STANDPIPES: AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY

Standpipes: An Evolving Approach to

4 Public Water Supply

Many low-income households that are unable to afford a household connection

must rely on public water points, commonly known as standpipes or standposts. As
noted earlier, irregular and unpredictable incomes, caused by unemployment or
seasonally varying wages, are a primary characteristic of low-income households.
Consequently, in many instances, standpipes and other arrangements allow them
to purchase the amount of water they can afford, as and when they need it. The
standpipe often provides much-needed flexibility that can be critical to their
livelihood strategies. Common throughout Africa, standpipes therefore constitute a
key element of any strategy for improving water supply to low-income
communities.

Standpipes allow Public standpipes are typically installed by utilities in low-income areas, and financed
either directly by the utility, by local authorities or through grants from central
the poor to
government, donors or NGOs. They differ from private kiosks in that the infrastructure
purchase the is installed and owned by the utility even though it may be leased to a private
amount of water operator for management purposes.1 In many countries an emerging alternative to
they can afford, the standpipe is resale from a private or domestic connection located in a residential
when they need it. compound nearby. While most of these connections are installed for a single
household unit, many operate as yard connections serving multiple households either
within the compound or in neighboring compounds. Although initially offering free
water in many cities, standpipes now charge US$0.40 to US$1.00 per m3. These
alternatives are discussed in turn below.

4.1 Manage public standpipes better to serve the poor

The evolution of public standpipes

Standpipes are a long-standing delivery mechanism in many African countries. Until
the 1980s, standpipes that dispensed ‘free’ water were a common way of getting
water to low-income households. Political ideology determined who paid for this
water. Some independent utilities would bill government but in many public utilities
(e.g. municipal water departments), neither the state nor the user was invoiced for
the water consumed. Over time, the inability to recover costs resulted in growing
utility deficits and eventually to the decline of free public standpipes as a key
component of delivery to low-income households.

In Benin, Ghana and Cameroon, the 1980s saw the systematic removal of
standpipes due to a change in policy; and in Sao Tomé and Madagascar they were
removed due to the lack of adequate cost recovery. In other cities, such as Nairobi,
consumer preference for more reliable and accessible private water kiosks
gradually led to the elimination of the public standpipe as a primary means of public
water supply (see Chapter 5). Approximately 30% of households in Nairobi now rely
1
Privately installed and managed
on water kiosks, while in Blantyre, 70% depend on community-managed standpipe
water standpipes or kiosks are facilities.
discussed in Chapter 5.

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 BETTER WATER AND SANITATION FOR THE URBAN POOR

In the 1990s, payment for water at standpipes became more common. In some
countries the transition from ‘free’ standpipes to ‘paying’ water points was well
defined, as in Togo, where payment for water from standpipes came into effect
after 1999. In several countries standpipes have been replaced by resale from a
(private or yard) connection (e.g. Ghana), but in many other countries (such as in
Burkina-Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria) standpipes managed on
‘commercial terms’ under delegated arrangements are still the primary means of
supplying water to low-income households. In a few cases, such as Kano, Nigeria,
commercial and non-commercial systems exist side by side. Some free standpipes
have been retained to allow low-income users a limited quantity of water (measured
in jerry cans). Water vendors and households wishing to use more than the prescribed
amount are required to pay a fee at commercial standpipes.

Utility-owned and managed standpipes

Some utilities develop and manage a network of standpipes with their own revenue Management
(or with funding from other public sources). These standpipes are clearly the utility’s
arrangements
responsibility and operation and maintenance tasks are either handled directly or
delegated to other actors. Experience suggests that these management
are a key factor
arrangements are a key factor determining the performance of standpipes. Several determining the
management options have been tried with varying degrees of success. The two performance of
main options are: (i) salaried standpipe attendants; and (ii) delegated management standpipes
(be it to local administrative officers or local leaders, the community or private
operators). The success of these models is often linked to three main factors: the level
of convenience to the customer, the institutional arrangements for management and
the incentives for cost recovery.

