MR

Almanac
Che Guevara and Guerrilla Warfare:
Training for Today’s Nonlinear Battlefields
Captain Steve Lewis, US Army
Since the American Revolution, similar situations in the future, it is every unit’s mobility and safety.
US Armed Forces have been con- important for commanders to study Comprehensive training geared to
fronted, and sometimes confounded, such tactics in order to be successful developing confidence and initiative
by low-intensity conflicts (LIC) and on nonlinear, changing battlefields. develops a person’s attitude. To
unconventional warfare (UW).1 To Although not considered a strate- maintain mobility, land-navigation
protect US interests abroad, US mili- gic military genius, Guevara’s effec- training is critical. Key leaders need
tary forces will be called on to con- tive, realistic principles served him to know the unit’s mission and what
duct insurgency warfare and peace- well. They included mobility, move- each person’s role will be. Well-con-
keeping operations and to provide ment by night, careful use of ammu- ducted rehearsals develop soldiers’
logistic support in a fluid, nonlinear nition (supplies), flexibility, careful confidence and encourage planning
environment. study of the ground and surprise for the unexpected. For example, no
Nonlinear battle challenges tradi- and fury.4 vehicle should stop without knowing
tional military roles. Thus, logisti- Mobility. “The fundamental char- where it will go next. If that decision
cians, not infantrymen defending or acteristic of a guerrilla band is mobil- depends on circumstances, the leader
destroying a supply convoy, would ity.”5 Mobility is the ability to move must know those circumstances and
play a more effective part in seizing vehicles, soldiers and equipment rap- why he should or should not by-
a key terrain feature than would con- idly with relative freedom. Guevara’s pass an LRP.
ventional forces. This point is clearly plan was to strike and move freely, Movement by night. Movement by
made in the 1940 version of the US avoiding detection. Mobility comple- night, another important characteris-
Marine Corps (USMC) Small Wars mented surprise and flexibility. The tic of the guerrilla band, includes road
Manual: “[T]hat small wars are, gen- guerrillas did not become comfortable marches, convoys, reconnaissance,
erally speaking, campaigns rather or get tied to certain areas. They had emplacement of operational bases,
against nature than against hostile to stay one step ahead of govern- resupply activities, rehearsals and
armies . . . constitutes one of the most ment forces. Their mobility put a con- attacks. Guevara believed his guerril-
distinctive characteristics of this stant strain on government forces, las knew the ground better than did
class of warfare. [They affect] the which had to spread their assets thin. government forces. Therefore, they
course of operations to an extent Mobility allows US forces to keep would have more success while op-
[that varies] greatly according to cir- a potential enemy guessing in the erating at night against government
cumstances, but so vitally at times as same way. The US usually has an forces whose “garrison attitude” kept
to govern the whole course of the advantage in mobility since its indus- them safely indoors during the night.
campaign from start to finish. [They] trial edge allows deployment of all Guerrillas were free to move forces,
arise almost entirely out of the diffi- necessary materiel. The ability to conduct surveillance, attack with
culties as regards supply which the establish logistic resupply points surprise then withdraw into the night,
theaters of small wars generally (LRPs) at any place and time helps contributing to the impression that
present.”2 prevent ambushes or traps. they were everywhere and could at-
Guevara’s “Small War” Developing mobility in small tack at any time.
Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara units within a support battalion re- In conventional operations, night
formulated his principles of guer- quires the development of circum- operations are a strong component
rilla warfare from 1956 to 1958 dur- stances and attitude to ensure each of force protection for the parent unit
ing the revolt against President soldier and vehicle has the proper and for the group conducting the
Fulgencio Batista. The war, which tools to operate in any area at any operation. Departing from a brigade
contributed to the fall of Batista’s time. This means having several support area (BSA) at night limits the
regime, helped install Fidel Castro days worth of food and water for enemy’s knowledge of what supplies
as El Presidente. each soldier and equipment and are loaded. If the enemy sees three
Guerrilla warfare principles are supplies needed for communica- palletized-load system trucks carry-
part of the Marxist dogma to which tion, minor repairs, signaling and ing 120-millimeter tank rounds leav-
many insurgent organizations ad- first aid. Many innovative ideas are ing the BSA quickly, heading toward
here.3 Because US forces might face currently being explored to increase a certain task force’s area of oper-

