G.R. No. 211140. January 12, 2016.

*
 
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE,   JR.,   SECRETARY   GENERAL   MARILYN 1 B.   BARUA­YAP   and
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases; A petition for
quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well­founded,
or   if   he   has   forfeited   his   right   to   enjoy   the   privilege.—A   petition   for quo   warranto is   a
proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well­founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he
must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a
right to the undisturbed possession of  the  office.  In this case, given the present factual
milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; ( ii) the
final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13­053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s
Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in
SPC No. 13­010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco
as the  winning candidate for the position of  Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for
herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the
respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
Same; Same; Mandamus; A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the
subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well­defined, clear and certain right
_______________

*  EN BANC.
1  Originally cited as “Emilia.”
 
 
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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
to warrant the grant thereof.—Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
provides that any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the   law   specifically   enjoins   as   a   duty   resulting   from   an   office,   trust,   or   station,   or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.” A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof
is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well­defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.
Same;   Same;   Same;   “Ministerial   Act”   and   “Discretionary   Act,”   Distinguished.—The
difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty   shall   be   performed,   such   duty   is   discretionary   and   not   ministerial.   The   duty   is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.

BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
 
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; View that the writ of mandamus is
an extraordinary remedy issued only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary course
of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal
right to the performance of the act to be compelled.—Mandamus is a command issuing from
a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to
 some    inferior   court,   tribunal,   or   board,   or   to   some   corporation   or   person,   requiring   the
performance   of   a   particular   duty   therein   specified,   which   duty   results   from   the   official
station   of   the   party   to   whom   the   writ   is   directed,   or   from   operation   of   law.   The   writ
of mandamusis an extraordinary remedy issued only in cases of extreme necessity where
the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one
who has a clear legal right to the perform­
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 83
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
ance of the act to be compelled. As a peremptory writ, mandamus must be issued with
utmost circumspection, and should always take into consideration existing laws, rules and
jurisprudence   on   the   matter,   particularly   the   principles   underlying   our   Constitution.
Moreover,   the   remedy   of mandamus is   employed   to   compel   the   performance   of
a ministerial duty after performance of the duty has been refused. As a rule, it cannot be
used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion; if at all, the obligated official carrying
the duty can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act in a particular way. The
courts can only interfere when the refusal to act already constitutes inaction amounting to
grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, palpable excess of authority, or other causes
affecting jurisdiction.
 Same; Same; Same; View that the person aggrieved by the unlawful neglect or unlawful
exclusion   of   the   tribunal,   corporation,   board,   officer,   or   person   may   file   the   petition   for
mandamus   with   the   proper   court.—In   this   jurisdiction,   the   remedy   of mandamus is
governed by Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3, mandamus is the
remedy available when “a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, [and], there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.” The person aggrieved by the unlawful neglect or
unlawful   exclusion   of   the   tribunal,   corporation,   board,   officer,   or   person   may   file   the
petition for mandamus with the proper court.
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; View that the
majority in Reyes v. COMELEC, 699 SCRA 522 (2013), required the concurrence of all three
(3) events — proclamation, oath, and assumption to office — to trigger the jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) over election contests relating to the
winning candidate’s election, returns, and qualifications. All 3 events duly took place in the
case of respondent Reyes, such that the HRET at this point should have jurisdiction over
questions   relating   to   respondent   Reyes’   election,   even   on   the   basis   of   the   majority’s   own
standards.—If only for emphasis, I call attention again to the fact that as of June 30, 2013,
Reyes had been proclaimed, had taken her oath, and assumed office as the elected and
 
 
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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
proclaimed Representative of Marinduque. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that the Electoral  Tribunal  of  the HOR shall  be the “sole judge  of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of [its] Members.” I highlight, too, that
in Reyes   v.   COMELEC,   699   SCRA   522   (2013),   the   majority   declared   that   a   winning
candidate becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET only after he or she becomes a
member of the HOR. The majority stressed that a candidate becomes a member of the
HOR only after he or she has been proclaimed, taken his or her oath, and assumed
the office. In other words, the majority in Reyes v. COMELEC, required the concurrence of
all three events — proclamation, oath, and assumption to office — to trigger the jurisdiction
of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s election, returns,
and qualifications. All three events duly took place in the case of respondent Reyes,
such   that   the   HRET   at   this   point   should   have   jurisdiction   over   questions   relating   to
respondent Reyes’ election, even on the basis of the majority’s own standards.
Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC),   by   express   constitutional   mandate,   has   no   jurisdiction   over   the   election,
returns,  and qualifications of  members of  the House of  Representatives (HOR)  (or  of the
Senate)   as   Article   VI   vests   this   jurisdiction   with   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) (or the Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]).—Under Section 2(2), Article IX­
C   of   the   Constitution,   the   COMELEC   has   the   “exclusive   jurisdiction   over   all   contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
 and   city   officials  x x x.”   In   other   words,   the   Constitution   vests   the   COMELEC   this
exclusive   jurisdiction   only   with   respect   to elective   regional,   provincial,   and   city
officials. The  COMELEC,   by   express   constitutional   mandate,   has   no  jurisdiction
over the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the HOR (or of the
Senate)   as   Article   VI   vests   this   jurisdiction   with   the   HRET   (or   the   SET).   The
validity of the proclamation of respondent Reyes who became a member of the HOR on
June 30, 2013, and the right of either respondent Reyes or Velasco to hold the contested
congressional   seat   are election   contests relating   to   a   Member’s   election,   returns,   and
qualifications. By Reyes v. COMELEC’s own defined standard, the jurisdiction over these
election
 
 
85
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 85
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
contests affecting respondent Reyes already rested with the HRET beginning June 30,
2013.
Same;   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal;   View   that   any   other   legal
significance which these rulings may have on the right of either Reyes or Velasco to the
congressional   seat   must   now   be   left   to   the   judgment   and   discretion   of   the   House   of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which must appreciate them in a properly filed
action.—Any other legal significance which these rulings may have on the right of either
Reyes or Velasco to the congressional seat must now be left to the judgment and discretion
of the HRET which must appreciate them in a properly filed action. Additionally and finally
on   this   point,   the   HRET   now   has   jurisdiction   to   rule   upon all   questions relating   to
respondent Reyes’ election, returns, and qualifications that may still be fit and proper for
its resolution in accordance with existing laws and its own rules of procedure. This Court
itself cannot assume jurisdiction over any aspect of HRET jurisdiction unless it relates to a
matter filed or pending with us on a properly filed petition, taking into account the clear
conferment and delineation of the Court’s jurisdiction and those of the HRET under the
Constitution.
Same; Salaries; View that the right to receive the salaries, allowances, bonuses, and
emoluments that pertain to an office must be received by one who actually perform the duties
called   for   by   the   office;   Velasco   may   be   qualified   for   the   office.   His   right   to   hold   the
congressional   seat,   however,   is   at   most   substantially   doubtful   or   in   substantial   dispute;
worse, he has not performed the duties of the office. In short, Reyes’ receipt of the salaries,
etc. that pertain to the congressional seat obviously could not have worked injustice to and
seriously prejudiced him.—I find tenuous Velasco’s claim that Reyes’ continued holding of
the contested Congressional seat has “worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in
that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain
to the [office] since June 30, 2013 up to the present x x x.” This argument clearly forgets that
public office is a public trust. Public service and public duty are and must be the primary
and utmost consideration in entering the public service. Any remuneration, salaries, and
benefits that a public officer or employee receives in return must be a consideration merely
secondary   to  public   service.   Accordingly,   any   salary,   allowance,   bonus,   and   emoluments
pertaining to an office
 
 
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86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
must be received by one who is not only qualified for the office, but by one whose right
to the office is clearly and unmistakably without doubt and beyond dispute. In the case of
an elective public office, this right is, at the very least, established by the mandate of the
majority of the electorate. More importantly, of course, the right to receive the salaries,
allowances, bonuses, and emoluments that pertain to an office must be received by one who
actually perform the duties called for by the office. Here, Velasco may be qualified for the
office. His right to hold the congressional seat, however, is at most substantially doubtful or
in substantial dispute; worse, he has not performed the duties of the office. In short, Reyes’
receipt of the salaries, etc. that pertain to the congressional seat obviously could not have
worked injustice to and seriously prejudiced him.
Same;   Mandamus;  View  that   petitioner  Velasco failed  to  show   that  the   respondents
have the clear and specific legal duty to allow a second­placer candidate like him whose
right to the contested congressional seat is substantially doubtful, to assume the office until
such   time   that   all   doubts   are   resolved   in   his   favor.   Thus,   in   the   absence   of   any   law
specifically requiring Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap to act, and to act in a
particularly   clear   manner,   the   Supreme   Court   (SC)   cannot   compel   these   respondents   to
undertake the action that Velasco prays for via a writ of mandamus.—I submit that Velasco
likewise failed to show that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap have the clear and
specific duty, founded in law, to administer the required oath, to allow Velasco to assume
the duties of the office, and to register his name in the Roll of Members as the duly elected
Representative   of   Marinduque.   He   also   failed   to   show   that   the   respondents   unlawfully
refused or neglected to admit him as member. At the very least, he failed to show that the
respondents have the clear and specific legal duty to allow a second­placer candidate like
him whose right to the contested congressional seat is substantially doubtful, to assume the
office until such time that all doubts are resolved in his favor. Thus, in the absence of any
law specifically requiring Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap to act, and to act in a
particularly clear manner, the Court cannot  compel these respondents  to undertake the
action that Velasco prays for viaa writ of mandamus. Additionally, the HOR in this case
simply acted pursuant to law and jurisprudence when it admitted respondent Reyes as the
duly elected Representative of Marinduque. After this admission, the HOR and its officers
cannot be compelled to
 
 
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Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
remove  her without   an  order  from  the tribunal  having  the  exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve all contests affecting HOR members, of which Reyes has become one. This tribunal,
of course, is the HOR’s own HRET.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; View that since Reyes
is a member of the House of Representatives (HOR), any challenge against her right to hold
the   congressional   seat   or   which   may   have   the   effect   of   removing   her   from   the   office   —
whether pertaining to her election, returns or qualifications — now rests with the House of
Representatives Electoral  Tribunal  (HRET).—Since Reyes  is a member  of the HOR,  any
challenge against her right to hold the congressional seat or which may have the effect of
removing her from the office — whether pertaining to her election, returns or qualifications
— now rests with the HRET. Viewed by itself and in relation to the surrounding cited cases
and circumstances, Velasco’s present petition cannot but be a challenge against respondent
Reyes’   election,   returns,   and   qualifications,   hiding   behind   the   cloak   of   a   petition
for mandamus.   In   other   words,   although   presented   as   a   petition   that   simply   seeks   to
enforce a final Court ruling, the petition is an original one that ultimately seeks to oust
Reyes from the congressional seat. The relationships between and among the cited cases
and  the  present  case,  read  in  relation with  the  relevant   developments,  all   point  to this
conclusion. Thus, rather than recognize this roundabout manner of contesting respondent
Reyes’ seat, the Court should recognize this kind of challenge for  what it really is — a
challenge that properly belongs to the domain of the HRET and one that should be raised
before   that   tribunal   through   the   proper   action.   The   Court,   in   other   words,   should
acknowledge that it has no jurisdiction to act on the present petition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the admission of a member and his or her exclusion is
primarily an internal affair that the House of Representatives (HOR) should first resolve
before this Court should step in through the coercive power of a writ of mandamus.—To
state  the  obvious,   the  admission   of   a   member   and   his   or   her   exclusion   is   primarily  an
internal affair that the HOR should first resolve before this Court should step in through
the   coercive   power   of   a   writ   of mandamus.   The   principles   of   separation   of   powers   and
judicial   noninterference  demand   that   the  Court   respect   and  give  due   recognition  to  the
HOR in its internal affairs. By granting the petition and
 
 
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88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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 issuing   a   writ   of mandamus,   the   Court,   not   only   disrespects   the   HOR,   but   sows
confusion as well into the HRET’s jurisdiction — a jurisprudential minefield in the coming
elections.
Political Law; Separation of Powers; View that underlying the principle of separation of
powers   is   the   general   scheme   that   each   department   is   supreme   within   their   respective
spheres of influence, and the exercise of their powers to the full extent cannot be questioned
by another department.—The Constitution does not specifically provide for the principle of
separation of powers. Instead of a distinct express provision, the Constitution divides the
governmental powers among the three branches — the legislative, the executive, and the
judiciary. Under this framework, the Constitution confers on the Legislature the duty to
make the law, on the Executive the duty to execute the law, and on the Judiciary the duty
to   construe   and   apply   the   law.   Underlying   the   principle   of   separation   of   powers   is   the
general   scheme   that   each   department   is   supreme   within   their   respective   spheres   of
influence,   and   the   exercise   of   their   powers   to   the   full   extent   cannot   be   questioned   by
another   department.   Outside   of   these   spheres,   neither   of   the   great   governmental
departments   has   any   power;   and   neither   may   any   of   them   validly   exercise   any   of   the
powers   conferred   upon   the   others.   Thus,   as   a   fundamental   principle,   the   separation   of
powers provides that each of the three departments of our government is distinct and not
directly subject to the control of another department. The power to control is the power to
abrogate;  and  the  power  to abrogate  is  the power  to  usurp.  In  short,  for  one branch  to
control  the  other  is to usurp  its power.  In this  situation,  the exercise  of  control  by one
department over another would clearly violate the principle of separation of powers.
Remedial   Law;   Special   Civil   Actions;   Mandamus;   View   that   as   a   general   rule,
mandamus will not lie against a coordinate branch.—As a general rule, mandamus will
not lie against a coordinate branch. The rule proceeds from the obvious reason that
none   of
the three departments is inferior to the others; by its very nature, the writ of       mandamus   is
 available against an    inferior   court, tribunal, body, corporation, or person. With respect to
a   coordinate   andcoequal   branch,   the   issuance   can   be   justified   only   under   the   Court’s
expanded jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and under the most
compelling   circumstancesand equitable   reasons.   I   submit   that   no   grave   abuse   of
discretion intervened
 
 
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in the present case to justify resort to the Court’s expanded jurisdiction. Neither are
there compelling and equitable reasons to justify a grant as there is a remedy in law
that was available to petitioner Velasco (for reasons of his own, he has failed to pursue
the remedy before the HRET to its full fruition) and that is available now — to present
the final rulings in the cited HRET cases to the HOR for its own action on an internal
matter it zealously guards.
 Same; Same; Same; Election Law; View that the exclusion of sitting members and the
admission of replacement members — are not ministerial acts for which mandamus will lie.
—Notably,   under   the   attendant   facts,   significantly   altered   by   the   intervening   factual
developments and the consequent legal considerations, the acts sought to be performed —
the exclusion of sitting members and the admission of replacement members — are not
ministerial acts for which mandamus will lie. That much is implied, if not directly held, as
early   as Angara   v.   Electoral   Commission,   63   Phil.   139   (1936),   and   many   other   cases
relating   to   this   situation   followed.   Their   common   thread   is   that Congress   takes   the
admission (or exclusion) of its members as a very serious concern that is reserved
for   itself   to   decide,   save   only   when   a   superior   law   or   ruling   with   undoubted
validity intervenes. Such freedom from doubt, however, is not apparent in the present
petition.
Same;   Same;   Same;   View   that   in   situations   where   the   constitutional   separation­of­
powers principle is involved, mandamus, as a rule, will not lie against a coequal branch
notwithstanding the petitioner’s compliance with the requirements necessary for its grant, as
discussed above.—In any case, mandamus is, by its nature, a discretionary remedy that can
be denied when no compelling equitable grounds exist. In particular, in situations where
the constitutional separation­of­powers principle is involved, mandamus, as a rule, will not
lie   against   a   coequal   branch   notwithstanding   the   petitioner’s   compliance   with   the
requirements necessary for its grant, as discussed above. To justify the issuance of the writ,
the   petitioner   must   not   only   comply   with   the   requirements;   the   petitioner   must,   more
importantly,   show   that mandamus is demanded   by   the   most   compelling   reasons   or
circumstances   and   by   the   demands   of   equity.   These   exception­inducing   factors,   as
discussed above, are simply not present in this case.
 
 
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PEREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; View that the present petition seeks
the “enforcement of clear legal duties” as it does not seek to try disputed title. It no longer
puts in issue the validity of Reyes’s claim to office — a question that has long been resolved
by   the   Supreme   Court   (SC)   in   its   twin   Resolutions   in   the   antecedent   case   of Reyes   v.
COMELEC,   699   SCRA   522; 708   SCRA   197   (2013).—While quo
warranto and mandamus are   often   concurrent   remedies,   there   exists   a   clear   distinction
between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the
right   to   an   office   or   franchise   and   to   oust   the   holder   from   its   enjoyment,
while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties. In the case at bench, I concur with
the ponencia that the present petition seeks the “enforcement of clear legal duties” as it
does not seek to try disputed title. It no longer puts in issue the validity of Reyes’s claim to
office — a question that has long been resolved by the Court in its twin Resolutions in the
antecedent case of Reyes v. COMELEC, 699 SCRA 522; 708 SCRA 197 (2013), docketed as
G.R.   No.   207264,   wherein   the   Court   sustained   the   polling   commission’s   cancellation   of
respondent Reyes’ Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) on the ground that she does not possess
the necessary eligibility to hold elective office as a member of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is a fundamental precept in remedial law that for the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that the petitioner has a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform   the   act   required.—It   is   a   fundamental   precept   in   remedial   law   that   for   the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that the petitioner has a clear
legal   right   to   the   thing   demanded and it   must   be the   imperative   duty   of   the
respondent to perform the act required. As will be demonstrated, it is beyond cavil
that the dual elements for the mandamus petition to prosper evidently obtain in the case at
bar.
Election Law; View that upon resolving with finality that Reyes is ineligible to run for
Congress   and   that   her   Certificate   of   Candidacy   (CoC)   is   a   nullity,   the   only   logical
consequence is to declare Velasco, Reyes’ only political rival in the congressional race, as the
victor in the polling exercise.—Upon resolving with finality that Reyes is
 
 
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ineligible   to   run   for   Congress   and   that   her   CoC   is   a   nullity,   the   only   logical
consequence is to declare Velasco, Reyes’ only political rival in the congressional race, as
the   victor   in   the   polling   exercise.   This   finds   basis   in   the   seminal   case   of  Aratea   v.
COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012), wherein it was held that a void CoC cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Hence, as concluded in Aratea: Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was cancelled, because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor.   Whether  his  certificate   of   candidacy   is   cancelled   before   or   after   the  elections   is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from
the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one
qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections — Antipolo, who therefore received
the highest number of votes. Thus, notwithstanding the margin of votes Reyes garnered
over Velasco, the votes cast in her favor are considered strays since she is not eligible for
the congressional post, a noncandidate in the bid for the coveted seat of Representative for
the Lone District of Marinduque. Following the doctrinal teaching in Aratea, Velasco, as the
only   remaining   qualified   candidate   in   the   congressional   race,   is,   for   all   intents   and
purposes, the rightful member of the lower house.
Same; Considering that Reyes’ Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) was cancelled and was
deemed   void   ab   initio   by   virtue   of   the   final   and   executory   decisions   rendered   by   the
Commission  on Elections (COMELEC) and this Court, Velasco is a not second­placer as
claimed by the Dissent; rather, Velasco is the only placer and the winner during the May
elections and thus, for all intents and purposes, Velasco has a clear legal right to office as
Representative   of   the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque.—Considering   that   Reyes’   CoC   was
cancelled   and   was   deemed   void ab   initio by   virtue   of   the   final   and   executory   decisions
rendered by the COMELEC and this Court, Velasco is a not second­placer as claimed by the
Dissent; rather, Velasco is the only placer and the winner during the May elections and
thus, for all intents and purposes, Velasco has a clear legal right to office as Representative
of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Same;   View   that   by   lodging   a   petition   for   denial   or   cancellation   of   Certificate   of
Candidacy (CoC), a voter seeks to ensure that the candidate who purports to be qualified to
represent his or her constituents is indeed eligible to do so.—By lodging a petition for denial
 
 
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or cancellation of CoC, a voter seeks to ensure that the candidate who purports to be
qualified   to   represent   his   or   her   constituents   is   indeed   eligible   to   do   so.   Such   petition,
therefore, is for and in benefit of the electorate, and not for one’s personal advantage. This
is in clear consonance with the aforequoted rule, which never required the petition to be
filed by a candidate’s political rival. Otherwise stated, it is not required for petitioner Tan
in SPA No. 13­053 to have a claim to the contested electoral post to be permitted by law to
challenge the validity of Reyes’ CoC. At the same time, petitioner Velasco herein is not
under any legal obligation to intervene in SPA No. 13­053 and G.R. No. 207264 before he
could benefit directly or indirectly from the ruling. Unlike civil cases which only involve
private   rights,   petitions   to   deny   or   cancel   certificates   of   candidacy   are   so   imbued   with
public interest that they cannot be deemed binding only to the parties thereto. Indeed, it
would be an absurd situation, after all, to declare Reyes ineligible only insofar as Tan is
concerned, and presumed eligible as to the rest of the Marinduqueños, including Velasco.
Same; Mandamus; View that contrary to the opinion espoused in the Dissent, Sec. 3,
Rule   65   merely   requires   the   applicant   to establish   a   clear   legal   right   to   the   ministerial
function to be performed, without distinction on whether this right emanates from a final
judgment in a prior case or not.—For a petition for mandamus to prosper, Sec. 3, Rule 65 of
the   Rules   of   Court   provides: Section   3. Petition   for   mandamus.—When   any   tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the   law   specifically   enjoins   as   a   duty   resulting   from   an   office,   trust,   or   station,   or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. Apparently, there is
nothing   in   foregoing   provision   which   requires   that   the   person   applying   for   a   writ
of mandamusshould establish that he or she was the prevailing party­litigant to a prior
case (i.e., a petitioner, respondent or an intervenor) to be entitled to
 
 
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the writ’s issuance. Contrary to the opinion espoused in the Dissent, Sec. 3, Rule 65
merely requires the applicant to establish a clear legal right to the ministerial function to
be performed, without distinction on whether this right emanates from a final judgment in
a prior case or not. Thus, there is no basis to the opinion that Velasco should have been a
party in Reyes in order for this Court to grant of a writ of mandamus in his favor.
Same; Same; View   that petitioner herein seeks the performance of a ministerial act,
without which he is unjustly deprived of the enjoyment of an office that he is clearly entitled
to.—Anent   the   second   element   for mandamus to   lie,   it   is   critical   that   the   duty   the
performance of which is to be compelled be ministerial in nature, rather than discretionary.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.   The   writ   neither   confers   powers   nor   imposes   duties.   It   is   simply   a   command   to
exercise   a   power   already   possessed   and   to   perform   a   duty   already   imposed.   Without   a
doubt, petitioner herein seeks the performance of a ministerial act, without which he is
unjustly   deprived   of   the  enjoyment   of   an   office   that   he  is   clearly  entitled   to,   as   earlier
discussed. It must be borne in mind that this petition was brought to fore because, despite
repeated demands from petitioner and their receipt of the “Certificate of Canvass of Votes
and   Proclamation   of   Winning   Candidate   for   the   position   of   Member   of   House   of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque,” respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap
refused to  allow  Velasco to sit   in  the  Lower  House as   Marinduque Representative.  The
nondiscretionary   function   of   respondents   Belmonte   and   Barua­Yap   is   underscored
in Codilla,   Sr.   v.   De   Venecia,   393   SCRA   639   (2002),
wherein the Court held that the House Speaker and the Secretary General of the Lower
House are duty­bound to recognize the legally elected district representatives as members
of the House of Representatives.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; View
that under the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
 