Salaried attendants recruited by the utility • Although it is increasingly uncommon for

utilities to hire staff to man standpipes, the practice is still adopted by some utilities
and departments such as in Ethiopia in the utility in Dire Dawa and in most Cape
Verde municipalities. Experience shows that there is limited incentive for a salaried
employee to either maintain prices at the level set by the utility or to ensure (much
less improve) cost-recovery. Some utilities, municipalities, associations and
committees responsible for standpipes therefore provide commissions (or bonuses) to
standpipe attendants as an incentive to improve and adapt their service. In Zambia
for instance, attendants are paid a fixed wage plus a commission on water sold,
while in some West African countries, commissioned attendants are given financial
incentives to remain open in the evening to serve women who are unable (for
religious or cultural reasons) to visit the standpost during the day. In several cases
such as in Ethiopia and Zambia, staff are required to manage standposts on a
rotational basis, particularly if commissions are paid on some, but not all, standpipes.
This limits the risk of misappropriation and avoids any inequality in remuneration
between standpipe attendants.

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 STANDPIPES: AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY

Delegated Management Arrangements in Arusha, Tanzania Box 9

Public kiosks in Arusha originally provided free water services through standpipes
managed by the utility. These standpipes were located along main roads within the
public space defined by the road reserve. As costs were not recovered from these
points, the facilities received little maintenance from the utility and as a result, the
scheme collapsed in 1990.

A new system of public standpipes managed by neighborhood representatives

known as “mtaa leaders”, was introduced in 1993 as part of a water and sanitation
rehabilitation program funded by a KfW grant. The revised approach placed the
management of the individual kiosks in the hands of the mtaa. Operators are hired
by the mtaa leader to sell water to the public from metered standpipes installed by
the utility. The operator is required to take daily returns to the mtaa leader who banks
the daily collections and submits monthly returns to the ward executive officer for
each kiosk under his control. The utility retains responsibility for O&M financing up to
and including the water meter and the ward development committee
responsibilities start at the meter and end at the tap.

The public water standpipes provide a level of water services that responds to the
socio-economic needs of the peri-urban communities. The utility sells water to the
standpipes at TZH 3/- (US$0.003) and the kiosks retail it at TZH 10/- (US$0.01) per 20 liter
jerrican. Most of the standpipes surveyed actually charge TZH 20/- (US$0.02) per can
and the profit margins provide sufficient commercial incentive to sustain this
practice. This arrangement is not without problems. One of the key problems
encountered is the non-payment of utility bills by mtaa leaders. This has led to the
disconnection of about 40% of the standpipes. Also, as socio-economic
circumstances improve in peri-urban areas, residents have obtained private yard
connections and started selling water in competition with the public standpipes.

The introduction of private kiosks has improved access for low-income consumers but
has also led to the closure of some mtaa-managed standpipes. Many wards are Note:
now seeking to privatize the standpipes in order to improve efficiency, Exchange Rate
demonstrating that, through an evolving process, improvements in management US$1 = T Sh 800 (2000)
arrangements for public water points can result in better access for poor households. Source:
Wandera, 2000

Management delegated to local leaders and water committees • Faced with a

growing number of problems in the management of standpipes, several utilities
(such as in Arusha illustrated in Box 9, Blantyre and Addis Ababa) have handed over
the responsibility for operating and maintaining standpipes to local leaders, local
authority administrators or water committees. This arrangement has had its share of
problems, as the inefficiencies in utility operations have not been eliminated simply
by transferring responsibility to another often less experienced and capable
operator. Although there was an expectation that institutions operating closer to
the community would be more effective in handling these systems and ensuring that
social concerns were addressed, in reality the performance of these organizations
has been poor. Poor performance is often the result of political interference,
inexperience in financial management, lack of incentives and weak accountability
mechanisms.

Management delegated to community organizations • Partnerships with local

community-based organizations are an increasingly common arrangement for the
management of standpipes. In Zambia, Senegal (see Box 10) and Mali, communities are
given the opportunity to apply for management responsibility and identify a manager(s)
who will be contracted by the utility, municipality, or directly by the community. In
several cases, the community retains oversight and has a contract with the relevant
party. While community organizations have proven to be better managers of

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standpipes than local leaders, experience varies across the region and depends on the
degree of organizational ability and management capacity in the community.

