OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
MAXIMO D. SISON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010
FACTS: The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog,
Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman Marcelo, accusing Governor
Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar, including Maximo D. Sison, of highly
anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the
Provincial Budget Officer.
The letter-complaint arose from the audit investigation conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34
million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were expended
without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines,
electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the
administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar. The latter were then required to file
their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-complaint and
claimed his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification
that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that
funds are available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued by the
requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in
the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary
evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually
connected nor directly implicated in the complaint.
Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had not
participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by the Province of Samar.
The Office of the Ombudsman found Sison and several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of
grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing
him from service.
Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43. CA reversed and set aside
decision of the Ombudsman against Sison. CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration but it was subsequently denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the
adverse decision rendered by the CA.
HELD: Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court
We are not persuaded.
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full
measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an
interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its
main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole
controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur:
(1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding.
The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment.
Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia (Garcia was forced to resign for
gross neglect of duty. On appeal, CSC exonerated him. SC ruled that PNB should be allowed to appeal reso. Of
CSC to CA since PNB was the aggrieved party. PNB should, therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision that, in
its view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its
name as a premier banking institution in the country) to support its intervention in the appellate court for
the following reasons:
First, Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and was, in fact, dismissed for
grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Office of the
Ombudsman in the administrative case. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, unquestionably,
the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal.
Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its
decision, not its right to appeal.
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority.
Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize ‘either party’ to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal.
One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion
or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the
penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The
government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the
respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing
the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the
respondent.
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must
remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an
advocate.
It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are
appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’etre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not
active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual
positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the judges’ active participation. When judges
actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become
adversarial instead.
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), the Court
applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in granting the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of
the Ombudsman, to wit:
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing and resolving
the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a
court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle
the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and applicable laws, regulations and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There
must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts.
When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably
forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective
now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of
errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
Likewise, the facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA via a verified Petition for Review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, which
govern appeals to the CA from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition for review shall state the full
names of the parties to the case without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents. Thus, the only parties in such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as
respondent. The court or, in this case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from,
is not a party in the said appeal.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to intervene. As the CA held
correctly:
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative case against
the petitioner such that it would be directly affected by the judgment that this Court had rendered. It must
be remembered that the legal interest required for an intervention must be direct and immediate in
character. Lest it be forgotten, what was brought on appeal before this Court is the very Decision by the Office
of the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an advocate, has no
legal interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule 43 Petition.
Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on Time
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only after
the Decision of the CA was promulgated.
It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of
Court provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of
service of a copy on the court or agency a quo. Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time
within which to file a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The
Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive onlooker.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held in
Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted after a decision has already been
rendered.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER,
vs.
ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR., DR. PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA, ROLANDO L.
LONTOC, JR. AND GLORIA M. MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013
FACTS: The BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez directing the former to
enforce the Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution finding respondents
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing penalty of dismissal from service with accessory
penalties. Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, resolving to implement the Order
of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the RTC of Batangas City, against the BSU-
BOR. The gist of the petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal and,
therefore, are not yet final and executory.
The RTC ordered the dismissal of respondents' petition for injunction on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Respondents filed their notice of appeal and Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction with the CA. CA granted the TRO and enjoined the BSU-BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18,
series of 2005.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion to Recall
Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order attached thereto.
Respondents opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The CA issued the Resolution allowing the Ombudsman’s motion only in so far as to afford it with
ample opportunity to comment on and oppose appellants' application for injunctive relief, but not for the
purpose of allowing the Ombudsman to formally and actively intervene in the instant appeal. However,
Ombudsman’s Motion to Recall TRO was denied and respondent’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was granted. The Office of the Ombudsman filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in denying the Office of the Ombudsman’s Motion to Intervene.
HELD: No. The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal pending with
the lower court. In resolving the issue of whether the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to
intervene in the appeal of its Decision, the Court expounded, thus:
x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public officials who, through
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is
critical because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake.
The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject matter of litigation.
Paragraph 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall writ of preliminary
injunction averred:
"2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on the apparently
erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the
implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision.”
In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up
its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally
mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve
administrative disciplinary cases against public officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to
abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and accountability.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent
committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people
and preserve the integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully
within the parameters of its authority.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to
the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such
discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be
exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the
Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was in question.
This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of the power, duties and functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral
specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the
offense is committed against the government and public interest. What further proof of a direct
constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public officers is necessary?
Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution is in danger
of being impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its right to have its
judgment carried out. The CA patently erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion for
intervention.