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 ALMANAC
ations, it might be a tip-off that charged. If the tank’s wing-man is 10 adjust to a changing environment. A
someone is short of ammunition. kilometers away, the battalion’s sup- battalion commander who believes in
Weapons training also should be port platoon must drive farther dis- only centralized control could find
conducted at night, if possible, to tances more frequently to resupply that his elements are dead or lost and
take advantage of the cover darkness both. In turn, the support platoon is his vehicles out of fuel and ammuni-
provides. exposed to greater risk and must be tion.
Careful Use of Ammunition (Sup- protected and resupplied as well. Careful Study of the Ground.
plies). “[T]he care which must be Flexibility. “Another fundamental “[G]uerrilla-defended positions,
taken of ammunition and the method characteristic of the guerrilla soldier when they have been selected on
of using it are further characteristics is his flexibility, his ability to adapt the basis of a careful study of the
of guerrilla warfare.”6 All armies have himself to all circumstances and to ground, are invulnerable.”8 The value
restrictions on available supplies, the convert to his service all the acci- of reconnaissance and preparation,
care and management of which can dents of the actions.”7 Flexibility is map reconnaissance, terrain walks,
contribute significantly to any the ability to adapt to changing cir- rehearsals, familiarity with the pat-
operation’s outcome. For example, cumstances to take advantage of terns of the enemy and the local
wasteful movement of unneeded change. Guerrilla armies are usually population and a relationship with
supplies can detract from a battle in forced to limit their operations to tar- the local population cannot be over-
the same way as can the absence of gets of opportunity early in their cam- stated. Guerrilla forces usually are
needed supplies. Supply bases or paigns. This requires flexibility and familiar with the people and the ter-
depots are also high-payoff targets. the ability to take advantage of an rain in which they operate.
Ammunition was Guevara’s most unguarded government asset or mili- The most useful aspect of a study
critical supply item. It was only avail- tary target. of the ground is recognizing pat-
able from government forces, and it No operation ever goes as planned, terns. Most large organizations, es-
was quickly expended. Food, cloth- and the skill and wisdom to recog- pecially military organizations, fall
ing and shelter were available from nize changing circumstance can into patterns of conduct. Convoys
the local population, and weapons, change defeat into victory. However, leave and arrive; guards change
taken from the government or guer- the ability to do this is only present shifts; and units receive supplies.
rilla dead, had long, useful lives if if there is decentralized control and Patterns can tell how long it takes a
properly maintained. But only small if initiative is encouraged at every unit to react to an enemy attack and
amounts of ammunition were avail- level. The higher up the chain of what weapons it will use. Guevara’s
able. Guevara trained his soldiers to command that information must guerrillas’ familiarity with the area al-
fire only at certain targets and to travel before a decision can be made lowed them to always have the most
never waste ammunition. Fire disci- decreases exponentially the time reliable information.9
pline and marksmanship were critical. available to use the information. US forces must recognize that
Ammunition is no less important. To maintain and employ flexibility, there is more to the ground than just
As one of the most industrialized US forces must have the proper dirt. During an LIC, they must remem-
nations on earth, the United States equipment and training to allow them ber that the local population will be
has an absolute advantage in avail- to seize the initiative and take advan- close. They must know who lives in
able supplies. The ability to move a tage of changing circumstances. the area of operations, what their
large amount of supplies rapidly is a Properly equipped vehicles enable politics are, whether they are prima-
key strength. However, there is need- soldiers to maintain contact with rily urban or agrarian and whether op-
less waste of military assets, which higher headquarters and monitor erations are aiding or hindering them
causes support soldiers to expend ongoing operations. in their daily lives. Soldiers will be
unnecessary time and energy and Flexibility is further developed interacting closely with the local
places them in unnecessary danger through training soldiers to use their populace, so training must go be-
if they must resupply a unit that mental tools to maximize their physi- yond learning to yell “stay away from
could not forecast or manage its re- cal tools. The ability to call for fire the wire.”
sources properly. and close air support as well as to Surprise and Fury. “The form of
That the US Army is so powerful coordinate with other units must be attack of a guerrilla army is also dif-
and fast compromises the logistic taught to every noncommissioned ferent; starting with surprise and
chain. The farther combat vehicles officer (NCO). fury, irresistible, it suddenly con-
and troops move from their sources Initiative is the most important tool verts itself into total passivity.”10
of supplies, the more resources are that can be taught and nurtured. A Surprise is doing the unexpected
required to resupply them. Therefore, commander, platoon leader or section and doing it rapidly — an action
timely resupply from the forward sup- sergeant must underwrite subordi- that gives no indication or warning
ply brigade is critical. For example, a nates’ honest mistakes. Soldiers must when it begins or when it will end.
tank stationed at a road intersection really believe their boss wants them However, surprise cannot be accom-
still consumes fuel even while sta- to seize an opportunity. A battalion plished without mobility and flexibil-
tionary because it must continue to commander must ensure his soldiers ity. Also, movement at night increases
run its engine to keep its battery know he believes in their ability to flexibility and contributes to surprise.

