G.R. No.

185954 February 16, 2010 The Special Audit Team, which was created under LAO Office Order
No. 2003-059 dated July 7, 2003, summarized the corresponding
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, COA audit findings and observations, to wit:
vs.
MAXIMO D. SISON, Respondent. 1. Rules and regulations pertaining to procurement of
supplies and materials were consciously and continually
The Case violated as disclosed in the verification of selected purchases
of the Province. Below were the findings and observations:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
assailing and seeking to set aside the Resolution1dated December 18, a. Purchases of various items, totaling at least PhP
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611, entitled 29.34 million and allegedly procured through public
Maximo D. Sison v. Fr. Noel Labendia for Himself and in bidding, were found highly irregular for lack of
Representation of Isog Han Samar Movement, Diocese of Calbayog, proper bidding procedures and documentation;
Catbalogan, Samar. The CA Resolution denied petitioner Office of
the Ombudsman’s Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit b. At least PhP 28.165 million worth of purchases
Attached Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s June 26, 2008 through repeat orders were made by the Province
Decision.2 without observing the pertinent law, rules and
regulations governing this mode of procurement;
The Facts and

On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by c. Emergency purchases of medicines and assorted
Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, goods totaling PhP 14.67 million were found not
filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon complying with the requirements set forth under the
Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public Rules and Regulations on Supplies and Property
officials3 of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Management in Local Governments (RRSPMLG).
Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them Moreover, the purchases were charged against the
amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial calamity fund, despite absence of any declaration
Budget Officer. from the President that Samar was under a state of
calamity, in violation of Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated
August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office 2. Inconsistencies in the dates of supporting documents
(LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, relating to the purchases discussed in finding No. 1 were so
that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without glaring that they raised doubts on the validity of the
proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds transactions per se;
were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by
the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans,
and cement were substantially overpriced.
3. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves for calamity as 7. The necessity and veracity of the distribution of t-
funding source of emergency purchases was not legally shirts/caps, medicines, assorted goods and cement
established, there being no declaration from the Office of the purchased by the Province of Samar could not be established
President that Samar was under a state of calamity, as due to rampant inconsistencies in dates, quantities, as well
required under Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160; as the signatures of the alleged recipients in the Requisition
and Issue Slip; and,
4. Splitting of requisitions and purchase orders was resorted
to in violation of COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30, 1976; 8. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance to Individuals in
Crisis Situation (AICS) totaling at least PhP 5.4 million in
5. There was overpricing in the purchase of rice, medicines, 2002 and PhP 2.78 million as of April 2003 were granted to
electric fans and cement in the amount of PhP 580,000.00, various applicant-recipients without subjecting them to the
PhP 322,760.00, PhP 341,040.00, and PhP 3.6 million, guidelines set forth by the Department of Social Welfare and
respectively. An overpayment was also committed in the Development (DSWD).4 x x x
payments of cement in the amount of PhP 96,364.09;
On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director
6. Other observations gathered corollary to the purchases Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative
made are the following: case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar, docketed as
OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The latter were then required to file their
a. Purchase Orders were not duly accomplished to counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the
include a complete description of the items to be complaint.
purchased, the delivery date and the terms of
payment, in violation of the provisions of Section 74 In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations
and other corollary provisions of RRSPMLG. Some contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the
were even acknowledged by suppliers; charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a
certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the
b. At least 36 vouchers/claims were not supported corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are
with an official receipt, in violation of the provisions available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the
of Section 4 of PD 1445 that all disbursements must certification issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred
be supported with complete documentation; and that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in
the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding.
c. Advanced deliveries of medicines and assorted
goods were made on some purchases even before Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far
the purchase orders were prepared and before the attached in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was
public biddings were conducted. neither factually connected nor directly implicated in the complaint.

On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of

the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had not participated in the
alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by the COLINARES LATORRE, JR., MARIA LOURDES CORTEZ UY,
Province of Samar. BIENVENIDA P. REPOL and RAMON P. DEAN, JR., who are no
longer public officials, is DISMISSED.
On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a
Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the 4. For insufficiency of evidence, the administrative complaint against
Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and ANAMIE P. MANATAD-NUNEZ and ROSIE AMARO
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing VILLACORTE is DISMISSED.
him from service. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
5. The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Office is DIRECTED to conduct
VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, DECISION is hereby further fact-finding investigations on the following:
rendered as follows:
a. On DV Nos. 221-2002-12-083 and 221-2002-11-065: (a) to
1. Respondents ROLANDO B. MONTEJO, DAMIANO Z. CONDE, DETERMINE the other public officials who may be held
JR., ROMEO C. REALES, MAXIMO D. SISON, AURELIO A. administratively liable; and (b) to FILE, if necessary, the
BARDAJE and NUMERIANO C. LEGASPI are FOUND GUILTY of corresponding Complaint;
GRAVE MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and are b. On Bid Nos. 079-2002, 442-2002, 554-2002, 861-2002, 937-
METED the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, and shall carry 2002, 947-2002, 1221-2002, 1375-2002, 1411-2002, 007-2003,
with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, 014-2003, 023-2003, 047-2003 and 082-2002: (a) to VERIFY
and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the whether actual public biddings took place relative to the
government service. transactions covered by these bids; (b) to CHECK the
veracity of the documents relative to the repeat orders made;
Accordingly, Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and Executive Director (c) to DETERMINE the other public officials who may
Presentacion R. Montesa of the Bureau of Local Government appear to be administratively liable therefor; and (d) to FILE,
Finance, Department of Finance, are respectfully directed to if warranted, the corresponding Complaint; and
implement this Order upon receipt hereof and to forthwith inform
the Office of compliance herewith. c. On Bid Nos. 078-2002, 448-2002, 931-2002, 1230-2001, 411-
2002, 944-2002, 1244-2002, 1407-2001, 198-2002, 316-2002 and
2. The administrative complaint against respondents MILAGROSA 431-2002: (a) to DETERMINE whether actual public biddings
T. TAN, FE ORTEGA TAN ARCALES, SUSANO DIMAKILING were held relative to the above-mentioned transactions; (b)
SALURIO, BARTOLOME P. FIGUEROA, ANTONIO DE LEON to CHECK the veracity of the documents relative to the
BOLASTIG, III, ROSENAIDA A. ROSALES and BARTOLOME R. repeat orders made; (c) to ASCERTAIN the other public
CASTILLO III is DISMISSED in view of their re-election in May 2004; officials who may be held administratively liable therefor;
and (d) to FILE the corresponding Complaint, if warranted.
3. The administrative complaint against ERNESTO CARCILLAR
ARCALES, FELIX T. BABALCON, JR., JIMMY R. DY, JUAN
Accordingly, let a copy of this Memorandum be furnished the Fact- Hence, we have this petition.
Finding and Intelligence Office for its appropriate action.
The Issues
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied.)
I
Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under
Rule 43, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96611. Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioner’s right to
intervene in the proceedings, considering that (a) the Office of the
On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting Ombudsman has sufficient legal interest warranting its intervention
aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison. in the proceedings before the [CA] since it rendered the subject
The fallo of the CA decision reads: decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials
and employees; and (b) contrary to the appellate court a quo’s
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Ombudsman dated 22 August ruling, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman filed its Omnibus
2006 in OMB-C-A-05-0051-B in so far as it finds the herein petitioner Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion for
MAXIMO D. SISON administratively liable for grave misconduct, Reconsideration on a patently erroneous decision of the [CA] which
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service is has not yet attained finality.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence.
Accordingly, he is absolved from administrative liability as charged. II

SO ORDERED.6 Whether the [CA] erred in ruling that the finding of the Office of the
Ombudsman was not supported by substantial evidence.
In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed
to adduce substantial evidence in order to convict Sison. Moreover, it III
reasoned that Sison’s responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was
to ensure that appropriations exist in relation to the emergency Whether the [CA] erred in giving due course to respondent’s petition
purchase being made and that he had no hand or discretion in for review when this was prematurely filed as it disregarded the
characterizing a particular purchase as emergency in nature. Hence, well-entrenched jurisprudential doctrine of exhaustion of
he cannot be held administratively liable for simply attesting to the administrative remedies.
existence of appropriations for a certain purpose, save if such
certification is proved to be false. Our Ruling

