Matibag v.

Benipayo
380 SCRA 49

Facts:
The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Sometime
after, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein as Comelec Chairman and
Comelec Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on
Appointments of the respondents for confirmation. However, the commissions did not act on
said appointments. Once more, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments for the
respondents and made them took their oaths for the second time. Again, the Office transmitted
their appointments to the Commission for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the
Commission could act on their appointments. Thus, the President renewed against the ad
interim appointments of the respondents to the same positions. The Office submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission. They took their oaths of office anew.

In his capacity as Comelec Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum addressed to

petitioner to be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner asked for a reconsideration of
her reassignment but was denied of it. Hence, the petition herein questioning the validity of the
appointment of the respondents.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is a temporary appointment that
is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

(2) Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or not the renewal of the ad
interim appointments of the respondents is a violation of Section1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution

Holding:
(1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution uses the word “effective only until.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. Thus, the term "ad
interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.

(2) A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by
the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final
decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment
as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of
the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows:

"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or

appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at
the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new
nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission."
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be
considered again if the President renews the appointment.

SORIANO VS. LISTA

399 S 437

Facts:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a
petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office,
which requires confirmation of the COA.

Held:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act
or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is
in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even
be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does
not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.

Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the
Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC).

Pimentel vs Ermita
472 S 587

Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international
law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of
treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome
Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention
clear not to become parties to the treaty

Issue:
whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

Holding:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact
the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the
legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of
checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treatymaking process in this wise:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of
the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under
the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the
parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his
authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers,
which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice
for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-
proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or
protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable
to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature.
This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the
state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in
accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy
which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the
contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be
bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made
subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated
them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the
parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.

Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification.
It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct
steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means
of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed
by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the
formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government.
Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the
treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state
to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty
are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state
expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the
state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the
responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not
inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the
signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the
head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It
has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by
its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the
refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise,
the other state would be justified in taking offense.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is
a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction
to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.

Quintos-Deles vs The Commission on Constitutional Commissions

177 S 259

Facts:
Due to the opposition of some congressmen-member of the Commission on Appointments, the
Petitioner and three others were unable to take their seats as Sectoral Representatives, as
appointed by the President.

Issue:
The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to
the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

Holding:
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the
said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,

Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the

Bermudez vs Executive Secretary Ruben Torres

311 S 733

Facts:
The validity and legality of the appointment of respondent ConradoQuiaoit to the post of Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President Fidel V. Ramos is assailed in this petition on the ground that the
appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be
held fatal to the appointment of respondent ConradoQuiaoit.

Holding:
An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, reiterated in Flores vs.Drilon,
this Court has held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power .
.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise
of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer,
such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to
appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose
authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments, bureaus and offices." Control
means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of
the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President
has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can
accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials
under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase "upon
recommendation of the Secretary," found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory
upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in
nature. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority
CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA V SALONGA
FACTS:On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights. Realizing perhaps
the need for a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on Human Rights,
befitting an independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, the President of the
Philippines extended to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the
Commission. It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised
by the President that she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the
office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of the
President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of office.
On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this Court, petitioner Bautista took her oath
of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
petitioner Bautista discharged the functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights which, as previously stated, she had originally held merely in an
acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information and
documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission on Appointments' Secretary
again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a meeting of the Commission on
Appointments Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set for 19
January 1989 at 9 A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights. 8
On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments stating, for the reasons therein given, why she considered the Commission on
Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Notwithstanding that, the Commission on Appointments
disapproved petitioner Bautista’s “ad interim appointment” as Chairperson of the Commission
on Human Rights in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner requires the confirmation of the
Commission of Appointments;
2. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner is an ad interim appointment;

RULING:
1. No. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the
 Commission on Human Rights, is to be made without the review or participation of the
Commission on Appointments.

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers
of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by la to appoint.”
2. No. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend
only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed.
That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation
of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709, G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
Facts: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was convicted by final judgement of two counts of estafasome
time before 1979. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18,
1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President on the condition that
petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines,” which he accepted.
He was released from confinement.
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On
October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued “by authority of the
President” an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and children of convicted felon, Wilfredo
Sumulong Torres, praying for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise
of the President’s prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to
determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of the
pardonee’s right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus meritorious.
Held: There is no adequate basis for the Court to oblige the petition.
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to
the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to
prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. Under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order “the arrest and
re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition,
or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.” It is now a well-entrenched rule
in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The
determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment
of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional
pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged as
illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering
that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach
thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final
sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.
Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a
pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a
breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise no basis for the courts to
effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of
powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
People vs. Casido, 269 SCRA 360, G.R. No. 116512 March 7, 1997
Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for conditional pardon before the
Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for
amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC), while their appeals were pending
before the Supreme Court. The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building
measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon.
After their release, they filed for a Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the Supreme Court which
the latter denied. The Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-
appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the
resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.
Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid.
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted
them and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts in o oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in
by both Houses of Congress.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the release of accused-
appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and this case is dismissed with costs de oficio.
The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon and of its
Secretariat are admonished to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their
duty to save the President from any embarrassment in the exercise of his power to grant pardon
or parole.
People vs. Pariarca, Jr., 341 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000
Facts: Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before
RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for the
killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case
No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the
decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against
Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the
Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was
favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in
pursuit of his political beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who
have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes
and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he
is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED.
Magdalo Para saPagbabago vs. Commission on Elections, 673 SCRA 651, G.R. No.
190793 June 19, 2012
Facts: Petitioner MagdalosaPagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the
National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local
Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where
it held that Magdalo Para saPagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art.
IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and
Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of
the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using
unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc
for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23
December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and
Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by MAGDALO.
Issue:Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means?
Held: COMELEC’s Resolutions are sustained. To join electoral contests, a party or organization
must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in
Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x xx Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws
grant to qualified registered parties.
x xx Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition;
stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be
made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions
that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied
registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no
political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force;
that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.
On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime,
considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in
the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in
the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC
only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation
pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily
criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative
liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this
Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable.
DISMISSED
Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al., 82 Phil. 642, No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
Facts: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the
war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal
had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty
as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14thAmnesty Commission refused to
process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime
as charged. Jimenez &Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.
Issue: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
Held: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36,
RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that
he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the
accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if
necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both
for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or hero
who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of
the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as
the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation
and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction,
whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
Cristobal V. Labrador
Facts:
The CFI of Rizal found respondent Santos guilty of estafa and was confined in the provincial jail
for 6 months. However, he continued to be a registered elector in the city of Malabon, Rizal and
was seated as the municipal president from 1934 to 1937. On 1938, Commonwealth Act No 357
or the Election Code, was approved by the National Assembly. Section 94, paragraph (b) of
which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been “declared by final judgment guilty
of any crime against property.” In view of this provision, the respondent applied to the President
for an absolute pardon. Upon favorable recommendation of the Sec of Justice, the President
granted the petition on 1939, restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights, except
that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or
property responsibility.

On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos from the list of voters
in precinct no. 11 of Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the latter is disqualified under par (b) of
Sec 94 of the Election Code. After hearing, the court denied the petition for exclusion and
declared that the pardon extended in favor of respondent has had the effect pf excluding him
from the disqualification created by the Election Code.

Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the pardoning power of the President applies to legislative prohibitions? And
consequently, whether or not the pardoning power exercised here would amount to an unlawful
exercise of the President of a legislative function?

