G.R. No.

190798

RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the September 25, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
1

CR. No. 31285 which affirmed with modifications the July 17, 2007 Decision of the 2

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255 of Las Piñas City, convicting Ronald Ibañez
(Ronald), Emilio Ibañez (Emilio) and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez (Bobot) (collectively, petitioners)
of the crime of frustrated homicide.

The Facts

For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners
together with their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez (David), who have
remained at large, were charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an
Information dated October 11, 2001. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
3

"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade and stab with bladed weapons one
RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, thus performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA,
which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio were released
on bail. Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002. Emilio was, in turn,
4

arraigned on December 10, 2002. All the petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged. After termination of pre-trial on April 23, 2003, trial on the merits immediately
5 6

followed. In the course of trial, two versions of what transpired on the early morning of July
15, 2001 surfaced. These conflicting versions of the incident, as culled from the records, are
as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David
were his neighbors in CAA, Las Piñas City. Rodolfo recalled that he had visitors on the day
of the incident. When his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001, Rodolfo
accompanied them outside his house. After about thirty minutes and as he was about to go
inside, Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of his house. Addressing nobody in particular,
Rodolfo uttered in the vernacular "bakit dito tinambak ang basura sa harap ng aking bahay
na malawak naman ang pagtataponan ng basura?" Emilio and Boyet, who was then
7

present and angered by what they heard, threw stones at the private complainant hitting
him twice on the forehead. With blood oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his
house to cleanse his face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x
2" (dos por dos) piece of wood. Rodolfo was caught off guard when he was hit on the head
with a shovel by another accused, David. Then, Ronald held Rodolfo, rendering him
8

helpless, as Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed him in the abdomen. At this point,
9

Rodolfo fell to the ground, lying flat and eventually lost consciousness. When he regained
consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las Piñas District Hospital (LPDH) but was
later on transferred to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for the much-needed surgical
procedure. At the PGH, Rodolfo was operated on, confined for nine days and incurred
hospital expenses amounting to P30,000.00. 10

PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took the statements of
Rodolfo’s daughter Ruth Ann Lebria (Ruth) and Rodolfo’s wife, Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion)
when they went to the police station to complain about the incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that
when he asked Ruth and Salvacion why Rodolfo was not with them, he was informed that
Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and treatment for the injuries suffered from the
petitioners. PO2 Sulit also testified that he endorsed the complaint against the petitioners to
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas for proper disposition. 11

To corroborate Rodolfo’s testimony, the prosecution presented Ruth and Salvacion as

Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she admitted was
preceded by the utterance made by his father. Her testimony on how Ronald, Emilio,
12

Bobot, Boyet and David ganged up on her father and who among them stoned, hit, held and
stabbed Rodolfo perfectly matched the latter’s sworn declarations. 13

Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the beating and stabbing
her husband endured in the hands of the petitioners and their co-accused. Salvacion also
submitted receipts in the total amount of P2,174.80, representing the medical expenses
incurred for the treatment of Rodolfo’s injuries resulting from the incident. 14

The prosecution presented the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the Records Division of
the PGH showing that Rodolfo suffered multiple stab wounds in the abdomen and
underwent an exploratory laparotomy, the standard surgery in abdominal trauma cases
15

involving life-threatening injuries.

Version of the Defense

To refute the accusations against them, the petitioners offered an entirely different scenario.
Not only did he deny the allegations against him but Ronald even claimed that he was the
one who was stabbed by Rodolfo. Ronald averred that the incident happened within the
vicinity of his home, which was about four meters away from the house of Rodolfo. When 17

Ronald heard Rodolfo shouting at around 2:00 a.m., he tried pacifying Rodolfo by telling him
that they would just talk later in the day. Unappeased, Rodolfo allegedly destroyed the
bicycle belonging to Ronald’s son-in-law. Rodolfo then attacked Ronald by stabbing him on
his right arm. It was during this time that Ronald’s son, Bobot, came to his rescue but was
prevented from doing so as Bobot was also struck with a knife by Rodolfo. Ronald and his
son instituted a criminal complaint against Rodolfo for attempted homicide but nothing came
out of it. In support of his testimony, Ronald presented a picture taken the day after the
incident showing a slipper purportedly belonging to Rodolfo and a balisong. Ronald further
insisted that all the other accused were not around as they were residing elsewhere at that
crucial time.