 
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 Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.—
As in Codilla, the fact of Reyes’ disqualification can no longer be disputed herein, in view of
the   consecutive   rulings   of   the   COMELEC   and   the   Court   in   SPA   No.   13­053,   G.R.   No.
207624, and SPA No. 13­010. Reyes’ ineligibility and Velasco’s consequent membership in
the Lower House is then beyond the discretion of respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap,
and the rulings upholding the same must therefore be recognized and respected. To hold
otherwise   —   that   the   Court   is   not   precluded   from   entertaining   questions   on   Reyes’
eligibility to occupy Marinduque’s congressional seat — would mean substantially altering,
if  not   effectively  vacating,   Our ruling  in Reyes that   has   long  attained  finality,   a  blatant
violation of the immutability of judgments. Under the doctrine, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even   if   the   modification  is   meant   to   correct   erroneous   conclusions   of   fact   and   law,   and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act   which   violates   this   principle   must   immediately   be   struck   down.   Justice   Leonen,
however, urges this Court to revisit, nay relitigate, Reyes two (2) years after the date of its
finality and abandon the same, in clear contravention of the doctrine of immutability and
finality of Supreme Court decisions.
Election   Law;   Second   Placer   Rule;   Mandamus;   View   that   synthesizing Aratea   v.
COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012), with Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, 393 SCRA 639 (2002),
petitioner Velasco may now successfully invoke the qualified second­placer rule to prove the
certainty of his claim to office, and compel the respondent Speaker and Secretary General to
administer   his   oath   and   include   his   name   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   of
Representatives.—That   the   second­placer   rule   was   not   yet   abandoned   when Codilla was
decided   is   inconsequential   in   this   case.   As   earlier   discussed,   what   is   of   significance
in Codilla is the certainty on who the rightful holder of the elective post is. It may be that
when Codilla was  decided,  plurality  of  votes and successional rights,  in disqualifications
cases,   may   have   been   the   key   considerations,   but   as   jurisprudence   has   been   enriched
by Aratea and by the subsequent cases that followed, the qualified second­placer rule was
added to the enumeration. Synthesizing Aratea with Codilla, petitioner Velasco may now
successfully invoke the qualified second­placer rule to prove the certainty of his claim to
 
 
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office, and compel the respondent Speaker and Secretary General to administer his
oath and include his name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. With
the presence of the twin requirements, the extraordinary writ of mandamus must be issued
in the case at bar.
 Same; Commission on Elections; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
is the proper entity that can legally and validly nullify the acts of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC).—The Dissent also claims that when respondent Reyes was proclaimed
by the PBOC as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque of May
18,   2013,   petitioner   Velasco   should   have   continued   his   election   protest via a quo
warranto petition before the HRET. This suggestion is legally flawed considering that the
HRET is without authority to review, modify, more so annul, the illegal acts of PBOC. On
the contrary, this authority is lodged with the COMELEC and is incidental to its power of
“direct control and supervision over the Board of Canvassers.” Therefore, the COMELEC is
the proper entity that can legally and validly nullify the acts of the PBOC.
Same; View that it is of no moment that there are two (2) quo warranto cases currently
pending   before   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   (HRET)   that   seek   to
disqualify   Reyes   from   holding   the   congressional   office. These   cases   cannot   oust   the
Commission  on  Elections (COMELEC)  and  the  Supreme  Court  (SC)  of  their  jurisdiction
over the issue on Reyes’ eligibility, which they have already validly acquired and exercised
in SPA No. 13­053 and Reyes.—It is of no moment that there are two quo warranto cases
currently   pending   before   the   HRET   that   seek   to   disqualify   Reyes   from   holding   the
congressional   office.   These   cases   cannot   oust   the   COMELEC   and   the   Court   of   their
jurisdiction over the issue on Reyes’ eligibility, which they have already validly acquired
and   exercised   in   SPA   No.   13­053   and Reyes.   The   petitioners   in   the quo   warranto cases
themselves recognize the enforceability of the COMELEC and the Court’s ruling in SPA No.
13­053   and Reyes,   and   even   invoked   the   rulings   therein   to   support   their   respective
petitions. They seek not a trial de novo for the determination of whether or not Reyes is
eligible   to   hold   office   as   Representative,   but   seek   the   implementation   of   the   final   and
executory decisions of the COMELEC and of the High Court. Interestingly, Reyes merely
prayed for the dismissal of these cases, but never asked the HRET for any affirmative relief
to counter the
 
 
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96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
executory rulings in SPA No. 13­053, G.R. No. 207264, and SPA No. 13­010.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election   Law;   Election   Contests;   View   that   an   election   contest,   whether   an   election
protest or petition for quo warranto, is a remedy “to dislodge the winning candidate from
office” and “to establish who is the actual winner in the election.”—The power to be the “sole
judge”   of   all   these   contests   is   vested   by   our   Constitution   itself   in   the   House   of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal to the exclusion of all others. The Constitution clearly
provides: SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral  Tribunal  which  shall   be the  sole  judge  of   all   contests   relating  to the  election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of  Representatives,  as  the  case  may  be,  who  shall  be  chosen  on the basis  of
proportional   representation   from   the   political   parties   and   the   parties   or   organizations
registered   under   the   party­list   system   represented   therein.   The   senior   Justice   in   the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. An election contest, whether an election protest
or petition for quo warranto, is a remedy “to dislodge the winning candidate from office”
and “to establish who is the actual winner in the election.” The action puts in issue the
validity of the incumbent’s claim to the office.
Same; Same; View that while the petitions for quo warranto were pending before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), the Supreme Court (SC) did not have
the   jurisdiction   to   rule   on   this   Petition   for   Mandamus.—A   contest   contemplated   by   the
Constitution settles disputes as to who is rightfully entitled to a position. It is not this court
but the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has sole jurisdiction of contests
involving   Members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   This   can   be   filed   through   (a)   an
election protest under Rule 16 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal;   and   (b) quo   warranto under   Rule   17   of   the   2011   Rules   of   the   House   of
Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal.   Thus,   while   the   petitions   for quo   warranto were
pending before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this court
 
 
97
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 97
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
did not have the jurisdiction to rule on this Petition for Mandamus. A grant of the writ
of mandamus would   have   openly   defied   the   Constitution   and,   in   all   likelihood,   would
muddle   the   administration   of   justice   as   it   would   have   rendered   the quo   warranto cases
properly   pending   before   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   moot   and
academic. We would have arrogated upon ourselves the resolution of then pending House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal cases.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; View that any alleged
invalidity of the proclamation of a Member of the House of Representatives (HOR) does not
divest the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) of jurisdiction.—When Reyes
was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Representative of
the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque   on   May   18,   2013,   Velasco   should   have   continued   his
election   protest   or   filed   a quo   warranto Petition   before   the   House   of   Representatives
Electoral   Tribunal.   Instead,   Velasco   filed   a   Petition   to   annul   the   proceedings   of   the
Provincial Board of Canvassers and the proclamation of Reyes on May 20, 2013 before the
Commission   on   Elections.   At   that   time,   the   Commission   on   Elections   no   longer   had
jurisdiction   over   the   Petition   that   was   filed   after   Reyes’   proclamation.   Any   alleged
invalidity of the proclamation of a Member of the House of Representatives does not divest
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal of jurisdiction.
 Same; Same; Same; View that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
is the sole judge of contests involving Members of the House of Representatives (HOR).—The
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of contests involving Members
of the House of Representatives. This is a power conferred by the sovereign through our
Constitution. Again, as in my dissent in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 197
(2013):   This   Court   may   obtain   jurisdiction   over   questions   regarding   the   validity   of   the
proclamation of a candidate vying for  a seat  in Congress without  encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of a constitutional body, the electoral tribunal. “[The remedies of] certiorari and
prohibition will not lie in this case [to annul the proclamation of a candidate] considering
that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; [that is, the
filing of an electoral protest before the electoral tribunals].” These remedies, however, may
lie
 
 
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
only after a ruling by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal or the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.
Same;   Second­Placer   Rule;   View   that   if   the   Certificate   of   Candidacy   (CoC)   of   the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes was void ab initio, the votes of the candidate
should be considered stray and not counted. This would entitle the candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to the position.—Aratea v. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA
105   (2012),   qualified   the   second­placer   rule.   The   candidate   receiving   the   next   highest
number  of  votes would  be entitled  to the position  if  the Certificate of  Candidacy  of  the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes had been initially declared valid at the
time   of   filing   but   had   to   be   subsequently   cancelled.   Additionally,   if   the   Certificate   of
Candidacy of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes was void ab initio, the
votes of the candidate should be considered stray and not counted. This would entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to the position.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Marcelino Michael I. Atanante IV for petitioner.
  Roger R. Rayel for respondent Regina Ongsiako Reyes.
LEONARDO­DE CASTRO, J.:
In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one
party is the son of a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring
what ought to be done as dictated by law and justice solely for that reason.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon.
Marilyn   B.   Barua­Yap   (Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap), Secretary   General,   House   of
Representatives,   and   Hon.   Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes   (Reyes), Representative,   Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.
 
 
99
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 99
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Velasco principally alleges that he is the “legal and rightful winner during the
May  13,  2013  elections  in  accordance  with  final  and  executory  resolutions  of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court”;2 thus, he seeks
the following reliefs:
 
a.   that   a   WRIT   OF MANDAMUS against   the   HON.   SPEAKER
FELICIANO   BELMONTE,   JR.   be   issued   ordering   said   respondent   to
administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco
for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; and
allow petitioner to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and
exercise   the   powers   and   prerogatives   of   said   position   of   Marinduque
representative;
b.   that   a   WRIT   OF MANDAMUS against   SECRETARY­GENERAL
[MARILYN] BARUA­YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the
name   of   Regina   O.   Reyes   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   of
Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco, herein petitioner, in her stead; and
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN,
PREVENT   and   PROHIBIT   respondent   REGINA   ONGSIAKO   REYES   from
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of said
position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to
IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position.3

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
_______________

2  Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), pp. 3­4.
3  Id., at pp. 25­26.
 
 
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
On   October   10,   2012,   one   Joseph   Socorro   Tan   (Tan),   a   registered   voter   and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on
Elections   (COMELEC) a   petition4 to  deny   due  course  or  cancel  the  Certificate  of
Candidacy  (CoC)  of  Reyes  as   candidate  for  the  position  of  Representative   of the
Lone   District   of   the   Province   of   Marinduque.   In   his   petition, Tan   alleged   that
Reyes  made several  material  misrepresentations  in  her  CoC, i.e., “(i)  that
she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural­born
Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a
foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is
single;   and   finally   (vi)   that   she   is   eligible   for   the   office   she   seeks   to   be   elected
to.”5 The case was docketed as SPA No. 13­053 (DC), entitled “Joseph Socorro B.
Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.”
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition;
hence,   Reyes’s   CoC   was   accordingly   cancelled.   The   dispositive   part   of   said
resolution reads:
 
WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   instant   Petition
is GRANTED.   Accordingly,   the   Certificate   of   Candidacy   of   respondent
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.6

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.
But   while   said   motion   was   pending   resolution,   the   synchronized   local   and
national elections were held on May 13, 2013.
The   day   after,   or   on   May   14,   2013,   the   COMELEC En   Bancaffirmed   the
resolution of the COMELEC First Division, to wit:
_______________

4  Docketed as SPA No. 13­053 (DC).
5  Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), pp. 31­32.
6  Id., at p. 42.
 
 
101
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 101
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   is
hereby DENIED for   lack   of   merit.   The   March   27,   2013   Resolution   of   the
Commission (First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.7
 
 A   copy   of   the   foregoing   resolution   was   received   by   the   Provincial   Election
Supervisor   of   Marinduque,   through   Executive   Assistant   Rossini   M.   Oscadin,   on
May 15, 2013.
Likewise, Reyes’s counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on
May 16, 2013.
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution,
the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the
winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case
No. 13­028, entitled “Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.”
Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelamwas also filed
against   Reyes   in   the   HRET   docketed   as HRET   Case   No.   13­027,   entitled
“Christopher P. Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.”
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality8 in SPA
No. 13­053 (DC), which provides:

NOW,   THEREFORE,   considering   that   more   than   twenty­one   (21)   days

have lapsed since the date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the
Supreme   Court   restraining   its   execution,   the   Resolution   of   the
Commission En   Bancpromulgated   on   May   14,   2013   is   hereby
declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.9
_______________

7  Id., at p. 47.
8  Id., at pp. 65­67.
9  Id., at p. 67. Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to paragraph
2, Section 8 of Resolution No.
 
 
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 207264, entitled “Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections
and   Joseph   Socorro   Tan,”   assailing   (i)   the   May   14,   2013   Resolution   of   the
COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27,
2013   Resolution   of   the   COMELEC   First   Division   cancelling   her   Certificate   of
Candidacy (for material misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013
Certificate of Finality.
In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13­010, entitled “Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco
vs. New Members/OldMembers of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the
Lone   District   of   Marinduque   and   Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes,” assailing   the
proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition
in SPC No. 13­010.
On   June   25,   2013,   in G.R.   No.   207264,   this   Court   promulgated   a   Resolution
dismissing Reyes’s petition, viz.:
 
IN VIEW   OF  THE FOREGOING, the instant  petition is DISMISSED,
finding   no   grave   abuse   of   discretion   on   the   part   of   the   Commission   on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirm­
_______________

9523, provides that a decision or resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in special actions and special
cases shall become final and executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is
issued by the Supreme Court. Section 3, Rule 37, Part VII also provides that decisions in petitions to deny
due   course   to   or   cancel   certificates   of   candidacy,   to   declare   a   candidate   as   nuisance   candidate   or   to
disqualify a candidate, shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from promulgation,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
 
 
103
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 103
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
ing   the   27   March   2013   Resolution   of   the   COMELEC   First   Division   is
upheld.10
 
Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which
has jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a
valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.11
On   June   28,   2013,   Tan   filed   a Motion   for   Execution (of   the   March   27,   2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No. 13­053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:

[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate
 EXECUTION   of   this   Honorable   Commission’s   Resolutions   dated   March   27,
2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY
Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District  of Marinduque, during the May 2013  National  and  Local
Elections.12

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started
discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13­010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of
Velasco,   the   COMELEC En   Banc reversed   the   June   19,   2013   denial   of   Velasco’s
petition  and declared null  and void  and without   legal  effect  the  proclamation  of
Reyes. The dispositive part reads:
_______________

10  Id., at p. 82.
11  Id., at p. 74.
12  Id., at p. 106.
 
 
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   instant   motion   for
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution
of the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force
and   effect. Petitioner   LORD   ALLAN   JAY   Q.   VELASCO   is
hereby proclaimed   the   winning   candidate for   the   position   of
representative   in   the   House   of   Representatives   for   the   province   of
Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied)
 
Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13­053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an
Order (i) granting Tan’s motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and
(ii)   directing   the   reconstitution   of   a   new   PBOC   of   Marinduque,   as   well   as   the
proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
 
IN   VIEW   OF   THE   FOREGOING,   the   Commission   hereby   GRANTS   the
instant   Motion.   Accordingly,   a   new   composition   of   the   Provincial   Board   of
 Canvassers   of   Marinduque   is   hereby   constituted   to   be   composed   of   the
following:
1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz ­ Chairman
2. Atty. Abigail Justine
    Cuaresma­Lilagan ­ Vice Chairman
3. Dir. Ester Villaflor­Roxas ­ Member
4. Three (3) Support Staffs
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the
parties,   the   convening   of   the   New   Provincial   Board   of   Canvassers   of
Marinduque on July
_______________

13  Id., at p. 267.
 
 
105
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 105
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor,
PDG   Intramuros,   Manila   and   to   PROCLAIM   LORD   ALLAN   JAY   Q.
VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone   District   of   Marinduque   in   the   May   13,   2013   National   and   Local
Elections.
Further, Director Ester Villaflor­Roxas is directed to submit before the New
Provincial Board of Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of
congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and
Local Elections.
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to
furnish copy of the Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) and the House of Representatives.14
 
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein
petitioner Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for
the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque   with   48,396   votes   obtained   from   245   clustered
precincts.15
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally
convened   in   a   joint   session.   On   the   same   day,   Reyes,   as   the   recognized   elected
Representative   for   the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque,   along   with   the   rest   of   the
Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before
Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
 On   July   23,   2013,   Reyes   filed   a Manifestation   and   Notice   of   Withdrawal   of
Petition “without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as
will be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum.”16
_______________

14  Id., at p. 107.
15  Id.,   at  p.  109. Certificate of  Canvass  of  Votes  and  Proclamation  of Winning  Candidate  for   the
Position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque.
16  Rollo (G.R. No. 207264), pp. 409­412.
 
 
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
On October 22, 2013, Reyes’s motion for reconsideration 17 (of this Court’s June 25,
2013  Resolution in G.R. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was  denied by this
Court, viz.:
 
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal
of the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.18
 
On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.
On   December   3,   2013,   said   motion   was   treated   as   a   second   motion   for
reconsideration and was denied by this Court.
On   December   5,   2013   and   January   20,   2014,   respectively,   Velasco   sent   two
letters to Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative
of the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
On   December   10,   2013,   Velasco   wrote   a   letter   to   Speaker   Belmonte,   Jr.
requesting,   among   others,   that   he   be   allowed   to   assume   the   position   of
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13­010, acting on the Motion for Issuance of
a Writ of Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED
to implement and enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13­053, the
July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13­010 and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of
Proclamation   of   Petitioner   Lord   Allan   Jay   Q.   Velasco   as   Representative   of
Marinduque.   It   is   further   prayed   that   a   certified   true   copy   of   the   writ   of
execution be personally served and delivered by the Commission’s bailiff to
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter’s im­
_______________
 17  Id., at pp. 308­376.
18  Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 122.
 
 
107
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 107
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
plementation   and   enforcement   of   the   aforementioned   May   14,   2013
Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of
Proclamation   issued   by   the   Special   Board   of   Canvassers   of   the   Honorable
Commission.19

the COMELEC issued an Order 20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that
all   copies   of   its   Resolutions   in   SPA   No.   13­053   (DC)   and   SPC   No.   13­010,   the
Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the
Certificate   of   Proclamation   dated   July   16,   2013   be   forwarded   and   furnished   to
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter’s information and guidance.
On   February   4,   2014,   Velasco   wrote   another   letter   to   Speaker   Belmonte,   Jr.
reiterating the above mentioned request but to no avail.
On   February   6,   2014,   Velasco   also   wrote   a   letter   to   Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap
reiterating his earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes
from the Roll of Members and register his name in her place as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all
the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap, they
refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate
the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she
continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence,   the   instant   Petition   for Mandamus with   prayer   for   issuance   of   a
temporary restraining order and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:
_______________

19  Id., at p. 269.
20  Id., at pp. 269­272.
 
 
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.

A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED
 and   ORDERED   by   a   Writ   of Mandamus to   administer   the   oath   in   favor   of
petitioner   as   duly   elected   Marinduque   Representative   and   allow   him   to
assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office.

B. Whether   or   not   respondent   SG   Barua­Yap   can   be   COMPELLED,

DIRECTED   and   ORDERED   by   a   Writ   of Mandamus to   delete   the   name   of
respondent   Reyes   from   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   and   include   the
name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

C. Whether   or   not   a   TEMPORARY   RESTRAINING   ORDER   (TRO)   and   a

Writ of PERMANENT INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and
prohibit   respondent   Reyes   from   exercising   the  prerogatives   and   performing
the functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE the
said office.21
 
As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he “has a well­defined
and clear legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.”22 He
insists that the final and executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13­053
(DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of respondent
Reyes’s   proclamation   and   his   subsequent   proclamation   as   the   duly   elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal
right to claim the congressional seat.
Thus,   he   contends   that   it   is   the   ministerial   duty   of   (i)   respondent   Speaker
Belmonte,   Jr.  “to  administer  the   oath  to  [him]  and  to  allow  him   to  assume  and
exercise   the   prerogatives   of   the   congressional   seat   for   Marinduque
representative”;23 and   (ii)   respondent   Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap   “to   register   [his]   name
x x x as the duly elected member of the House and
_______________

21  Id., at pp. 12­13.
22  Id., at p. 14.
23  Id., at pp. 16­17.
 
 
109
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 109
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members.”24 Velasco anchors
his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to the
effect that the Speaker of the House of Representatives has the ministerial duty to
recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly elected Representative of the
Fourth District of Leyte.
Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte,
Jr.  and  Sec.  Gen.  Barua­Yap are  unlawfully  neglecting the  performance  of their
alleged   ministerial   duties;   thus,   illegally   excluding   him   (Velasco)   from   the
enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.26
With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the “continued usurpation
and unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and
serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances,
bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of Marinduque Representative
since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several hundreds of
thousands of pesos.” Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to “restrain,
prevent and prohibit [her] from usurping the position.”27
In   her   Comment,   Reyes   contends   that   the   petition   is   actually   one   for quo
warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she
usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in
the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public
office, the petition
_______________

24  Id., at p. 20.
25  442 Phil. 135, 189­190; 393 SCRA 639, 658 (2002).
26  Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 21.
27  Id., at pp. 24­25.
 
 
110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases.28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the
Court over Quo Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives.
She   posits   that   “even   if   the   Petition   for   Mandamus   be   treated   as   one   of   Quo
Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal
right   on   the   part   of   [Velasco].”29 She   argues   that   numerous   jurisprudence   have
already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns
and   qualifications   of   Members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   Moreover,   she
insists that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically states that the
COMELEC   is   divested   of   jurisdiction   upon   her   proclamation   as   the   winning
candidate,   as,   in   fact,   the   HRET   had   already   assumed   jurisdiction   over quo
warranto cases30filed against Reyes by several individuals.
Given   the   foregoing,   Reyes   concludes   that   this   Court   is   “devoid   of   original
jurisdiction   to   annul   [her]   proclamation.”31 But   she   hastens   to   point   out   that   (i)
“[e]ven   granting   for   the   sake   of   argument   that   the   proclamation   was   validly
nullified, [Velasco] as second­placer cannot be declared the winner x x x” as he was
not   the   choice   of   the   people   of   the   Province   of   Marinduque;   and   (ii)   Velasco   is
estopped from asserting the
_______________

28  Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 (1949); Pilar v. Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Communications, 125 Phil. 766; 19 SCRA 358 (1967); Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
129   Phil.   7;   21   SCRA   774   (1967); Topacio   v.   Ong,   595   Phil.   491;   574   SCRA   817   (2008); Señeres   v.
Commission on Elections, 603 Phil. 552; 585 SCRA 557 (2009).
29  Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 314.
30  HRET Case Nos. 13­036 to 37, entitled “Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes” and “Eric Del Mundo Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes,” respectively.
31  Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 344.
 
