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PRESENTATION SCRIPT– OPERATION OVERLORD

1. COMDT, CDS, DS BODY AND FELLOW COURSE MEMBERS. TODAY MY SUB

A. MEJ ZAINUDIN BIN BAHARI.

B. LT KDR JAMALUDIN BIN SAIRI.

C. MEJ IBRAHIM BIN MD YUSOFF TUDM.

D. MAJ ZUBACA AHMED.

AIM

2. THE AIM OF THIS PRESENTATION IS TO STUDY AND ANALYSE THE

OPERATION OVERLORD AND DERIVE THE LESSONS LEARNT FROM THAT

OPERATION.

SCOPE

3. THIS PRESENTATION WILL COVER THE FOLLOWING SCOPE:

a. BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE.

c. LESSON LEARNT.

d. CONCLUSION.

e. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

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BACKGROUD OF THE BATTLE

ORIENTATION

BEFORE EXPLAINING THE BATTLE LET US HAVE A LOOK AT THE

TOWARDS TO THE NORTH IS GREAT BRITAIN. TO THE SOUTH IS FRANCE,

DESCRIPTION

IN 1940 THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

ORDERED THE CREATION OF A JOINT PLANNING GROUP TO START WORK ON

THE BRITISH RETURN TO THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.

ON JULY 1941, THE US ARMY’S PLANNERS PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT

ROOSEVELT A PLAN KNOWN AS THE ‘VICTORY PROGRAM’. IN APRIL 1942, THE

US ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL ARRIVED IN LONDON

TO DISCUSS JOINT ACTION AGAINST THE GERMAN.

AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH THE BRITISH AND THE SOVIET

UNION, FULL UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED WITH REGARD TO THE URGENT

TASKS OF CREATING A SECOND FRONT IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, THE FIRST

CONCRETE STEP WAS NOT TAKEN UNTIL MARCH 1943, WHEN MAJOR GENERAL

FREDERICK MORGAN WAS APPOINTED AS CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE SUPREME

ALLIED COMMANDER. ON JUNE 1943, THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CHIEF OF

STAFF IN WASHINGTON TOOK THE SECOND STEP WHEREBY, FIRST MAY 1944

WAS NAMED AS THE TARGET DATE FOR THE INVASION WHICH IS TO BE

CALLED OPERATION OVERLORD.

THE COSSAC PLAN FOR FIRST MAY 1944 LANDING WAS PRESENTED TO

ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL IN AUGUST 1943 AT THE QUEBEC CONFERENCE.

ON 30th NOVEMBER 1943, THE BRITISH AND THE US HIGH COMMAND ISSUED

THE DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION OVERLORD. ROOSEVELT APPOINTED

GENERAL DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER AS THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR

THE OPERATION. THE OPERATION OVERLORD ASSAULT STARTED ON 6 JUNE

1944.

THE ALLIED LAND FORCES COMPRISED OF US FIRST ARMY AND BRITISH

SECOND ARMY, WHICH WAS HEADED BY FIELD MARSHALL BERNARD

MONTGOMERY. THE NAVAL FORCES WERE COMPRISED OF SIX HUNDRED

WARSHIPS AND 4,000 VESSELS, WHILE THE ALLIED AIR FORCES WERE

CONSISTED OF 331 US SQUADRONS AND 220 BRITISH SQUADRONS.

D-DAY DIARY OF EVENT. THE SIGNIFICAN TIMING ON 6 JUNE ARE AS FOLLOW:

0016 – CAEN CANAL: 6 BRITISH ARMY GLIDERS LAND TO SECURE VITAL

BRIDGES

• 0130 – NORMANDY: THE GERMAN ARMY RAISES THE INVASION ALERT

• 0240 – FRANCE: BRITISH PARA DROP EAST OF THE ORNE RIVER & US

FLOATING HQ ANCHOR OF UTAH & OMAHA BEACHES.

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• 0500 – BERCHTESGADEN: NEWS OF THE ALLIED INVASION REACHES

HITLER HQ.

• 0530 – NORMANDY: BRITISH NAVAL BOMBARDMENT BEGIN.

• 0631 – NORMANDY: US INF LAND ON UTAH BEACH.

• 0725 – NORMANDY: BRITISH FORCE LAND ON SWORD & GOLD

BEACHES.

• 0735 – NORMANDY: CANADIAN INF LAND ON JUNO BEACH.

• 1200 – KLESSHEIM: HITLER HOLDS A CONFERENCE.

• 1600 - LA ROCHE GUYON: ROMMEL ARRIVED FROM GERMANY.

• 1655– BERCHTESGADEN: HITLER ORDERED THE ALLIED BRIDGEHEAD

ANNIHILATED BY EVENING 6 JUNE.