On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus The appeal lacks merit.
Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court
assailed resolution of December 18, 2008.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the Office of the SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be
Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
of the adverse decision rendered by the CA. copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman
to intervene, because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not
party who has a legal interest in the administrative case against originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject
petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose
the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman their claim.10 Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a
was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision. single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy
among, the persons involved.11
In its Petition, however, the Office of the Ombudsman asserts that it
has sufficient legal interest to warrant its intervention in the To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two
proceedings, since it rendered the subject decision pursuant to its requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the
administrative authority over public officials and employees. matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or
Further, it contends that the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
timely filed, since, at the time of its filing, the decision of the CA had claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
not yet attained finality. separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene,
must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
We are not persuaded. immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.12
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to
Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 7 The In support of its argument that it has legal interest, the Office of the
permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court Ombudsman cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr.
the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the (Garcia). 13 In the said case, the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
intervention,8 thus: imposed upon its employee, Garcia, the penalty of forced resignation
for gross neglect of duty. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest (CSC) exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or him. In accordance with the ruling in Civil Service Commission v.
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected Dacoycoy,14 this Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to appeal to
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the CA the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed the aggrieved party which complained of Garcia’s acts of dishonesty.
to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the Should Garcia be finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the upon PNB to take him back into its fold. PNB should, therefore, be
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view, hampered its right to
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and
preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.
country.1avvphi1 The government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting
the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an
Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or
Garcia to support its intervention in the appellate court for the tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached,
following reasons: becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus,
in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court
First, Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges declared:
against him, and was, in fact, dismissed for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service To be sure when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case, OMB-C- were brought to the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission
A-05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the
unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal. Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should
"detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher
Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to court for review."
intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal.
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission
And third, Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an
Appeals15 and National Appellate Board of the National Police advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide
Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag),16 in which this Court administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions
agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached.
decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator,
authorize ‘either party’ to appeal in the instances that the law allows not an advocate.
appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves
from the service. The other party is the government when the from cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the review. The raison d’etre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges
government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the
penalty. opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the
appellate court to decide the issues without the judges’ active
However, the government party that can appeal is not the participation.17 When judges actively participate in the appeal of
disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become
adversarial instead.18
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),19 the Court applied this doctrine interest to intervene. As the CA held correctly:
when it held that the CA erred in granting the Motion to Intervene
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit: The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal
interest in the administrative case against the petitioner such that it
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and would be directly affected by the judgment that this Court had
impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but rendered. It must be remembered that the legal interest required for
even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. an intervention must be direct and immediate in character. Lest it be
The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must forgotten, what was brought on appeal before this Court is the very
keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the Decision by the Office of the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the
controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an advocate, has no legal
applicable laws, regulations and/or jurisprudence. His judgment interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule 43 Petition.21
should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and
law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on Time
judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the
court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene
appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was
objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was
original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering promulgated on June 26, 2008.
his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s
assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of the Ombudsman
overturned on appeal. v. Samaniego.22 That case, however, is not applicable here, since the
Office of the Ombudsman filed the motion for intervention during
Likewise, the facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA via a the pendency of the proceedings before the CA.
verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of
1995, which govern appeals to the CA from judgments or final the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the
orders of quasi-judicial agencies. appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the
CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court or agency a
Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that quo.23 Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time
the petition for review shall state the full names of the parties to the within which to file a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do
case without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman
respondents.20 Thus, the only parties in such an appeal are the is expected to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive
appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in onlooker.24
this case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment
appealed from, is not a party in the said appeal.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for
Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held in Rockland
Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted
after a decision has already been rendered.25

In light of the foregoing considerations, all other issues raised in the

petition are rendered moot and academic and no further discussion
is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Resolution dated

December 18, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010 On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a
Manifestation11 before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they
MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis
JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners, (Sylvia)—who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel
vs. Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.12
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI,
represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—
Administrator, Respondent. Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the
latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of
On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Rodolfo.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision, the Court of
Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their
Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the
herein petitioners and their siblings4 to intervene in the estate intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. 14 As it was, by
proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5 The decretal portion of the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have
the decision of the appellate court reads: already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter. 15

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in
assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the their Manifestation, the following documents:
Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE
and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and
enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting Rodolfo;16
for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders. No
costs.6 b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17 and

The antecedents are: c.) Their respective proof of births.18

Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the
1966.7 He died without issue.8 foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the
spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother
of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now
administration9 with the Court of First Instance of Negros represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however,
Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate. begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of
pending before the intestate court.10 Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the
petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and
subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was nullified the orders of the intestate court.30
purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was
In its Comment to the Manifestation,19 the respondent called an error on the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the
attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate.31 The appellate court,
on 14 February 1946.20 As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia siding with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves
states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated—which includes
Desantis.21 The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and the civil status of her parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of
John Desantis as "married."22 The respondent posits that the Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.
foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute
prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their
Desantis.23 siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage
of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was
According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriage—the
absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being bigamous.33 From that
marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio. 24 premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that
On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
proceedings.25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at Hence, the instant appeal.34
hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of
Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred
siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf. 26 when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the
petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was proceedings.
insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis.27 It ventured on the possibility that the The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following
entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the arguments:
status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save
Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a
out of wedlock.28 writ of certiorari.35 In nullifying the intestate court’s order, the
appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the was issued with grave abuse of discretion.36 Rather, it chose to re-
intestate court in its order dated 26 January 2006. 29 Undeterred, the assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabel’s
respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of right to inherit from Rodolfo.37
Appeals.
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave First Argument
abuse of discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate
court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The
orders.38 Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court question of whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion
is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient
(2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo. 39 evidence to establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in
was correct in addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial
evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding
nevertheless erred in finding that there was none.40 A proper may be allowed to intervene.45Otherwise stated, a court has no
evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis. 41 proceeding, to intervene therein.46

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an
certificate executed between Isabel and John Desantis.42 The uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not simply
conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the
credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place. allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only
be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
necessary weight to be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis.43 In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of
Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence
among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or
to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of marriage and insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners
make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. 44 and their siblings have successfully established Isabel’s interest in
Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is an indispensable
Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of
not satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if
finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous. the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the
latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
We are not impressed.
We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.

Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We to "save face."53 They urge this Court to take note of a "typical"
agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of
and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.
Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the That, the Court cannot countenance.
petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has
interest in Rodolfo’s estate. The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by
any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do,
previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude
established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that
marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which
record. they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful
statements in its vital entries.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their
marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis.
certificate.48 Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the
parents.49 inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as
the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence
Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved results in a
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and categorical language, Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the
Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of
Isabel and John Desantis. Appeals.

Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
of the facts attested.52In the case at bench, the petitioners and their
siblings offered no such rebuttal. Costs against the petitioners.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in SO ORDERED.
Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order
 [G.R. No. 115813. October 16, 2000] conducted pursuant to said decision and order. It also seeks the
review of the Court of Appeals resolution dated May 30, 1994
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

EDUARDO FERNANDEZ, TERESITA FERNANDEZ-CAVA, This petition involves Lot 435 of the Bacolod cadastre originally
LETICIA FERNANDEZ-TORREA, ADOLFO titled to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Prudencio
FERNANDEZ, GLORIA FERNANDEZ-HUGONIN, Fernandez. After Fernandez acquired ownership of the lot, he tried
ZENAIDA FERNANDEZ-ILEDAN, and ESMERNA to eject private respondent Jesus Ciocon and some other occupants
FERNANDEZ-LEGASPI, AS HEIRS OF PRUDENCIO off the property. Allegedly, Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS a last chance to repurchase the lot.Fernandez refused. After this
(FORMER ELEVENTH DIVISION), JESUS CIOCON, rejection, on September 21, 1985, Ciocon instituted against
CIRILO CIOCON, VICENTE URBANOZO, ALFONSO Fernandez Civil Case No. 7687 before Branch 47 of the RTC of Negros
JARDENIL and ANUNCIACION JOVER, LEVITA LLERA Occidental for reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after
(ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ANTONIO deducting portions already sold to others. Ciocon claimed he had
BERLIZO), JOEL LLERA, FEBE LLERA (ACCOMPANIED paid for the full reconveyance price to Fernandez on February 7,
BY HER HUSBAND LUCIANO LIM), SALVACION N. 1958 for which Fernandez signed a receipt. Fernandez through his
VDA. DE LLERA, HOSPICIO PEDRINA, RUFO CALVEZ, guardian ad litem denied receiving any money from Ciocon and
and MONSERRAT VILLABA,[1] respondents averred that Ciocons receipt was a forgery. Fernandez died on
January 23, 1966. He was substituted in the civil suit by his heirs
DECISION namely: Dominadora,[4] and their children Eduardo, Teresita, Leticia,
Adolfo, -
QUISUMBING, J.:
Gloria, Zenaida and Esmerna.
For review is the Decision dated February 17, 1994, of the Court Private respondents Levita Llera, Hospicio Pedrina, Rufo
of Appeals which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari, Calves, and Monserrat Villalba were intervenors in said suit who
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary claimed that they had purchased portions of Lot 435 from
injunction filed by petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 30086. The decision Ciocon. Civil Case 7723 was filed by Alfonso Jardenil, Anunciacion
effectively affirmed the Order dated July 23, 1992 of the Regional Jover, and Vicente Urbanozo who also claimed to have bought
Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 47, for the cancellation of portions of the lot from Ciocon. Civil Case No. 7687 and Civil Case No.
Entry No. 178073, which was the notice of lis pendens pertaining to 7723 were eventually consolidated.
Civil Case Nos. 7687 and 7723 annotated in TCT No. T-165298 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bacolod. This petition now asks for (1) the On May 30, 1988, Judge Enrique Jocson, presiding judge of RTC
annulment of the said order of cancellation; (2) the re-annotation of Branch 47, noting that the parties were indifferent about submitting
said notice of lis pendens; and (3) the annulment of the decision of to a decision based on extant but incomplete records proceeded to
said RTC dated October 15, 1991 that set aside the original decision render judgment dismissing both complaints and ordering private
dated May 30, 1988 of the RTC in the aforecited civil cases, [2] and the respondent Ciocon and the intervenors to deliver immediate
order dated October 31, 1991 granting private respondent Jesus possession of Lot No. 435 to the heirs of Fernandez. [5]
Ciocons Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,[3] and all proceedings
 Private respondents and intervenors timely filed their notices of On October 29, 1991, Ciocon moved for execution pending
appeal which were given due course on July 29, 1988. appeal.[12] Six days after, on November 4, 1991, the trial court granted
the motion ex parte.[13] The TCT in the name of Fernandez was
On March 12, 1990, Judge Jocson issued an Order requiring the
cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of respondent
parties to state in writing within fifteen (15) days whether or not they
Ciocon. On December 2, 1991, petitioners motion for reconsideration
agree to have the records transmitted to the Court of Appeals with
of the order was denied.[14]
incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes, and if they should fail
to reply after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, the court On March 17, 1992, Ciocon filed a motion asking that the
would consider the parties silence as conformity and order the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City be directed to cancel entries in
transmittal of the extant records to the Court of Appeals.[6] TCT No. T-164785, particularly Entries Nos. 44213, 1063, 5121,
5381 and 13188 upon the plaintiffs filing of additional bond of
On July 29, 1988 an order was issued ordering transmittal of the
P300,000.00.[15] Entry No. 178073, the notice of lis pendens involved in
records to the appellate court.[7]
Civil Case No. 7687 and 7723, was not among the entries listed in the
Meanwhile the Court of Appeals noted the incompleteness of motion.
the records and ordered the re-taking and completion of missing
It was only on April 20, 1992, at 3:45 P.M., that Entry No. 178073
testimonies.
was annotated on TCT T-164785.[16]
On September 30, 1991, Ciocon filed a Motion to have Above-
On July 23, 1992, Judge Jocson ordered the cancellation of the
Entitled Cases Decided Anew,[8] which Judge Jocson granted on
entries of the notices of lis pendens listed in the aforementioned
October 3, 1991. Judge Jocson reasoned that since the cases were
motion, including Entry Nos. 177656, 178526, 178527,and 178073, all
decided on the basis of the records taken by his predecessor, and
unlisted in the March 17, 1992 motion.[17]
without the testimony of Roberto Tolentino, the handwriting expert
who testified on the alleged forgery of Fernandez signature, granting Ciocon then sold the subject property to one Eduardo Gargar,
the motion was in the best interest of justice.[9] resulting in the issuance of TCT No. T-165298 in Gargars name. Entry
No. 178073 was one of the entries carried over in TCT No. T-
On October 15, 1991, Judge Jocson rendered a second decision
165298.[18] Gargar immediately mortgaged the property to the Rizal
setting aside the judgment rendered on May 30, 1988. In the second
Commercial and Banking Corporation to secure a loan for
decision, the judge explained that the Court of Appeals, after
P2,000,000.00.
receiving the notices of appeal and the incomplete records,
remanded the case and ordered the re-taking of the testimonies of On May 28, 1992, the trial court issued another Order, directing
witnesses Ciocon and Tolentino. The second decision was a complete the transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals.[19]
reversal of the first decision and directed the return of the disputed
On February 2, 1993, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
lot to Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary
litigated. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title issued to
injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set aside the Order dated July
Fernandez and the issuance of a new title in the name of Jesus
23, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court cancelling the lis
Ciocon and intervenors.[10]
pendens notations in the TCT, and its Decision dated October 15, 1991
Not surprisingly, on October 25, 1991, petitioners appealed the setting aside its original decision dated May 30, 1988, for having
second decision.[11] been issued without jurisdiction. Petitioners prayed that the trial
court be compelled to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 7687 and WHEREFORE, the judge-designate in Civil Cases Nos. 7687 and 7723
Civil Case No. 7723 to the Court of Appeals.After hearing on March is hereby ordered to desist from further proceeding with said
17, 1993, the case was submitted for decision.[20] cases. Instead, he is hereby directed to elevate the record thereof to
this Court for consideration on appeal.
In its Decision, dated February 17, 1994, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and ordered the judge-designate to desist
Petition DISMISSED.
from further proceeding with Civil Cases No. 7687 and No. 7723,
and to elevate the records for consideration on appeal. Said the
appellate court: SO ORDERED.[21]