Held:
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative of the President: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction and (b) that such
power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it
and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting
from the conviction. In this case, the disability is the result of the conviction without which there
would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment, which
the law imposes upon those who violates its command. There are accessory and resultant
disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such left of the consequences of
conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving
no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full civil
and political rights.

The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code, does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of his
pardoning power not contemplated in the Constitution and would lead furthermore to the result
that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Pelobello v. Palatino
Facts:
Respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atendado contra la
autoridad y susagentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day
of prisioncorreccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested
municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon. The fact of
conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the
respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-
appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has
been proven that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil
and political rights

Issue:
Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.

Held:
 Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was
converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The
pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held
that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the
prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in
question.

Monsanto V. Factoran
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the
decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the
rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister
of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore
the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that
she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be
required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and
that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?

Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government
any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in
force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Torres V. Gonzales
Facts:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged
with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department
erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prisioncorreccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
Llamas V. Executive
Facts:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants
filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption.
Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor,
Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO
showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day
suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They
say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal
cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has
been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to
criminal cases.

Issue:
WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.

Held:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or
administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised
by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide
for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President
can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the
Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required
is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

Bayan v Executive
342 SCRA 449

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.Pres. On the other hand, Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on
October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable
and not Section 21, Article VII.Following the argument of the petitioner, under the provision
cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless
the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,
however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue
and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Pimentel v. Office of Executive Secretary

462 SCRA 449
Facts:

The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will
have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The
Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute
however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory state. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both
domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of
the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty
to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of
the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President?

Held:
No, the President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign
nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. In
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states
and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3
required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec.
21, Art VII). The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the
executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political
maturity and growth.
Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation Board | Barrera, J.
9 SCRA 27

Facts:
Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King were charged before the Deportation Board with having
purchased $130,000.00 without the necessary licensing from the Central Bank and having
clandestinely remitted the same to Hong Kong. After the filing of the deportation charges, a
warrant of arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et al. pending investigation. They were granted
provisional liberty upon their filing of a surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for
P10,000.00. Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the ground,
among others, that such charges are not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not
jurisdiction over such charges. The motion to dismiss was denied. Qua Chee Gan, et al. then
filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition.
Triial Court then upheld the validity of the delegation by the President to the Deportation Board
the power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien
in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.
The court also sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation on the theory that the power to
arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the
power to deport aliens.

Issues:

1) WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such power is validly delegated to
the Deportation Board.?
2) WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order the arrest of such aliens?

Held:
1)Yes, Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the power to
effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners, but such power was not intended to be delimited to the Immigration
Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code, although not expressly conferring such
power, lays down the procedure for such deportation proceedings for the President.
Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways:
By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and
By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. And although the charges
against Qua Chee Gan are not enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of profiteering, hoarding or
black marketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations, which is tantamount
to economic sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503
amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

2)Yes, but only to the deportation order. Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in
deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in order to
secure their appearance.

However, the same did not authorize the arrest of the alien pending investigation.
It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motuproprio or upon the filing of formal
charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien
complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for
his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the
Chairman of the Board. However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose
authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest.
Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of
the Constitution: “...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce...”
Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement — "to be determined by the judge"
— to any public officer who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination,
and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an
order of deportation.
However, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough
that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was
authorized in EO69.

Dispositive Position
  Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant
of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
 The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void
and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.

Go TEK v Deportation Board

79 SCRA 17

Facts:
On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go
Tek, a chinaman, praying that the board recommend his immediate deportation to the President
because he was an undesirable alien on the basis of these allegations:
Go Tek was a sector commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit of the
“Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States;” And he was in possession of fake
dollar checks in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC. Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss. The complaint
was premature as he had a pending case in the city fiscal’s office for violation of Art. 168. The
board had no jurisdiction over the case because the board may only deport aliens on the
grounds expressly specified by law citing an obiter in Qua Chee Gan. The Board denied the
motion ruling that a conviction is not required before the State may deport an undesirable alien
and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President. Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI. The CFI
granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the Qua Chee Gan case. It held that Sec. 37(3) of
the Immigration Law requires conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and, thus, the
complaint was premature since mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for
deportation under the Immigration Law.
Issues:

1) Can the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which
is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law?
2) Is prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Tek necessary to allow the board to
continue its investigation?

Ruling:
1) Yes, under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by
order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 1 of the Revised
Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation
of the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation, as
charged against the alien, under Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law.
2) No, when deportation is effected by the President in the exercise of his powers, it need
not be under any ground specified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law; such a
requirement is relevant only when the deportation is effect by the Commissioner of
Immigration.
Sec. 69 of the RAC and E.O. No. 398, creating the Deportation Board, do not specify the
grounds for deportation.There is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power
to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive full
discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as
to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state.The Chief Executive is the
sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens
as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with Sec. 69 of the RAC. After
all, the inherent right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued
presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified. As the President is
granted full discretion as regards deportation, it is fundamental that an executive order
for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case.

Domingo v. Scheer
GR. No. 154745
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45, of the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the
respondent's petition for certiorari and prohibition annulling the order of arrest issued by
petitioner, and permanently enjoining her from deporting the respondent from the Philippines.

1
The appellate court reversed the Summary Deportation Order of the Board of Commissioners.

Respondent Scheer is a native of Germany, who was eventually granted a permanent resident
status in the Philippines. He eventually married here and started a family as well as a business
in Palawan. Vice Consul Hippelein informed the Philippine Ambassador to Germany that the
respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany. The DFA receive from the
German Embassy in Manila that the respondent is wanted in Germany, and requested to turn
over his German passport to the Embassy. Thereafter BOC issued a Summary Deportation
Order dated September 27, 1997. It was stated that the deportation shall be held in abeyance
pending respondent’s case and he shall remain in the custody of the bureau. In issuing this the
BOC relied on the statement of the German Vice Consul on the speculation that it is improbable
that the respondent will be issued a new passport, the warrant of arrest for insurance fraud and
alleged illegal activities in Palawan. Respondent nevertheless stayed in the Philippines after
airing his side to then BID Commissioner Verceles, the latter giving him time to apply for a
clearance and a new passport. Scheer eventually filed in Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
stating that his right to due process was violated, for there was no notice or chance to be heard
before the issuance of the deportation order. Eventually the criminal case for physical injuries
against the respondents was dismissed, and he was issued a passport. He informed
Commissioner Verceles about this matter and reiterated the cancellation of the order, but the
Commissioner did not respond. Thereafter Commissioner Domingo assumed office and on June
6, 2002, she ordered the apprehension of the respondent who was held in custody awaiting
deportation. Shocked, respondent sough remedy with the CA, during the hearing of which the
Solicitor General suggested that the respondent leave the country first then just re-apply. A
decision was reached in favor of Scheer, permanently enjoining Domingo from continuing the
deportation, thus this petition.

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the BOC was an indispensable party to the case?
2. Whether or not respondent's arrest and detention was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary?

HELD:
1) Yes- but not enough to invalidate the petition. Petitioner argues that the respondent must
have impleaded BOC as the respondent, and not Commissioner Domingo alone. The Summary
Deportation Order was issued by the BOC as a whole and Domingo is just but on Commissioner
so the petitioner argues that the action may be dismissed. The court ruled that it agrees with the
petitioner that the BOC was an indispensable party to the respondent's petition in the CA.
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Parties may be added as ordered by the court and if the petition refuses to implead an
indispensable party, then the petition may be dismissed. In the case at bar, CA did not require to
implead BOC as the respondent so it does not warrant the dismissal of respondent's petition.
The court may choose to ament the processes and the pleadings by substituting as party-
plaintiff the real party- interest, but the court also has the power to avoid delay in the disposition
of cases and it may just be unnecessary to still choose to implead BOC. The OSG has already
represented the petitioner in instant proceedings thus the BOC cannot claim that it was not
afforded the opportunity to be in court. Proceedings may be to facilitate justice but they do not
constitute the thing itself and they may be relaxed in certain cases.