• 1850 – BLETCHLEY PARK: BRITISH CODE BREAKER’S DISCOVER

GERMAN UNCERTAINTY OF THE PLACE OF ALLIED INVASION.

• 2055 – NORMANDY: FIGTHING DIES DOWN ALONG THE ENTIRE FRONT

• 2300 – HITLER HOLDS 2ND CONFERENCE.

VCD SHOW. BEFORE WE PRESENT THE ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE, WE WILL

SHOW A SHORT VIDEO CLIP ON THE ASSAULT AT NORMANDY.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE.

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ORBAT OF THE BATTLE

ALLIED FORCES. HEADED BY GEN EISENHOWER AND THE ORBAT ARE

AS SHOWN ON THE SLIDE.

GERMAN FORCES. HEADED BY FIELD MARSHAL VON RUNSTEDT AND

THE ORBAT ARE AS SHOWN ON THE SLIDE.

OPERATIONS LEVEL PLANNING

ALLIED FORCES

A. GROUND FORCES PLAN. THE GROUND FORCES WERE TASKED TO

ASSAULT SIMULTANEOUSLY ON THE BEACHES OF NORMANDY

IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF CARENTAN STREAM UNTIL RIVER ORNE. THE

OBJECTIVE WAS TO SECURE A BASE FOR FURTHER OPERATION AND TO

INCLUDE AIRFIELD SITES AT THE PORT OF CHERBOURG AND BRITTANY.

ONCE ASHORE AND FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, THEY WERE TO BREAK OUT

ON THE EASTERN FLANK TO CAPTURE THE CITY OF CAEN.

B. NAVAL FORCES PLAN. THE NAVAL TASK FORCES WERE

RESPONSIBLE IN SUPPORTING THE LAND FORCES. THE WESTERN TASK

FORCE WAS TO SUPPORT THE US 1 ST ARMY WHILE THE EASTERN

TASKFORCE WAS TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH 2ND ARMY.

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C. AIR FORCES PLAN. AS A DECEPTION PLAN, CRITICAL RATES AND

HEAVY BOMBING OF THE TARGETS IN THE PAS DE CALAIS AREA WERE

CARRIED OUT. THE AIR FORCES WERE ALSO TO ENGAGE THE

LUFTWAFFE TO WEAR DOWN ITS STRENGTH BEFORE THE LAND BATTLE

DEVELOPED. FOR THE D-DAY TASK, THE AIR FORCES WAS TO DEMOLISH

SELECTED TARGET WITHIN THE ENEMY COASTAL DEFENSES AND

SUPPORT THE TROOPS PROGRESSING INLAND.

D. THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT PLAN.

(1) TO THE WEST, THE 101ST US AIRBORNE DIVISION WAS TO

SECURE THE ROADS THAT LED OFF TO THE UTAH BEACH. THE 82 ND

US AIRBORNE DIVISION TO OCCUPY THE CROSSROADS OF SAINTE

MERE EGLISE AND CAPTURE TWO BRIDGES ACROSS THE

MERDERET RIVER.

(2) THE BRITISH 6TH AIRBORNE DIVISION WAS TO BE DROPPED

BETWEEN THE ORNE AND DIVES RIVER TO PROTECT THE LEFT

FLANK OF THE BRITISH FORCES LANDING ON SWORD BEACH.

E. ARMOR SUPPORT. THE NEED FOR ARMOURED SUPPORT WAS

VITAL AS SOON AS THE INFANTRY HAD LANDED. ON MARCH 1943,

GENERAL BROOKE TURNED THE 79 TH BRITISH ARMOUR DIVISION INTO

AN EXPERIMENTAL FORMATION WITH THE TASK OF DEVELOPING

ARMOURED TACTICS FOR THE INVASION.

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F. CLOSE FIRE SUPPORT. STRONGER AND CLOSE FIRE SUPPORT

WAS NEEDED FOR THE FIRST WAVE OF ASSAULT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL

THAT THE GAP BETWEEN FORMATION COVERED BY ARTILLERY-GUNS,

MORTAR AND ROCKET BATTERIES, WHICH MOUNTED ON LANDING

CRAFTS AND GUN BOATS. TANKS ON LANDING CRAFTS WERE

FOLLOWING CLOSE BEHIND THE LEADING INFANTRY FOR PROVIDING

FIRE SUPPORT WHILE LANDING.

