PNCC SKYWAY 213299 Grave Abuse of

CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE Discretion

SECRETARY OF LABOR AND BAUTISTA
EMPLOYMENT AND PNCC SKYWAY
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
UNION, Respondents.
Real parties-in-
ANDY ANG, Petitioner, 208928 interest
vs. BAUTISTA
SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P.
TORRALBA, SUSANA LOBERANES,
CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO, and PEDRITO P.
AZARCON, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
GALILEO P. TORRALBA, Respondents.
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, 157583 BAUTISTA
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN,
QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER
(PHILIPPINES) LIMITED, CO., PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, and DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Respondents.
215820 Pre-trial
ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS and BAUTISTA
her daughters, namely, VIRGINIA, AUREA, and
BINGBING, all surnamed DELOS
SANTOS, Petitioners
vs
ALBERTO ABEJON and the estate of TERESITA
DINGLASAN ABEJON, Respondents
SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE AND BEATRIZ BAUTISTA
DELA CRUZ ROQUE, with deceased Jose C. 193787
Roque represented by his substitute heir JOVETTE
ROQUE-LIBREA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C.
SABUG, JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP),
represented by its Secretary General SHARON
ROSE JOY RUIZ-DUREMDES, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), represented by
Branch Manager EVELYN M. MONTERO, ATTY.
MARIO S.P. DIAZ, in his Official Capacity as
Register of Deeds for Rizal, Morong Branch, and
CECILIO U. PULAN, in his Official Capacity as
Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Binangonan, Rizal,Respondents.
G.R. No. 208928 July 8, 2015

ANDY ANG, vs.SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P. TORRALBA, SUSANA

LOBERANES, CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO, and PEDRITO P. AZARCON,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, GALILEO P. TORRALBA,

Doctrine:

When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action .

Facts

In a land dispute, the RTC concluded that respondents are not the real parties in interest to
institute an action against petitioner, warranting the dismissal of their complaint. The CA agreed
with the RTC's finding that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant case,
considering that, as mere grandchildren of Udiaan, they have no successional rights to Udiaan's
estate. This notwithstanding, the CA nullified the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale because it was
clearly executed by a person other than Udiaan, who died more than 20 years before such sale
occurred.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly declared the nullity of the Questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale and distributed portions of the subject land to different parties, among others, despite ruling
that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant case.

Ruling

Yes, the rule on real parties in interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an
action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. One having no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. Having established that respondents are not the
real parties in interest to the instant suit, the proper course of action was for the CA to merely affirm
the RTC's dismissal of their complaint. It therefore erred in proceeding to resolve the other
substantive issues of the case and granting one of the principal reliefs sought by respondents, which
is the declaration of the nullity of the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. Basic is the rule that no
relief can be extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a case

Dispostivie Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
September 28, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 13, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00992-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Summary
Judgment dated September 12, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 38
in Civil Case No. 2003-115 is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 157583 September 10, 2014

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN,

QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER (PHILIPPINES) LIMITED, CO.,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, and DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,

Doctrine

The right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the
right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of
intervention ceases.

Facts:

This is a direct recourse to the Court via a petition for review on Certiorari. QPL filed a
Complaint for Consignation and Damages before the RTC against the Province of Quezon, the
Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Mauban, Quezon, and the Provincial Assessor and
Provincial Treasurer of Quezon, QPL essentially protested the Municipal Assessor’s assessment
for,among others, its lack of legal authority to make such assessment and its supposed non-
compliance with the prescribed valuation process.

Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention and Answer-in-

Intervention (motion for intervention), alleging, among others, that as a resident and taxpayer of
Quezon Province, he has an interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL. By way
of counterclaim, he prayed for the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees, anchoring the same
on the "mindless disturbance of the forest and marine environment whereon the power plant of
[QPL] stands." Pulgar’s motion was initially granted and his Answer-in Intervention was admitted.

The RTC ruled that it is the Local Board of Assessment Appeals that had jurisdiction over
the complaint. Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgar’s motion for intervention since with the
dismissal of the main case, the samehad no leg to stand on.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar’s motion for intervention as a
consequence of the dismissal of the main case

Ruling:

No, Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.
Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction. The RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of
his intervention. In other words, the cessatiori of the principal litigation - on jurisdictional grounds
at that - means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be
borne in mind that Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to
the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor, unnecessarily delay the placid operation of
the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or
interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect
such right or interests. Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right
of the original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight
for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 215820

ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS and her daughters, namely, VIRGINIA,

AUREA, and BINGBING, all surnamed DELOS SANTOS, vs
ALBERTO ABEJON and the estate of TERESITA DINGLASAN ABEJON,

Doctrine:

Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the
parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More
significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy
disposition of cases.

Facts:

Respondents filed Complaint for Cancellation of Title with collection of sum of money
against Petitioners before the RTC. The complaint alleged that Erlinda and her late husband Pedro
Delos Santos (Pedro) borrowed money from the former's sister, Teresita, as evidenced by a
Promissory Note. As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title. which mortgage was annotated on the title. After Pedro died, Erlinda
ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject land to Teresita. They
executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage, and eventually issued in the name of "Teresita,
Abejon.” In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the spurious Deed of Sale, and
instead, maintained that it was Teresita who fabricated the same and caused its registration before
the Register of Deeds of Makati City. They likewise asserted that Erlinda and Pedro never sold the
subject land to Teresita, and that they did not receive any demand for the payment, representing the
loan, representing the construction cost of the building. Finally, they claimed that the improvements
introduced by Teresita on the subject land were all voluntary on her part.