2. Yes. The Court ruled the BOC committed grave abuse of discretion in causing the arrest and
detention of the respondent. Aliens may be deported from the Philippines only on grounds and
in the proper manner provided by the Constitution. The United Nations Declaration on Human
Rights grants every person rights, and that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile. BOC ordered respondent's deportation without even conducting summary
deportation proceedings, but merely relied on the speculation of the German Embassy and the
Vice Consul that is improbable that the respondent will be issued a new passport, warranting
the deportation. The respondent was no afforded any hearing at all, and not given the
opportunity to put up a defense for himself, thus violating his right to due process. A deportation
proceeding may not be a criminal action, but since it affects the liberty of a person, the right to
due process of a respondent must be respected. Even six years after the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent which was still not attended to, out of nowhere and arbitrarily
the agents were ordered to arrest him. Even after being issued a new passport and even
securing clearance from the PNP and NPA, the BOC still proceeded with the deportation. BOC
is required to resolve the motion of the respondent first, giving him the chance to be heard and
present his evidence. The petitioner put up the defense that they cannot review cased decided
before the change of members, but since it is the same government entity, they have the
authority to review past cases. In addition, the court finds the contention of the OSG for the
respondent to leave the country then just re-apply again ridiculous when there is no legal
impediment for the respondent to continue his stay in the country.

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS, THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF TRADE, et al.
PRINCIPLE/FACTS: Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose
general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or
that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff
Commission. Congress has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It
is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not align with
established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative
prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in a nation of the
legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.

ISSUE: Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the
Imposition of General Safeguard Measures

HELD: The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the Court of
Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a
positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The fundamental premise rooted
in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the required positive final determination of
the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the
delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section
28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.

Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the Delegated Power to

Impose Safeguard Measures

The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported
products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the
country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these
safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.

The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing
in this case. They are:
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot
come from the Finance Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World
Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.

(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the
justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from
administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or
whim of the President.

(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the
law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose.
Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the
President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no
duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn,
no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of
limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the President.

There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These
impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power
which is within the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution.

Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and
other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2)
Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground
that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional
provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an
exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent
executive power.

This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority
attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must
be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further
empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last
power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and
restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted
jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch.

The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article
VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President,
such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to
impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts
as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or
Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the
President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even
as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports.

Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed
within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to
impose tari(s and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that
regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of
Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation
of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the
purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses
inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute,
the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because
taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.

When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under
the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of
Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is
basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or
disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the
procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the
various o ces in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of
such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the
necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned
the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions in the legislature’s
scheme of things.

There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions
imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions
are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these
limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless
their constitutional in#rmity can be demonstrated.

What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire
SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and
Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar
imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA,
captioned “Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures,” and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of
the Tariffs Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities,
whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious
injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural
products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will
be in the public interest.

GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Dr. BienvenidoIcasiano was appointed by President Aquino as Schools Division

Superintendent, Division of City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned as a
superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology as recommended by DECS
Secretary Ricardo Gloria on June 17, 1994. In October 1994 Director Roxas informed Icasiano
of the reassignment but Icasiano requested reconsideration of the assignment. Request was
denied and the Court of Appeals granted a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court of Appeals
found that the reassignment as violative of Icasiano’s security of tenure. However, Secretary
Gloria and Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is improper because it attacks as act of
the President in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said act is in violation of the doctrine of presidential Immunity from
suit?

HELD: The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against the
petitioners and not against the President.

The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

RODRIQUEZ V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of AlyansaDagitiMannalonIti Cagayan, an

organization affiliated with KilusangMagbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military
tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the OplanBantayLaya, making its members targets
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.Rodriguez was abducted by military men
and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When
released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo andand Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data
with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, etal. The writs were
granted but the Court of Appeals dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be
sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

ISSUE: Whether or not former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo should be dropped as
respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit.

HELD: No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or
criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as
ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search
for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Therefore, former President Arroyo cannot use
such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.

LOZADA V. ARROYO

The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction
between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN),
and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA
Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal.
The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in
the said transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of the
Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a
subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify. Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon
Committee. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering
his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to implement such order and make a
return.

In Lozada’s petition, he claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his
bag. He allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the
men when he heard them say in their handheld radio “Huwagkayongdumaandiyan sir
nandyanangmgatagasenado.”

Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection.
Lozada asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks. They
stopped at a restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada
claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per
his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening the
security of his, his family and the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of LSGH.

Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an
affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother petitioned for a
Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo;
(b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards
documents related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other
document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.

Respondents claim that Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of
his arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived of his
liberty and that Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.

The Court of Appeals rules dropped President Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys
immunity from suit as president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria
Arroyo despite her failure to submit a verified return and personally claim presidential immunity
in a way not in accord with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure
of o ce or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be
invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.

In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the
original Petition and the issuance of the Court of Appeals Decision, occurred during the
incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have
dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.

It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former
President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to
evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or
threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.

SAEZ V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: The petitioner sought to be granted the privilege of the Writs of Amparo and habeas
data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of
documents. He expressed his fear of being abducted and killed which is why he sought that
he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease
from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to
be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him
to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he
was always being followed by a certain “oel, a former colleague at Bayan Muna. Joel
pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner‟s store. Three days before
the petitioner was apprehended, Joel approached and informed him of his marital status
and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. Joel inquired if the petitioner was still
involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the Court of Appeals justices during the hearing
if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in
the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. The court A
denied the petition for writ of amparo because he failed to allege how the supposed threat
or violation of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any
narration of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate
petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the
writs prayed for.

Application for writ of habeas data is likewise denied because allegations therein do
not comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6 on the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as
to how petitioner’s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. The court also
dropped Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the
petition and dropping Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent.

HELD: No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by
substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either
acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the
petitioner merely included the President‟s name as a party respondent without any attempt at
all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations.
Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation
that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be
completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner
in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the
doctrine of command responsibility.
City of Tagaytay v. Guerrero

Topic: Composition of Supreme Court

Facts:
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two (2)
parcels of land situated in the Province of Batanggas. TTTDC incurred real estate tax liabilities
on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. the City Government of Tagaytay (City of
Tagaytay) offered the properties for sale at public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of
sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the
titles of the properties. It then filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in
its favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City.
Subsequently, these lands were sold to Melencios.

TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties on
the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and, thus,
beyond its taxing authority. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1196 before the RTC of
Cavite. The auction sale was nullified. Said decision became final and executor. Petitioners filed
an MR. denied.

Issue: Whether the RTC of Cavite had jurisdiction to settle the alleged boundary dispute.

Ruling:
The subject properties that are situated in Barrio Birinayan, Municipality of Talisay, are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Batangas. This factual finding binds this Court and is no
longer subject to review

There is no boundary dispute in the case at bar. The RTC did not amend the existing territorial
limits of the City of Tagaytay and the Province of Batangas. The entire Barrio Birinayan was
transferred to the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, by virtue of R.A. No. 1418. At
present, Barrio Birinayan forms part of the Municipality of Laurel, also in the Province of
Batangas, pursuant to R.A. No. 5689. The RTC acted well within its powers when it passed
judgment on the nullification of the auction sale of the contested properties, considering that the
City of Tagaytay has no right to collect real estate taxes on properties that are not within its
territorial jurisdiction.