G. ASSAULT AREA. THE AREA FOR LANDING BASED ON THE THREE

SERVICES REQUIREMENT. NORMANDY THAT COVERS A DISTANCE OF 50

MILES OF THE COASTAL AREA WERE SUITABLE FOR ITS. THIS AREA WAS

THEN DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTORS FOR THE US 1 ST ARMY AND THE

BRITISH 2ND ARMY. THE AMERICANS WERE ALLOCATED THE WESTERN

SECTOR NAMED UTAH AND OMAHA. THE BRITISH AT THE EASTERN

SECTOR NAMED GOLG, JUNO AND SWORD.

H. THE NEED FOR HARBOUR. THE ALLIED ASSUMMED THAT ANY

PORT CAPTURED WOULD BE MINED OR DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS

DURING THEIR RETREAT. THEREFORE, THEY BUILT TWO ARTIFICIAL

HARBORS, TO ACCOMMODATE THE FLOW OF LOGISTIC SUPPORTS FOR

EACH FORMATION.

I. LANDING CRAFT. ON THE FIRST MAY 1944, THE LANDING

CRAFTS REQUIREMENT WAS NOT FULFILLED. THEREFORE THE DATE OF

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THE LANDING HAVE BEEN POSTPONED TO THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE

1944 TO ALLOW THE PRODUCTION OF LANDING CRAFT BY THE BRITISH

SHIPYARD.

K. TRAINING. THROUGHOUT THE EARLY PART OF 1944, ALL UNITS

WHICH INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE HAD STUDIED AND PRACTICED THE

HIGHLY SPECIALIZED SKILLS OF THEIR TRADE. AS INVASION

PREPARATIONS SPEED UP IN THE AUTUMN OF 1943, ONE AREA WAS

CHOSEN IN SOUTHERN ENGLAND FOR A SERIES OF CRUCIAL

MANOEUVRE. THIS TRAINING PRACTICE WAS SIMILAR TO THE GROUND

WHERE THE BATTLE WOULD TAKE PLACE.

GERMAN FORCES

A. CONCEPT OF DEFENSE IN THE YEARS THAT FOLLOWED THE

FALL OF FRANCE, THE GERMANS PUBLICIZED THE BUILDING OF AN

ATLANTIC WALL AGAINST ANY INVASION. BY THE END OF MARCH 1944,

GERMAN AGENTS IN BRITAIN CONFIRMED THAT THE ALLIED PLANNED

AN INVASION FROM SOUTHERN ENGLAND. TO MEET THE ALLIES

ASSAULT, THE COASTAL DEFENCE WAS PLANNED, WHICH WERE

CONCENTRATED AT THE BEACHES AND WERE NOT DEVELOPED ANY IN

DEPTH. THE BEACH DEFENSES WERE DESIGNATED TO STOP THE

ATTACKING FORCE BY OBSTACLES, MINES, AND EVERY TYPE OF

DEFENSIVE WEAPONS.

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C. OBSTACLE PLAN. IN 1944, THE GERMANS HAD CONSTRUCTED A

SYSTEM OF OBSTACLES TO COUNTER ANY MASSIVE LANDINGS. THESE

OBSTACLES WERE ARMED WITH MINES OR IMPROVISED CHARGES. THE

POSTS WERE ANGLED SEAWARDS TO IMPEDE INCOMING CRAFT AND

THE EXPLOSIVES WERE ARMED WITH IMPACT DETONATOR. APART

FROM THAT, ANTI LANDING DEVICES WAS PLACED ON POTENTIAL

DROPPING AND LANDING AREAS.

THE CONDUCT OF OPERATION

ALLIED FORCES.

A. THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT - WESTERN FLANK. THE 101 US

AIRBORNE DIVISION COMMENCED LANDING AT 0130 HOURS D-DAY AT

THE CHERBOURG PENINSULA AND ADVANCED TO THE RIVER DOUVE

AND CAPTURED CARENTAN. THE 82 US DIVISION LANDED AT

CHERBOURG AT 0230 D-DAY AND CAPTURED SAINTE MERE EGLISE AT

0400 HOURS D-DAY WHILE 101 DIVISION CAPTURED CARENTAN AT 0600

HOURS.

B. THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT - EASTERN FLANK. THE FIRST AIR

OFFENSIVE INVOLVING 1,056 AIRCRAFTS OF RAF BOMBER COMMAND

WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE TEN STRONGEST COASTAL BATTERIES ON

THE INVASION FRONTAGE, WHICH HAD BEEN DEALT BEFORE THE

ARRIVAL OF FIRST ELEMENT OF THE AIRBORNE DIVISION. AT 2000

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HOURS D–1, 6 BRITISH AIRBORNE DIVISION PATHFINDERS TOOK OFF

FROM BRITAIN TO MARK OUT THE DROPPING ZONE AND LANDING AREA

FOR THE MAIN FORCE. THE GLIDER GROUP OF THE COUP DE MAIN

PARTY OF 6 AIRBORNE DIVISION LANDED AT BENOURVILLE AND

RANVILLE AT 0016 HOURS D-DAY AND CAPTURED THE STRUCTURE

INTACT. THE MAIN BODY OF THE 3 AND 5 BRIGADE THEN ARRIVED AT

0500 HOURS D-DAY TO TAKE HOLD ALL THE BRIDGES OVER THE CAEN

CANAL, RIVER ORNE AND RIVER DIVES FOLLOWED BY CAPTURING AND

NEUTRALIZING THE POWERFUL BATTERY AT MARVILLE.

