm thick.

b) Explanation
The D6-distances give the normal minimum separation between the walls of adjacent igloos when the layout
would qualify for the use of D4-distances but the design of head-wall, door frame or door(s) does not meet
the stringent requirements specified in paragraph 2.3.2.2. In some cases it may be economic to improve the
design of these features in order to qualify for the smaller Inter-Magazine Distances.

6. D7-Distances

a) Distance Function
D7 = 2.4 Q1/3

This formula is based upon French (Burlot) (Ref. 15) and UK trials (Ref. ). The D7-distances prevent
propagation of an explosion by flame, heat and blast.

b) Explanation

7. D8-Distances

a) Distance Function

D8 = 3.6 Q1/3
This formula is based upon UK trials (Ref. ). The D8-distances prevent propagation by fragments where
the radius of fragments is greater than the flame radius.

b) Explanation

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8. D9-Distances

a) Distance Function
D9 = 4.8 Q1/3

b) Explanation

9. D10-Distances

a) Distance Function
D10 = 8.0 Q1/3

This formula is based upon UK trials (Ref. ) and US trials (Ref. ). The D10-distances protect personnel
against severe injuries by blast.

b) Explanation

The D10-distances give the minimum distance from any aspect of an igloo to ensure that the blast effects
are tolerable for an explosives workshop which is barricaded and has a protective roof. The normal design
load for an explosives workshop is free field overpressure of 0.2 bar, the positive duration (ms) is 4.0 Q1/3
and the positive impulse per unit area is 0.4 Q1/3 (bar ms).

c) Minimum Distance
D = 270 m

The distance is the minimum distance from an igloo at which the hazard from rocks and structural debris is
tolerable for an explosives workshop which is unbarricaded or has no protective roof. This minimum
distance is used in conjunction with the formula for blast protection given by D10-distances.

10. D11-Distances

a) Distance Functions
1) D = 3.6 Q1/2

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This formula is valid for Q ≤ 4 500 kg. The distances are two thirds of the Inhabited Building Distances
given by D = 5.5 Q1/2, suitably rounded (Ref. ).

2) D = 14.8 Q1/3

This formula is valid for Q > 4 500 kg. The distances are exactly two thirds of the Inhabited Building
Distances given by 22.2 Q1/3 (Ref. ).

b) Explanation

c) Minimum Distance
D = 180 m

The distance is exactly two thirds of the minimum Inhabited Building Distance D = 270 m (Ref. ).

11. D12-Distances

a) Distance Function
D12 = 22.2 Q1/3

b) Explanation

12. D13-Distances

a) Distance Functions
1) D13 = 5.5 Q1/2

This formula is valid for Q ≤ 4 500 kg. The distances were based originally on a UK analysis (Ref. ) of
bomb damage to traditional British brick dwellings including a survey of accidental explosions and trials.
Subsequently the US independently re-appraised the expected damage from small explosions (Ref. ). The
Group (Ref. ) abolished the former reduction of distances by 20 % for Q ≤ 3 600 kg in the light of UK
trials (Ref. ) and US trials (Ref. ) and statistical analysis of damage from accidental explosions (Ref. ).
The distances do not correspond to a fixed value of peak overpressure, the positive impulse per unit area
approximates to ?? bar ms (Ref. ).
The expected degree of damage to dwellings is tolerable since the extent of buildings affected by an
explosion not exceeding 4 500 kg would not be great (Ref. ).

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2) D13 = 22.2 Q1/3

This formula is valid for Q > 4 500 kg. The distances were based originally on the same analysis (Ref. ) as
1) above. The US had contemporaneously adopted values tending to 20 Q1/3 based on a review of a
comprehensive study of damage to dwellings of North American construction from a very large accidental
explosion (Ref. ). The Group subsequently adopted the criterion 50 mb peak overpressure for all normal
types of construction (excluding curtain wall) and for caravans (Ref. ) in the context of the tolerable degree
of damage to a limited number of dwellings (individual risk). Discussion continues on the tolerable extent
of such damage (group risk) (Ref. ).

b) Explanation

c) Minimum Distances

1) D = 270 m

This distance is the minimum distance at which the risk of injury from projections for an
individual in a dwelling is considered to be tolerable in sparsely populated areas (i.e. individual
risk). It is not tolerable in a built-up area (group risk), nor in a vicinity of an igloo which
produces many pieces of structural debris (Ref. ).

2) D = 400 m

This distance is the minimum distance for tolerable group risk in a built-up area (Ref ). It is also
the minimum distance for tolerable individual risk in a sparsely populated area near an igloo
owing to the many pieces of structural debris produced.

13. D14- and D15-Distances

a) Distance Functions

1) D14 = 14.0 Q1/3

2) D15 = 18.0 Q1/3

b) Explanations

1) The D14- and D15-distances are based on US full scale and model trials (Ref. 18-20).

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2) D14-distances are used for Inhabited Building Distances from the rear of and D15-distances
from the side of earth-covered buildings acting as a PES. The buildings must meet the
requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.7.a), have an internal volume exceeding 500 m3 and have a
NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition not exceeding 45 000 kg. In no case may the Q-D be
less than 400 m.

14. D16- and D17-Distances

a) Distance Functions

D16 = 9.3 Q1/3

D17 = 12.0 Q1/3

b) Explanations

1) The D16- and D17-distances are based on US full scale and model trials (Ref. 18-20).

2) The D16- and D17-distances are the Public Traffic Route Distances corresponding (i.e. 2/3) to
D14- and D15-Inhabited Building Distances. The D16-distances therefore apply tothe rear of
and the D17-distances to the side of an earth-covered building acting as a PES. The buildings
must meet the requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.7.a), have an internal volume exceeding 500
m3 and have a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition not exceeding 45 000 kg. In no case
may the Q-D be less than 270 m. However, the full Inhabited Building Distances (D14- and
D15-distances) with a minimum of 400 m should be used, when necessary, in accordance with
subparagraph 1.3.1.14.b).

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Section III - Criteria for Q-D Table 2

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Inter-Magazine Distances : paragraphs 19 - 20

- Explosives Workshop Distances : paragraph 21
- Public Traffic Route Distances : paragraphs 22 - 23

1. Fixed Distance

a) D = 2m

This distance is used whenever the ES offers protection against fragments and/or debris from the PES.

b) Explanation

2. Fixed Distances

a) D = 10 m - 25 m - 90 m

These distances are dependent on:

1) The fragments and debris likely to arise from the PES in the event of an accidental explosion in
the PES.

2) The susceptibility of the ES i.e. door facing PES, weak roof etc. to attack by such debris and/or
fragments.

3) The desired level of protection.

b) Explanation

3. Fixed Distances

a) D = 25 m - 90 m - 135 m

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The fixed distance 25 m is used for the barricaded workshop with a protective roof i.e. it offers good
protection against fragments. The fixed distances 90 m and 135 m are used for barricaded workshops with
light roofs and unbarricaded workshops with or without protective roof. 90 m or 135 m are used depending
on the PES contains ammunition up to 60 mm calibre only or ammunition above 60 mm calibre.

b) Explanations

1) (for D = 25 m)

2) D = 90 m. Based upon US trials (Ref. ). Acceptable risk from fragments and lobbed
ammunition. Workshops can be evacuated and traffic can be stopped before the final fragment
saturation has been reached. In the first minutes of an accidental explosion only a few items and
fragments can be expected to be propelled at that distance. The possibility that protected
buildings may be breached by an explosion within them and that subsequent explosions may
cause ammunition to be lobbed out through these breaches is accepted.

3) (for D = 135 m)

4. Fixed Distances

a) D = 90 m - 135 m

A fixed distance of 90 m or 135 m depending on the calibre of the ammunition in the PES is used when
traffic can be stopped promptly to avoid the worst attack.

b) Explanation

D = 90m and 135 m. Based upon US trials. Acceptable risk from fragments and lobbed ammunition.
Workshops can be evacuated and traffic can be stopped before the final fragment saturation has been
reached. In the first minutes of an accidental explosion only a few items and fragments can be expected to
be propelled at that distance. The possibility that protected buildings may be breached by an explosion
within them and that subsequent explosions may cause ammunition to be lobbed out through these breaches
is accepted.

5. Distance Functions

a) 1) D1 = 53 Q0.18
2) D2 = 68 Q0.18
b) Explanation

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The D1- or D2-distances depending on the calibre of the ammunition in the PES are used when it is
impossible to stop traffic promptly in the event of an explosion.

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Section IV - Criteria for Q-D Table 3A

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Fixed Distances : paragraphs 24 - 28

- Distance Functions Distances : paragraphs 29 - 32

1. Fixed Distance

a) D = 2m

This distance is used, providing virtually complete protection, whenever the PES is an earth-covered
building or heavy-walled building with or without protective roof, which is side - or rear - on to the side,
rear or face (when doors and head-wall are resistent to fire) of an ES which is an earth-covered building or
building of non-combustible construction with walls of 70 cm concrete, brick or equivalent with protective
roof.

b) Explanation

2. Fixed Distance

a) D = 10 m

This distance is used, providing high/limited degree of protection, whenever the PES is an open stack or
light structure, barricaded or unbarricaded, or earth-covered building with door facing the ES and where the
ES is a side-on earth-covered building not complying with paragraph 2.3.2.2. or a barricaded open stack or
light structure.

b) Explanation

3. Fixed Distance

a) D = 25 m

This distance is used as alternative to 2 m or 10 m to provide a better degree of protection or in cases where
resistance of head-wall and doors is inadequate.

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b) Explanation

Known as Fire-Fighting Distance this distance prevents ignition of buildings and stacks by radiant heat,
whilst UK and US trials with propellants in buildings designed to vent through the door end show that the
contents of the buildings are thrown through the front only.

4. Fixed Distance

a) D = 160 m

This distance is used as minimum distance for Public Traffic Routes when the PES is an unspecified earth-
covered building with door facing the route and likely reaction of drivers on busy roads is considered to be
acceptable.

b) Explanation
2/3 minimum Inhabited Building Distance used for PES detailed in subparagraph 27.a) above.

5. Fixed Distance

a) D = 240 m
This distance is the minimum Inhabited Building Distance when the PES is an unspecified earth-covered
building with door facing the inhabited building.

b) Explanation

Based upon US trials with propellants. Minimum distance for protection against burning items projected by
mortar effect (i.e. directional projection).

6. D1-Distances

a) D1 = 0.22 Q1/2

D1-distances are used, with a minimum of 25 m, in those cases when because of orientation or construction
of either PES or ES, 25 m fixed distance is inadequate.

b) Explanation

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Based upon UK trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D = 1.05 W0.44. Distances protect
against communication by flame and heat.

7. D2-Distances

a) D2 = 3.2 Q1/3

D2-distances are used, with a minimum of 60 m, as distance to workshops from all types of PES except
when the PES is an unspecified earth-covered building with unbarricaded door facing the workshop.

b) Explanation

Based upon UK and US trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D = 8 W1/3; corresponding US
formula D = 7 W1/3 (approx.). Distances protect against effect of radiant heat. Heavy-walled buildings are
considered to give no appreciable protection against the hazard.

8. D3-Distances

a) D3 = 4.3 Q1/3

D3-distances are used as Public Traffic Route Distance, with a minimum distance of 60 m (but see
paragraph 27 above), when reaction of drivers on busy roads is considered to be acceptable.

b) Explanation

These distances are 2/3 of the Inhabited Building Distance. The distances are reduced in conformity with
UK wartime and US current practices. Distances give a reasonable degree of protection against flame, heat
and lobbed ammunition.

9. D4-Distances

a) D4 = 6.4 Q1/3

D4-distances are used, as Inhabited Building Distance with a minimum of 60 m (but see paragraph 28
above).

b) Explanation

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Based upon UK trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D = 16 W1/3. Distances protect against
flame and heat.

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Section V - Criteria for Q-D Table 3B

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Fixed Distances : paragraphs 33 - 36

- Distance Function Distance : paragraph 37

1. Fixed Distance

a) D = 2m

This distance is used, providing virtually complete protection, for all side- or rear-on earth-covered ES
regardless of PES and when the PES is a side- or rear-on earth-covered building and the ES is a face-on
earth-covered building with protective door and head-wall or a heavy-walled building with protective roof.

b) Explanation

2. Fixed Distance

a) D = 10 m

This distance is used, providing either virtually complete or high/limited degree of protection, where the
PES is a heavy-walled building with or without protective roof or an open stack or light structure with or
without barricade and the ES is a face-on earth-covered building or barricaded open stack or light structure.

b) Explanation

3. Fixed Distance

a) D = 25 m

This distance is used as alternative to or in place of 10 m when resistance of headwall and door of an earth-
covered building or other form of ES is inadequate. It is also used as Workshop Distance where the
workshop is a barricaded heavy-walled building with protective roof.

b) Explanation

Known as Fire-Fighting Distance this distance prevents ignition of buildings and stacks by radiant heat,
whilst UK and US trials with propellants in buildings designed to vent through the door end show that the
contents of the buildings are thrown through the front only.

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4. Fixed Distance

a) D = 60 m

This distance is used as alternative to or in place of 25 m when construction or orientation of the PES/ES is
considered to be inadequate. It is also used as Workshop Distance where the workshop does not have a
protective roof and/or a barricade and as fixed Public Traffic Route Distance when traffic can be stopped
promptly.

b) Explanation

Based upon French (Burlot's) trials. Minimum distance from a PES containing Hazard Division 1.3 items,
other than propellants.

5. D4-Distances

a) D4 = 6.4 Q1/3

D4-distances are used as Inhabited Building Distances with a minimum of 60 m.

b) Explanation

Based upon UK trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D = 16 W1/3. Distances protect against
flame and heat.

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DETAILED INFORMATION RELATED TO

EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINES (IGLOOS)

SECTION I TYPES OF IGLOOS

SECTION II BLAST DATA FOR DESIGN OF IGLOOS

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Section I - Types of Igloos

1. General

a) On the basis of data from structural analyses, modeltests and full-scale trials of the response of structures to
explosion blast loads, the following designs are considered by the nations concerned to be suitable for Inter-
Magazine Distances prescribed in Part I, Annex A.

b) The information contained in this section reflects the designs and features applicable to national
requirements of NATO nations for the storage of ammunition and explosives. The types described do not
necessarily equate to each other and should not be considered as freely interchangeable or alternative types.

c) Note should be taken of revisions among the specified drawings which include strengthening of head-walls,
doorframes and doors, compared with earlier designs.

d) Less onerous requirements obtain for earth-covered magazines if they are sited at Inter-Magazine Distances
greater than those prescribed in Part I, Annex A. Conversely, stronger types of construction may warrant
smaller Inter-Magazine Distances. It is for the National Authority to balance the cost of real estate and to
determine the optimum in any particular situation other than the norm.

e) When it is not possible for NATO authorities to obtain safety requirements from a host nation, they may
contact the AC/258 Group for general guidance or for amplification of the principles in this Manual.

2. French Igloo-Magazine Types

a) The magazines below are approved by the French Ministry of Defence (Décision ministérielle N°
4986/DEF/DCG/T2 dated 9th September, 1975). There are three types of magazines:

1. Steel-arch type, 7 mm thick (ARMCO)

2. Steel-arch type, 5 mm thick (ARVAL)
3. Reinforced concrete arch type, 200 mm thick.

b) All magazines have a circular arch and all have earth-cover of 0.6 m. The usable interior dimensions are 12
m by 20 m giving a gross floor area of 240 m2. The capacity is a NEQ of 60 000 kg. Two other models with
dimensions of 12 m by 10 m and 12 m by 30 m are used, their gross floor areas and their NEQ vary in the
same proportions.

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c) The head-walls and the doors (single sliding doortype) are designed to resist an external blast loading of 7
bar and an impulse of 140 bar ms. The door consists of two steel sheets each 10 mm thick, reinforced by U-
shaped girders. The dimensions of the door are 3.25 m by 3.25 m giving an opening of 3 m by 3 m.

3. German Reinforced Concrete, Portal Type

Reinforced concrete, portal type, earth-covered magazines, designed to vent through the head-wall, the
construction of which is at least equivalent in strength to that specified in German Ministry of Defence drawings
75743 or 75740 for 50 m2 storage area magazines and in drawings 75744 or 75741 for 25 m2 storage area magazines
(Munitionslagerhaus 611). The original doors and doorframes shown in the drawing no. 75929/4 are not satisfactory
and must be redesigned for exposure as specified in subparagraph 2.3.2.2.b)2). The NEQ is limited to 125 000 kg
explosives of Hazard Division 1.1 and to 250 000 kg of Hazard Divisions 1.2 and 1.3 based only on the limitation of
quantity-distances.

4. German Reinforced Concrete, Stradley

Reinforced concrete, Stradley (Yurt) magazines, earth-covered, designed to vent through the head-wall, the
construction of which is at least equivalent in strength to that specified in the German Ministry of Defence drawing
75737 (Munitionslagerhaus 602) for 93 m2 and 186 m2 storage area magazines. The original door and doorframes
shown in the drawings nos. 75737/8 and 9 are satisfactory. The NEQ is limited to 125 000 kg explosives of Hazard
Division 1.1 and 250 000 kg explosives of Hazard Divisions 1.2 and 1.3 based only on the limitation of quantity-
distances.

5. German Reinforced Concrete, Portal Type 180B and 90B

Reinforced concrete, portal type, earth-covered magazines with a floor space of 180 m2 and 90 m2
respectively, designed in accordance with AC/258-D/211(Revised) dated 4th September, 1975 (Project No. 71517).
Head-wall and door are satisfactory for exposure to a blast loading of 7 bar and an impulse of 84 bar ms. The earth-
covered side-walls and rear-wall are satisfactory for exposure to a blast loading of 3 bar and an impulse of 42 bar
ms. The NEQ is limited to 75 000 kg.

6. German Corrugated Steel, Oval Arch Type 180S and 90S

Corrugated steel, oval arch type, earth-covered magazines with a floor space of 180 m2 and 90 m2
respectively, designed in accordance with AC/258-D/211(Revised) dated 4th September, 1975 (Project 71922).
Head-wall and door are satisfactory for exposure to a blast loading of 7 bar and an impulse of 84 bar ms. The earth-

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covered side-walls and rear-wall are satisfactory for exposure to a blast loading of 3 bar and an impulse of 42 bar
ms. The NEQ is limited to 75 000 kg.

7. Norwegian Reinforced Concrete, Arch Type

The following reinforced concrete, arch type, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least
equivalent in strength to Norwegian Defence Construction Service drawings as stated below:

1. Drawings A-6631, sheet 20-26 (arch radius 3.5 m)

2. Drawings A-7324, sheet 1-9 (arch radius 4.0 m)

Both types have double winged steel doors according to drawings A-7126, sheet 1-12. The front-wall and door of both
types have been structurally calculated to withstand a long duration blast load of 8 bar overpressure. The door has been
proof tested for a 12 bar and 150 bar ms blast load and classified as a 14 bar and 120 bar ms door. The arch and the
rear-wall are statically designed to support the dead load pressure from the earth-cover and have been compared with
model and full-scale tested US-designs. It has been concluded that the arch and the rear-wall will not collapse at scaled
distances of 0.51/3 and 0.81/3 respectively. Only type 2 is now applied for new sites. According to the Norwegian
Service Regulations for Storage dated 1st July, 1974, the maximum permitted NEQ in a single magazine is 80 000 kg
for any magazine type. Any request for further information should be forwarded through the appropriate channels to
the Norwegian Defence Construction Service.

8. United Kingdom Reinforced Concrete, Portal Type

a) The following reinforced concrete, portal type, earth-covered magazines the construction of which is at
least equivalent in strength to the United Kingdom Department of the Environment Drawings shown below:

1. Single Bay. Drawing No. XB1/1, 1/2, 1/6, 1/9A and 1/10.
Gross Floor Area: 149 m2

(1) Type 1. Storage capacity 80 NATO standard pallets.

Stacked 2 high.

(2) Type 2. Storage capacity 120 NATO standard pallets.

Stacked 3 high.

2. Double Bay. Drawing No. XB1/3A, 1/5B, 1/6, 1/9A and 1/10.
Gross Floor Area: 288 m2

(1) Type 1. Storage capacity 160 NATO standard pallets.

Stacked 2 high.

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(2) Type 2. Storage capacity 240 NATO standard pallets.

Stacked 3 high.

b) The magazines have been dynamically designed in accordance with the load parameters given in Part II,
paragraph 2.3.2.2. for a maximum NEQ of 75 000 kg of Hazard Division 1.1 and up to 250 000 kg of Hazard
Divisions 1.2 and 1.3 depending on quantity-distances available. The magazines are designed to vent through
the head-walls which have also been designed to resist an external blast loading of 7 bar and an impulse of 84
bar ms. The design parameters permit the magazines to be sited with Inter-Magazine Distances of 0.5 Q1/3
side-to-side and 0.8 Q1/3 rear-to-front for storage of Hazard Division 1.1.

9. United States Earth-Covered Magazines

a) US earth-covered magazines are of approved designs based upon satisfactory survival of a full-scale proof
test, or by analytical and model test comparison with proven types. Except as noted, all are approved for the
exposures as in subparagraphs 2.3.2.2.b)1) and 2.3.2.2.b)2) for any quantity of explosives allowed by
applicable tables.

b) Reinforced Concrete, Arch Type

Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least equivalent in
strength to those in United States Army Corps of Engineers drawing 33-15-06 dated 1st August, 1951,
revised 31st May, 1956. The arch door(s), doorframe(s), and head-wall(s) of these magazines are
satisfactory for any quantity of explosives allowed by applicable tables. These magazines are approved
based upon full-scale and model tests in the Arco-DDESB series of 1944-1946, and comparison with the
Fre-Loc non-circular concrete arch tested full-scale in ESKIMO-V 1977.
(DDESB = Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board).

c) Reinforced Concrete, Arch Type

Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least equivalent to US
Navy drawings 357428 through 357430 dated 9th August, 1944 and modified in accordance with Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) drawing 626739 dated 19th March, 1954, or NAVFAC
drawings 627954 through 627957, 764957, 793747, 658384 through 658388, 724368,764596, and 793746.
The arch, door(s), doorframe(s), and head-wall(s) of these magazines are satisfactory for any quantity of
explosives allowed by applicable tables.
These magazines are approved based upon full-scale and model tests in the Arco-DDESB series of 1944-
1946 and comparison with the Fre-Loc non-circular concrete arch tested full-scale in ESKIMO V.

d) Corrugated Steel, Arch Type

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Corrugated steel, arch type, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to
those in United States Army Corps of Engineers drawings AW 33-15-63 (5th March, 1963), AW 33-15-64
(10th May, 1963) and AW 33-15-65 (10th January, 1963); NAVFAC drawings 1059128-30, 1059132,
1069906, 1355460-61, and specifications cited therein. The arch and rear-wall of these magazines are
satisfactory for any quantity of explosives allowed by applicable tables. The original doors and doorframes
shown in these drawings are satisfactory for exposure in subparagraph 2.3.2.2.b)1) but marginal for
exposure as in subparagraph 2.3.2.2.b)2) for the larger quantities currently allowed. If maximum utilization
is desired for Hazard Division 1.1 a door and head-wall such as that for OCE 33-15-73 below should be
used. The se magazines were proof tested at full-scale in the Naval Weapons Center-DDESB Steel Arch
Igloo test series of 1963-1965 and in ESKIMO I. Various door and head-wall modifications were further
evaluated in ESKIMO II and IV.

e) Corrugated Steel, Oval Arch Type

Corrugated steel, oval arch type, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least equivalent in
strength to those in United States Army Corps of Engineers drawing 33-15-73 dated 21st February, 1975.
The arch, door, head-wall and rear-wall of this magazine are satisfactory for any quantity of explosives
allowed by applicable tables. It has been fully evaluated by full-scale proof test in ESKIMO III, IV and V
including a door and head-wall combination suitable for 14 bar pressure and 80 bar ms impulse with a
donor of 160 000 kg NEQ and with the originally required concrete thrust beams omitted.

f) Reinforced Concrete, Stradley

Reinforced concrete, Stradley (Yurt) magazines, earth-covered, whose construction is at least equivalent in
strength to those in United States Army Corps of Engineers drawing 33-15-61 (sheets 1 to 12). The original
door(s) and doorframe(s) shown in these drawings are satisfactory for any quantity of explosives allowed by
applicable tables. These magazines are approved based upon analytical comparison with other types tested in
US DDESB test programme and specific testing of doors and head-walls at full-scale in ESKIMO II and IV.
g) Reinforced Concrete, Fre-Loc

Reinforced concrete, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to

those in US Army Engineer Command Europe drawing 33-15-13. The arches, head- walls and rear-
walls of these magazines are suitable for any quantity of explosives permitted by applicable tables.
The magazine was exposed in the ESKIMO V test to an impulse load of 33 bar ms with a peak
pressure of about 7 bar on the surface of the earth-cover over the arch. The originally designed doors
may be marginal for exposures listed in subparagraph 2.3.2.2.b)2) and loadings greater than 7 bar.
Thus in some cases, it may be desirable to specify stronger doors, such as those for OCE 15-33-73
above.