It is our considered opinion that justice would be better served if we The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition
allow the regular appeal, which had been timely filed, to proceed in was denied. Hence, this petition, asserting that:
due course instead of annulling the various proceedings taken in the
court below. The order of July 23, 1992 (Annex C), insofar as it cancelled the
notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by the petitioners, is
The observation is partly based on the single fact agreed on by both null and void because it was issued without jurisdiction, and in
violation of due process and fundamental rules of procedure.[22]
parties, that the appeal be allowed to push through.

In its support petitioners argue that:

It must also be noted that until and unless there is a definitive ruling,
and this can only be achieved in a final judgment, on the issue of (1) The cancellation of said notice of lis pendens is a patent
rightful possession and ownership of the property in question, there nullity because no motion for the cancellation of the
can be no satisfactory solution to the case. notice (Entry No. 178073) was filed.

Section 1 of Rule 65 (Rules of Court) governing the special civil (2) Assuming that a motion was filed, by then, the RTC had
action of certiorari presupposes that there is no appeal nor any plain, already lost jurisdiction to grant the same since the
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. appeal by petitioners from the first and even the second
decision had been perfected.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is available which, we (3) Even assuming that the motion had been filed and the
believe, would be more speedy and adequate, and demonstrably RTC still had jurisdiction, there was no showing of the
congruent with law and justice under the circumstances. necessity for the cancellation of said notice of lis
pendens. On the contrary, there were reasons for
Evidence has been submitted, after the hearing of the application for maintaining said notice of lis pendens.
preliminary injunction, that a judge has been designated to
(4) The execution pending appeal in 1991 was itself invalid.
substitute for the respondent Judge who had been separated from
the service.Hence, this Courts order is directed to said judge- Considering that the issues of ownership and possession are
designate. best left for determination by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in
essence aver that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari insofar as it refused to pass on (1) the impropriety and the purpose of molesting the adverse party or was not necessary to
invalidity of the trial courts cancellation of the notice of lis protect the rights of the party who caused its annotation. They
pendens and (2) the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court when the contend that since the determination of the basis for cancellation of
latter granted the motion for execution of its second decision dated the notice is factual, the Supreme Court is already bound by such
October 15, 1991, pending appeal, which was the basis of the determination by the RTC.
cancellation of the cited notice of lis pendens.
We note, at the outset, that the trial courts determination of the
On the first point, petitioners contend that in promulgating its basis for cancellation of said notice is precisely the bone of
assailed decision, and denying the corrective writ of certiorari against contention in the present appeal. While the trial court has inherent
the RTC, the Court of Appeals refused to recognize that, at the very power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is exercised under
least, the cancellation by the RTC of the notice of lis express provisions of law.[24] A notice of lis pendens is an
pendens, particularly Entry No. 178073, upon a mere ex parte motion is announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is
already grave abuse of discretion, and even graver abuse since Entry in litigation. Such announcement is founded upon public policy and
No. 178073 was not even subject of the motion at all. Petitioners necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation
stress that respondent Ciocon prayed for cancellation only of certain within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to
entries appearing on the TCT but not Entry No. 178073. Petitioners prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
point out that at the time Ciocon asked for cancellation of the other alienation.[25] Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,[26] now
entries, there was no Entry No. 178073 yet. This entry was made Sec. 14 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis
more than a month after Ciocon filed his motion for cancellation of pendens may be canceled only after proper showing that the purpose
certain entries.[23] Petitioners contend that without a motion for of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
cancellation of Entry No. 178073, no hearing on it could be necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
conducted.Without notice and hearing, there was manifest denial of annotated. We have scrutinized the records but found no showing
petitioners right to due process. This infirmity in the ex that the annotation was caused by petitioners merely to molest
parte cancellation resulted in the hasty use by Gargar, the new private respondents, nor that it was not needed to protect petitioners
registered owner of Lot 435, of the property as collateral for a rights. The peculiar and exceptional circumstances of the case, as in
P2,000,000.00 loan, manifestly prejudicing petitioners. the rendering of two conflicting decisions by the same judge,
indubitably manifest that the annotation was not merely to molest
Petitioners assert that in their motion for reconsideration of the
the other party but was needed to protect petitioners interest from
petition, they conceded that the issues of rightful possession and
any hasty transfer of the property to another, making recovery of the
ownership be resolved in the appeal rather than risk more delay. But
property extremely complicated. This is exactly what happened in
they resolutely ask for the nullification of the order cancelling the
this case when the notice of lis pendens was cancelled.
cited notice of lis pendens and pray for re-annotation thereof.
Further, the trial courts inherent power to cancel a notice of lis
In their opposition and comment to the petition, private
pendens is exercised only under exceptional circumstances, such
respondents claim, with respect to the cited notice of lis pendens, that
as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who caused
the order cancelling the annotation of the notice was within the
the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the
discretion of the RTC and that there was no abuse of discretion on its
prejudice of the other party because of several continuances
part because the RTC could determine on its own if a notice was for
procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis for the lis
pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the happened in this case, Ciocon sold the property to Gargar who
plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who encumbered the property as security for a loan. We are, therefore,
caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso constrained to conclude that, contrary to private respondents stand,
facto cancelled.[27] These exceptional circumstances are not present in the Court could not be bound by the trial courts determination of the
this case. It will be noted that although the case took long to resolve, bases of the cancellation of the cited notice. Further, we find the trial
it was not due to petitioners. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged courts order injudicious and erroneous.
owners of the lot in the first decision and it was private respondents
We now resolve the question of jurisdiction. The records show
who filed a motion that the case be decided anew, despite a timely
that the notices of appeal from the first decision of the trial court
notice of appeal from the first decision. Furthermore, it was the
were filed within the reglementary period and were duly
Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of the lost testimonies,
approved.[31] At such time the appeals were perfected. There is
which the trial court erroneously took as a remand of the case,
abundant jurisprudence stating that after perfection of an appeal, the
resulting in a second decision which was also timely appealed. The
trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a decision appealed from, and
records mentioned no such order to remand by the Court of
also to issue orders for execution pending appeal. The perfection of
Appeals. The cancellation of the lis pendens notations should not
an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a case and the
have been ordered since there had been no final judgment yet, the
trial court may issue orders only if in the exercise of its residual
decisions having been timely appealed.
functions. Fundamental is the doctrine that jurisdiction is fixed by
More significantly, a notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered law. No amount of rationalization therefore, even a declaration that
cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less without any motion at a new decision is being made in the best interest of justice, can confer
all. There should be notice to the party who caused the annotation so on the trial court the jurisdiction it had lost. Jurisdiction cannot be
that he may be heard to object to the cancellation of his notice and acquired, waived, enlarged, diminished or extended by any act or
show to the court that the notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the
his rights and is not merely to molest the other party. [28] As the court.[32]
records of this case reflect, private respondent Ciocons motion dated
It must also be borne in mind that the order of cancellation of
March 17, 1992, to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not include
notation of lis pendens was based on the ex parte approval of the
a request to cancel Entry No. 178073 in particular, and it certainly
motion for execution pending appeal of the trial courts second
could not have been included since the entry was annotated in the
decision. This order is fatally flawed, for being the result of a
TCT only a month after the filing of the motion, on April 20,
hearing ex parte, hence without notice to the adverse party and
1992.However, Judge Jocsons order of cancellation included Entry
thereby violative of due process.
No. 178073.[29]
The Court is not unaware of Asmala vs. Comelec,[33] holding that
Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled upon the
the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of
mere filing of a bond by the party on whose title the notice is
its jurisdiction over a case to resolve pending incidents; and Roxas vs.
annotated. The ultimate purpose of the annotation which is to keep
Dy,[34] that the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens, being a mere
the properties in litigation within the power of the court and to
incident to an action, may be ordered at any given time by the court
prevent the defeat of the judgment by subsequent alienation will be
having jurisdiction over it.The operative phrase, however, is that the
rendered meaningless if private respondents are allowed to file a
cancellation be ordered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Such is
bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice.[30] As it
not the case here for the RTC already lost its jurisdiction upon the Costs against private respondents.
perfection of the appeal from its first decision as early as 1988.
SO ORDERED.
The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in this case,
Entry No. 178073, should be set aside for three reasons. First, it was
granted ex parte. Petitioners were deprived of their right to be heard
on notice. Second, there was no showing that the annotation of the
notice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, nor that it
was not necessary to protect the rights of those who sought the
annotation. And third, at the time of the order of cancellation of the
notice, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction.
Lastly, we need not delve on the appellate courts dismissal of
the petition for certiorari. It is mooted by petitioners acceptance,
although reluctantly, of the appellate courts judgment that the issues
of rightful possession and ownership of the property be resolved in
the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) The Order dated July 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 47, in Civil Cases
No. 7687 and No. 7723 insofar as it directed the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, Entry No.
178073 on TCT No. T-165298, is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
(2) The Register of Deeds of the City of Bacolod is directed
to RE-ANNOTATE the notice of lis pendens, Entry No.
178073 on TCT No. T-165298.
(3) The judge-designate in Civil Cases No. 7687 and No.
7723 is ordered to elevate the records of said cases to
the Court of Appeals for consideration on appeal.
(4) The Court of Appeals upon receipt of the complete
records is directed to immediately proceed with the
appeal for the determination of the rightful ownership
and possession of the lot in dispute.
 [G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003] At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the
following facts:

1. The identity of the accused;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS
PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-appellant.
2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;

DECISION
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May
PER CURIAM: 1990 as evidenced by her birth certificate;

For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated October 26, 1999 of 4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal
the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal examination to which a medico-legal certificate was issued by Dr.
Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez (appellant for Editha Divino.
brevity), guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca (Mayia for brevity) and
imposing on appellant the death penalty. The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim
Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit A, and the medico-legal certificate
On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial issued by Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit B.[6]
Prosecutor[2] of Zambales filed an Information[3] charging appellant
with the crime of rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the
Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No.
following witnesses: the victim, Mayia Ponseca; the victims mother,
7610, committed as follows:
Hermie Ponseca; the victims father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo
Giron; and Dr. Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio defense presented appellant and his employer, Bartolome Tolentino.
Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the Municipality of Palauig, Province of
Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity)
Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion, summarized the prosecutions version of the incident in the appellees
inducement and other consideration, did then and there, wilfully brief, to wit:
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia Ponseca was
walking along Sulok on her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8, TSN,
Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded not guilty to the offense December 15, 1998). Appellant introduced himself as Johnny and
charged.[4] Subsequently, the trial court allowed the withdrawal of immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen
Atty. Montefalcon as counsel for health reasons. The trial court (p. 10, TSN, December 15, 1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.).
appointed Atty. Roberto Blanco as appellants counsel de oficio.[5] At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them.
Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while b. Genitalia had hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, 9 and 12 oclock
simultaneously removing Mayias panty. He then inserted his penis positions.
inside Mayias vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia felt excruciating pain in her
private parts (sic) but was not able to repel her aggressor whose (pp. 4-6 id.)
strength and weight totally engulfed her. Her only recourse was to
cry while her young body was being ravished (p. 13, id.). Because of the extent of the damage on her genitals, Mayia
undertook an IV sedation operation to repair her lacerations (p. 6,
After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and id.) During her confinement at the hospital, the Ponseca couple
ran away (p. 14, id.). Notwithstanding that her vagina was bleeding reported the incident to the Palauig PNP Police Station and
profusely and her dress now covered with her own blood, Mayia recounted their daughters narration including the name of the
managed to stand up and seek help. She ran to the house of Virginia culprit as Johnny who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at
Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the the fishpond of Bartolome Tolentino (pp. 11-12, TSN, January 5,
crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard her dog barking 1999). Police operatives then proceeded to the said fishpond and
(apparently, it was the same dog barking at appellant while he was arrested appellant. After her discharge from the hospital, Mayia
consummating his lust on Mayia, pp. 2-3, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. learned that appellant was already apprehended (pp. 3-8, TSN,
11, TSN, December 15, 1998). Looking at the direction of the noise, January 5, 1999). In the police station, she was able to positively
she saw a confused Mayia approaching her with blood dripping identify the appellant as the person who sexually assaulted her (p.
from her private parts and thighs. When Giron asked Mayia what 18, TSN, December 15, 1998).[7]
happened, the latter shouted ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako (p. 4, TSN,
January 4, 1999).Giron then summoned her husband and other Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the
companions to look for Mayias attacker but was unable to find date of the alleged rape incident, he was working at a fishpond at
him. Giron then proceeded to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca, Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the rape of a young girl from his
Mayias parents, to inform them of what happened (p. 5, TSN, manager, Bartolome Tolentino (Tolentino for brevity).[8] Appellant
January 5, 1999; p. 2, TSN, January 19, 1999). further testified that on January 25, 1997, policemen went to the
fishpond where he worked. The policemen arrested appellant and
When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter brought him to the police station at Palauig. Later, the policemen
answered the name Johnny. (id.) The couple brought their daughter took him to the municipal jail of Palauig.
to the President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital for medical
examination (p. 2, TSN, February 24, 1999). She was examined by On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is
Dra. Editha Dela Cruz Divino, who issued a medico-legal certificate not Johnny but Jessie.[9] He testified that on January 17, 1997, at
dated January 23, 1997 stating the following: around 12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to
Barangay Alwa which was about thirty meters from the fishpond. [10]
a. Bleeding of genitalia coming from median laceration at The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino
the vaginal floor around four (4) centimeters to prove that appellant was employed as caretaker of Tolentinos
in size. Possible cause, a fall and then hitting fishpond for almost two years before the alleged rape
a sharp object and also an alleged sexual incident. Appellant was purportedly of good moral character while
assault (p. 4, TSN, February 24, 1999). employed as a fishpond caretaker. The prosecution admitted the
offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules
testimony of Tolentino in open court.[11] provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender
years[13] as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment[12] on October 26,
prompting or suggestion.[14] Leading questions are necessary to coax
1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:
the truth out of their reluctant lips.[15] In the case at bar, the trial
court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult,
(SIC) is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of if not uncertain.[16] As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:[17]
Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in
was only 6 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, in
exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is
reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Jesus Perez is directed to
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to
pay to the private complainant the amount of Seventy-Five
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as and by way of civil indemnity and
are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as and by way of moral damages.
child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all
Hence, this automatic review. stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further
In his brief, appellant raises the following lone assignment of the interests of justice.
error:
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE for a child of tender age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, to
GUILT OF THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of
REASONABLE DOUBT. her private part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her
familys honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong
desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her. [18]
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by
Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points out that the prosecutor Mayia recounted her harrowing experience, thus:
had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt
when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged Q What time was this when Johnny introduced himself to
rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open you?
court, she referred to him as a man named Johnny and did not give A I do not recall, mam.
any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims
he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police Q Was it in the morning, noontime or in the afternoon or in
arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done the evening?
with the usual police line-up.
A Noontime, mam.
Appellants contention is untenable.
Q So, when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what did you do? Q You said that Johnny penetrated your private part. With
what instrument did he use in penetrating your
A None, mam.
private part?
Q After that when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what
A His penis, mam.
happened?
Q What was he wearing at that time?
A He strangled (sinakal) me.
A A black denim, mam.
Q Were there persons around in the place when Johnny
strangled you? Q When he used his penis in entering your private part,
did he remove his pants?
A None, mam.
A No, mam.
Q So, what did he do then after he strangled you?
Q What did he do with his pants?
A He boxed me on my stomach, mam.
A He brought out his penis, mam.
Q When he boxed you on your stomach, what happened to
you? Q You mean to say Mayia, he lowered his pants?
A I was shocked, mam. A Yes, mam.
Q Did you fall down? Q What about you, were you wearing any panty?
A Before that, I was already lying down, so when he boxed A Yes, mam.
me, I was shocked.
Q What was your clothes at that time?
Q You said that you were already lying down. Who made
A A dress, mam.
you lie down?
Q When his penis entered your vagina Mayia, did he
A The person, mam.
remove your panty?
Q Why were you shocked, Mayia?
A Yes, mam.[19]
A Because he strangled me and boxed me.
The identity of appellant as the rapist has been established by
Q After he boxed you on your abdomen, what happened? the clear, convincing and straightforward testimony of Mayia.
What else did he do to you? During the trial, she testified as follows:
A There was a dog that arrived in the place and it barked Q Mayia, there is a man sitting wearing orange t-shirt, do
at us. Then Johnny moved in a hurry by penetrating you know this man?
my private part and after he dressing (SIC) me, he ran
A Yes, mam.
away.
Q Do you know his name? Q Is this Johnny whom you point to the person whom you
saw in that Sulok?
A Yes, mam.
A Yes, sir. [21]
Q What is his name?
Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the
A Johnny, mam.
witness stand of her harrowing experience lends credence to her
Q Why do you know him? accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her accusation
was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has
A Because he introduced himself to me. stressed in numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says
Q Where did he introduced himself to you? that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to
show that rape was indeed committed.[22]
A At Sulok, mam.
Mayia had a clear sight of appellants face since the rape
Q Sulok is a place? occurred at noontime.[23] Her proximity to appellant during the
sexual assault leaves no doubt as to the correctness of her
A Yes, mam.
identification for a man and woman cannot be physically closer to
Q Do you have any companion when this man introduced each other than during the sexual act.[24] Thus, even if Mayia did not
himself to you? give the identifying marks of appellant, her positive identification of
appellant sufficed to establish clearly the identity of her sexual
A None, mam. assailant.
Q How did he introduce himself to you? Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia
A The man introduced himself to me by saying, Kilala mo to identify appellant is without basis. True, Mayia did not identify
ba ako? Hindi po. Ako si Johnny.[20] appellant in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his
cell. However, appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two
The trial court further asked Mayia: other companions in his cell.[25] Moreover, the Court has held that
Q You were talking of a certain Johnny. s this Johnny in there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
court now? identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a
proper identification as long as the police did not suggest such
A Yes, sir. identification to the witnesses.[26]The records are bereft of any
indication that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as
Q Can you point to him?
the rapist.
A Yes, sir.
Mayias identification in open court of appellant as her rapist
Q Point to him. dispels any doubt as to the proper identification of appellant. Mayia
positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We are
A (Witness pointing to the person sitting at the accused satisfied that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her
bench and when asked of his name answered Jesus rapist. As held in People v. Marquez:[27]
Perez)
xxx. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was of Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit
abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of complainant to face A[31] without any objection from the defense.
police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea
public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her
bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of
complaint. Stated differently, it is most improbable for a five-year
evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as the herein
evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits
offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any
the charge but interposes lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as
man if it were not true.
will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.[32] Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during
In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that
pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of
the guilt of appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
Criminal Procedure[33]provides:
trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.Appellant maintains
that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
prosecution to prove Mayias age by independent evidence.
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and
Appellant points out that while Mayias birth certificate was duly
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
marked during the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during
during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayias minority must not
the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
only be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be
(Emphasis supplied)
established beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her
age. During the trial on December 15, 1998, which was about twenty-
At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory
three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17,
disposition of the criminal case. Appellant, assisted by counsel,
1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was 8 years old
signed a Pre-Trial Agreement[28] which, as incorporated in the Pre-
last May 23.[34] Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23,
Trial Order, stated that:
1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and
seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took
x x x.
place. We rule that the prosecution has indisputably proven that
Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May
1990 as evidenced by her birth certificate; Finally, the trial court was correct in imposing the death penalty
on appellant. Under Article 335[35] of the Revised Penal Code, as
x x x. (Emphasis supplied) amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,[36]the death penalty
shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence below seven (7) years old. Mayia was six (6) years and seven (7)
Mayias birth certificate as Exhibit A.[29] The prosecution submitted its months old when appellant raped her.
Offer of Evidence[30] which included Exhibit A, a certified true copy
 If rape is qualified by any of the circumstances[37] warranting
the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for actual or
compensatory damages is mandatory.[38] Following prevailing
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity is fixed at P75,000.00. In addition,
moral damages of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the rape
victim without need for pleading or proving it.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case
No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to
suffer the death penalty,[40] and ordering him to pay the victim
Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659, upon the
finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President of the Philippines for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175507 October 8, 2014 Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to be
Antonio Ching’s illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes
RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, Igne.12 While Ramon Ching disputed this,13 both Mercedes and
vs. Lucina have not.14
JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE1 AND
LUCINA SANTOS, Respondents. Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill sometime in
1996, he entrusted her with the distribution of his estate to his heirs if
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions something were to happen to him. She alleged that she handed all
at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under the property titles and business documents to Ramon Ching for
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the safekeeping.15 Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from illness
prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant. and allegedly demanded that Ramon Ching return all the titles to the
properties and business documents.16
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 2 and
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86818, which On July 18, 1996, Antonio Ching was murdered. 17 Ramon Ching
upheld the (1) order4 dated November 22, 2002 dismissing Civil Case allegedly induced Mercedes Igne and her children, Joseph Cheng
No. 02-103319 without prejudice, and (2) the omnibus order 5 dated and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and waiver 18 to Antonio
July 30, 2004, which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Ching’s estate in consideration of ₱22.5 million. Mercedes Igne’s
Both orders were issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, children alleged that Ramon Ching never paid them.19 On October
Branch 6.6 29, 1996, Ramon Ching allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement
of estate,20 naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon
The issues before this court are procedural. However, the factual himself the entirety of Antonio Ching’s estate.21
antecedents in this case, which stemmed from a complicated family
feud, must be stated to give context to its procedural development. Ramon Ching denied these allegationsand insisted that when
Antonio Ching died, the Ching family association, headed by
It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses and Vicente Cheng, unduly influenced him to give Mercedes Igne and
properties, among which was Po Wing Properties, Incorporated (Po her children financial aid considering that they served Antonio
Wing Properties).7 His total assets are alleged to have been worth Ching for years. It was for this reason that an agreement and waiver
more than 380 million.8 It is also alleged that whilehe was in consideration of 22.5 million was made. He also alleged that
unmarried, he had children from two women.9 hewas summoned by the family association to execute an affidavit of
settlement of estate declaring him to be Antonio Ching’s sole heir. 22
Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ching
with his common-law wife, Lucina Santos.10 She, however, disputed After a year of investigating Antonio Ching’s death, the police found
this. She maintains that even ifRamon Ching’s birth certificate Ramon Ching to be its primary suspect.23Information24 was filed
indicates that he was Antonio Ching’s illegitimate child, she and against him, and a warrant of arrest25 was issued.
Antonio Ching merely adopted him and treated him like their own. 11
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne
(the Chengs) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles
against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This On November 22, 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91046 (the first case).26 motion to dismiss on the basis that the summons had not yet been
served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they had not
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave of court, yet filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the second case
to implead additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of was made without prejudice.36
which Ramon Ching was a primary stockholder.The amended
complaint was for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a
Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 22, 2002.
Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and They argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice
Writ of Preliminary Injunction."27 Sometime after, Lucina Santos filed under the "two dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
a motion for intervention and was allowed to intervene. 28 of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first
case.37
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs
subject matter.29 and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Disinheritance and
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra
On November 13, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, judicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
over the subject matter.30 Upon motion of the Chengs’ counsel, against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was
however, the Chengs and Lucina Santos were given fifteen (15) days docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251(the third case) and was
to file the appropriate pleading. They did not do so.31 eventually raffled to Branch 6.38

On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed
for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of their comment/opposition to the application for temporary
Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said restraining order in the third case. They also filed a motion to
Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ dismiss on the ground of res judicata, litis pendencia, forum-
of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. A
Properties.32This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103319 (the series of responsive pleadings were filed by both parties.39
second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.33 When Branch 20 was made aware of the first case, it issued On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus order40 resolving both
an order transferring the case to Branch 6, considering that the case the motion for reconsideration in the second case and the motion to
before it involved substantially the same parties and causes of dismiss in the third case. The trial court denied the motion for
action.34 reconsideration and the motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal
of the second case was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion the filing of the third case.41 On October 8, 2004, while their motion
to dismiss their complaint in the second case, praying that it be for reconsideration in the third case was pending, Ramon Ching and
dismissed without prejudice.35 Po Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari (the first certiorari
case) with the Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated November In their comment, respondents allege that when the trial court
22,2002 and the portion of the omnibus order dated July 30, 2004, granted the motion to dismiss, Ramon Ching’s counsel was notified
which upheldthe dismissal of the second case.42 in open court that the dismissal was without prejudice. They argue
that the trial court’s order became final and executory whenhe failed
On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying the to file his motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
motion for reconsideration in the third case. The denial prompted period.55
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to file a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with application for a writ of preliminary injunction Respondents argue that the petition for review should be dismissed
or the issuance of a temporary restraining order (the second on the ground of forum shopping and litis pendencia since Ramon
certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals.43 Ching and Po Wing Properties are seeking relief simultaneously in
two forums by filing the two petitions for certiorari, which involved
On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision 44 in the same omnibus order by the trial court.56 They also argue that the
the first certiorari case dismissing the petition. The appellate court "two-dismissal rule" and res judicata did not apply since (1) the
ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties’ reliance on the failure to amend a complaint is not a dismissal, and (2) they only
"two-dismissal rule" was misplaced since the rule involves two moved for dismissal once in the second case.57
motions for dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it
found that the dismissal of the first case was upon the motion of the In their reply,58 petitioners argue that they did not commit forum
defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the shopping since the actions they commenced against respondents
instance of the plaintiffs.45 stemmed from the complaints filed against them in the trial
courts.59 They reiterate that their petition for review is only about the
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 46 Ramon Ching second case; it just so happened that the assailed omnibus order
and Po Wing Properties filed this present petition for review47 under resolved both the second and third cases.60
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Upon the filing of the parties’ respective memoranda,61 the case was
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the dismissal of the submitted for decision.62
second case was with prejudice since the non-filing of an amended
complaint in the first case operated as a dismissal on the For this court’s resolution are the following issues:
merits.48 They also argue that the second case should be dismissed
on the ground of res judicata since there was a previous final I. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case
judgment of the first case involving the same parties, subject matter, operated as a bar to the filing of a third case, asper the "two-
and cause of action.49 dismissal rule"; and