Bobot testified that he immediately rushed outside his house, which is located beside his
father’s, upon hearing Ronald shout, "Tulungan mo ako, ako'y sinaksak." However, he was
18

not able to save his father as he himself was stabbed twice with a knife by Rodolfo. A
struggle for the possession of the knife between Bobot and Rodolfo ensued and in the
process, the latter accidentally sustained a stab wound in the abdomen. Still, Bobot
asserted that it was Rodolfo who ran away from the scene of the crime. Meanwhile, Ronald
had already left for the nearby police detachment to seek help.

Accused Emilio, for his part, interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He emphatically
denied that he threw a stone at Rodolfo. On the date and time of the incident, Emilio
claimed that he was working overtime as a laborer in Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, which is
one kilometer away from the crime scene. He argued that he was just unfortunately dragged
into this case which had nothing to do with him at all.19

The defense likewise proffered two medical certificates to support the petitioners’ claims.
The July 15, 2001 medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Cecilia Leyson (Dr. Leyson), of the
Ospital ng Maynila, declared that Ronald’s body bore lacerations and hematoma at the time
she attended to him. Nevertheless, Dr. Leyson acknowledged that she had no idea how the
injuries were sustained by Ronald. The other medical certificate dated March 20, 2006 was
issued by Dr. Renato Borja (Dr. Borja), a physician affiliated with the Parañaque Community
Hospital where Bobot was taken after getting injured. Based on the hospital records, Dr.
Borja testified that Bobot had sustained wounds on the head and chest, possibly caused by
a sharp instrument. 20

Petitioners’ Representation in the Trial Court Proceedings

In view of the petitioners’ allegation that they were denied of right to counsel, a narration of
petitioners’ representation in the trial court proceedings is imperative.

During the arraignment on May 9, 2002, Ronald and Bobot were assisted by Atty. Bibiano
Colasito, who was selected as their counsel de oficio only for that occasion. At his
arraignment on December 10, 2002, Emilio appeared with the assistance of Atty. Antonio
Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then appointed by the trial court as counsel de oficio for
all the accused. In the pre-trial conference that followed, Atty. Manzano appeared for the
petitioners. Atty. Manzano was informed that the trial for the presentation of prosecution
evidence was set on June 18, 2003.

Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective testimonies during the June 18,
2003 hearing. However, Atty. Manzano failed to appear at the said hearing despite prior
notice. Likewise, Ronald, one of the petitioners, absented himself from the same hearing.
As a result, the RTC issued the June 18, 2003 Order, the pertinent portion of which reads:
21

Due to the failure of Atty. Manzano to appear in today’s proceeding despite due notice and
so as not to delay the proceedings herein, his right to cross-examine the said two (2)
witnesses is deemed waived. At the same time, Atty. Manzano is hereby fined the amount of
P2,000.00 for his absence in today’s proceedings despite the fact that the same has been
previously set and known to him, without even filing any motion or pleading regarding his
inability to appear herein which clearly indicates a show of disrespect to the authority of this
Court.

Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused Ronald Ibañez for failing to appear in
today’s hearing despite notice and the bond posted by him for his provisional liberty
confiscated in favor of the government. As such, the bondsman BF General Insurance
Company, Inc., is hereby directed to produce the body of the said accused within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this Order and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against the bond.

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Criminal
Investigation Service Command, PNP, Camp Crame, are hereby directed to explain within
five (5) days from receipt of this Order why the warrants of arrest issued against Boyet
Ibañez and David Ibañez remain unimplemented and/or no return submitted to this Court.

Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners’ counsel de oficio. In its Order dated22

September 3, 2003, the trial court appointed Atty. Gregorio Cañeda, Jr. (Atty. Cañeda) as
the new counsel de oficio of the petitioners. On the same date, Atty. Cañeda conducted the
cross-examination of Ruth and even expressed his desire to continue with the cross-
examination of said witness on the next scheduled hearing. In the hearing of September 17,
2003, Atty. Cañeda appeared for the petitioners but Bobot and Emilio did not show up. This
prompted the trial court to issue the corresponding warrants for their arrest and the bonds
posted by them for their provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Despite the continued absence of his clients, Atty. Cañeda religiously attended
the succeeding hearings. On November 5, 2003, upon his request, the trial court relieved
Atty. Cañeda of his designation as counsel de oficio for the petitioners.

Per the trial court’s Order dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C. Pantua (Atty.
23

Pantua), of the Public Attorney’s Office, was designated as the petitioners’ counsel de oficio.
However, Atty. Pantua’s designation was recalled upon her manifestation that she had
previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the present case. In her stead, the trial court
appointed the petitioners’ current counsel de oficio, Atty. Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).

Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his help, all three
petitioners finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005. Atty. Sindingan handled
the cross-examination of another prosecution witness, Salvacion, as well as the
presentation of evidence for the defense.

After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their respective
memoranda in thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan submitted the Memorandum for the
petitioners while no memorandum was ever filed by the prosecution. Thereafter, the case
was deemed submitted for decision.

The RTC’s Ruling

The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
over the declarations of the defense, thus, the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio
Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide and hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, up to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, as well as to suffer the accessory penalties provided
for by law.

Also, accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez are ordered to pay
to private complainant or victim Rodolfo Lebria the sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual
medical expenses.

With costs de officio.

SO ORDERED. 24

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this was denied in
an Order dated October 11, 2007. Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to the
25

CA. They faulted the trial court for totally disregarding their claim that Rodolfo was the
aggressor and for not recognizing that Bobot was merely acting in self-defense when
Rodolfo was stabbed. The petitioners also asserted that they were deprived of their
constitutional right to counsel.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA agreed with the trial court’s judgment of conviction but modified the penalty
imposed. The appellate court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also found it proper to award P15,000.00 as
temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to Rodolfo. The petitioners sought
a reconsideration of the CA’s decision. Still, their motion was denied in the Resolution of
26

December 28, 2009.

The Issue
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of whether the
petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.

No Deprivation of Right to Counsel

The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the
Constitution which states that:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x.

Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and pursuant to its
rule-making authority, the Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
adopted the following provisions:

Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled to the following rights:

xxxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. x x x

xxxx

Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de
oficio for the accused in the absence of private representation. It provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before arraignment, the
court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one.
Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his
choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him.

SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and
ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the
bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of
good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in
criminal prosecution. As such, right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights
27

available to the accused. A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an
28

equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field. Simply put, an accused
29

without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is tantamount to a grave

On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch effort to be exculpated, the petitioners
insisted that they were denied of their right to counsel when their counsel de oficio failed to
appear on the June 18, 2003 trial court hearing during which Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit gave
their testimonies. As a consequence, the petitioners argued that they were divested of the
opportunity to cross-examine the said two prosecution witnesses.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the petitioners’ claim that
they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel. In their May 5, 2010
Comment on the instant petition, the OSG pointed out that since the beginning of the
31

proceedings in the trial court until the filing of the present petition before this Court, three (3)
counsel de oficio were appointed and represented the petitioners and to which designation
32

the latter did not raise any protest. The OSG opined that the trial court judge made sure
33

that the petitioners were adequately assisted by a counsel de oficio when they failed to
engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, the OSG recommended the
dismissal of the petition.

The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG.

There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the petitioners were not
only assisted by a counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their
counsel de oficio actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court including the
direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners
34

were duly represented by a counsel de oficio all throughout the proceedings except for one
hearing when their court appointed lawyer was absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit
presented their testimonies. As previously stated, it was during said hearing when the trial
35

court declared that the cross-examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was
deemed waived.

Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-
examine. The case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et
36

al. thoroughly explained the meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral
component of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly
waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation,
be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity
to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received
or allowed to remain in the record. 37

Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were
not subjected to cross-examination was not because the petitioners were not given
opportunity to do so. Noticeably, the petitioners’ counsel de oficio omitted to mention that in
the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of the accused, did not show up despite prior
notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty was ordered confiscated in favor
of the government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court asserting the very right he
seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing without justifiable
cause. Moreover, neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to the presentation of
testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their
counsel de oficio subsequently seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.

Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was merely
exercising a judicial prerogative. No proof was presented by the defense showing that the
exercise of such discretion was either despotic or arbitrary.

Going by the records, there is no indication that any of the counsel de oficio had been
negligent in protecting the petitioners’ interests. As a matter of fact, the counsel de
oficio kept on attending the trial court hearings in representation of the petitioners despite
the latter’s unjustified absences.

In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the
hearings of this case amounts to a denial of right to counsel. Nor does such absence
warrant the nullification of the entire trial court proceedings and the eventual invalidation of
its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that a particular counsel de oficio
did not or could not consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is effectively a denial
of the right to counsel, especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that
the several appointed counsel de oficio in any way neglected to perform their duties to the
appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in any substantial sense
therefrom.38

Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which are backed up by
substantial evidence on record, led this Court to no other conclusion than that the
petitioners are guilty of frustrated homicide.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or
mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the
qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is present. There being no prior determination by both the trial and appellate
39

courts of any qualifying circumstance that would elevate the homicide to murder, the Court
will simply limit its discussion to the first two elements.
In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following
factors: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the accused. 40

Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was attacked, by the
concerted actions of the accused, the weapon used and the nature of wounds sustained by
Rodolfo.

Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy
presupposes unity of purpose and unity of action towards the realization of an unlawful
objective among the accused. Its existence can be inferred from the individual acts of the
41

accused, which if taken as a whole are in fact related, and indicative of a concurrence of
sentiment. In this case, conspiracy was manifested in the spontaneous and coordinated
42

acts of the accused, where two of them delivered the initial attack on Rodolfo by stoning,
while another struck him with a shovel and the third held him so that the other two can
simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when Rodolfo laid helpless on the ground and had
lost consciousness that the accused hurriedly left the scene. This chain of events leading to
the commission of the crime adequately established a conspiracy among them.

Plainly, the kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and the vital parts of
Rodolfo’s body at which he was undeniably stabbed demonstrated petitioners’ intent to kill.
The medico-legal certificate revealed that Rodolfo sustained multiple stab wounds in the
epigastrium, left upper quadrant of the abdomen resulting to internal injuries in the
transverse colon (serosal), mesentery and left kidney. Given these injuries, Rodolfo would
43

have succumbed to death if not for the emergency surgical intervention.

With respect to the petitioners’ defenses of denial and alibi, the Court concurs with the lower
courts’ rejection of these defenses. An assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi
necessitates looking into the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. Well-settled is
the rule that in determining who between the prosecution and defense witnesses are to be
believed, the evaluation of the trial court is accorded much respect for the simple reason
that the trial court is in a better position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they
deliver their testimonies. As such, the findings of the trial court is accorded finality unless it
44

has overlooked substantial facts which if properly considered, could alter the result of the
case.45

In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this rule considering
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to petitioners’ denial.
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with
the positive identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution
witnesses. Between an affirmative assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general
46

denial, the former generally prevails. The prosecution witnesses recounted the details of
47

the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent manner, without any hint of hesitation or sign of
untruthfulness, which they could not have done unless they genuinely witnessed the
incident. Besides, the prosecution witnesses could not have mistakenly identified the
petitioners as Rodolfo’s perpetrators considering there is so much familiarity among them.
The records are also bereft of any indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated
by ill motives when they testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit.

In contrast, the petitioners’ testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human reason and
experience.

The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than themselves, who had
actually seen the incident and could validate their story. Additionally, aside from the medical
certificates of Ronald and that of Bobot which was issued almost five (5) years since the
incident occurred, the defense have not submitted any credible proof that could efficiently
rebut the prosecution’s evidence.

Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that Ronald, would just
leave his son Bobot, while the latter was being stabbed and struggling for the possession of
the knife with Rodolfo, to go to a police station for assistance. Logic dictates that a father
would not abandon a son in the presence of actual harm.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the
offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Emilio
48

himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the
incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio
failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on the date and time in
question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the
positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. In
49

the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the
assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his
immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor, as in this case,
50

where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the
incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio’s defense of alibi will not hold.

Anent Bobot's claim of self-defense, it is undeserving of any serious consideration or

record that will show that Bobot categorically admitted that he wounded Rodolfo.

Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate courts' conviction of the
petitioners for frustrated homicide.
1âwphi1

Penalty and Civil Liability

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the same Code states that the imposable penalty upon
principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony. Hence, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision
mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty to be meted on the petitioners
should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years
of prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from the medium period
of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the
imposition by the CA of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.

As regards the civil liability of the petitioners, the Court sustains the award of moral and
temperate damages with modification as to the latter's amount.

Pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount of which cannot be proven with
certainty. In People v. Villanueva and Serrano v. People, the Court ruled that in case the
52 53

amount of actual damages, as proven by receipts during trial is less than P25,000.00, the
victim shall be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount. In the instant case, only the amount of P2,174.80 was supported by
receipts. Following the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it necessary to increase the
temperate damages from P15,000.00 to P25,000.00.

The award of moral damages is justified under Article 2219 of the Civil Code as Rodolfo
sustained physical injuries which were the proximate effect of the petitioners' criminal
offense. As the amount is left to the discretion of the court, moral damages should be
reasonably proportional and approximate to the degree of the injury caused and the gravity
of the wrong done. In light of the attendant circumstances in the case, the Court affirms
54

that P30,000.00 is a fair and reasonable grant of moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 31285 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners RONALD IBAÑEZ,
EMILIO IBAÑEZ and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ are found guilty of frustrated homicide
and sentenced to a prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. They are also ordered to
pay RODOLFO LEBRIA Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate
damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