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h) Reinforced Concrete, Strengthened Fre-Loc

Reinforced concrete, earth-covered magazines whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to that
in US Army Office, Chief of Engineers drawing 33-15-74 dated 11th April, 1979. The arch, head-wall
and rear-wall of these magazines are suitable for any quantity of explosives permitted by applicable
tables. The drawing cited depicts a magazine whose arch and rear-wall are identical to those of the Fre-
Loc (subparagraph g) above), and whose head-wall and door are identical to those of the oval steel arch
magazine (subparagraph e) above). In the ESKIMO V test, the Fre-Loc magazine was exposed to an
impulse load of 33 bar ms, with a peak pressure of about 7 bar in the surface of the earth-cover over the
arch. The door and head-wall combination had been subjected in ESKIMO IV to an impulse load of 80
bar ms with a peak pressure of 14 bar.

10. Tabulated Information

Available information on Igloos has been given in Table 1.

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TABLE 1 - INFORMATION ON IGLOOS - CHART OF CODE NUMBERS

Pr reflected pressure in bars Ir reflected impulse in bars/ms

HV/LV high/low velocity proterction * AS Eskimo V Fre-Loc

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Section II - Blast Data for Design of Igloos

1. Origins of Data

This section sets out, in a format that facilitates comparisons, all the blast data measured during the United
States ESKIMO III Trial in 1974 and the five United Kingdom model tests 1971-1972. It also gives some of the data
from earlier United States full-scale trials on igloos 1962-1963.

2. Tabulation of Data

The data has been arranged in a number of tables based on the nominal scaled separation of the Explosion
Site and the ES. Table 1 presents the data for a separation of 0.5 Q1/3, Table 2 for 0.6 Q1/3, Table 3 for 0.8 Q1/3, Table
5 for 8 Q1/3 while Table 4 relates to sundry observations between 1 and 2 Q1/3.

3. Arrangement of Data in each Table

In each table the values have been arranged in ascending order of the scaled distance from the centre of the
explosion to the gauge, rounded to two decimal places. The locations of the Explosion Site and the gauge are shown
in column (2). These diagrams are not to scale; they show a plan view and ignore differences in elevation, for
simplicity. The important variable is the orientation of the Explosion Site relative to the ES and the gauge. As a
convention, the Explosion Site is always shown on the left of the diagram.

4. Blast Parameters

The values of side-on and face-on blast parameters are shown in separate columns. The latter include the
reflected shocks sometimes observed in the vicinity of the head-walls of the igloo at the ES, except for certain
values of scaled distances in Table 4 (no. 4-11), where the reflected values are given in a separate column. Values of
positive duration and positive impulse per unit area have been scaled by dividing by the cube root of the NEQ.

5. Validity of Model Testing

The validity of comparisons between model and full-scale igloos was established by the Arco trials of the
United States 1946 and is corroborated by the recent United States and United Kingdom tests.

6. Rounding of Values

All values have been rounded for simplicity in making comparisons. The experimental variations among
replicate tests are such that an implied precision better than about 10 % would not be justified. Certain unreliable

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observations, such as those from gauges underneath sand cover in the United Kingdom models, have been excluded
from the tables.

7. Symbols

The symbols used are as follows:

1) Igloo plan view with

head-wall/door
downwards

2) Foundation slab for UK

Test 5 (no Explosion Site)

3) Sand barricade
(UK model tests)

4) In the tables igloo A is the left igloo and igloo B is the right igloo.

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TABLE 1 - BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 0.5 Q1/3

No. Location of gauge IDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak overpressure Scaled duration Scaled impulse Peak overpressure bar Scaled duration Scaled impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3 ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3
(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)

1. 0.57 10.3 - - 17.2 - - Gauge shows initial shock and 90 700 kg TNT in 155 mm projectiles AS/DDESB 1971 Eskimo 1, East 1.
reflection from headwall. Contents (15% net charge). igloo, gauge flush with ground, left
of acceptor igloo detonated after 60 of door.
ms.

2. 0.60 18.0 0.6 4.5 Gauge on sidewall of igloo 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 1/A. 2.
underneath the sandcover.

3. 0.62 22.0 0.4 16.0 Gauge on sidewall of igloo 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 1/H. 3.
relatively exposed to the air, by
partial removal of sand cover over
the gauge zone (re-sidual cover 0.1-
6m).

4. 0.62 5.2 0.7 0.8 Gauge 3 m toward donor from igloo 159 000 kg tritonal in 750 lbs bombs. US/DDESB Eskimo III 4.
A centerline, on headwall 1.2 m
from ground

5. 0.62 3.8 - 0.8 Gauge 3 m toward donor from igloo 159 000 kg tritonal in 750 lbs bombs. US/DDESB Eskimo III 5.
B centerline, on headwall 1.2 m
from ground.

6. 0.68 3.4 0.8 0.4 Gauge on igloo A centerline, in 159 000 kg tritonal in 750 lbs bombs. US/DDESB Eskimo III 6.
ground 0.6 m in front of door.

7. 0.68 4.5 0.8 0.5 Gauge on igloo B centerline, in 159 000 tritonal in 750 lbs bombs. US/DDESB Eskimo III 7.
ground 0.6 m in front of door.

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TABLE 1 (page 2) – BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPERATION OF 0.5 Q 1/3

No. Location of gauge IDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak overpressure Scaled duration Scaled Peak overpressure bar Scaled duration Scaled impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 impulse ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3
bar.ms.kg-1/3 (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)
(5)
8. 0.70 1.7 1.2 0.4 Gauge flush with headwall, beside door. 64 kg tetryl/TNT in steel case, 20% UK/ESTC 1971 Test 2, gauge 1/C 8.
net.
idem
9. 2.7 1.3 1.3 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 1/C 9.
idem
10. 2.7 0.8 0.9 idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge 1/C 10.

11. 0.72 5.5 0.2 0.5 Gauge flush with headwall, beside door. 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 1/C 11.

12. 0.73 33.2 0.4 1.7 Gauge flush with roof, devoid of any 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 1/D 12.
sand cover.

13. 35.3 0.4 1.3 idem idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 1/E 13.

14. 0.73 4.1 - 1.0 Gauge 3 m farther from donor than igloo 159 000 kg tritonal in 750 lbs bombs. US/DDESB Eskimo III 14.
A centerline, on headwall 1.2 m from
ground.

15. 0.73 2.8 1.0 0.8 Gauge 3 m farther from donor than igloo 159 000 kg tritonal in 750 lbs bombs. US/DDESB Eskimo III 15.
B centerline, on headwall 1.2 m from
ground.

16 Gauge on outside of door, in middle. 45 400 RDX/TNT bulk explosive in US/ASESB 1963 Test 6, West igloo 16
cane.

17. 0.75 3.4 0.8 1.0 Gauge flush with headwall, above door. 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1971 Test 1, gauge 1/B 17.
idem
64 kg tetryl/TNT in steel cans, 20% UK/ESTC 1971 Test 2, gauge 1/B
18. 2.2 0.6 0.5 net. 18.
idem
64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 1/B
19. 2.2 1.0 1.2 idem 19.
idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge 1/B
20. 2.0 1.1 0.8 20.

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No. Location of gauge IDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.
(scaled distance)
Peak overpressure Scaled duration Scaled Peak overpressure bar Scaled duration Scaled impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 impulse ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3
bar.ms.kg-1/3 (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)
(5)
21. 0.77 2.6 1.0 1.0 Gauge flush with ground. 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge G1 21.

22. 0.77 7.6 1.0 1.3 Gauge flush with headwall, above door. 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 1/B 22.

23. 0.80 10.8 0.7 1.2 Gauge flush with ground. 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge G1 23.

24. 0.93 2.4 Gauge allegedly "normal to door" but is 580 kg TNT equivalent (HE plus pro- UK/ASESB 1963 Test 5, igloo C 24.
assumed to record side-on overpressure pellant in 3 missiles.
only.

TABLE 1 (PAGE 3) – BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPERATION OF 0.5 Q1/3

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(Edition 1)

TABLE 2 - BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 0.6 Q1/3

No. Location of gauge SIDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak Scaled Scaled Peak Scaled Scaled
overpressure duration impulse overpressure duration impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3
.kg-1/3 (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (1)

1. 0.77 2.2 1.1 0.9 1.

Gauge flush with headwall, beside 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge UK/ESTC 1971 Test 1, gauge 2/C
door.

2. 0.83 3.7 - - 2.

Gauge on outside face of door, in 45 400 kg RDX/TNT bulk explosive in US/ASESB 1963 Test 6, East igloo
middle. case.

3. 0.85 2.3 1.3 1.0 3.

Gauge flush with headwall, above 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1971 Test 1, gauge 2/B
4. 1.7 0.8 0.6 door. idem 4.
UK/ESTC 1971, Test 2, gauge 2/B

64 kg tetryl/TNT in steel case, 20%

net.
5. 1.02 2.5 - - 5.

Gauge allagedly "normal to door" but 580 kg TNT equivalent (HE plus pro- US/ASESB 1963 Test 5, igloo B
is assumed to record side-on pellant en 3 missiles).
overpressure only.

6. 1.03 1.7 2.3 - 6.

Gauge allegedly 910 kg TNT equivalent in lightly cased US/ASESB 1962 Test 7, nearer door of
"normal to igloo face" but is assumed charges. acceptor igloo.
to record side-on overpressure only.

7. 1.60 0.3 - - Gauge allegedly 7.

580 kg TNT equivalent (HE plus pro- US/ASESB 1963 Test 5, igloo D
"normal to the door" but is assumed to pellant in 3 missiles).
record side-on overpressure only.

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 ANNEX II-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

TABLE 3 (page 1) - BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 0.8 Q1/3

No. Location of gauge SIDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak Scaled Scaled Peak Scaled Scaled
overpressure duration impulse overpressure duration impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3 bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-
1/3
(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)
1. 0.86 54.8 0.7 7.2 1.
Gauge flush with ground. Headwall 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge G2
failed under blast load and was
projected into igloo, damaging rear
wall.

2. 0.86 5.6 0.9 1.8 2.

Gauge flush with ground. Gauge 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge G2
shows initials shock & reflection
from headwall.

3. 0.90 6.6 0.8 1.8 Gauge flush with headwall, above 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 2/B 3.
door.

4. 6.2 0.8 2.0 4.

Gauge flush with headwall, beside idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 2/C
door.

5. 0.91 168 0.8 10.7 Gauge flush with headwall, above 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 2/B 5.
door, wall failed.

6. 162 0.7 11.2 Gauge flush with headwall, beside idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 2/C 6.
door.

7. 0.92 5.6 0.7 1.6 Gauge flush with headwall, above 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 TEST 4, gauge 2/B 7.
door.

8. 8.
6.9 1.1 2.4 Gauge flush with headwall, beside idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge 2/C
door.

9. 0.99 5.2 - - 16.4 0.3 - 9.

Gauge shows initial shock & 90 7000 kg TNT in 155 mm US/DDESB 1971 Eskimo I, North
reflection from headwall. projectiles igloo, right ground gauge
(15% net charge).

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 ANNEX II-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
TABLE 3 (PAGE 2) – BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 0.8 Q1/3

No. Location of gauge SIDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak Scaled Scaled Peak Scaled Scaled
duration impulse overpressure duration impulse
overpressure
ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3 bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-
1/3
bar (5)
(1) (2) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)
(3)
10. 1.00 5.0 0.6 1.0 10.
90 7000 kg TNT in 155 mm US/DDESB 1971 Eskimo I. Sauth
projectiles igloo, gauge flush with headwall,
(15% net charge). left door

11. 5.2 0.7 1.1 idem Idem but gauge right of door 11.

12. 1.00 1.9 - - 4.2 0.6 - Gauge shows initial shock & 90 700 kg TNT in 155 mm US/DDESB 1971 Eskimo I. South 12.
reflection from headwall. projectiles (15% net charge). igloo, left ground gauge

13. 2.3 - - 4.2 0.6 - idem idem US/DDESB 1971 Eskimo I. South 13.
igloo, right ground igloo

14. 1.00 3.1 0.7 1.0 14.

Gauge shows initial shock & 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge G3
reflection from headwall.

15. 1.01 20.6 0.9 3.7 15.

Headwall cracked by blast load but 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge G3
remained in place.

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 ANNEX II-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

TABLE 3 (PAGE 3) – BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 0.8 Q1/3

No. Location of gauge SIDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak Scaled Scaled Peak Scaled Scaled
overpressure duration impulse overpressure duration impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3 bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-
1/3
(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)
16. 1.05 5.6 0.6 1.5 Flus gauge above door. 64 kg tetry/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 3/B 16.

17. 6.9 0.8 1.2 Flush gauge beside door. idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 3/C 17.

18. 2.7(3.0) 0.7(2.9) 1.0(5.3) Flush gauge above door. Two idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 3/B 18.
distinct pulses recorded.

19. 4.8 0.6 1.1 Flush gauge beside door. idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 3, gauge 3/C 19.
20. 1.07 4.5 1.0 1.5 Flush gauge above door. 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge UK/ESTC 1971 Test 1, gauge 3/B 20.

21. 5.6 0.7 1.2 Flush gauge beside door. idem UK/ESTC 1971 Test 1, gauge 3/C 21.

22. 2.8 - - Flush gauge above door. 64 kg tetryl/TNT in steel cases, UK/ESTC 1971 Test 2, gauge 3/B 22.
20% net.

23. 1.07 54.1 0.6 4.9 Gauge flush with headwall, above 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 3/B 23.
door. Headwall cracked by blast,
remained in place.

41.2 0.6 3.3 Gauge flush with headwall beside idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 3/C
24. door. 24.

25. 1.08 6.7 0.8 1.2 25.

Gauge flush with ground beyond 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/estc 1972 Test 4, gauge C5
sand barricade.

26. 1.08 11.0 0.8 1.5 26.

Gauge fluh with ground beyond 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge G4
sand barricade.

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 ANNEX II-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
TABLE 4 - BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 1 - 2 Q1/3
No. Location of gauge SIDE-ON REFLECTED FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.
(scaled distance)
Peak over- Scaled duration Scaled Peak Scaled Peak Scaled Scaled
pressure bar ms kg-1/3 impulse overpressure impulse overpressure duration impulse
bar mskg-1/3 bar bar ms- kg-1/3 bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3
(5) (5a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3a) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1)
1. 1.7 - - 4.4 0.9 - Seperation of igloos -1.1 90 700 kg TNT in 155 US/DDESB 1971, Eskimo 1.
1.17 Q1/3. Gauge shown mm projectiles (15% net I, West igloo, left ground
initial shock & charge). gauge
reflection from
headwall.
2. 2.
2.6 - - 4.7 0.9 - idem idem US/DDESB 1971, Eskimo
I, West igloo, right ground
gauge
3. 1.20 8.5 0.7 1.1 3.
Beyond sand barricade. 64 kg te-tryl/TNT UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5,
Gauge flush with uncased charge. gauge G5
ground.

4. - - - 6.6 - Gauge 3 m from igloo C 159 000 kg tritonal in US/DDESB, Eskimo III 4.
centerline on headwall 750 lbs bombs.
1.49 and 1.52 1.2 m from ground.

3.1 - - 7.9 - Gauge on igloo C idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III

5. centerline, in ground 5.
0.6 m in front of door.

6. 1.45, - - - 5.2 1.1 Gauge 3 m from igloo D idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III 6.
1.50 and 1.58 centerline on headwall
1.2 m from ground.
7. 7.
1.7 - - 4.8 - Gauge on igloo D idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III
centerline, in ground
8. 0.6 m in front of door. 8.

- - - 5.2 0.7 Same as above off- idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III

centre gauge.
9. - - - 11.4 2.0 Gauge 3 m from igloo E idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III 9.
1.63, centerline on headwall
1.68 and 1.75 1.2 m from ground.

10. 5.2 - - 12.4 - Gauge in igloo E 10.

centerline, in ground 0.6 idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III
m in front of door.
11. - - - 10.3 1.6 11.
Same as above off-
centre gauge. idem US/DDESB, Eskimo III

12. 2.18 0.3 2.5 0.2 12.

Seperation of igloos 1 000 kg TNT US/ASESB 1962 Test 1,
-1.8 Q1/3. equivalent, teking North-east igloo, gauge
Gauge flush with account of explosive NE-1
ground. type (Comp B) & GP
Assumed to be the bomb case.
reflected shock from
headwall.

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 ANNEX II-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

TABLE 5 - BLAST DATA FOR IGLOOS AT NOMINAL SCALED SEPARATION OF 8 Q1/3

No. Location of gauge SIDE-ON FACE-ON Remarks Q Reference No.

(scaled distance)
Peak Scaled Scaled Peak Scaled Scaled
overpressure duration impulse overpressure duration impulse
bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3 bar ms kg-1/3 bar.ms.kg-1/3
(5) (8)
(1) (2) (3) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (1)
(4)
1. 8.13 0.3 3.6 0.3 1.
Gauge beyond sand barricade flush 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge G9
with ground.
Gauge shows initial shock & reflection
from headwall.

2. 8.15 0.6 3.4 0.4 2.

Gauge beyond sand barricade flush 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge G9
with ground.
Gauge shows initial shock & reflection
from headwall.

3. 8.25 0.2 2.3 0.2 Gauge fluh with 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge 4/B 3.
headwall, above door.

4. 0.2 2.7 0.3 Gauge flus with idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 4, gauge 4/C 4.
haedwall, beside door.

5. 8.27 0.5 3.0 0.4 Gauge fluh with 64 kg tetryl/TNT uncased charge. UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 4/B 5.
headwall, above door.

6. 0.6 2.8 0.4 Gauge flus with idem UK/ESTC 1972 Test 5, gauge 4/C 6.
haedwall, beside door.

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 ANNEX II-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

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 ANNEX II-C
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 ANNEX II-C
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

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 ANNEX II-C
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

No. Paper ref. Date Contents

1 ESTC SOLTAU TRIALS AUG
1947
2 AFWL-TR-67-132 MAY High Explosive Storage
1968 Test BIG PAPA
3 AC/258(ST)WP/1 OCT Original basis for discussion
1970
4 AC/258-D/152 JUL 1971 Summary of London
meeting, February 1971
5 AC/258-D/176 FEB 1972 Summary of Brussels
meeting, January 1972
6 AC/258(ST)WP/31 NOV Blast Data from
1972 ESKIMO I
7 Informal Working Papers JAN- Blast and response data
United Kingdom AUG from UK model tests
1972 and
SEP-DEC
1972
8 NWC TP 5430 APR Final technical report
1973 on ESKIMO I
9 AC/258-R/14 JAN 1974 AC/258-D/211 principles
approved as part of AC/258-D/70
10 NWC TP 5557 SEP 1974 Final technical report
on ESKIMO II
11 US(ST)IWP/11 SEP 1974 US data on earth-covered
igloos
12 US(ST)IWP/16 NOV ESKIMO III test results
1974
13 US(ST)IWP/49 JAN 1976 ESKIMO IV test results
14 AC/258-D/211(2nd MAY Quantity-Distances for
Revise) 1977 earth-covered magazines
(igloos)

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 ANNEX II-C
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(Edition 1)

No. Paper ref. Date Contents

15 OCT Burlot
1985 See FR(ST)IWP/2-85
16 NWC TR 5873 MAR ESKIMO IV magazine
1977 separation test
17 NOTS TR 3843 JUL 1965 Summary report of earth-covered
Steel Arch Magazine Test
18 US(ST)IWP/13-82 8th OCT Reduced Q-D from the side
1982 and rear of igloos
19 US(ST)IWP/8-83 3rd AUG Reduced Q-D from the side
1983 and rear of igloos
20 AC/258-UK(ST)IWP/137 21st Reduced Q-D from the side
MAR and rear of igloos
1984

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MANUAL OF

NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

PART III

MAY 2006

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 AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

Section I - Introduction

3.1.1.1. Purpose

This part of the Manual [1]† deals with special types of storage of ammunition and explosives such as
underground storage and storage aboveground in circumstances other than normal for an aboveground depot.
Although each chapter contains both principles and technical details, it is necessary to refer to Part I and Part II of
the Manual for an explanation of the fundamental concepts and the definitions of certain terms.

3.1.1.2. Design Environment Criteria

This part uses distances, specified by the criteria below, to achieve desired levels of protection to personnel
and property. Distances provided by the criteria do not guarantee absolute safety. However, assuming an event,
these distances do limit the expectation of a severe injury or fatality to normally less than 1% for personnel in the
open or in a conventional building at Inhabited Building Distance (IBD).

Advisable criteria at IBD are:

Air blast overpressure: 5 kPa

Fragments and debris: 1 hazardous fragment per 56 m2
Ground Shock Particle Velocities:
Foundation on soil 60-200 mm/s
Foundation on soft rock 115-400 mm/s
Foundation on hard rock: 230-800 mm/s

Actual particle velocity to be used at IBD should depend on the robustness of the structure under
consideration.

The criteria listed above are used in Part I, Chapter 4 to obtain required distances.

Special considerations that are not discussed in detail here are required to provide levels of protection for
historical monuments and sites, high-rise buildings, and locations where many people are assembled.

