[G.R. No. 122039.

May 31, 2000]

FACTS:

Respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the
conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she
was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion
of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to
ambulate in crutches during said period.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck.

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-
delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.

On appeal, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against
Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney
by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to
Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.

ISSUE:

Is Calalas exempt from liability?

HELD:

No. The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the
owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.

In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and
it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.

Moreover, several factors militate against petitioners contention. First, as found by the Court of Appeals,
the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of
the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:

Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.

Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity
of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm

Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption
of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky

The court found it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an "extension
seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims
of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that
the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the
injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.