Page 1 of 14

parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
BANAT VS COMELEC
ISSUES:
Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
FACTS: II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
following rules:
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); HELD:
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number
case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-
list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-
Available to Party-List Representatives
list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. Hence,
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill
the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the
computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
 Page 2 of 14

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given
all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2%
the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly,
two percent threshold is present.
in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
“the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
How is this done?
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
to also get a seat. additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still
be observed.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
Example:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33%
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
additional seat
each.
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
three (3) seats.
 Page 3 of 14

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are Hence, contrary to the Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system is not the exclusive domain
still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those of sectoral representatives belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented sectors” but
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied. may be participated in by non-sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)from participating in the party-list elections. Issue:
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party- of this court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-
list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution list elections
in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
RULING: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, Bayani andBANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
dominate the party-list system.
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
[G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02 APRIL 2013 ] organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
Facts:
1. A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
on Elections reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
v. Commission on Elections (BANAT). elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
2. In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations which were disqualified by The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
the Commission on Election from participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections because through a coalition.
they allegedly do not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector of society, the
majority is of the view that the party list system includes not only sectoral parties but also non- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
sectoral parties. lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
 Page 4 of 14

communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
qualified. 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional are ideologically marginalized.
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party- ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
above).
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
FACTS:
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties unless he is a natural-born citizen."
into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 1935 Constitution.
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
 Page 5 of 14

United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act FACTS:
No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenshipby, among others, "rendering
 Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation bigamous.
under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
 Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case
an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from
for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of
applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.
the Constitution.
 According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian
ISSUE:
Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age
of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The
HELD: wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.
YES. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
 Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18,
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging
Filipino citizen. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance
to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, ISSUES:
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
*The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines),
to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?
The petition is hereby DISMISS
2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?
3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC
4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections,
(Aug. 1, 1989) replace him?
 Page 6 of 14

HELD/RATIO: Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review,
it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is
1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal
regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because
did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the
he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case.
petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee.
When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee --
thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
decided in this case.
2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of Facts:
citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of
a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC)
and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the
- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national
interest. SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
- The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically candidacy.
restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void
on the grounds of bigamy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino position.
citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even
alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant
3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a)
when he was elected. of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions.
4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position
These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall
replace Labo. Issue:
*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):
 Page 7 of 14

Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline
Held: of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether
valid classification be complied with, namely: one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of
national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to
treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support
classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public his campaign.
Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable
his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to
and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
show his fitness for the position aspired for.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section
but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the
not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
to the purposes of the law.
 Page 8 of 14

Silverio Tagolino v HRET

(G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013) HRET ruling:
 It dismissed Juntilla's petition and declared the substitution as valid
FACTS:  It also said that the COMELEC 1st Division's resolution spoke of disqualification and
 Richard Gomez filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking the Congressional office of not the cancellation of the CoC
the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Leyte.
 In his CoC, he indicated that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng Ormoc City. Juntilla filed for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court
 Bueneventura Juntilla, one of the opposing candidates, questioned the residence
indicated in the CoC before the COMELEC. ISSUE:
 Juntilla argued that, Richard is a resident of Colgate St, East Greenhills, San Juan City,  Was there a valid substitution? And as a consequence of such substitution, was Lucy
Metro Manila and not of Can-adieng Ormoc City Torres-Gomez validly elected as a representative of the 4th District of Leyte? NO

COMELEC 1st division ruling: HELD:

 It granted Juntilla's petition without any qualification. And in its dispositive portion it
stated, "Richard Gomez is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of A valid CoC as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate
Congresssman, Fourt District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement"
 Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official candidate of a
Lucy Torres-Gomez then filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate of a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of
her husband Richard wherein the COMELEC En Banc approved such substitution. candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified
 Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate
COMELEC En Banc's ruling: substitution proceeds.
 It held that the disqualification does not automatically cancel one's CoC and the political  As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person
party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of
disqualified. candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties.
Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration from the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc. Pending  Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be
the resolution of the motion, the elections were held and the name of Richard Gomez remained considered a candidate.
in the ballots which garnered majority of the votes. Due to the approved substitution by the
COMELEC, votes for Richard were credited in favor of Lucy and she was proclaimed the Effect of Sec 68 and Sec 78 on candidate substitution under Sec 77
Representative of the 4th District of Leyte
 Sec 681 speaks of a disqualification of the candidate based on the election offenses
Juntilla opposed and filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET arguing that, Lucy did enumerated therein while Sec 78 speaks of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
not validly substitute Richard because his CoC was void ab initio. based on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for
the elective office aspired for. It is not enough there was lack of qualification but there