†
References are in Annex III A

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 AASTP-1
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When they are available, site-specific and configuration-specific tests and/or analyses may be used to
determine recommended distances.

When deciding distances that provide protection for personnel , the requirements of Part II, para 2.5.5.5.d,
para 2.5.5.6, Fig 5-XV, and Annex II A-D10 distance should be considered. These are:

Airblast overpressure: 20-kPa side-on overpressure will not cause severe injury to persons in the
open.

Ground shock: A velocity change of less than 3 m/s will not cause severe injury to
personnel.

Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD) is normally 2/3 of IBD because moving traffic is not continuously exposed.
However, IBD should be used instead of PTRD where there is a heavy traffic.

3.1.1.3. Limitations

Configurations of underground facilities will vary from site-to-site. Only a limited number of possible
configurations have been investigated. Site-specific tests and analyses will be necessary if high-levels of confidence
are required for the more complex configurations.

Recommendations for underground storage are based on the best-available, worldwide database of information.
Recommendations are based on accidents or scaled tests with non-responding steel models (1/100th to 1/20th scale)
or rock tunnels (1/8th to 1/3rd scale).

3.1.1.4. Requirements

Engineered structures and devices related to explosives safety must be designed to 90% confidence levels
for collapse or failure with a given load (Part II, Para 2.3.2.2).

QD distances provided in this document are based on TNT-equivalencies for the energetic materials that are
involved. Significant differences in the TNT-equivalency must be considered [3].

See Part I, Annex IA, Section 1, Para 2 [1] for rounding of Quantity-Distances.

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 AASTP-1
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Section II - Definitions

3.1.2.1. General

The following definitions are used in connection with underground storage. For additional definitions, see
Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2 [1].

3.1.2.2. Definitions

a) Adit

A passage or tunnel leading into an underground storage site

b) Chamber Interval

The interval between the natural or artificial walls of adjacent underground storage chambers/sites

c) Cover

The solid ground situated between the ceiling or the wall of an underground chamber and the nearest
exterior surface

d) Crack

A short, primary discontinuity, which is not pervasive and may not be visible

e) Crater

A hole or chasm in the cover (burden) caused by an underground explosion

f) Faulting

Motions in the earth’s crust resulting in failure of the rock mass and concentrated displacements along
failure planes, for instance discontinuities (joints, fractures)
g) Filled Joints

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 AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

A clearly visible, pervasive discontinuity of geological origin which has a mineral filling of loose or porous
materials and which may be several tens of millimetres thick

h) Fissure

A short, hardly visible and partly irregular, secondary discontinuity, which appears in conjunction with
prepared planes, for instance a blasting fissure or a rock pressure fissure

i) Joint

A term in rock mechanics for a mechanical discontinuity in rock, with a thickness less than a few tens of
millimetres. Joints (fractures, discontinuities) may be open or filled with some material.

j) Single Chamber Storage Site

A chamber storage site with one chamber, which has its own entrance from the exterior and is not
connected by air ducts or passageways to any other storage chamber

k) Shot Gun Type Magazine

A single chamber storage site with one exit and a direct line-of-sight from the chamber to the outside of the
underground installation.

l) Underground Storage

Storage, normally in solid rock, in a cavern or chamber storage

m) Venting

The reduction of internal pressure due to release of gases into a passageway, other chambers, adits, and any
aperture in the cover.

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(Edition 1)

-III-1-6-
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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Section I - General

3.2.1.1. Optimized Underground Ammunition Storage Site (General Description)

a) Underground storage facilities may consist of a single chamber or a series of connected chambers. The
chamber(s) may be either excavated or natural geological cavities. Figures 2-I and 2-II† illustrate general
concepts for several possible configurations of underground facilities. Underground ammunition storage
sites should be located in sound rock. A storage site may consist of one or more storage chambers with
usually one access tunnel in each chamber. The number of chambers depends upon prevailing
topographical and geological circumstances and safety aspects in the environment of the storage site.
Potential blockage should be considered for multi-chamber sites.

b) The thickness of the rock formation surrounding an underground storage site should be designed so
cratering hazards, in case of an explosion, can be practically excluded. Then the only significant external
hazards will be the ground shock and the explosion effects coming from the adit tunnel. The effects coming
from the adit may be considerably reduced by means of structural measures in or in front of the tunnel or
even eliminated by the installation of tunnel closing devices.

c) Adequate separations and tunnel closing devices should be used to prevent the propagation of an explosion
from chamber-to-chamber.

d) Provided the access openings are adequately hardened, underground storage is relatively well-protected
against enemy attack..

e) Geological aspects have a great influence on building costs and, in terms of the construction cost alone,
underground storage is often more costly than aboveground storage. However, when estate, operating,
maintenance and lifetime costs are considered, at least for larger underground facilities, it may be less than
for comparable aboveground facilities. Generally, the most economical are chambers measuring from 100
to 200 m in length with a volume between 5,000 and 15,000 m3. This provides a total gross capacity
between 1000 and 2000 tonnes of ammunition. The length of the access tunnel may be 50 to 150 m,
depending on topographical conditions and the desired rock thickness.

†
Figures are in Annex III B
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 ANNEX III-A
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(Edition 1)
3.2.1.2. Explosion Effects in Underground Ammunition Storage Sites

a) The blast wave originating from an explosion in an underground storage chamber will surge through the
rock formation as ground shock and will escape as blast through the access tunnel into the open air. The
strong confining effect of an underground storage site and the large amount of hot explosion gases
generated will produce a relatively constant high pressure in the chamber. This pressure may break up the
rock formation and produce a crater. The kinetic energy (dynamic pressure impulse) of the blast in the main
passageway is very high compared to an explosion in free air. Objects like unexploded ordnance, rock,
gravel, equipment, and vehicles will be picked up and accelerated up to velocities of several hundred
metres per second before leaving through adits. In addition, engineered features can collapse and cause
debris hazards. Break-up of the cover will cause projection of a heavy fall of rock and earth in all directions
onto the surrounding surface area.

b) The explosion gases will surge at a high velocity through the access tunnel into the open air where they will
burn completely. The escaping gases will carry along ammunition, rock debris, installations, and lining
onto surrounding areas.

c) A disturbance near the surface of the ground will emit compression P-waves, shear S-waves, and Rayleigh
surface R-waves in a semi-infinite elastic medium. Deeply buried disturbances will emit only P-waves and
S-waves, but in the far field, interface effects will result in R-waves being produced. For all of these waves
types, the time interval between wave front arrivals becomes greater and the amplitude of the oscillations
becomes smaller with increasing standoff distance from the source.

The first wave to arrive is the P-wave, the second the S-wave, and the third the R-wave. The P-wave and S-
wave are minor tremors, as these waves are followed by a much larger oscillation when the R-wave arrives.
The R-wave is the major tremor because: 1) about two-thirds of the ground shock energy at the source goes
into the R-wave, and 2) the R-wave dissipates much less rapidly with distance than either the less energetic
P-wave or S-wave. P-waves and S-waves dissipate with distance r to a power of r-1 to r-2. At the surface, P-
waves and S-waves dissipate with distance as r-2, while R-waves dissipate with distance as r-0,5. The greater
energies being transmitted by R-waves and the slower geometric dissipation of this energy causes R-waves
to be the major tremor, the disturbance of primary importance for all disturbances on the surface.

d) Small-Scale Model Tests and Validity of Scaling Laws

1. A portion of the blast energy from an underground detonation is used to compress the surrounding
geological media. This allocation of energy should be considered when evaluating the
experimental results of underground tests.

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(Edition 1)
2. Small-scale, modeling tests that are constructed of non-responding materials do not exhibit the
non-linear energy loss effects typical of an underground explosion. Therefore, air blast results
from non-responding models tend to be safety conservative for predicting hazards that would
occur in an actual underground event. In spite of this, small-scale model tests are still of value for
design purposes.

3.2.1.3. Advantages of Underground Storage

Advantages of underground storage are:

1. A smaller total land area is required than for an aboveground storage.

2. A high degree of protection is afforded against bombing or terrorist attack.

3. The area is easier to camouflage and to guard than an aboveground area.

4. In case of an incident in an underground chamber, damage to ammunition in other chambers is

preventable. Damage to ammunition in aboveground buildings, other than earth-covered
magazines, is usually more extensive.

5. The temperature in underground storage sites is almost constant. The deleterious aging effects on
munitions and explosives caused by extreme temperatures and temperature cycling is mitigated.

6. Effects of sand, snow, and ice, which may cause difficulties in aboveground storage, may be
avoided.

7. Inherent protection may be afforded against external fire.

8. Estate costs, as well as maintenance and operation may be less costly as for an aboveground
storage site, thus more than offsetting the construction costs.

3.2.1.4. Disadvantages of Underground Storage

Disadvantages of underground storage may be:

1. The choice of localities is restricted.

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
2. The costs of the original excavation or the modification of an existing excavation and the
installation and maintenance of special equipment may increase the initial costs of underground
storage over that of aboveground.

3. Extra handling equipment may be required.

3.2.1.5. Work Prohibited in Underground Storage Sites

The opening of packages or the removal of components from unpacked ammunition or similar operations
should be prohibited in the storage chamber, but could be done in the loading/unloading dock or in a separate
chamber if suitable measures are taken to prevent a propagation into the storage chambers.

3.2.1.6. Storage Limitations

Limitations on underground storage are:

1. Ammunition containing Flammable Liquids or Gels

Ammunition containing flammable liquids is only permitted in underground storage sites if

proper protection against fuel leakage is established. The possible energy release of a
stochiometric combustion should be considered as part of the total energy release. Multi-
chamber sites should be arranged and/or sealed in such a way that fuel-fire or gas explosion
should not increase the likelihood of reaction in neighbouring chambers more than established
through interior distances to prevent detonation transfer.

2. Ammunition containing Toxic Agents

Because of the difficulties of decontamination underground, ammunition containing toxic agents

should only be stored under special provisions.

3. Suspect Ammunition and Explosives

Suspect ammunition and explosives should not be stored.

4. Ammunition containing Pyrotechnics

Ammunition containing pyrotechnics, such as illuminating, smoke and signal ammunition, could
in some cases be more vulnerable to mishaps or self ignition, and thereby increase the likelihood

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
of an accident. The decision to store ammunition that contains pyrotechnics underground must
be made on a site-specific basis and provisions must be taken to mitigate the peculiar hazards of
pyrotechnic materials.

5. Ammunition containing Depleted Uranium

Before ammunition containing depleted uranium is permitted in underground sites, the slight
radioactivity and chemical toxicity that would result from an accidental fire or explosion should
be assessed and accepted.

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Section II - Design

3.2.2.1. General

Planning of new underground storage facilities must account for site conditions, storage requirements, and
operational needs. Only when these are established can the design be developed. An optimal compromise between
the sometimes-contradictory demands for planning, construction and operation of storage sites must consider safety,
military and cost requirements.

3.2.2.2. Safety Requirements

Operational procedures should be planned and conducted so that, to the best extent possible, explosives
mishaps are prevented. Facility configurations are to be designed so that, if an explosives mishap should occur, its
hazards are mitigated to acceptable levels. Safety efforts that are essential for ammunition storage sites include:

1. Surveillance and maintenance to ensure that only safe ammunition is stored

2. Well-designed and environmentally controlled chambers and facilities to protect the ammunition
against unintended events

3. Suitable structural designs and operating procedures (doors and guards, for example) to protect
the ammunition against deliberate action by third parties

4. Structural designs and operating procedures to

a) mitigate explosion propagation outside the area of initial occurrence, and

b) provide desired levels of personnel, facility, and asset protection

5. The construction and operation of ammunition storage sites should only be entrusted to qualified
and trained personnel who have clearly defined responsibilities.

6. Evaluate a suitable location for the installation taking into account the site-specific use of
surrounding (inhabited buildings, roads, etc.).

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
3.2.2.3. Military Requirements

Functional requirements that dictate the geographical location of a storage site or its storage and transfer
capacity, may sometimes run counter to desirable safety considerations, thereby requiring innovative designs to
provide required levels of explosives safety. Military requirements often involve protection against enemy weapons,
intruder protection, etc.

3.2.2.4. Financial Aspects

The lifetime cost of a storage facility (construction, operation, and maintenance) should be considered
during the planning phase. Where possible, designs should be selected that minimize total cost while providing
required safety and operational capabilities.

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Section III - Equipment

3.2.3.1. Humidity Control and Ventilation

a) High humidity may be a problem in underground sites. Dehumidifying equipment may then be necessary
to control relative humidity to about 60%. The chambers may be lined with concrete or coated fabric to
better control humidity. The roof lining should be strong enough to withstand minor rock falls.

b) The type of transportation equipment used may govern ventilation requirements. Ventilation shafts to the
exterior should be designed to prevent trespass and sabotage.

3.2.3.2. Electric Installations and Equipment

a) Electric installations and equipment for underground storage sites should conform to the national standards
of the host nation.

b) An emergency lighting system should be installed. Otherwise transportable battery operated lights of an
appropriate standard should be provided and kept at suitable points.

c) A portion of the personnel employed underground should be equipped with hand lamps of an appropriate
standard.

3.2.3.3. Lightning Protection

An underground storage site does not normally require a system of protection against lightning. Metal and
structural parts of the site which have less than 0.6 m cover should be protected as for an aboveground site, see Part
II, Chapter 3, Section IV. However, each underground storage site should be considered individually to take account
of possible conducting faults in the cover.

3.2.3.4. Transport and Handling Equipment

Rail vehicles, road vehicles, mobile lifting or stacking appliances and cranes of the fixed or gantry type,
when operated electrically or by diesel engine, may be permitted in underground storage sites subject to the
following conditions:
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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

1. Electrical equipment should conform to the national standards of the host nation for underground
storage sites.

2. Diesel operated equipment should be fitted with an effective means of preventing sparks or
flames from exhaust outlets. Any portion of the exhaust system or exposed parts of the engine,
which may develop a surface temperature exceeding 100o C, should be suitably screened to
ensure that all exposed surfaces are below that temperature. If the engine is to be kept running
during loading and unloading within the storage site, it should conform to the host nation
standards for underground (confined space) operations.

3. The flash point of the fuel oil for diesel engines should be not less than 55o C. Fuel tanks should
be filled only at authorized places and no spare fuel should be carried.

4. Where fuel oil filling stations are authorized in the underground area, the fuel should be taken
underground in strong closed containers in quantities not exceeding that required for one
working day. The filling station should have a concrete floor with a sill of sufficient height to
contain the quantity of fuel authorized to be stored there.

3.2.3.5. Fire-fighting Equipment

Equipment should conform to the national standards of the host country with particular consideration given
to the following:

1. Reduce the probability that a small fire will escalate by installing an automatic smoke-detecting
and fire-extinguishing system.

2. Consideration should be given to protecting reserve water tanks from potential explosives
effects.

3. An alarm system should be provided to operate throughout the whole area, both above and below
ground.

4. In air-conditioned sites or in sites provided with forced ventilation, the need to shut these down
on an outbreak of fire must be considered.

5. Fire-fighting equipment retained underground should be positioned for accessibility and

potential use.

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

6. For large underground areas, detector devices, to specify the location of a fire, and
communication capabilities, to issue instruction throughout the underground facility, should be
installed.

7. Self-contained breathing apparatus and training in its use are essential for underground fire
fighting or rescue operations, etc.

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

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CHANGE 2
 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Section IV – Explosives Hazards Mitigation Methods.

3.2.4.1. Facility Layout

a) A single-chamber facility with a straight access tunnel leading from the chamber to the portal is a
“shotgun” magazine because blast and debris behave as if fired from a gun. More complex facility layouts
will provide reductions in exit pressures.

b) The side on pressure, the side on pressure impulse, dynamic pressure and the dynamic pressure impulse
decrease as the volume increases.

c) Distributing munitions over several storage chambers may control the size of an initial explosion. Proper
separation or hazard mitigating constructions can limit subsequent damage.

3.2.4.2. Exits

a) The exits from underground storage sites should not emerge where they direct blast, flame, and debris
hazards to Exposed Sites, ES, such as other entrances, buildings, or traffic routes.

b) Connected chambers and cave storage sites should have at least two exits. Exits should be separated by at
least the chamber interval.

3.2.4.3. Branch Passageways

a) When a main passageway has one exit, branch passageways should be inclined at an angle where they join
the main passageway to direct the flow field towards the exit. This inclination should provide for vehicle
access. Angles between 40 degrees and 70 degrees are normally appropriate.

b) The rock thickness between the chamber and the main passageway should be at least equal to or greater
than the chamber interval. Otherwise, an explosion in a chamber might destroy the main passageway and
prevent access to stocks of ammunition and explosives in the other chambers.

3.2.4.4. Blast Closures

a) High-pressure closures are large blocks constructed of concrete or other materials that can obstruct or
greatly reduce the flow of blast effects and debris from an explosion from or into a storage chamber. For
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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
chamber loading densities of about 10 kg/m3 or above, closure blocks will contain 40 percent or more of the
explosion debris within the detonation chamber, provided the block is designed to remain intact. If a
closure block fails under the blast load, it will produce a volume of debris in addition to that from the
chamber itself. However, since the block’s mass and inertia are sufficient to greatly reduce the velocity of
the primary debris, the effectiveness of other debris-mitigating features, such as debris traps, expansion
chambers and barricades is increased. Debris traps and expansion chambers intended to entrap debris must
be designed to contain the full potential volume of debris, based on the maximum capacity of the largest
storage chamber.

b) These debris mitigation features were investigated in the tests described in Reference [7]. These tests
showed that such measures can be very effective, however, no quantitative figures for the reduction of the
adit debris throw were derived. Furthermore, it was shown that a proper design of the mitigation measures
is very important. Sample drawings of the features which proved to be effective for the tested
configurations are in Reference [5].

c) An alternative, full-scale tested, design for a high-pressure closure device, the Swiss-Klotz [4], is shown in
Figure 2-III. This device is highly effective up to chamber loading densities of 28 kg/m3. A special
advantage of this Klotz is that it is movable and can be closed during times when access to the storage
chamber is unnecessary.

d) In case of an explosion inside the storage chamber and a Klotz in closed position, practically all of the
hazardous debris as well as the explosion gases will be trapped inside the storage chamber, thereby
reducing these hazardous effects to virtually insignificant levels. In case the Klotz is in open position, it
will be pushed into the closed position by the explosion gases within approximately 100 ms,
letting pass only a small fraction of the total amount of debris and gases.

e) In any case, using a properly designed high-pressure closure device in conjunction with a portal barricade
will lower the debris hazard to a level where specific debris QD considerations will not be required. Other
combinations of mitigation features will also reduce adit debris throw to a great extent. The remaining adit
debris hazard has to be assessed based on the actual facility layout and quantified by means of suitable
tests.

f) Blast doors that are protected from primary fragments have proven effective for loading densities up to 10
kg/m3.

3.2.4.5. Expansion Chambers

a) Expansion chambers are so-named because of the volume they provide for the expansion of the detonation
gasses behind the shock front as it enters the chamber from a connecting tunnel. Some additional

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
degradation of the peak pressure at the shock front occurs as the front expands into the chamber and
reflects from the walls.

b) Expansion chambers have other practical purposes. They serve as loading/unloading chambers, as weather
protected areas for the transfer of munitions from trucks to storage chambers, and as turn-around areas for
transport vehicles. Figures 2-IV and 2-V illustrate underground facilities with and without expansion
chambers.

3.2.4.6. Constrictions

a) Constrictions, which may be used for mitigating explosives hazards, are short lengths of tunnel with
reduced cross sectional area.

b) A constriction at a chamber entrance reduces the magnitude of airblast and thermal effects entering
chambers near one in which an explosion might occur. A constricted chamber entrance also reduces the
area, and hence the size of a blast door installed to protect the chamber contents.

c) A constriction intended to reduce airblast issuing from an exit of an underground storage facility should be
located within five tunnel diameters of the exit.

d) Although constrictions located more than five tunnel diameters from exits will reduce pressures by
delaying the release of energy [8, 9], their effects on pressure versus distance must be considered on a site-
specific basis.

3.2.4.7. Debris Traps within the Underground Facility

a) Debris traps are excavations in the rock at or beyond the end of sections of tunnel, designed to catch debris
from a storage chamber detonation. Debris traps should be at least 20 percent wider and 10 percent taller
than the branch passageway from the chamber whose debris it is intended to trap, with a depth (measured
along the shortest wall) of at least one tunnel diameter.

b) An expansion chamber may be effective for trapping debris. Tunnels entering or exiting the chambers must
either be offset in axial alignment by at least two tunnel widths or its axis must be offset at least 45 degrees
from the centerline of the tunnel associated with the chamber [5].

3.2.4.8. Blast Traps

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
a) Blast traps may be used to reduce the intensity of blast leaving or entering a passageway. They may be used
to attenuate the blast issuing from the adit of an underground site, thus reducing hazard to people and
property in the vicinity. They may also be used to reduce the blast entering an adjacent underground site,
and to diminish the hazard to other ammunition. The effect of various blast traps will be a function of the
geometrical design of the blast traps, and the peak side on pressure, the side on pressure impulse, the
dynamic pressure and the dynamic pressure impulse of the incident blast wave. Fixed reduction figures can
therefore not be given. The design of effective blast traps is a specialised subject.

b) Various types of blast traps are shown in Figure 2-VI. The relative decrease of pressure and impulse, and
thereby the effect of these blast traps, is in most cases dependent upon their locations. Some of the
limitations are also indicated in the figure. It is noteworthy that not all designs of blast traps are reversible.

c) For maximum blast reduction, the length of blast traps built as dead end tunnels should be at least half the
length of the blast wave. This may result in a considerable extension of these traps in the case of large
quantities of explosives.

3.2.4.9. Portal Barricade

a) Airblast

Airblast exiting the portal of an underground facility involve directional, very intense gas flow fields along
the extended centerline of the tunnel exit. Therefore, the shock wave on the extended centerline does not
attenuate as rapidly as that of a surface burst. However, a barricade in front of the portal intercepts this
intense flow field and directs it away from the extended centerline axis. This redirection of the flow field
allows shock waves traveling beyond the portal barricade to attenuate as an above ground distributed
source so that isobar contours become more circular. Figure 2-VII provides an example of a portal
barricade.

b) Adit Debris

A portal barricade reduces IBD for adit debris by obstructing the path of the debris as it exits the tunnel.
However the barricade must be used in conjunction with another debris mitigating construction, such as a
debris trap. QD decisions must be made by site-specific analyses and/or testing.

To be effective, a portal barricade must be properly designed and properly located.

Portal barricades for underground magazines are located immediately in front of the portal. The portal
barricade should be centered on the extended axis of the tunnel that passes through the portal. For

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
maximum effectiveness, the face of the barricade toward the portal must be vertical and concave in plan. Its
central face must be oriented perpendicular to the tunnel axis, and its wingwalls should be angled about 45-
degrees toward the portal. The minimum width of the central face is equal to the width of the tunnel at the
portal. The wingwalls must be of sufficient width so that the entire barricade length intercepts an angle of
at least ten degrees (to the right and left) of the extended width of the tunnel. Likewise, the height of the
barricade along its entire width must be sufficient to intercept an angle of ten degrees above the extended
height of the tunnel.