C. PRE ASSAULT BOMBARDMENT.

(1) AIR BOMBING. THE ASSAULT LANDINGS WERE TO BE

PRECEEDED BY INTENSIVE AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT IN

THE HALF-HOUR BEFORE TOUCHDOWN. THE RAF WAS TO

CONCLUDE THE EFFORT AGAINST COASTAL BATTERIES WITH A

CONCENTRATED ATTACK FROM H-30 TO H-5.

(2) NAVAL BOMBARDMENT. NAVAL GUNFIRE COMMENCED AT

H-40 TO H-3. THE BATTLESHIPS FIRED FROM 18,000 YARDS

OFFSHORE, AND THREE CRUISERS FIRED ON THE ENEMY

DEFENCES NEAR PORT-EN-BASSIN. GUNS FROM THE LANDING

CRAFTS WERE FIRED TO ACCOMPANY THE LEADING ASSAULT

WAVE ON SELECTED STRONG POINTS BEGINNING AT H-20. TEN

LCT CARRIED THE 105-MM HOWITZERS (SELF-PROPELLED), FIRED

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AT H-30 AT A RANGE OF 8,000 YARDS AND STOP FIRING AT A RANGE

OF 3700 YARDS BY H-5. THE TANK FIRED OVER THE RAMP,

BEGINNING FROM A RANGE OF 3,000 YARDS AT H–15. AT H

HOUR, NAVAL FIRES SHIFTED TO INLAND TARGETS.

D. THE SEABORNE ASSAULT.

(1) THE WESTERN SECTOR ASSAULT (US 1ST ARMY).

(A) THE H HOUR AT UTAH WAS AT 0630 HOUR AND 0725

HOUR AT OMAHA. THE FIRST UNIT TO TOUCH ON UTAH

BEACH WAS 8 REGT OF 4TH DIVISION AND FOLLOWED BY

THE DIVISION IN SUPPORT. AFTER CONFRONTED WITH

SOME POCKET OF GERMAN TROOPS, THEY MANAGED TO

SECURE THE BEACHHEAD AND AFTERWARD ADVANCED

INLAND TO LINK UP WITH 101 AIRBORNE DIVISION NEAR

VIERVILLE.

(B) AT OMAHA BEACH, FIRST DIVISION RECEIVED HEAVY

RESISTANCE, WHERE THEY HAD LOST MOST OF THEIR

SUPPORTING ARMOUR AND COMBAT ENGINEERS BEFORE

THEY REACHED THE SHORELINE. THE BEACH WAS

DOMINATED BY THE GERMANS WHO HAD TAKEN UP THE

POSITION ON THE HIGH GROUND. FINALLY, THEY MANAGED

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TO MOVE OFF THE BEACHES AND BY NIGHTFALL ASSAULT A

MILE INLAND.

(2) THE EASTERN SECTOR ASSAULT (BRITISH).

(A) THE H HOUR AT GOLD AND SWORD WAS AT 0725

HOUR. HOWEVER, H HOUR AT JUNO WAS AT 0735 HOUR DUE

TO THE NAVIGATIONAL PROBLEM IN CROSSING OVER THE

OUTER OFFSHORE BEFORE REACHING THE BEACH.

(B) AT H HOUR, THE BRITISH 50TH DIVISION UNDER 30TH

CORPS CAME ASHORE GOLD BEACH. AFTER GOING

THROUGH A HARD WAY DUE TO ROUGH SEA AND BEACH

OBSTACLES, THEY SECURED THE BEACH HEAD AND

SUBSEQUENTLY ADVANCED INLAND TO CAPTURE BAYEUX

AT ABOUT 2100 HOURS D-DAY.

(C) ON THE RIGHT OF 1ST CORPS, THREE CANADIAN

DIVISIONS LANDED IN JUNO BEACH. DUE TO THE ROUGH

SEA AND WIND CONDITIONS, THE LANDING CRAFTS WERE

DELAYED AND ONLY SURVIVED UP TO 25 MINUTES LATER.

