1ST CLAIM OF CHINA
- China’s Basic Position is that, Beijing considers that the islands, banks, and shoals as
well as surrounding waters of the Xisha, Nansha, Zongsha, and Dongsha
archipelagos,[1] all the way down to the Zengmu Ansha reef, as its southernmost tip,
constitute an indisputable and indivisible part of China’s historical territory.
-The geographical extent of the claimed area has variously been represented by 9,
10, and 11-dashed lines indicating the area China considers it has sovereignty over.
The most recent version of these maps was circulated by China as a set of notes
verbale to the United Nations in 2009.
- Although the exact number and distribution of dashes has varied, the 9-dash map
is largely seen to follow an 11-dash line map published by the Nationalist
Government of the Republic of China in 1947 .
- China’s claim is rooted in its understanding that the territorial features of the
South China Sea constitute territory over which China has historically held sovereign
jurisdiction – that is, “ancestral properties” passed down from previous
generations.
-China expresses that “Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back over 2000
years ago” with China being “the first country to discover, name, explore and
exploit the resources of the South China Sea islands and the first to continuously
exercise sovereign powers over them.” For instance, Chinese sources claim that
maps of the South China Sea islands were published throughout the Ming and Qing
dynasties, including in navigational charts drawn up by China’s thirteenth-century
admiral and explorer Zhen
-Chinese sources reiterate that Chinese possession of South China Sea islands has
been acknowledged by a number of international sources throughout modern
history. These include listings in, for example, British, (East and West -) German,
French, and Soviet atlases of the area published in the 1950s and 1960s.
- According to its proponents, China’s claim stood relatively undisputed until the
1930s. From this time onwards, Western colonial forces and an increasingly
assertive Imperial Japan recognized and sought to utilize the strategic value of the
Nansha Islands (Spratlys) in particular.
2nd CLAIM OF CHINA
-The various maritime features relied upon by China as a basis upon which to assert its
claims in the South China Sea are not islands that generate entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. Rather, some are 'rocks' within the meaning of
Article 121, paragraph 3; others are low-tide elevations; and still others are permanently
submerged. As a result, none are capable of generating entitlements beyond 12NM
(nautical miles), and some generate no entitlements at all. China’s recent massive
reclamation activities cannot lawfully change the original nature and character of these
features."
EXPLANATION: Under UNCLOS, habitable islands can generate a 200-nautical-mile
EEZ. Rocks cannot.
China describes some features in the South China Sea as islands. One of these is
Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal), a rocky sandbar. China claims these supposed
islands.
China also says these "islands" generate an EEZ, which could overlap with the EEZ of
the Philippines. The problem for the Philippines is, China declared in 2006 that it "does
not accept" arbitral jurisdiction when it comes to overlapping EEZs. UNCLOS allows
this exception.
This is partly why China says the tribunal at The Hague has no right to hear the
Philippine case – because it supposedly involves overlapping EEZs.
3rd CLAIM OF CHINA
China contested the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the following grounds:
1.) That the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial
sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea (SCS),
which is beyond the scope of the Convention, and does not concern the
interpretation or application of the Convention;
2.) That the two countries have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS, to settle their relevant
disputes through negotiations. Thus, the Philippines’ resort to arbitration is a
breach of its obligations under international law;
3.) Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were
concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that
subject-matter would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation,
which is covered by China’s 2006 declaration excluding maritime
delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement
procedures under the UNCLOS