Portal barricades for underground magazines must be located a distance of not less than one and not more
than three tunnel widths from the portal. The actual distance should be no greater than that required for
passage of applicable transportation equipment. This distance, as shown in Fig 2-VII, is based on the
turning radius and operating width of transportation equipment.

The barricade must withstand the impact of debris ejected from the tunnel and must be sufficiently robust
so it does not contribute to the debris hazards.

3.2.4.10. Interior Wall Roughness

Although the effect of wall roughness is not fully quantified, some of the differences between measured
and predicted results are likely attributable to it [8, 9]. Mitigating effects of wall roughness should be
considered on a site-specific basis.

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

REFERENCES

UNDERGROUND STORAGE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY HAZARDS

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

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CHANGE 2
 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
[1] AASTP-1, “Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition
and Explosives” (May 1992)

[2] Wilfred E. Baker, Peter S. Westine, and Franklin P. Dodge, “Similarity Methods in
Engineering Dynamics, Theory and Practice of Scale Modeling”, Published by Elsevier
(1991)

[3] LLNL Explosives Handbook, “Properties of Chemical Explosives and Explosive

Simulants, Change 2, “Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA.; Department of Energy,
Washington, DC. (NTIS Order Number: DE91006884INZ)

[4] Swiss Federal Buildings Office/Engineering Division - Swiss-Klotz Design, Drawing Nos.
1036.SP.2.020/025/027

[5] US Army Corps of Engineers Drawings, "Definitive Drawings Underground Storage

Facility" (DEF 421-80-04)

[6] Royal Swedish Fortifications Administration - Klotz-Test Operation Block, Report No.
119:5, 01.05.1974

[7] L. K. Davis and So-Young Song, “Technical Managers Final Report,” Joint U.S./ROK
R&D Program for New Underground Ammunition Storage Technologies TR SL-97-10 and
UAST-TR-97-002 (September 1997)

[8] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP)IWP 6-98 dated 24 November 1998 One-dimensional Blast Wave

Propagation

[9] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 8-98 dated 24 November 1998 Model Tests of Accidental
Explosions in Underground Ammunition Storage, II: Blast Wave Propagation in Tunnel
Systems

[10] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 7-98 dated 24 November 1998 Model Test of Accidental
Explosions in Underground Ammunition Storage, I: Chamber Pressure

[11] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 9-98 dated 24 November 1998 Blast Propagation outside a
Typical Underground Storage Site

[12] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 10-98 dated 24 November 1998 Underground Ammunition

Storage Magazines, Blast Effects from Accidental Explosions. (Norwegian Magazines
Standard)

[13] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 11-98 dated 24 November 1998 Calculation of Airblast from
Underground Ammunition Storage Magazines. (Norwegian Magazines Standard)

[14] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 12-98 dated 24 November 1998 Air Blast from Tubes Meeting
27-28 October 1987

[15] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 13-98 dated 24 November 1998 Underground Ammunition

Storage. Blast Effects from Accidental Explosions

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
[16] UK(ST)IWP 311 dated 3 March 1998 - AASTP- I Advice on Adit Debris Projections from
Underground Storage Sites

[17] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 007 dated 30 October 1998 - Debris Throw from Adit Tunnels.
Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP- 1, Part III Technical Background
for Throw Distances

[18] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 005 dated 30 May 1998 – Debris Throw from Craters -
Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III - Technical Background

[19] CH(ST) UGS/AHWP IWP 006 dated 30 October 1998 – Debris Throw from Craters -
Proposal Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III - Proposed Wording

[20] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 008 dated 4 November 1998 - Proposed Changes to the NATO
Safety Manual AASTP- 1, Part III - Proposed Wording - Swiss Contribution

[21] CH(ST)UG/AHWP IWP 002 dated 24 September 1997 - Debris Throw from Craters. –
Pertinent Technical Reports

[22] CH(ST)UG/AHWP IWP 003 dated I October 1997. - Debris Throw from Craters.

[23] US MEMO, dated 30 July 1997 - Recommendations for Ground Shock Criteria in NATO
Documents

[24] US(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 1-98 dated 30 September 1998 - US proposal for Ground
Shock from an Underground Storage Facility

[25] US MEMO, dated 31 December 1997 - Proposal for Ground Shock Explosives Safety
Principles

[26] NO(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 1/98 dated 11 February 1998 - AASTP- I Part II, Inhabited
Building Distance, Ground Shock

[27] Fook-Hou Lee, Wee-Beng Koh, and Thiam-Soon Tan, "Numerical Back Analysis of Field
Measurements of Ground Vibration from Underground Explosions," 28th DOD Explosives
Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998, Orlando, Florida

[28] Yingxin Zhou, Karen O Y Chong, and Yaokun Wu, "Small-Scale Testing on Ground
Shock Propagation in Mixed Geological Media," 28th DOD Explosives Safety Seminar
18-20 August 1998, Orlando, Florida

[29] Yingxin Zhou, Hong Ho, and Guowei Ma, "Ground Shock Damage Criteria for Inhabited
Buildings," 28th DOD Explosives Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998, Orlando, Florida

[30] US(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 1-98 dated 30 September 1998 - US proposal for Ground
Shock from an Underground Storage Facility

[31] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 14-98 dated 15 December 1998 - Ground Shock in Rock-Full
scale Tests in Norway

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 ANNEX III-A
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
[32] US MEMO, dated 16 December 1998, Minutes of Special UGS/AHWP meeting 15-16
October 1998

[33] Peter Westine, "Ground Shock from the Detonation of Buried Explosives, "Journal of
Terramechanics, Vol 15, No 2, pp 69-79 (1978)

[34] CH(ST) UG/AHWP IWP 4 dated 6 March 1998 – Debris Throw from Craters – CH Status
Report as of 6 March 1998

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

FIGURES

UNDERGROUND STORAGE

EXPLOSIVES SAFETY HAZARDS

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
Figure 2-I Layouts of Underground Facilities.

Main Passageway
Extension
Storage Chamber

Branch
Passageway

Blast Door and

Blast Valve

Storage Chamber

Branch Passageway

Blast Door and

Blast Valve
Loading/Unloading dock

Main
Passageway

Adit

Barricade

Shot gun type

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Figure 2-II Layout of an Underground Storage Site

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)
Figure 2-III: The Swiss-Klotz Layout

Ground Plan

0
1.5
Storage
Chamber

Access

2.50
Tunnel

Klotz in "open" Klotz in "closed"

-position -position

Longitudinal Section

Storage
Chamber Hydraulic moving mechanism
Access
2.50 Tunnel

Moveable reinforced concrete Klotz

0m 10 m
Heavily reinforced concrete abutment

-III-B-5-
 B
C B Dt
D

Dc
18000

R=
16 B
000
500
0 5000 5000

D D
3600

C
A
3850

3000

-III-B-6-
3300 18000
A Section B-B
C Section A-A
1400

1400

A Entrance
B Blast door
4550

4550

C Mechanical room
D Storage chamber
E Room for fuzes 5000
10000
Section D-D Section C-C
Figure 2-IV Magazine with expansion chamber

Ttphical magazine with 2500-m3 expansion

chamber as blast trap.
ANNEX III-B

(Edition 1)

CHANGE 2
AASTP-1
 A Entrance
B Blast door
C Mechanical room
D Storage chamber
E Room for fuzes

ca. 100000

B A

4000
D
B A
C
B

E
3600

-III-B-7-
Dt

18000
Dc
3850

16m2
3000
4550

18000

C Section C-C 3300 4000

78300 5500
Ttphical magazine with straight tunnel and no Section A-A Section B-B
expansion chamber.
83800
Figure 2-V Magazine without expansion chamber
(Edition 1)

CHANGE 2
AASTP-1
ANNEX III-B
 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Figure 2-VI Blast Traps

Turns, crossovers, obstacles and changes of cross section can be used to reduce the peak
overpressure and positive impulse of blast in passageways. The diagrams in this figure illustrate
some of the many possible designs. The Blast k assumed to travel from the point indicated by a
cross to that shown by a dot. Critical dimensions are indicated as multiples of passage diameter
“b”.

Some designs have comparatively little effect reducing the blast by only 10 % compared with the
straight-through passageway in Ref. No 1, whereas others reduce the blast by as much as 80 %.
It is therefore necessary to determine the actual effect of a chosen design by measurements in a
model using properly scaled and located explosive charges.

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Figure 2-VII: Portal Barricade Location, Height and Length.

Tunnel W L

a. Plan View
S = Stand off distance from portal (1 to 3 tunnel widths)
R = Turning rasdius of munition transport vehicles
V = Width of transport vehicles
L = Length of barricade
W = Tunnel width at portal
φ = Single angle [10 degrees minimum]

Portal

θ
H

Tunnel h

a. Elevation View
C = Crest Width [See DEF 421-80-04]
H = Height of barricade
h = Height of tunnel
θ = Elevation angle [10 degrees minimum]

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Figure 3-Ia: How to Establish Inhabited Building Distance Contours

Cross Section of Installation

CCS
α
C

CCB

Inhabited Building Distance Contour (ground-plan)

IBD = IBDF ∗ fαD IBD = IBDF ∗ fαI

CCB Line of Largest Gradient

Shape: Elliptical

IBD = IBDF

α = Slope Angle of Overburden

C = Cover / Overburden
CCS = Crater-Center-Surface
CCB = Crater-Center-Bottom
IBDF = Inhabited Building Distance
for Flat Terrain / Overburden
fαI = Inhabited Building Distance Increase Factor
fαD = Inhabited Building Distance Decrease Factor

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Figure 3-Ib: How to Establish IBD Distance Contours

Cross Section of Installation

Flat Overburden

C CCS C

CCB

Inhabited Building Distance Contour (ground-plan)

IBD = IBDF

CCS

IBD = IBDF IBD = IBDF

CCB

IBD = IBDF

C = Cover / Overburden
IBDF = Inhabited Building Distance
for Flat Terrain / Overburden
CCB = Crater-Center-Bottom
CCS = Crater-Center-Surface

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 ANNEX III-B
AASTP-1
(Edition 1)

Figure 3-II Directivity versus azimuth with the centre line as reference:
Fθ

1.
0

0.
9

0. Ref. /1/
8 7 mbar
Ref. /4/
Ref. /2/ 140 mbar
0. 10-15 mbar
7 Ref. /5/, /6/
Model test 5 to 50 mbar
50 mbar
0.
6 Ref. /3/
50 mbar

0.
5

0.
4
30o 60o 90o 120o 150o 180o

/1/ “Free field overpressures resulting from shock waves emerging from open-ended shock tubes.” Ballistic Research
Lab. Mem. Report 1965.

/2/ “An investigation of the pressure wave propagated from the open end of a 30 x 18 in. Shock tube.” Atomic
Weapons Research Establ. AWRE Report No. 0 – 60/65.

/3/ “Underground Explosion Trials at Raufoss 1968. Measurement of air blast outside the tunnel.” Intern Report X –
124. FFI 1969.

/4/ U.S Navy Gun Blast Committee: “Survey of Research of Blast”. First Interim Report, 1946.

/5/ “Model tests to investigate external safety distances.” Fortifikatorisk notat 36/67, FBT 1967.

/6/ “One-dimensional blast wave propagation.” Fortifikatorisk Notat 49/69, FBT 1969 .

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Figure 3-III: Inhabited Building Distance for Adit Debris

ADIT DEBRIS

Chamber Tunnel Fragment trajectory

Lb

Maximum dispersion angle (θ) = 10o for L/D ≥ 11 else θ = 20o

Lb = Length of straight tunnel section from portal

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Figure 3-IV: Inhabited Building Distance for Adit Debris

Inhabited Building Distance for Adit Debris IBD [m]

3000

2000

1500

1000

500

300

200

150

100
100 300 1000 3000 10000 30000 100000 300000 1000000

Weight of Explosives, NEQ [kg]

IBD = 79 ∗ Q 0.233

Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ [kg]

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Figure 3-V: Loading Density Parameter fγ

2
1.5
Loading Density Parameter fγ [.]

0.5

0.3

0.2
0.15

0.1

0.05
1 3 10 30 100 300 1000

Loading Density γ = Q / Vc [kg/m3]

fγ = (γ / 1600) 0.35

Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ [kg]

3
VC = Storage Chamber Volume [m ]

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Figure 3-VI Cover Depth Parameter fc

1.0

0.9
Cover Depth Parameter fC [.]

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2

Scaled Cover Depth C / Q 1/3 [m/kg1/3]

fC = 0.45 + 2.15 ∗ x - 2.11 ∗ x2 ; x = C / Q 1/3

C = Overburden, Cover [m]

Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ [kg]

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Figure 3-VII Auxiliary Tables for the Calculation of Q1/3, fc and fγ

Scaled Loading
1/3
Q Q Cover Depth fC Density fγ
1/3 1/3
[kg] [kg ] [m/kg ] [.] [kg/m³] [.]
1'000 10.0 0.10 0.64 1 0.08
1'500 11.4 0.15 0.73 3 0.11
2'000 12.6 0.20 0.80 5 0.13
2'500 13.6 0.25 0.86 10 0.17
3'000 14.4 0.30 0.91 15 0.20
4'000 15.9 0.35 0.94 20 0.22
5'000 17.1 0.40 0.97 25 0.23
6'000 18.2 0.45 0.99 30 0.25
7'000 19.1 0.50 1.00 40 0.27
8'000 20.0 0.55 0.99 50 0.30
0.60 0.98 60 0.32
10'000 21.5 0.65 0.96 70 0.33
15'000 24.7 0.70 0.92 80 0.35
20'000 27.1 0.75 0.88 90 0.37
25'000 29.2 0.80 0.82 100 0.38
30'000 31.1 0.85 0.75 120 0.40
40'000 34.2 0.90 0.68 140 0.43
50'000 36.8 0.95 0.59 160 0.45
60'000 39.1 1.00 0.49 180 0.47
70'000 41.2 1.05 0.38 200 0.48
80'000 43.1 1.10 0.26 220 0.50
1.15 0.13 250 0.52
100'000 46.4 1.20 0.00 300 0.56
150'000 53.1
200'000 58.5
250'000 63.0
300'000 66.9
400'000 73.7 Q = Weight of Explosives, NEQ
500'000 79.4
600'000 84.3
700'000 88.8
800'000 92.8

1'000'000 100.0
1'500'000 114.5
2'000'000 126.0

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Figure 3-VIII: Overburden Slope Angle Parameter

1.6

constant α fα|
1.5 0.0 1.0
Inhabited Building Distance

2.5 1.05
fα I = 1 + 0.02 ∗ α 5.0 1.10
Increase Factor fαI

1.4
7.5 1.15
10.0 1.20
1.3 12.5 1.25
15.0 1.30
17.5 1.35
1.2 20.0 1.40
22.5 1.45
1.1
>25 1.50

1.0
0 10 20 30 40

Slope Angle α [°]

1.0
α fαD
0.0 1.0
0.8 2.5 0.94
Inhabited Building Distance

5.0 0.88
Decrease Factor fαD

7.5 0.81
0.6 10.0 0.75
12.5 0.69
15.0 0.63
17.5 0.56
0.4
20.0 0.50
fα D = 1 - 0.025 ∗ α
constant 22.5 0.44
25.0 0.38
0.2
27.5 0.31
>30 0.25
0.0
0 10 20 30 40

Slope Angle α [°]

fα

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Figure 3-IX: How to Calculate IBD's for Crater Debris Throw - Example

Given:

C α
VC

VC = 5000 m3
NEQ = 200'000 kg = Q
C = 50 m
a = 20 °

Solution: Q1/3 (from Figure VII) = 58.5 kg1/3

Loading Density = Q / VC = 200'000 / 5000 = 40 kg/m3
Scaled Cover Depth = C / Q1/3 = 50 / 58.5 = 0.85 m/kg1/3

Loading Density Parameter (from Figure V or VII) fγ = 0.27

Cover Depth Parameter (from Figure VI or VII) fC = 0.75

IBDF = 38.7 ∗ Q1/3 ∗ fγ * fC

= 38.7 ∗ 58.5 ∗ 0.27 * 0.75 = 458 m

IBD Increase Factor (from Figure VIII) fαI = 1.4

IBD Decrease Factor (from Figure VIII) fαD =0.5

IBD = IBDF ∗ fαD Line of Largest Gradient

229 m = 458 m ∗ 0.5 IBD = IBDF ∗ fαI

641 m = 458 m ∗ 1.4
Shape: Elliptical

IBD = IBDF = 458 m

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Figure 3-X: Radial Particle Velocity Versus Scaled Energy Release in Rock and Soil

⎧U ⎫.⎧ Po ⎫1/2
⎩cp⎭ ⎩ρscp2⎭

EQ⋅Q
ρ⋅cp2⋅ R3

up(tamped) = peak particle velocity, (m/s)

r= radial distance (m)
EQ = effective energy/mass [3] for explosives material (J/kg)
Q= net explosives quantity (kg)
ρs = mass density of soil or rock (kg/m3)
cp = seismic velocity of p-wave (m/s)
P0 = atmospheric pressure (N/m2)

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MANUAL OF

NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

PART IV

MAY 2006

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CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

4.1.0.1. Purpose and Scope

a) This part of the Manual provides safety principles for use in those cases where it is not possible, without
seriously prejudicing operational effectiveness, to apply the normal peacetime principles detailed in Parts I-
III of the Manual.

b) Where a reduced level of protection, below that detailed in Parts I-III of the Manual, has been used in this part,
consequences as detailed in Part I, Chapter 4, Section VII have been accepted. This must be borne in mind by
all those using the recommendations contained in Part IV.

4.1.0.2. Basis for this Part of the Manual

In preparing this part of the Manual the following principles have been followed:

1. In peacetime the recommendations in Part IV must not reduce the normal level of protection
afforded to the general public as detailed in Parts I-III.

2. The recommendations in Part IV may reduce the normal peacetime level of protection afforded to
the personnel responsible for military operations, where this is essential in the interests of
operational effectiveness, bearing in mind the nature of the operation, and the consequences (see
subparagraph 4.1.0.1.b)).

4.1.0.3. Use of Principles

The decision whether to use the principles contained in this part or to use those in Parts I-III must be made
by National Authorities.

4.1.0.4. Updating

The "Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military

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Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258)", as custodian of this Manual, intends to maintain its value by publishing
corrigenda from time to time.

4.1.0.5 Conditions of Release :

The NATO Manual on Safety Principles for Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AASTP-
1) is a NATO Document involving NATO property rights. The understanding and conditions agreed for the release
of the Manual are that it is released for technical defence purposes and for the use by the defence services only of
the country concerned. This understanding requires that the release of the whole, or any part, of the Manual must
not be undertaken without reference to, and written approval of, NATO.

4.1.0.6. Inquiries

Any questions or requirements for further information should be addressed to the Secretary of the AC/258
Group at NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium.

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CHAPTER 2 - FIELD STORAGE

Section I - Introduction

4.2.1.1. Scope

a) The principles in this chapter apply to the storage of ammunition in the theatre of operations
(communications zone and combat zone) in Field Storage Areas where the principles for storage in
permanent depots cannot be applied and greater risks must be accepted. The principles are most important
with respect to safety and protection of ammunition when stored under field conditions. The principles
apply also to the parking of vehicles loaded with ammunition in the theatre of operations. Each vehicle or
container is treated as a Field Stack Module.

b) In Field Storage, all potentialities must be used to

1. keep the ammunition serviceable

2. avoid ammunition losses.

Protection of personnel, material, installations, and buildings should be considered

4.2.1.2. Exclusions

a) The following factors must also be considered but are outside the scope of this Manual and are left to the
discretion of the National Authorities.

1. Dispersion against attack.

2. Ground pattern.
3. Camouflage.
4. Isolation.
5. Communications.
6. Expansion.
7. Improvement.
8. Security.
9. Sabotage.

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b) The principles do not deal with ammunition depots established in peacetime to meet the need for holding
war reserves, even though the depot may be under field conditions. The normal principles for storage apply
to such situations.

c) The principles do not apply to the holding of ammunition in battery positions or in readiness areas.

4.2.1.3. Selection of Sites

Sites should be carefully selected taking account of the following requirements:

1. The ground must be firm to carry the heavy weight of ammunition stacks and laden vehicles.

2. The ground should be level, dry and pervious to water.

3. The site should be easily accessible, preferably on both sides of by-roads. Loading and unloading of
vehicles should be capable of being accomplished away from main roads so that traffic is not hindered.

4. The site should be located sufficiently far from trees, telegraph poles, pylons etc. so that a lightning strike
to a tree etc. would not cause damage to the ammunition.

5. A water supply should be available for fire-fighting.

6. Variations in terrain or a dense forest should be exploited to provide natural barricades.

7. Firebreaks of sufficient width should be planned and maintained to prevent a potential spread of fire. Roads
of corresponding width are considered as fire-breaks.

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Section II - Field Storage History

4.2.2.1. Introduction

Since the acquaintance of UN Logistics Directive 312 “Ammunition and Explosives” (dated 1992) there
have been a lot of discussion in NATO AC/258 AHTWP if NATO could provide better advice for storage of
ammunition and explosives during operations out-of-area. This discussion led to a NATO AC/258 STSG Field
Storage Workshop held on 4th November 1997 where national methodologies, procedures and experiences
regarding field storage were presented. The Storage Sub-Group noted the following conclusions from this first
workshop:

a) Field Commanders needed tools as well as, but not instead of, rules;
b) tools/rules users needed to be educated in concepts;
c) overall risk strategy and its consequences needed to be determined;
d) guidance developed by AC/258 should be set at a level suitable for people who understand the concepts
and not for the completely uninitiated.

4.2.2.2.

The workshop was succeeded with the establishment of the NATO Expert Working Group on Field Storage
(EWG/FS), which had its first meeting in Alexandria, VA, USA on 23-24 March 1998. The objective of the
EWG/FS is to develop changes to be made to the field storage advice in the NATO publication AASTP-1 based on
the information already available to AC/258.

4.2.2.3.

The NL MOD and UK MOD tasked TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory to write a Draft IWP with a proposal of
NATO advice on this subject on the basis of the following IWPs:

a) NL(ST)IWP/2-97;
b) US(ST)IWP/103-98;
c) GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP1-98;
d) GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP2-98;
e) GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP3-98.

This task resulted in a first draft version with guidelines [11]. This original version was discussed by UK-,
GE- and NL-MOD delegates during an interim meeting on January 12th, 1999 at TNO. Comments of UK-, GE-, NL-
and DK-MOD [12] were included in a second draft version [13] which was discussed during the 3rd NATO AC/258
FSWG meeting on June 7th, 1999 in Brussels. Comments on this second draft version [13] are implemented in this
final IWP.
The report starts giving short abstracts of the IWPs mentioned above. Topics of these IWPs are then
selected and combined into common NATO advice. The proposed guidelines for field storage are presented in
Annex A of the report. Annex B presents a proposal for the re-division of the current Part IV of NATO publication
AASTP-1.