In Re: Villanueva

Topic: Appointment and Qualifications

Facts:
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province. He
applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
Tagum City; Davao City; and Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.

In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination,
informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On
the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his
non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who
did not pass the prejudicature examination.

The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated February 3,
2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its
decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This
caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.

In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an
RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year
requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal
Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the
Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557 should not be
merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has
already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.

Issue:
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.

Ruling:
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting
applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to
determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC
issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants,
and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention
to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting
qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply with
them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from
interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the latter.

RE: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals.

Topic: Appointments and Qualifications

Facts:
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the SC the appointments of Court of
Appeals Justices:
Appointees Positions
 5 Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela Associate Justice, CA
6 Hon. Myra G. Fernandez Associate Justice, CA
7 Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. Associate Justice, CA
8 Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando Associate Justice, CA
The appointment papers of the Justices bore the following dates:
Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment
Hon. Myra G. Fernandez February 16, 2010
Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. February 16, 2010
Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando February 16, 2010
Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela February 24, 2010

The four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of
seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice
Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior).
The conflict stems from certain provisions of the 2009 Internal Rues of the CA (IRCA). Rule 1,
Sec.1 provides: “…The date and sequence of the appointment of the Justices determine
their seniority courtwide.”. On the other hand, Rule 2, Sec. 1 provides: “…The Associate
Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments as officially
transmitted to the Supreme Court.”

According to the CA Committee on Rules, Rule 2, Sec.1 should prevail as the conflict should be
reckoned with BP 129 (Sec 3. Organization) which states that: “There is hereby created a Court
of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and sixty-eight (68) Associate Justices who
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so
designated in his appointment, and the Associate Justices shall have precedence according to
the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them
shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the
President.’"

Judge Antonio-Valenzuela (ranked most junior) insisted that she is the most senior among the
four newly appointed CA Associate Justice pursuant to Rule2, Sec.1 IRCA. ." She argued that
"the final act in the process of appointing a member of the Judiciary is the transmittal of the
appointment to the Supreme Court."

Issue: Whether or not Judge Antonio-Valenzuela’s contention is correct.

Ruling: No.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the
President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the
appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in
connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the
earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the
same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material.
This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246)
controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments
as transmitted to this Court.

Perfecto vs. Meer

Topic: Salary

Facts:
Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his
salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was
illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce
it in violation of the Constitution.

Ruling:
Judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution

Endencia vs. David

Topic: Salary

Facts:
Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at
least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers. section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to
be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
A joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector
of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia representing the income tax
collected on his salary and to Justice Fernando Jugo.

Ruling:
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot
shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office, provided and secured
by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. The exemption was not primarily
intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy

Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR L-78780, 23 July 1987

Facts: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly
appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. They seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, CIR and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. Petitioners submit
that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.”

Issue: Whether the deduction of withholding tax constitutes a diminution of the salaries of
Judges and Justices?

Held: The Supreme Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in
Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia v. David, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of
Justices and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners
and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect.

The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof”,
and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto v. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia v. David, must be
deemed discarded.

We accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of
their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
Gualberto J. De La Llana, et. al. v Manuel Alba, et. al., GR No. L-57883, 12 March 1982

Facts: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to
enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
Justice from taking any action implementing Batas PambansaBlg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the
CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is
the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded.

Issues: Whether BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices
and judges in this case?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court is empowered:

“To discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was
the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for
the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.

As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments.

Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created
by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is
sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of
removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.

The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction
would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one
which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”
In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez Dated 16 March 1988 Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan To Comment On An Anonymous Letter-Complaint, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15,
1988

Facts: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, endorsed an anonymous letter

complaint with enclosure dated 14 December 1987, against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. The
mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. The second
attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with
the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 against Justice Fernan.

Issue: Whether disbarment proceedings will prosper against a Justice of the Supreme Court
whose position is constitutionally classified as impeachable?

Held: The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative
Case No. 3135 in the following terms:

There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine
Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI (2), Constitution). To grant
a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in
effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the
Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses
listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution quoted in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayanare substantially

reproduced in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,…
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not saying that Members of the other constitutional
offices we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possible criminal acts or for
alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the
Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed
before such liability may be determined and enforced.

A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of
impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of
the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer
either criminally or administratively, by disbarment proceedings, for any wrong or misbehavior
that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
Civil Service Commission v Department of Budget and Management,GR No. 158791, 10
February 2006

Facts: Automatic Release of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission

(CSC), a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. The total funds
appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for CSC was P285,660,790.44. CSC
complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was
only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends
that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their “no report, no release”
policy.

Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of
its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the
extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

Issue: Whether the DBM‘s “no report, no release” policy is not unconstitutional.

Held: the DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is
hereby declared unconstitutional.

The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing
fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that
the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

The Court held in the case of Batangas v. Romulo, Automatic Release in Section 6, Article X of
the Constitution is defined as an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention.
Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such
the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from the
national coffers. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations
to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the
enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted
fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and
the Ombudsman.

To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a
revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal
autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby
reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya v Hon. Mariano M. Malones, GR No. 182065, 27
October 2009

Facts: Petitioners Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya are stall holders of the newly renovated
Maasin Public Market, which imposes an increased “goodwill fee” of P20,000.00/month in
contrast with the previous P45.00/month rent prior to the renovation, as sanctioned by the
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, approved on 17 August 1998.

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 or the “Municipal Revised Revenue Code" contained a provision
for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees for stalls. The same Code
authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated
a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market.

On 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin passed a Resolution No. 68

declaring the public hearing dated 11 August 1988 inoperative because majority of the persons
affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, the
respondent Mayor vetoed the resolution. Thereafter, respondent Mayor sent a letter to the
petitioners informing them that the stalls were considered vacant and open for any qualified and
interested applicants, due to the fact that they did not have a new lease contract required by the
new ordinance.

Issue: Whether there was a need to exhaust administrative remedies before involving the
Courts?

Held: The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised
is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not
the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law,
which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of
judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the
Legislature may establish.

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was
whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to
its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law,
within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphases ours.)

In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the
RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local
ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy.

Tan Jr. v Matsuura

Facts:
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a
Complaint-Affidavitcharging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina
Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
Tan’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution dated July 1, 2004
granted the petition, indicting both Tanjutco and Matsuura for violation of Art. 172 (2) in relation
to Art. 171 (6) RPC and another information for violation of Art. 171 (2), RPC against
respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and Atty. Julie Cua.
The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ Undersecretary
Ernesto L. Pineda, signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a resolution affirming
the presence of probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco, but ordering the exclusion of
Cua from the filing of information. The DOJ later reversed its decision to exclude Cua and has
ordered the OCP of Makati to include Atty. Julie O. Cua in the information for violation of Article
171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code filed against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty.
Carolina Tanjutco.
The respondents filed with the CA the petition for certiorari separately docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 89346 and CA-G.R. SP No. 95263 respectively. The CA granted both petitions questioning
the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions.
Unsatisfied, Tan separately filed with this Court two petitions for review. G.R. No. 179003 assails
the CA’s disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutco’s petition, while G.R. No. 195816 assails the CA’s
decision in the petition filed by Cua.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming
the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice
Ruling:
Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of probable cause
is essentially an executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice. However, equally settled is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of
prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing
grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the courts’ power to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its
functions. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the
prosecutors’ findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their power, when the
circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors’ findings are supported by the
facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary
that are exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to
settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of the courts’ review power ensures that,
on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are
spared from baseless prosecution.
We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena 34 that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the
DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review
with respect to the DOJ’s findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is
committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
Giron vs COMELEC
Facts:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.

