THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS

vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 17584 (March 8, 1922)

FACTS:

Mr. Gregorio Santiago was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional and
to pay for the cost of the trial, for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence. He was the
cause of the death of a 7 year old Porfirio Parondo by striking the boy with his automobile while
he was driving at a rate of 30 miles per hour on a 6 meter wide road. Mr. Santiago disagrees
with the court’s judgment, arguing that the Philippine legislature is not authorize to amend the
General Order No. 58 Sec. 2 which states that “All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in
the name of the United States against the persons charged with the offenses” and therefore
questioned the constitutionality of Act No. 2886. By amendment of the General Order No. 58
sec. 2 , Act 2886 states that “All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the
people of the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense”.

ISSUE:

Whether or NOT Act 2889 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
NO. Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of
the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on principle.
Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal
successor to the Military Government as a legislative body. As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is
not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58. The Philippine Commission, at various
times, had amended it by the enactment of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194,
regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590
about preliminary investigations by justices of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and
before the enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had also amended
this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to the Supreme
Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and by Act No. 2709 which deals
with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in order to be utilized as state's
witnesses. These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our
present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as
the successors of the Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
Furthermore, the court’s main purpose is limited only to criminal procedure and to give to its
provisions the effect of law in criminal matters
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced to
the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances.
 THE UNITED STATES
vs.
ANDRES PABLO.
G.R. No. L-11676 (October 17, 1916)
FACTS:
Andres Pablo is a policeman of the municipality of Balanga. He was ordered by his chief to visit
ad raid the barrio of Tuyo for the alleged operation of Jueteng game. Upon arriving in the target
area, Mr. Pablo found nothing since the players left and ran away, perhaps advised that he will
be conducting a raid. However, upon his search, he then recovered a tambiolo and 37 balls used
in the game. He also saw Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leaving the place, since he saw
no proof that the two men were playing the game, he refrained from arresting them instead he
arrested Francisco Dato who was left in the area.
Andres Pablo then reported the said incident to his chief who immediately filed a complaint to
the Court of Justice of the Peace against Rodrigo, Malicsi and Dato for violating the municipal
ordinace No. 5. As a result, the accused were arrested but then admitted to bail.
Pablo took oath to testify that on October 21, 1915, he and his companion raided the jueteng
game where they saw Dato and a tambiola and 37 pieces of balls but they did not see Malicsi
and Rodrigo. His testimony acquitted Malicsi and Rodrigo from the suit.
The Provincial Fiscal then further investigated the case and found out that before the testimony
of Andres Pablo, he, together with Malicsi and Rodrigo had a discussion. Pablo would exclude
the two accused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the involvement in exchange of a bribe of fifteen
pesos.
Because of the development of the case, the Provincial Fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of
Frist Instance, charging Andres Pablo of perjury and in violation of Act No. 1697.
ISSUE:
Whether or NOT the respondent, Andres Pablo, is guilty of committing crime of perjury or of
false testimony, violated the provisions under the Revised Penal Code under article 318 and
324?
HELD:
YES. The respondent is guilty of violating the provisions under the Revised Penal Code under
Article 318 and 324.
Since Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code. The said articled
of the Penal Code are in force and applicable to false testimony. It is proven that Andres Pablo
falsely testified before the court by excluding the alleged gamblers from their accountabilities.
The court ruled that”… in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has
incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision
correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.”.
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and sentence
Andres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one day of prision correccional, to
pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. Mr. Pablo will also pay
the costs of both instances.
 ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES
G.R. No. L-64279 (April 30, 1984)
FACTS:
Anslemo Pesigan and Marcelino Pesigan were both Carabao dealers. On April 2, 1982, the transported an
Isuzu ten-wheeler truck with twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur bound to Padre
Garcia, Batangas.
To conform with the Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-cattle Rustling law of
1974, they secured a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur. They also
secured a permit to transport large cattle issued under the provincial commander and three certificates
of inspection : (1) from Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list
of lost, stolen and questionable animals; (2) from the livestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur; and (3) from livestock inspector, the mayor of Sipocot.
Despite of having secured the necessary permits to transport the Carabao, they were held and their
carabaos were confiscated by the town’s police station commander and the provincial veterinarian, Dr.
Bella S. Miranda. The confiscation was in accordance to the Executive Order No. 626-A which provides
"that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another”, “the confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit”. In
addition, the said Executive Order was released on October 25, 1980 and was published on an Official
Gazette on June 14, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or NOT the Executive Order No. 626-A can be enforced before its official publication in the
Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
HELD:
NO. Executive Order No. 626-A cannot be enforced before its official publication in the Official Gazette
on June 14, 1982. Since the Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that, “Laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided.” Publication is therefore important to inform the public of the provisions of the
Laws, Executive Orders, Presidential Decrees, etc. Therefore the trial court's order of dismissal and the
confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and
Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as
owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot,
Camarines Sur.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA.
G.R. No. L-63915 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus to enforce the respondent public officials to publish in the
Official Gazette several General Orders, Letter of instructions, Proclamations, Executive Orders,
Administrative Orders, and Presidential Decrees.
The Respondents, through the Solicitor General, dismissed the complaint because the petitioners have
no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition through the Solicitor General.
The petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course. However, the respondents contend that the publication in Official Gazette is not a
requirement for the effectivity of the law since the law has provided its own effectivity dates. Stressing
the point of the respondent through Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that “Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...”
ISSUE:
Whether or NOT publication in the Official Gazette affects the validity of the Executive issuances.
HELD:
The court ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. It was explained that
such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia legis non excusat
(ignorance of the law exempt no one). Moreover, the failure to publish would in return create injustice
on punishing persons violating the law in which he was not informed about it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