1
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs
 Page 9 of 14

was also a false representation in the CoC. ISSUE:

 And under Sec 68, a person disqualified can be validly substituted pursuant to Sec 77 Whether or not misrepresentation in the use of surname may serve as a ground for the
because he remains a candidate but is ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
of penal sanction by the commission of the election offenses enumerated in Sec 68.
RULING:
 But a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Sec 78
cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. Hence, being a No.
cancelled CoC it is considered void ab initio and thus cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and valid votes. In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is
authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any
 In this case, there was confusion as to the word "disqualified" in the resolution of the person pursuant to section 78 of the Code which states that -
COMELEC 1st division, which was also adopted by the COMELEC En Banc and
HRET. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
 But it must be noted that Richard's "disqualification" was due to his failure to comply filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained
with the residency requirement and misrepresenting his residence which is a ground therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
for denial due course to and/or cancellation of CoC under Sec 78. later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
 Hence, there was no valid substitution and Lucy Torres Gomez was not a bona fide be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
candidate for the position when she ran for office, which means she could not have
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under
been elected.
section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material
matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondents qualifications to run for the
office of mayor. Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in the use of the
SALCEDO II v. COMELEC
surname Salcedo, petitioner does not claim that private respondent lacks the requisite
FACTS: residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective
office as provided for in the Local Government Code.[24]Thus, petitioner has failed to discharge
On February 18, 1968, Neptali Salcedo is married to Agnez Celiz. Without his first marriage the burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly made by private respondent in her
being dissolved, Neptali married Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony in 1986. Two days later, certificate of candidacy pertains to a material matter.
Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist
During the May 11, 1998 Elections, petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor in Sara, Iloilo. Petitioner then filed candidate ineligible.[25] In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the
with the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy on electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended
the ground that she made a false representation in the use of her surname Salcedo. He alleges to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the provision.
that she had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali
Salcedo. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of
such surname by private respondent.
Private Respondent Emelita Salcedo
 Page 10 of 14

office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a continuing
requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando
disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of
Facts: the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the Constitution are nugatory.

Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as citizen Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of Jalosjos
of United States of America. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted and he v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced.
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. On November 2009, Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered the highest votes
Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his should be declared as winner.
declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the
contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the Philippines,
with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-
American and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been using
his American passport even after renunciation of American citizenship. A division of the
COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.
stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under G.R. 181613; 11 September 2009
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Meanwhile, Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the second highest Facts:
number of votes. The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for mayor
Issue: of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
one’s qualifications to run for public office. The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of
Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to
Held: onlookers, aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures
Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and and the municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino sound system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections.
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under
one to run for an elective position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there
required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public is no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature
 Page 11 of 14

campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period – when Penera Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a
was not yet a “candidate.” Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity
R.A. 9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, outside the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or
and has, thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. meetings to nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and
45 days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the
disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final
COMELEC’s ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a
the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also
Issue: face criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.

Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or partisan Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC
political activity outside the campaign period. rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-
Mayor was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government
Ruling: Code which provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor
shall become the mayor.
(A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Penera’s Petition and affirmed her disqualification
because: (B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying
that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section
(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and
15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:
the sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not
expressly repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be
(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to
presumed. Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and
the COMELEC, including Penera’s own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that
convincing in character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should
“Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which
endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the
passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and
other.
threw candies to the onlookers.” With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera
can hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned. (2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15
of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
“(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity,
prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two
falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on
provisions and, thus, give effect to both, to wit:
‘[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda (a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits “any
for or against a candidate[.]’ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to person, whether or not a voter or candidate” from engaging in election
introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus,
or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a
in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for candidate. Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.
no other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.” 164858; 16 November 2006) that “(w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
 Page 12 of 14

Code prohibits is ‘an election campaign or partisan political activity’ by a evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an
‘candidate’ ‘outside’ of the campaign period,” is erroneous. absurd situation.”