Issue:

WON the CA correctly held that petitioners should be held liable to respondents.

Ruling:

No, petitioners admitted the existence of the loan obligation as well as respondents' right to
collect on the same, it does not necessarily follow that respondents should collect the loan amount
from petitioners, as concluded by both the RTC and the CA. It must be pointed out that such loan
was contracted by Erlinda, who is only one out of the four herein petitioners, and her deceased
husband, Pedro, during the latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still subsisting. Both the
RTC and the CA erred in holding petitioners liable to respondents for the loan obligatio

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated March

19, 2014 and the Resolution dated December 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
96884 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
G.R. No. 193787 April 7, 2014

SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE AND BEATRIZ DELA CRUZ ROQUE, with deceased Jose
C. Roque represented by his substitute heir JOVETTE ROQUE-LIBREA, vs. MA.
PAMELA P. AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG, JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP), represented by its Secretary General
SHARON ROSE JOY RUIZ-DUREMDES, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(LBP), represented by Branch Manager EVELYN M. MONTERO, ATTY. MARIO S.P.
DIAZ, in his Official Capacity as Register of Deeds for Rizal, Morong Branch, and
CECILIO U. PULAN, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal,

Doctrine:

Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic
rules of fair play and justice.

Facts:

The property subject of this case is a parcel of land with an area of 20,862 square meters (sq.
m.), located in Sitio Tagpos, Barangay Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal, known as Lot 18089. Aguado
obtained an ₱8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) secured by a
mortgage over Lot 18089. When she failed to pay her loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid in the auction sale. Upon
Aguado’s failure to redeem the subject property, Land Bank consolidated its ownership, and TCT
No. M-115895 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003.

On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of real
estate mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate of sale, and damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-022, against Aguado, Sabug, Jr., NCCP, Land Bank, the Register of Deeds of Morong,
Rizal, and Sheriff Cecilio U. Pulan, seeking to be declared as the true owners of the subject portion
which had been erroneously included in the sale between Aguado and Sabug, Jr., and, subsequently,
the mortgage to Land Bank, both covering Lot 18089 in its entirety.

In opposition to the CA decision, Land Bank espouses that the instant petition should be
dismissed for raising questions of fact, in violation of the proscription under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which allows only pure questions of law to be raised. Moreover, it denied that ownership over
the subject portion had been acquired by Sps. Roque who admittedly failed to pay the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Besides, Land Bank points out that Sps. Roque’s action for
reconveyance had already prescribed

Issue:

Whether or not Sps. Roque have acquired the subject land thru prescription

Ruling:
 Finally, regarding Sps. Roque’s claims of acquisitive prescription and reimbursement for the
value of the improvements they have introduced on the subject property, it is keenly observed that
none of the arguments therefor were raised before the trial court or the CA. Accordingly, the Court
applies the well-settled rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this
would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. In any event, such claims appear to involve
questions of fact which are generally prohibited under a Rule 45 petition.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 12, 2010 and the
Resolution dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 92113 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 213299, April 19, 2016

PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

AND PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondents.

Doctrine:

When, a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law, or existing
jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is committed,63 as in this case.

Facts:

On December 28, 2007, issued termination letters to its employees and filed a notice of
closure with the DOLE - National Capital Region, advising them that it shall cease to operate and
maintain the Skyway, and that the services of the employees would be consequently terminated
effective January 31, 2008. In this regard, PSC offered its employees a separation package consisting
of 250% of their basic monthly salary for every year of service, gratuity pay of P40,000.00 each,
together with all other remaining benefits such as 13th month pay, rice subsidy, cash conversion of
leave credits, and medical reimbursement. On the same date, the PSC Employees Union (PSCEU)
filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice resulting in union busting and
dismissal of workers. On December 31, 2007, the DOLE Secretary intervened and assumed
jurisdiction over the labor incident and ordered PSC to pay its terminated employees P30,000.00
each as indemnity after finding that the notices of their dismissal were invalid, CA Affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the DOLE Secretary's ruling that PSC failed to
comply with the 30-day notice requirement under Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor
Code, as amended.

Ruling:

Yes, hence there is no basis to award any indemnity in favor of PSC's terminated employees.
PSC complied with the mandated thirty (30)-day notice requirement. Although PSC informed its
employees that it would be turning over its operations to SOMCO not earlier than December 31,
2007, they were duly notified that the effective date of their termination was set on January 31, 2008.
In light of valid business reasons, i.e., the transfer of operations to SOMCO pursuant to the
ASTOA, PSC asked its employees not to report for work beginning December 31, 2007 but were
still retained on payroll until January 31, 2008. Evidently, their employment with PSC did not cease
by the sole reason that they were told not to render any service.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2013 and
the Resolution dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111201 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.