HOWEVER WITH THE SUPPORT OF 4 SPECIAL SERVICE

BRIGADE THEY CLEARED THE OBSTACLES OPPOSED BY THE

GERMAN AND CAPTURED CAEN.

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(D) ON SWORD BEACH, 8 BRIGADE GROUP OF 3 BRITISH

DIVISIONS, SUPPORTED BY THE 1ST SPECIAL SERVICE

BRIGADE MANAGED TO SECURE THE BEACHHEAD

WITHOUT BEING CONFRONTED BY GERMAN TROOPS.

HAVING STARTED WITH RAPID CAPTURE OF HERMANVILLE,

THEY CONTINUED TO ADVANCE TO CAPTURE CAEN.

E. DECEPTION PLAN. THE ALLIED DECEPTION PLAN HAD LED

UNCERTAINTY TO THE GERMANS AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE

DECEPTIONS WERE THE THREE FORTITUDE SCHEMES.

FORTITUDE NORTH. A FICTITIOUS BRITISH FOURTH ARMY WAS

ESTABLISHED IN EDINBURGH FOR A PLANNED INVASION OF NORWAY.

DUMMY AIRCRAFTS WERE ALSO CONSTRUCTED, AND THE SHIPS THAT

WOULD TAKE PART FOR THE INVASION FORCE TO NORMANDY WERE

BASED IN SCOTLAND AS DECOY TO SUGGEST A NORWAY ATTACK.

FORTITUDE SOUTH. PLAYED ON THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE

GERMAN HIGH COMMAND, BY CREATING THE SO-CALLED 'FIRST US

ARMY GROUP', INTENDED TO ASSAULT ACROSS THE PAS DE CALAIS.

FORTITUDE SOUTH II. TOOK PLACE AFTER THE LANDINGS IN

NORMANDY HAD ACTUALLY HAPPENED. IT AGAIN USED FALSE

COMMUNICATIONS, AND OFFERED A FAKE SCENARIO THAT THE

NORMANDY INVASION WAS A DIVERSION, AND THAT THE 'FIRST US

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ARMY GROUP' WOULD SOON COME STORMING ACROSS THE CHANNEL

TO STRIKE SOMEWHERE NEAR CALAIS.

16. GERMAN FORCES.

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL. HITLER’S HAD SUSPICION OF HIS

GENERALS AND DIVIDED AUTHORITY AMONG THEM TO DENY OVERALL

POWER TO ANYONE. IN PARIS, FIELD MARSHAL VON RUNDSTEDT

PRESIDED AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF. AT ARMY GROUP B’S

HEADQUARTERS AT LA ROCHE GUYON, FIELD MARSHAL ERWIN

ROMMEL WAS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DIRECTING THE BATTLE

AGAINST THE INVADERS. YET ROMMEL WAS DENIED DIRECT CONTROL

OF THE PANZER DIVISION WHICH HE WANTED TO MAKE THE RESERVE

AVAILABLE IN THE WEST TO POSITION CLOSE BEHIND THE INVASION

BEACHES. VON RUNDSTEDT OVERRULED HIM, PREFERRING TO KEEP A

CENTRAL STRATEGIC RESERVE. THIS DISPUTE WAS RESOLVED BY

HITLER HALF OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS WERE PLACED IN THE

CONTROL OF ROMMEL’S ARMY GROUP B AND THE REMAINDER WAS

DIRECTLY UNDER THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND. THE PLANS OF THE

TWO FIELD MARSHALS WERE NEVER REALLY RECONCILED. VON

RUNDSTEDT CONTINUED TO SIT ON HIS MOBILE RESERVES, WHILE

ROMMEL SPED UP DOWN THE COAST, INSPECTING UNITS AND

FORTRESSES, SITING GUN, INVENTING OBSTACLES AND GINGERING UP

THE DEFENDERS WITH HIS CONSIDERABLE POWERS OF LEADERSHIP.

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B. BAD WEATHER. ROMMEL’S ASSUMPTION THAT THE ALLIES

WOULD NOT LAUNCH ITS ASSAULT ON STORMY WEATHER HAD LED HIM

TO CHOOSE TO SEE HITLER THUS, LEAVING THE POST COMMAND UNDER

GENERAL ERICH MARCKS, COMMANDING THE 84 CORPS. AS ROMMEL

WAS DRIVING BACK TO GERMANY, THE ALLIES INVASION FLEET WAS

ASSEMBLING AT ITS CONCENTRATION POINT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE

CHANNEL. HAD THE GERMAN U-BOATS OR PATROL PLANES BEEN ON

NORMAL ROUTINE, THEY WOULD HAVE SPOTTED THE CONVOY. THE

ANTICIPATED BAD WEATHER, HOWEVER, KEPT THEM IN PORT OR ON

THE GROUND.