Lucina Santos was able to file a comment50 on the petition within the II. Whether respondents committed forum shopping when
period required.51 The Chengs, however, did not comply.52 Upon the they filed the third case while the motion for reconsideration
issuance by this court of a show cause order on September 24, of the second case was still pending.
2007,53 they eventually filed a comment with substantially the same
allegations and arguments as that of Lucina Santos’.54
The petition is denied. SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of
The "two-dismissal rule" vis-à-vis his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
the Rules of Civil Procedure order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to
Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
Civil Procedure. The pertinent provisions state: or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
(Emphasis supplied)
RULE 17
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff
requests the dismissal of the case beforeany responsive pleadings
SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may be
have been filed by the defendant. It is donethrough notice by the
dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without
before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant before the service
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. It requires leave of
same claim. court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless
otherwise declared by the court.
SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in
the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the
plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is dismissed either
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu propio.
has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared
plaintiff’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the by the court.
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the
unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the
manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions
same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal to dismiss.63
under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court. In Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Hon. Plan,64 Consolidated Logging and
Lumber Mills filed a complaint against Insular Veneer to recover
some logs the former had delivered to the latter. It also filed ex
partea motion for issuance of a restraining order. The complaint and Consolidated Logging would liketo forget the Manila case, consign it
motion were filed in a trial court in Isabela.65 to oblivion as if it were a bad dream, and prosecute its amended
complaint in the Isabela court as if nothing had transpired in the
The trial court granted the motion and treated the restraining order Manila court. We hold that it cannot elude the effects of its conduct
as a writ of preliminary injunction. When Consolidated Logging in junking the Isabela case and in giving that case a reincarnation in
recovered the logs, it filed a notice of dismissal under Rule 17, the Manila court.
Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure.66
Consolidated Logging’ [sic] filed a new case in Manila at its own
While the action on its notice for dismissal was pending, risk. Its lawyer at his peril failed toappear at the pre-trial.70
Consolidated Logging filed the same complaint against Insular
Veneer, this time in a trial court in Manila. It did not mention any This court ruled that the filing of the amended complaint in the
previous action pending in the Isabela court.67 Isabela court was barred by the prior dismissal of the Manila court,
stating that:
The Manila court eventually dismissed the complaint due to the
nonappearance of Consolidated Logging’s counsel during pre-trial. The provision in section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that an
Consolidated Logging subsequently returned to the Isabela court to action may be dismissed because "there is another action pending
revive the same complaint. The Isabela court apparently treated the between the same parties for the same cause" presupposes that two
filing of the amended complaint as a withdrawal of its notice of similar actions are simultaneously pending in two different Courts
dismissal.68 of First Instance. Lis pendensas a ground for a motion to dismiss has
the same requisites as the plea of res judicata.
Insular Veneer also filed in the Isabela court a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the dismissal by the Manila court constituted res On the other hand, when a pleading is amended, the original
judicataover the case. The Isabela court, presided over by Judge Plan, pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any
denied the motion to dismiss. The dismissal was the subject of the further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the
petition for certiorari and mandamus with this court.69 amended pleading only. So, when Consolidated Logging filed its
amended complaint dated March 16, 1970 in Civil Case No. 2158, the
This court stated that: prior dismissal order dated January 5, 1970 in the Manila case could
he [sic] interposed in the Isabela court to support the defense of res
In resolving that issue, we are confronted with the unarguable fact judicata.71
that Consolidated Logging on its volition dismissed its action for
damages and injunction in the Isabela court and refiled substantially As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without
the same action in the Manila court. Then, when the Manila court prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused
dismissed its action for failure to prosecute, it went hack [sic] to the its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an
Isabela court and revived its old action by means of an amended adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the
complaint. same claim, the following requisites must be present:
 (1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a In view of the afore-going, the court finds the Motion to Dismiss
competent court; filed by Atty. Maria Lina Nieva S. Casals to be meritorious and the
Court is left with no alternative but to dismiss as it hereby dismisses
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim; the Amended Complaint.

(3) Both notices for dismissal werefiled by the plaintiff; and However, on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias, counsel for the
plaintiffs, he is given a period of fifteen (15) days from today, within
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was which to file an appropriate pleading, copy furnished to all the
consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter parties concerned.
paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.72
....
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious
litigation."73 When a complaint is dismissed a second time, the SO ORDERED.74
plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias
The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in view of failed to file the appropriate pleading within fifteen (15) days, he
the "two-dismissal rule" violated the order of the court. This, they argue, made the original
dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later 17, Section 3, i.e., a dismissal through the default of the plaintiff.
amended to include not only new defendants but new causes of Hence, they argue that when respondents filed the second case and
action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with
motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants onthe prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two dismissals caused
ground of lack of jurisdiction. by the plaintiff on the same claim. Unfortunately, petitioners’ theory
is erroneous.
The trial court granted that motion to dismiss, stating that:
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to
A careful perusal of the allegations of the Amended Complaint dismiss filed by the defendants. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo
dated February 10, 1999, filed by Plaintiff Joseph Cheng, show that Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days tofile an appropriate
additional causes of action were incorporated i.e. extra-judicial pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a request made bythe
settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio Ching and receivership, plaintiff’s counsel that had no bearing on the dismissal of the case.
subject matters, which should be threshed out in a special
proceedings case. This is a clear departure from the main cause of Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case
action in the original complaint which is for declaration of nullity of if the plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a situation where the
certificate of titles with damages. And the rules of procedure which dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was already a
govern special proceedings case are different and distinct from the dismissal prior to plaintiff’s default, the trial court’s instruction to
rules of procedure applicable in an ordinary civil action. file the appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the
plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial court does not matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most
dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands. ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but
to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of
defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil ground.77 (Emphasis supplied)
Procedure, which states:
For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated November 22,
SECTION 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before filing the 2002 dismissing the case, without prejudice. The order states:
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: When this Motion was called for hearing, all the plaintiffs namely,
Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, Mercedes Igne and Lucina Santos
.... appeared without their counsels. That they verbally affirmed the
execution of the Motion to Dismiss, as shown by their signatures
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the over their respective names reflected thereat. Similarly, none of the
claim; defendants appeared, except the counsel for defendant, Ramon
Chang [sic], who manifested that they have not yet filed their
.... Answer as there was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic]
and the latter has not yet been served with summons.
Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the same
action or claim subject to certain exceptions. Under the circumstances, and further considering that the
defendants herein have not yet filed their Answers nor any pleading,
the plaintiffs has [sic] the right to out rightly [sic] cause the dismissal
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely
of the Complaint pursuant to Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
refiling the same claim that had been previously dismissed on the
Civil Procedure without prejudice. Thereby, and as prayed for, this
basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice.
case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at
the plaintiff’s instance.
SO ORDERED.78 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by
respondents before the service of any responsive pleadings. When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same
Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of right that is claim, there was already one prior dismissal at the instance of the
not subject to the trial court’s discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants.
and Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and Development While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same
Corporation:76 claim, it does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim
was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to
[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since
determine before the rule may apply, as in this case.
dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a
Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the appropriate pleading in the first favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil
case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses
Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest
one without prejudice. In Gomez v. Alcantara:79 court dockets. What iscritical is the vexation brought upon the courts
and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same
adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting
prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in decisions being renderedby the different fora upon the same issues.
the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute
adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another direct contempt.
action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
prejudice.80 (Emphasis supplied) shopping, the most important factor toask is whether the elements of
litis pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in one case
In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court will amount to res judicatain another; otherwise stated, the test for
specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It is only determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases
when the trial court’s order either is silent on the matter, or states pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on reliefs sought.82 (Emphasis supplied)
the merits.
When respondents filed the third case, petitioners’ motion for
However, while the dismissal of the second case was without reconsideration of the dismissal of the second case was still pending.
prejudice, respondents’ act of filing the third case while petitioners’ Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be
motion for reconsideration was still pending constituted forum overturned upon reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher
shopping. court.