Management contracted out to private managers • Utilities are becoming

increasingly aware of the need to ensure that standpipe managers have a
commercial outlook that promotes efficiency and cost-recovery. Several are now
leasing their installations to private operators and selling them bulk water. Efforts
are increasingly being focused on procedures for awarding these contracts as
past experience suggests that the process to date has not always promoted
transparent selection of standpipe managers. This is particularly the case where
the municipality is involved in choosing the manager but does not assume any
liability when they fail. This is illustrated by experiences in the cities of Arusha,
Tanzania, Blantyre, Malawi and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Box 10 Community Management of Standpipes in Dakar, Senegal

The water supply to Dakar (and some 50 other urban areas) is provided by
Sénégalaise Des Eaux (SDE), a private company with a 10 year lease contract (1996-
2006) to the Senegalese National Water Authority (SONES) to manage and deliver
water services. At the end of 1999, 1900 standpipes were in operation, serving
500,000 customers in Dakar. Given the limited number of household connections,
standpipes are considered an essential element of the urban public water supply
strategy, especially in crowded or new neighborhoods. This is because, for a
relatively modest investment, standpipes have enabled the utility to respond to
demand from households with low or irregular incomes (for small quantities of water).

A strategy for reaching low-income communities

As the procedures and practices of SONES and SDE for dealing with household
connections were not considered appropriate to poor neighborhoods - where
community rather than individual solutions must be applied - in 1999 SDE and SONES
entered into a partnership with ENDA, an NGO experienced in ‘social engineering’,
to design a strategy for reaching low-income consumers.

The strategy developed requires the active involvement of the community, through
organized management committees that enter into lease agreements with SDE.
Community commitment is an essential element of the strategy because: (i) the local
population is required to contribute 25% of the cost of the standpipes and the
associated network extensions; and (ii) poor installation of a standpipe can lead to
it becoming unused. Local management committees represent the local people in
each area where an extension was planned.

Contracting to selected management groups

The day-to-day management of standpipes is entrusted to women’s groups or self-

help groups following a competitive selection procedure undertaken by the local
management committee. To qualify the applicants must live in the area targeted by
Note: the installation and be of ‘sound character’. On signing the agreement, a deposit
Exchange Rate of CFA 30 000 (US$54) is paid as a guarantee or an advance on future consumption
US$1 = CFA 560 (1999) payment. The contract with SDE is entered in the name of the chairman of the local
committee who supervises on a day-to-day basis and maintains responsibility for
ENDA is an international NGO based in
finances.
Dakar which undertakes a variety of
development activities in the welfare or The role of a supporting NGO
informal sector. Through the Water for
People Programme, Enda is acting within the In addition to helping to form or strengthen the local management committee,
SONES priorities in undertaking community ENDA is also responsible for installing the system under supervision of SONES and SDE.
connections and installing standpipes in The NGOs also provide training for standpipe operators in management,
marginalized areas. maintenance, and hygiene and provide back up support for a period of 6 months
Source: following installation.
Primary data from SDE, 1998

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 STANDPIPES: AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY

In other countries (such as in Mali, Guinea and Niger), private managers are
selected from existing customers who have proven their effectiveness as service
providers. Competition is also being used to improve performance and service
delivery. In Togo, a bidding system was jointly organized by the municipality (the
owner) and utility (the main operator) as a means of selecting standpipe managers.

Mechanical standpipes and water vending machines • The use of coin-operated or

electronic card-operated standpipes that dispense a given volume of water is not
very common in sub-Saharan Africa. Vending machines are a useful tool for
controlling the price of water and reducing management costs incurred by hiring
standpipe managers. They are also considered a preferable alternative where there
are high security risks (e.g. unsafe conditions for attendants) and where there is a
substantial likelihood of misappropriation of funds by attendants. Electronic pre-
payment cards/vending machines are currently in use in South Africa (as mentioned
in Chapter 3) and are being introduced in Uganda and Ghana.

Coin-operated standpipes called ‘yacoli’ are in use in Côte d’Ivoire. Originally

designed to be operated without a full time attendant, the yacoli or vending
machine is now run by an attendant who may run several water points
simultaneously. The introduction of an attendant has several benefits. Overall,
mechanical systems are often less flexible and therefore less customer-friendly.
Customers note that yacoli often take a long time to fill containers, and utilities note
the high costs of maintenance.2 In an effort to meet customers needs, attendants
may by-pass the coin-operated delivery mechanism in order to fill containers of
varying size and shorten filling times. However they are also relatively expensive,
approximately US$2,500 for a yacoli standpipe in Côte d’Ivoire, which is three times
more than an ordinary standpipe and ten times more than a domestic reseller’s
connection.

