1. Cosmic Lumber Corp. vs. CA, GR 114311, Nov.

Nov. 29, 1996 Estrada was not authorized to sell the subject property in the execution of the
compromise judgment, thus, it does not bind petitioner.
DOCTRINE: For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real
estate, a power of attorney must so express the powers of the agent in clear
and unmistakable language. When there is any reasonable doubt that the
language so used conveys such power, no such construction shall be given ISSUE: W/N the attorney-in-fact was authorized to sell the a portion of the
the document. disputed lot

FACTS: COSMIC LUMBER CORPORATION through its General Manager RULING: NO. The authority granted Villamil-Estrada under the special power
executed on 28 January 1985 a Special Power of Attorney appointing Paz G. of attorney was explicit and exclusionary: for her to institute any action in court
Villamil-Estrada as attorney-in-fact to initiate, institute and file any court to eject all persons found on Lots Nos. 9127 and 443 so that petitioner could
action for the ejectment of third persons and/or squatters of the entire take material possession thereof, and for this purpose, to appear at the pre-
lot 9127 and 443 and covered by TCT Nos. 37648 and 37649, for the said trial and enter into any stipulation of facts and/or compromise agreement but
squatters to remove their houses and vacate the premises in order that only insofar as this was protective of the rights and interests of petitioner in the
the corporation may take material possession of the entire lot, and for property. Nowhere in this authorization was Villamil-Estrada granted expressly
this purpose, to appear at the pre-trial conference and enter into any or impliedly any power to sell the subject property nor a portion thereof. Neither
stipulation of facts and/or compromise agreement so far as it shall can a conferment of the power to sell be validly inferred from the specific
protect the rights and interest of the corporation in the aforementioned authority to enter into a compromise agreement because of the explicit
lots. limitation fixed by the grantor that the compromise entered into shall only be
so far as it shall protect the rights and interest of the corporation in the
On 11 March 1985 Paz G. Villamil-Estrada, by virtue of her power of attorney, aforementioned lots. In the context of the specific investiture of powers to
instituted an action for the ejectment of private respondent Isidro Perez and Villamil-Estrada, alienation by sale of an immovable certainly cannot be
recover the possession of a portion of Lot No. 443 before the Regional Trial deemed protective of the right of petitioner to physically possess the same,
Court of Dagupan. more so when the land was being sold for a price of P80.00 per square meter,
very much less than its assessed value of P250.00 per square meter, and
On 25 November 1985 Villamil-Estrada entered into a Compromise Agreement considering further that petitioner never received the proceeds of the sale.
with respondent Perez whereby the former sold a portion of the disputed lot
for P26,640.00 computed at P80.00/square meter. When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void.
Although the decision became final and executory it was not executed within Thus the authority of an agent to execute a contract for the sale of real estate
the 5-year period from date of its finality allegedly due to the failure of petitioner must be conferred in writing and must give him specific authority, either to
to produce the owners duplicate copy of Title No. 37649 needed to segregate conduct the general business of the principal or to execute a binding contract
from Lot No. 443 the portion sold by the attorney-in-fact, Paz G. Villamil- containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A
Estrada, to private respondent under the compromise agreement. Thus on 25 special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the
January 1993 respondent filed a complaint to revive the judgment. ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for
a valuable consideration. The express mandate required by law to enable an
Petitioner asserts that it was only when the summons in Civil Case No. D- appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to sell must be one that
10459 for the revival of judgment was served upon it that it came to know of expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of
the compromise agreement entered into between Paz G. Villamil-Estrada and the act mentioned. For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell
respondent Isidro Perez upon which the trial court based its decision of 26 July real estate, a power of attorney must so express the powers of the agent in
1993 in Civil Case No. D-7750. clear and unmistakable language. When there is any reasonable doubt that
the language so used conveys such power, no such construction shall be given
Forthwith, upon learning of the fraudulent transaction, petitioner sought the document.
annulment of the decision of the trial court before respondent Court of Appeals
on the ground that the compromise agreement was void because: nullity of the It is therefore clear that by selling to respondent Perez a portion of petitioners
compromise judgment on the ground that petitioners attorney in fact Villamil- land through a compromise agreement, Villamil-Estrada acted without or in
obvious authority. The sale ipso jure is consequently void. So is the their consent. Furthermore, the Court has categorically ruled that a surety is
compromise agreement. This being the case, the judgment based thereon is liable for the debt of another, although he or she received no benefit therefrom.
necessarily void.
The Court stresses that the obligation of a surety is direct, primary and
2. Agra vs. PNB, GR 133317, June 29, 1999 absolute. Thus, the Court has held: [A]lthough the contract of a surety is in
essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the
DOCTRINE: The obligation of a surety is direct, primary and absolute. Thus, creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary, and absolute;
the Court has held: [A]lthough the contract of a surety is in essence secondary in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal. The surety
only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the therefore becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although he possesses
principal is said to be direct, primary, and absolute; in other words, he is directly no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any
and equally bound with the principal. The surety therefore becomes liable for benefit therefrom.
the debt or duty of another although he possesses no direct or personal
interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. Here, when petitioners signed as sureties, they expressly and unequivocally
agreed to the stipulation that the liability on this guaranty shall be solidary,
FACTS: The petitioners are the sureties in the loan granted by the Philippine direct and immediate and not contingent upon the pursuit by the creditor, its
National Bank (PNB) to the Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. on July 17, 1967, successors, indorsees or assigns, of whatever remedies it or they have against
in the amount of P2,500,000.00 with an interest rate of 21 % per annum. On the principal or the securities or liens it or they may possess. If they had
August 20, 1976, for failure to pay the said loan, the PNB filed an action for mistaken the import of the Surety Agreement, they could have easily asked for
collection of a sum of money against Fil-Eastern and the petitioners. In their its revocation. The Agreement stipulates that it may be revoked by the Surety
answer, the petitioners admitted that they signed the Surety Agreement, but at any time, but only after forty-eight hours notice in writing to the Creditor, and
they challenged their liability on the ground that they were allegedly coerced such revocation shall not operate to relieve the Surety from responsibility for
by their employer, Felipe Ysmael, Jr., to sign the Surety Agreement; they did obligations incurred by the Principal prior to the termination of such period.
not receive a single centavo in consideration thereof and the cause of the This they did not do.
complainant was barred by laches and estoppel considering that the PNB with
full knowledge of the deteriorating financial condition of the Fil-Eastern, did not The petition was DENIED.
take steps to collect from the said corporation while it was still solvent. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled against herein petitioners. On 3. Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA, GR 129792, Dec. 21, 1999
appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC ruling by deleting the award of
attorney's fees. Hence, this petition. DOCTRINE: Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one
cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is
ISSUE: W/N the sureties are liable for the loan granted by the PNB exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which
could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common
RULING: The Court ruled that it is true that prescription is different from laches, prudence.
but petitioners' reliance on Nielson Co., Inc., vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Co., 18 SCRA 1040, is misplaced. As held in the aforecited case, laches is The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
principally a question of equity. Necessarily, there is no absolute rule as to landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
accordingly to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is an person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. negligence.
Petitioners, however, failed to show that the collection suit against herein
sureties was inequitable. Remedies in equity address only situations tainted We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that
with inequity, not those expressly governed by statutes. Indeed, the petitioners ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to negligence.
failed to prove the presence of all the established requisites of laches. The
other equitable circumstances above enumerated failed to support petitioners' FACTS: In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA, mother, and ZHIENETH,
cause. Petitioners were already barred from questioning the voluntariness of her 6-year old daughter, were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store,
Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. ISSUE: W/N the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, negligence.
her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping
counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although RULING: An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous circumstance, event or
lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter
communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a
sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old. conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon person suffers injury.
petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake
and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with
Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages, docketed the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary
as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have
actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorneys fees and been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH negligence.
too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to negligence.
collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Based on the res gestae, when the child was asked by the doctor what did she
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it do.. the child said nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just
observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision fell on me.
and control of its employees. The other petitioners likewise raised due care
and diligence in the performance of their duties and countered that the All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they
complaint was malicious for which they suffered besmirched reputation and be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant
mental anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in their favor. testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
TC: ruled against the Spouses doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
CA: reversed the decision of TC; ruled in favor of the Spouses Gonzales testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that
facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
Under these circumstances, petitioners argued that it could not be held omission to secure or make stable the counters base.
responsible for the accident that befell ZHIENETH.
Also, Gonzales earlier testimony on petitioners insistence to keep and maintain
the structurally unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence
because the counters were never nailed. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees
and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done.
Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge
the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

Moreover, there can be no contributory negligence attributed to the mother and