 
111
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 111
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an
Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap, opposed Velasco’s petition on the following grounds:
 
I.
UPON   RESPONDENT   REYES’   PROCLAMATION   ON   MAY   18,   2013,
EXCLUSIVE   JURISDICTION   TO   RESOLVE   ELECTION   CONTESTS
INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER
PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE
HRET.
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election
protest   filed   against   respondent   Reyes,   and   such   HRET   resolution   or
resolutions become final and executory, respondent Reyes may not be restrained
from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent
 Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap   may   not   be   compelled   by   mandamus   to   remove
respondent Reyes’s name from the Roll of Members of the House.
II.
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN
THAT   PETITIONER,   BEING   MERELY   THE   SECOND­PLACER   IN   THE
MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF
MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap may not be
compelled   by   mandamus   to,   respectively,   administer   the   proper   oath   to
petitioner and register the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of the House.
III.
PETITIONER   IS   NOT   ENTITLED   TO   THE   INJUNCTIVE   RELIEFS
PRAYED FOR.32
_______________

32  Id., at pp. 385­386.
 
 
112
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need
for this Court to revisit its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22,
2013 both in G.R. No. 207264, given that (i) this Court was “divided” when it issued
the same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that
this Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is
no hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.
Moreover, the OSG contends that:
 
Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22,
2013 Resolution, upholding the cancellation of respondent Reyes’s CoC, there
has been no compelling reason for the House to withdraw its recognition of
respondent   Reyes   as   Marinduque   Representative,   in   the   absence   of   any
specific order or directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the
Honorable Court’s disposition in Reyes v. COMELECthat required any action
from   the   House.   Again,   it   bears   emphasis   that   neither   petitioner   nor
respondents   Speaker   Belmonte   and   Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap   were   parties
in Reyes v. COMELEC.
Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been
filed against respondent Reyes:
 (i) Case No. 13­036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan &
Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;
(ii) Case No. 13­037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes;
(iii) Case No. 13­027 (Quo Warranto), entitled Christopher Matienzo v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and
(iv)   Case   No.   13­028   (Election   Protest),   entitled Lord   Allan   Jay
Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.33
 
And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
_______________

33  Id., at pp. 398­399.
 
 
113
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 113
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
If   the   jurisdiction   of   the   COMELEC   were   to   be   retained   until   the
assumption of office of the winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of jurisdiction
between   the   HRET   and   the   COMELEC,   given   that   the   2011   HRET   Rules
provide that the appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from
the date of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June 25, 2013 Resolution
provides,   the   HRET’s   jurisdiction   begins   only   after   assumption  of  office,   at
noon   of   June   30   following   the   election,   then quo   warranto petitions   and
election protests filed on or after said date would be dismissed outright by the
HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of time, where the winners
have already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up
to June 14.34
 
In   recent   development,   however,   the   HRET   promulgated   a   Resolution   on
December   14,   2015   dismissing   HRET   Case   Nos.   13­036   and   13­037, 35 the   twin
petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for
Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11,
2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly,   the   present Petitions   for   Quo   Warranto are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.36
  
In the said Resolution, the HRET held that “the final Supreme Court ruling in
G.R.   No.   207264   is   the   COGENT   REASON   to   set   aside   the   September   11,   2014
Resolution.”37
_______________

34  Id., at p. 397.
35  Petitioner Velasco’s Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, with attachments.
36  Id., Annex “D,” p. 5.
37  Id., at p. 2.
 
 
114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
To   make   clear,   the   September   11,   2014 Resolution of   the   HRET   ordered   the
dismissal of a Petition­in­Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the
twin petitions for quo warranto, for “lack of merit.” Further, the HRET directed “the
hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against x x x
Respondent [Reyes] to proceed.”38 Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration of
the   said   September   11,   2014   HRET Resolution based   on   the   argument   that   the
latter was contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in
G.R. No. 207264.
Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that —
 
The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
 
It   is   necessary   to   clarify   the   Tribunal’s   jurisdiction   over   the   present
petitions for quo warranto, considering the parties’ divergent postures on how
the Tribunal should resolve the same vis­à­vis the Supreme Court ruling in
G.R. No. 207264.
The   petitioners   believe   that   the   Tribunal   has   jurisdiction   over   their
petitions.   They   pray   that   “after   due   proceedings,”   the   Tribunal   “declare
Respondent   REGINA  ONGSIAKO   REYES  DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE   to
sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the Province of
Marinduque.”   In   addition,   the   petitioner   Eric   Del   Mundo   Junio   urges   the
Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition­in­Intervention, pleads
for the outright  dismissal  of  the  present  petitions  considering the Supreme
Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part, respondent Regina Reyes
 prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of
evidence by the contending parties.
_______________

38  Id., at p. 1.
 
 
115
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 115
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is “the sole judge of
all   contests   relating   to   the   election,   returns,   and   qualifications   of   [House]
Members.” Such power or authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: “The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.”
x x x x
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on
May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in
SPA No. 13­053 (DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC First Division
correctly   cancelled   her   CoC   on   the   ground   that   she   lacked   the   Filipino
citizenship   and   residency   requirements.   Thus,   the   COMELEC   nullified   her
proclamation.   When   Regina   Reyes   challenged   the   COMELEC   actions,   the
Supreme   Court En   Banc,   in   its   Resolution   of   June   25,   2013   in   G.R.   No.
207246, upheld the same.
With   the   COMELEC’s   cancellation   of   respondent   Regina   Reyes’   CoC,
resulting in the nullification of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we
would   want   to,   cannot   assume   jurisdiction   over   the   present   petitions.   The
jurisdiction   of   the   HRET   begins   only   after   the   candidate   is   considered
a Memberof the House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in
G.R. No. 207264, thus:
x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered   a Member of   the   House   of   Representatives,   as   stated   in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
x x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction
over a can­
 
 
 116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
didate who is not a member of the House of Representatives x x x.
x x x x
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of
the House of Representatives?
In Vinzons­Chato   v.   COMELEC,   citing Aggabao   v.
COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the   House   of   Representatives,   the   COMELEC’s   jurisdiction   over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. x x x
    From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member
of   the   House   of   Representatives,   there   must   be   a   concurrence   of   the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption   of   office   x x x.
 
Based   on   the   above   quoted   ruling   of   the   Supreme   Court,   a valid
proclamation is   the   first   essential   element   before   a   candidate   can   be
considered a Member
    of the House of Representatives over which the Tribunal
could   assume   jurisdiction.   Such   element   is   obviously   absent   in  the  present
cases as Regina Reyes’ proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which
nullification   was   upheld   by   the   Supreme   Court.   On   this   ground   alone,   the
Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions
since   Regina   Reyes   “cannot   be   considered   a   Member   of   the   House   of
Representatives,”   as   declared   by   the   Supreme   Court En   Bancin   G.R.   No.
207264. It further stresses:
 
 
117
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 117
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
 
“x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina
Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner’s oath
of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there
can be no valid and effective assumption of office.”
The   Supreme   Court   has   spoken.   Its   pronouncements   must   be   respected.
Being the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design,
 the Supreme Court is “supreme in its task of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all
decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to
and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final.” This Tribunal, as all
other courts, must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the
Supreme Court.39
 
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article
177 (Usurpation of Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3,
2015,   has   been   filed   in   court,40entitled   “People   of   the   Philippines   v.   Regina
Ongsiako Reyes.”41

The Issue
 
The issue for this Court’s resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ
of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap to perform
the specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition.
 
The Ruling
 
The petition has merit.
_______________

39  Id., at pp. 3­5.
40  Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City.
41  Petitioner Velasco’s Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, with attachments, Annex “B.”
 
 
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of
this petition to relitigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are
reminded to respect the Entry of Judgment that has been issued therein on October
22, 2013.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations  in this  petition, it  is readily
apparent that this  special civil  action is  really one for mandamus and not a quo
warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to
the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment,
if his claim is not well­founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to
the   controverted   position;   otherwise,   respondent   has   a   right   to   the   undisturbed
possession of the office.42 In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the
final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and
executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13­053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s
Certificate   of   Candidacy;   and   (iii)   the   final   and   executory   resolution   of   the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13­010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes
and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative
for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the
present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed
office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal
duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not
convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
_______________

42  Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780, 783 (1948); Caraan­Medina v. Quizon, 124 Phil. 1171, 1178; 18
SCRA 562, 569 (1966); Castro v. Del Rosario, 125 Phil. 611, 615­616; 19 SCRA 196, 200 (1967).
 
 
119
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 119
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person
may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer   or   person   unlawfully   neglects   the   performance   of   an   act   which   the   law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.” A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well­defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.43
The   difference   between   a   ministerial   and   discretionary   act   has   long   been
established.   A  purely   ministerial   act   or  duty  is   one  which  an  officer  or  tribunal
performs   in   a   given   state   of   facts,   in   a   prescribed   manner,   in   obedience   to   the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public   officer   and   gives   him   the   right   to   decide   how   or   when   the   duty   shall   be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only   when   the   discharge   of   the   same   requires   neither   the   exercise   of   official
discretion or judgment.44
 As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap
have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to
register the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives,
respectively.   It   is   beyond   cavil   that   there   is   in   existence   final   and   executory
resolutions   of   this   Court   in   G.R.   No.   207264   affirming   the   final   and   executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13­053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s
_______________

43  Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 25 at p. 189; pp. 680­681.
44  Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768, 801; 590 SCRA 110, 139 (2009), citing Codilla, Sr. v.
De Venecia, id.
 
 
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13­010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes,
and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative
for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as
settled and beyond dispute — Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate
for the Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul
her   proclamation.   Instead,   it   is   the   HRET   that   is   constitutionally   mandated   to
resolve any questions regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her
qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she
has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as
a Member of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case — her
proclamation,   oath   and   assumption   of   office —   has   not   altered   the   legal
situation between Velasco and Reyes.
The   important   point   of   reference   should   be   the   date   the   COMELEC   finally
decided to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of Reyes which was on May 14,
2013. The most crucial timeis when Reyes’s CoC was cancelled due to her non­
eligibility   to   run   as   Representative   of   the   Lone   District   of   the   Province   of
Marinduque   — for   without   a   valid   CoC,   Reyes   could   not   be   treated   as   a
candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That
particular   decision   of   the   COMELEC   was   promulgated   even   before   Reyes’s
proclamation,   and   which   was   affirmed   by   this   Court’s   final   and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
 This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of
the COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 121
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling
Reyes CoC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note
must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was
proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said decision cancelling her CoC. These
points clearly show that the much argued proclamation was made in clear defiance
of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
That Velasco now has a well­defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
of the present petition for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts
that should be taken into consideration:
First. At the time of Reyes’s proclamation, her CoC was already cancelled by the
COMELEC En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the
effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the
prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period of five (5)
days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining
order was forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.
Second.   This   Court   upheld   the   COMELEC   decision   cancelling   respondent
Reyes’s CoC in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these
Resolutions are already final and executory.
Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13­010
cancelled respondent Reyes’s proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives in representation of the Lone
District   of the  Province  of  Marinduque. The  said   proclamation  has   not  been
challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.
Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte,
Jr. in open session, Reyes had NO valid CoC NOR a valid proclamation.
 
 
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Thus,   to   consider   Reyes’s   proclamation   and   treating   it   as   a   material   fact   in
deciding this case will paradoxically alter the well­established legal milieu between
her and Velasco.
 Fifth.   In   view   of   the   foregoing,   Reyes HAS   ABSOLUTELY   NO   LEGAL
BASIS to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District
of   the   Province   of   Marinduque,   and   therefore,   she HAS   NO   LEGAL
PERSONALITY to   be   recognized   as   a   party­respondent   at   a quo
warranto proceeding before the HRET.
And   this  is  precisely the  basis   for the  HRET’s  December  14,  2015  Resolution
acknowledging and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo
warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was based on the existence of a final and
executory   ruling   of   this   Court   in   G.R.   No.   207264   that   Reyes   is   not   a bona
fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To
reiterate   this   Court’s   pronouncement   in   its   Resolution,   entitled Reyes   v.
Commission on Elections45 —
 
The   averred   proclamation   is   the   critical   pointer   to   the   correctness   of
petitioner’s   submission.   The   crucial   question   is   whether   or   not   petitioner
[Reyes] could  be proclaimed  on 18  May  2013.  Differently  stated,  was  there
basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner’s oath of
office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be
no valid and effective assumption of office.
x x x x
“More   importantly,   we   cannot   disregard   a   fact   basic   in   this
controversy — that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013,
the COMELEC En Banchad al­
_______________

45  G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 219.
 
 
123
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 123
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
ready   finally   disposed   of   the   issue   of   petitioner’s   [Reyes]   lack   of
Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013.
After   14   May   2013,   there   was,   before   the   COMELEC,   no   longer   any
pending   case   on   petitioner’s   qualifications   to   run   for   the   position   of
Member of the House of Representatives. x x x.”
As   the   point   has   obviously   been   missed   by   the   petitioner   [Reyes]   who
continues to argue on the basis of her “due proclamation,” the instant motion
 gives   us   the   opportunity   to   highlight   the   undeniable   fact   we   here   repeat
that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was
WITHOUT ANY BASIS.” (Emphasis supplied)
 
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the
HRET   is   a   plain,   speedy   and   adequate   remedy,   such   recourse   is   not   a   legally
available   remedy   to   any   party,   specially   to   Velasco,   who   should   be   the   sitting
Member  of  the  House of  Representatives   if it   were  not   for  the  disregard   by  the
leadership   of   the   latter   of   the   binding   decisions   of   a   constitutional   body,   the
COMELEC, and the Supreme Court.
Though   the   earlier   existence   of   the   twin quo   warranto petitions   filed   against
Reyes   before  the  HRET  had  actually   no   bearing   on   the  status   of  finality   of   the
decision   of   the   COMELEC   in   SPC   No.   13­010.   Nonetheless,   their   dismissal
pursuant  to the HRET’s  December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco’s  well­
defined, clear and certain right to the subject office.
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel   respondents   Speaker   Belmonte,   Jr.   and   Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap
to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution
of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco
and   entering   the   latter’s   name   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   of
Representatives. In other words, the Court is
 
 
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
called   upon   to   determine   whether   or   not   the   prayed   for   acts, i.e.,   (i)   the
administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in
the   Roll   of   Members,   are   ministerial   in   character vis­à­vis the   factual   and   legal
milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the
registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for
the   Lone   District   of   the   Province   of   Marinduque are   no   longer   a   matter   of
discretion   or   judgment on   the   part   of   Speaker   Belmonte,   Jr.   and   Sec.   Gen.
Barua­Yap. They are legally duty­bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in
view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC’s compliance with the
said ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the
Speaker   of   the   House   of   Representatives   to   administer   the   oath   to   the   rightful
Representative   of   a   legislative   district   and   the   Secretary­General   to   enter   said
Representative’s   name   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.
In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:
 
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person
may   file   a   verified   petition   for mandamus “when   any   tribunal,   corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to   which   such   other   is   entitled,   and   there   is   no   other   plain,   speedy   and
adequate   remedy   in   the   ordinary   course   of   law.”   For   a   petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the
part of the board, officer or person, and that the peti­
_______________

46  Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 25 at pp. 188­190; pp. 680­682.
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 125
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
tioner   has   a   well­defined,   clear   and   certain   right   to   warrant   the   grant
thereof.
The   distinction   between   a   ministerial   and   discretionary   act   is   well
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate   of   a   legal   authority,   without   regard   to  or  the  exercise  of  his   own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing
the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the
part   of   the   public   respondents.   The   facts   are   settled   and   beyond   dispute:
petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got
53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division
initially   ordered   the   proclamation   of   respondent   Locsin;   on   Motion   for
Reconsideration   the   COMELEC En   Banc set   aside   the   order   of   its   Second
Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the
 COMELEC En Banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent
Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative
district   of   Leyte   has   been   finally   settled   by   the   COMELEC En   Banc,   the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands
that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN   VIEW   WHEREOF,   the   Petition   for Mandamus is   granted.   Public
Speaker   of   the   House   of   Representatives   shall   administer   the   oath   of
petitioner EUFRO­
 
 
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
CINO   M.   CODILLA,   SR.,   as   the   duly­elected   Representative   of   the
4th legislative   district   of   Leyte.   Public   respondent   Secretary­General   shall
likewise   register   the   name   of   the   petitioner   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the
House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision
shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted)
 
Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC En BancResolution dated May
14, 2013 in SPA No. 13­053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in
SPA No. 13­053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in
SPC No. 13­010; (iv) COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA
No.   13­053   (DC);   and   (v)   Velasco’s   Certificate   of   Proclamation   dated   July   16,
2013, Velasco   is   the   rightful   Representative   of   the   Lone   District   of   the
Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ of mandamus.
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither
ask for the enforcement of the Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine
of res   judicata by   conclusiveness   of   judgment   applies   to   him   and   the   public
respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along
with public respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap, are all
legally bound by this Court’s judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the
COMELEC   correctly   cancelled   Reyes’s   CoC   for   Member   of   the   House   of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground
that the latter was ineligible for the subject position due to her failure to prove her
Filipino   citizenship   and   the   requisite   one­year   residency   in   the   Province   of
Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets unnecessarily clogged with
petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all registered voters not a party to
a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted interpretation
of res
 
 
127
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 127
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
judicata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To
be sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke
the Court’s final judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject position. 47
It   is   well   past   the   time   for   everyone   concerned   to   accept   what   has   been
adjudicated and take judicial notice of the fact that Reyes’s ineligibility to run for
and be elected to the subject position had already been long affirmed by this Court.
Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to the Rule of
Law and should not be countenanced.
In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13­053 (DC) and
SPC   No.   13­010,   there   is   no   longer   any   issue   as   to   who   is   the   rightful
Representative  of the Lone  District   of the Province  of Marinduque;  therefore,  to
borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,48 “[t]he rule of law demands that its
Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of
law except the reign of chaos and confusion.”
WHEREFORE,   the   Petition   for Mandamus is GRANTED.   Public   respondent
Hon.   Feliciano   R.   Belmonte,   Jr., Speaker,   House   of   Representatives,   shall
administer the oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly­
elected   Representative   of   the   Lone   District   of   the   Province   of   Marinduque.   And
public   respondent   Hon.   Marilyn   B.   Barua­Yap, Secretary   General,   House   of
Representatives, shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of
office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
_______________

47  Cañero v. University of the Philippines, 481 Phil. 249, 270; 437 SCRA 630, 646 (2004).
48  Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 25 at p. 190; p. 681.
 
 
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Sereno (CJ.), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas­Bernabe and Jardeleza, JJ.,
No part.
Brion, J., See: Dissenting Opinion.
Perez, J., I concur and submit a Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:
Before   the   Court   is   the   petition   for mandamus1 filed   by   Lord   Allan   Jay   Q.
Velasco2 (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (as Speaker of the House
of   Representatives, Speaker   Belmonte),   Secretary   General   Marilyn   B.   Barua­Yap
(Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap), and Representative Regina Ongsiako­Reyes (Reyes).
 
I. The Petition
 
The petition seeks to compel: Speaker Belmonte to administer the proper oath in
favor of Velasco and allow him to assume office as Representative for Marinduque
and   exercise   the   powers   and   prerogatives   attached   to   the   office;   and   Sec.   Gen.
Barua­Yap to remove the name of Reyes, and register his name in her place, in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives (HOR). It also seeks to restrain
Reyes from
_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 3­26.
2  Petitioner Velasco is the son of incumbent Supreme Court Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
 
 
129
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 129
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
further exercising the powers and prerogatives attached to the position and to
direct her to immediately vacate it.
Velasco asserts that “he has a well­defined and clear legal right and basis
to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.” He argues that the final and
executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) in SPA No.
13­053   and   SPC   No.   13­010 and   of   the Court   in   G.R.   No.   207264,   with   his
proclamation as Representative of Marinduque, grant him this clear legal right to
claim and assume the congressional seat.
Because of this clear legal right, Velasco reasons out that Speaker Belmonte
has the ministerial duty to “administer the oath to [him] and allow him to
assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat, x x x.” Sec.
Gen.   Barua­Yap,   on   the   hand,   has   the   ministerial   duty to   “register   [his]
name x x x as the duly elected member of the [HOR] and delete the name of
respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members.” Velasco cites Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia3 to support his claim.
He   claims   that   Speaker   Belmonte   and   Sec.   Gen.   Barua­Yap   are   unlawfully
neglecting the performance of these ministerial duties, thus, illegally excluding him
from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Marinduque Representative.
As   regards Reyes,   Velasco   asserts   that   the   “continued   usurpation   and
unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice
and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries,
allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the [office] since June
30, 2013 up to the present x x x.”
For these reasons, he argues that a writ of mandamus should be issued to compel
Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap to perform their ministerial duties; and
that a
_______________

3  442 Phil. 139; 393 SCRA 639 (2002).
 
 
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
TRO   and   a   writ   of   permanent   injunction   should   also   be   issued   to   restrain,
prevent, and prohibit Reyes from usurping the position that rightfully belongs to
him.
 
II. The Ponencia’s Ruling
 
The ponencia grants the petition; it views the petition merely as a plea to the
Court for the enforcement of what it perceives as clear legal duties on the part of
the respondents.
To   the ponencia,   any   issue   on   who   is   the   rightful   Representative   of  the   Lone
District of Marinduque has been settled with the finality of the rulings in G.R. No.
207264, SPA No. 13­035, and SPC No. 13­010.
 Recognizing it settled that Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the
Marinduque   Representative   position,   the ponenciaconcludes   that   the
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the
HOR are no longer matters of discretion on the part of Speaker Belmonte and Sec.
Gen. Barua­Yap. Hence, the writ of mandamus must issue.
 