On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and
14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
specifically requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to
the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to
the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been
printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office)
of Batas PambansaBlg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this
law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their
respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding
in a permanent capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC, opposes the
Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the matter in Fariñas v.
Executive Secretary.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may decide on the wisdom, soundness or expediency of a
statute.

Ruling:

On a final note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention raise various

arguments that we deem are matters of policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are valid, we
reiterate that the power of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the law. Judicial power
does not include the determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, or expediency of a
statute. Otherwise, the Court may be accused of engaging in judicial legislation. As it is
Congress that is empowered by the Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws,
we feel that petitioner's reasoning would be best addressed by the legislature.

CMU vs Executive
Facts:
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and
run by the State.1 In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401
hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU.

Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for
distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag,
Bukidnon.
CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-
Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation
310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to
an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila
RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMU’s
application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial
reconsideration of the RTC’s order denying their motion to dismiss.

After hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et
al’s motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMU’s action for lack of jurisdiction. Still,
the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act.

CMU appealed to the CA raising two issues: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of its right to
due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310
was constitutional. CA dismissed CMU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMU’s
recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court,
because it raised pure questions law—bearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 310.

CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s order of dismissal but it denied the
same,5 prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMU’s appeal on the ground that it raised purely
questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this Court.

Ruling:

Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 19806 vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction
over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal
from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on
certiorari filed directly with this Court. The question in this case is whether or not CMU’s appeal
from the RTC’s order of dismissal raises purely questions of law.

As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of its right to
due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was
constitutional. Did these grounds raise factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and
adjudicate?

Regarding the first reason, CMU’s action was one for injunction against the implementation of
Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact
that the President issued this proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in
Malaybalay City where the lands were located were facts that were not in issue. These were
alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the
CMU’s remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question
of law, indeed lies with this Court.

As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to
due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation
310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU points out that the issue of the
constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had
not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction
case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation,
resulting in the denial of CMU’s right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper
for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred
in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of law.

Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310 has been raised
and amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful purpose to have the case
remanded to the CA Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings.

Abalos vs Darapa
Facts:

On 25 June 1962, petitioner DBP, Ozamis Branch, granted a ₱31,000.00 loan to respondent
spouses LomantongDarapa and SinabDimakuta (spouses) who executed therefore a real and
chattel mortgage contract, which covered, among others, the following:

A warehouse to house the rice and corn mill, constructed on a 357 square meter lot situated at
poblacion, Linamon, Lanao del Norte which lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. A-148 of
Linamon, Lanao del Norte..

In 1970, the spouses applied for the renewal and increase of their loan using SinabDimakuta’s
(Dimakuta) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1,997 as additional collateral. The DBP
disapproved the loan application without returning, however, Dimakuta’s TCT. When the
spouses failed to pay their loan, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on 16 September
1971, which, unknown to the spouses, included the TCT No. T-1,997. The spouses failed to
redeem the land under TCT No. T-1,997 which led to its cancellation, and, the eventual
issuance of TCT No. T-7746 in DBP’s name.

In 1984, the spouses discovered all these and they immediately consulted a lawyer who
forthwith sent a demand letter to the bank for the reconveyance of the land. The bank assured
them of the return of the land. In 1994, however, a bank officer told them that such is no longer
possible as the land has already been bought by Abalos, daughter of the then provincial
governor.

On 12 May 1994, the DBP sold the land to its co-petitioner Josefa Abalos (Abalos). The TCT
No. T-7746 (originally TCT No. T-1,997) was cancelled.

On 20 August 1994,the spouses filed with the RTC of Iligan City, a Complaint for Annulment of
Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages, against DBP and Abalos. The RTC, in a Decision
dated 29 November 2000, annulled the DBP’s foreclosure sale of the land under TCT No. T-
1,997 and its sale to Abalos; further, it declared Dimakuta as the land’s lawful owner.

The DBP and Abalos assailed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals; Abalos, however,
later abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition in a Decision dated 26 September 2003. It ratiocinated
that DBP had no right to foreclose the land under TCT No. T-1,997, it not having been
mortgaged.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In the main, DBP wants to convince this Court that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-
148 mortgaged in 1962, then untitled, is the same land now covered by TCT No. T-1,997

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may review said decision.

Ruling:

We find the petition unmeritorious, and thus, affirm the Court of Appeals.

It is fundamental procedural law that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure shall, as a general rule, raise only questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts- this
is in contradistinction from a question of fact which arises from doubt as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. A question of law does not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them and the resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.

The Court of Appeals’ factual findings, affirming that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on
this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such
as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings
of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case;
and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. None of the exceptions is
present in this petition.
Republic vs De Guzman

Facts:

Petitioner had accredited respondent (Proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise) as the

PNP’s supplier of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of
various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of
buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts.

Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM and petitioner, represented by the PNP,
through its chief, executed a Contract of Agreement (the Contract) wherein MGM, for the price
of ₱2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver to the PNP the construction materials
itemized in the purchase orderattached to the Contract. Respondent claimed that after the PNP
Chief approved the Contract and purchase order, MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with the
delivery of the construction materials, as evidenced by Delivery Receipt Nos. 151-153, Sales
Invoice Nos. 038 and 041, and the "Report of Public Property Purchase"issued by the PNP’s
Receiving and Accounting Officers to their Internal Auditor Chief. Respondent asseverated that
following the PNP’s inspection of the delivered materials on March 4, 1996, the PNP issued two
Disbursement Vouchers; one in the amount of ₱2,226,147.26 in favor of MGM, and the other, in
the amount of ₱62,415.34, representing the three percent (3%) withholding tax, in favor of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Respondent later demanded payment from the PNP amounting to ₱2,288,562.60 as agreed
upon their December 1995 Contract. The PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge, repliedto
respondent’s counsel, informing her of the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) Check No. 0000530631, as evidenced by Receipt No. 001, issued by the
respondent to the PNP on April 23, 1996. Respondent denied having ever received the LBP
check.She also claimed that Receipt No. 001, a copy of which was attached to the PNP’s
November 17, 1997 letter, could not support the PNP’s claim of payment as the aforesaid
receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders, her other company, which was also doing business with
the PNP, and not to MGM, with which the contract was made.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner before the RTC, Branch
222 of Quezon City. The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 5, 1999, on the ground that
the claim or demand set forth in respondent’s complaint had already been paid or extinguished.
After conducting hearings on the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order on May 4, 2001,
denying the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter filed its Answer,
wherein it restated the same allegations in its Motion to Dismiss.On September 8, 2003, the
RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] and

against [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay [respondent] the following sums:
 (1) ₱2,226,147.26 representing the principal sum plus interest at 14% per annum from
April 18, 1996 until the same shall have been fully paid;

(2) 20% of the sum to be collected as attorney’s fees; and,

(3) Costs of suit.

The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the RTC’s ruling on September 27, 2006.