The rule against forum shopping and the "twin-dismissal rule" Moreover, petitioners were not prohibited from filing the motion for
reconsideration. This court has already stated in Narciso v.
In Yap v. Chua:81 Garcia83 that a defendant has the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of a trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or since "[n]o rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, reconsideration."84 The second case, therefore, was still pending
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or when the third case was filed.
the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping
may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to wait
until the final disposition of the second case before filing the third
case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second case was without Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum
prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, in accordance with the shopping. Any judgment by this court on the propriety of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. In their haste to file the third case, dismissal of the second case will inevitably affect the disposition of
however, they unfortunately transgressed certain procedural the third case.
safeguards, among which are the rules on litis pendentiaand res
judicata. This, in fact, is the reason why there were two different petitions for
certiorari before the appellate court. The omnibus order dated July
In Yap: 30, 2004 denied two pending motions by petitioners: (1) the motion
for reconsideration in the second case and (2) the motion to dismiss
Litis pendentiaas a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to in the third case. Since petitioners are barred from filing a second
that situation wherein another action is pending between the same motion for reconsideration of the second case, the first certiorari case
parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action was filed before the appellate court and is now the subject of this
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis review. The denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in the
pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another third case, however, could still be the subject of a separate petition
more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same for certiorari. That petition would be based now on the third case,
cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the and not on the second case.
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy incourts
more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be This multiplicity of suits is the veryevil sought to be avoided by the
avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of rule on forum shopping. In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co.,
persons. Inc.,86 the rule is that:

The requisites of litis pendentiaare: (a) the identity of parties, or at Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the dismissal not only of the petition pending before this Court, but also
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is so because
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such twin dismissal is a punitive measure to those who trifle with the
that judgment in one, regardless ofwhich party is successful, would orderly administration of justice.87 (Emphasis supplied)
amount to res judicatain the other.85 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez, Jr. 88 In
There is no question that there was an identity of parties, rights, and Buan, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with this court while
reliefs in the second and third cases. While it may be true that the another petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction was
trial court already dismissed the second case when the third case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila involving the
was filed, it failed to take into account that a motion for same parties and based on the same set of facts. This court, in
reconsideration was filed in the second case and, thus, was still dismissing both actions, stated:
pending. Considering that the dismissal of the second case was the
subject of the first certiorari case and this present petition for review, Indeed, the petitioners in both actions . . . have incurred not only the
it can be reasonably concluded that the second case, to this day, sanction of dismissal oftheir case before this Court in accordance
remains pending. with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also the punitive measure of
dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court and that in the technicalities: [C]ases should be determined on the merits, after all
Regional Trial Court as well. Quite recently, upon substantially parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
identical factual premises, the Court en banchad occasion to defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections.
condemn and penalize the act of litigants of filing the same suit in In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of
different courts, aptly described as "forum shopping[.]"89 procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing all rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to
pending actions on the same claim filed in any court. Accordingly, frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.In
the grant of this petition would inevitably result in the summary fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules [on Civil Procedure]
dismissal of the third case. Any action, therefore, which originates shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
from the third case pending with any court would be barred by res ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
judicata. and proceeding.92 (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an examination The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be
must first be made on the purpose of the rule.1âwphi1Parties resort shown that (1) the original case has been dismissed upon request of
to forum shopping when they file several actions of the same claim the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only pending matter
in different forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is is a motion for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural
prohibited by the courts as it "trifle[s] with the orderly reasons that serve the goal of substantial justice for the fresh new·
administration of justice."90 case to proceed.

In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became final and The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since
executory upon the failure of respondents’counsel to file the been dismissed and is now the subject of a petition for certiorari. The
appropriate pleading. They filed the correct pleading the second third case filed apparently contains the better cause of action for the
time around but eventually sought its dismissal as they"[suspected] plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they are more
that their counsel is not amply protecting their interests as the case is comfortable with. Substantial justice will be better served if
not moving for almost three (3) years."91 The filing of the third case, respondents do not fall victim to the labyrinth in the procedures that
therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable their travails led them. It is for this reason that we deny the petition.
result butonly to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of
rights. Manila, Branch 6 is ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. 02-
105251 with due and deliberate dispatch.
It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original
controversy between the parties has long beenmired in numerous SO ORDERED.
procedural entanglements. While it might be more judicially
expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and disallow the
proceedings in the third case to continue, it would not serve the ends
of substantial justice. Courts of justice must always endeavor to
resolve cases on their merits, rather than summarily dismiss these on
G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003 Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land in
Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna, registered in the names of spouses
LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The
vs. property was scheduled for public auction on March 20, 2002.
ONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, On March 19, 2002, private respondent filed before the RTC of
THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Parañaque City, a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary
MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D. restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to
VILLARIN, respondents. enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public
auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property
DECISION subject of the execution sale; that the property regime between
private respondent and her husband was complete separation of
CORONA, J.: property, and that she was not a party in the HLURB case, hence, the
subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate
Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by Lincoln L. Yao, assailing liability of her husband.
the resolution dated March 22, 2002 and Order dated May 10, 2002,
of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, 1 which On even date, public respondent Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a
respectively granted private respondent Bernadine D. Villarin’s 72-hour temporary restraining order and set the case for raffle and
petition for prohibition and denied petitioner’s motion for conference on March 22, 2002.
intervention.
The case was eventually raffled to RTC, Branch 276, presided by
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by public respondent judge. A conference was then conducted, after
petitioner before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board which public respondent judge issued the assailed resolution of
(HLURB) against a certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its March 22, 2002 granting private respondent’s petition for prohibition
managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. Hence,
husband. the scheduled auction sale did not materialize.

On September 17, 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision rescinding On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent
the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering judge issued the resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a
PR Builders to refund petitioner the amount of ₱2,116,103.31, as well motion for intervention. However, public respondent judge denied
as to pay damages in the amount of ₱250,000. the motion in her assailed order of May 10, 2002:

Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR ORDER

Builders and its managers, and referred the writ to the office of the
Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement.
The MOTION FOR INTERVENTION is denied, considering that this civil, due or received during his marriage from his or her separate
case has long been decided, hence the intervention is too late. There property. (214a)
is no case for them to intervene.
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion
Let the decision be executed to satisfy the judgment debt.1awphi1.nét to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the
current market value of their separate properties.
SO ORDERED in open Court.2
The liability of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall,
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari however, be solidary. (215a)1a\^/phi1.net
imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondent judge in: (a)
declaring the subject property exempt from execution and therefore It is clear from the foregoing that the only time the separate
could not be sold to satisfy the obligation of private respondent’s properties of the spouses can be made to answer for liabilities to
husband, and (b) denying petitioner’s motion for intervention on the creditors is when those liabilities are incurred for family expenses.
ground that the same was filed late. This has not been shown in the case at bar.

It is a basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of Accordingly, private respondent acted well within her rights in filing
judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to a petition for prohibition against the deputy sheriff because the latter
the judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff on property by virtue of went beyond his authority in attaching the subject property. This
a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority right is specifically reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of
of the court only vis-a-vis property belonging to the defendant. For Court.
indeed, "one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's
debts."3 In the case at bar, the property levied on by the sheriff was Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that
clearly not exclusively owned by Pablito Villarin. It was co-owned the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be
by herein private respondent who was a stranger in the HLURB case. prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus, as
The property relation of spouses Villarin was governed by the the judgment creditor in the HLURB case, petitioner claims that he
regime of complete separation of property as decreed in the was an indispensable party in the petition for prohibition and should
order4 dated November 10, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed
27, Parañaque City. to do so.

Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code governing the regime of Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
complete separation of property provide:
SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course court.6 Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that respondent’s petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002,
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may final and executory.
require.
Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution is sufficient cause for
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all the outright dismissal of the instant petition. Certiorari as a special
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the last filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (2a) its errors, if any.

Consequently, petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when the power is
without basis. Nothing in the said provision requires the inclusion of exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the personal hostility. The Court fails to find grave abuse of discretion
other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the committed by public respondent judge in rendering the assailed
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise resolution and order.
qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a
separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the SO ORDERED.
first is not more important than the second.5

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioner’s right as a

judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on
the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of
property exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case
that can be levied upon.

Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner

indeed had the right to intervene, he must exercise said right in
accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may