(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as

amended, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start NAVAROSA VS COMELEC
of the campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon
the filing of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention FACTS : Petitioner Charito Navarosa (petitioner Navarosa) and respondent Roger M. Esto
to run as a candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with (respondent Esto) were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May 2001 elections.
his candidacy, his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed
campaign or partisan activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of three (3) votes over
Code (holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have respondent Esto
committed after filing his CoC and before the campaign period, can already be
Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, respondent
considered as the promotion of his election as a candidate, constituting
Esto filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. 129 (election protest) in the
premature campaigning, for which he may be disqualified. Conversely, if he
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (trial court). Petitioner Navarosa, who also
withdraws his CoC before the campaign period, his act can no longer be
viewed as for the promotion of his election, and there can be no premature claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a counter-protest in the same case.
campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with. On 4 March 2002, after revision of the contested ballots, the trial court rendered judgment in
Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a favor of respondent Esto
candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial courts ruling to the COMELEC (EAC Case No. A-9-
acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election 2002). Respondent Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution of
campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person the judgment pending petitioner Navarosas appeal. Petitioner Navarosa opposed respondent
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can Estos motion. In the alternative, petitioner Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay
said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the execution pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent Estos motion.
Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a
candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be In its Resolution dated 28 November 2002 (Resolution), the COMELEC Second Division
sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. affirmed the trial courts Order granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the
execution. The Second Division also found that respondent Esto duly paid the COMELEC
(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as filing fee.
amended, provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” Petitioner Navarosa sought reconsideration of this ruling but the COMELEC En Banc denied
this does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only her motion on 15 April 2003.
be committed during the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was
it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful. Hence, this petition.

If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the prohibited act of premature On 10 June 2003, the Court required the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution
campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before of this petition.
the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign ISSUE :
war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead
of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very WON the Trial court had power to order the stay of execution pending appeal
 Page 13 of 14

HELD : supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in
election protest cases
to grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case
there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting of its affirmation.[31] Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of
execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.[23] Petitioner Navarosa concedes the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection,
respondent Estos compliance with the first and third requisites. What she contests is the trial through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Section 3 states:
courts finding that there are good reasons to order discretionary execution of its decision. [T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.
Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably
include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office
Unlike the Election Code of 1971,[27] which expressly provided for execution pending appeal and perform its functions
of trial courts rulings in election protests, the present election laws are silent on such remedy.
As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed can only answer
Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39 (Section 2) of the Rules of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil
for that portion of the trial courts ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual damages,
Procedure) applies in suppletory character to election cases, thus allowing execution pending
attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secure execution of that portion proclaiming
appeal in the discretion of the court.
respondent Esto duly elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by popular will of the electorate and
he Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) and the other election laws do authorizing him to assume the office. This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the
not specifically provide for execution pending appeal of judgment in election cases, unlike the filing of the supersedeas bond in the first place.
Election Code of 1971 whose Section 218 made express reference to the Rules of Court on
In sum, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
execution pending appeal The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of
ordering execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision. Grave abuse of discretion
the Election Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no
implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
longer available in election cases. In election contests involving elective municipal officials,
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave
which are cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform
officials, which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending
a duty enjoined by law.[33] This does not obtain in the present case.
appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143
of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In insisting that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending RAMAS vs. COMELEC
appeal, petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy 286 SCRA 189
consideration. Instead, she merely contends that Section 3 of Rule 39 (Section 3) applies also
in a suppletory character because its Siamese twin[30] provision, Section 2, is already being so Facts: Petitioners and private respondents were the official candidates of the NPC Lakas-
applied. Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest underlying NUCD for elective municipal positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur. After the canvass of
Section 2s application. We cannot countenance such argument. election returns, petitioners were proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials therein.

T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. Private respondents seasonably filed an election protest with the RTC of Pagadian City which
Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably ruled in their favor. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of Decision
include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office pending Appeal, however, petitioner filed an Opposition to this Motion.
and perform its functions.
 Page 14 of 14

The trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. COMELEC
concurs with the trial court’s decision, hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it concurs with
the decision of the trial court.

Held: The Supreme Court held the it has explicitly recognized and given approval to execution
of judgments pending appeal in election cases filed under existing election laws. All that was
required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the
immediate execution should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.”

The rationale why such executionis allowed in election cases is “to give as much recognition
to the worth of a trial judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the
proclamation by the board of canvassers.”

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would bring back
the ghost of the “grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by
devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office.” The
following constitutes “good reasons,” and a combination of two or more of them will suffice
to grant the execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or the will of the electorate;
(2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; (3) the length of
time that the election contest has been pending. In this case, all elements was present,
considering that this has been pending for a year, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.