REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I - CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY.

BRONDIAL'S 2017 SYLLABUS

COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO (The Poypis')

90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and the
issuance of pre trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated the case was set for trial.

After several resetting, petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture
of the US$356 million. The Sandiganbayan granted petitioner motion for summary judgment. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON Summary Judgment is proper. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which
would either justify or negate summary judgement.

RULING: YES. Summary judgment is proper

The SC finds that respondent Mrs Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine
issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad
faith of patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents'
defenses of “lack o knowledge or lack of privity” or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time
ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender
genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses’ defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and
confuse the issues.
Moreover respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for
forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no
sufficient knowledge” or “they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs.
Marcos "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.

If an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a
particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express dental must
be made. Here. despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by
simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations.
Such a general self-serving claim of ignorance of the FACTS alleged in the petition for forte ture was
insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they
were supposedly ignorant of the FACTS alleged.

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative
pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial FACTS in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial FACTS alleged in the pleading Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the
sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer were
deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, XXX shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

Further, when matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient
to form belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge their alleged ignorance or lack of
information will not be considered a specific denial. An unexplained denial of information within the
control of the pleader or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective
denial. Simply but a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the
pleader's knowledge or means of knowing as ineffective as no denial at all. Thus, the general denial of the
Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture
"for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
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they were not privy to the transactions” cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the
legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their
father vis-a-vis the Swiss Funds.

Furthermore, their opposition to the motion for Summary Judgment was not accompanied by affidavits,
depositions or admissions as required by Section 3. Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure xxx The
adverse party may save opposing affidavits depositions or admissions at least three (3) days before
hearing After hearing the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions and missions on file show that except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

The absence of opposing affidavits depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the
Republic’s motion only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and
therefore unworthy of belief in sum mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible
in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.

A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions of issues of fact posed and therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both
parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits,
depositions of other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition
supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both
parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them.

Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1. Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure SECTION 1. Summary Judgment for claimant - A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.
The theory of summary judgment is that although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner.

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION VS. ALON

533 SCRA 28

TOPIC: Negative Pregnant

FACTS: On July 15, 1999. Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Silay City, Branch 40, a complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the Land
Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera, praying for the following reliefs: issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction
sale of petitioners property declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held, declaration of nullity
of the mortgage constituted over petitioners property in favor of respondent; and award of damages.

On July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale set on July 23, 1999, as
agreed upon by the parties. Notwithstanding said directive another foreclosure sale was scheduled on
October 15, 1999 Per RTC Order dated October 14, 1999, the October 15 scheduled sale was held in
abeyance, but re-scheduled the sale on November 15, 1999 for the following reasons:
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I - CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL'S 2017 SYLLABUS

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However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial institution to foreclose
collaterals and/or securities for any loan,credit, accommodations and/or guarantees granted by them
whenever the accrued interest and other charges amount tot least 20% of the total n d the book of the
financial institution. Moreover restraining order temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the
court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance
with the mandatory foreclosure provided by said law. x x x “T he defendant Land Bank of the Philippines
and Eric B. De Vera, Sherriff of this Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner then
filled with of Court of Appeals (CA) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with injunction which it denied
due course and dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, which was
eventually denied
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties subject of this case.
HELD: Without first resolving the foregoing issue the court finds that the petition should be denied for
the sole reason that the ought to be enjoined by petitioner is already fail accomplish. In Transfield
Philippines, Inc. V Luzon Hydro Corporation the Court held that:

The Injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or
an accomplished or unconsummated act. in Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that where
the period within which the former employees were prohibited from engaging in or working for an
enterprise that competed with the former employer the very purpose of the preliminary injunction has
expired, any declaration upholding the propriety of the writ would be entirely useless as there would be
no actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned.
Records show that the foreclosure sale which petitioner sought to be enjoined by the RTC has already
been carried out by the Sheriff and in fact, a Certificate of Sale dated June 26, 2000 was issued to
respondent. There is therefore, no more actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the
RTCs refusal to enjoin the sale is concerned, and any resolution by the Court of the impropriety or
propriety of the RTCs refusal to issue any restraining or injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale will
serve no purpose but merely lend further addle to Civil Case pending before the RTC.
Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioners bone of contention before the
RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust
Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property. It does not categorically deny that these promissory
notes are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are in fact, negative pregnancy. e.,
denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial FACTS in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a form
of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable
to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial FACTS alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.