The petitioner is now before this Court, praying for the reversal of the lower courts’ decisions on
the ground that "the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law by affirming the decision
of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may review said decision.

Ruling:

It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.

This Court has, on many occasions, distinguished between a question of law and a question of
fact. We held that when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it is
a question of law; but when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, then it
is a question of fact. "Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law."To elucidate further, this
Court, in Hko Ah Pao v. Ting said:

One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the
Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence,
in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition
must not involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented. In addition, the
facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to
decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was
appropriate.

Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will only review them
under the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.

Although petitioner’s sole ground to support this petition was stated in such a manner as to
impress upon this Court that the Court of Appeals committed an error in law, what the petitioner
actually wants us to do is to review and re-examine the factual findings of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals.

Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the enumerated
exceptions to the rule, we are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the conclusions reached in the appealed decision.

GUILLERMO CUA V. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Guillermo Cua is a Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR in Olongapo City. He was
charged with Malversation of Public Funds after an audit disclosed that he incurred a cash
shortage amounting to P291,783. Initially he admitted his cash shortage purportedly to get even
with the BIR which failed to promote him but promised to pay the amount as soon as possible. A
special arrangement was made between the BIR and him wherein the BIR would withhold his
salary and apply the same to the shortage incurred until full payment of the accountability was
made. Nonetheless, an Information for Malversation of public funds was filed against him. Cua
did not testify and instead adduced documentary evidence showing that he had paid for the
shortage by means of deductions from his salary. The RTC convicted him. The CA affirmed his
conviction. Now before the SC, Cua claims among others that he is not criminally liable because
the PNB confirmed the authenticity of the pertinent documents and that his payment of the
shortage was involuntary and without his consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can review questions of fact.

RULING: NO.
 At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. Thus, questions of fact are not reviewable.
It is not the Court’s function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower court. As such, a question of law must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are accorded respect. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law
is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved
without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Thus, the issue to be resolved
must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a
review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.

The resolution of the issue raised by petitioner necessarily requires the re-evaluation of
the evidence presented by both parties. This is precisely a question of fact proscribed under
Rule 45. Petitioner has failed to establish that the present case falls under any of the exceptions
to said rule. On the other hand, the factual findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA, and as
such, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. On this ground alone, the
petition must be denied.

LORZANO V. TABAYAG

FACTS :

The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan Tabayag.
Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the burial of their father, the
petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be allowed to take possession of and
receive the income generated by the subject property until after her eldest son could graduate
from college. The petitioner’s siblings acceded to the said request. After the petitioner’s eldest
son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them the possession of the subject
property so that they could partition it among themselves. However, the petitioner refused to
relinquish her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased the subject
property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Respondent filed an action for annulment of the sale on the ground that the signature of their
father was forged. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It also awarded moral damages and
attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question of the petitioner regarding the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees are questions of fact.

RULING : YES.

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.

That the signature of Tabayag in the deed of sale was a forgery is a conclusion derived
by the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon this Court as it
involves the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, which is a matter not for this Court to resolve.
Where a petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the CA
regarding the existence of forgery is a question of fact. For the same reason, we would
ordinarily disregard the petitioner’s allegation as to the propriety of the award of moral damages
and attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent as it is a question of fact. Thus, questions on
whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to justify the award of damages or
whether or not there was a causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage
suffered by the private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability might arise
exists are questions of fact.

Essentially, the petitioner is questioning the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees
in favor of the respondent as the same is supposedly not fully supported by evidence. However,
in the final analysis, the question of whether the said award is fully supported by evidence is a
factual question as it would necessitate whether the evidence adduced in support of the same
has any probative value. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.

BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
 On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act No. 7227 creating the Bases
Conversion And Development Authority (BCDA). Sec 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA
Board of Directors shall exercise the power and functions of the BCDA under Sec 10, the
functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the adoption
of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational structure
of the BCDA and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.

On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme
which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular
permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum dated 25 August 1997, Board
Chairman Victoriano A. Basco (Chairman Basco) recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos
(President Ramos) the approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme. In a
memorandum dated 9 October 1997, President Ramos approved the new compensation and
benefit scheme.

In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In
2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10
of RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at
least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials
and employees from P10,000 to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and
employees received a P30,000 year-end benefit, and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed
Resolution No. 2002-10-193 approving the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.

Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board
members, the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.

ISSUE:Whether or not the members of the Board of Directors are entitled to the year-end
benefit.

RULING: NO.

Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors
are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. The same goes with
full time consultants wherein no employer-employee relationships exist between them and the
BCDA. Thus, the whole amount paid to them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.

The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the year-
end benefit.
 The BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and full-
time consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of the Board include
the adoption of compensation and benefit scheme.

The Court is not impressed. The Board's power to adopt compensation and benefit
scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a
per diem: “Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem collected per
month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further, That the amount
of per diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but such amount shall
not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase.”

CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL

FACTS :

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process
and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the
existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the representative of Congress referred to in Article VIII, Section of the
1987 Constitution refers to two members from the Congress, one from the Senate and one from
the House of Representatives.

RULING : NO.

The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from
Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative
of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members
of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from
the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

LEGARDA V. DE CASTRO
FACTS:

Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal but the
PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration
assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the
issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the
canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be
made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine
the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts,
it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns; that the averments
contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate to form a valid cause
of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He also contends that the Tribunal
cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass
(COC).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal can correct the manifest errors in the
SOV and COC.
RULING: YES.

The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the
duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618 (November 23, 2010)
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” Sec 12, Art. VIII
of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the PET. He chafes at the
creation of a purportedly “separate tribunal” complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set
personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioner argues
that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET. According to him, the designation of the justices of the SC
as members of the PET violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution since the PET exercises
quasi-judicial powers. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm
footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.

ISSUES and RULING:

Is the PET unconstitutional?

No. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting
the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was
statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And
under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

Does the PET exercise quasi judicial powers?

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA
MANUFACTURING, INC.
G.R. No. 110571 (March 10, 1994)
NOCON, J.:

Facts:
BOI granted First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic
tiles." Eventually, Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while
FilHispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Mariwasa
filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. CA
required the BOI and First to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no
injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI
from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on
March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction. On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to
Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over
BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. On May 25, 1993, respondent court
denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution on June 4, 1993,
First Lepanto decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is
essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
SC.

Held:
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular
1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or
decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary
contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it

has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de
Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court
dated September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No.
20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the
Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases
instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the
circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
customs or practice to the contrary."

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified,
diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right
of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided
where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-
making powers.

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI
should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to
appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of
the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred
the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and
provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an
incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in
the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply
to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI.

Since in DBP v. CA , we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the
Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by
B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI
should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as
the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman;

HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and
NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 129742 (September 16, 1998)
REGALADO, J:

Facts:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin
was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the
offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the
Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to
do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually
filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman – who inhibited himself – later the case led to the deputy
Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD:
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision
was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES
G.R. No. 132177 (July 19, 2001)
BUENA, J.:

Facts:
On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a
Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s
eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. It was alleged that he requested Caoibes to
return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that Caoibes did not answer so
respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted
“Tarantadoito ah,” and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of
his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent
had the incident blottered with the Las Piñas Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be
filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner. On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge
lodged another administrative case with the Supreme Court, praying for the dismissal of
petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial
officer. The Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. But instead of
filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and “Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the
Honorable Supreme Court,” praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of
Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court .Petitioner
contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make
a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who,
both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a
judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.