MILITARY REVIEW l September-October 2001 99

 Even with limited resources and war to repel the Soviet Army, the operations. This altered battlespace
personnel, Guevara insisted on main- Mujahidin—Afghan rebels—roamed requires a flexible, fluid supply-distri-
taining the edge of surprise. Attack- the countryside. They would choose bution channel because if combat
ing government forces when they an ambush site, destroy a convoy units are not massed in small areas,
did not expect it was the only way then disappear, forcing the Soviets conventional supply-distribution
to maximize limited resources. A criti- to deploy more soldiers and armored systems will not work. Support sol-
cal part of his plan was to keep gov- vehicles on every convoy.13 diers will have to travel longer dis-
ernment forces guessing where he Close proximity to local popula- tances to resupply the widespread
would strike next, forcing them to tion. In an urban environment or combat units.
spread their resources thin to cover countryside, the area of operations is In the former Yugoslavia, US
all, or the most probable, targets. usually tied to the civilian population. forces are currently confronting this
US forces can keep adversaries Protecting one civilian group from problem. Since their mission is peace-
off balance by not establishing pat- another requires a close relationship keeping, forces are spread over a
terns. Units that establish routines with the protected group. The mis- large area for maximum visibility,
that can be “read” by the enemy can sion will not be to defeat an which creates considerable supply
fall victim to surprise attacks. In the enemy’s standing army but to main- challenges.18 Creation of flexible sup-
mid-1990s, US Army Rangers in So- tain peace between two ethnic ply teams is needed to meet these
malia established a dangerous pat- groups or to support a newly demo- new demands.
tern by taking down buildings, cratic government. Proximity to civil- Decrease in US ability to optimize
thought to contain Somali warlords, ians might also affect logistics, since mass or use heavy weapons. US in-
in the same way every time. After many receiving and distribution cen- dustrial power might not be used
seeing the US military continuously ters will be located in heavily popu- because of political constraints or it
use the same tactics, the Somalis laid lated areas and might employ local might be ineffective. For example,
a successful ambush. Somali Colonel citizens.14 tanks that can destroy targets at 2,500
Ali Aden said, “If you use a tactic Specialized supply requirements. meters might be used as roadblocks,
twice, you should not use it a third Individual water sources, fresh food, or bombers that can deliver tons of
time.”11 automotive parts, humanitarian-aid ordnance might not be used at all.
In 1999, a successful use of sur- items, nonlethal weapons and infra- Consider the following examples of
prise occurred at the National Train- structure supplies are all nonstand- ineffective firepower.
ing Center in Utah. The opposing ard supply items that might be During France’s attempt to defeat
force (OPFOR) set a pattern of attack- needed in a low-intensity conflict. A the Vietnamese communists from
ing the BSA with mortars about the smaller quantity of these items, rela- 1946 to 1954, they made considerable
same time every day. Their location tive to a conventional war, will be use of heavy artillery. However, they
was never the same, but their target needed over an area far wider than were surprised to discover that artil-
was usually fuel tankers. The com- on a conventional battlefield. The US lery had little effect on Vietnamese
mander deduced the pattern and the Army discovered this while conduct- guerrillas. The Viet Minh—the prede-
next likely area from which the ing military operations in urban ter- cessors of the Viet Cong—took cover
OPFOR would attack. He was right, rain training. Special ladders and until artillery barrages ceased then
and his troops destroyed the OPFOR other climbing aids, as well as forced- continued their attack. The Viet Minh
mortar team.12 entry tools, were required.15 also “hugged” French bases, keep-
Learning by Example Specialized requirements for build- ing too close for the French to call
Leaders can apply Guevara’s prin- ing democracy, such as food, voting in effective fire. The French also dis-
ciples to the ever-changing LIC/UW equipment and public address sys- covered that close air support was
environment, which has several dis- tems, might also be needed.16 The largely ineffective against the guer-
tinctive characteristics, as the follow- USMC Small Wars Manual states, rillas.19
ing examples illustrate. “In most small war situations, almost In another example, British soldier
No front lines and no clearly de- every accepted principle of warfare T.E. Lawrence directed Arab guerrilla
fined battlespace, enemy areas or on a large scale is subject to modifi- warriors to avoid open battles with
safe areas. An LIC is not limited to cation due to the irregularity of the the Turks because the Turks out-
the linear battle; the enemy might operation. It is this characteristic that gunned them. He opted for attacks on
come from all sides. Therefore, it is sets the ‘small war’ in a class by it- supply and troop trains — areas
unlikely that the conflict will have self. It is obvious then, that a suc- where heavy firepower was absent.20
defined enemy areas or safe areas. cessful supply plan in any small war These examples reveal firepower
The danger to convoys or supply theater must be ready to meet these limitations that could affect US logis-
areas will be just as great as or irregular conditions.”17 ticians’ abilities to operate in an LIC
greater than to infantry soldiers. With Greater requirement for indi- area. With no heavy or effective fire-
no organized uniformed army to de- vidual or small-unit operations. Dur- power, guerrilla fighters might be
feat or terrain to hold, battles will be ing LICs, combat units are broken more willing to risk confrontation, es-
ones of individual initiative. into smaller groups and spread over pecially with less well-armed logistics
During the Afghanistan guerrilla the width and depth of the area of soldiers.