ALMA JOSE VS. JAVELLANA

664 SCRA 1
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APPEALS, FORUM SHOPPING, FRESH PERIOD RULE.

FACTS: On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of
P160,000.00 10 respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of
3,675 and 20.936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan, They agreed that
Javellana would pay P80.000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of 80.000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under are Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by
Margarita within a reasonable period of time), and that should Margarita become incapacitated her son
and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M Alma Jose Juvenal), and her Caughter petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose
would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla being Margarita's sole surviving her. However Priscilla did not
comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and,
instead began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of
converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision

Faced with Priscilla's refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for
specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan
(RIC): Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain Priscilla from cumping filling materials in the parcels of land, and that Priscilla be ordered to
institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription,
and that the complaint did not state a cause of action, which was initially denied. However, upon her MR
RTO reversed its decision and granted the motion to dismiss opining that Javellana had no cause of action
against her due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not
being party thereto.
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
any reason to disturb the order of the RTC was not appealable, that the appeal was not perfected on time,
and that Javellana was gurity of forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his
complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the RTC.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the order of the RTC on June 21, 2000 was not appealable?
2. Whether or not the notice of appeal was belatedly filed?
3. Whether or not Javellana was guilty of forum shopping?

HELD:
1. Yes. The denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and
appealable. First of all the denial of Javellana's motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done
by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not
an interlocutory one.

The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,
thuswise: The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes
of the subject
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matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done
except to enforce by execution what the court has determined but the latter does not completely dispose
of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgement is interlocutory or final is, does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment
is interlocutory, otherwise, it is final.
And secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgement rule enunciated in
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable,” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for
certiorari.

2. Yes

The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

The Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an
aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15
days within which to the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Under the rule, Javellana's notice of appeal filed on July 19,
2000 was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.
3. No
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favourable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favourable
disposition. Forum shopping happens when in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendente
are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum
shopping.

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the
parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts and (c) the identity in the two cases should
be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential
FACTS and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it
does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were
raised, and two objectives were sought.

In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC's erroneous dismissal of
Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and
determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective "to
prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case
until his appeal is finally resolved," as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.

Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to
prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same
cause of action would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-
97 whereas C.A.-G.R. whereas C.A.-G.R.
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I - CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL'S 2017 SYLLABUS

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S.P. No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of
shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favourable ruling or judgement after not getting it in the
appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. No. 68259 as of the filing of the
petition for certiorari.

MEDADO vs. HEIRS OF ANTONIO CONSUING

665 SCRA 534

TOPIC: Verification and Certification

FACTS: (Spouses Medado) and Estate of Consuing executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
of the property identified as Hacienda.

As part of the deal Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with (PNB). Subsequent to the
sale, however, the estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government. Estate of Consing also
instituted with the RTC, an action for rescission and damages against Spouses Medado due to the alleged
failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement.

In the meantime while the case for rescission was pending, Land Bank issued in favour of the Estate of
Consing a certificate of deposit of cash as compensation for the lots. Spouses Medado feared that LBP
would release the full proceeds thereof to the Estate of Consing, they institute an action for injunction to
restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the proceeds of the lots to Estate of Consing, and
restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds.
RTC granted the injunction (Medado) and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. The writ was
implemented 1 day before the hearing for the motion for reconsideration filed by Heirs of Consing. Feeling
aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's order via a petition for
certiorari filed with the CA. They sought among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction
for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping.
On the matter of the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to
a petition for certiorari, the heirs explained that the implementation of the questioned writs rendered
their motion for reconsideration moot and academic. The heirs argued that their case was within the
exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration
is first filed.

CA NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE the ruling of RTC

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case for injunction
during the pendency of Civil Case for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against forum
shopping.
ISSUES: Whether or not the requirement for verification and certification against forum shopping
complied with by the heirs of Consing when the same is solely signed by Soledad- administratix?
RULING: The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA petition
were substantially compiled with following settled jurisprudence. Where the petitioners are immediate
relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the
petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from
proceeding with the action.
The Court has consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement
intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance
with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations
In the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in 9000 taith or are true and correct it was based on this principle that this Court had also allowed
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herein petitioner waar Resolution dated April 22. 2009. a chance to submit a verification that complied
with Section 4. Rule 7 of me Rules of Court as amended, instead of the Court dismissing the petition
outright

COA VS. PALER

614 SCRA

Topic: Authority to file petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping / appeal
despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