Tokens, monthly payment cards and other non-mechanical payment systems • As

an alternative to pre-payment vending machines, some utilities have introduced
tokens, tickets or monthly cards as a means of improving cost recovery (see Box 11
on the token system in Chipata town in Zambia). In addition to controlling the
handling of cash, these systems also allow tariffs to be set at a unit rate that is lower
than the smallest coin. Depending on the nature of the arrangement, the
production, distribution and collection of tokens can increase management costs
2
Yacoli are also relatively complex
and often require the services of (which must then be reflected in the price of water). Unsurprisingly, they may only
expert technicians from the utility be justified for small water supply systems.

The Token System in Chipata town, Zambia Box 11

A token system was introduced in Chipata town in Zambia following a decision to

introduce commercialized public standpipes in Mchini compound (prior to this
water had been provided free of charge). The token system was introduced with
the aim of improving commercial operations and improving user participation in
water supply management. Standpipes are run by attendants, paid a salary and
commission for token sales by CWSC. Each token buys 20 liters of water and
consumers purchase tokens as and when needed. All standpipes are metered and
readings are used to assess tokens sold and revenue collected. Records indicate
that 93% of metered water is sold. Attendants are required to maintain
environmental hygiene at the standpipes. Source:
Taylor et al, 1998

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Lowering the price of water from standpipes

In order to lower the price of water from public standpipes it is necessary to
consider the measures that will increase the number and distance between
water points and provide incentives for those operating them.

Increasing the number of providers by encouraging competition • In areas

where standpipes are the predominant or only form of water supply the
standpipe owner/manager is often given the exclusive right to sell within a fixed
catchment area. Although this approach is frequently promoted by utilities –
who see it as a means of reducing investment costs while providing access
within acceptable distance – it is also favored by standpipe managers and
resellers who logically seek to limit competition (and may get together with
fellow providers to form cartels).

Lack of competition may work against low-income households as they suffer the
inconvenience caused by long distances, longer queues and higher prices that result
from a shortage of supply. However, a larger number of standpipes does not
necessarily mean lower prices. The case studies illustrated that in Dakar and Bamako,
the cities with the greatest number of standpipes, prices were not necessarily
cheaper. Standpipe managers compensate for low sales turnover by increasing the
margin on the price of water.

Providing financial incentives to those who sell large volumes • Given the large
volumes that they dispense, tariffs should also be structured to accommodate a
flat or bulk rate for standpipe supply. In Burkina Faso, where there are few private
connections, the utility provides large flow standpipes (medium diameter, high
pressure) and standpipe managers sell an average of 20m3 per day. Standpipes
are also sufficiently spaced to ensure competition, permit lower prices while at
the same time providing an incentive for managers.

4.2 Promote domestic resale to reach those without

connections
Increasingly, householders with a private connection are selling water to their
neighbors. In some cities this practice, described in this document as ‘domestic
reselling’ supplies up to 50% of households (and 80% of low-income households). It is
particularly prevalent in cities, such as Cotonou, Benin and Accra, Ghana, where
standpipes have been shut down without an alternative arrangement (such as a
water kiosk or vending machine) being put in place. It is also common in cities where Domestic
the distance between standpipes is too great, or the ratio of standpipes to people resellers are able
too low. This is the case in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and Conakry, Guinea. to offer a more
Domestic reselling has grown in response to customer demand. Households with convenient
private connections are often prevailed upon to sell water to neighbors.3 As they service and
operate on commercial terms, domestic retailers are able to offer more convenient payment
‘opening hours’ and provide more flexible payment mechanisms than public
standpipes. They are often located close to those households (within the same lane
mechanisms.
or neighborhood) and may even provide customers with credit facilities. In many
cases such as in Kampala, Uganda and Yaoundé, Cameroun consumers prefer to
3
In some cases, the connection
pay more for the convenience offered by a nearby domestic retail point, than to
may have been obtained illegally.
queue for water that is free to them at a public standpipe. (see Box 12).

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 STANDPIPES: AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY

Yet domestic reselling is not without problems. Those that can afford connections are
often the better-off, less vulnerable members of the community, and although many
households are pushed into supplying water to their neighbors, domestic reselling
may increase their leverage within the community. While some reselling
arrangements are mutually beneficial, others are exploitative and can lead to high
tariffs and political maneuvering affecting low-income households.