D. SLOW REACTION TO THE LANDINGS. GERMANS WERE

UNCERTAIN OVER THE ALLIED INTENTIONS FOR 1944 INVASION. HITLER

BELIEVED THAT THE INVASION WOULD BE AT NORMANDY; WHILE FM

VON RUNSTEDT AND GEN ROMMEL BELIEVED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD

LAND AT PAS DE CALAIS. THE CONFUSION WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE

ALLIED DROP OF THOUSANDS OF DUMMIES WHICH DOUBLED THE

GERMAN’S UNCERTAINTY. THE ABSENCE OF MANY VITAL SENIOR

GERMAN COMMANDERS RESULTED IN A SLOW REACTION TO THE

LENDINGS. THE SEVENTH ARMY WAS ALERTED AT 0135 HOUR. HALF AN

HOUR EARLIER, GENERAL MARCKS HAD CALLED OUT HIS OWN 84

CORPS.

AT 0600 HOUR, VON RUNDSTEDT’S HEADQUARTERS TOLD THE

GERMAN HIGH COMMAND THAT A MAJOR INVASION APPEARED TO BE

TAKING PLACE, AND ASKED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE ARMOURED

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RESERVE. HOWEVER, THE GERMAN OFFICERS WERE HESITATED TO

WAKE HITLER UP, KNOWINGLY OF HIS DISLIKE TO BE AWAKENED. THUS,

THE REQUEST WAS DENIED. IT WAS NOT FINALLY GRANTED UNTIL TEN

HOURS LATER.

E. DENIAL OF TRAINING FOR THE GERMAN FORCES.

COMMANDERS COMPLAINED THAT THEY WERE BEING DENIED TIME TO

CARRY OUT ESSENTIAL TRAINING BECAUSE THEIR MEN WERE

CONTINUOUSLY EMPLOYED ON BUILDING FORTIFICATIONS. THE

MAJORITY OF THE ARMY WERE FORMATIONS SHATTERED IN THE EAST,

WHICH WOULD NEED MASSIVE REINFORCEMENT AND RE-EQUIPMENT IF

THEY WERE EVER TO REGAIN THEIR OLD FIGHTING POWER.

DOCTRINE

ALLIED FORCES. ALLIED FORCES ADOPTED THE CONCEPT OF JOINT

OPERATION COMBINING MASSIVE FORCES FROM THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR

FORCES.

GERMAN FORCES. GERMAN CONDUCTED DEFENSIVE OPERATION AND

ADOPTED LINER DEFENCE, WHICH CONCENTRATES MORE FORCES TOWARD

DEFENDING THE BEACH LINE. DUE TO THAT REASON, ALL THE TROOPS HAVE

BEEN UTILIZED AND THERE WERE NO BACKUP FORCES TO DEFENCE THE

DEPTH POSITION. THERE WERE ALSO NO SUFFICIENT RESERVED FORCES.

LOGISTIC SYSTEM

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ALLIED FORCES. THE LOGISTIC BUILDUP IN BRITAIN BEGAN IN 1942.

WITH 39 DIVISIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INVASION, THERE WAS LITTLE TIME

TO WASTE. THE NUMBER OF US FIGHTING MEN BASED IN GREAT BRITAIN

ALONE, DOUBLED IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1944, RISING TO 1,537,000.

MORE THAN 16 MILLION TONS OF SUPPLIES WERE NEEDED, AS WELL AS 137,000

JEEPS, TRUCKS AND HALF-TRACK; 4,217 TANKS AND FULLY TRACKED

VEHICLES; 3,500 ARTILLERY PIECES; 12,000 AIRCRAFT; AND HUGE STORES OF

SUNDRIES. TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT, THE SEABORNE TRANSIT SYSTEM, A

BUILD-UP CONTROL ORGANIZATION WAS FORMED TO HANDLE THE SEA

TRANSIT OF PERSONNEL AND STORES DURING THE LANDING PERIOD.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

GENERAL DWIGHT EISENHOWER WAS APPOINTED AS THE SUPREME

COMMANDER ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR

ARTHUR W. TEDDER WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER. ADMIRAL SIR BERTRAM

RAMSAY WAS ALLIED NAVAL FORCES COMMANDER, WHILE THE US AND

BRITISH TACTICAL AIR FORCES WERE UNDER THE COMMAND OF AIR CHIEF

MARSHAL TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY. LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR NELSON

BRADLEY COMMANDED US ARMY GROUP AND GENERAL SIR BERNARD

MONTGOMERY COMMANDED BRITISH ARMY GROUPS RESPECTIVELY.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH, WAS CHIEF OF STAFF