FACTS: Celso M Paler was a Supervis na Legislative Staff Officer II with the Technical Support Service of
the DOA Mr Paner submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days then left for the U.S. without
verifying whether the application for leave was approved. Comm. Chairman informed Paler that he was
being dropped from the roll of employees due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave and in
accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14. S. 1999. Mr. Paner moved for MR with the Comm.
Chairman, was denied, on appeal CSC reversed and set aside the Comm. Chairman's decision (Rule 43) CA
affirmed CSC resolution: hence Rule 45

Issue/s:

1. WON Commission Secretary may file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman
2. WON appeal may prosper despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Ruling/s:
1. Representatives, lawyers or any person who personally knew the truth of the FACTS alleged in the
petition could sign the verification However, as to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established
rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. Lack of
authority. (certification of non forum shopping, dismissible.

2. Procedural rules need not be strictly observed if appeal is meritorious. "it is within the power of this
Court to femper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be
faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do
not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly
conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive
rights of the parties."

BASAN VS. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS

749 SCRA 541

FACTS:
ON FEBRUARY 18, 1998, petitioners Basan among others, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money
claims against Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines alleging that the respondent dismissed them without just
cause and prior written notice.

Respondent Corporation on the other hand argues that it hired petitioners as temporary route helpers for
a period in anticipation of the volume of work in their plants or sale offices.

LA ruled in favor of petitioner finding that they are performing activities necessary and desirable to the
usual business of the petitioner for more than the period for regularization. NLRC affirmed LA decision
only to be reversed by the CA. Hence this appeal.
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ISSUE: whether or not the petition should fall on the ground that its verification and non-forum shopping
has been signed by only one of the petitioners

RULING:
NO.
On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them
petitioner Basan in case appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the procedural
requirement. Jurisprudence Is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this court has consistently held that when under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one o them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement. Thus the fact that the petition
was signed only by petitioner Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in
accord with substantial justice to overlook petitioners' procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of
technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice cralawlawibrary

UY VS. CA. 770 SCRA 513

FACTS:
In 1979 private respondent Naval-Sai acquired ownership of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 54-B
(LRO) from her brother. The land was later subdivided and registered in Naval-Sai's name in the Register
of Deeds North Cotabato

Subsequently, Naval-Sal sold a part of the land to a certain Boby Adil. Adil failed to pay the amortization
forcing him to sell his unfinished building to spouses Omandac.

Meanwhile, Naval -Sal borrowed money from Grace Ng. As security. Naval-Sal delivered her two portions
of the land he owns. Ng on the other hand, borrowed money from petitioner and delivered to the latter
two titles to guarantee the payment of the load.

Thereafter Naval-Sai was informed that petitioner filed a case for recovery of possession against
Omandac. RTC Kidapawan City ruled in favor of petitioner Naval -Sai filed a motion for new trial before
CA, arguing that her signature was forged in the purported deed of sale between her and petitioner.
However, it became final and executor in 1991

In July 1999, Naval-Sa filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages before the same court
against petitioner, aval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots and that her signature in the purported
deed of sale is spurious

Naval-Sai filed an Amended Complaint dated July 29, 1999. She asserted that the subject TCTs were
already cancelled by virtue of the deed of sale. Unlike the original complaint, however, the Amended
Complaint was not signed by Naval-Sai, but by her counsel.

In his answer with counterclaim, petitioner raised special and affirmative defenses, among others,
noncompliance with the requisite certification of non-forum shopping and prescription. He asserted that
jurisdiction has never been acquired over the parties and the subject matter because the certification
against forum shopping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for having been merely signed by Naval-
Sai's counsel. He further

BATCH N INSERT HERE

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PEOPLE VS. ARROJADO

774 SCRA 193

FACTS:
In an Information dated March 23, 2009. herein respondent was charged with the crime of murder by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz. The case was raffled to RTC Roxas City, On June 16, 2009
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information filed against him on the ground that the
investigating prosecutor who fled the said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of
issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance as required by Bar
Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated
June 3, 2008.

Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss contending that: (1)
the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance: (2) the lack of proof of MCLE
compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the information should not prejudice the interest
of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative edict
cannot prevail over substantive or procedural law, by imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency
of a criminal information.

RTC dismissed the case and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to indicate the date and number of his MCLE Compliance Certificate in the
information would result to its dismissal

RULING: In this case, YES. But for the next cases, the trial court should not dismiss but simply require the
investigating prosecutor to number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.