4.2.2.4. Abstract of IWPs

a) NL approach

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On behalf of the RNLA and RNLAF, TNO-PML proposed guidelines for field storage of ammunition and
explosives which are based on a modular storage concept by analogy with Part IV of the NATO publication
AASTP-1. While the AASTP-1 gives Q-Ds for relatively large storage sites (maximum 200 t gross weight)
and storage areas (maximum 5000 t gross weight), the proposed field storage concept is based on much
smaller quantities of ammunition and explosives specifically for battalion or company size.
In this concept a basic module is defined as 5000 kg NEQ of ammunition and explosives stored in any
storage facility or open stack. In general, this NEQ matches the amount of ammunition and explosives in a
vehicle or 20 ft container during transport. A storage module consists of one to five basic modules.
Therefore, the maximum credible event is determined by the number of basic modules in a storage module
(5 t, 10 t, 15 t, 20 t or 25 t NEQ). Several storage modules together are defined as a storage site.
Internal safety refers to explosion safety precautions inside a storage site. Intermodule Q-Ds are defined to
prevent sympathetic reactions of adjacent basic modules or storage modules. External safety is related to
exterior exposed sites which are subdivided into military exposed sites inside a military compound and
civil exposed sites. Military exposed sites are redefined, e.g. unprotected, semi-protected, and protected
personnel.

In practice, situations may arise in which the standard minimum quantity-distances cannot be observed.
Therefore, for some well-documented exposed sites, like unprotected people and people in buildings, the
resulting consequences are assessed and presented in Hazard Diagrams. Although these hazard diagrams
give no absolute figures, they have the objective of making field commanders aware of the increased level
of risk when the standard Q-Ds cannot be observed.
The Hazard Diagrams include all (primary, secondary and tertiary) detonation effects in one graph and are
drawn up with the TNO-PML computer program RISKANAL [7].

b) US approach

The U.S. established a Working Group of DDESB members. This working group was tasked to propose an
update of Chapter 10 of the U.S. manual DoD6055.9-STD entitled “Theater of Operations”. This resulted
in the document US(ST)IWP/103-98 which is a draft version of Chapter 10.
The U.S. IWP is complete and detailed and written from the U.S. point of view and requirements. U.S.
makes distinction between Field Storage and Handling Areas (large amounts of NEQ: > 500 kg) and
BLAHAs (small amounts of NEQ: 5 up to 4000 kg). The corresponding Q-Ds are based approximately
upon the same damage/injury criteria (low consequences).

It is proposed to replace the current Chapter IV of Part IV of AASTP-1 entitled

“Q-Ds for BLAHAs” by the updated section on BLAHAs of Chapter 10 of the U.S. manual DoD6055.9-
STD.

The draft Chapter 10 cites Risk Analysis as a tool to underpin waivers and exemptions to standard Q-D
criteria. The steps of a risk analysis procedure are mentioned but not discussed in detail in this report.
However, the developments of the risk-analysis concept of U.S. MoD is and will be extensively presented
and discussed in the NATO AC/258 RAWG. Any proposed risk assessment technique needs to be simple
enough for field commanders to understand.

c) GE approach

The GE MOD formulated a draft directive on field storage of ammunition during out-of-area missions for
the German Forces. The directive includes preliminary protective and safety regulations for field storage of
ammunition and explosives. Q-Ds are given for three categories of exposed sites within a field camp. These
categories are more or less compatible with the categories as proposed by NL MOD, e.g. unprotected-,
semi-protected-, and protected personnel. Q-Ds are given for NEQs ranging from 500 kg to 20,000 kg.

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The German Ernst Mach Institute was tasked to develop field storage advice for waivers and exemptions to
standard Q-D criteria. They came up with:

1. Risk Score Diagrams (give a qualitative description of risk).

2. Hazard Diagrams (lethality/injury as a function of stand-off distance and NEQ for people
endangered by blast, projections and building collapse).
3. Hazard Formula (gives hazard potential and shows what parameters have an influence on the
level of risk).
4. Tolerable activities (distance vs. acceptable activity for MCE of a detonation of 4,000 kg
ammunition in a container enclosed by barricades).

4.2.2.5. Synthesis of IWPs

a) Twofold approach

During the first Field Storage Workshop [9] it was concluded that NATO advice in the form of standard
Q-Ds only, based on peace time acceptance criteria, is not enough to cope with all peace keeping, peace
enforcing and combat situations. Although standard Q-Ds are not easily observed in out-of-area conditions,
they still form a good basis for explosives safety.

From this starting point, a twofold approach is suggested for implementation in Part IV of the NATO
publication AASTP-1:

1. give advice in the form of standard Q-Ds;

2. give advice with the help of consequence analysis tools.

In the following sections both approaches are further defined using the information given in the considered
IWPs of the NL-, US- and GE MOD. The proposed changes to AASTP-1 are presented in Annex A and
Annex B of this report.

b) Standard Q-Ds for field storage

It is proposed to adopt the Modular Storage Concept by NL MOD. The NEQ per module is variable to
cover differing field situations. However, it is strongly recommended to limit the NEQ of a module to 1000
kg. The proposed amendments to NATO manual AASTP-1 regarding HD1.2 items are included [10].

Besides this basic information, it is proposed to include the German example of acceptable activities in the
case of field storage of 4,000 kg NEQ in the NATO advice [3]. This amount of NEQ is the exact turning
point between both concepts.

c) Advice based on consequence-analysis tools

The Hazard Formula as proposed by the German Ernst Mach Institute can be an ideal tool for Field
Commanders. With the Hazard Formula in- and outputs, a Field Commander can see if the risk of a specific
established field storage is acceptable or not and what parameters affect this risk. In the first draft version
of this report [11], some Hazard Diagrams of NL MOD were included to make Field Commanders aware to
what extent the risk increases when the advised minimum quantity-distances cannot be observed. In this
second draft report these diagrams are reduced to one general ‘risk’ curve which is produced by the TNO-
PML risk model RISKANAL [7].
The general Hazard Diagram in combination with the Hazard Formula should give a Field Commander
enough basic information to make well considered decisions. For detailed information on risk assessment
and -analysis methodologies the proposed guidelines refer to the upcoming NATO ‘Risk manual’ AASTP-
4.

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4.2.2.6. Conclusions

A dual approach for NATO advice has been proposed:

a) implementation of standard Q-Ds which are adapted for field storage conditions;
b) implementation of consequence-analysis tools to quantify and control risk when standard QDs can not be
observed.

Ad 1. The modular storage concept of NL MOD is adopted in which the NEQ per module is variable. It is
strongly recommended to limit the NEQ per basic module to 1,000 kg. However, a list with acceptable activities for
basic modules with 4,000 kg NEQ (on the basis of GE IWP) is included.

Ad 2. Two types of information are proposed for implementation in AASTP-1:

a) presentation of the so-called Hazard Formula (proposal of GE). This qualitative tool shows a user what
parameters have a major influence.
b) Presentation of a general Hazard Diagram which give information about the increase of risk (expressed as
probability of lethality) when standard Q-Ds cannot be observed.

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REFERENCES

[1] TNO-PML fax 98D2/1158F, dated 23 June 1998, with proposed topics for draft IWP on field storage of
ammunition and explosives.

[2] AC/258 GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP/1-98, dated 2 March 1998.

“Draft” Directive on Field storage of ammunition during out-of-area missions for the German Armed
Forces.

[3] AC/258 GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP/2-98, dated 3 March 1998.

Hazards arising with field storage of ammunition. Charts and Hazard
Formula. Report E 20/97 by G. Gürke (Ernst Mach Institute).

[4] AC/258 GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP/3-98, dated 4 March 1998.

Field storage of ammunition. Risk score analysis and tolerable activities.
Report W/98 by G. Gürke (Ernst Mach Institute).

[5] US(ST)IWP/103-98, dated 2 March 1998.

Draft Chapter 10 of U.S. DoD 6055.9-STD manual.

[6] AC/258-NL(ST)IWP/2-97, dated 4 February 1997.

Guidelines for field storage of ammunition and explosives.

[7] R.J.M. van Amelsfort

Risk calculations involved in storing explosives.
TNO-report PML 1992-123, dated November 1992.

[8] AASTP-1
Manual of NATO safety principles for the storage of military ammunition
and explosives. May 1992.

[9] Decision sheet AC/258(ST)DS/59, dated 11 December 1997.

[10] UK(ST)IWP 312 (Revised) D/ESTC/6/3/2

Proposed amendments to NATO manual AASTP-1 for the inclusion of
revised Hazard Division 1.2 Quantity Distance rules.

[11] AC/258-NL(ST)IWP/2-98
Proposed NATO advice for field storage of ammunition and explosives.
TNO draft report, July 1998.

[12] AC/258 DA(ST)(FSWG) IWP 1/98

Comments on the concept for field storage. 30 December 1998.

[13] AC/258-NL(ST)IWP/4-99, dated May 1999.

Proposed NATO advice for field storage of ammunition and explosives.
TNO report 1999-C20.

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Section III-Definitions

4.2.3.1. Definitions

The following definitions are used in connection with field storage:

4.2.3.2. Basic Module

A Basic Module Consists of 5,000 kg NEQ of ammunition and explosives stored in any storage facility or
open stack.

4.2.3.3. Storage Module

A Storage Module consists of from one to five Basic Modules.

4.2.3.4. Storage Site

A Storage Site consists of several Storage Modules.

4.2.3.5. Intermodule Q-Ds

Intermodule Q-Ds prevent Sympathetic reactions of adjacent Basic or Storage Modules.

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Section IV-Guidelines for Field Storage

4.2.4.1. Standard Q-Ds

a) Site planning principles

The function of a proper layout of an ammunition and explosives storage site is dual:

1. Internal safety must be guaranteed. The basic modules should be positioned in such a way that
the probability of a sympathetic reaction of adjacent modules is minimised. Barricades around
modules should always be used, since they considerably reduce minimum intermodule quantity-
distances necessary to prevent sympathetic detonations. Barricades function by stopping
ammunition fragments and to protect the stored ammunition against external threats, like enemy
fire.
If barricades are not available, the corresponding larger minimum intermodule quantity-distance
should be observed. If the prescribed minimum intermodule distances can not be observed, the
net explosive quantity to calculate interior- and exterior quantity-distances is the sum of all net
explosive quantities of the Potential Explosion Sites (PESs). As a result, interior- and exterior
quantity-distances will be considerably larger. If these interior and exterior minimum quantity-
distances can not be observed, the safety of the troops and civilians inside these distances is
compromised (see section 2: Consequence-analysis tools).

2. External safety must be optimal. Complying with the advised minimum quantity-distances to
military- and civil exposed sites results in an acceptable level of risk for military personnel and
civilians. The exterior quantity-distances for military and civil exposed sites result in a layout of
the total compound in which the most vulnerable Exposed Sites (ESs), like unprotected lodging
or administrative accommodations, are positioned further away from the PES than less
vulnerable exposed sites, for instance protective shelters.

b) General principles

1. The amount of ammunition and explosives in the field camp must be limited to the minimum
consistent with safe and efficient operations. “No ammunition in the field camp that does not
support the mission”.
2. Store the main amount of ammunition and explosives in a field storage site separated from the
field camp. Transfer only the minimum ammunition and explosives to the field camp.
3. Modular storage of ammunition and explosives is mandatory in the field camp to limit the MCE
(Maximum Credible Event) to one basic module. Modular storage refers to a barricaded area
comprised of a series of cells separated from each other by barricades.
4. The NEQ per module should be kept as low as practically possible, consistent with the mission
and the available separation distances.

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c) Mixing of HDs and CGs

The UN international system of hazard classification with definitions of hazard divisions and storage
compatibility groups is effective. Normally, a storage module should contain ammunition of one hazard
division only. When this is not possible, the following principles should apply:

1. When ammunition of HD1.2 and HD1.3 are stored together in the same storage module, the
quantity-distances for each hazard division is assessed independently and the larger distance
must be observed.

2. When ammunition of HD1.2 and/or HD1.3 is stored in the same module as ammunition of
HD1.1, then the whole storage module must be regarded as HD1.1 with regard of quantity-
distances.

Different compatibility groups should be stored in a separate storage module as well, except that:

1. Items of compatibility groups C, D and E may occupy the same storage module.
2. Items of compatibility group S may occupy the same module as any other items except those in
compatibility group L.
3. Fuzes may be stored in the same module as the projectiles to which they belong.

The following types of ammunition must be stored in separated storage modules:

1. Ammunition in compatibility group B.

2. Ammunition in compatibility group F.
3. Ammunition in compatibility group G.
4. Ammunition in compatibility group H.
5. Ammunition in compatibility group K.
6. Ammunition in compatibility group L (within this group, different types of ammunition should
be stored separately).

This indicates that in general several storage modules are necessary.

d) Storage conditioning

In order to keep the ammunition and explosives operational, the storage modules should give adequate
protection against all weather conditions including lightning. A variety of equipment to achieve internal
conditioning of the facility is available. The use of pallets to stack the ammunition and explosives is
strongly advised to keep the stored goods free from the floor and thus dirt and mud and to obtain maximum
air circulation and ventilation.

4.2.4.2 Q-Ds

a) Intermodule Quantity-Distances

Minimum intermodule quantity-distances for ammunition and explosives of HD1.1, HD1.2 and HD1.3
necessary to prevent adjacent modules sympathetically detonating are given in the following tables as a
function of Hazard Division and Maximum Credible Event. These distances do not cover assets
preservation.
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The use of effective barricades is highly recommended, because they:

1. protect the ammunition from external threats, like enemy fire;

2. minimise explosion effects in case of an accidental explosion (barricades stop ammunition
fragments);
3. prevent sympathetic detonation of adjacent modules.

As a result, the application of effective barricades around storage modules will reduce the required surface
area for a storage site considerably. Effective barricade designs are described in Part II, Chapter III, Section
III.
Instead of conventional earth embankments which have certain slopes and which are therefore space
consuming, ‘big bags’ or concertainers can be used (e.g. Hesco Bastion Concertainers). These
concertainers must be filled with a material (like sand) that stops ammunition fragments and that does not
contribute to debris throw.

Figure 1.2.1.a Example of field barricades (ref. AC/258 DA(ST)IWP1-99).

In case of storage of HD1.2 and HD1.3 articles it is recommended that an effective roof constructions be
applied. The roof will protect the stored ammunition for external threats and minimise explosion effects (like
ammunition fragments, lobbed ammunition, heat radiation), especially during the first minutes after alarm
when evacuation of personnel will take place. Proposed effective roof constructions for out-of-area
circumstances are, for instance, earth covered plates of steel or concrete prefab slabs.

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Table 1.2.1.a Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.1 stored in ISO containers or
equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.1

500 1 ton 5 10 15 20 25
kg NEQ tons ton ton ton ton
NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unbarricaded D= 4.8 Q1/3 39 48 83 105 120 135 145
Barricaded D= 0.8 Q1/3 7 8 14 18 20 22 24

Table 12.1.b Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.2(.1 and .2) stored in ISO containers
or equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2

500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unbarricaded 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Barricaded No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
Barricaded and protective No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
roof

Table 1.2.1.c Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.3C stored in ISO containers or
equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3C

500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unbarricaded D= 0.44 Q1/2 10 14 32 44 56 64 70
Barricaded D= 0.22 Q1/2 5 7 16 22 28 32 35
Barricaded - No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
and protective
roof

Table 1.2.1.d Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.3G stored in ISO containers or
equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3G

500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unbarricaded 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Barricaded No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
Barricaded and protective No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
roof

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b) Exterior Quantity-Distances

Specific types of exposed sites as they appear in the theatre of operations are redefined and classified into their
vulnerability to explosion effects. They are subdivided into military and civil ones (see table 1.2.2.a).

Table 1.2.2.a Definitions of exposed sites in the exterior military and civil zone.

Exposed site Examples

Unprotected Personnel in:
personnel the open, standard vehicles, tents,
light structures, field hospitals, etc.
Semi-protected Personnel in strengthened structures
personnel
Protected Personnel in:
personnel protective shelter, armoured vehicles
(like YPR-765), etc.

Unprotected -
POL-installation
Protected POL- POL-installation with protective
installation measures, e.g. Hesco Bastions and
protective roof construction
Unprotected People in:
civilians the open, houses, cars, etc.

Chemical -
industry

“Semi-protected personnel” refers to personnel in strengthened structures. Examples are:

1. accommodations in which the normal glazing is replaced by air blast- and bullet resistant glazing;
2. accommodations which are equipped with bullet (SAA) resistant panels;
3. strengthened roof constructions (e.g. earth covered 20 ft flatracks).

“Protected personnel” refer to personnel in bunkers and armoured vehicles. This type of structures must be able to
resist explosion effects like ammunition fragments and air blast with a peak incident overpressure of 21 kPa
(corresponding with a protection level of 8.0 Q1/3).

An example of a field protective shelter is shown in figure 1.2.2.a. Protection is given by walls of Hesco Bastion
Concertainers and a protective roof which is made of small Hesco Bastion Concertainers filled with sand with on
top of that a burster layer. Inside this heavy structure, a 20 ft iso-container is placed to offer personnel some
comfort.

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Figure 1.2.2.a Example of protective shelter.

Minimum exterior Q-Ds for ammunition and explosives of HD1.1, HD1.2(.1 and .2) and HD1.3 are given in the
following tables.

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Table 1.2.2.b Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from a PES with ammunition of HD1.1.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.1

Exposed Site Protection 500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
level NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unprotected personnel D= 22.2 180 225 380 480 550 610 650
Q1/3
Semi-protected D= 14.8 120 150 255 320 365 405 435
personnel Q1/3
Protected personnel D= 8.0 Q1/3 64 80 140 175 200 220 235
Unprotected POL- D= 22.2 180 225 380 480 550 610 650
installation Q1/3
Protected POL- D= 1.2 Q1/3 10 12 21 26 30 33 36
installation
Unprotected civilian D= 22.2 180 225 380 480 550 610 650
Q1/3
Chemical industry D= 22.2 180 225 380 480 550 610 650
Q1/3

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Table 1.2.2.c Minimum exterior distances (in meters)from an unbarricaded open stack or light structure (e.g. ISO
container) PES with ammunition of HD1.2.1.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2.1

Exposed Site Protection 500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
level NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unprotected personnel D2* 220 257 337 370 389 402 412
Semi-protected D6* 148 173 226 248 261 270 277
personnel
Protected personnel N/A No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
Unprotected POL- D2* 220 257 337 370 389 402 412
installation
Protected POL- N/A No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
installation
Unprotected civilian D2* 220 257 337 370 389 402 412
Chemical industry D2* 220 257 337 370 389 402 412
* Ref. [10].

Table 1.2.2.d Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from an unbarricaded open stack or light structure (e.g. ISO
container) PES with ammunition of HD1.2.2.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2.2

Exposed Site Protection 500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
level NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unprotected personnel D1* 75 88 123 141 152 160 166
Semi-protected D5* 60 60 83 95 103 108 112
personnel
Protected personnel N/A No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
Unprotected POL- D1* 75 88 123 141 152 160 166
installation
Protected POL- N/A No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
installation
Unprotected civilian D1* 75 88 123 141 152 160 166
Chemical industry D1* 75 88 123 141 152 160 166
* Ref. [10].

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Table 1.2.2.e Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from the side- and rear walls of earth covered PES with
ammunition of HD1.2(.1 and .2).

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2(.1 and .2)

Exposed Site Protection 500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
level NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unprotected personnel IBD* 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Semi-protected PTRD* 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
personnel
Protected personnel EWD* No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
Unprotected POL- IBD* 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
installation
Protected POL- N/A No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
installation
Unprotected civilian IBD* 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Chemical industry IBD* 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
* Ref. [10].

Table 1.2.2.f Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from a PES with ammunition of HD1.3C.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3C

Exposed Site Protection 500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
level NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unprotected personnel D= 6.4 Q1/3 51 64 110 140 160 175 190
Semi-protected D= 4.3 Q 1/3 35 43 73 92 110 120 125
personnel
Protected personnel D= 3.2 Q1/3 26 32 55 68 80 87 94
Unprotected POL- D= 6.4 Q1/3 51 64 110 140 160 175 190
installation
Protected POL- D= 3.2 Q1/3 26 32 55 68 80 87 94
installation
Unprotected civilian D= 6.4 Q1/3 51 64 110 140 160 175 190
Chemical industry D= 6.4 Q1/3 51 64 110 140 160 175 190

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Table 1.2.2.g Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from a PES with ammunition of HD1.3G.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3G

Exposed Site Protection 500 kg 1 ton 5 ton 10 ton 15 ton 20 ton 25 ton
level NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ NEQ
Unprotected personnel N/A* 51 64 110 140 160 175 190
Semi-protected N/A* No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
personnel
Protected personnel N/A* No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD
Unprotected POL- D= 6.4 Q1/3 51 64 110 140 160 175 190
installation
Protected POL- D= 3.2 Q1/3 26 32 55 68 80 87 94
installation
Unprotected civilian D= 6.4 Q1/351 64 110 140 160 175 190
Chemical industry D= 6.4 Q1/351 64 110 140 160 175 190
*It is here assumed that there are opportunities to evacuate personnel after alarm.

4.2.4.3 Acceptable activities for 4,000 kg NEQ HD1.1

The statements in Table 1.3a apply under the precondition that by means of protective measures it has been
ensured that in the worst case a NEQ of 4,000 kg of HD1.1 may detonate at once in an ammunition container. It is
assumed that temporary structural protective measures, barricades or other barriers exist at the PES. The exposed
sites must be protected by protective roofs especially against fragments and projections. The distances in Table 1.3a
are laid down in such a way that the direct and indirect consequences of an occurrence of damage will not lead to a
catastrophe.

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Table 1.3.a Tolerable activities in case there is a small probability of an accidental explosion of 4,000 kg
NEQ of HD1.1.

Minimum Tolerable activities Risk level and

range (m) expected
consequences in
case of an explosion
350 a) Built-up area b) Minor risk
c) Projections and
breaking glass
250 d) Billets if structural g) Medium risk
protection is available h) Injuries caused
e) Scattered buildings by projections,
f) Public roads collapse and
breaking glass
150 i) Billets if structural l) Significant risk
protection against m) Injuries caused
projections, breaking glass, by fragments
and collapse is available and projections
j) Unprotected personnel in n) Fatalities
the open: 50 maximum,
temporarily
k) Public roads: low density
100 o) Personnel in the open with s) Significant risk
individual protective t) Injuries caused
equipment: 20 maximum, by fragments
for a short time and projections
p) Continuous parking of u) Fatalities
armoured vehicles,
temporary parking of
vehicles
q) Storage of materiel
r) Maintenance work if
structural protection is
available
50 v) Guard personnel: 10 y) Significant risk
maximum, continuously z) Injuries caused
w) Structural protection against by blast,
projections and collapse fragments and
x) Parking of armoured projections
vehicles for a short time aa) Fatalities
< 50 bb) Ammunition handling: 2 to cc) Significant risk
6 persons and vehicles for a dd) Fatalities
short time

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4.2.4.4. Consequence-analysis tools

a) Hazard Diagrams

In practise, situations may arise in which the standard minimum quantity-distances can not be observed.
For some well-documented exposed sites, like unprotected humans and humans in buildings, the resulting
consequences are known. Figure 2.1.a shows a general hazard diagram in which the increase in risk as a
function of the actual distance between PES and ES is presented. The example curve represents the risk for
personnel in the open subjected to explosion effects of HD1.1 articles with a NEQ of about 5 tons.

