EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,[1] dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the
Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3
of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed
with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in
Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they
did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of
NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS
(P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount
of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse,
give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank
for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the
accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been
closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated
amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and
7070 are similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number,
date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount
of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount
of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26,
1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam.
He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico[6] and Evangeline Ladonga became
his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55
loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8] sometime
in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by
UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third
loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11] when the Ladonga
spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there
was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses
claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature;[13] and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no
participation in the issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga
spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico
Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and
accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of
them, and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1)
year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744;
and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of
them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse
the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00 representing actual
expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and
the amount of P30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks
which bounced; but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand,
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred
in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle
of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover,
she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof.[17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.[18] It held that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable
to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, [19] U.S.
vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article 10 of the Revised
Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special
laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that
since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy
may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that
the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not
exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone
performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one
conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR
ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED
HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF
ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS
CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS
APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and
issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven
by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of
conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not
provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are
applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses
which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to
such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal
laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said
clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special
legal provisions prevail over general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant generali.
In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The
main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code
shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically
provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs.
Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the
suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special
laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22[28] of the
Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the
retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs.
Ponte involved the application of Article 17[29] of the same Penal Code, with
reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S.
vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with reference to the
confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium
Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P.
Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case
of Yu vs. People,[31]the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is
analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17
in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since
all the conspirators are principals.[33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute
or implement the criminal plan.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed
any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone
prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely
present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal
Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also
did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did not specify the
nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a
direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or
cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt
act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.[38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance
of the common design and purpose.[39]
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs.
Mandao:[40]
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at
every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances;
as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to
prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and
simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a
judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecutions
evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-
appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal liability on its
sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of
the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty --
not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even
when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all
criminal cases. (Citations omitted)[41]
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with
moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for
conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners
innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision,
dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming
the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3),
Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P.
Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No.
284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter,
without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up
the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give
and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however,
upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the
reason that the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the other hand, petitioner brought
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring
with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.
ISSUE:
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as conspirator
applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is applicable?
RULING:
A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence
in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition
regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the
RPC supplementary to such laws
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus,
in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the
RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the
provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent
or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals. BUT In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt
act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