Section 1. Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written statements of the
respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Among
the pleadings enumerated under Section 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the
other hand, under Section 4. Rule 110 of the same Rules an information is defined as an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In
accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations
therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which
alleges a plaintiff cause of cause of action.

The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal construction of
procedural rules by arguing that such liberal construction may be invoked in situations where there may
be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading provided that the same does not subvert the
essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The
prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M.
No. 1922. Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject information
was filed, the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of
Compliance was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling
reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an
afterthought, hence, cannot be granted

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to
indicate! in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance,
this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by
repealing the phrase Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action. Thus, under the
amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of
issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless such failure will subject the lawyer to the
prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action
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COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO (The Poypis')

In light of the above amendment while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the subject
Information was held the more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should have done in the
first place, so as to avoid delay in the disposition of the case was not to dismiss the Information but to
simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance.

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES INC. VS. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

781 SCRA 508

FACTS:
From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner a domestic corporation dealing with medical
equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's
hospital under the following contracts:

a.) Memorandum of Agreement dated January 9, 2006 for the supply ol' medical equipment in
the total amount of P18,625,000.00
b.) Deed of Undertaking dated July 5, 2006 for the installation of medical gas pipeline system
valued at P8,500,000.00
c.) Deed of Undertaking dated July 27 2006 for the supply of one unit of Diamond Select Slice CT
and one unit of Diamond Select CV-P costing P65,000,000.00
d.) Deed of Undertaking dated February 2, 2007 for the supply of furnishings and equipment
worth P32,928,650.00.

According to the petitioner the respondent paid only P57,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of
P123,901,650.00 leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195,54. However, on February 11, 2009, the
petitioner and the respondent, respectively represented by Rafael P. Fernando and Guillermo T. Maglaya,
Sr., entered into an agreement, whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00,
and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had
reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice
or lesion, and that it was consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because
of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of
office had expired.

On June 24, 2009 the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent.

Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money
in the RTC

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue: (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum
shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for the
rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City,
and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer denying
paragraph 6.7,8 of the complaint alleging that he lacks "knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the
term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines."
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I - CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL'S 2017 SYLLABUS

COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO (The Poypis')

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent's denial may be considered ‘specific denial’ within the purview of
the Rules of Civil Procedure

RULING:

We answer the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the respondent's total
obligation as of February 15, 2009 was P123.901,850.00, but its balance thereafter became only
P54,654.105.54 because it had since then paid P87 357.683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no.
7 stated that the petitioner had agreed with the respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce the
balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would pay in 36 months through 36
postdated checks of P1.400,000.00 each, which the respondent then issued for the purpose
Paragraph no. 8 averred that after four of the checks totalling P5,600,000.00 were paid the
respondent stopped payment of the rest, rendering the entire obligation due and demandable
pursuant to the February 11, 2009 agreement Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the
complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to know or could have easily known, the
answer did not specifically deny such material averments. It is settled that denials based on lack
of knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it,
or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.”
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special and
affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and
forum shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses by their nature,
involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and thus did not negate the
material averments of the complaint.
The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there
are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not
depends on how the defending party's answer has dealt with the ultimate FACTS alleged in the
complaint. The defending party's answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate
FACTS in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate FACTS the answer
admit, being undisputed will not require evidence to establish the truth of such FACTS, but the
allegations of ultimate FACTS the answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence.
The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate FACTS of the adverse party's pleadings
not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it omits to deal
with them at all. The controversion of the ultimate FACTS must only be by specific denial. Section
10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer
raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of
fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance
of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending
party who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the denial is done by the defending
party specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate FACTS as is true and material and
denying only the remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint by stating so in the answer Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically
denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated
damages.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK

760 SCRA 486

FACTS:
On October 4, 2002, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners Go Tong Electrical and its
President Ho, seeking that the latter be held jointly and severally liable to it for the payment of
their loan obligation in the aggregate amount of Php 87 M.
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I - CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL'S 2017 SYLLABUS

COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO (The Poypis')