The (upcoming) NATO publication AASTP-4 (Risk Manual) includes detailed information on risk
assessment and –analysis methodologies and tools. In the absence of AASTP-4, a useful methodology is
described in the following section.

100
Probability of lethality (%)

0 500
Distance from PES (m)

Figure 2.1.a The increase of risk when advised minimum quantity-distances can not be met [7].

b) Hazard Formula

In the following the concept of the hazard formula is shown by means of an example. It uses quantities,
which on the one hand are closely related to the hazardousness of an accidental detonation and on the other
hand can be analysed with a relatively high degree of exactness. The proposed procedure leads to a clear
result: It thus enables the responsible officer to take his stand against risky storage situations.

The scenario: an ammunition container containing a load quantity with an NEQ of 4,000 kilograms
is to be stored. The numerical data regarding the hazard potential and the reduction factors are to be taken
as examples. Should the proposed approach be taken into consideration, it will be the responsibility of
ammunition safety experts to determine the parameters of the hazard formula.

The hazard formula: For the "hazard G" for persons staying in the environment of a field storage site, a
"hazard potential P" is determined. The "reduction factors F" reduce the hazard potential.

G = P / (F1ςF2ςF3...)

The hazard formula is structured in such a way that for a positive decision a value G equal to or smaller
than 1 is required.

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The hazard potential: In order to obtain numerical values for the hazard potential P of an ammunition
container it is proposed that the hazard divisions and the compatibility groups available for all types of
ammunition be used. In accordance with the six hazard divisions, an exponential rise of hazard potential P
is allocated to the ammunition container. That means:

Hazard Division 1.6 Hazard Potential P = 2

Hazard Division 1.5 Hazard Potential P = 4
Hazard Division 1.4 Hazard Potential P = 8
Hazard Division 1.3 Hazard Potential P = 16
Hazard Division 1.2 Hazard Potential P = 32
Hazard Division 1.1 Hazard Potential P = 64

The reduction factors: In order to reduce the hazard G to the value 1 or smaller, reduction factors F are
used. For that purpose physical and organizational reduction factors are taken into consideration.

Physical reduction factors Fm:

As examples for physical reduction factors Fm for the ammunition container with NEQ = 4000 kilograms
the following factors are suggested:

• Barricade in due form: Fm1 = 4

• Simple barrier: Fm2 = 2
• Making use of the terrain (under certain circumstances): Fm3 = 2 through 4
• Explosive quantity distance 500 m: Fm4 = 16
• Explosive quantity distance 350 m: Fm5 = 8;
• Explosive quantity distance 250 m: Fm6 = 4
• Explosive quantity distance 150 m: Fm7 = 2;
• Reduction of load quantity by 50 %: Fm8 = 2
• Demonstrated measures to avoid detonation transmission: Fm9 = 2 through 16.

Organizational reduction factors Fo:

Hazard G can also be reduced by organizational measures. Periods in the endangered area can be limited in
regard to number of people present as well as to location and time. Examples:
1. The distance range R < 150 meters must be crossed. By means of organizational measures it is
ensured that only one vehicle at a time stays in the area for a few seconds. Fo1 = 2.
2. In the distance range R = 150 meters to R = 250 meters unprotected people stay for no longer
than a few hours for physical exercises. Fo2 = 4.
3. The rooms of a building on the side facing the storage site are not occupied.
Fo3 = 2.

Under certain conditions a strict guard, an alarm system, or video monitoring may contribute to reduce the
hazard.

There may be cases in which the decision must be made that only one or two of the organizational
reduction factors may be used.

Renunciation: Application of the hazard formula may mean renunciation. If it is impossible to achieve risk
value 1 by means of physical and organizational measures there remains the possibility to reduce the
quantity of ammunition stored or to do without certain ammunition types.

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Step-by-step approach: The procedure is completed by a step-by-step approach:

1. Operational planning: Storage of ammunition and explosives should be taken into

consideration when planning out-of-area missions. That planning is done at home by means of
ammunition catalogs, plane-table sheets, layout plan and so on. The result of the operational
planning is a hazard potential P and references to potential reduction factors. Operational
planning has to come to the result that it is possible to obtain the value G = 1 by means of the
hazard formula.

2. Local planning: At the operational location the first task will be to define the reduction factors
F. Can the reduction factors proposed within the scope of operational planning be implemented?
Local planning directs the measures which enable achievement of the value G = 1 by means of
the hazard formula.

3. Measures taken on-site: The last decision level concerns the current situation on-site which
may constantly change during out-of-area missions. Does the hazard potential ascertained during
operational planning and local planning still apply? Are the reduction factors still valid? How
much ammunition has been added or taken away? Which changes have occurred in the
environment? Is equipment and materiel available by now to erect a larger barricade? Have there
been terrorist attacks? Has the situation changed in regard to sabotage? On site the measures
have to be taken which make it possible to obtain the value G = 1 by means of the hazard
formula.

Example: An ammunition container holds Q = 4000 kilograms of engineer demolitions of Hazard Division
1.1. According to operational planning it has a hazard potential with the value P = 64. At the operational
location a minimum explosive quantity distance of R = 350 meters can be observed - corresponding to
reduction factor Fm5 = 8. A barrier in due form reduces the hazard potential by a reduction factor Fm1 = 4. In
order to achieve the hazard value G = 1, an organisational measure must be taken. The rooms of the
barracks facing the storage site must not be occupied: Fo3 = 2. The hazard formula leads to the result:

G = P / (Fm5 ς Fm1 ς Fo3) = 64 / (8 ς 4 ς 2) = 1.

With the value G = 1 relative safety is achieved. In the case of an accident serious injuries and especially
fatalities should be avoided. A commander who gets the value G = 1 or lower three times - in other words:
who has come to a positive decision three times, may assume that he has done all that is humanly possible.
The remaining risk will be justifiable.

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Section V - Fire-Fighting

4.2.5.1. General

Fire-fighting principles and procedures are the same as those given for permanent depots in Part I, Chapter
7 and Part II, Chapter 4 respectively. However, ammunition in field storage is more vulnerable to fire than when in
permanent depots, therefore more importance should be placed on fire precautions and fire-fighting in field storage.

4.2.5.2. Symbols

Fire-fighting symbols must be displayed at each Field Storage Site. Symbols are fixed to posts, clear of the
ammunition and placed where they are easily seen by anyone approaching the site. To take into account the need for
camouflage as the situation may require, the colour of the fire symbols should be left to the discretion of the
National Authorities.

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CHAPTER 3 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR MISSILE INSTALLATIONS

4.3.0.1. General

The quantity-distance principles missile installations are essentially the same as those given in Part I,
Chapter 4 for aboveground storage of ammunition. These distances do not cater for the inadvertent release of a
missile. Each missile installation is treated as a PES requiring Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances as given in
Part I, Annex A, Section II. Judgement should be used to associate the missile installation with an appropriate
pictograph for a PES taking account of the particular design. Reference to Part III, Chapter 2 may also be necessary.
Interior Quantity-Distances required for system-determined technical and/or operational reasons are not taken into
consideration in this chapter. They are part of the weapons system regulations.

4.3.0.2. Potential Explosion Sites

a) Launching platforms, warheading buildings, ready-round storage areas and other facilities where the
missile with warhead is serviced or stored are considered to be PES containing ammunition of Hazard
Division 1.1.

b) The "Definitive Drawings" for a missile installation should include the separation distances necessary to
prevent propagation of explosion. Where operational requirements for the missile system necessitate
smaller distances, the PES are aggregated and considered to be one PES as regards Exterior Quantity-
Distances.

4.3.0.3. Exposed Sites

a) Military sites such as operation centres, readiness structures, radar and communication installations, fuel
stations, parking areas and guard shelters may be considered to be ES which are protected by appropriate
Interior Quantity-Distances. These ES may be inside the missile installation under consideration or inside
another military installation.

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b) The "Definitive Drawings" for a missile installation are based on operational requirements which may
override the Interior Quantity-Distances and which must be taken into account by additional infrastructure
measures (site safety plans).

c) An Exposed Site outside a missile installation, not being inside another military installation, must be
protected by the Exterior Quantity-Distances given in Part I.

4.3.0.4. Measuring of Quantity-Distances

Quantity-Distances at launcher platforms are measured from the extremities of the missile(s) when in
normal position on the platform. As regards assembly buildings and storage sites at a missile installation the normal
procedure in Part I, paragraph 1.3.2.3. applies.

4.3.0.5. Net Explosives Quantity

The normal procedure for computing the NEQ applies, see Part I, subparagraphs 1.3.2.3.a) and 1.3.2.3.b).
Information, which may be classified, on the effective NEQ of a particular type of missile should be obtained from
the design authority. Otherwise the actual NEQ must be calculated in accordance with the definition as follows: The
NEQ is the total explosives content of ammunition unless it has been determined that the effective quantity is
significantly different from the actual quantity. It does not include such substances as white phosphorus, war gases
or smoke and incendiary compositions unless these substances contribute significantly to the dominant hazard of the
hazard division concerned.

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CHAPTER 4 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR

BASIC LOAD AMMUNITION HOLDING AREAS

4.4.0.1. General

a) Provisions of this chapter apply only to essential basic load ammunition holding areas, which are permitted
by host nation laws and/or status of Forces Agreements, case by case.

b) Certain units must keep their basic load ammunition in readiness within the boundaries of their barracks or
in the immediate vicinity thereof. This requires deviations from the quantity-distance standards in Part I,
Chapter 3. A high level of risk must be accepted in relation to Interior Quantity-Distances, otherwise the
units cannot fulfil their mission. The Exterior Quantity-Distances, however, are not reduced.

c) The following quantity-distance standards apply to locations where combat units hold their basic load
ammunition in armoured vehicles, trucks, trailers, structures or on pads. Such locations are described in this
Manual as basic load ammunition holding areas.

d) It is emphasized that the quantity-distances given in this chapter are the minima and that greater quantity-
distances should be observed wherever practicable in order to provide a higher degree of safety.

4.4.0.2. Mixing of Basic Load Ammunition of Different Hazard Divisions and Compatibility Groups

Ammunition in Hazard Divisions 1.1 and 1.2 in a basic load ammunition holding area is regarded as
Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition for administrative convenience and Table 4-I applies. All components necessary
for complete rounds of artillery, mortar and rocket ammunition may be stored together without regard to
compatibility. Complete rounds of ammunition of all compatibility groups may be stored together within heavy
armoured vehicles.

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4.4.0.3. Net Explosives Quantity

a) Normally the total NEQ of ammunition in a single site is used for the computation of quantity-distances.
For exclusion of propelling charges from the computation, see Part I, paragraph 1.3.2.6. In the case of
basic load ammunition holding areas, it is also permitted to exclude from the computation the NEQ of
ammunition in Hazard Division 1.3 unless this is the only ammunition at a site in which case Table 3 of
Part I, Annex A applies. The maximum NEQ at any site in a basic load ammunition holding area must not
exceed 4 000 kg.

b) Armoured Vehicles

The total NEQ of ammunition in each single vehicle (heavy or light) is used for the computation of
quantity-distances.

c) Trucks and Trailers

1) The total NEQ of ammunition in each truck or trailer is used for the computation of quantity-
distances, provided that each truck or trailer is separated from every other one by at least the BD1-
distances in Table 4-I, if barricaded, or BD3-distances, if unbarricaded.

2) The total NEQ of ammunition in all trucks or trailers within a truck park or a trailer park is used
for the computation of quantity-distances, if the trucks or trailers within a park are not separated
from each other by quantity-distances specified in 1) above.

4.4.0.4. Separation of Vehicle Parks

Figure 4-I shows a schematic layout of vehicle parks. The BD-distances refer to the columns in Table 4-I.
It is permissible to park both trucks and trailers in a single park.

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4.4.0.5. Separation of Armoured Vehicles

Armoured vehicles containing basic load ammunition are separated from each other by a minimum
distance of 2 m in all directions regardless of the quantity of ammunition within the vehicle. This separation
distance is required for manoeuvering of the vehicles and it is not based on explosive safety considerations.

4.4.0.6. Separation of Trucks and Trailers

Trucks and trailers containing basic load ammunition are separated from each other by BD3-distances in
Table 4-I.

4.4.0.7. Storage in Earth-Covered Structures

Sometimes it may be possible to place basic load ammunition in earth-covered structures in unit load
configurations which permit rapid loading of vehicles. When standard igloos are used, separation distances given for
Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition apply (see Part I, Annex A, Table 1). When earth-covered shelters of light
construction are used, the BD1-distances in Table 4-I apply to the side-to-side configuration provided that the earth-
cover complies with Part I, paragraph 1.3.6.7. and the explosives are stored at least 1 m from the end of the shelter. If
end-to-end exposures are involved the BD2-distances in Table 4-I apply provided that there is a barricade (Part I,
paragraph 1.3.6.1.).

4.4.0.8. Exterior Quantity-Distances

a) Exterior Quantity-Distances from Vehicles with Heavy Armour

The BD6-distances in Table 4-I are used both as Public Traffic Route Distances and as Inhabited Building
Distances. It can be assumed that heavy armour can contain fragments and is therefore an effective
barricade. The BD6-distances are based on blast impulse only.

b) Exterior Quantity-Distances from Vehicles with Light Armour

The BD4- and BD5-distances in Table 4-I are used as Public Traffic Route Distances and

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Inhabited Building Distances, respectively. Barracks, headquarters and maintenance facilities within a
military installation should be separated in all cases from trucks and trailers by BD5-distances. If this is not
possible owing to operational requirements and limitations of real estate, the user nation may observe lesser
distances provided these have been properly authorized by that user nation.

4.4.0.9. Location of Basic Load Vehicles within Ammunition Facilities

Proper location of basic load ammunition within ammunition storage points, pre-stock points and depots is
essential in order to preclude the possible loss of large stocks of ammunition. Therefore the user nation must assess
carefully such a proposal before granting a special authorization.

4.4.0.10. Miscellaneous Installations

Basic load ammunition holding areas are separated from other important facilities by BD5-distances in
Table 4-I unless special operational requirements demand other distances.

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Figure 4-I - Separation of Basic Load Vehicle Parks

1. A, B, C and D are parks for trucks and trailers, each vehicle containing Q1 kg NEQ.
E is a park for light or heavy armoured vehicles, each vehicle containing Q2 kg NEQ.
Every vehicle and park is considered in turn as, a PES.

2. In Park A the vehicles are unbarricaded but are separated by BD3-distances in Table 4-I. Hence the
Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances from this park are based on Q1 only.

3. In Park B the vehicles are unbanicaded and closer together than BD3-distances in Table 4-I. Hence the
Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances from this park are based on 4 Q1.

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4. In Park C the effective NEQ is 4Q1. Be barricade between Park C and Parks D and E permits BDI-distances in
Table 4-1 to be used from this park in the direction of Park D and Park E.

5. In Park D the individual trucks and trailers are barricaded and separated by BDI-distances in Table 4-1.
Hence the Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances from this park are based on Q1 only.

6. In Park E the vehicles ire separated by at least 2 m. The Interior Quantity-Distance from this park is BDl or
BD3 based on Q2 only. Park E is deemed to be a barricaded PES when the armour is heavy; light armour,
however, cannot contain all fragments.

7. When Park E is considered as an ES, it is always deemed to be barricaded since the light or heavy armour
is capable of excluding fragments.

8. The relative sizes of the Interior Quantity-Distances depend on the values of Q1 and Q2 and the number of
trucks and trailers which are aggregated. The optimum layout balances the numbers of vehicles and parks
against the availability of land and earth for barricades.

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Q-D TABLE FOR BASIC LOAD AMMUNITION HOLDING AREAS

NEQ Quantity-Distances

Q (kg) m
BD1 BD2 BD3 BD4 BD5 BD6

50 3.0 7 18 180 270 20

75 3.5 8 21 | | 26
100 4.0 9 23 | | 32
125 4.0 9 24 | | 38
150 4.5 10 26 | | 42
175 4.5 11 27 | |
200 5.0 11 28 | |
| |
250 6.0 12 31 | |
300 6.0 13 33 | |
350 6.0 13 34 | |
400 6.0 14 36 | |
450 7.0 14 37 | |
| |
500 7.0 15 39 | |
600 7.0 16 41 | |
700 8.0 16 43 | |
800 8.0 17 45 | |
900 8.0 18 47 | |
| |
1 000 8.0 18 48 | |
1 200 9.0 20 52 | |
1 400 9.0 21 54 | |
1 600 10.0 22 57 | |
1 800 10.0 22 59 | |
| |
2 000 11.0 23 61 180 270
2 500 11.0 25 66 185 275
3 000 12.0 26 70 205 305
3 500 13.0 28 73 220 330
4 000 13.0 29 77 235 350

Distance BD1 = BD2 = BD3 = BD4 = BD5 = BD6=

Functions 0.8 Q1/3 1.8 Q1/3 4.8 Q1/3 3.6...Q1/2 5.5 Q1/2 1.5Q2/3

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CHAPTER 5 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR

AIRFIELDS USED ONLY BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT

4.5.0.1. General

a) This chapter recommends principles and safety requirements for airfields used only by military aircraft.

b) Air forces generally operate in war from the same locations that they occupy in peacetime. It may therefore
be necessary to store or hold weapons and ammunition as close to the aircraft as possible without exposing
personnel or facilities to unacceptable risk from an accidental explosion or the detonation of weapons or
ammunition as a result of enemy action in war. The following advice is intended to provide the minimum
levels of protection deemed necessary.

c) The quantity-distances specified in this chapter apply essentially to PES which exist in peacetime. It
follows that Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) which contain armed aircraft and/or stocks of ammunition
in peacetime should be treated as PES. Commanders will need to decide the quantity-distances to be
applied to sites which only become PES in emergencies or wartime and such distances will need to be
catered for in the airfields' peacetime layout. In reaching his decision the Commander should bear in mind
that a reduction in recommended quantity-distances to non-operationally essential facilities may result, in
the event of an explosion at the PES in increased damage and casualties, whilst a similar reduction to
operationally essential facilities could result in the facility ceasing to function and the prejudicing of
operational plans.

d) Operational Commanders are advised that the more essential military resources may require additional
protection.

4.5.0.2. Aircraft Parking - Designated Areas

a) Aircraft carrying explosives must be armed, loaded, unloaded or parked in a Designated Area. Where
possible such a Designated Area should be separated from other such areas and from ES by the quantity-
distances given in paragraph 4.5.0.4.

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b) A loading, unloading or parking area specifically designated for continual use presents a recurring hazard
as opposed to an occasional one and should be formally authorised for the purpose.

c) Exception

This requirement does not apply to aircraft containing only installed explosives and safety devices such as
authorised signals in survival kits, egress systems components, engine starter cartridges, fire extinguisher
cartridges and other such items necessary to flight operations.

4.5.0.3. Aircraft Parking - Principles for Selecting Designated Areas

a) The following principles should be followed in selecting Designated Areas:

1. The safest possible area compatible with quantity-distances prescribed in this chapter and
operational requirements must be used.

2. The loading, unloading or parking area must be located outside runway clear zones. Aircraft
arm/disarm pads are exempted from the restriction1

3. Whenever possible, the quantity-distances recommended in paragraph 4.5.0.4. should be observed

between adjacent loaded aircraft which are in the open. Where this is not possible consideration
should be given to grouping several aircraft together and separating the groups by greater
distances than can be provided between individual aircraft. If an explosion should occur, aircraft
in adjacent groups may be damaged by fragments; however, the explosion is unlikely to propagate
simultaneously. Subsequent explosions may be caused by fragments, debris or secondary fires.

1
In general, the applicable runway clearance is the 150 m lateral safety zone each side from the runway centreline. Further details
are given in the 6th or latest Edition of NATO Airfield Criteria.

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4. Ideally, aircraft should face the direction involving least exposure of personnel, equipment and
facilities to the line of fire of forward-firing armament. For practical purposes, aircraft should be
pointed so that no centre of population exists for 3 000 m within 5° on either side of the line of fire
unless this is intercepted by a suitable barricade.

b) Exceptions

Aircraft carrying their operational loads of gun ammunition, practice bombs and small rockets (e.g. 2.75"
HE rockets or others with equivalent characteristics) do not require the quantity-distances specified in
paragraph 4.5.0.4.

4.5.0.4. Quantity-Distances

a) The following quantity-distances, which assume Hazard Division 1.1 loads, may be used for all hazard
divisions. Where Part I of the Manual permits, lesser distances may be used for hazard divisions other than
Hazard Division 1.1.

b) Quantity-Distances between Aircraft Loaded with Explosives

1. Unbarricaded individual aircraft, or groups of aircraft at Designated Areas, loaded with explosives
should be separated from one another by AD13-distances (12.0 Q1/3) unless space limitations or
operational considerations dictate otherwise. At this distance, adjacent unsheltered aircraft may
sustain damage due to fragments but should, in most cases, remain operable. Where nearly
complete protection against fragments is deemed necessary, a distance of 270 m between aircraft
should be provided. Individual or groups of aircraft should be separated by AD10-distances (7.2
Q1/3) to protect against propagation of detonation. If the aircraft carry ammunition of comparable
resistance to propagation as robust shells, AD9-distances (4.4 Q1/3) may be used to protect against
simultaneous detonation. Lesser distances may be used for specific weapons where trials have
shown that such distances are adequate to minimize the probability of propagation.

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2. Barricades between adjacent aircraft will prevent simultaneous propagation due to high velocity,
low angle fragments. It should be noted, however, that a barricade does not necessarily prevent
subsequent propagation or damage caused by blast, lobbed items, debris or secondary fires.

c) Exterior Quantity-Distances from Designated Areas

Where possible, the appropriate Exterior Quantity-Distances in Part I should apply between parked aircraft
loaded with explosives at Designated Areas and ES not related to the servicing and support of those
aircraft. Safety is enhanced by towing aircraft, after loading, to a safer area rather than close to other
aircraft being loaded or unloaded.

d) Quantity-Distances between HAS and Associated Storage Facilities

1. HAS2 and associated storage facilities spaced according to Table 5-II will prevent propagation
between such facilities. An explosion in one shelter or ready storage facility may destroy it and its
contents, but aircraft within adjacent shelters will be undamaged, provided the doors are closed.
Those aircraft may not be immediately removable due to debris.

2. HAS and associated storage facilities spaced according to Table 5-III may be damaged; however,
there will be a high degree of protection against propagation. These distances should be used only
in wartime or during periods of increased operational readiness.

3. Areas of hazard to front, side or rear of HAS or igloos as PES or ES lie in the arcs shown in Figure
5-I. A particular face of an ES is deemed to be threatened by a PES face when both these faces lie
within the arc of threat or hazard of the other. In those cases where an ES lies on the line
separating rear/side etc. of a PES, the appropriate larger quantity-distance should be observed.

2
The tables in this chapter do not apply to Norwegian designs of third generation HAS for which tables will be published in due course.