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Inability to distinguish friend one preparation day and one battle US President John F. Kennedy
from foe. Guerrilla fighters are civil- day, then the cycle repeats. In an said that unconventional warfare “is
ians. If they are not carrying weap- LIC, many smaller operations might another type of war, new in its inten-
ons, they are almost impossible to be required, each with varying time sity, ancient in its origins—war by
identify as adversaries. Civilians lines.25 Therefore, the schedule that guerrillas, subversives, insurgents,
who are not guerrillas might be unit leaders have trained to assassins; war by ambush instead of
passing information to the enemy throughout their careers might not by combat; by infiltration, instead of
or to US forces. Each person will apply. aggression, seeking victory by erod-
have loyalties, and some people will The availability and use of ad- ing and exhausting the enemy in-
change loyalties daily. vanced technology. Geographic po- stead of engaging him. . . . [I]t re-
The Russian occupation of Af- sitioning systems (GPS), night-vision quires in those situations where we
ghanistan provides many examples goggles (NVGs), weapons, cellular must counter it . . . a whole new kind
of “trusted” Afghan citizens commit- phones and GPS jammers are avail- of strategy, a wholly different kind of
ting acts of sabotage against the able to anyone for relatively low force and therefore a new and wholly
Soviets. In one instance, a Soviet prices and can be purchased from a different kind of military training.”28
officer’s driver helped Afghan rebels military surplus catalog.26 This avail- Kennedy’s statement shows remark-
kidnap the Soviet officer. In another, ability of high-tech weapons pre- able insight into the battles of the
an Afghan employee at the commu- sents a serious threat. Guerrilla future. MR
nist party headquarters planted a armies might not be able to afford a
bomb. After the explosion, and not tank, but they might be able to afford NOTES
being a suspect, she got a new job plastic explosives, NVGs and various 1. John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun (Consho-
hocken, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995), 64. Although many
at Kabul University where she small arms. conventional battles occurred during the Revolutionary
War, those in North and South Carolina, especially,
planted another bomb. Both bombs In a 1999 Army Times article, were considered guerrilla warfare.
caused considerable damage and Colonel John Rosenberger, the 2. US Marine Corps (USMC), Small Arms Manual
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office
loss of life.21 NTC OPFOR commander, de- (GPO), 1940), 13, sec 3-17.
3. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, NE:
An increase of nonaligned play- scribes available technology: “For University of Nebraska Press, 1985).
4. Ibid., 58-61.
ers. Apart from civilian populations, $40,000 I can go buy a GPS jammer 5. Ibid., 58.