Held:
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to
have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court
for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should
hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the
Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due
respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining
whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative
liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda
vs. Vasquez.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before
it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the
exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally
sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative

supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT

INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in
his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
G.R. No. 178902 (April 21, 2010)
ABAD, J.:

Facts:
Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties
affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The
government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower
court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH
to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of
Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties
subject of the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public
Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent
Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were,
however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain
Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and
informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still
serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of
Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed
Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report
recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons
responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. The Department of
Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint
against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes

be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and
likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a
judge.

Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a
criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e).

Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint
and/ or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint
against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an
investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the
Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation
because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety
of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed
any administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present
inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

Held:
No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.”

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public
officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and

issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions.
The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not
such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the
course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.
“No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any
other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or
decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis
for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone.

Adajar V. Develos
Facts:
Luz C. Adajar filed a complaint against Teresita Develos, Cyrus Ellorin and CelsaEllorin,
who are government employees stationed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Complainant alleged that she delivered pieces of jewelries on a
consignment basis amounting to 70,000 pesos to Mrs. Teresita Develuz at her office at RTC
Branch 8 Staff Room, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon with the agreement that she will pay the said
amount within Three (3) Months. Mrs. Develuz made partial payments in the total amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. However, when demanded from to pay the balance of
P20,000.00 Pesos, she refused. On February 6, 2002 complainant, again, went to RTC Branch
8 to collect the account from Mrs. Develuz when the latter, in an angry and loud voice said, “Dili
bangagihatagan ta namankasalistahansamganakakuhasaalahas? Ikawnaangmaningilsaila”,
(which in English literally means “IS IT NOT THAT I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN YOU THE LIST OF
THOSE WHO GOT THE JEWELRIES? YOU COLLECT IT YOURSELF”). While having a verbal
tussle, Mr. Cyrus Ellorin who is a co-employee of Mrs. Develuz, with the designation of court
interpreter of Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, allegedly, went near and shouted. Mr. Cyrus
Ellorin violently pushed complainant of the staff room, practically driving her out as if she was a
leper. Employees of the office of the Clerk of Court brought her to their office and gave her
water and comforted her. The incident was reported to the police and entered into the blotter.
Respondents contend that the acts of respondents CelsaEllorin and Teresita Develos
being complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as court employees
but were in connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant. Respondents further assert
that complainant is guilty of dishonesty for certifying that she did not commence any other action
before any tribunal or body except before this Court when in fact she also filed a complaint for
misconduct with the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao. Respondents also submitted in
evidence a Joint-Affidavit executed by persons who were indebted to complainant stating
therein that respondent Develos simply facilitated the sale of jewelry made by complainant.
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct filed by
herein complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case against herein
respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against herein complainant.
The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao and, accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint be
dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this case

Held:
No, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of the
instant case the same being administrative in nature. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, it
has been settled as early as the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of power.
Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should have
referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead of resolving the same.
Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any force and effect on the present
administrative case before us.
 IN RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
Facts:
Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T.
Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative
Services of the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability to the
Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
(RA) 101541 which states:

Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of
Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the
Office of the President.
Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests
in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it
oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative
action against them for any violation thereof.4 As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody
records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires
retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees
of the Judiciary.1âwphi1 To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-
enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court
personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-
expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.5
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority of the court’s personnel?
Held:
Yes, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are
presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should
not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of court
personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary.
It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement
obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to
criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the
Ombudsman,6 on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s
power of administrative supervision.
 People V. Gacott
Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge
EustaquioGacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme Court. The
respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross
ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge?

Held: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matter or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court En Banc.
 IN RE: IBP ELECTIONS
696 SCRA 8 (2013)
Facts:
This is yet another controversy involving the leadership of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) that could have been resolved at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ level but
was instead referred to this taking away precious resources that could have been better applied
to resolve other conflicts for the public interest.
The consolidated cases involve two Administrative Matters. The first Administrative
Matter (A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC) arose from a Motion filed by Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP
Governor for Western Visayas. Atty. Ubano sought to invalidate or have this Court declare as
ultra vires the portion of the March 21, 2013 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which
approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as replacement of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. The second Administrative Matter arose from another Motion filed by
Atty. Ubano who sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election for IBP Executive Vice President
(EVP) and restrain Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging the duties of IBP EVP/Acting
President. In a Resolution dated June 18, 2013, this Court consolidated the second
Administrative Matter with the first.
On March 27, 2013, Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas, filed a
Motion (Original Motion) in relation to A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC. Atty. Ubano sought to invalidate or
have this Court declare as ultra vires the portion of the March 21, 2013 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the replacement
of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. In this Original Motion, Atty. Ubano
noted that on December 4, 2012, this Court approved an amendment to Article I, Section 4 of
the IBP By-Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public
office. Under the amended By-Laws, the resignation takes effect on the starting date of the
official campaign period. Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B.
Habawel, filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the
Province of Ifugao on or before October 5, 2012, and that on or before December 21, 2012, IBP
President, Roan Libarios, filed a Certificate of Substitution to run as a substitute congressional
candidate for the First District of Agusan del Norte.2
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the IBP?
Held:
The leadership of our Integrated Bar must find a better way of resolving its conflicts other
than elevating these matters to this Court. It cannot fail to show maturity in resolving its own
conflicts. It behooves the members of the legal profession to avoid being solitigious that they
lose sightof the primordial public interests that must be upheld in every case and conflict that is
raised to the level of this Court.
Otherwise, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines will continue to alienate its mass
membership through political contestations that may be viewed as parochial intramurals from
which only a few lawyers benefit. It will be generations of leaders who model needless litigation
and wasted time and energy. This is not what an integrated bar of a noble profession should be.
The Motion to Declare dated March 27, 2013 as Ultra Vires or Invalid the Urgent Motion to
Defer/Restrain Performance of Duties as Successor Governor of IBP Northern Luzon Region
dated April 22, 2013and the Very Urgent Motion to Restrain Atty. Chaguile from Voting in the
EVP Election on May22, 2013 dated May 20, 2013 filed by Atty. Marlou B. Ubano are denied for
being moot and academic.

YLAYA V. GACOTT
Facts:
Fe Ylaya filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. GacOtt. According to her, Atty. Gacott
deceived her and her late husband, Laurentino, into signing a preparatory deed of sale which
they thought would be used in the sale of the properties to the City Government of Puerto
Prinsesa because at that time the said properties were subject to expropriation proceedings. But
to their dismay, according to her, it was converted into a deed of absolute sale in favor of Atty.
Gacott’s uncle Reynolds So. Atty. Gacott denied these and claimed that Laurentino and Reynold
had originally purchased the properties that they were co-owners and that Laurentino
subsequently sold his share to Reynold under the deed of absolute sale. He also argued that it
was clear from the document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not juridical
because there were spaces for the buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship. Also, he
claimed that he was even constrained to file a subsequent motion to intervene on behalf of
Reynold because the complainant maliciously retained the TCTs to the subject properties after
borrowing them from his office.
Then, after some time, Fe Ylaya submitted a motion to withdraw and executed an
affidavit affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness, and due execution of the deed of
absolute sale. The IBP governor resolved to suspend Atty. Gacott to 2 years, finding him guilty
of violation of Rule 1.01 and canon 16 of the code of professional responsibility.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Atty. Gacott indeed deceived the spouses and should be suspended.
2. Whether or not the motion to withdraw and affidavit affirming and confirming the existence,
genuiness, and due execution will affect the disbarment proceedings.