III. My Dissent
 
I   submit   this Dissenting   Opinion to   object   to   the ponencia’s   GRANT   of   the
petition, as I disagree with the ponencia’s premises and conclusion that Velasco is
entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. I likewise believe that Velasco’s
petition should be dismissed because:
(1) he   failed   to   satisfy   the   requirements   for   the   issuance   of   the   writ
of mandamus; and
(2) the grant of the writ is a patent violation of the principle of the separation of
powers that will disturb, not only the Court’s relations with the HOR, a coequal
branch of government. As well, it will result in upsetting the established lines
 
 
131
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 131
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
of   jurisdiction   among   the   COMELEC,   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), and the Court.
Needless   to   state,   the   HOR   may   very   well   have   its   own   views   about   the
admission of its Members and can conceivably prefer its own views to those of the
Court   on   matters   that   it   believes   are   within   its   competence   and   jurisdiction   to
decide as an equal and separate branch of government.
Additionally,   as   I   reminded   the   Court   in   my   writings   on   the   cases   affecting
Velasco, the Court should be keenly aware of the sensitivity involved in handling
the   case. Velasco   is   the   son   of   a   colleague, Associate   Justice   Presbitero
Velasco, who is also the Chair of the HRET. Thus, we should be very clear and
certain if we are to issue the writ in order to avoid any charge that the Court favors
its own.
 
IV. Discussion

IV.A. Mandamus:
            Nature and Concept
 
 Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
 
the   name   of   the   state   or   sovereign, directed   to   some    inferior   court,   tribunal,   or
board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.4
The   writ   of mandamus is   an extraordinary   remedy issued   only   in cases
 of   extreme necessity where the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and
_______________

4  Feria & Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, p. 486 (2001), citing 34 Am. Jur. Mandamus, S. 2.
 
 
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be
compelled.5
As a peremptory writ, mandamus must be issued with utmost circumspection,
and should always take into consideration existing laws, rules and jurisprudence on
the matter, particularly the principles underlying our Constitution.
Moreover, the remedy of mandamus is employed to compel the performance of
a ministerial duty after performance of the duty has been refused. As a rule, it
cannot   be   used   to   direct   the   exercise   of   judgment   or   discretion;   if   at   all,   the
obligated official carrying the duty can only be directed by mandamus to act, but
not to act in a particular way. The courts can only interfere when the refusal to act
already   constitutes   inaction   amounting   to   grave   abuse   of   discretion,   manifest
injustice, palpable excess of authority, or other causes affecting jurisdiction. 6

IV.A.1. Mandamus as a remedy under
       Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
 
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of mandamus is governed by Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 3, mandamus is the remedy available when “a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, [and], there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
 The   person   aggrieved   by   the   unlawful   neglect   or   unlawful   exclusion   of   the
tribunal,   corporation,   board,   officer,   or   person   may   file   the   petition
for mandamus with the proper court.
_______________

5  See Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 109.
6  Feria & Noche, supra note 4.
 
 
133
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 133
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
IV.A.2. Ministerial v. Dis­
          cretionary acts
 
“Discretion,” when applied to public functionaries, means the power or right
conferred   upon   them   by   law   of   acting   officially,   under   certain   circumstances,
uncontrolled by the judgment or sense of propriety of others. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how and when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.7
In contrast, a purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs under a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
on the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 8 The duty is ministerial only when
the   discharge   of   the   same   requires   neither   the   exercise   of   official   discretion   or
judgment.9
A ministerial act is one as to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
who   must   perform.   It   is   a simple,   definite   duty   arising   under   conditions
admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. It is a precise act accurately
marked out, enjoined upon particular officers for a particular purpose. 10

IV.B. Requirements for the issuance
    of the writ of mandamus
 
In the light of its nature, the writ of mandamus will issue only if the following
requirements are complied with:
_______________

7   Id., at p. 487 (citation omitted).
8   See Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768; 590 SCRA 110 (2009).
9   Id.
10  See Feria & Noche, supra note 4 at p. 488 (citation omitted).
  
 
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
First, the   petitioner   has   a clear   and   unmistakable   legal   right to   the   act
demanded.
The clear and unmistakable right that the writ of mandamusrequires pertains to
those rights that are well­defined, clear and certain. The writ contemplates only
those rights which   are founded   in   law,   are   specific,   certain,   clear,
established, complete, undisputed or unquestioned, and are without any
semblance or color of doubt.11
In   situations   where   the  right   claimed,   or   the  petitioner’s   entitlement   to  it,  is
unclear, the writ of mandamus will not lie. The writ of mandamus will not issue to
establish a right or to compel an official to give to the applicant anything to which
he   is   not   clearly   entitled. Mandamus never   issues   in   doubtful   cases,   or   to
enforce   a   right   which   is   in   substantial   dispute   or   to   which   substantial
doubt exists.12
Second, it must be the duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is
mandated by law.
The act must be clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of the
respondent’s official station. It must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required.13
Third, the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined
by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or enjoyment of the right or
office.
Fourth, the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary.
_______________

11  Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, supra note 8; Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department
of   Transportation   and   Communications,   602   Phil.   722;   552   SCRA   59,   102   (2008).   See   also   Feria   &
Noche, id., at p. 488 (citation omitted).
12   See Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 178407,
March 18, 2015, 753 SCRA 474; and Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, id.
13  See Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, id.
 
 
135
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 135
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
 Fifth and   last, there   is   no   other   plain,   speedy,   and   adequate   remedy   in   the
ordinary course of law.

IV.C. Velasco’s petition and the
     requirements for the issu­
     ance of the writ of man­
     damus
 
Velasco failed to comply with all five requirements for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus.
IV.C.1. No showing of any clear and unmistakable right
Velasco failed to show that he has a clear, established, and unmistakable right to
the position of Representative of Marinduque. Any right that Velasco may claim to
hold is, at most, substantially doubtful or is in substantial dispute; in either case,
the existence of doubt renders the Court unjustified in issuing a writ in Velasco’s
favor.
Velasco’s   cited  legal   grounds   for   the   issuance   of  the   writ   of mandamus in   his
favor   are  the   final   rulings   in  the   following  cases: SPA   No.   13­053 and Reyes   v.
COMELEC, and SPC No. 13­010. Thus, a look into what these cases really are and
what they say is in order.

IV.C.1.a. SPA No. 13­053 (Socorro
          B. Tan v. Regina Ongsiako­
          Reyes) and Reyes v. COME­
          LEC, G.R. No. 207264
 
SPA No. 13­053 involved the petition filed by Socorro B. Tan before the
COMELEC to deny due course to or cancel Reyes’ CoC on the ground of the
alleged material misrepresentations Reyes made. Velasco was not a party
to this case.
 
 
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
The COMELEC cancelled Reyes’ CoC in its May 14, 2013 resolution (in
SPA No. 13­053). Note should be taken of the fact that this May 14, 2013
 COMELEC ruling became final and executory only on   May 19, 2013 or “five
(5)   days   after   its   promulgation”   per   Section   13,   Rule   18   of   the   1993
 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, in relation with Paragraph 2, Section 8 of
Resolution No. 9523; and that the COMELEC itself did not enjoin Reyes’
proclamation. As a result, the COMELEC, itself, proclaimed Reyes on May
18, 2013.
I point out that in the June 25, 2013 resolution in Reyes v. COMELEC,
this   Court   expressly   characterized SPA   No.   13­053to   be summary   in
nature.14
Reyes   assailed   the   COMELEC   rulings   in   SPA   No.   13­053   before   this
Court via a   petition   for certiorari,   docketed   as G.R.
    No.   207264    ( Reyes   v.
 COMELEC   or   “Reyes” ).   The   Court’s   majority,   in   this   June   25,   2013
resolution, dismissed respondent   Reyes’   petition outright based   solely   on
the face of the petition and its annexes.
Reyes carries several features that the Court should be aware of:
First. Reyes was a petition that respondent Reyes filed to question the
COMELEC’s cancellation of her CoC in SPA No. 13­053. Respondent Reyes
cited the violation of her right to due process and the COMELEC’s grave
abuse of discretion as grounds for her petition.
Second. Only Tan (the petitioner before the COMELEC) was the party­
respondent before the Court in Reyes; Velasco was not a party to the case
as he was not a party to the challenged COMELEC ruling.
Third. The Court did not see it fit to hear the respondent Tan (let alone
Velasco   who   was   not   a   party)   before   issuing   its   outright   dismissal,
although the Court subsequently heard
_______________

14  See Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522, 538­539.
 
 
137
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 137
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Tan’s arguments in her comment to herein respondent Reyes’ motion for
reconsideration (compelled perhaps by the vigorous dissent issued against
the outright dismissal).15
Under the circumstances of the outright dismissal of the petition, the
belated   attempt   at   hearing   Tan   on   the   motion   for   reconsideration,
however,   does   not   change   the   character   of   the   Court’s   rulings   and
proceedings as summary.
Fourth.   In dismissing   the   petition   outright,   the   Court   only   considered
the Reyes petition itself, the assailed COMELEC rulings (SPA No. 13­053),
and the petition’s other annexes. The outright dismissal was made despite
the   plea   from   the   Dissent   that the   case   be   fully   heard   because   it   would
benefit the son of a sitting Justice of the Court.
Fifth. The Court’s majority also chose not to hear anymore the HRET,
the COMELEC, or the Office of the Solicitor General on petitioner Reyes’
positions   and   arguments,   particularly   on   the issue   of   the   delineation   of
jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC.
Sixth. The Court’s rulings — both in the June 25, 2013 outright dismissal
of the Reyes petition and the October 22, 2013 resolution on the motion for
reconsideration   — never   declared   nor   recognized   Velasco   as   the   duly
elected Representative of Marinduque.
Seventh. The rulings in SPA No. 13­053 and Reyes v. COMELEC did not
consider   and   rule   on   any   matter   other   than   the   material
misrepresentation she allegedly committed.
Thus, any legal effect that these rulings carry should not be extended to
matters outside of the issues and matters specifically addressed by these
rulings, as these extraneous rulings are obiter dicta.
_______________

15  See Dissenting   Opinion   of J.   Brion,   joined   in   by   Senior   Associate   Justice   Antonio   T.

Carpio, and Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.
 
 
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Specifically, these rulings and their legal effects cannot extend to Reyes’
election,   returns,   and   qualification   as   Marinduque   Representative.   Nor
should   these   rulings   vest   in   Velasco   the   title   to   hold   the   position,   even
assuming that petitioner Reyes’ CoC was properly cancelled.
In resolving the present mandamus petition, the Court must appreciate
that   Velasco’s   cited   rulings   are   simply   summary   determinations   of   the
alleged material misrepresentation committed by Reyes in her CoC, and
cannot be used as basis for the requested issuance of the writ.
Eighth.   In   the   outright   dismissal   of   Reyes’ certiorari petition,   the
Court’s majority declared that the COMELEC retained its jurisdiction over
respondent   Reyes   and   the   CoC   cancellation   proceeding   against   her
because respondent Reyes was not a member of the HOR over whom the
HRET can exercise its jurisdiction.
 The majority reasoned out that a candidate is considered a Member of
the   HOR   only   after   the   candidate   has   been proclaimed,   has   taken   the
proper oath, and has assumed office.
This   declaration   is   noteworthy   because   of   the intervening   factual
developments that significantly altered the consequent legal effects of: (1)
the   COMELEC’s   rulings   in   SPC   No.   13­053   and   of   the   Court’s   rulings
in Reyes   v.   COMELEC;   and   (2)   the   subsequent   COMELEC   actions   and
rulings affecting respondent Reyes’ right to hold her congressional seat.
These intervening factual developments, more fully discussed below, is
another reason why the Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus for the
reason   alone that   the   rulings   in   SPC   No.   13­053   and   in Reyes   v.
COMELEC had become final and executory.
Lastly,   the   Court   should   sit   up   and   take   notice   because   of   the Reyes’
pronouncement   on   the   jurisdictional   divide   between   the   HRET   and   the
COMELEC, a matter more extensively discussed below.
 
 
139
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 139
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.

IV.C.1.b. SPC No. 13­010 (Rep. Lord
          Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. New
          Members/Old Members of the
          Provincial Board of Canvass­
          ers [PBOC] of the Lone Dis­
          trict of Marinduque and Re­
          gina Ongsiako­Reyes)
 
SPC No. 13­010 was the petition that Velasco filed before the COMELEC
on May 20, 2013, to declare respondent Reyes’ May 18, 2013 proclamation
void.
The COMELEC dismissed SPC No. 13­010 on June 19, 2013.
On July 9, 2013, however, the COMELEC issued a resolution reversing
its June 19, 2013 resolution; this reversal declared void and without legal
effect respondent Reyes’ proclamation.
In between these dates — i.e., from May 20, 2013, when Velasco initiated
SPC   No.   13­010   before   the   COMELEC,   and   the   COMELEC’s   July   9,   2013
resolution   —   respondent   Reyes   had   already   taken   her   oath   (on   June   7,
2013) and had assumed office on June 30, 2013. Significantly, as of June 30,
2013, when respondent Reyes assumed office, the challenge to respondent
Reyes’ proclamation stood dismissed by the COMELEC and was entered in
its records.
Thus, as   of   June   30,   2013,   respondent   Reyes   was   the   candidate   the
COMELEC recognized as the duly proclaimed winner of the Marinduque
congressional   seat.   She   was   proclaimed   pursuant   to   the   electorate’s
mandate   through   the   majority   of   the   votes   cast   in   Marinduque.   More
importantly, at the time Reyes assumed the office on June 30, 2013 — after
she had been proclaimed and had taken her oath — there was no standing
challenge against her proclamation.
 
 
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Significantly,  the records of Reyes show  that soon after assumption to
office   on   June   30,   2013, she   started   discharging   the   functions   of   her
office by filing bills with the HOR.
These developments and dates are pointed out because of their critical
significance.   In   resolving   the   present   petition,   the   Court   cannot   simply
undertake a mechanistic reading of the cited rulings and on this basis rely
on   the   finality   doctrine.   The   Court   must   appreciate   that   at   the   time
respondent Reyes assumed office on June 30, 2013, the COMELEC had cast
aside the challenge to her proclamation and her oath was properly taken.
To   be   sure,   the   COMELEC   eventually   declared   respondent   Reyes’
proclamation void, but this reversal happened only on July 9, 2013, and
only   after   Reyes   had   taken   her   oath   and   assumed   office   based   on   a
standing   proclamation.   The   proclamation,   oath,   and
assumption effectively altered the legal situation as respondent Reyes —
instead of being a mere candidate waiting for proclamation — had already
become a Member of the HOR whose election, returns, and qualification
are subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET.
This   altered   legal   situation   cannot   but   affect   how   the   petition
for mandamus should be resolved.

IV.C.1.c. The intervening factual
        developments; Reyes v.
        COMELEC versus the
         present petition
 
Another   critical   point   the   Court   should   not   fail   to   consider   in
determining   whether   Velasco   has   a   clear   legal   right   to   a   writ
of mandamus are the various factual developments that intervened (from
the COMELEC’s rulings in SPA No. 13­053 and the Court’s ruling in Reyes
v. COMELEC, to the filing of the present petition) that substantially and
substantively   differentiate   the   present mandamus case   from Reyes   v.
COMELEC.
 
 
141
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 141
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
These factual developments are:
First, while respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed the office of
Representative of Marinduque after the COMELEC cancelled her CoC in
SPA No. 13­053, she did not simply accept the cancellation and forthwith
proceeded   to   question   it   before   this   Court   through   a   petition
for certiorari entitled Reyes v. COMELEC. This petition was still pending at
the time respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed office (on June 30,
2013);   by   then   the   case   was   pending   based   on   the   motion   for
reconsideration that respondent Reyes filed against the Court’s June 25,
2013   Resolution. As   a   result,   Reyes   had   already   assumed   office   even
before Reyes v. COMELEC became final and executory.
It must be noted, too, that respondent Reyes’ oath and assumption to
office   also   occurred   before   the   COMELEC   (in   SPC   No.   13­010   filed   by
Velasco)   declared   void   respondent   Reyes’   proclamation   as   Marinduque
Representative.   The   COMELEC   ruling   only   came   on   July   9,   2013.   As
discussed above, respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed office (on
June 30, 2013) when the standing COMELEC ruling in SPC No. 13­010 (to
cancel respondent Reyes’ proclamation) was the June 19, 2013 dismissal of
the Velasco petition.
Thus, as of June 30, 2013, Reyes had taken her oath and had assumed
office   based   on   a   subsisting   proclamation.   The   COMELEC   declared   her
proclamation void only on July 9, 2013; prior to this declaration, there was
no   pending   legal   challenge   that   could   have   impeded   her   oath   and
assumption of office.
 Second, the COMELEC granted Tan’s motion for execution, in SPA No.
13­053,   and   directed   the   proclamation   of   Velasco   as   the   duly   elected
Representative   of   Marinduque,   only   on July   10,   2013.   Velasco   was
proclaimed by the new PBOC much later — on July 16, 2013.
These dates are stressed because when the COMELEC took actions to
enforce SPA No. 13­053 and to proclaim
 
 
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Velasco as the duly elected Representative of Marinduque, Reyes was
already a member of the HOR — she had by then been proclaimed, taken
her oath, and assumed office.
Significantly, these   developments   were   not   considered   in Reyes   v.
COMELEC; neither were they considered in SPC No. 13­010. In these lights,
I   submit   that   this mandamus petition   is   not   a   continuation   of Reyes   v.
COMELEC and should not be resolved on the basis of the bare finality of
SPA No. 13­053 and Reyes v. COMELEC, and of SPC No. 13­010.
Since   the   present   case   substantially   and   substantively   differs
from Reyes v. COMELEC, the latter’s finality (as well as the finality of the
COMELEC rulings in SPA No. 13­053 that Reyes v. COMELEC passed upon)
should not control the resolution of the present petition and must not be
determinative of Velasco’s right to the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Moreover,   as   I   stated   above,   these   intervening   factual   developments
significantly altered the consequent legal effects of the COMELEC’s rulings
in   SPC  No.   13­053  and   of   this  Court’s  rulings   in Reyes   v.  COMELEC,   the
COMELEC’s   ruling   in   SPC   No.   13­010,   and   the   subsequent   COMELEC
actions   and   rulings   affecting   respondent   Reyes’   right   to   hold   her
congressional seat.

IV.C.1.d. The proper appreciation
          of SPA No. 13­053, Reyes
          v. COMELEC and SPC
          No. 13­010 vis­à­vis the in­
          tervening factual devel­
          opments in the context of
          the present petition
 
 If only for emphasis, I call attention again to the fact that as of June 30,
2013, Reyes had been proclaimed, had taken her oath, and assumed office
as the elected and proclaimed Representative of Marinduque.
 
 
143
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 143
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Section   17,   Article   VI   of   the   Constitution   provides   that   the   Electoral
Tribunal of the HOR shall be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of [its] Members.”16
I highlight, too, that in Reyes v. COMELEC, the majority declared that a
winning candidate becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET only
after he or she becomes a member of the HOR. The majority stressed that a
candidate becomes   a   member   of   the   HOR only   after   he   or   she   has
been proclaimed, taken his or her oath, and assumed the office.
In   other   words,   the   majority   in Reyes   v.   COMELEC required   the
concurrence of all three events — proclamation, oath, and assumption to
office   —   to   trigger   the   jurisdiction   of   the   HRET   over   election   contests
relating   to   the   winning   candidate’s   election,   returns,   and
qualifications. All three events duly took place in the case of respondent
Reyes,   such   that   the   HRET   at   this   point   should   have   jurisdiction   over
questions relating to respondent Reyes’ election, even on the basis of the
majority’s own standards.
Note   in   this   regard   that   in   my   Dissent   in Reyes   v.   COMELEC,   I
considered   this   majority   action   a   “major retrogressivejurisprudential
development that can emasculate the HRET.”
I still maintain that the proclamation of the winning candidate — the
last   operative   act   in   the   election   process   that   is   subject   to   COMELEC
jurisdiction — triggers and opens the way for the HRET’s own jurisdiction.
This was the position I took, backed up by jurisprudence, 17 in my Dissent
in Reyes v. COMELEC. I said:
_______________

16  See also Rule 14 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
17  See Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections, 601 Phil. 751; 583 SCRA 1 (2009); Jalosjos,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
 
 
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
[T]he proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact
that   triggers   the   jurisdiction   of   the   HRET   over   election   contests
relating   to   the   winning   candidate’s   election,   returns   and
qualifications x x x the proclamation of the winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation and the party questioning the qualifications
of   the   winning   candidate   should   now   present   his   or   her   case   in   a
proper   proceeding   [i.e.,   quo   warranto]   before   the   HRET,   who,   by
constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the [HOR].
 
Thus, even by the Court majority’s own standard 18 as defined in Reyes v.
COMELEC, respondent Reyes became a member of the HOR as of June 30,
2013. To reiterate, respondent Reyes was proclaimed on May 16, 2013. She
then took her oath on June 7, 2013, and assumed office on June 30, 2013,
pursuant   to   a   subsisting   proclamation.   The   COMELEC   ruling   that
declared   respondent   Reyes’   proclamation   void   came   only   after   she   had
already fully complied with Reyes v. COMELEC’s defined standard.
In these lights, the COMELEC had already been divested of jurisdiction
over   any   issue   that   may   have   affected   respondent   Reyes’   proclamation
(including   all   consequent   legal   effects   her   proclamation   carries)   at   the
time   the   COMELEC   declared   her   proclamation   void   on   July   9,   2013.   As
well,   the   COMELEC   was   already   without   jurisdiction   when   it   granted
Tan’s motion for execution on July 10, 2013, and proclaimed
_______________

Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 530; and Perez v. COMELEC, 317 SCRA
641   (1999).   See   also Guerrero   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   391   Phil.   344;   336   SCRA   458
(2000); Vinzons­Chato   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   548   Phil.   712;   520   SCRA   166   (2007);
and Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, 449 SCRA 400 (2005).
18  See J. Brion’s Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 14.
 