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e) Quantity-Distances to Runways and Taxiways

If the transient risk to military aircraft movements is accepted, it is recommended that the separation of the
PES from runways and taxiways which are considered to be operationally essential should ideally be such
as to prevent the runways or taxiways being rendered unoperational by ground shock as a result of an
explosion in the PES. The use of a distance equivalent to about three times the crater radius is
recommended. In normal soil AD4-distances (1.8 Q1/3) should be used; in saturated soils or clay greater
distances may be advisable because of the increased crater radius. If the transient risk is not accepted,
AD13-distances (12.0 Q1/3) should be used to provide protection to the aircraft.

f) Quantity-Distances to Explosives Workshops

Explosives workshops should be separated from other PES by AD11-distances (8.0 Q1/3). Suitably
hardened explosives workshops may be sited at reduced distances.

g) Quantity-Distances to Facilities and Activities in Both Direct and Indirect Support of Flightline and
Aircraft Servicing

Use AD10-distances (7.2Q 1/3) for separation of any PES where explosives are present on a long-term basis
from squadron operations buildings, flightline maintenance functions, flightline fire and rescue stations,
and other activities in direct support of flightline and aircraft servicing (e.g. alert crew, POL and LOX
facilities) unless the facilities are hardened to NATO criteria, when reduced distances may be used. At this
distance, damage to unstrengthened buildings may be of a serious nature with resulting casualties. Where
greater protection is required, AD12-Distances (9.6 Q1/3) should be used, except where
1/3
subparagraph 4.5.0.4.k) permits smaller distances. Use AD14-distances (16.0 Q ) for similar unhardened
facilities in indirect support of flightline operations, with reductions for facilities hardened to NATO
criteria. In transition to war (TTW) and war, all facilities may be considered to be directly supporting and
the lesser distances used.

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h) Quantity-Distances for Emergency Power Supply Shelter and POL Shelter for the Support of Hardened
Aircraft Shelters

If the quantity-distances prescribed in subparagraph 4.5.0.4.g) cannot be maintained, lesser quantity-

distances are permissible for the construction of Emergency Power Supply Shelter and POL Shelter for the
support of a nearby HAS under the following conditions:

1. Power Supply and POL Shelters must be hardened

- Wall and roof thickness : at least 65 cm reinforced concrete
- Gate thickness : at least 30 mm steel plate

2. The POL tank for this structure must be buried (minimum earth-cover 1 m).

3. The following quantity-distances to PES have to be maintained (see Figure -II):

- Minimum distance between the walls and PES : AD5-distances

- Minimum distance between the gates and PES : AD9-distances, at least 25 m
- At least 25 m for the buried POL tank.

i) Quantity-Distances to Military Aircraft not Loaded with Explosives

Use AD13-distances (12.0 Q1/3) for separation of PES from military aircraft in exposed parking (tankers,
transports), but damage may be sustained due to fragments (see sub-subparagraph 4.5.0.4.b).1.). Where
operational requirements outweigh consideration of asset preservation, distances may be reduced to that
dictated by operational necessity but minimum distances corresponding to the distance function 9.6 Q1/3 for
embarking/disembarking military personnel for transport and distances corresponding to the distance
function 7.2 Q1/3 for tanker aircraft should be considered.

j) Quantity-Distances to Open Stacks of Ammunition

Open storage of ammunition, barricaded effectively, is permitted at not less than AD13-distances (12.0
Q1/3) from parked aircraft outside shelters.

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k) Quantity-Distances to General Public and Central Airfield Administrative Support Facilities

1. Use AD16-distances (14.0 Q1/3) from the rear and AD17-distances (18.0 Q1/3) from the sides and
front of ready service igloos containing up to 10 000 kg NEQ at loading density of up to 20 kg/m3.
Apply a minimum distance of 270 m to central airfield administrative support facilities and low
density public traffic routes.

2. When the PES is a US third-generation or similar hardened aircraft shelter containing up to 5 000
kg NEQ, the AD18-distances (20.0 Q1/3) from the front, the AD19-distances (25.0 Q1/3) from the
side and AD14-distances (16.0 Q1/3) from the rear may be used to protect an unhardened ES
against debris and blast. With NEQ of 50 kg or less in a HAS, a minimum distance of 80 m to the
front of the HAS and nil to the side and rear need only to be applied.

3. Use AD15-distances (22.2 Q1/3) for other PES where explosives are present on a long-term basis,
and apply minimum distances of 270 or 400 m depending on the nature of the PES (open vs igloo)
and the ES (density of population).

4. Where ES have been hardened, lesser distances may be used depending on the degree of hardening
provided.

4.5.0.5. Operational Considerations

a) When operational requirements necessitate the use of Table 5-III or distances less than those prescribed
above, particularly in the case of explosives of Hazard Division 1.1, the operational Commander should be
advised of any potentially serious risks in accordance with Part I, Chapter 3, Section VII, so that measures
can be taken to eliminate or at least reduce the consequences.

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b) The aim should be to maintain the maximum practicable separation between unbarricaded aircraft loaded
with explosives of Hazard Division 1.1. The use of distances less than 270 m involves a progressively
increasing risk of propagation by blast, flame, radiant heat and projections.

c) Safety is enhanced by towing aircraft, after loading, to aircraft being loaded or unloaded.

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Figure 5-I

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FIGURE 5-II

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TABLE 5-I (PAGE 1)

Q-D TABLE FOR AIRFIELDS HAZARD DIVISION 1.1

NEQ Quantity-Distances
Q
m
kg AD1 AD2 AD3 AD4 AD5 AD6 AD7 AD8 AD9 AD10

500 4 6 9 15 16 20 25 29 35 58
600 5 7 10 16 17 21 27 31 38 61
700 5 7 10 16 18 22 28 32 40 64
800 5 7 11 17 19 23 30 34 41 67
900 5 8 11 18 19 24 31 35 43 70

1 000 5 8 11 18 20 24 32 36 44 72
1 200 6 9 12 20 21 26 34 39 47 77
1 400 6 9 13 21 22 27 36 41 50 81
1 600 6 9 13 22 23 29 37 43 52 85
1 800 7 10 14 22 24 30 39 44 54 88

2 000 7 10 14 23 25 31 40 46 56 91
2 200 7 10 14 24 26 31 42 47 57 94
2 500 7 11 15 25 27 33 43 49 60 98
3 000 8 12 16 26 29 35 46 52 64 105
3 500 8 12 17 28 30 37 49 55 67 110

4 000 8 13 18 29 32 39 51 58 70 115
4 400 8 13 18 30 33 39 52 59 72 120
5 000 9 14 19 31 34 42 55 62 76 125
6 000 10 15 20 33 36 44 58 66 80 135
7 000 10 15 22 35 38 46 61 69 85 140

8 000 10 16 22 36 40 48 64 72 88 145
8 800 10 17 23 37 41 50 66 74 91 150
9 000 11 17 23 38 42 50 67 75 92 150
10 000 11 17 24 39 43 52 69 78 95 160

Distance AD1 AD2 AD3 AD4 AD5 AD6 AD7 AD8 AD9 AD10
Functions = = = = = = = = = =
0.5 0.8 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.4 3.2 3.6 4.4 7.2
Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3

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TABLE 5-I (PAGE 2)

Q-D TABLE FOR AIRFIELDS HAZARD DIVISION 1.1

NEQ Quantity-Distances

Q
m
kg AD AD1 AD1 AD1 AD1 AD15 AD17 AD18 AD19
11 2 3 4 5 a) a) a) a)
500 64 77 95 130 270 270 270 160 200
600 68 81 100 135 | | | 170 215
700 72 86 105 145 | | | 180 225
800 75 90 110 150 | | | 190 235
900 78 93 115 155 | | | 195 245
| | |
1 000 80 96 120 160 | | | 200 250
1 200 86 105 130 175 | | | 215 270
1 400 90 110 135 180 | | | 225 280
1 600 94 115 140 190 | | | 235 295
1 800 99 120 145 195 | | | 245 305
| | |
2 000 105 125 150 205 | | | 255 315
2 200 105 125 155 210 270 | | 265 330
2 500 110 135 165 220 275 | | 275 340
3 000 120 140 175 235 305 | 270 290 365
3 500 125 150 180 245 330 | 275 305 380
|
4 000 130 155 190 255 350 | 290 320 400
4 400 135 160 200 260 365 | 295 330 410
5 000 140 165 205 275 380 | 310 345 430
6 000 150 175 220 295 405 | 330 -------- ---------
7 000 155 185 230 310 425 270 345

8 000 160 195 240 320 445 280 360

8 800 170 200 250 330 460 290 375
9 000 170 200 250 335 465 295 380
10 000 175 210 260 345 480 305 390

Distance AD11 AD12 AD13 AD14 *) AD16 AD17 AD18 AD19

Functions = = = = = = = =
8.0 9.6 12.0 16.0 **) 14.0 18.0 20.0 25.0
Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3 Q1/3

*) AD15 = 5.5 Q1/2 for Q < 4 500 kg

**) AD15 = 22.2 Q1/3 for Q 4 500 kg

NOTE: a) see subparagraph 4.5.0.4.k)

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TABLE 5-II (PAGE 1)

ASSET PRESERVATION

FROM (PES) 1st Generation 2nd and 3rd Generation

Aircraft Shelter a) Aircraft Shelter a)

TO (ES) Side Rear Front Side Rear Front

1st Generation Side AD8 AD6 AD8 AD8 AD6 AD8

Aircraft Rear AD7 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD5 AD7

Shelter Front AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10

2nd or 3rd Generation Side AD8 AD6 AD8 AD8 AD6 AD8

Aircraft Rear AD7 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD5 AD7

Shelter Front AD9 AD8 AD10 AD9 AD8 AD10

Distance Functions: see TABLE 5-I

NOTE: a) Limited to a maximum of 5 000 kg per shelter.

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TABLE 5-II (PAGE 2)

ASSET PRESERVATION

FROM (PES) Ready Service Ready Service

Igloo b) Magazine c)

TO (ES) Side Rear Front Front Barr. Unbarr.

Barr. Unbarr.

1st Generation Side AD3 AD3 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Aircraft Rear AD3 AD3 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Shelter Front AD9 AD8 AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10

2nd or 3rd Side AD3 AD3 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Generation Rear AD3 AD3 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Aircraft Front AD3 AD3 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Shelter

Distance Functions: see TABLE 5-I

NOTES:
b) Ready Service Igloo - An earth-covered explosives storage location, often utilizing an arch-type interior
shell, used to store built-up ammunition for combat aircraft loading. Storage is limited to not more
than 10 000 kg NEQ and a loading density of not more than 20 kg m-1/3.

c) Ready Service Magazine - Any aboveground explosives storage facility, other than an igloo, used to store
built-up ammunition for combat aircraft loading. Storage is limited to not more than 10 000 kg.

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TABLE 5-II (PAGE 3)

ASSET PRESERVATION

FROM (PES) Igloo Magazine

TO (ES) Side Rear Front Front Barr. Unbarr.

Barr. Unbarr.

1st Generation Side AD5 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Aircraft Rear AD5 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Shelter Front AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10 AD10

2nd or 3rd Side AD5 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Generation Rear AD5 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Aircraft Front AD5 AD5 AD7 AD7 AD7 AD7

Shelter

Distance Functions: see TABLE 5-I

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TABLE 5-III (PAGE 1)

PROPAGATION PREVENTION

FROM (PES) 1st Generation 2nd or 3rd Generation

Aircraft Shelter Aircraft Shelter a)

TO (ES) Side Rear Front Side Rear Front

1st Generation Side AD2 AD2 AD3 AD2 AD2 AD3

Aircraft Rear AD2 AD2 AD3 AD2 AD2 AD3

Shelter Front AD6 AD4 AD7 AD6 AD4 AD8

2nd or 3rd Gene- Side AD2 AD2 AD3 AD2 AD2 AD3

ration Aircraft Rear AD2 AD2 AD3 AD2 AD2 AD3

Shelter Front AD4 AD3 AD5 AD4 AD4 AD6

Ready Side AD2 AD2 AD3 AD2 AD2 AD3

Service Rear AD2 AD2 AD3 AD2 AD2 AD3

Igloo Front AD3 AD3 AD5 AD3 AD3 AD6

Barr.

Front AD6 AD4 AD7 AD6 AD4 AD8

Unbarr.

Ready Ser- Barr. AD6b) AD6b) AD6 AD6b) AD6b) AD6

vice Maga- Unbarr. AD9 AD9 AD9 AD9 AD9 AD9

zine

Distance Functions: see TABLE 5-I

NOTES:
a) Limited to a maximum of 5 000 kg per shelter.
b) This separation provides a high degree of protection (see Part I, subpara. 1.3.1.9.b)2)). AD3-distances may be
used for robust stores or in wartime or emergency situations and would provide a moderate degree of
protection (see Part I, subpara. 1.3.1.9.b)3)).

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TABLE 5-III (PAGE 2)

PROPAGATION PREVENTION

FROM (PES) Ready Service Ready Service

Igloo c) Magazine d)

Side Rear Front Front Barr. Unbarr.

TO (ES) Barr. Unbarr.

1st Generation Side AD1e) AD1e) AD3f) AD3f) AD3 AD3

Aircraft Rear AD1e) AD13) AD3f) AD3f) AD3 AD3

Shelter Front AD3f) AD3f) AD6f) AD8f) AD6 AD8

2nd or 3rd Gene- Side AD1e) AD1e) AD3f) AD3f) AD3 AD3

ration Aircraft Rear AD1e) AD1e) AD3f) AD3f) AD3 AD3

Shelter Front AD1e) AD1e) AD3f) AD3f) AD3 AD3

Ready Service Side

Igloo Rear

Front
Barr.
Use PART I Distances
Front
Unbarr
.

Ready Service Barr.

Magazine Unbarr
.

NOTES:
c) Ready Service Igloo - An earth-covered explosives storage location, often utilizing an arch-type interior shell, and often used to store

built-up ammunition for combat aircraft loading. Storage is limited to not more than 10 000 kg NEQ and a loading density of

not more than 20 kg m-1/3, except as noted below.

d) Ready Service Magazine - any aboveground storage facility, other than an igloo, used to store built-up ammunition for combat aircraft

loading. Storage is limited to not more than 10 000 kg.

3
e) Use AD2-distances where the loading density exceeds 20 kg m-1/ .
f) The loading density limitation of 20 kg m-1/3 not to be applied.

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TABLE 5-III (PAGE 3)

PROPAGATION PREVENTION

FROM (PES) Igloo Magazine

Side Rear Front Front Barr. Unbarr.

TO (ES) Barr. Unbarr.

1st Generation Side

Aircraft Rear

Shelter Front
See TABLE 5-II
2nd or 3rd Gene- Side

ration Aircraft Rear

Shelter Front

Ready Side

Service Rear

Igloo Front
Barr.
Use PART I Distances
Front
Unbarr.

Ready Service Barr.

Magazine Unbarr.

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CHAPTER 6 - SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN NAVAL OR MILITARY PORTS

Section I-Introduction

4.6.1.1.

The principles detailed in this chapter leaflet are designed to give the levels of protection to other vessels,
facilities and to personnel working in the immediate environment as well as to the general public when vessels are
anchored, moored or berthed in naval or military ports, and are in general based on the advice used in AASTP-1 for
above-ground storage.

4.6.1.2.

This leaflet recommends a desired level of protection, with related quantity-distances but because it may
not always be practical to obtain this desired level, also details, wherever possible, alternative lower levels of
protection and their related quantity-distances. It is the responsibility of the National Authorities to decide which
level of protection to use after conducting a proper assessment of the often conflicting requirements of safety and
operational effectiveness.

4.6.1.3.

In general warships are ignored for the purposes of this document provided that the following conditions
are met:

(1) all ammunition is stowed in the designated magazines and/or explosives lockers

(2) all explosive storage areas are secure

(3) no movement of explosives takes place on board the warship.

4.6.1.4.

In general the guiding principle is to consider a vessel being loaded at a berth as equivalent to a storage site
for quantity distance purposes, particularly if the berth is in constant or almost constant use.

4.6.1.5.
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However where the berth is not in constant use or a higher explosives limit is required for only short
periods of operation then the assessment of HD 1.1 limits should be made initially using the quantity distance
guidelines laid down in this leaflet and the results confirmed by a consequence analysis. Having assessed the HD
1.1 limits, limits for explosives of HD 1.2 and 1.3 are generally derived using a comparison technique.

4.6.1.6.

Appropriate models, which may be used to conduct the consequence analysis, are detailed in the modelling
section of AASTP-4.
4.6.1.7.

It must be emphasised that probability of propagation, damage and casualties are all directly related to
separation distance. Any increase above quantity-distances recommended in this leaflet will result therefore in
improved levels of protection. In addition good working practices can do much to reduce the probability of
propagation, for example mooring ships in tandem and closing hatches.

4.6.1.8.

As the aim of this leaflet is to produce a practical and applicable technique for the assessment of explosive
limits in ports, albeit naval or military ones, the advice given in the leaflet could also be useful to the regulatory
authorities, port users and the ports authorities themselves.

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Section II- General

4.6.2.1.

This prescription details safety principles for the transfer of military explosives when vessels are anchored,
moored or berthed in naval or military ports, i.e. areas where the basin, cargo handling facilities, and inland support
facilities are under the jurisdiction of the military. Each vessel is considered either as a Potential Explosion Site
(PES) or as an Exposed Site (ES), if it is at risk from a PES. For definitions of other ES see AASTP-1.

4.6.2.2.

These principles apply to the separation distances to be observed by vessels loaded with military
explosives. Examples of such vessels are Lighters, Barges, Small Coastal Craft, Cargo Ships, Transports, Auxiliary
Vessels and Warships although this list is not intended to be exhaustive.

4.6.2.3.

Circumstances where these Principles may not apply. These principles are not applicable to military
explosives stored in ships' magazines, which are intended for the service of the shipboard armament or aircraft,
provided that these magazines are not opened or worked upon when the vessel is at the berth. They do, however,
apply to the loading, off-loading, or handling of such military explosives. Special procedures are applied to those
circumstances where ammunition "topping-up" operations are required.

4.6.2.4.

Traversed/Untraversed Vessels. The military explosives in a vessel are considered to be traversed when
they are all stored at least 0.5 m below the waterline. Conversely, if any are stored less than 0.5m below the
waterline, the total quantity of explosives embarked is to be considered as untraversed.

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Section III - Calculation of Net Explosives Quantity

4.6.3.1.

In view of the close proximity of ships' compartments and holds, and adjacent ship to shore transfer area, it
is possible that an explosion could involve the whole cargo. For this reason all the military explosives on board a
vessel are to be aggregated in accordance with the principles of AASTP-1. The NEQ to be taken into account must
therefore include:

1) all military explosives on jetties or in vehicles or vessels alongside the ship;

and

2) all military explosives being handled and fitted on the deck of the ship;
and

3) all military explosives in the magazine or hold being worked plus those in adjacent magazines or
hold being worked plus those present in any other adjacent magazines unless the risk of
simultaneous propagation has been assessed as being negligible. (See paragraph 4.6.3.2 below)

4.6.3.2.

It may be possible to arrange for a vessel's explosive cargo to be stowed in such a way that the
simultaneous propagation of an explosion from one stowage location to another would not occur. Such stowage
must include both a separation distance and traversing to intercept and prevent high-speed fragments initiating a
simultaneous explosion. The distance must be at least 0.8 Q1/3 and the traversing must be at least equivalent to the
traverse (2.4 metres of earth) normally provided for storage ashore. Care should be taken to ensure that there are no
'windows' in the traversing particularly where stowage on different deck levels is envisaged. The traverse can be
composed of inert material such as provisions, water ballast, ship's machinery, 1.4 ammunition, etc. During loading
and unloading operations only one hold may be worked at any one time and care must be taken to ensure that the
inert material remains in place to provide the necessary traverse. In case of doubt as to the equivalence or
effectiveness of the traverse advice may be sought through normal explosives safety channels.

4.6.3.3. Quantity-Distances

Quantity-distances to be observed by vessels when carrying, loading or unloading military explosives at

piers, jetties, wharves or anchorages are given in Table A at Annex A and are to be applied as detailed below for the
NEQ concerned to ensure adequate protection of ES.
4.6.3.4.
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Measurements are made from the nearest point of compartments in which military explosives are stowed in
a berthed or anchored vessel to the nearest point of the ES.

4.6.3.5.

When quantity-distances are calculated due allowance is to be made for movement of ships due to tides
when anchored or berthed at a single buoy. The radius of the swinging circle is to be taken into account in the
overall distance and the position of the aftermost compartment in which military explosives are stored taken as the
point from which the quantity-distances should be measured.

4.6.3.6.

If it is necessary to berth 2 or more vessels containing military explosives at less than the appropriate
separation distance that is required by considering each vessel as a separate PES, the total NEQ of the cargo of both
vessels is to be used as one unit PES to determine quantity-distances to any other ES.

4.6.3.7.

If berthing of 2 vessels together is necessary they should preferably be moored in tandem (i.e. one behind
the other) as the bows and sterns will afford additional protection to each of the vessels by reducing their exposed
areas. Provided that the conditions detailed in paragraph 3.2 above have been met this should allow the vessels to
be treated as being effectively traversed. Vessels so berthed should be secured by the bows and sterns to prevent
swinging in order to maintain the effectiveness of the traversing arrangement.

4.6.3.8.

Table B is a summary of quantity-distances to be observed for vessels loaded with or loading or unloading
military explosives of Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 in naval ports.

4.6.3.9.

The application of greater minimum separation distances may be appropriate where nuclear powered
vessels are considered as ESs.

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Section IV - Levels of Protection against propagation for HD 1.1

4.6.4.1. General

There is only one level of protection against propagation, viz protection level B, allowed for, in accordance
with the principles laid down in AASTP-1. It is considered that protection level A is inappropriate since no vessel
is capable of providing complete protection against protection equivalent to that afforded by an earth covered
structure. In addition since, under protection level C, the loss of stocks, and therefore in all likliehood the vessels
containing them, at the ES is almost guaranteed in the event of an accidental explosion at the Potential Explosion
Site this level of protection is not considered as a normally acceptable option.

4.6.4.2. Protection Level B

There is a high degree of protection against practically instantaneous propagation of explosion by ground
shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections. There are occasional fires or subsequent explosions caused by
these effects or by lobbed ammunition. Heavy cased ammunition is likely to be serviceable although covered by
debris. However the probability is significant that stocks of other types of explosives are likely to be lost through
subsequent propagation from lobbed ammunition or the spread of burning debris.

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Section V - Protection Between Vessels Each Loaded with Military Explosives

4.6.5.1. General

Such vessels must be separated from other vessels loaded with military explosives by quantity-distances
selected according to the HD of the military explosives concerned and the type of vessel at the ES. If the vessel at
the ES is a warship this may be discounted from consideration provided the conditions of paragraph 1.3 have been
met. The distances in this section are to be observed between vessels at anchorages, explosives piers or jetties. No
specific separation distances are advised to vessels which are underway.