Regularizing the domestic reselling of water

Reselling of water by households with private connections is often explicitly prohibited
by utilities, which have the exclusive (legal) right to sell water within their service area.
In Ghana and Togo, although it is not prohibited, the practice of domestic reselling
may be frowned upon or discouraged by the utility. In a number of countries
however this policy is changing. In the case of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire described in
Box 12, the utility has begun to recognize the need for alternative arrangements for
reaching low-income consumers, resellers are given special contracts allowing them
to sell water from a tap or kiosk in their compound.

Utilities or While it might not be strictly legal, utilities or authorities rarely contest this practice of
reselling water at the household level. It is generally accepted that removing this
authorities rarely
option would have an impact on a large number of users who have no other access
contest this to an acceptable water supply. Prohibiting this practice may also place households
practice of that have a private connection at loggerheads with their neighbors – who may
reselling water at continue to exert pressure on them to provide the service. It may also create conflicts
with utility or municipal staff – who may resort to collusion or corruption to keep
the household
certain retailers in business.
level.
Reducing application costs and improving conditions for domestic
reselling
Recognition of domestic reselling could:

• encourage resellers to be more professional in their approach;

• reduce the risk to resellers - by making their investments more secure; and

• enable the utility to reduce the number of illegal connections/reduce the level
of unaccounted for water.

The decision to authorize domestic resale should be accompanied by a review of

local constraints to ensure that the service can be provided at a reasonable cost.
Experience to date suggests that there is an emphasis on measures that control, and
perhaps hinder, rather than enable or promote resale (e.g. higher application fees
and deposits, ineligibility for subsidies). Operating conditions often mean that any
additional costs incurred by the domestic reseller are passed on to their consumers,
further penalizing unserved households.

For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire, where resale has been explicitly authorized, resellers are
excluded from the benefit of a subsidized connection (approximately US$250) as that
would be considered to be a public subsidy for a commercial activity. The utility also
requires a deposit (about US$300, equal to the cost of 12 months consumption) to
reduce the risks of non-payment. This limits the number of resellers and subsequently
limits competition.

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Approved Resellers in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire

Box 12
In the early 1980s in Côte d’Ivoire, the utility SODECI and the national government made a
decision to address the growth in the unauthorized resale of water (mostly obtained
through individual illegal connections). This had become an important form of supply to
the poorest people, especially those without a household connection or access to a public
standpipe) as many of these illegal connections were made in informal settlements not
reached by the utility. The decision was made to provide resellers with a permit authorizing
them to sell water. They had to apply to the utility and covert to formal connections. This
move had several objectives, reducing illegal activity and improving revenue collection.
In 1983 the utility launched a campaign for authorized vending points.

In practice, the total volumes distributed by approved resellers are low and the impact of
approved resellers has been limited to less than 5% of the total population. Authorized
vendors only provide about 1% of the total resale and the volumes sold are on average,
only 40 - 50m3 per month. See table.

Approved resale figures

The corresponding turnover is also low, from CFA35 000 - 50 000 (US$50-70) per month. After
deducting the water bills from SODECI, CFA15 000 - 20 000 per month, (US$20-30), the gross
margin is quite low at CFA17 500 - 31500 per month (US$25-45), to be shared between the
reseller and his technician. Furthermore, prices charged by the approved resellers are
often the same as those charged by illegal resellers (who are obviously not billed by the
utility). Despite this, business is good as resellers meet the demand of households with low
or irregular incomes, particularly in underserved areas where there is little alternative.

Insufficient incentive for resellers

Other than the benefits to SODECI, the campaign to legalize reselling did not have any
direct benefits for resellers as the terms they received were the same as those of domestic
consumers. This is unfortunate as resellers already finance major extensions in
neighborhoods. It might also have the effect of limiting competition which might
contribute to higher prices thus making the service less accessible to the poorest people.

As is the case for all individual consumers, the vendor was required to provide a title deed,
or landlord’s permission - for rented premises, which is difficult at best for those in
unplanned neighborhoods. Secondly, as installation of water meters is only permitted
where legal right of way exists, the reseller is required to invest heavily in the cost of
extending the network between the meter and their vending point often in a haphazard
manner - losses incurred due to leaks in the system are inevitably billed by SODECI.
Resellers are also subject to the normal tariff scales, and are therefore charged in the
higher band in the tariff if they consume more than the average vendor (i.e. over
50m3/month). As a result the campaign to convert illegal connections into approved
resellers carried out by SODECI did not make substantial gains. In Abidjan, the number of
approved resellers dropped from 1 585 in 1983, to 869 by the end of 1997.