 
145
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 145
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Velasco   (through   the   new   PBOC)   as   the   duly   elected   Marinduque
Representative on July 16, 2013.19
_______________
 19  Id. Pertinent are the following discussions:
The ponencia’s holding on
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
vis­à­vis the HRET is incon­
sistent with the HRET Rules
The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers
the jurisdiction of the HRET is also supported by the HRET Rules. They state:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction.—The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
RULE 15. How Initiated.—An election contest is initiated by the filing of a verified
petition of protest or a verified petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House
of   Representatives.  An  election  protest shall  not  include  a  petition   for quo  warranto.
Neither shall a petition for quo warranto include an election protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest.—A verified petition contesting the election or returns of
any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has
duly   filed   a   certificate   of   candidacy   and   has   been   voted   for   the   same   office,   within
fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the protest shall
be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
x x x
RULE 17. Quo   Warranto.—A   verified   petition   for quo   warrantocontesting   the
election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter of the
district   concerned   within   fifteen   (15)   days   from   the   date   of   the   proclamation   of   the
winner. The party filing the petition shall be
 
 
146
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Under Section 2(2), Article IX­C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has
the “exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns,
and   qualifications   of all elective   regional,   provincial,   and   city
officials x x x.” In other words, the Constitution vests the COMELEC this
exclusive   jurisdiction   only   with   respect   to elective   regional,   provincial,
and city officials. The COMELEC, by express constitutional mandate, has
no jurisdiction over the election, returns, and qualifications of members of
the HOR (or of the Senate) as Article VI vests this jurisdiction with the
HRET (or the SET).
The   validity   of   the   proclamation   of   respondent   Reyes   who   became   a
member of the HOR on June 30, 2013, and the right of either respondent
Reyes   or   Velasco   to   hold   the   contested   congressional   seat   are election
contests relating   to   a   Member’s   election,   returns,   and   qualifications.
By Reyes v. COMELEC’s own defined standard, the jurisdiction over these
election   contests   affecting   respondent   Reyes   already   rested   with   the
HRET beginning June 30, 2013.
_______________

designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent[.]
Based   on   the   above   Rules,   it   appears   clear   that   as   far   as   the   HRET   is   concerned,   the
proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as
well   as   the   trigger   that   brings   any   contests   relating   to   his   or   her   election,   return   and
qualifications within its sole and exclusive jurisdiction.
In   the   context   of   the   present   case,   by   holding   that  the   COMELEC   retained  jurisdiction
(because   Reyes,   although   a   proclaimed   winner,   has   not   yet   assumed   office),   the   majority
effectively emasculates the HRET of its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e., on
June   30   in   the   usual   case).   To   illustrate   using   the   dates   of   the   present   case,   any   election
protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15) days from
Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for
having been filed out of time under the HRET rules.
 
 
147
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 147
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
To be sure, the validity of this COMELEC resolution in SPC No. 13­010
was   never   challenged   before   this   Court   such   that   the   ruling   lapsed   to
finality. Under existing legal principles, the Court cannot pass upon the
validity of this COMELEC ruling without violating the doctrine of finality
of judgments and the principle of separation of powers with the principle
of judicial noninterference that it carries.
Nonetheless, the Court also cannot and should not simply rely on this
COMELEC   ruling   to   grant   Velasco’s   present mandamuspetition   and
compel   the   HOR   to   admit   him   as   its   member.   The   fact   that   these
COMELEC rulings and actions all occurred after Reyes had fully complied
with the restrictive Reyes v. COMELEC standard creates substantial doubt
on   their   validity   and   efficacy.   In   view   of   these   substantial   doubts,   the
Court should consider them with utmost caution.
In   this   respect,   I   submit   that   any   legal   significance   the   Court   may
accord to the COMELEC’s ruling in SPC No. 13­010 (as well as its July 10,
2013 execution order) in considering Velasco’s present move to compel, via
mandamus, the HOR to admit him as its member must be limited to:
one, the fact of their issuance;
two, the fact that the COMELEC declared void Reyes’ proclamation on
July 9, 2013; and
 three, the fact that Velasco was proclaimed on July 16, 2013,

without prejudice to whatever ruling that the HRET and this Court may
render in the future on the validity or invalidity of the COMELEC rulings
that were made after HOR jurisdiction had vested.
Any other legal significance which these rulings may have on the right
of either Reyes or Velasco to the congressional seat must now be left to the
judgment and discretion of the HRET which must appreciate them  in a
properly filed action.
 
 
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Additionally and finally on this point, the HRET now has jurisdiction to
rule upon all questions relating to respondent Reyes’ election, returns, and
qualifications   that   may   still   be   fit   and   proper   for   its   resolution   in
accordance with existing laws and its own rules of procedure. This Court
itself   cannot   assume   jurisdiction   over   any   aspect   of   HRET   jurisdiction
unless it relates to a matter filed or pending with us on a properly filed
petition, taking into account the clear conferment and delineation of the
Court’s jurisdiction and those of the HRET under the Constitution.
In sum, the COMELEC’s rulings in SPA No. 13­053 and SPC No. 13­010,
and the Court’s rulings in Reyes v. COMELEC did not establish a clear and
unmistakable right in Velasco’s favor to the position of the Representative
of Marinduque.
At most, Velasco’s right to hold the congressional seat based on these
rulings is substantially doubtful. Unless this substantial doubt is settled,
Velasco cannot claim as of right any entitlement, and cannot also compel
the  respondents to admit  him, to  HOR  membership through  the  Court’s
issuance of a writ of mandamus.
In the absence of any other clear and unmistakable legal source for his
claimed right to the contested congressional seat, Velasco’s petition must
necessarily fail.

IV.C.1.e. Reyes’ holding of the office
          could not have worked injus­
          tice and seriously prejudiced
          Velasco with her receipt of
           the salaries, allowances, bo­
          nuses, and emoluments that
          pertain to the office
 
Finally, I find tenuous Velasco’s claim that Reyes’ continued holding of
the   contested   Congressional   seat   has   “worked   injustice   and   serious
prejudice to [him] in that she has already
 
 
149
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 149
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain
to the [office] since June 30, 2013 up to the present x x x.”
This argument clearly forgets that public office is a public trust. 20 Public
service   and   public   duty   are   and   must   be   the   primary   and   utmost
consideration in entering the public service. Any remuneration, salaries,
and benefits that a public officer or employee receives in return must be a
consideration merely secondary to public service.
Accordingly, any salary, allowance, bonus, and emoluments pertaining
to an office must be received by one who is not only qualified for the office,
but by one whose right to the office is clearly and unmistakably without
doubt   and   beyond   dispute.   In   the   case   of   an   elective   public   office,   this
right is, at the very least, established by the mandate of the majority of the
electorate. More importantly, of course, the right to receive the salaries,
allowances,   bonuses,   and   emoluments   that   pertain   to   an   office   must   be
received by one who actually perform the duties called for by the office.
Here,   Velasco   may   be   qualified   for   the   office.   His   right   to   hold   the
congressional   seat,   however,   is   at   most   substantially   doubtful   or   in
substantial dispute; worse, he has not performed the duties of the office. In
short, Reyes’ receipt of the salaries, etc. that pertain to the congressional
seat obviously could not have worked injustice to and seriously prejudiced
him.

IV.C.2. Clear, established, and
       specific legal duty and
       unlawful neglect in the
       performance of ministe­
       rial acts
_______________

20  See Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution.
 
 
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
For the same factual and legal reasons discussed above, I submit that
Velasco   likewise   failed   to   show   that   Speaker   Belmonte   and   Sec.   Gen.
Barua­Yap have the clear and specific duty, founded in law, to administer
the required oath, to allow Velasco to assume the duties of the office, and
to   register   his   name   in   the   Roll   of   Members   as   the   duly   elected
Representative of Marinduque. He also failed to show that the respondents
unlawfully refused or neglected to admit him as member.
At the very least, he failed to show that the respondents have the clear
and specific legal duty to allow a second­placer candidate like him whose
right   to   the   contested   congressional   seat   is   substantially   doubtful,   to
assume the office until such time that all doubts are resolved in his favor.
Thus, in the absence of any law specifically requiring Speaker Belmonte
and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap to act, and to act in a particularly clear manner,
the Court cannot compel these respondents to undertake the action that
Velasco prays for via a writ of mandamus.
Additionally,   the   HOR   in   this   case   simply   acted   pursuant   to   law   and
jurisprudence   when   it   admitted   respondent   Reyes   as   the   duly   elected
Representative   of   Marinduque.   After   this   admission,   the   HOR   and   its
officers   cannot   be   compelled   to   remove   her   without   an   order   from   the
tribunal having the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all contests affecting
HOR members, of which Reyes has become one. This tribunal, of course, is
the HOR’s own HRET.

IV.C.3. Absence of any other
       plain, speedy and
       adequate remedy
 
Lastly, I submit that Velasco failed to show that there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law to
secure to him the congressional seat.
 
 
 151
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 151
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
I reiterate and emphasize once more that respondent Reyes became a
Member of the HOR on June 30, 2013, after her proclamation, oath, and
assumption to office. Whether the Court views these circumstances under
the   restrictive   standard   of Reyes   v.   COMELEC to   be   the   legally   correct
standard   or   simply   the   applicable   one 21 under   the   circumstances   of   the
petition, respondent Reyes undoubtedly has complied with the conditions
for HOR membership that Reyes v. COMELEC laid down.
Since Reyes is a member of the HOR, any challenge against her right to
hold the congressional seat or which may have the effect of removing her
from   the   office   —   whether   pertaining   to   her   election,   returns   or
qualifications — now rests with the HRET.
Viewed   by   itself   and   in   relation   to   the   surrounding   cited   cases   and
circumstances,   Velasco’s   present   petition   cannot   but   be   a   challenge
against   respondent   Reyes’   election,   returns,   and   qualifications,   hiding
behind   the   cloak   of   a   petition   for mandamus.   In   other   words,   although
presented as a petition that simply seeks to enforce a final Court ruling,
the petition is an original one that ultimately seeks to oust Reyes from the
congressional seat. The relationships between and among the cited cases
and the present case, read in relation with the relevant developments, all
point to this conclusion.
Thus,   rather   than   recognize   this   roundabout   manner   of   contesting
respondent Reyes’ seat, the Court should recognize this kind of challenge
for what it really is — a challenge that properly belongs to the domain of
the HRET and one that
_______________

21   As  I  discussed in  my   Dissenting  Opinion  to  the  June  25, 2013  Resolution   in Reyes  v.
COMELEC, supra note   14,   this   reasonable   standard   is   the   proclamation   of   the   winning
candidate. There, I said that: “[t]he proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning
candidate’s election, returns and qualifications.”
 
 
152
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
 should   be  raised   before   that   tribunal   through   the  proper   action.   The
Court, in other words, should acknowledge that it has no jurisdiction to
act on the present petition.
Under the 2011 Rules of the HRET, 22 the proper actions in coming before
the HRET are: (1) a verified petition of protest (election protest) to contest
the  election or  returns of  the member;  or (2)  a  verified petition  for quo
warranto to contest the election of a member on the ground of ineligibility
or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 23 Both petitions should be
filed within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner, 24 save in
the case of a petition for quo warranto on the ground of citizenship which
may be filed at any time during the member’s tenure. 25 The failure to file
the appropriate petition before the HRET within the prescribed periods
will bar the contest.26 These are the rules that must guide Velasco in his
quest for a remedy.
To be sure, though, this remedy has been within Velasco’s knowledge
and contemplation as on May 31, 2013,27 he filed
_______________

22   Issued   pursuant   to   the   HRET’s   rule­making   that   necessarily   flows   from   the   general
power granted to it by the Constitution as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its members (see Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
[1936]).
23  See Rules   16   and   17   of   the   2011   Rules   of   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal.
24  See Rule 16, paragraph 1, and Rule 17, paragraph 1 of the 2011 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
25  See Rule 17, paragraph 2 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
26  See Rule   19   of   the   2011  Rules   of   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral  Tribunal.   It
reads:
RULE 19. Periods   Non­Extendible.—The   period   for   the   filing   of   the   appropriate
petition, as prescribed in Rules 16 and 17, is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.
27   In fact, also on May 31, 2013, a quo warranto petition was filed by a certain Matienzo
before the HRET against Reyes; this was docketed as HRET Case No. 13­027.
 
 
153
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 153
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
an election   protest before   the   HRET,   docketed   as   HRET   Case   No.   13­
028.28 Very   obviously,   he   recognized   that,   as   early   as   May   31,   2013,   any
challenge   against   respondent   Reyes’s   election,   returns,   or   qualifications
should be raised before the HRET — the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of HOR members.
Why   he   now   appears   to   have   glossed   over   this   legal   reality   in   the
present   petition   (especially   since   Reyes   is   now   a   clearly   recognized
member   of   the   HOR   after   satisfying   the   restrictive Reyes   v.
COMELEC standard) is a question I would not dare speculate on; only the
attendant facts and the legal realities can perhaps sufficiently provide the
answer.29
_______________

28   See Rollo,   p.   399.   As   of   April   1,   2014,   the   HRET   Records   show   that Matienzo   v.
Reyes and Velasco v. Reyes have been withdrawn.
29  A possible answer may be drawn from these facts: first, the two quo warranto petitions
— HRET Case No. 13­036 entitled “Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina
Ongsiako   Reyes”  (filed  on   July   13,  2013)   and  HRET   No.  13­037  entitled  “Eric   Del   Mundo   v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes” (filed on December 13, 2013) — filed against Reyes have been pending
before the HRET, of which a Member of this Court, Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, is
petitioner Velasco’s father, for more or less two years without any action by the HRET. The
only action the HRET has taken so far in these cases was in relation with the petition­for­
intervention filed by Victor Vela Sioco seeking the dismissal of the quo warranto petitions for
lack of jurisdiction where it required (viaResolution No. 14­081) Reyes to comment thereon.
Second,   the   HRET   has   recently   revised   its   Rules   of   Procedure   incorporating   the
restrictive Reyes v. COMELEC standards that requires the concurrence of proclamation, oath,
and assumption of office before the elected candidate is considered a member of the HOR over
whom the HRET can exercise jurisdiction. The 2015 HRET Rules of Procedure was published
in the Philippine Star on November 1, 2015, and took effect fifteen days thereafter. Rule 80 of
the   2015   HRET   Rules   provides   for   its   application   to   all   pending   actions   save   “when
substantive rights are affected as may be determined by the Tribunal.”
 
 
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
In   reality,   two   other   cases   —   both   of   them quo   warrantopetitions   —
were subsequently filed against Reyes. The first is HRET Case No. 13­036
entitled   “Noeme   Mayores   Tan   and   Jeasseca   L.   Mapacpac   v.   Regina
Ongsiako Reyes.” The second is HRET No. 13­037 entitled “Eric Del Mundo
v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.”
On March 14, 2014, the HRET issued a resolution in HRET Case No. 13­
036 and HRET No. 13­037 stating that “the proclamation of Representative
Reyes   as   the  winning  candidate  for  the  position  of   Representative  of   the
Lone   District   of   Marinduque   is   and   remains   valid   and   subsisting   until
annulled by HRET.”
 In a modified ponencia circulated on January 11, 2016 (for deliberation
on   January   12,   2016), it   was   alleged that   the   HRET   promulgated   a
Resolution on December 14, 2015, dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13­036 and
13­037 — the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes.
Allegedly, the HRET held that “the final Supreme Court ruling in G.R.
No.   207264   is   the   COGENT   REASON   to   set   aside   the   September   11,   2014
Resolution.”   The   HRET   ruling   allegedly   reversed   its   own   ruling   of
September 11, 2014 that ordered the dismissal of the petition of Victor Vela
Sioco in the twin petitions for quo warranto for “lack of merit,” and for the
hearings in the petitions against Reyes to proceed.
_______________

Third,  per   the  November  5, 2015  letter­petition   —  Urgent  Follow­Up  on   the  Petition  for
Recall of the Designation of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. to the HRET — to the Court En
Banc by Reyes’ counsel Roque and Butuyan Law Offices (letter signed by H. Harry L. Roque,
Jr., Joel Ruiz Butuyan, and Roger R. Rayel), the HRET has deferred action on its February 3,
2015   manifestation/motion   that   from   thereon   it   shall   act   as   Reyes’   lead   counsel   and   been
refusing to furnish it copies, at their expense, of all documents, pleadings, etc. pertaining to
the two quo warranto cases.
 
 
155
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 155
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Under these attendant facts, the circumstances surrounding the Reyes­
Velasco dispute becomes more confused and all the more should this Court
refrain from acting on the present petition.
If   indeed   there   is   already   a   HRET   ruling   as   alleged,   then  the  proper
remedy now is for the HRET to present this ruling, certified as a final and
executory   one,   to   the   HOR   for   that   body’s   action   in   light   of   its   own
Tribunal’s decision.
To   state   the   obvious,   the   admission   of   a   member   and   his   or   her
exclusion is primarily an internal affair that the HOR should first resolve
before   this   Court   should   step   in   through   the   coercive   power   of   a   writ
of mandamus.   The   principles   of   separation   of   powers   and   judicial
noninterference demand that the Court respect and give due recognition
to the HOR in its internal affairs.
By granting the petition and issuing a writ of mandamus, the Court, not
only   disrespects   the   HOR,   but   sows   confusion   as   well   into   the   HRET’s
jurisdiction — a jurisprudential minefield in the coming elections.
IV.D. The Separation of Powers
    Principle Demands the
    Dismissal of the Present
    Petition

IV.D.1. The principle of sepa­
       ration of power
 
An   issue   that   the   Court   cannot   but   recognize   in   the   present   case   is
whether it can, under the circumstances of this case, compel a House of
Congress — a coequal branch — to act. The resolution of this issue calls for
the consideration of several principles, foremost of which is the principle
of separation of powers that underlie our governmental structure.
The   Constitution   does   not   specifically   provide   for   the   principle   of
separation of powers. Instead of a distinct express
 
 
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
provision, the Constitution divides the governmental powers among the
three branches — the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Under
this  framework,  the  Constitution  confers on  the  Legislature the  duty  to
make the law, on the Executive the duty to execute the law, and on the
Judiciary the duty to construe and apply the law.30
Underlying the principle of separation of powers is the general scheme
that   each   department   is   supreme   within   their   respective   spheres   of
influence,   and   the   exercise  of   their   powers   to   the   full   extent   cannot   be
questioned by another department. Outside of these spheres, neither of the
great governmental departments has any power; and neither may any of
them validly exercise any of the powers conferred upon the others. 31
Thus,   as   a   fundamental   principle,   the   separation   of   powers   provides
that each of the three departments of our government is distinct and not
directly subject to the control of another department. The power to control
is   the   power   to   abrogate;   and   the   power   to   abrogate   is   the   power   to
usurp.32 In short, for one branch to control the other is to usurp its power.
In this situation, the exercise of control by one department over another
would clearly violate the principle of separation of powers.
_______________

30  See Defensor­Santiago, Constitutional Law, citing U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
31  Id.
32  See Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924).
In   this   light,   the   question   that   we   ask   next   is:   whether   the   Court   can   compel   Speaker
Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap — who are admittedly officers of the HOR — to perform the
acts specifically prayed for by Velasco via mandamus. To properly answer this question, we
must hark back to our earlier discussion of mandamus, and consider it in the context of the
principle of separation of powers.
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 157
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IV.D.2. Mandamus against
            a coequal branch
 
Over and above the usual requirements of mandamus earlier discussed,
it   must   be   appreciated   that   the   remedy   of mandamusis   essentially   a
discretionary   remedy   that   is   contingent   upon   compelling   equitable
grounds for its grant. As a peremptory writ, a presumption exists strongly
against its grant; it will and must issue only in the most extraordinary of
circumstances and always with great caution.
In the context of the separation of powers principle, I submit that the
Court must proceed with greater caution before issuing the writ against a
coequal branch, notwithstanding the concurrence of the requirements.
As   a   general   rule, mandamus will   not   lie   against   a   coordinate
branch.33 The rule proceeds from the obvious reason that none of the three
departments   is   inferior   to   the   others;   by   its   very   nature, the   writ
 of    mandamus    is   available   against   an   inferiorcourt,   tribunal,   body,
corporation, or person. With respect to a coordinate and coequal branch,
the issuance can be justified only under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction
under   Article   VIII,   Section   1   of   the   Constitution34 and   under   the most
compelling circumstances and equitable reasons.35
_______________

33  Id.
34  Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution reads in full:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
35  Supra note 32.
 
 
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158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
I   submit   that   no   grave   abuse   of   discretion   intervened   in   the   present
case   to   justify   resort   to   the   Court’s   expanded   jurisdiction.   Neither   are
there   compelling   and   equitable   reasons   to   justify   a   grant   as there   is   a
remedy in law that was available to petitioner Velasco (for reasons of his
own,   he   has   failed   to   pursue   the   remedy   before   the   HRET   to   its   full
fruition)   and that   is   available   now —  to   present   the   final   rulings   in   the
cited HRET cases to the HOR for its own action on an internal matter it
zealously guards.
The COMELEC petition to contest respondent Reyes’ proclamation was
filed by Velasco, but this was a case solely addressing respondent Reyes’
proclamation   and   voiding   it.   Beyond   this,   the   ruling   made   no   other
directive. But even given all these, there is indisputably the live question
of whether the COMELEC still had jurisdiction when it issued its rulings
as Reyes had by then become a member of the HOR. At the very least, this
complication   leaves   the   continued   validity   of   the   COMELEC   ruling   in
doubt.
Another point to consider is the filing and withdrawal by Velasco of an
election protest case with the HRET against respondent Reyes. By doing
this   and   despite   the   withdrawal   of   his   petition,   Velasco   recognized   the
jurisdiction of the HRET. Can he now turn around and simply say that the
COMELEC and the Court are, after all, correct in its rulings and that he
would now avail of these rulings although he was never a party to them? I
provide   no   answers   but   again   this   development   effectively   brings   the
propriety of Velasco’s use of mandamuswithin the realm of doubt.
A   further   point   to   consider   is   that   Speaker   Belmonte   and   Sec.   Gen.
Barua­Yap   are   officers   of   the   HOR   chosen   by   its   members. 36 As   HOR
officers, their acts made in the perform­
_______________

36  See Section 16(1), Article VI of the Constitution. It reads:
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and  the House of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.Each House shall
 
  
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 159
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
ance of their duties and functions are acts of the HOR. The acts Velasco
wants this Court to compel Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua­Yap to
perform pertain to their official positions. Hence, any mandamus that will
be issued against them is a mandamus issued against the HOR. As I have
stated   before, mandamus does   not   and   will   not   lie   against   a   coordinate
branch.
Notably,   under   the   attendant   facts,   significantly   altered   by   the
intervening   factual   developments   and   the   consequent   legal
considerations, the acts sought to be performed — the exclusion of sitting
members and the admission of replacement members — are not ministerial
acts   for   which mandamus will   lie.   That   much   is   implied,   if   not   directly
held, as early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,37 and many other cases
relating to this situation followed.38 Their common thread is that Congress
takes the admission (or exclusion) of its members as a very serious concern
that is reserved for itself to decide, save only when a superior law or ruling
with undoubted validity intervenes. Such freedom from doubt, however, is
not apparent in the present petition.
Appeal   to   “compelling   and   equitable   circumstances”   that   call   for   the
application   of   the   equitable   remedy   of mandamus is,   at   best,   a   murky
proposition in light of the circum­
_______________

choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. [emphases supplied]
37  Supra note 22.
38  See Suanes v. The Chief Accountant, Accounting Division, Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948); Co
v.   Electoral   Tribunal   of   the   House   of   Representatives,   276   Phil.   758;   199   SCRA   692
(1991); Lazatin   v.   House   Electoral   Tribunal,   250   Phil.   390;   168   SCRA   391   (1988); Vilando   v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 671 Phil. 524; 656 SCRA 17 (2011); Dueñas, Jr. v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 619 Phil. 730; 593 SCRA 316 (2009), to name a few.
 