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS. THIS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE RESULTED IN

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THE DIRECT INTEGRATION OF THE COALITION FORCES AND CONTRIBUTED

SIGNIFICANTLY TO THEIR OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

SELECTIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM. THE ALLIES HAD MADE

NO SECRET OF THEIR INTENTION TO INVADE EUROPE AND FOR ITS

LIBERATION FROM THE CLENCH OF HITLER. GEN GENERAL’S AIM WAS TO

DESTRUCT GERMAN ARMED FORCES. AS EARLY AS JULY 1941, PLANS AFTER

PLANS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND REVISED UNTIL THE ALLIES ARRIVED AT

THE DECISION TO LAUNCH THE ASSAULT AROUND THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE

1944, WHICH THEY NAMED IT OPERATION OVERLORD. THE SELECTION AND

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM HAD BEEN FOCUSED WHICH LED TO THE

DEFEAT OF GERMANY.

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE. THE PLAN IN OPERATION OVERLORD IS

BASED ON TWO MAIN PRINCIPLES THAT IS CONCENTRATION OF FORCE AND

TACTICAL SURPRISE. CONCENTRATION OF THE ASSAULT IS CONSIDERED

ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AIR SUPPORT AND IF OUR

LIMITED ASSAULT FORCES ARE TO AVOID DEFEAT IN DETAIL. FIRE POWER

PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE SUCCESS OF OVERLORD. THE APPLICATION OF

FIREPOWER HAD DEFINITELY A DECISIVE IMPACT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE

CAMPAIGN OR MAJOR OPERATION.

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COOPERATION. BENEATH THE TENSION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND

ARMY HEADQUARTERS ON MATTERS OF HIGH POLICY, OFFICERS OF THE

AMERICAN AND BRITISH WORKED SIDE BY SIDE WITH EXTRAORDINARY

AMITY IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION OVERLORD.

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. FIRE POWER PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE

SUCCESS OF OPERATION OVERLORD. ON THE BEACHES OF UTAH, OMAHA,

GOLD, JUNO AND SWORD BECAME A LIVING HELL FOR THE GERMAN

DEFENDERS. THE AIR AND NAVAL PRE-INVASION BOMBARDMENT HAD OPENED

FIRE. SHELL WAS FIRED FROM THE THOUSANDS OF BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS

AND DESTROYERS LYING OFF THE COAST AND BOMB AFTER BOMBS FELL

INLAND, LEAVING THE BEACHES NON-CRATERED, BUT EVENTUALLY MAKING

THE ASSAULT INLAND EASIER.

SURPRISE. THE GERMANS WERE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE WHEN THE

ALLIES LAUNCHED THE ASSAULT ON 6 JUNE 1944. THE LAST GERMAN AERIAL

RECONNAISSANCE ON 24 MAY BEFORE D-DAY REVEALED NO SUDDEN

CONCENTRATION OF SHIPPING IN THE PORTS OF DOVER, FOLK STONE AND

ALONG THE THEMES. THE WEATHER APPARENTLY ALONG THE CHANNEL WAS

GOING TO WORSEN ON 2 JUNE 1944.

FLEXIBILITY. THE PLAN IN OPERATION OVERLORD WAS SIMPLE.

HENCE, THAT OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED SMOOTHLY, EFFICIENTLY AND

PROVEN EFFECTIVE DUE TO THE PLAN WHICH WAS MADE SIMPLE THROUGH

DELIBERATE. IN THE OPERATION OVERLORD, THE ALLIES FORCES WERE

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DEPLOYED BY SECTORS. THE PRESENT COMMANDERS ARE LAUDABLE TO

EXERCISE CLEAR AND SIMPLE PLANS FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY OPERATION

OR BATTLE. ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT REMAINS THE GREATEST ORGANIZATION

ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

MAINTENANCE OF MORALE. MORALE OF MEN HAS TO BE

MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES. GEN MONTGOMERY WENT AROUND TO VISITS

THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS ASSIGNED TO THE NORMANDY ASSAULT

TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE INVASION. EVEN KING GEORGE V, THE BRITISH

MONARCH THEN, VISITED THE TROOPS.

LESSON LEARNT

ALLIED FORCES

PLANNING. PROPER PLANNING AND INTENSIVE TRAINING WERE

CRUCIAL FACTORS WHICH MUST BE GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE

SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AS SHOWN IN OPERATION OVERLORD . THE ALLIED

TOOK ALMOST FOUR YEARS IN PLANNING THIS OPERATION, WHICH INCLUDE

THE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING OF THE SOLDIERS.

THEREFORE ALTHOUGH MALAYSIA HAVE NO IMMINENT THREATS, MAF MUST

CONTINUE THE PLANNING AND CONDUCTING TRAINING IN ORDER TO FACE

UNFORSEEN SITUATION.