there are a number of nongovern- from Russia. They put it on the 6. Ibid., 60.
7. Ibid.
mental organizations (NGO), gov- market two months ago. It’s an 8- 8. Ibid., 61.
9. Ibid., 115.
ernment organizations from neutral watt jammer that will take down 10. Ibid., 61.
11. Daniel Bolger, Battle for Hunger Hill (Novato,
countries, national and interna- both [commonly used GPS] fre- CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 167.

tional businesses and religious or- quencies for about 200 to 250 12. NTC Rotation 99-06, Combat Service Support
After Action Review (April 1999).
ganizations whose interests might miles. Well, that levels the playing 13. MG Oleg Sarin and COL Lev Dvoretsky, The Af-
ghan Syndrome (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 97.
be for, against or neutral to US in- field. . . . [S]houldn’t we be train- 14. LTG William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Bos-
ton, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 107.
terests. ing against the forces that create 15. Robert Hahn and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare

The Center for Army Lessons a loss of GPS capability? You and the Urban Warfighter of 2025,” Parameters (Sum-
mer 1999), 74-86.
Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan- bet.”27 16. US Army, Training, Tactics and Procedures
(TTP), Volume 1, “Bosnia-Herzegovina National Elec-
tions,” CALL Newsletter 98-18 (1998), <www.call.army.
sas, currently lists 70 NGOs oper- Training’s Importance mil/call/newsltrs/98-18/98-18toc.htm>.
ating in Kosovo alone. 22 While A conventional army cannot be 17. USMC, 7, sec 3-5.
18. US Army, “Drawing a Line in the Mud,” CALL
such organizations are for humani- thrust into an LIC/UW environment Newsletter 96-5 (1996), <www.call.army.mil/call/
newsltrs/96-5/sec3zos.htm>.
tarian reasons, how many could without training or preparation. A 19. Robert Scales, Firepower in Limited War (Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 33.
harbor a sniper or saboteur? How UW environment is just that—un- 20. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New
many might relay information about conventional. If soldiers are not York: Doubleday, 1926), 194.
21. Ali Jalai and Lester Grau, “Night Stalkers and
US forces if they felt it would fur- trained or allowed to think for them- Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas,” Infantry
(January-April 1999).
ther their interests? Also, simply selves, the US Armed Forces will 22. US Army, <http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/ngos/
organizations.html>.
conferring with representatives of lose. There are limited resources 23. P.T. Simmons, “Learning to Live with NGOs,” For-
extreme political organizations can abroad and limited amounts of train- eign Policy (Fall 1998), 83.
24. Bolger, 206.
sometimes lend them a legitimacy ing time. Therefore, the US military 25. NTC AAR.
26. US Army, US Cavalry Equipment Catalog, 1999.
that could be detrimental to US in- must determine the correct training 27. Sean Naylor, “Combat Training Just Got
Tougher,” Army Times (27 December 1999), 15.
terests.23 needed for tomorrow’s battles and 28. John F. Kennedy as quoted in US Army Field
Changes in the military deci- focus on it. Manual 90-8, Counter Guerrilla Warfare (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1986), iv.
sionmaking process and battle The military can prepare for
changes in the plan, but the only way Captain Steve Lewis received his B.S.
rhythm. Conventional US warriors from Arizona State University and is a
are accustomed to a well-estab- it can really prepare for unconven- recent graduate of the Combined Logis-
lished planning and execution cycle tional war is to teach soldiers to take tics Captains Career Course, Fort Lee,
known as battle rhythm. A brigade the initiative. Leaders must ensure Virginia. He has served in various pla-
toon and company positions in the
battle rhythm for a major operation that NCOs receive the proper re- Continental United States. Anyone who
is 32 hours for planning and prepa- sources and the confidence that wants to correspond with Lewis regard-
ration and 21 hours for execution.24 they will be trusted with important ing this article can E-mail him at
<stevel214@earthlink.net>.
At the NTC, the battle rhythm is missions.

MILITARY REVIEW l September-October 2001 101