 
159
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 159
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
stances surrounding the May 2013 Marinduque election situation as a
whole.
 It should not be forgotten that Reyes won by a convincing margin over
Velasco, but the latter chose to fight his electoral battle in the COMELEC,
bypassing thereby the verdict against him of the people of Marinduque.
The merits of the COMELEC ruling is likewise not beyond doubt from the
point   of   view   of   the   imputed   due   process   violations,   as   the   Dissent
in Reyes and the close vote in Court showed.
In   any   case, mandamus is,   by   its   nature,   a   discretionary   remedy   that
can be denied when no compelling equitable grounds exist. In particular,
in   situations   where   the   constitutional   separation   of   powers   principle   is
involved, mandamus,   as   a   rule,   will   not   lie   against   a   coequal   branch
notwithstanding   the   petitioner’s   compliance   with   the   requirements
necessary for its grant, as discussed above. To justify the issuance of the
writ,   the   petitioner   must   not   only   comply   with   the   requirements;   the
petitioner must, more importantly, show that mandamus is demanded by
the   most   compelling   reasons   or   circumstances   and   by   the   demands   of
equity.   These  exception­inducing   factors,   as   discussed  above,   are   simply
not present in this case.
Thus,   the   Court   cannot   dictate   action   under   the   present   petition
without committing gross usurpation of power. The risk for the Court in
ruling   under   these   circumstances   is   to   be   accused   of   ruling   under   a
situation of doubt and uncertainty in favor of the son of a colleague. In a
worse scenario, Congress — even if it does not frontally rebuff the Court —
may raise issues that would effectively disregard the writ issued by the
Court.   While   no   constitutional   crisis   may   result,   the   Court   would   have
tested the limits of its constitutional powers and failed. The situation does
not bode well for the Court’s integrity, reputation, and credibility — the
essential   attributes   that   allow   it   to   occupy   the   moral   high   ground   in
undertaking its functions within the Constitution’s tripartite system.
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 161
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
The  better  view,  under  the circumstances  and  as  posited  above,  is  to
allow internal matters within the HOR to take their natural course. This
position best addresses the confused situation that is the Marinduque May
2013   elections,   while   respecting   the   interests   of   all   concerned   parties,
including those of the Court’s.
 
 V. Conclusion
 
In   sum,   the   present   petition   for mandamus must   be   dismissed   as
petitioner   Velasco   failed   to   comply   with   all   five   requirements   for   the
issuance   of   the   writ   of mandamus.   Most   importantly,   the   petitioner’s
speedy remedy to address his situation lies with the HRET and the HOR,
not   with   the   Court.   In   any   case,   the   remedy   of mandamus does   not   lie
against   the   HOR,   a   coequal   branch, under   the   circumstances of   the
case and   would   be   an   unwarranted   intrusion   and   impermissible
usurpation by this Court of the authority and functions of the HOR and of
the HRET.
For these reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition.

CONCURRING OPINION

PEREZ, J.:
 
The ponencia, upon which this concurrence hinges, postulates that the
administration of oath and the registration of petitioner Lord Allan Jay
Velasco (Velasco) in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque is no longer a matter
of   discretion   on   the   part   of   respondents   House   Speaker   Feliciano   R.
Belmonte,   Jr.   (Belmonte)   and   Secretary   General   Marilyn   B.   Barua­Yap
(Barua­Yap).1 Hence, the petition for mandamus must be granted.
_______________

1  Ponencia, p. 119.
 
 
162
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
I join the ponencia in the vote to grant the instant petition.
 
I
 
Preliminarily, the theory of respondent Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes)
—   that   the   instant   petition   is   in   actuality   an   election   contest,   a   veiled
action for quo warranto — is rejected.
 While quo   warranto and mandamus are   often   concurrent   remedies,
there   exists   a   clear   distinction   between   the   two.   The   authorities   are
agreed   that quo   warranto is   the   remedy   to   try   the   right   to   an   office   or
franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only
lies   to   enforce   clear   legal   duties. 2 In   the   case   at   bench,   I   concur   with
the ponencia that   the   present   petition   seeks   the   “enforcement   of   clear
legal duties” as it does not seek to try disputed title. 3 It no longer puts in
issue the validity of Reyes’s claim to office — a question that has long been
resolved   by   the   Court   in   its   twin   Resolutions   in   the   antecedent   case
of Reyes   v.   COMELEC (Reyes),4 docketed   as   G.R.   No.   207264,   wherein   the
Court   sustained   the   polling   commission’s   cancellation   of   respondent
Reyes’   Certificate   of   Candidacy   (CoC)   on   the   ground   that   she   does   not
possess   the   necessary   eligibility   to   hold   elective   office   as   a   member   of
Congress. In Reyes, the Court pronounced in no less than categorical terms
that:5
 
As  to   the  issue  of   whether  the  petitioner   failed  to   prove  her   Filipino
citizenship, as well as her one­year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to
say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
_______________

2  Lota v. Court of Appeals, No. L­14803, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 715, 718.
3  Ponencia, p. 118.
4  G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522, 538; G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708
SCRA 197.
5  Id.
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 163
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.
 
Our edict became final and executory, as a matter of course, upon denial
of   Reyes’   motion   for   reconsideration   on   October   22,   2013.   There   is,
consequently, no “disputed title” to speak of which ought to be resolved
through a quo warranto proceeding.
Instead, the primordial issue, in this case for mandamus, is whether or
not respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap can and should be compelled (1)
to   swear   in   petitioner   as   the   duly   elected   Representative   of   the   lone
legislative district of Marinduque, and (2) to include petitioner’s name and
delete   that   of   Reyes’   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   of
Representatives,   respectively.   Petitioner   asserts   that   in   the   aftermath
of Reyes,   his   clear   and   enforceable   legal   right   to   assume   office   must   be
recognized.
The claim is meritorious.
It is a fundamental precept in remedial law that for the extraordinary
writ   of mandamus to   be   issued,   it   is   essential   that   the   petitioner   has a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required.6 As will be demonstrated, it
is   beyond   cavil   that   the   dual   elements   for   the mandamus petition   to
prosper evidently obtain in the case at bar.
 
a. Petitioner’s clear legal right
 
Well­settled is that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of
the particular act which is sought to be compelled by mandamus must be
clear   and   complete.   A   clear   legal   right   within   the   meaning   of   this   rule
means a right
_______________

6  Philippine Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, Inc., G.R. No. 163088, July 20, 2006,
495 SCRA 763, 777.
 
 
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164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
clearly founded in, or granted by law; a right which is inferable as a
matter of law.7
Here, petitioner indubitably established his right to be acknowledged as
a member of the House of Representatives. To elucidate, there were only
two (2) candidates in the 2013 congressional race for the Lone District of
Marinduque:   petitioner   Velasco   and   respondent   Reyes.   In   the   initial
canvassing   results,   Reyes   garnered   more   votes   than   Velasco. 8Before   she
could be proclaimed the winner, however, the COMELEC First Division,
acting   on   the   Petition   to   Deny   Due   Course   or   Cancel   the   Certificate   of
Candidacy9 filed by one Joseph Socorro Tan and docketed as SPA No. 13­
053,10 by Resolution dated March 27, 2013, cancelled Reyes’ CoC. 11Borrowing
the words of the Court in Reyes:
  
The   COMELEC   First   Division   found   that,   contrary   to   the
declarations that she made in her CoC, [Reyes] is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic   Act   (R.A.)   No.   9225   or   the Citizenship   Retention   and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn
renunciation   of   her   American   citizenship   before   any   public   officer
authorized   to   administer   an   oath.   In   addition,   the   COMELEC   First
Division   ruled   that   she   did   not   have   the   one­year   residency
requirement   under   Section   6,   Article   VI   of   the   1987
Constitution. Thus,   she   is   ineligible   to   run   for   the   position   of
Representative   for   the   lone   district   of   Marinduque.   (Emphasis   and
words in brackets added)
_______________

7  Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, No. L­3261, December 29, 1949, 85 Phil. 272, 275.
8  J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 340.
9  Filed on October 10, 2012.
10   Petition   for   Cancellation   of   Certificate  of   Candidacy,  entitled Joseph   Socorro   Tan   v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes.
11  See Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 4 at p. 529.
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 165
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
The division ruling, in no time, was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc,
only to be affirmed on May 14, 2013. 12Reyes would receive a copy of the En
Banc Resolution   two   (2)   days   later   on   May   16,   2013.   Nevertheless,   she
would  only  assail  the ruling via petition for certiorari with the Court on
June 7, 2013. Needless to say, no injunctive writ was issued by the Court in
the interim. There was, effectively, no restraint against the enforcement of
Reyes’   disqualification,   a   legal   bar   to   a   valid   proclamation.   As   held
in Reyes:13
 
It   is   error   to   argue   that   the   five   days   should   pass   before   the
petitioner   is   barred   from   being   proclaimed.   Petitioner   lost   in   the
COMELEC   as   respondent.   Her   certificate   of   candidacy   has   been
ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a
 final finding against her by the COMELEC. She needed a restraining
order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding.
 
_______________

12 Id., at p. 530.
13   Footnote   No.   3   of   the   October   22,   2013   Resolution   distinguished   between   a   final
judgment  and  one  that  is  final  and  executory  in  the  following  wise:  “The  concept of  ‘final’
judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final
and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what   the   rights   and   obligations   of   the   parties   are   and   which   party   is   in   the   right;   or   a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy
or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to
be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist
of   the   filing   of   a   motion   for   new  trial   or   reconsideration,  or   the   taking   of   an   appeal)   and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use
the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’ See Investments, Inc v. Court
of Appeals, 231 Phil. 302, 307; 147 SCRA 334, 339­340 (1987).”
 
 
166
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
After   the   five   days   when   the   decision   adverse   to   her   became
executory,   the   need   for   Supreme   Court   intervention   became   even
more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling
her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would
allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury
and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of   the   COMELEC.   In   this   case,   before   and   after   the   18   May   2013
proclamation,   there   was   not   even   an   attempt   at   the   legal   remedy,
clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner
did was to “take the law into her hands” and secure a proclamation in
complete disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was final
on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
 
SPA No. 13­053 eventually made its way to this Court (the Reyes case),
docketed   as   G.R.   No.   207264,   but   We   dismissed   Reyes’   petition   and
subsequent   motion   for   reconsideration   questioning   the   findings   of   the
COMELEC   for   lack   of   merit   on   June   25,   2013   and   October   22,   2013,
respectively.14 Undeterred, Reyes, on November 27, 2013, filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for Reconsideration, which was
treated   as   a   second   motion   for   reconsideration,   a   prohibited   pleading.
Unavoidably, the motion was denied on December 3, 2013, serving as the
final nail in the coffin, laying the highly­contested issue regarding Reyes’
eligibility to rest.15
Upon resolving with finality that Reyes is ineligible to run for Congress
and that her CoC is a nullity, the only logical consequence is to declare
Velasco, Reyes’ only political rival in the congressional race, as the victor
in the  polling exercise. This finds basis in the seminal case of Aratea v.
COMELEC
_______________

14  Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 4.
15  Ponencia, p. 106.
 
 
167
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 167
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
(Aratea),16 wherein it was held that a void CoC cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.17 Hence, as concluded in Aratea:18
 
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was cancelled, because he was
ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
candidacy   is   cancelled   before   or   after   the   elections   is   immaterial
because   the   cancellation   on   such   ground   means   he   was   never   a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in
the May 2010 elections — Antipolo, who therefore received the highest
number of votes.
 
Thus, notwithstanding the margin of votes Reyes garnered over Velasco,
the votes cast in her favor are considered strays since she is not eligible
for the congressional post, a noncandidate in the bid for the coveted seat
of   Representative   for   the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque.   Following   the
doctrinal   teaching   in Aratea,   Velasco,   as   the   only   remaining   qualified
candidate in the congressional race, is, for all intents and purposes, the
rightful member of the lower house.
 Associate   Justice   Marvic   M.V.F.   Leonen   (Justice   Leonen),   however,
echoing the position of the OSG and that of the respondents, asserts in his
Dissent   that   Velasco   is   a   second­placer   during   the   elections   who   is   not
entitled to hold the subject position. The honorable Justice suggests that
petitioner   cannot   seek   refuge   under   the   Court’s   pronouncements
in Aratea and the subsequent cases of Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC19
_______________

16  Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105.
17  See also Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223.
18  Aratea v. COMELEC, supra.
19  Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1.
 
 
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
and Maquiling v. COMELEC20 because the positions involved in the said
cases were not for members of Congress.21
What   the   Dissent   failed   to   take   into   account   though   is   the   most
significant similarity of the present petition to the above mentioned cases
—   that   there   exists   a   final   and   executory   decision   of   the   COMELEC
ordering the cancellation of the CoC of the candidate who committed false
material   representations   therein   and   declaring   them   ineligible   to   hold
public office. In all these cases, and as it should likewise be in this case,
the Court ruled that the CoC was deemed void ab initio and as such:
 
“If   the   certificate   of   candidacy   is   void ab   initio,   then   legally   the
person   who   filed   such   void   certificate   of   candidacy   was   never   a
candidate   in   the   elections   at   any   time.   All   votes   for   such
noncandidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such
noncandidate   can   never   be   a   first­placer   in   the   elections.   If   a
certificate   of   candidacy   void ab   initio is   cancelled   on   the   day,   or
before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all
votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy
void ab   initio is   cancelled   one   day   or   more   after   the   elections,   all
votes   for   such   candidate   should   also   be   stray   votes   because   the
certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. x x x”22

In Maquiling, this Court also said:
 Thus,   the   votes   cast   in   favor   of   the   ineligible   candidate   are   not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the   will   of   the   electorate   is   still   respected,   and   even   more   so.   The
votes cast in favor of an
_______________

20  G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
21  J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 345.
22  Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 19 at p. 32.
 
 
169
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 169
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression
of   the   sovereign   voice.   The   votes   cast   in   favor   of   eligible   and
legitimate   candidates   form   part   of   that   voice   and   must   also   be
respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine
the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next
in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
x x x
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not
a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The
very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate
ineligible.   Knowledge   by   the   electorate   of   a   candidate’s
disqualification   is   not   necessary   before   a   qualified   candidate   who
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second­placer in the vote count is actually the first­placer among
the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and
has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification
based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate   of   candidacy   voids   not   only   the   CoC   but   also   the
proclamation.23
  
In Velasco v. COMELEC, this Court further expounded:
 
x x x. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a CoC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false CoC data
wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their CoC
qualifications if they know that an election victory will
_______________

23  Maquiling v. COMELEC, supra note 20 at pp. 462­463.
 
 
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
cure   any   defect   that   their   CoCs   may   have.   Election   victory   then
becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal
legal command, framed by a Congress representing the national will,
is rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has decided
to   vote   a   candidate   into   office   despite   his   or   her   lack   of   the
qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his
claim   that   he   is   registered   voter   when   he   is   not,   as   has   been
determined by a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that
he   has   made   a   material   misrepresentation under   oath   in   his
CoC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must pay the
ultimate price — the nullification of his election victory. He may also
have   to   account   in   a   criminal   court   for   making   a   false   statement
under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide
upon.
We   distinguish   our   ruling   in   this   case   from   others   that   we   have
made in the past by the clarification that CoC defects beyond matters
of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of
the   benefit   of   our   ruling   that   CoC   mandatory   requirements   before
elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves
more   than   the   will   of   the   people   in   any   given   locality.   Where
a material   CoC   misrepresentation   under   oath is   made,   thereby
 violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well
with   an   assault   on   the   will   of   the   people   of   the   Philippines   as
expressed   in   our   laws.   In   a   choice   between   provisions   on   material
qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the
electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold
that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always
tilt
 
 
171
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 171
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to
slowly gnaw at the rule of law.24
 
Therefore, considering that Reyes’ CoC was cancelled and was deemed
void ab initio by virtue of the final and executory decisions rendered by
the COMELEC and this Court, Velasco is a not second­placer as claimed by
the Dissent; rather, Velasco is the only placer and the winner during the
May elections and thus, for all intents and purposes, Velasco has a clear
legal right to office as Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Unconvinced,   Justice   Leonen   would   protest   in   his   Dissent   that
petitioner Velasco, a nonparty to SPC No. 13­053 and G.R. No. 207264, is a
stranger   to   the   case   and   cannot   be   bound   by   Our   factual   findings   and
rulings therein.25
The proposition is devoid of merit.
Sec.   1,   Rule   23   of   the   COMELEC   Rules   of   Procedure,   as   amended,
pertinently reads:

Section 1. Ground   for   Denial   or   Cancellation   of   Certificate   of

Candidacy.—A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any
registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or
coalition   of   political   parties   on   the   exclusive   ground   that   any
material representation contained therein as required by law is false.
x x x (emphasis added)
 
By lodging a petition for denial or cancellation of CoC, a voter seeks to
ensure that the candidate who purports to be qualified to represent his or
her constituents is indeed eligible to do so. Such petition, therefore, is for
and in benefit of the electorate, and not for one’s personal advantage. This
is in
_______________

24  Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614­615.
25  J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, pp. 335­336.
 
 
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
clear consonance with the aforequoted rule, which never required the
petition to be filed by a candidate’s political rival. Otherwise stated, it is
not required for petitioner Tan in SPA No. 13­053 to have a claim to the
contested electoral post to be permitted by law to challenge the validity of
Reyes’ CoC. At the same time, petitioner Velasco herein is not under any
legal obligation to intervene in SPA No. 13­053 and G.R. No. 207264 before
he could benefit directly or indirectly from the ruling. Unlike civil cases
which only involve private rights, petitions to deny or cancel certificates
of   candidacy   are   so   imbued   with   public   interest   that   they   cannot   be
deemed binding only to the parties thereto. Indeed, it would be an absurd
situation,   after   all,   to   declare   Reyes   ineligible   only   insofar   as   Tan   is
concerned,   and   presumed   eligible   as   to   the   rest   of   the   Marinduqueños,
including Velasco.
Furthermore, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, Sec. 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust,   or   station,   or   unlawfully   excludes   another   from   the   use   and
enjoyment   of   a   right   or   office   to   which   such   other   is   entitled,   and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course   of   law,   the   person   aggrieved   thereby   may   file   a   verified
petition   in   the   proper   court,   alleging   the   facts   with   certainty   and
praying   that   judgment   be   rendered   commanding   the   respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
 to   pay   the   damages   sustained   by   the   petitioner   by   reason   of   the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
 
Apparently, there is nothing in foregoing provision which requires that
the  person applying  for  a writ of mandamus should  establish that he  or
she was the prevailing party­
 
 
173
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 173
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
litigant to a prior case (i.e., a petitioner, respondent or an intervenor) to
be entitled to the writ’s issuance. Contrary to the opinion espoused in the
Dissent, Sec. 3, Rule 65 merely requires the applicant to establish a clear
legal right to the ministerial function to be performed, without distinction
on whether this right emanates from a final judgment in a prior case or
not. Thus, there is no basis to the opinion that Velasco should have been a
party in Reyes in order for this Court to grant a writ of mandamus in his
favor.
 
b. Respondent Belmonte
   and Barua­Yap’s min­
   isterial duties
 
Anent   the   second   element   for mandamus to   lie,   it   is   critical   that   the
duty the performance of which is to be compelled be ministerial in nature,
rather than discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an
officer   or   tribunal   performs   in   a   given   state   of   facts,   in   a   prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done.26 The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a
duty already imposed.27
Without   a   doubt,   petitioner   herein   seeks   the   performance   of   a
ministerial act, without which he is unjustly deprived of the enjoyment of
an   office   that   he   is   clearly   entitled   to,   as   earlier   discussed.   It   must   be
borne   in   mind   that   this   petition   was   brought   to   fore   because,   despite
repeated demands from petitioner and their receipt of the “Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for the position
of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of
_______________

26  Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013, 688 SCRA
403, 424.
27  Supra note 6.
 
 
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Marinduque,”   respondents   Belmonte   and   Barua­Yap   refused   to   allow
Velasco to sit in the Lower House as Marinduque Representative.
The nondiscretionary function of respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap
is underscored in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia(Codilla),28 wherein the Court
held   that   the   House   Speaker   and   the   Secretary   General   of   the   Lower
House   are   duty­bound   to   recognize   the   legally   elected   district
representatives   as   members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   In   the
concluding   statements   of   Codilla,   the   Court,   speaking   through   retired
Chief Justice Reynato Puno, instructs that:
 
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration
of   the   petitioner   in   the   Roll   of   Members   of   the   House   of
Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no
longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents.
The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the
May   14,   2001   elections.   The   COMELEC   Second   Division   initially
ordered   the   proclamation   of   respondent   Locsin;   on   Motion   for
Reconsideration   the   COMELEC En   Bancset   aside   the   order   of   its
Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision   of   the   COMELEC En   Banc has   not   been   challenged   before
this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final
and executory.
In   sum,   the   issue   of   who   is   the   rightful   Representative   of   the
4th legislative   district   of   Leyte   has   been   finally   settled   by   the
COMELEC En Banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the
matter. The rule of   law   demands  that  its  Decision  be obeyed  by  all
 officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except
the reign of chaos and confusion.29 (Emphasis in the original)
_______________

28  G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639, 681.
29  Id.
 
 
175
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 175
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
As   in Codilla,   the   fact   of   Reyes’   disqualification   can   no   longer   be
disputed herein, in view of the consecutive rulings of the COMELEC and
the Court in SPA No. 13­053, G.R. No. 207624, and SPA No. 13­010. Reyes’
ineligibility and Velasco’s consequent membership in the Lower House is
then beyond the discretion of respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap, and
the   rulings   upholding   the   same   must   therefore   be   recognized   and
respected.   To   hold   otherwise   —   that   the   Court   is   not   precluded   from
entertaining   questions   on   Reyes’   eligibility   to   occupy   Marinduque’s
congressional seat — would mean substantially altering, if not effectively
vacating,   Our   ruling   in Reyes that   has   long   attained   finality,   a   blatant
violation of the immutability of judgments. Under the doctrine, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer   be   modified   in   any   respect,   even   if   the   modification   is   meant   to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by
the  court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of  the land. Any act
which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. 30 Justice
Leonen, however, urges this Court to revisit, nay relitigate, Reyes two (2)
years   after   the   date   of   its   finality   and   abandon   the   same,   in   clear
contravention   of   the   doctrine   of   immutability   and   finality   of   Supreme
Court decisions.
It matters not that respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap are nonparties
to Reyes.   It   is   erroneous   to   claim   that   Our   final   ruling   therein   is   not
binding against Belmonte and Barua­Yap on ground that that they were
neither petitioners nor respondents in the said case, 31 and that they were
not given the opportunity to be heard on the issues raised therein. 32 Again,
SPA No. 13­053, G.R. No. 207264, and SPA No. 13­010 are not civil cases and
do   not   involve   purely   private   rights   which   requires   notice   and   full
participation of respondents
_______________
 30  FGU   Insurance   Corporation   v.   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Makati   City, Br.   66,   G.R.   No.
161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50, 56.
31  Memorandum for the OSG in behalf of public respondents, p. 9.
32  Id., at p. 12.
 