Despite the mixed results of this experience, in countries where resale is at best tolerated
Note: and at worst banned, and where there are few public standpoints, the recognition of
Exchange Rate resellers is critical. Recognition and appropriate contracting arrangements should be key
US$1 = CFA 700 (2001) aspects of a public water supply strategy that aims to reach the poor.
Source:
CREPA, 1999

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 STANDPIPES: AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY

Establishing appropriate arrangements for domestic reselling

Domestic reselling also means that utilities deal with fewer customers buying larger
quantities of water – a benefit for customer management. Efforts should therefore be
made to focus on cost recovery, while at the same time encouraging appropriate
behavior (e.g. fair pricing) by domestic retailers. In a manner similar to the strategy
toward standpipes outlined above, if policy makers take into account the incidence
of domestic reselling, it is clear that efforts should be made to formalize (and
regularize) the practice and to develop mechanisms aimed at improving the level of
service provided to the neighbor-customer. Measures could include:

• reviewing the tariffs applied to domestic resellers – rising block tariffs penalize the
high consumption that stems from reselling and thus results in high unit rates for
those households consuming water from the same meter;

• shifting policy and regulatory provisions to legalize this practice and thereby
reduce the risk associated with the reselling role including formalizing the service
delivery by establishing contracts with resellers;

AREQUAP-CI: an Umbrella Body of Authorized Vendors in Côte d'Ivoire Box 13

AREQUAP-CI, is the umbrella body of authorized water vendors in Côte d'Ivoire

whose primary objective is to obtain recognition from the Ivorian water utility
(SODECI) and improve working conditions for its members. Among other issues, the
association is lobbying for: an appropriate tariff regime, lower deposit amounts,
shorter billing periods, and protection from unfair competition by illegal vendors.
AREQUAP-CI would like to evolve from an informal sector association to a
professional one.

AREQUAP-CI was established in November 1998, on the initiative of several approved

resellers in Abidjan. The association states that it wishes to professionalize the sector
so as to improve the service given through city residents. This small group of founding
members succeed in drawing in other resellers. In 2000 the association had 147
members, that is, one quarter of the approved resellers. Any resellers approved by
SODECI can be a member of the association provided they pay a membership fee
of CFA5,000 (US$7) and a monthly subscription of CFA1000 (US$1.5). The association
is run by a management committee of eight members elected by its members.

The association, encouraged by its recognition togther with the lobbying talent of its
President, soon became an important voice. Whenever there are meetings with
SODECI concerning urban water supply, AREQUAP-CI ensures that its opinion and
demands are heard. They are currently pursuing two important issues. The
establishment of a tariff system (based on a bulk rate) that is appropriate for resellers.
This is because resellers are at present subject to the "normal" tariff offered to
domestic customers, and as they consume large volumes of water, their bills
fluctuate greatly from one month to the next. The association also contends that
billing on a quarterly cycle results in frequent disconnections for its members who are
Note:
unable to save funds over this long period of time (some have no access to banking
Exchange Rate
facilities, etc), and are unable to estimate costs because of these monthly
US$1 = CFA 700 (2001)
fluctuations.
Source:
Any, 1999

• facilitating access through a connection subsidy in situations where the number

of connections is small, standpipes do not exist or are too few in number;

• establishing a bulk rate for resellers such as the bulk price applied on kiosks in
Nairobi or tankers in Accra;

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• reducing risks for both parties by adjusting the billing cycle to sub-monthly or Efforts should be
monthly (or more frequent) payments;
made to
• facilitating appropriate payment mechanisms for resellers (e.g. allowing deposits formalize and
to be paid in installments; allowing deposits to be indexed against average
regularize the
consumption rather than the more common practice of a fixed annual fee);
practice of
• encouraging competition between domestic resellers to set prices that cover
domestic
costs but do not include unfair profit margins;
reselling.
• monitoring the impacts on the poor, and especially on vulnerable households.

Finally, as domestic resellers are generally not recognized, they often do not have
contacts with utilities and municipalities. AREQUAP-CI, an association of authorized
domestic resellers in Abidjan, described in Box 13, is an exception that illustrates the
benefits of recognizing the activity of reselling.

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 STANDPIPES: AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY

Photocredit:
Lukman Salifu

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Photocredit:
Hydroconseil

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