4.6.5.2. HD 1.1.

For HD 1.1 Protection Level B should be applied wherever practicable. Different separation distances are
recommended for warships and other explosives carrying vessels because of the rational given at 6.1. Smaller
separation distances are also quoted which may be acceptable when it is unlikely that significant numbers of
personnel will be exposed to blast and debris hazards. Berthing of vessels in tandem at the same pier or at an
anchorage will help to decrease the fragment hazard to the explosive cargo because of the additional protection
afforded by the bow and stern. The quantity-distances, which should be used, are given below and the distance
functions quoted relate to those given in Table A at Annex A.

4.6.5.3.

Normal Protection Level (B) for explosives carrying vessels :

a. Untraversed : SD3.

b. Traversed : SD2.

HD 1.2. For HD 1.2 fixed separation distances are applied as follows :

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c. 60 m for military explosives of HD 1.2*

d. 90 m for military explosives of HD 1.2

4.6.5.4. Flooding

An incident involving military explosives belonging only to HD 1.2 may be reduced significantly in severity if
means are available to rapidly flood the vessel. In such a case, a lesser distance of 60 m may be acceptable.

4.6.5.5. HD 1.3

A minimum separation distance of 60 m is to be used whether the PES is traversed or untraversed and for any
quantity of explosives regardless of the vessel at the ES.

4.6.5.6. HD 1.4

When the cargo comprises only military ammunition and explosives of HD 1.4, vessels are to be separated by
a minimum distance of at least 25 m for any quantity of explosives whether the vessel is traversed or untraversed. This
is primarily to allow effective fire fighting access.

4.6.5.7. Piers and Jetties

The distances quoted above for other explosives carrying vessels should also be used for protection of
untraversed military explosives on piers and jetties from vessels (both traversed and untraversed) loaded with military
explosives.

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Section VI - Protection from Vessels Loading or Unloading Military Explosives

4.6.6.1.

The distances in this section are also to be observed from a vessel loading or unloading at an anchorage,
explosives pier or jetty. No specific separation distances are advised to vessels which are underway.

4.6.6.2.

To vessels carrying military explosives, untraversed.

HD 1.1 : SD4

HD 1.2 : Fixed separation distance of 90 m.

HD 1.2* : Fixed separation distance of 60 m.

HD 1.3 : Fixed separation distance of 60 m.

HD 1.4 : Fixed separation distance of 25 m.

4.6.6.3.

To vessels carrying military explosives, effectively traversed.

HD 1.1 : SD3

HD 1.2 : Fixed separation distance of 90 m.

HD 1.2* : Fixed separation distance of 60 m.

HD 1.3 : Fixed separation distance of 60 m.

HD 1.4 : Fixed separation distance.

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4.6.6.4. Protection of Explosives Workshops

The separation distances from all vessels loaded or vessels loading or unloading military explosives to an
explosives workshop are to be based on the aggregated NEQ within the vessel and on the adjacent transfer area. These
distances are the minimum permissible distances between PES and explosives workshops as given in AASTP-1. The
distances are intended to provide a reasonable degree of immunity for personnel within the explosives workshops from
the effects of a nearby explosion, such as blast, flame, radiant heat and projections. Light structures are likely to be
severely damaged. These distances also provide a high degree of protection against immediate or subsequent
propagation of explosion.

4.6.6.5. Protection of Marshalling Areas

Separation from loaded vessels or vessels loading or unloading military explosives to marshalling areas
containing road or rail trucks and wagons of military explosives are SD3-distances given in Table A for traversed and
untraversed vessels, based on the NEQ within the vessel and on the adjacent transfer area.

4.6.6.6. Protection of the General Public and Other Non Explosive Exposed Sites

1) Schools, Hospitals and Similar Institutions must not be sited at less than the full inhabited building distance
(22.2 Q1/3 ) when occupied.

2) Buildings of Vulnerable Construction must not be sited at less than 33 Q1/3 but these will require individual
assessments. Buildings of Vulnerable Construction are defined in AASTP-1.

3) Ordinary Property of Conventional Design should in general not be sited at less than 16.7 Q1/3 separation
distances. However a few isolated buildings may be acceptable between SD3 and 16.7 Q1/3 distances provided
that no unacceptable fatality levels are generated as a result. It may also be necessary for such property beyond
22.2 Q1/3 to be taken into account if there are areas of high density development. Any property of
unconventional design will have to be assessed separately. The following types of facilities are included in
this overall grouping:

(a) one or two storey housing of conventional brick wall design

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(b) public houses

(c) dock offices, customs offices, etc

(d) factories, offices and manned facilities not in any way associated with the explosives
handling.

(e) Personnel working in the open and not involved with the explosives shipment should not be
exposed at separations less than 11.1 Q1/3.

(f) Bulk above ground Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant Storage Installations should not be sited at
less than 11.1 Q1/3 , provided that the tanks are effectively bunded. Special attention should
be paid to Petroleum Spirit, LNG and LPG tanks which should not generally be sited at less
than 16.7 Q1/3 distances.

(g) Canteens should in general not be sited at less than 11.1 Q1/3 provided they are occupied by
less than 50 people. If they are occupied by more than 50 people they should in general not
be sited at less than 16.7 Q1/3 distances. They may be ignored if they are likely to be
unoccupied during the actual explosives handling operations.

(h) Passenger terminals and passenger ships when embarking or disembarking should not be
sited at less than 22.2 Q1/3 when explosives are being handled and 16.7 Q1/3 from ships
loaded with explosives where explosives are not being handled. Any open areas over
which passengers are likely to pass should not in general be sited at less than 11.1 Q1/3.

(i) Tankers used for carrying petroleum spirit, LNG or LPG, unless empty and inerted, should
not be sited at less than 16.7 Q1/3, provided that neither the explosives are being handled or
the tanker is being loaded or unloaded. If concurrent operations are essential then the
separation should not be less than 22.2 Q1/3. A separation of 16.7 Q1/3 should be used from
an explosives ship if the explosives are being handled but no loading or unloading of the
tanker is taking place, or vice-versa.

(j) Bulk carriers carrying significant quantities of other dangerous goods should not be berthed
at less than 11.1 Q1/3. Consideration may need to be given to special loads.

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(k) Lock gates or other facilities, if vital to the operation of the port and manned should be
assessed specifically but in general should not be sited at less than 11.1 Q1/3.

(l) Transit Sheds and other installations used for the storage of significant quantities of highly
flammable materials should not be sited at less than 16.7 Q1/3. Such facilities containing
other dangerous goods should not be sited at less than 11.1 Q1/3. If the facility is used for
the storage of inert materials and is unmanned it may be ignored. If the facility is manned it
should not in general be sited at less than 16.7 Q1/3. However lesser distances may be
acceptable if the facility is of substantial construction or the numbers employed in the
facility are very low.

(m) Roads giving access to the berth may be ignored but the density of traffic on all other roads
should be assessed. If the density of traffic is very high then they should not be sited at less
than 16.7 Q1/3. If the density is relatively low the road should not be sited in general at less
than 11.1 Q1/3. All other roads should not in general be sited at less than 8.0 Q1/3.

(n) Railways used for goods traffic in the dock area may be ignored. Main line or busy
suburban passenger train routes should not be sited at less than 16.7 Q1/3. All other
passenger routes should not in general be sited at less than 11.1 Q1/3.

(o) Other ships, not loaded or with non-dangerous cargoes and having resident personnel on
board, should be sited at not less than 11.1 Q1/3.

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Section VII - Scuttling Areas

6.6.7.1.

Safe areas should be designated at ports used for handling military explosives to which vessels carrying
military explosives should, if possible, be directed or towed in the event of circumstances leading to a decision to
scuttle. Scuttling areas should be selected at the appropriate quantity-distances from ES, and in sufficient depth of
water to ensure complete swamping of military explosives holds at all states of the tides. Calculation should be based
on the largest NEQ likely to be in a single vessel handled at the port and the quantity-distance should be measured from
the boundaries of the designated scuttling area. The scuttling area will normally be one of the approved licensed berths
or buoys.

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Annex A

Table A. Q-D Table for Vessels

Net Explosives Quantity-Distances

Quantity
Q SD1 SD2 SD3 SD4
kg m M m m
500 60 39 135 130
600 60 41 135 135
700 60 43 135 145
800 60 45 135 150
900 60 47 135 155
1 000 60 48 135 160
1 200 60 52 135 175
1 400 60 54 135 180
1 600 60 57 135 190
1 800 60 59 135 195
2 000 60 61 135 205
2 500 60 66 135 220
3 000 60 70 135 235
3 500 60 73 135 245
4 000 60 77 135 255
5 000 60 83 140 275
6 000 60 88 150 295
7 000 62 92 155 310
8 000 64 96 160 320
9 000 67 100 170 335
10 000 69 105 175 345
12 000 74 110 185 370
14 000 78 120 195 390
16 000 81 125 203 405
18 000 84 130 210 420
20 000 87 135 218 435
25 000 94 145 235 470
30 000 100 150 250 500
35 000 105 160 265 530
40 000 110 165 275 550
50 000 120 180 295 590
60 000 130 190 315 630
70 000 135 200 330 660
80 000 140 210 345 690
90 000 145 220 360 720
100 000 150 225 375 750
130 000 160 245 395 790
140 000 170 250 420 840
160 000 175 265 435 870
180 000 185 275 455 910
200 000 190 285 470 940
250 000 205 305 510 1 020
300 000 215 325 540 1 080
350 000 230 340 570 1 140
400 000 240 355 590 1 180
500 000 255 380 640 1 280
1 000 000 320 480 800 1 600
Distance functions SD1=3.2Q1/3 SD2=4.8Q1/3 SD3=8.0Q1/3 SD4=16.0Q1/3

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Annex B

Table B. Summary of Quantity-Distances to be Observed for Seagoing Vessels Loaded with or Loading or Unloading
Military Explosives HD 1.1 in Naval Ports

Exposed site Potential explosion site

Vessels loaded with explosives Vessels loading or unloading explosives

Traversed Untraversed Traversed Untraversed

Vessels loaded SD3 SD3 (135 m SD4b SD4b

with explosives minimum)

Vessels loading or SD4b SD4b SD4ab SD4ab

unloading
explosives

Other cargo SD4b SD4b (180 m SD4b SD4b (180 m

vessels minimum) minimum)

Port facilities c C c c

Inhabited buildings c C c c

Public traffic c C c c
routes and main
shipping routes

Explosives c C c c
workshops

Holding areas SD3 SD3 SD3 SD3

POL jetties SD4b SD4b SD4b SD4b

Notes

a. Ships moored in tandem may use SD2-distances.

b. May be reduced to SD3 provided the exposed vessels are under military control and the controlling authority
determines the exposure to be operationally necessary.

c. Quantity-distances in AASTP-1 Inhabited Building Distances and Public Traffic Routes.

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INDEX
Crater Prediction .............................................. II-5-53
A
Ejecta ............................................................... II-5-44
Aboveground Storage ........................................... II-3-1
D
Basis of Quantity-Distances.................................I-3-1
Buffered Storage in Open Stacks ....................... II-3-1 Definitions
Distances for Hazard Division 1.4 .......................I-3-5 Adit ................................................................... III-1-5
Explosives Workshop Distances..........................I-3-9 Air Termination Network................................. II-3-15
Inter-Magazine Distances ....................................I-3-6 Chamber Interval .............................................. III-1-5
Kinds of Quantity-Distances................................I-3-1 Chamber Storage Site........................................ III-1-6
Separation of Explosives Workshops from Classification Code ..............................................I-2-7
Storage Sites.....................................................I-3-9 Compatibility .......................................................I-2-5
Storage in Open stacks....................................... II-3-1 Cover................................................................. III-1-5
Accidental Explosions Crack ................................................................. III-1-5
Reports on ............................................................I-8-1 Crater ................................................................ III-1-6
Air Blast............................................................... II-5-15 Down Conductor.............................................. II-3-15
Blast Loading of Structures ............................. II-5-22 Earth Termination Networks............................ II-3-15
Calculating Blast Parameters ........................... II-5-21 Faulting ............................................................. III-1-5
Properties of a Blast Wave in Air .................... II-5-17 Field Stack Module ...........................................IV-2-9
Airfields used only by military aircraft.................IV-5-1 Field Storage Area ............................................IV-2-9
Aircraft Parking ................................................IV-5-1 Field Storage Site ..............................................IV-2-9
Operational Considerations...............................IV-5-7 Filled Joints....................................................... III-1-6
Quantity-Distances............................................IV-5-3 Fissure ............................................................... III-1-6
Aisles and Safety Exits .......................................... II-6-9 Hazard Classification or Classification ................I-2-7
Ammunition Joint........................................................II-3-6, III-1-6
Classified..............................................................I-2-1 Single Chamber Storage Site ............................ III-1-6
Stacking ............................................................. II-6-7 Stack..................................................................IV-2-9
Test Joint............................................................ II-3-6
B
Venting.............................................................. III-1-6
Barricaded Stacks of Ammunition Zone of Protection............................................ II-3-16
Buffered Storage ................................................I-3-24 Depleted Uranium
Cluster Bomb Units............................................I-3-23 Effects of Internal .............................................. II-8-9
Stacks of Bombs ................................................I-3-23 Fire-Fighting .................................................... II-8-13
Barricades .................................................. I-3-35, II-3-9 Properties of ....................................................... II-8-1
Functions of ........................................... I-3-35, II-3-9 Radiation Properties........................................... II-8-2
Geometry of Earth............................................ II-3-10 Depleted Uranium (DU) Ammunition
Influence of Door Barricades.............................I-3-36 Effects of Fire and Explosion ..............................I-9-2
Influence upon Quantity-Distances....................I-3-36 Radioactivity ........................................................I-9-1
Material for Earth............................................. II-3-12 Storage of Depleted Uranium ............................I-3-25
Walls as............................................................ II-3-13 Accident Consequences ..................................... II-8-7
Basic Load Ammunition Holding Areas Design Environment Criteria ................................. II-5-1
Mixing of Basic Load Ammunition ..................IV-4-1 Air Blast ........................................................... II-5-15
Net Explosives Quantity ...................................IV-4-2 Cratering and Ejecta Hazards........................... II-5-41
Quantity-Distances............................................IV-4-3 Ground Shock .................................................. II-5-49
Separation of ........................................IV-4-2, IV-4-3 Methods to Design a Building at an Exposed SiteII-5-1
Blast Effects Projections ....................................................... II-5-33
Earth-covered magazines ...................................I-3-17 Thermal Radiation............................................ II-5-63
Open Stacks and Light Structures......................I-3-43
E
C
Earth cover
Classification Common earth....................................................I-3-37
Classification Code ..................................................I-2-7 Earth Termination Networks................................ II-3-19
Compatibility Groups Electro-Explosive Devices.......................................I-6-2
Definitions of .......................................................I-2-5 Ammunition containing .......................................I-6-1
Determination of ..................................................I-2-5 Assessment of Hazard..........................................I-6-5
Cratering and Ejecta Hazards............................... II-5-41 Management Radios.............................................I-6-8
NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED
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Maximum Energy Pick-Up ................................ II-7-7 Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.1..I-3-7
RF Environment...................................................I-6-3 Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.2..I-3-8
Storage and Transport ..........................................I-6-3 Inter-Magazine Distances for Hazard Division 1.3..I-3-9
Transmitter Antennas......................................... II-7-5 Isolation Magazines ............................................... II-6-9
Types of ............................................................. II-7-1
L
Explosives........................................................................
Storage of Very Sensitive ..................................I-3-25 Lighting in Explosives Storage Buildings ........... II-3-23
Explosives Storage Site/Depot Safety....................I-3-29 Lightning Protection
Explosives Workshop Distances..............................I-3-9 Air termination network................................... II-3-18
Ammunition Bins............................................. II-3-20
F
down conductors .............................................. II-3-15
Field Storage Earth Termination Network ............................. II-3-18
Building of Field Stack Modules ....................IV-2-11 Earth Termination Networks............... II-3-15, II-3-19
Fire-fighting ....................................................IV-2-27 Earth-covered buildings ................................... II-3-18
Isolated Storage...............................................IV-2-11 Equipotential Bonding ..................................... II-3-19
Layout of Sites ................................................IV-2-11 External ............................................................ II-3-16
Limitations on Gross Weight ..........................IV-2-11 Fixed air termination networks ........................ II-3-16
Principles ........................................................IV-2-11 General............................................................. II-3-16
Protection Against the Weather ......................IV-2-12 Insulated System for buildings......................... II-3-17
Quantity-Distances....................................IV-2-13, 14 Internal ............................................................. II-3-16
Scope.................................................................IV-2-1 Minimum Distances ......................................... II-3-21
Segregation of Different Compatibility GroupsIV-2-12 Systems for Buildings ...................................... II-3-18
Selection of Sites...............................................IV-2-2 Systems for Open-air Stacks ............................ II-3-19
Separation of Hazard Divisions ......................IV-2-12 Temporarily established ammunition stacks .... II-3-29
Field Storage .........................................................IV-2-1 Testing of Systems ........................................... II-3-21
Fire-fighting Lightning protection systems ............................... II-3-27
Ammunition Containing Depleted Uranium ...... II-4-5
M
Arrangements for .................................................I-3-4
Fire Division ........................................II-4-3 to II-4-5 Missile installations
Fire Division Symbols ....................................... II-4-1 Exposed Sites ....................................................IV-3-1
Fire Divisions.......................................................I-7-3 Potential Explosion Sites ..................................IV-3-1
Principles ...................................................I-7-1, I-7-7 Quantity-Distances............................................IV-3-2
Procedures.......................................................... II-4-3 Mixed Storage........................................................I-2-13
Supplementary Symbols ......................... II-4-1, II-4-8 Permissible Quantities of Ammunition ..............I-3-20
Mixing of Ammunition and Explosives...................I-2-9
G
Mixed Storage......................................................I-2-9
Ground Shock Mixing and Aggregation Rules ..........................I-2-10
Phenomenology................................................ II-5-49 Special circumstances ........................................I-2-13
Computation..................................................... II-5-50 Storage Limitations ................................. I-2-9, III-2-4
Design Implications ......................................... II-5-50 Suspect Ammunition......................................... I-2-13
H N
Handling of Ammunition and Explosives............ II-6-11 Naval Ports
Hazards Divisions Net Explosives Quantity ...................................IV-6-5
Definitions of .......................................................I-2-1 Protection Levels ..............................................IV-6-9
EED Sensitivity Thresholds ............................... II-7-2 Protection between Vessels.............................IV-6-11
Hazards from Electromagnetic Radiation .......... II-7-1 Quantity-distances.............................................IV-6-5
Historical Background .............................................I-1-5
Net Explosives Quantity ........................................I-3-18
I
O
Inhabited Building Distances .................................I-3-13
for Hazard Division 1.1......................................I-3-13 Operations in an Explosives Area.......................... II-6-1
for Hazard Division 1.2......................................I-3-15
P
for Hazard Division 1.3......................................I-3-15
Injury and Damage.................................................I-3-43 Personnel and Explosive Limits........................... II-6-15
Levels of Protection ...........................................I-3-43 POL Tanks ...............................................................I-5-1
Inter-Magazine Distances ........................................I-3-6 Separation of ........................................................I-5-1

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POL-Facilities Smoking ............................................................. II-6-5

Small Quantities of POL ......................................I-5-1 Safety Site Plans ....................................................I-3-29
Projections ........................................................... II-5-33 Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)................. II-6-15
Ballistic Properties ........................................... II-5-35 Storage Buildings
Fragment Ballistics .......................................... II-5-35 Construction to Contain Fragments ...................I-3-33
Fragment Number Density............................... II-5-41 Lightning Protection ........................................ II-3-15
Initial Velocity ................................................. II-5-35 Performance Criteria .......................................... II-3-5
Injury Criterion ................................................ II-5-39 Pressure Release................................................. II-3-8
Stack Effects .................................................... II-5-41 Protection against Projections............................ II-3-7
Trajectory Analysis .......................................... II-5-36 Protection of Igloos............................................ II-3-5
Protection at an ES...................................................I-3-7 Rocket Storage Buildings................................... II-3-8
Levels of ..............................................................I-3-7 Structural Materials............................................ II-3-5
Blast Effects ........................................I-3-43 to I-3-53 Structures to Protect from Flame, ......................I-3-33
Public Traffic Route Distances ..................I-3-11, I-3-38 Ventilation Openings ......................................... II-3-7
Q T
Quantity-Distances Temperature ........................................................... II-6-8
Airfield............................................................IV-5-11 Thermal Radiation................................................ II-5-59
Ammunition classified 1.6N ..............................I-3-55 Injury to Persons from ..................................... II-5-36
Basic Load Ammunition Holding Areas...........IV-4-1 Parameters of Fireball ...................................... II-5-59
Buildings with common earth cover ..................I-3-37 Transit Magazines ................................................ II-6-10
Determination of ................................................I-3-17
U
Electricity supply ...............................................I-3-45
for Hazard Division 1.1........................................I-3-2 Unbarricaded Stacks of TNT .................................I-3-24
for Hazard Division 1.2........................................I-3-2 Underground Storage
for Hazard Division 1.3........................................I-3-5 Blast Closures ................................................. III-2-14
for Hazard Division 1.4........................................I-3-6 Blast Traps ...................................................... III-2-16
for Holding Yards ..............................................I-3-27 Branch passageways ....................................... III-2-13
Igloos .................................................................I-3-31 Chamber Interval ............................................... II-1-5
Influence of Protective Construction .................I-3-32 Cover.................................................................. II-1-5
Interchange Yards ..............................................I-3-27 Design of Sites .................................................. III-2-7
Inter-Magazine Distances ....................................I-3-6 Electric Installations and Equipment ................ III-2-9
Kinds of................................................................I-3-1 Exits ................................................................ III-2-13
Marshalling Yards..............................................I-3-27 Explosion Effects .............................................. III-2-2
Measuring of ......................................................I-3-17 Explosives Workshop Distances........................I-4-25
Missile installations...........................................IV-3-1 Financial Aspects .............................................. III-2-8
Mixed Storage....................................................I-3-19 Fire-fighting Equipment.................................. III-2-10
Naval ports ........................................................IV-6-5 Humidity Control .............................................. III-2-9
Net Explosives Quantity ....................................I-3-18 Kinds of Quantity-Distances................................I-4-3
Pipeline, separation of........................................I-3-28 Layout of Sites ................................................ III-2-13
Relaxation of......................................................I-3-21 Lightning Protection ......................................... III-2-9
Storage Building ................................................I-3-31 Measuring of Quantity-Distances ........................I-4-4
Tables.................................................................I-3-17 Military Requirements ...................................... III-2-8
Public Traffic Route Distance............................I-4-23
R
Quantity-Distance Criteria ...................................I-4-3
Radiated Field .................................................................. Safety Requirements ......................................... III-2-7
Nature of ............................................................ II-7-5 Storage Limitations ........................................... III-2-4
Repair, Modification, Inspection and Proof of Transport and Handling Equipment................ III-2-10
Ammunition ................................................. II-6-13 Ventilation of Magazines ................................... II-6-8
Rockets Work Prohibited................................................ III-2-4
Propulsive Rockets.............................................I-3-25
S
Safety Precautions.................................................. II-6-3
Food and drink ................................................... II-6-5
Responsibilities .................................................. II-6-3
Safety Responsibilities....................................... II-6-3

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