 
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Belmonte   and   Barua­Yap.   It   must   also   be   noted   that   the   said   case
originated   as   petition   to   deny   or   cancel   Reyes’   CoC,   which   does   not
require   the   participation   of   the   Speaker   and   Secretary   General   of   the
House   of   Representatives.   In   fact,   there   is   nothing   in   BP   881,   the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor in Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which requires that the Speaker and Secretary General to
be included either in the original petition for cancellation of CoC or when
the case is elevated to this Court via petition for certiorari. In any event,
the fact that they were not made parties in Reyes does not mean that the
public respondents are not bound by the said decision considering that the
same already form part of the legal system of the Philippines.33
The   Dissent   endeavors   to   divert   our   attention   to   the   peculiarities
of Codilla that allegedly preclude the Court from applying its doctrine in
the case at bar. It was noted that (i) the petitioner in Codilla acquired the
plurality of votes, which according to the dissent is the primary reason for
the   grant   of   the   petition;34 (ii)   that   respondent   Reyes’   proclamation   was
never nullified in SPA 13­053; 35 and (iii) that the second­placer rule was not
yet abandoned when Codilla was promulgated.36
With all due respect, the arguments are bereft of merit. Their rehashed
version fails to persuade now as they did before in Reyes.
First, the ruling on Codilla was not primarily hinged on the plurality of
votes  acquired  by  petitioner   therein,  but  on  the certainty as   to  who  the
lawfully elected  candidate  was. To reiterate the holding  in Codilla: “the
issue of who is the rightful Representative x x x has been finally settled by
the  COMELEC  En  Banc,  the  constitutional   body   with  jurisdiction  on  the
matter.” (Emphasis added) Hence, it became ministe­
_______________

33  Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines.
34  J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, pp. 340­341.
35  Id., at p. 341.
36  Id., at p. 344.
  
 
177
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 177
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
rial   on   the   part   of   then   House   Speaker   Jose   de   Venecia   and   then
Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to
swear in and include the name of petitioner Eufrocino Codilla (Codilla) in
the Roll of Members.
Acquiring the plurality of votes may be one way of asserting one’s claim
to office, but the cancellation of the CoC of the candidate who garnered
the   highest   number   of   votes   is   likewise   a   viable   alternative   in   light
of Aratea. Thus, in spite of the initial determination that Velasco failed to
obtain the plurality of votes, he could still validly claim that his right to be
seated   as   Marinduque’s   Representative   in   Congress   has   been   settled   by
virtue of Reyes’ disqualification.
Second, the ruling in Reyes may have been silent as to the validity of her
proclamation, but the Dissent failed to take into account the developments
in   SPC   No.   13­010,   wherein   Velasco   assailed   the   proceedings   of   the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) and prayed before the COMELEC
that the May 18, 2013 proclamation of Reyes be declared null and void.37
On June 19, 2013, the COMELEC would deny Velasco’s petition. But on
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc, on July 9, 2013, made a reversal
and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of
Reyes,   and,   in   the   very   issuance,   declared   petitioner   Velasco   as   the
winning candidate.38And so it was that on July 16, 2013, Velasco would be
proclaimed by a newly constituted PBOC as the duly elected member of
the   House   of   Representatives   for   the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque,   in
congruence with the COMELEC’s rulings in SPA No. 13­053 and SPC No.
13­010.39 This   proclamation   was   never   questioned   by   Reyes   before   any
judicial or quasi­judicial forum.
_______________

37  Ponencia, p. 101.
38  Id., at p. 102.
39  Id., at p. 104.
 
 
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
 This   sequence   of   events   bears   striking   resemblance   with   the   factual
milieu of Codilla wherein Codilla, on June 20, 2001, seasonably moved for
reconsideration   of   the   June   14,   2001   order   for   his   disqualification   and
additionally   questioned   therein   the   validity   of   the   proclamation   of   Ma.
Victoria   Locsin   (Locsin).   On   the   next   day,   he   would   lodge   a   separate
petition   challenging   the   validity   of   Locsin’s   proclamation   anew.   The
petition,   however,   would   suffer   the   same   fate   of   being   initially   decided
against   his   favor.   It   will   not   be   until   August   29,   2001   when   the
COMELEC En   Banc,   by   a   4­3   vote,   would   reverse   the   rulings   that
disqualified   Codilla   and   upheld   the   validity   of   Locsin’s   proclamation.
Notably,   Locsin   did   not   appeal   from   this   Resolution   annulling   her
proclamation   and   so   the   COMELEC En   Banc’s   ruling   then   became   final
and executory.
Thereafter, on September 6, 2001, the COMELEC En Bancreconstituted
the   PBOC   of   Leyte   to   implement   its   August   29,   2001   Resolution,   and   to
proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the
district as the duly elected Representative of the 4th Legislative District of
Leyte.   So   it   was   that   on   September   12,   2001,   petitioner   Codilla   was
proclaimed winner of the congressional race.
With   the   finality   of   the   COMELEC   ruling   disqualifying   Locsin   and
nullifying her proclamation, and the consequent proclamation of Codilla
as   the   lawfully   elected   Representative   of   the   4th District   of   Leyte,   the
Court   saw   no   legal   obstacle   in   directing   then   House   Speaker   Jose   de
Venecia   and   then   Secretary   General   Roberto   Nazareno   of   the   House   of
Representatives to swear in and include petitioner Codilla’s name in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. This very same outcome
in Codilla should be observed in the present case.
Third,   that   the   second­placer   rule   was   not   yet   abandoned
when Codilla was   decided   is   inconsequential   in   this   case.   As   earlier
discussed,   what   is   of   significance   in Codilla is   the certainty on   who   the
rightful   holder   of   the   elective   post   is.   It   may   be   that   when Codilla was
decided, plurality of votes and
 
 
179
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 179
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
successional rights, in disqualifications cases, may have been the key
considerations, but as jurisprudence has been enriched by Aratea and by
the subsequent cases that followed,40 the qualified second­placer rule was
added   to   the   enumeration.   Synthesizing Aratea with Codilla,   petitioner
Velasco may now successfully invoke the qualified second­placer rule to
prove   the   certainty   of   his   claim   to   office,   and   compel   the   respondent
Speaker   and   Secretary   General   to   administer   his   oath   and   include   his
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
With   the   presence   of   the   twin   requirements,   the   extraordinary   writ
of mandamus must be issued in the case at bar.
 
II
 
We now discuss the collateral issues raised.
The   Dissent   cites   the   cases   of Tañada   v.
COMELEC (Tañada), Limkaichong   v.   COMELEC (Limkaichong),
and Vinzons­Chato v. COMELEC (Vinzons­Chato), to persuade Us to revisit
the   ruling   in Reyes   v.   COMELEC,   and   divest   the   COMELEC   of   its
jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes’ qualification in favor of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Similarly, respondents raised
the   issue   of   jurisdiction   arguing   that   the   proclamation   alone   of   the
winning candidate is the operative act that triggers the commencement of
HRET’s exclusive jurisdiction,41 and insisted that to rule otherwise would
result in the clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC. 42
On the outset, I express my strong reservations on revisiting herein the
issue   on   the   HRET’s   jurisdiction,   which   has   already   been   settled   with
finality in Reyes, for it is not at
_______________

40  Jalosjos Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 19; Maquiling v. COMELEC, supranote 20.
41  Memorandum of the OSG, p. 16.
42  Id., at p. 24.
 
 
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
issue in this petition for mandamus. I SHARE THE OBSERVATION BY
THE PONENCIA THAT   RESPONDENTS   ARE   TAKING   ADVANTAGE   OF
THIS   PETITION   TO   RELITIGATE   WHAT   HAS   BEEN   SETTLED
IN REYES AND   DOES   NOT   SEEM   TO   RESPECT   THE   ENTRY   OF
JUDGMENT THAT HAS BEEN ISSUED THEREIN ON OCTOBER 22, 2013.
Nevertheless, assuming in arguendo that there is no impropriety in taking
a   second   look   at   the   issue   in   this   case,   I   see   no   irreconcilability
between Reyes, on the one hand, and the cases cited in the Dissent, on the
other.
As a review, the doctrine in Reyes is that the HRET only has jurisdiction
over Members of   the   House   of   Representatives.   To   be   considered   a
Member   of   the   House   of   Representatives,   the   following   requisites   must
concur: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.43
Our   ruling   in Reyes does   not   run   in   conflict   with Tañada,   which   was
decided   by   the   Court En   Banc by   a   unanimous   vote,   as   our   esteemed
colleague pointed out. As held in Tañada:
 
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been
proclaimed as   Member   of   the   House   of   Representatives   for   the
4th District   of   Quezon   Province  on  May  16,   2013, as   she  has  in  fact
taken   her   oath and assumed   office past   noon   time  of   June   30,   2013,
the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As
they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the
resulting  proclamation  of  Angelina  as  herein  discussed  are  matters
which fall under the scope of the terms “election” and “returns” as
above   stated   and   hence,   properly   fall   under   the   HRET’s   sole
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added)
 
Hence, the Court’s ruling in Tañada, disclaiming jurisdiction in favor of
the HRET, is premised on the concurrence of the three (3) requirements
laid down in Reyes. In any case,
_______________

43  Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 4 at p. 535.
 
 
181
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 181
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Tañada is   a   Minute   Resolution   not   intended   to   amend   or
abandon Reyes, as was made evident by the subsequent case Bandara v.
COMELEC,44 to wit:
 
 It   is   a   well­settled   rule   that   once   a   winning   candidate   has   been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House   of   representatives,   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Commission   on
Elections   (COMELEC)   over   election   contests   relating   to   his/her
election,   returns,   and   qualification   ends,   and   the   HRET’s   own
jurisdiction   begins.   Consequently,   the   instant   petitions
for certiorariare not the proper remedies for the petitioners in both
cases to question the propriety of the National Board of Canvassers’
proclamation, and the events leading thereto.
 
Limkaichong is even more blunt as the Court decided the case with the
following opening statement:45

Once   a winning   candidate has   been proclaimed, taken   his   oath,

and assumed   office as   a   Member   of   the   House   of   Representatives,
the jurisdiction   of   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal
begins. x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
 
And in Vinzons­Chato v. COMELEC:46

x x x   [I]n   an   electoral   contest   where   the   validity   of

the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office  and  assumed  his   post  as  Congressman is  raised,  that   issue   is
best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self­evident,
for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
_______________

44  G.R. Nos. 207144 and 208141, February 3, 2015.
45  Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831­32 and 179120, 179132­33, 179240­41, April 1,
2009, 583 SCRA 1, 8­9.
46   G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 180, citing Pangilinan v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993, 228 SCRA 36, 43.
 
 
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
between   constitutional   bodies,   with   due   regard   to   the   people’s
mandate. (Emphasis added)
 
 Verily, Reyes delineated   the   blurred   lines   between   the   jurisdictions   of
the  COMELEC  and the HRET, explicitly ruling where one  ends  and the
other begins. Our ruling therein was not wanting in jurisprudential basis
and is in fact supported by cases cited by in the Dissent no less.
Certainly, the principle in Reyes does not offend Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution nor does it undermine the adjudicatory powers of the HRET.
On   the   contrary,   it   strictly   adheres   to   the   textual   tenor   of   the
constitutional provision, to wit:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have   an   Electoral   Tribunal   which   shall   be   the   sole   judge   of   all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective   Members.   Each   Electoral   Tribunal   shall   be   composed   of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may   be,   who   shall   be   chosen   on   the   basis   of   proportional
representation   from   the   political   parties   and   the   parties   or
organizations   registered   under   the   party­list   system   represented
therein.   The   senior   Justice   in   the   Electoral   Tribunal   shall   be   its
Chairman. (Emphasis added)
 
It has to be emphasized that the Court, in deciding Reyes, did not divest
the   Senate   and   House   of   Representative   Electoral   Tribunals   of   their
jurisdiction over their respective members, but merely set the parameters
on who these “Members” are. The jurisprudence earlier reviewed are in
unison in holding that to be considered a “Member” within the purview of
the   constitutional   provision,   the   three   indispensable   elements   must
concur.
 
 
183
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 183
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
As to the alleged clash of jurisdiction, the Court, in its October 22, 2013
Resolution in Reyes, explained:
 
“11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the
COMELEC   and   the   HRET   insofar   as   the   petitioner’s   being   a
 Representative   of   Marinduque   is   concerned.   The   COMELEC   covers
the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course
or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines
who   can   be   legally   proclaimed.   The   matter   can   go   to   the   Supreme
Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC,
which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court
grounded   on   more   than   mere   error   of   judgment   but   on   error   of
jurisdiction   for   grave   abuse   of   discretion.   At   and   after   the
COMELEC En   Banc decision,   there   is   no   longer   any   certificate
cancellation   matter   than   can   go   to   the   HRET.   In   that   sense,   the
HRET’s   constitutional   authority   opens,   over   the   qualification   of   its
MEMBER,   who   becomes   so   only   upon   a   duly   and   legally   based
proclamation,   the   first   and   unavoidable   step   towards   such
membership.   The   HRET   jurisdiction   over   the   qualification   of   the
Member   of   the   House   of   Representatives   is   original   and   exclusive,
and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the
COMELEC   which,   as   just   stated   has   been   terminated.   The   HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine
who   should   be   the   Member   of   the   House. It   must   be   made   clear
though,   at   the   risk   of   repetitiveness,   that   no   hiatus   occurs   in   the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a
representative   who   shall   sit   as   the   HRET   proceedings   are   had   till
termination.   Such   representative   is   the   duly   proclaimed   winner
resulting   from   the   terminated   case   of   cancellation   of   certificate   of
candidacy of petitioner.  The petitioner [Reyes] is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between
the   parties:   who   shall   sit   in   the   House   in   representation   of
Marinduque, while there is
 
 
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
yet   no   HRET   decision   on   the   qualifications   of   the
Member.47 (Emphasis and words in brackets added)
 
It thus appears that there is no conflict of jurisdiction, and that if a quo
warranto case   should   be   filed   before   HRET   as   espoused   by   the
respondents and in the Dissent, it cannot be one against Reyes who never
became a member of the House of Representatives over whom the HRET
could exercise jurisdiction.
 
III
 
The Dissent also claims that when respondent Reyes was proclaimed by
the   PBOC   as   the   duly   elected   Representative   of   the   Lone   District   of
Marinduque of May 18, 2013, petitioner Velasco should have continued his
election protest via a quo warranto petition before the HRET.48
This suggestion is legally flawed considering that the HRET is without
authority to review, modify, more so annul, the illegal acts of PBOC. On
the contrary, this authority is lodged with the COMELEC and is incidental
to   its   power   of   “direct   control   and   supervision   over   the   Board   of
Canvassers.”49 Therefore,   the   COMELEC   is   the   proper   entity   that   can
legally and validly nullify the acts of the PBOC. As held by this Court held
in Mastura v. COMELEC:50

“Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises
direct supervision and control over
_______________

47  Supra note 4 at pp. 231­232.
48  J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 335.
49  Section 227, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 227. Supervision   and   control   over   board   of   canvassers.—The   Commission   shall
have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers.
50  G.R. No. 124521, January 29, 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499­500.
 
 
185
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 185
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
the   proceedings   before   the   Board   of   Canvassers.   In Aratuc   v.
Commission on Elections51 we held —
 
“While   nominally,   the   procedure   of   bringing   to   the   Commission
objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite
loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and
by   this   Court   .   .   .   as   an   appeal,   the   fact   of   the   matter   is   that   the
authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not
spring   from   any   appellate   jurisdiction   conferred   by   any   specific
 provision   of   law,   for   there   is   none   such  provision   anywhere   in   the
Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the above quoted provisions of Section
168.   And   in   administrative   law,   it   is   a   too   well   settled   postulate   to
need   any   supporting   citation   here,   that   a   superior   body   or   office
having   supervision   and   control   over   another   may   do   directly   what
the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. x x x x”
 
Furthermore, the illegal proclamation of the PBOC cannot operate  to
automatically   oust   the   COMELEC   of   its   supervisory   authority   over   the
PBOC. As clearly explained in Reyes:
 
 “More   importantly,   we   cannot   disregard   a   fact   basic   in   this
controversy — that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue
of   petitioner’s   lack   of   Filipino   citizenship   and   residency via its
Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before
the   COMELEC,   no   longer   any   pending   case   on   petitioner’s
qualifications   to   run   for   the   position   of   Member   of   the   House   of
Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept
the   argument   of   the   petitioner   that   the   COMELEC   was   ousted   of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the
COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Can­
_______________

51  Nos. L­49705­09 and L­49717­21, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.
 
 
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
vasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed
to   render   nugatory   a   decision   of   the   COMELEC En   Banc which
affirmed   a   decision   of   the   COMELEC   First   Division.” 52 (Emphasis
supplied)
 
It  must likewise  be noted  that the COMELEC En Banc’s  May 14, 2013
Decision   in   SPA   No.   13­053   was   already   final   as   “there   was,   before   the
COMELEC,   no   longer   any   pending   case   on   petitioner’s   qualifications   to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representative,” and in the
absence of a restraining order from this Court, it became executory. Thus,
as   held   in Reyes,   it   was   an   error   for   the   PBOC   to   proclaim   Reyes,   a
noncandidate, on May 18, 2013. As aptly observed by Chief Justice Sereno
in her Concurring Opinion in the said case:53

“On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already resolved the
Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy   filed   against   Reyes.   Based   on   Sec.   3,   Rule   37   of   the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, this Resolution was already final and
should have become executory five days after its promulgation. But
despite this unrestrained ruling of the COMELEC En Banc the PBOC
still proclaimed Reyes as the winning candidate on 18 May 2013.
On   16   May   2013,   petitioner   had   already   received   the   judgment
cancelling   her   Certificate   of   Candidacy.   As   mentioned,   two   days
thereafter, the PBOC still proclaimed her as the winner. Obviously,
the proclamation took place notwithstanding that petitioner herself
already knew of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
It must also be pointed out that even the PBOC already knew of the
cancellation of the Certificate of Can­
_______________

52  Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 4 at p. 537.
53  Chief Justice Sereno, Concurring Opinion, supra note 4 at pp. 243­248, dated October 22,
2013.
 
 
187
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 187
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
didacy   of   petitioner   when   it   proclaimed   her.   The   COMELEC En
Banc Resolution   dated   9   July   2013   and   submitted   to   this   Court
through   the   Manifestation   of   private   respondent,   quoted   the
averments in the Verified Petition of petitioner therein as follows:
x x x  While  the  proceedings  of  the  PBOC  is  suspended  or  in
recess,   the   process   server   of   this   Honorable   Commission,   who
identified   himself   as   PEDRO   P.   STA.   ROSA   II   (‘Sta.   Rosa,’   for
brevity),   arrived   at   the   session   hall   of   the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial canvassing is
being held.
 x x x The process server, Sta. Rosa, was in possession of certified
true   copies   of   the Resolution promulgated   by   the   Commission   on
Elections En   Banc on   14   May   2013   in   SPA   No.   13­053   (DC)   entitled
‘Joseph   Socorro   B.   Tan   v.   Atty.   Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes’   and
an Order dated   15   May   2013   to   deliver   the   same   to   the   Provincial
Election Supervisor of Marinduque. The said Order was signed by no
less   than   the   Chairman   of   the   Commission   on   Elections,   the
Honorable Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
x x x   Process   Server   Pedro   Sta.   Rosa   II   immediately   approached
Atty.   Edwin   Villa,   the   Provincial   Election   Supervisor   (PES)   of
Marinduque, upon his arrival to serve a copy of the aforementioned
Resolution   dated   14   May   2013   in   SPA   No.   13­053   (DC).   Despite   his
proper identification that he is a process server from the COMELEC
Main Office, the PES totally ignored Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa
II.
x x x Interestingly, the PES likewise refused to receive the copy of
the Commission on Elections En BancResolution dated 14 May 2013 in
SPA No. 13­053 (DC) despite several attempts to do so.
x x x Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption of the
proceedings   of   the   PBOC   and   instructed   the   Board   Secretary   to
immediately   read   its   Order   proclaiming   Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes   as
winner   for   the   position   of   Congressman   for   the   Lone   District   of
Marinduque.
 
 
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
This   narration   of   the   events   shows   that the   proclamation   was   in
contravention   of   a   COMELEC En   Banc Resolution   cancelling   the
candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy.
The   PBOC,   a   subordinate   body   under   the direct   control   and
supervision   of   the   COMELEC,   cannot   simply   disregard   a
COMELEC En   Banc Resolution brought   before   its   attention   and
hastily  proceed  with the proclamation by reasoning  that it  has not
officially received the resolution or order.
x x x     x x x
The PBOC denied the motion to proclaim candidate Velasco on the
ground that neither the counsel of petitioner nor the PBOC was duly
 furnished   or   served   an   official   copy   of   the   COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013 and forthwith proceeded with the
proclamation of herein petitioner, whose Certificate of Candidacy has
already been cancelled, bespeaks mala fideon its part.
As   early   as   27   March   2013,   when   the   COMELEC   First   Division
cancelled   petitioner’s   Certificate   of   Candidacy,   the   people   of
Marinduque, including the COMELEC officials in the province, were
already aware of the impending disqualification of herein petitioner
upon the finality of the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy.
When   the   COMELEC En   Banc affirmed   the   cancellation   of   the
certificate   of   candidacy   on   the   day   of   the   elections,   but   before   the
proclamation of the winner, it had the effect of declaring that herein
petitioner was not a candidate.
Thus, when the PBOC proclaimed herein petitioner, it proclaimed
not a winner but a noncandidate.
The proclamation of a noncandidate cannot take away the power
vested in the COMELEC to enforce and execute its decisions. It is a
power that enjoys precedence over that emanating from any
 
 
189
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 189
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
other   authority,   except   the   Supreme Court, x x x.”   (Emphasis
supplied)
 
Hence,  at  that  moment,  the COMELEC  is  not  only  bestowed with  the
authority,   but   more   so,   duty­bound   to   rectify   the   PBOC’s   mistake.
Consequently,   the   COMELEC En   Banc,   in   its   July   9,   2013   Resolution   in
SPC   No.   13­010,   nullified   the   proclamation   of   Reyes,   proceeded   to
constitute a special PBOC and on July 9, 2013, proclaimed Velasco as the
winning Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque for the 2013­
2016   term.   As   emphasized   in   the ponencia,   this   proclamation   of   Velasco
was   never   questioned   before   this   Court   and   likewise   became   final   and
executory.54
The Dissent makes much of the cases questioning Reyes’ eligibility that
are pending before the HRET, and argues that the Court should deny the
instant petition and defer to the action of the electoral tribunal.55
The argument is specious.
 It   is   of   no   moment   that   there   are   two quo   warranto cases   currently
pending before the HRET that seek to disqualify Reyes from holding the
congressional   office.56 These   cases   cannot   oust   the   COMELEC   and   the
Court of their jurisdiction over the issue on Reyes’ eligibility, which they
have already validly acquired and exercised in SPA No. 13­053 and Reyes.
The   petitioners   in   the quo   warranto cases   themselves   recognize   the
enforceability of the COMELEC and the Court’s ruling in SPA No. 13­053
and Reyes,   and   even   invoked   the   rulings   therein   to   support   their
respective petitions. They seek not a trial de novofor the determination of
whether or not Reyes is eligible to hold office as Representative, but seek
_______________

54  Ponencia, p. 113.
55  J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, pp. 201­202.
56   HRET   Case   No.   13­036,   entitled   “Noeme   Mayores   Lim   and   Jeasseca   L.   Mapacpac   v.
Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes,”   and   HRET   Case   No.   13­037,   entitled   “Eric   D.   Junio   v.   Regina
Ongsiako Reyes.”
 