Held:
1. Yes but not because of violation of Rule 1.01. Atty. Gacott’s failure to prove the existence
of co ownership does not lead to the conclusion that the deed of aabsolute sale is spurious and
he was responsible for creating the spurious documents.
However, he is liable for violating canon 16, rule 15.03, and rule 18.03. Canon 16, he
was remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. he lost certificates of land titles
that were entrusted to his care by Reynold. Rule 15.03, he admitted to be a acting as legal
counsel for the former owner of the subject properties, spouses Ylaya, and Reynold So. There
was no written consent from any of the parties involved. Rule 18.03, he neglected legal matters
entrusted to him. Records show that he never filed motion for leave to intervene on behalf of the
spouses in the expropriation proceedings, contrary to what he claimed.
2. No. While Fe Ylaya submitted the motion to withdraw the verified complaint and the
affidavit appear to exonerate Atty. Gacott, complete exoneration is not the necessary legal effect
as they are immaterial for purposes of the disbarment proceedings. According to Sec 5 Rule
139-B of the rules of Court, “no investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same”. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievances. They are undertaken and prosecutes solely for the
public welfare. Atty. Gacott was suspended from practice of law for one year.
SANDOVAL VS HRET
Facts:
- 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes, as evidenced by the Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for the Member of the House of
Representatives, the Board of Canvassers of the Legislative District of Malabon City-
Navotas proclaimed protestee Sandoval [herein petitioner] the winning candidate for the
Office of the Member of the House of Representatives with Seventy-one Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety (71,490) votes as against protestant Lacson-Noel who obtained the
second highest number of votes with Seventy Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-One
(70,331) votes; or a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Nine (1,159)
votes. Per the Summary Statement of Votes.

- Refusing to concede defeat, protestant Lacson-Noel filed the instant Petition of

Protest on 29 May 2007, and alleged in substance that the results [of the election] do not
reflect the true will of the voters as they are but products of various fraudulent and illegal
acts, schemes and machinations employed by [protestee] Sandoval, his agents and
supporters, with the connivance or conspiracy of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs),
which defrauded and deprived [her] of lawful votes cast at the precinct level. Specifically,
protestant Lacson-Noel assails the results of election in 623 precincts of the 1,437 total
number of precincts in the Lone Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas.
 - Sandoval filed his Answer wherein he specifically denied the material allegations of the
protest regarding the number of contested precincts, grounds for protest, commission of
frauds and irregularities, and the necessity of recount and revision, for being self-serving
and unsupported by evidence. By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, protestee
Sandoval contends that it is protestant Lacson-Noel who is guilty of violating election
laws, rules and regulations and which, on the other hand, resulted to (sic) the loss of
legal and valid votes in [his] favor. He narrates that during the crucial hours of voting,
counting, recording of the votes cast and transmittal of the records of the votes cast,
most of his poll watchers were unable to effectively keep an eye on the proceedings and
secure his votes because the latter were supposedly prevented from entering the
Navotas polling precincts unlike protestant Lacson-Noel's poll watchers who were readily
accommodated. As a result of the illegal schemes and machinations employed by
protestant Lacson-Noel and her supporters, protestee Sandoval maintains that
protestant Lacson-Noel was able to garner a substantial number of illegal and
undeserved votes from the Municipality of Navotas. With respect to Malabon City,
protestee Sandoval similarly claims that massive fraud and illegal electoral practices
were committed all through the election process which tarnished the results of several
identified precincts in Malabon City.
Issue:
W/N HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
not admitting petitioner's formal offer of evidence, thereby denying him due process.
Ruling:
- It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of
electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not
interfere with the electoral tribunals’ exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.
- Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an additional period of time
within which to make his formal offer of evidence. However, a review of the proceedings
will reveal that the HRET acted in accordance with its rules of procedure and well within
its jurisdiction.
- Petitioner commenced presentation of his evidence on September 2, 2008. Further
hearings were scheduled for September 15, 18, 23 and 25, 2008. He was able to
present evidence on September 15, 18, and 25, 2008, but the hearing set for September
23, 2008 was canceled upon motion of petitioner. On September 29, 2008, the Hearing
Commissioner set additional hearings for October 2, 13, 27, 28, 29 and 31, 2008 and
November 3, 2008, for reception of petitioner's evidence. However, due to unavailability
of petitioner's counsel, no hearings were held on the dates set for the whole month of
October. Hearings only resumed on November 3 and 11, 2008 and, on the latter date,
petitioner moved that he be allowed more time to present additional witnesses. Despite
opposition from respondent Lacson-Noel, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 08-342
dated November 24, 2008, granting petitioner an additional period of ten (10) days within
which to present evidence, with the warning that no further extension shall be given. The
Hearing Commissioner notified the parties that further hearings will be held on
December 10 and 11, 2008. Said hearing dates were utilized by petitioner.
 - Nevertheless, in utter disregard of the Tribunal's warning, petitioner again filed on
December 18, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion (with Prayer for Suspension of the
Period to File Protestee's Formal Offer of Evidence), praying for more time to present
more witnesses, and that he be allowed to file his Formal Offer of Evidence upon
completion of presentation of his evidence. Respondent Lacson-Noel opposed said
motion, pointing out that the additional period of ten (10) days granted to petitioner
lapsed on December 24, 2008. Thus, on January 22, 2009, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 09-009, pointing out that despite the additional period of ten days granted
to him and the lapse of more than three (3) months reckoned from September 2, 2008,
petitioner had not completed the presentation of his evidence. Since the last day of the
extension granted to him was on December 23, 2008 and said period lapsed without
petitioner completing presentation of his evidence including formal offer thereof, he was
deemed to have waived the same.

GUINGONA VS GONZALEZ
Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the
Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5;
NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able
to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP
majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12
senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not
leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation.

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the
membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect
12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a
proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the
maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership
thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it
results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed
by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the
required quorum.
City of Davao Vs RTC
FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of
its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of
Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land
it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government
Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS
its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of
LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.”

However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon
effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption,
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second
paragraph.

Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact
future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power
of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal
laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting
the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec.
33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through
legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two
conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt
status of GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption,
incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed
strictly against the person claiming it.”

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the
GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the
City of Davao.
Nazareth vs Villar
Facts:
- Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered
on June 4, 2009 by the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled
Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of Science and
Technology, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005
and LAO-National Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on disallowances of
subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,2
affirming the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit Team Leader of
COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the payment of benefits to
covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the DOST.

- The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June
4, 2009 "null and void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the
benefits for CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439),
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other
Science and Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on
the strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April
12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the "approval" made by the Executive Secretary on April 12, 2000 on the
request for authority to use savings of the agency to pay the benefits, was valid; and

2. Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the agency using its savings for the
years 1998 and 1999 based on Section 56 of RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998
[GAA]) were legal and valid.
Ruling:
- In Nazareth v. Villar, there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object
of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose
of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress
had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for
augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution
and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during
budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.
- No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the
payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a... benefit granted by law to
 a covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by the good faith
of the approving official and of the recipient.

- Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President was subject to two
essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation from the agency's savings
would be validly effected. The first required that there must be savings from the
authorized appropriation... of the agency. The second demanded that there must be an
existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to
which the savings would be transferred for augmentation purposes only.
 ARAULLO VS AQUINO

Facts:
- When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
- The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn,
these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy
as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the
DAP
- Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting
in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators.
- This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
Issues:
Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
Held:
- No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
- No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations
for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be
an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
- No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.