As early as 1996. Go Tong had applied for and was granted financial assistance by the then Bank
of South East Asia (BSA). Subsequently DBS Bank of the Philippines, INC. (DBS) became the
successor-in-interest of BSA. It was renewed on January 6, 1999 through a Credit Agreement.
On even date, Go Tond Electrical represented by Go, obtained a loan from DBS in the principal
amount of P 40M for which Go Tang Electrical executed a Promissory Note for the same amount.
Under the PN's terms, the Petitioner bound itself to pay default penalty interest and attorney's
fees. Go also executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement (CSA) covering any and all
obligations undertaken by Go Tong Electrical, including the aforesaid loan. Upon default, DBS
then its successor-in-interest BPI demanded payment to no ava, hence the complaint.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners merely stated that they specifically deny the
allegations under the complaint. Of particular note is their denial of the execution of the loan
agreement, the PN and the CSA “for being sert-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
[respondent's] purposes. By way of special and affirmative defenses,, petitioners argued, among
others, that: (a) the real party-in-interest should be DBS and not respondent (b) no demand was
made upon them; and (c) Go cannot be held liable under the CSA since there was supposedly no
solidarity of debtors. Petitioners further interposed counterclaims for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as litigation and attorney's fees in the total amount of P1.250,000.00
During trial, respondent presented Sunio, the Account Officer handling petitioners' loan accounts
as its witness. Sunio attested to the existence of petitioners loan obligation in favor of respondent.
On cross examination, Sunio nonetheless admitted that he had no knowledge on how the PN was
prepared, executed. And signed nor did he witness its signing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the genuineness and due execution of the document shall be deemed admitted
RULING:
YES.
In Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the
earlier case of Songco v. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due
execution of an actionable document, viz.:
chan RoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document
or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect
that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the
genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant "sets forth what he
claims to be the FACTS," which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this
case.
Thus with said pleading failing to comply with the "specific denial under oath" requirement under
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners
had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing their
loan obligation to respondent.
To this case law enlightens that “[t]he admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority that at the time it was signed
it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it, that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law such as a seal, an
acknowledgment or revenue stamp, which it lacks are waived by him. Also, it effectively
eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, eg
that the
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document was spurious, counterfeit. or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties,
or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries or that the signatures were unauthorized
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

BENGUET EXPLORATION INC. VS. CA

351 SCRA
DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things (1) that the document was signed,
(2) that the document complied with all the formalities under the laws: (3) that when the document was
signed, it was in the original form without any alteration and (4) that the document was delivered
FACTS: Pertioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against
SeawoodShipping and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd. Kogelo Lumibao marketing assistant of
Benguet was in charge of exportation. His responsibilities include documentation of export products
presentations with banks and other duties connected with the export products. He explained that private
respondent Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates.
The bill of lading stated that the cargo, consisting of 2.243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates
was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point San Fernando, La Union. It was insured by
Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked. When the cargo was uploaded in Japan,
however, Rogelio Lumibao received a report dlated August 19, 1985, from a surveyor in Japan stating that
the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of lading For this reason petitioner
Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In its letter, dated
August 21, 1985 petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the alleged shortage. As both
Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance refused the demand petitioner Benguet brought these cases
against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance:
Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of his testimony, he was secretary
of Nil Alejandre, manager of Benguet. According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the warehouse at La Union
to assist in the loading of the copper concentrates. These copper concentrates were to be loaded on the
ship Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Loading Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28.
1985. According to Cayabyab, the Marine Survivor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to
determine how much was loaded on the ship. Cayabyab stated that he saw petitioner Benguet's
representative and his immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas,
sign the Certificate of Weight. Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of Weight,
which stated therein that 2.243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship.
Cayabyab likewise confirmed the authenticity of the Mate's Receipt saying that he witnessed the Chief
Mate sign the document
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e.. Bill of
Lading, Certificate of Loading. Certificate of Weight, Mate's Receipt, were properly established by the
testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that
their contents are true.
ISSUE: Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented were properly
established by the testimony of the plaintiff's witness, resulting to prima facie presumption that their
contents are true.
RULING: This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a
document. Simply means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was
signed by another for him with his authority that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading
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of the party relying upon it that the document was delivered, and that any formal requisites required by
law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him genuineness
and due execution of the instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed It is equally true, however, that
execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without
enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a
prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on
the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence
Respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these documents. Switzerland
Insurance presented Export Declaration No 113 1/85 which petitioner's own witness, Rogelio Lumibao
prepared in wacht was stated that the copper concentrates to be transported to Japan had a gross weight
of only 2,050 wet metric of 1.645 dry metric tons 10 percent more or less. On the other hand, Certified
Adjusters, Inc., to which Winterland Insurance had referred petitioner's claim, prepared a report which
showed that a total of 2.451 630 wat metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point. As
the report stated it is to be pointed out at there were no actual weighing made at Benguet Exploration's
site. The procedure done was that aher weighing the trucks before and after unloading at Poro Point, the
weight of the load was determined and entered on Philex Trip Ticket which was later on copied and
entered by the truck driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc. Transfer Slip.
Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual amount of copper
concentrates transported to Poro Point and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount
of copper concentrates shipped
Thus whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might have risen from the genuineness and
due execution of the Bill of Lading Certificate of Weight Certificate of Loading, and Mate's Receipt was
successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by Switzerland Insurance which showed disparities in the
actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded
by the admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual
amount of copper concentrates loaded on the vessel In the face of these admissions, appellant's claim of
loss or shortage is placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the accuracy of the figures
indicated in appellant's documentary evidence that could confirm the alleged loss of 355.736 MT
Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1 that 2.243.496 WMT of copper concentrates
was loaded by appellant at the port of origin, it should be stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence
of the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of lading. Thus, it has been held that
recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods
were delivered for shipment and as between the consignor and a receiving carrier the fact must outweigh
the recital. Resultingly, the admissions elicited from appellant's witnesses that they could not confirm the
accuracy of the figures indicated in their documentary evidence with regard to the actual weight of the
cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the part of destination, in effect rebuts the
presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.