 
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
the   implementation   of   the   final   and   executory   decisions   of   the
COMELEC and of the High Court. Interestingly, Reyes merely prayed for
the dismissal of these cases, but never asked the HRET for any affirmative
relief to counter the executory rulings in SPA No. 13­053, G.R. No. 207264,
and SPA No. 13­010.
 
IV
 
All   told,   We   cannot   turn   a   blind   eye   to   the   undisputed   fact   that   the
Court’s   pronouncements   in Reyes and   the   pertinent   resolutions   of   the
COMELEC have established that the title and clear right to the contested
office   belongs   to   petitioner.   In   reinforcing   this   conclusion,
the ponencia aptly observed that:57

x x x In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., the final and
executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264, the final and
executory   resolutions   of   the   COMELEC   in   SPA   No.   13­053   (DC)
cancelling   Reyes’   Certificate   of   Candidacy,   and   the   final   and
executory   resolution   of   the   COMELEC   in   SPA   No.   13­010   declaring
 null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as
the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque, it cannot be claimed that the
present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to
the claimed office.
 
It   has   thus   been   conclusively   proven   that   Velasco   is   the   winning
candidate   for   the   position   of   Representative   for   the   Lone   District   of
Marinduque   during   the   May   2013   Elections.   As   a   consequence,   when
respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap received the “Certificate of Canvass
of   Votes   and   Proclamation   of   Winning   Candidate   for   the   position   of
Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque”
issued by the COMELEC in favor of the herein petitioner,
_______________

57  Ponencia, p. 118.
 
 
191
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 191
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
they should have, without delay, abide by their respective ministerial
duties to administer the oath in favor of the petitioner and to register his
name in Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the 2013­2016
term. Upon their unlawful refusal to do so despite repeated demands from
petitioner, the extraordinary writ of mandamus ought to lie.
In the end, Reyes has no legal basis whatsoever to continue exercising
the   rights   and   prerogatives   as   the   Lone   District   Representative   of
Marinduque as there is at present no pending action or petition which was
instituted   by   her   either   before   the   HRET   or   the   Court   challenging
petitioner Velasco’s proclamation. Respondents Belmonte and Barua­Yap
must thus honor the rights of petitioner and execute the final COMELEC
and Supreme Court Resolutions in accordance with and furtherance of the
rule of law.
May I just be permitted one last word.
In what was in all ill designed as a master stroke, Reyes, after all have
been   said   and   done   by   this   Court   in   the   petition,   she   herself   filed,
submitted   a   motion   to   withdraw   that   petition,   G.R.   No.   207264, Regina
Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC and Tan.58 I had the opportunity to say, in the
Court’s denial of her motion to reconsider the dismissal of her petition,
that:
x x x
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted
thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind petitioner that
jurisdiction,   once   acquired,   is   not   lost   upon   the   instance   of   the
parties, but continues until the case is terminated. When petitioner
filed her Petition for Certiorari, jurisdiction vested in the Court and,
in   fact,   the   Court   exercised   such   jurisdiction   when   it   acted   on   the
petition.   Such   jurisdiction   cannot   be   lost   by   the   unilateral
withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
_______________

58  Supra note 4 at p. 233.
 
 
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
More   importantly,   the   Resolution   dated   25   June   2013,   being   a   valid
court issuance, undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by
the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the
Court’s Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner
against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the
Supreme   Court,   petitioner   cannot   withdraw   her   petition   to   erase   the
ruling   adverse   to   her   interests.   Obviously,   she   cannot,   as   she   designed
below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
I cannot be moved one bit away from the conclusion, then as now, that
parties   to   cases   cannot   trifle   with   our   Court   processes.   If   we   deny   the
petition at hand, we will ourselves do for Reyes what we said in judgment
cannot be done by her.
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   I   register   my   vote   to GRANT the
petition.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:
 
I concur in the result.
 The quo   warranto cases1 filed   before   the   House   of   Representatives
Electoral Tribunal have been dismissed in the Resolution 2 dated December
14,   2015.   The   proper   constitutional   body,   the   House   of   Representatives
Electoral   Tribunal,   has   already   ruled   on   the   basis   of   Lord   Allan   Jay
Velasco’s (Velasco) claim to a seat in Congress. There is thus no pending
proceeding   nor   matter   that   bars   this   court   from   issuing   the   writ
of mandamus in favor of Velasco.
_______________

1  Rollo, p. 788, Regina Ongsiako Reyes’ Memorandum. These cases were docketed as HRET
Case Nos. 13­036 and 13­037.
2  Petitioner’s Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, Annex D.
 
 
193
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 193
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Under   the   situation   attendant   in   this   case,   I   therefore   concur   in   the
grant of the Petition for Mandamus.
 
I
 
Election   contests   assailing   Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes’   (Reyes)   title   as   a
member   of   the   House   of   Representatives   were   filed.   Velasco   filed   an
electoral   protest   before   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal.3 For reasons only he understood, he opted to withdraw his case
against Reyes before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and,
instead, after Reyes had taken her oath and proceeded to represent the
Lone District of Marinduque, filed the present Petition for Mandamus.
However, three quo warranto cases were also filed against Reyes before
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.4
When   Velasco   filed   this   Petition   for Mandamus,   the   House   of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal had yet to rule on Velasco’s title to a
seat   in   Congress.   The quo   warranto cases   were   still   pending   before   the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
While   election   contests   were   pending   before   the   House   of
Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal,   this   Petition   for Mandamuswas,   in
effect, an election contest.5 It was a procedural vehicle to raise “contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” 6 of  a Member of  the
House of Representatives. This action set up the title of Velasco to a public
office.
_______________

3  Rollo,   p.   630,   Hon.   Speaker   Feliciano   R.   Belmonte   and   Secretary   General   Marilyn   B.
Barua­Yap’s Memorandum. The case was docketed as HRET Case No. 13­028.
4  Id., at pp. 629­630.
5  HRET Rules, Rule 15. The action filed may be an election protest or quo warranto under
the HRET Rules.
6  Const., Art. VI, Sec. 17.
 
 
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Velasco claims a clear and better legal right as against the occupant. An
election contest is a suit that can be filed by a candidate to question the
title of an incumbent to a public office.7
The power to be the “sole judge”8 of all these contests is vested by our
Constitution itself in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to
the exclusion of all others.9
The Constitution clearly provides:

SECTION 17. The   Senate   and   the   House   of   Representatives   shall

each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective   Members.   Each   Electoral   Tribunal   shall   be   composed   of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may   be,   who   shall   be   chosen   on   the   basis   of   proportional
representation   from   the   political   parties   and   the   parties   or
organizations   registered   under   the   party­list   system   represented
therein.   The   senior   Justice   in   the   Electoral   Tribunal   shall   be   its
Chairman.10

An   election   contest,   whether   an   election   protest 11 or   petition   for quo

warranto,12 is a remedy “to dislodge the winning
_______________

7  HRET Rules, Rules 15­17.
8  Const., Art. VI, Sec. 17.
 9  Id. See also Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J.Laurel, En Banc].
10  Id.
11  HRET Rules, Rule 16 provides:
RULE 16. Election Protest.—A verified petition contesting the election or returns of any
Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days after
the proclamation of the winner.
 
 
195
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 195
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
_______________

The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party
shall be known as the protestee.
No   joint   election   protest   shall   be   admitted,   but   the   Tribunal,   for   good   and   sufficient
reasons, may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them jointly. Thus, where
there are two or more protests involving the same protestee and common principal causes of
action,   the   subsequent   protests   shall   be   consolidated   with   the   earlier   case   to   avoid
unnecessary costs or delay. In case of objection to the consolidation, the Tribunal shall resolve
the   same.   An   order   resolving   a   motion   for   or   objection   to   the   consolidation   shall   be
unappealable.
The protest is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read it and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief or based on verifiable information or
authentic   records.   A   verification   based   on   “information   and   belief,”   or   upon   “knowledge,
information and belief,” is not a sufficient verification.
An unverified election protest shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to
file the protest.
An election protest shall state:
1. The date of proclamation of the winner and the number of votes obtained by the parties
per proclamation;
2. The total number of contested individual and clustered precincts per municipality or
city;
3. The individual and clustered precinct numbers and location of the contested precincts;
and
4. The   specific   acts   or   omissions   complained   of   constituting   the   electoral   frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the contested precincts.
12  HRET Rules, Rule 17 provides:
RULE 17. Quo Warranto.—A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of
a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines  shall be  filed  by any registered  voter of  the district  concerned
within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the
petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the
respondent.
The   provisions   of   the   preceding   paragraph   to   the   contrary   notwithstanding,   a   petition
for quo warranto may be filed by any
 
  
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
candidate from office”13 and “to establish who is the actual winner in the
election.”14 The action puts in issue the validity of the incumbent’s claim to
the office.
A contest contemplated by the Constitution settles disputes as to who is
rightfully   entitled   to   a   position. 15 It   is   not   this   court   but   the   House   of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has sole jurisdiction of contests
involving   Members   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   This   can   be   filed
through   (a)   an   election   protest   under   Rule   16   of   the   2011   Rules   of   the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and (b) quo warranto under
Rule   17   of   the   2011   Rules   of   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal.
 
Thus,   while   the   petitions   for quo   warranto were   pending   before   the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this court did not have the
jurisdiction   to   rule   on   this   Petition   for Mandamus.   A   grant   of   the   writ
of mandamus would   have   openly   defied   the   Constitution   and,   in   all
likelihood, would muddle the administration of justice as it would have
rendered   the quo   warranto cases   properly   pending   before   the   House   of
Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   moot   and   academic.   We   would   have
arrogated   upon   ourselves   the   resolution   of   then   pending   House   of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal cases.
_______________
registered voter of the district concerned against a member of the House of Representatives,
on   the   ground   of   citizenship,   at   any   time   during   his   tenure.
The   rule   on   verification   and   consolidation   provided   in   Section   16   hereof   shall   apply   to
petitions for quo warranto.
13  Tecson   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   468   Phil.   421,   461;   424   SCRA   277,   325   (2004)
[Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
14  Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 279 Phil. 877, 898; 202 SCRA 808,
825 (1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
15  Const., Art. VI, Sec. 17.
 
 
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 197
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
II
 Notwithstanding   the   pendency   of   the quo   warranto cases   before   the
House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal,   Velasco   relies   on   the
Decision in Reyes v. Commission on Elections 16upholding the jurisdiction of
the   Commission   on   Elections   and   affirming   the   Resolution   of   the
Commission   on   Elections   cancelling   Reyes’   Certificate   of   Candidacy   for
the grant of the writ of mandamus.
The   Resolution   on   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   in Reyes   v.
Commission   on   Elections17 was   denied   by   a   divided   court.18 Five
justices19 voted to deny the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Reyes, and
four justices20 voted to grant the Motion for Reconsideration.
On   the   same   day that   the   Resolution   was   promulgated,   this   court En
Banc decided Tañada,   Jr.   v.   Commission   on   Elections 21by   a   unanimous
vote.22 In Tañada,   this   court   once   again   upheld   the   jurisdiction   of   the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal “over disputes relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representa­
_______________

16  G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
17  G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
18  Id., at p. 234.
19  The five justices were Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Associate Justices
Teresita J. Leonardo­De Castro, Roberto A. Abad, Jose P. Perez, and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
20  The four justices were Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Arturo D. Brion, Martin S.
Villarama, Jr., and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.
21  G.R. Nos. 207199­200, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 188 [Per J. Perlas­Bernabe, En Banc].
22  Id., at p. 196.
 
 
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
tive[.]”23 The issue on the validity of  the proclamation of a Member of
Congress is included in the term “returns.” We said:
 
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate
following   the   election   divests   the   COMELEC   of   jurisdiction   over
disputes   relating   to   the   election,   returns,   and   qualifications   of   the
proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase “election,
returns, and qualifications” refers to all matters affecting the validity
of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term “election” refers to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
 electoral   campaign,   and   the   casting   and   counting   of   the   votes;
“returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
“qualifications”   refers   to   matters   that   could   be   raised   in   a quo
warranto proceeding   against   the   proclaimed   winner,   such   as   his
disloyalty   or   ineligibility   or   the   inadequacy   of   his   CoC. 24 (Citation
omitted)

In Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections, et al.:25
 
Petitioners   (in   G.R.   Nos.   179120,   179132­33,   and   179240­41)
steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong’s proclamation was tainted
with   irregularity,   which   will   effectively   prevent   the   HRET   from
acquiring jurisdiction.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this
case,   was   alleged   to   have   been   tainted   with   irregularity   does   not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. The Court has shed light on this in
the case of Vinzons­Chato, to the effect that:
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico
has   already   been  proclaimed  and   taken   his   oath   of   office  as   a
Member of the House of Representatives
_______________

23  Id., at p. 195.
24  Id., at pp. 195­196.
25  601 Phil. 751; 583 SCRA 1 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
 
 
199
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 199
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
(Thirteenth   Congress);   hence,   the   COMELEC   correctly   ruled
that   it   had   already   lost   jurisdiction   over   petitioner   Chato’s
petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate
to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent
Unico’s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed
to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly,
the allegation that respondent Unico’s proclamation is null and
void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
 x x x   [I]n   an   electoral   contest   where   the   validity   of   the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath
of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that
issue   is   best   addressed   to   the   HRET.   The   reason   for   this
ruling is self­evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings
and   a   clash   of   jurisdiction   between   constitutional   bodies,
with due regard to the people’s mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato’s
election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the
constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
    In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation
will   not   prevent   the   HRET   from   assuming   jurisdiction   over   all
matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the House  of
Representatives.
    . . . .
    Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in
the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one’s
eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification   is   to   file   before
the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a
 
 
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET
Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that where
the   candidate   has   already   been   proclaimed   winner   in   the
congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral
protest   with   the   Electoral   Tribunal   of   the   House   of
Representatives.26(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
 
In Vinzons­Chato v. Commission on Elections,27 this court ruled that:

once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed   office   as   a   Member   of   the   House   of   Representatives,   the
COMELEC’s   jurisdiction   over   election   contests   relating   to   his
election,   returns,   and   qualifications   ends,   and   the   HRET’s   own
jurisdiction   begins. Stated   in   another   manner,   where   the   candidate
has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the
 remedy   of   the   petitioner   is   to   file   an   electoral   protest   with   the
HRET.28 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

When Reyes was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as
the   duly   elected   Representative   of   the   Lone   District   of   Marinduque   on
May 18, 2013, Velasco should have continued his election protest or filed
a quo   warranto Petition   before   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal.29Instead, Velasco filed a Petition to annul the proceedings of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers and the proclamation of Reyes on May 20,
2013 before the Commission on Elections.30 At that time, the Commission on
Elections no longer had jurisdiction over the Petition that was filed after
Reyes’ proclamation.
_______________

26  Id., at pp. 782­783; p. 37.
27  548 Phil. 712; 520 SCRA 166 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
28  Id., at pp. 725­726; p. 179.
29  HRET Rules, Rules 16­17.
30  Rollo, p. 574, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco’s Consolidated Reply. The Petition was docketed
as SPC No. 13­010.
 
 
201
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 201
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Any alleged invalidity of the proclamation of a Member of the House of
Representatives   does   not   divest   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal of jurisdiction.31
Should there have been pending cases at the House of Representatives
Electoral   Tribunal,   we   should   have   deferred   to   the   action   of   the
constitutional  body  given  the competence to  act  initially  on  the matter.
Thus, in the Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections:
 
In case of doubt, there are fundamental reasons for this Court to be
cautious in exercising its jurisdiction to determine who the members
are   of   the   House   of   Representatives.   We   should   maintain   our
consistent   doctrine   that   proclamation   is   the   operative   act   that
removes jurisdiction from this Court or the Commission on Elections
and   vests   it   on   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal
(HRET).
 The first reason is that the Constitution unequivocably grants this
discretion   to   another   constitutional   body   called   the   House   of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). This is a separate organ
from the Judiciary.
. . . .
The   second   fundamental   reason   for   us   to   exercise   caution   in
determining the composition of the House of Representatives is that
this is required for a better administration of justice. Matters relating
to factual findings on election, returns, and qualifications must first
be vetted in the appropriate electoral tribunal before these are raised
in the Supreme Court.32

The   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   is   the   sole   judge   of

contests involving Members of the House of Repre­
_______________

31  Gonzalez   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   660   Phil.   225,   267;   644   SCRA   761,   799   (2011)
[Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
32  Reyes v. Commission on Elections, supra note 17 at pp. 327­344 [Per J.Perez, En Banc].
 
 
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
sentatives.33 This   is   a   power   conferred   by   the   sovereign   through   our
Constitution.
Again, as in my dissent in Reyes v. Commission on Elections:34
 
This   Court   may   obtain   jurisdiction   over   questions   regarding   the
validity   of   the   proclamation   of   a   candidate   vying   for   a   seat   in
Congress   without   encroaching   upon   the   jurisdiction   of   a
constitutional   body,   the   electoral   tribunal.   “[The   remedies
of] certiorari and   prohibition   will   not   lie   in   this   case   [to   annul   the
proclamation of  a candidate]  considering that there is  an available
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; [that is, the filing
of   an   electoral   protest   before   the   electoral   tribunals].” These
remedies,   however,   may   lie   only   after   a   ruling   by   the   House   of
Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   or   the   Senate   Electoral
Tribunal.35 (Emphasis supplied)
 However, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal already ruled
on the two quo warranto cases against Reyes that were consolidated. 36 The
House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   held   that   it   had   no
jurisdiction   to   resolve   the   petitions   for quo   warranto relying   on   this
court’s Decision in Reyes v. Commission on Elections.37 In their Resolution,
the House of Representatives pronounced:

Such   element   is   obviously   absent   in   the   present   cases   as   Regina

Reyes’   proclamation   was nullified by   the   COMELEC,   which
nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone,
the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present
peti­
_______________

33  Const., Art. VI, Sec. 17.
34  Reyes v. Commission on Elections, supra note 17.
35  Id., at p. 342, quoting Barbers v. Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 570, 585; 460 SCRA
569, 583 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
36  Rollo,   p.   788,   Regina   Ongsiako   Reyes’   Memorandum.   HRET   Case   No.   13­036   was
entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. HRET Case
No. 13­037 was entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.
37  Reyes v. Commission on Elections, supra note 16.
 
 
203
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 203
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
tions since Regina Reyes “cannot be considered a Member of the
House   of   Representatives,”   as   declared   by   the   Supreme   Court En
Banc in G.R. No. 207264.38(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
 
The   tribunal   dismissed   the quo   warranto cases   holding   that   the
Commission on  Elections’  cancellation of  Reyes’ certificate  of candidacy
resulted in the nullification of her proclamation.39Thus:
 
WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   September   23,   2014
Motion for Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED.
The   September   11,   2014   Resolution   of   Tribunal   is
hereby REVERSED and SET   ASIDE.   Accordingly,   the
present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.40 (Emphasis in the original)
 In   effect,   the   decision   by   the   sole   judge   of   all   electoral   contests
acknowledges Reyes’ lack of qualifications. While maintaining my dissent
in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, I now acknowledge that there is no
other   remedy   in   law   or   equity   to   enforce   a   final   decision   of   this   court
except through mandamus.
Applying Codilla,   Sr.   v.   Hon.   De   Venecia,41 this   Petition
for Mandamus should be granted.
_______________

38  Petitioner’s Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, Annex D, p. 4. Annex D refers to HRET
Resolution in HRET Case Nos. 13­036 and 13­037.
39  Id., at p. 3.
40  Id., at p. 5.
41  442 Phil. 139; 393 SCRA 639 (2002) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
 
 
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
III
 
Aratea v. Commission on Elections 42 qualified the second­placer rule. The
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes would be entitled to
the position if the Certificate of Candidacy of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes had been initially declared valid at the time of
filing but had to be subsequently cancelled. 43 Additionally, if the Certificate
of Candidacy of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes was
void ab initio, the votes of the candidate should be considered stray and
not counted.44 This would entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to the position.45 Thus:
 
Decisions  of  this  Court  holding  that  the  second­placer  cannot  be
proclaimed   winner   if   the   first­placer   is   disqualified   or   declared
ineligible   should   be   limited   to   situations   where   the   certificate   of
candidacy   of   the   first­placer   was valid   at   the   time   of   filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio,   then   legally   the   person   who   filed   such   void   certificate   of
candidacy   was   never   a   candidate   in   the   elections   at   any   time.   All
 votes   for   such   noncandidate   are   stray   votes   and   should   not   be
counted. Thus, such noncandidate can never be a first­placer in the
elections.  If  a  certificate  of  candidacy  void ab  initio is  cancelled on
the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence
holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate
of   candidacy   void ab   initio is   cancelled   one   day   or   more   after   the
elections,   all   votes   for   such   candidate   should   also   be   stray   votes
because the certificate of candidacy is void from the begin­
_______________

42  G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
43  Id., at p. 146.
44  Id.
45  Id.
 
 
205
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 205
Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
ning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect
of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio.
Otherwise,   a   certificate   of   candidacy   void ab   initio can   operate   to
defeat   one   or   more   valid   certificates   of   candidacy   for   the   same
position.46(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
 
The   Decision   in Aratea was   subsequently   reiterated   in Jalosjos,   Jr.   v.
Commission on Elections47 and Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.48
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Mandamus.
Petition granted.
Notes.—A   petition   for quo   warranto is   a   proceeding   to   determine   the
right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the
holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well­founded, or if
his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited. (De Castro vs. Carlos,
696 SCRA 400 [2013])
In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a
clear   right   to   the   office   allegedly   held   unlawfully   by   another.   Absent   a
showing   of   that   right,   the   lack   of   qualification   or   eligibility   of   the
supposed usurper is immaterial. (Id.)
 
 
 ——o0o——
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46  Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1,
31­32 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
47  Id.
48  G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420 [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
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