be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
[G.R. No. 91486. September 10, 2003] 2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and
TCT No. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and the
subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of those titles
belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab
ALBERTO G. PINLAC petitioners, vs. COURT OF initio;
APPEALSREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF 3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel OCT No.
THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 as well as the subsequent TCTs
issued and emanating therefrom, with the exception of those titles
belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;
This resolves the Petition-In-Intervention[1] filed by the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority 4) Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true and actual
and the Motion for Clarification[2] filed by respondents. area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs subsequently issued by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the area in excess of
The facts may be briefly restated as follows: The controversy said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-
stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by petitioners defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;
over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 is
covered by TCT No. 5690, while Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally 5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs
covered by OCT No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual
21, 1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision[3] in favor of area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those titles belonging
petitioners and against the defendants who were declared in default, to the non-defaulted respondents;
including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision
whose properties were within Lot No. 2. The dispositive portion of 6) Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated August 7, 1985,
which reads: in so far as those areas covered by the cancelled OCTs and TCTs
hereof are concerned, as permanent;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of petitioners and against the defaulted respondents: 7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue herein
petitioners the corresponding individual transfer certificate of titles
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to upon proper application made thereof.
wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes,
Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in fee simple SO ORDERED.
title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary
prescription, with the exception of the lands covered by the
On May 17, 1989, the defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with
respective transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted
the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the
respondents;
trial court, which was granted in a decision[4] dated November 15,
1989. The appellate court ruled that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondents because of defective (2) affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
service of summons by publication.Petitioners motion for CA-G.R. No. 17596 in all other respects.
reconsideration of the said decision was denied; hence, they filed this
petition for certiorari. SO ORDERED.[7]
On January 19, 2001, we rendered a Decision denying the
petition and affirming the Judgment of the Court of Appeals. The On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
dispositive portion thereof reads: the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a
Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court
declaring:
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with
the decisions this Honorable Court had already
SO ORDERED.[5]
rendered;
Petitioners filed a Motion for
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original
Reconsideration contending, inter alia, that the disposition of the
[6]
area of 52,949,737 square meters;
trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, should not have been annulled
by the Court of Appeals because the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. They 3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land
prayed that the January 19, 2001 decision of the Court which and is covered by OCT No. 333;
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals be reconsidered
insofar as Lot No. 3 is concerned. 4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-
35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are null and void;
On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution partially and
granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by reinstating
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the trial courts Partial 5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-
Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, thus 35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY Republic and other interested parties.
GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on January 19, 2001 is
MODIFIED as follows: The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and
equitable under the circumstances.[8]
(1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the Partial
Decision of the court a quo; and The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same was affirmed by
timeliness of the filing thereof.[9] Indeed, in exceptional cases, the the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review
Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period
even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now
already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.[10] Rule 19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure].
In Mago v. Court of Appeals,[11] intervention was granted even
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein
after the decision became final and executory, thus
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and
object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice
discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to say,
to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only after
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition for relief
from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene arising from
In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
the strict application of the rule was an injustice to petitioners whose
allowed intervention almost at the end of the
substantial interest in the subject property cannot be disputed. It
proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling, much less
must be stressed that the trial court granted private respondent's
hesitation or circumvention, on the part of subordinate and inferior
petition for prohibition with injunction without petitioners being
courts to abide and conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme
impleaded, in total disregard of their right to be heard, when on the
Court.[12]
face of the resolution of the Community Relations and Information
Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners were the ones
The Solicitor General summarized the interest of the Republic in
directly to be affected. We need not belabor the point that petitioners
Lot No. 3 (originally covered by OCT No. 333), as follows:
are indeed indispensable parties with such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made in their absence without affecting, nay injuring, such interest. On March 5, 1979, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826 reserving for national government center site a parcel of land
situated in the Constitution Hill, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions for
containing an area of four million for hundred forty thousand FOUR
intervention were filed when the case had already reached this
HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX SQUARE METERS. In a certification [Annex
Court, it was declared:
F, Rollo, p. 1415] issued by the Land Registration Authority, it
attested to the fact that the National Government Center described in
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by
Proclamation No. 1826 is within the area covered by GLRO Record
the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already
No. 1037 (OCT-333) and GLRO Record No. 5975 as plotted in our
Municipal Index Sheet (MIS) Nos. 2574-C, 5707-B, 5708-A, 5708-B law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
and 3339-D. indispensable party to the case at bar.As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of
In a letter [Annex B-2, Rollo, p. 1330], the Housing and Urban individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be
Development Coordinating Council certified that within the Project invoked by the Republic to protect its properties.[14]
site/jurisdiction of the National Government Center Housing Project
After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find that our
(NGCHP) and the NGC-EASTSIDE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, the
November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
following government buildings, offices and complexes are situated:
trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, overlooked
certain aspects which, if not corrected, will cause extreme and
1) House of Representatives; irreparable confusion and prejudice. The reinstated portions of the
2) Civil Service Commission (CSC); decision states:
3) Department of Social Works and Development
(DSWD);
4) Declaring the area of [OCT] No. 333 in excess of its true and actual
4) Sandiganbayan;
area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs subsequently issued by
5) Commission on Audit (COA);
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the area in excess of
6) Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-
Depot;
defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;
7) Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP)
Commonwealth Campus;
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs
8) TESDA Skills Training Center;
subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual
9) Several Public Elementary and High Schools, Health
area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those titles belonging
Centers and Barangay Halls.
to the non-defaulted respondents;[15]
It also certified that the NGCHP under its Peoples Housing
We note that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which portions
Alternative for Social Empowerment land Acquisition Development
are in excess of the 4,574 square meter area of OCT No. 333 and
Program (PHASE-LADP), has already awarded 3,975 TCTs to its
which areas belong to the defaulted and non-defaulted
beneficiaries. This program comprises the biggest chunk of the
respondents. Neither did the body of the trial courts decision state
NGCHP with about 117 hectares intended for disposition to
the metes and bounds that would serve as basis in implementing the
qualified beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National
dispositive portion thereof. Verily, this flaw goes into the very
Governments thrust of fast-tracking the implementation of the
identity of the disputed land. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null
NGCHP, the remaining 20,696 TCTs are about to be awarded to
and void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional
qualified beneficiaries.[13]
mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect
which it is based.[16] Hence, the November 20, 2001 Resolution
public interest as well as government properties located and projects
reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision
undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person
should be modified.
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
 The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid and Agricultural land under Act 926. The Attorney General
existing title is likewise meritorious. In Republic v. Tofemi Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment. In
Corporation (Tofemi),[17] an action for Cancellation of Titles & G.L.R.O. No. 1037, the application for registration was granted and
Reversion of TCT No. 55747 and TCT No. 55748, the validity of OCT consequently the issuance of a title was decreed in favor of the
No. 333 from which said transfer certificates of title originated, has applicant because the Land Registration Court found that the land
already been settled. In dismissing the petition of the Republic, it applied for is agricultural susceptible of private appropriation
was held therein that OCT No. 333 is a valid title duly issued by the (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra; Ankron vs. Government of the
Land Registration Court. The Republic did not appeal therefrom and Philippine Islands, supra). We repeat by way of emphasis, the record
the decision became final and executory. Pertinent portion of which does not reveal that the Government has always considered the lot in
states question as forest reserve prior to the issuance of OCT 333. To
declare the land now as forest land on the authority of LC Map 639
Regarding the issue of nullity of OCT No. 333, of Rizal approved on March 11, 1937 only, would deprive
defendants of their registered property without due process of
We find that the then Land Registration Court had the power, law. It was pronounced in Ramos vs. Director of lands, supra:
authority and jurisdiction to issue it. It was issued after trial, or
presumptively in a fair and square trial with all the requisites of the x x x Upon the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of
law (The Phil. British Co., Inc. vs. de los Angeles, 63 SCRA 52). contrary evidence, that land is agricultural in nature. One very good
reason is that it is good for the Philippine Islands to have a large
The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known in local history as the public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural
Philippine Bill of 1902, in its sections 13 to 18, mentions three (3) attitude of the sagacious citizen.
classes of land, to wit, public land or public domain, mineral lands,
and timber land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175). Early OCT No. 333 being legal and valid; ergo, TCTs Nos. 55747 and
decisions as regards classification of public lands, such as Mapa vs. 55748, being derived from the said mother title, are also legal and
Insular Government, 10 Phil 175, Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra, valid. These TCTs were in turn derived from TCTs Nos. 45832 and
and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10, 45833, covering Lots Nos. 65, 76 and 81 which originally formed
which were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first parts of Parcel C of Plan Psu-32606 approved by the Court of First
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on Instance of Rizal on October 21, 1924. (Emphasis supplied) [18]
October 7, 1926, or prior to the passage of Act No. 2874, had
impliedly ruled that there was no legal provision vesting in the chief Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands disturb not what is settled. It is a salutary and necessary judicial
of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural; so that practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law
the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to such principle
justiciable cases, or were invested with implicit power in so doing, and apply it to all future cases in which the facts sued upon are
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. In Mapa vs. substantially the same.[19] It is beyond cavil, therefore, that since the
Insular Government, supra, Feb. 10, 1908, the Court of Land court had already ruled on the validity OCT No. 333, said issue must
Registration granted the application for registration after finding that be laid to rest and must no longer be relitigated in the present case.
it was neither timber nor mineral and came within the definition of
 With respect, however, to the area covered by OCT No. 333, the resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to
principle of stare decisis is not applicable because the decision of the the original action being re-filed in the proper court.
Court of Appeals did not indicate the boundaries of the lot covered
In the meantime, the World War II Veterans Legionaries of the
by OCT No. 333. While it was held therein that the area of OCT No.
Philippines (WW II) filed a Petition-in-Intervention with prior leave
333 is 52,949,735 square meters, the metes and bounds of the land
of court. It alleges that the Court of Appeals decision dated
covered by OCT No. 333 was not specified. We cannot adopt the
November 15, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596, which is the subject of
findings as to the area of OCT No. 333 for it might cause deprivation
the instant petition for review, ran counter to the June 22, 1989
of property of adjacent land owners without due process of law.
decision of the same court in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221, which merely
So, also, the Court cannot nullify the entire Partial Decision of amended the first paragraph of the Partial Decision of the trial court
the court a quo. The defaulted defendants whose properties are in Civil Case No. Q-35672. The latter decision of the appellate court
located in Lot No. 1 did not question the decision of the trial was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 90245 on April 8, 1990.
court. Neither was it shown in the Petition-In-Intervention that the
We find no conflict between the two decisions of the Court of
OSG is an indispensable party to Lot No. 1.
Appeals. It is true that both decisions affected the portion of the
In their Motion for Clarification and Manifestation, respondents Partial Decision of the trial court which declared petitioners, who are
seek the clarification of paragraph 1 of the trial courts Partial individual members of the WW II, as absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1,
Decision declaring petitioners as owners of, among others, Lot No. 2 2 and 3. However, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221 merely
where respondents properties are located. Paragraph 1, provides: granted WW IIs prayer that it be substituted for its individual
members, who were declared the owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to Partial Decision. Aside from this, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo F. Reyes, 17221 had nothing to do with the merits of the case. As such, it did
Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in fee simple not contradict the Court of Appeals decision of November 15, 1989 in
title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extraordinary CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 which set aside the Partial Decision of the trial
prescription, with the exception of the lands covered by the court.
respective transfer certificate of title belonging to non-defaulted
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Petition-In-
respondents.[20]
Intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Resolution promulgated on November 20, 2001 is
In view of the annulment of the trial courts Partial Decision MODIFIED as follows: The Decision dated March 21, 1988 of the
with respect to Lot No. 2 originally covered by OCT No. 614, all Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No. Q-
portions of the decision pertaining to Lot No. 2, including that in 35762, is annulled insofar as it concerns Lot No. 2, originally covered
paragraph 1 declaring petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of by OCT No. 614 and Lot No. 3 originally covered by OCT No.
Lot No. 2, is declared void. Likewise, the declaration of nullity of 333. The November 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a G.R. No. 17596 is affirmed in all other respects.
quo concerning Lot No. 3, renders the disposition in paragraph 1
insofar as it affects Lot No. 3, also void. Under the 1997 Rules on As clarified above, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the
Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 47, Section 7 thereof, a judgment of decision of the court a quo is void insofar as it declares petitioners as
annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or absolute owners in fee simple of Lot Nos. 2 and 3.
 The Petition-in-Intervention filed by the World War Veterans
Legionaries of the Philippines is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.