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TECHNOLOGY. EXPLOITATION OF TECHNOLOGY BY ALLIED FORCES

HAD ACCENTUATED THE MASSIVE STRENGTH OF THE COMBINED COALITION

FORCES WHICH WAS FULLY CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE COALITION EFFORT.

AS AN EXAMPLE, THE AMERICAN P-51 MUSTANG FIGHTER MADE ITS GREATEST

CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIED, VICTORY BY WINNING THE BATTLE FOR AIR

SUPREMACY OVER GERMANY BEFORE D- DAY. THIS SCENARIO ALSO

OCCURRED IN THE GULF WAR, WHEREBY THE COUNTRY WHICH POSSESSED

ADVANCE TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS GAIN CONTROL OVER THEIR OPPONENT.

THEREFORE, NEITHER THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT NOR MAF MUST

CONSIDER THIS FACTORS SERIOUSLY AND CONTINUOUSLY EQUIPPED THE MAF

WITH THE LATEST TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENTS.

AIR POWER. DURING THE CAMPAIGN, THE CONTROL OF THE AIR HAS

SHOWN A GREAT IMPACT ON THE RESULT OF THE WAR. WITH MORE THAN

12,000 AIRCRAFTS CONDUCTING STRATEGIC BOMBING OVER GERMAN

FRONTLINE HAS LEAD TO THE SUCCESSFUL LANDING OF THE ALLIED TROOPS

IN NORMANDY BEACHES. IN RECENT WAR, AIR POWER WAS USED

INTENSIVELY TO NUETRALISE ENEMY STRENGTH AND WIN THE WAR IN SHORT

PERIODS. THEREFORE IT IS VITAL FOR THE MAF TO HAVE SUFFICIENT

NUMBERS OF ADVANCE AIRCRAFT

COMMAND AND CONTROL

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THE LEADERS OF THE ALLIED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN THE FREEDOM

OF EXUCUTING THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN ACHIEVING THE ALLIED

OBJECTIVE. THEY WORK VERY CLOSELY AND PUT ASIDE THEIR NATIONAL AIM

AND FOCUS FOR WINNING THE BATTLE.

GERMAN FORCES.

LINEAR DEFENCE. DUE TO THE LONG STRETCH OF THE NORMANDY

COASTLINE, THE GERMAN HAS NO OTHER MEANS AND ADOPTING A SINGLE

LAYER DEFENCE AND RESULTED LESS CONCENTRATION ON THE REAR AREA.

THE ALLIED FORCES TOOK THESE ADVANTAGES BY DEPLOYING THE

AIRBORNE DIVISIONS PENETRATING DEEP INTO GERMAN TERRITORY AND

CONTROLLING THE STRATEGIC AREA. MALAYSIA SURROUNDED BY SEA WITH

OVER 2,000 KM COASTLINE. IF THE GERMANS NEED 48 DIVISIONS TO LAY HER

DEFENCE FROM CALAIS TO SAINTE MERE EGLISE, MALAYSIA NEED MORE

DIVISIONS TO COVER-UP HER COASTLINE. BUT LINEAR DEFENCE IS NOT THE

ANSWER, BECAUSE IT NOT IN LINE WITH THE DEFENCE PRINCIPLES.

COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE HITLER ADOPTED THE AUTOCRATIC

STYLE OF LEADERSHIP WHEREBY THE GERMAN COMMANDERS HAD NO VOICE

IN MAKING ANY PLANS OR DECISION. DUE TO THIS REASON, THE GERMAN

FORCES ARE SLOW IN TAKING ANY ACTIONS AGAINST THE ALLIED INVASION.

THEREFORE COMANDERS IN MAF SHOULD NOT PRACTISED AUTOCRATIC

SYSTEM AND ONE MAN DECISION MAKING.

CONCLUSION

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ON THE D-DAY OF OPERATION OVERLORD, ALL ELEMENTS OF A

COMBINED ALLIED FORCES HAD BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER AND USED IN

HARMONY WHEREBY THE AIR FORCES TO WEAKEN THE ENEMY RESPONSE,

WARSHIPS TO PROTECT THE TRANSPORT FLEET, AIRBORNE DIVISIONS TO

SECURE THE FLANKS AND STRIKE DEEP INTO ENEMY TERRITORY, INFANTRY

AND AMOUR TO CARVE OUT THE FOOT HOLD FROM WHICH THE LIBERATION

OF WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BEGIN. THE FACT THAT IT ALL WORKED IS A

LASTING TRIBUTE TO ALL THE PEOPLE INVOLVED.

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