ASIAN CONST. & DEV. CORP. VS. CA

458 SCRA
DOCTRINE: There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a
claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
FACTS: The original plaintiff in this case, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC), filed a collection suit with
damages against Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) for non-payment of rentals of
the
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I - CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL'S 2017 SYLLABUS

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several leased equipment amounting to P5071.335.86. ACDC, on the other hand, filed a motion to file and
admit answer with third-party complaint against Bethel Overseas Corporation (BOC) alleging by way of
special and affirmative defense that while it is true ACDC is indebted to MEC in the amount of
P5,071,335,86, the same cannot be complied with because BOC is yet to pay ACDC the contracted services
it rendered which includes the use of the subject equipment at its project site and therefore, as a result,
BOC should be impleaded as a third party defendant in this case MEC opposed it by filing a motion for
summary judgment alleging that since the was no genuine issue as to the monetary obligation of ACDC to
MEC, the only issue left for the trial court to resolve is the amount of attorneys fees and cost of litigation.
Furthermore, MEC also added that the demand set forth by ACDC in its special and affirmative defensa
partook the nature of a negative pregnant and that there was e need for a hearing in its claim for damages.
Both the RTC and CA ruled denying the motion filed by ACDC and in favor of MEC ISSUE: Whether or not
the lower courts erred in denying the third-party complaint filed by ACDC RULING: No. There is no showing
in the proposed third-party complaint that the respondent knew or approved the use of the leased
equipment by the petitioner for the said project in Quezon. BOC cannot invoke any defense the petitioner
had or may have against the claims of the respondent in its complaint because the petitioner admitted its
liabilities to the respondent for the amount of P5,075 335.86. The barefaced fact that the petitioner used
the equipment it leased from the respondent in connection with its project with BOO does not provide a
substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against the latter. There is no causal connection
between the claim of the respondent for the rental and the balance of the purchase price of the
equipment and parts sold and leased to the petitioner, and the failure of BOC to pay the balance of its
account to the petitioner after the completion of the project in Quezon The controversy between the
respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and BOC, on the other are
thus entirely distinct from each other. Hence, the denial of the third-party complaint by the courts were
proper.
SALVADOR VS. RABAJA
749 SCRA 654
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1998. Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were looking for a buyer of the
subject property. Petitioner Herminia Salvador (Herminia) personally introduced Gonzales to them as the
administrator of the said property Spouses Salvador even handed to Gonzales the owner's duplicate
certificate of title over the subject property. On July 3, 1998, Spouses Rabaja made an initial payment of
P48.000/00 to Gonzales in the presence of Herminia Gonzales then presented the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA), executed by Rolando Salvador (Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. On the same day, the
parties executed the Contract to Sell" which stipulated that for a consideration of P5,000,000.00. Spouses
Salvador sold, transferred and conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property. Spouses Rabaja
made several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales pursuant to the SPA
provided earlier as evidenced by the check vouchers signed by Gonzales and the improvised receipts
signed by Herminia.
Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses Salvador complained to Spouses Rabaja that they did not
receive any payment from Gonzales. This prompted Spouses Rabaja to suspend further payment of the
purchase price, and as a consequence they received a notice to vacate the subject property from Spouses
Salvador for nonpayment of rentals
Thereafter Spouses Salvador instituted an action for ejectment against Spouses Rabaja. In turn, Spouses
Rabaja filed an action for rescission of contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales, the subject matter
of the present petition