FACTS:
Two cases filed for the complaint for the violation of the Anti-Subversion Act. First, on March 5, 1970 was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against Feliciano Co, stating that Co was a high-ranking leader
of the Communist Party of the Philippines which aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines
by means of force, violence, deceit, or any other illegal means. Second, on May 25, 1970, another
criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. Both parties requested the court to render the previous decision as null and void questioning
the validity and constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act is a Bill of Attainder.

ISSUE:
Whether or NOT the Anti-Subversion Act participates in the nature of Bill of Attainder.

HELD:
yes. The Anti-Subversion Act participates in the nature of Bill of Attainder. According to Article III, section
1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.”
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder
because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of
the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge,"
and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because
it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
Therefore, the statute only applies to those persons who were proved to be members of the Communist
group in such a way that to inflict punishment without any judicial trial makes the law bill of attainder.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES
UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC.,
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

FACTS:
A petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a duly recognized and
existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No.6132 and the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and
duties thereunder. Kay Villegas Kami Inc. impugns only on the first paragraph of R.A. No. 6132 Sec.8(a)
claiming it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression, and that it is
an ex post facto law.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is unconstitutional and is in the nature of an ex post facto
law
RULING:
No, Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional and is not in the nature of an ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is a law that: a) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; b) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed; c) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed; d) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; e)
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful ; and f) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled such as protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Given such, the constitutional inhibition pertains
only to criminal laws which are given a retroactive effect.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978
FACTS:

On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the city court of
Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4,
966. 63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the court
of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.
Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch
VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case
falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took
cognizance of the case, should try it.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his order of April 21, 1977 directed
the re-elevation of the case. His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium
under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article
315 of the Revised Penal Code.
That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court on May 27, 1977
by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty for estafa imposed constitutes the nature of ex post facto?
HELD: YES. The court held that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original
jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or four months and
one day to two years and four months.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years, imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks which
was committed or after October 22, 1975.
That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on October 16, 1974. To
apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited
by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE
G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922
Facts:
On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered into a
contract with the defendants concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros and co. were obliged to pay five
percent interest per month within the first ten days of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz
Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and in case of
insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law. They took it to
SC to plead.
ISSUE: WoN the Usury Law has a retroactive effect and an ex post facto in this case?
HELD:
No, the Usury law, a penal law, cannot become retroactive unless it is favorable to the person
accused. The Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this
jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the present case
Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to
make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The
Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before its adoption a
crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is curative in character, but
ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.
For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the present case were legal at the time of
their occurrence, they cannot be made criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto legislation. What
the courts may say, considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil Code, when a civil action is
brought upon said contract, cannot now be determined. A contract may be annulled by the courts
when it is shown that it is against morals or public order.
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901
Facts:
A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance against Philip K. Sweet, an employee of the US
Military, for having committed an offense against a prisoner of war. The offense charged in the
complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325
to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56
(6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of
more than six months' imprisonment or fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." In his
defense, he contended that being a soldier or a military employee, that he was “acting in the line of
duty” at the time the offense was committed, it exempts him from the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil court have jurisdiction to try the case of the accused?
HELD:
Yes. In this case, the general principle applies—that the jurisdiction of civil courts is unaffected by
the military or other special character of the person brought before it. The contention also that the
act was performed under the order of his military superior cannot affect the right of the court to take
jurisdiction of the case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no actual conflict
between the two jurisdictions; the military tribunal not asserting any claim.
LILY RAQUIZA
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD
G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945
FACTS:
Petitioners Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante invoked their petition for
habeas corpus dated August 30, 1945, that they have been and are being "confined, restrained and
deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women. By virtue of the proclamation
issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily Raquiza was on
March 13, 1945, arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the U.S. Sixth
Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385 (Schedule A), wherein she was
charged as follows:
Commitment Order. — The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security of
the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any military stockade,
jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is authorized and directed to
detain him in custody until released by competent military authority.
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against petitioner
Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, it appears that by virtue of the aforesaid proclamation she, on
February 25, 1945, was arrested by the same 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and
detained under Security Commitment Order No. 286 (Schedule A-2) wherein the Commitment Order
is in exactly the same terms as in Schedule A. The specific complaint or charge against petitioner
Tee Han Kee in Schedule A-2 is "Active collaboration with the enemy."
With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, it appears that by virtue of the same proclamation she,
on April 10, 1945, was arrested by the 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United
States Army Forces in the Far East and detained under Commitment of that date (Schedule A-1),
wherein she was charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association
with the enemy constitutes a present security risk to the United States Armed Forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court have jurisdiction or legal power to try the case?
HELD:
No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or
to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage
implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline).
Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our
country’s faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.
 JEFFREY LIANG vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000
FACTS:

Jeffrey Liang was an employee of Asian Development Bank (ADB) as an economist. The petitioner was
allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. A petition
was filed against Jeffrey Liang. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity
from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside
the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement?

HELD:
No. The petitioner is not covered by immunity under the agreement. He is not covered by immunity
because the commission of a crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly
adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by
immunity. That a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the accused as
much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty. Under Vienna
convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
FACTS:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11,
1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification
of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition
with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal
action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of
Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article
III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such
jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the
Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila and SC has jurisdiction to try the case?

HELD:
Yes. The Court of First Instance of Manila and SC has jurisdiction to try the case. This case involves no
question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to
which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where he resides. the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was NOT exclusive.
The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction"
in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred
upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of
original
The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the
Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment or fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.)
Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already
indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are
subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the
Union.

THE UNITED STATES

vs.
H. N. BULL
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

FACTS:
H. N. Bull was a master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard. The vessel was
known to have transported cattle, carabao, and other animals from a foreign port to the port of Manila.
On December 2, 1908, H. N. Bull was alleged to have willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport,
and bring the said animals in the port of Manila from the port of Ampieng, Formosa. It was alleged to
carry 677 heads of cattle and carabao without providing suitable means for securing said animals while
in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals. H. N. Bull master failed to
provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a
proper manner and some animals were being tied by means of rings passed through its noses and allow
and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied
or secured in stalls, and all without bedding. The H. N. Bull master neglected and failed to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court,
where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4)
that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines?

HELD:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila
Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime
committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters - although the same conditions existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and
while it was on the high seas.
Considering the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

THE UNITED STATES

vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU)
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

FACTS:
On August 19, 1909, the defendant, Look Chaw was found to have carried, kept, possessed and had in his
possession and control, 96 kilograms of opium and selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium from
Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty,
and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government,
of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or
when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned
over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on immigration.
The defendant contended that the Court of First instance of Cebu has no jurisdiction on the case and has
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court have the jurisdiction to try the case of unlawful possession of opium
on a foreign vessel and unlawful sale of opium on Philippine soil?

HELD:

No. The Philippine court have no jurisdiction to try the case. Although the mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose
use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the
court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.
The court ordered reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000,
respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.

THE UNITED STATES

vs.
AH SING
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917

FACTS:
Ah Sing was an employed fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. On April 25, 1917, the steam ship Shun
Chang arrived in the port of Cebu after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant was found
to have possessed eight cans of opium bought from Saigon. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his
purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into
the Philippine Islands.
Stating the case of US vs. Look Chaw, a marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and
the facts in the present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case was the
illegal possession and sale of opium while in Ah Sing case the charge as illegal importation of opium; in
the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit while in Ah Sing case the foreign vessel was not in
transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegal possession of opium in the Philippine soil has criminal liability?

HELD:
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports or brings any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control
on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the
Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or
the defense proves otherwise.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

LOL-LO and SARAW
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

FACTS:
On June 30, 1920, 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat
arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded
by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat,
too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All
of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2
women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
 All the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular
state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to
war, are not neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD:
YES. Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force
in the Philippines. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary
for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. At least 3
aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of
superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. In accordance with provisions of Act No.
2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced
therefor to be hung until dead.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN),
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

Facts:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the
revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant.
The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the
city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said
crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters?

Held: Yes. The Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed since to smoke opium within
our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public
order because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.
 JESUS MIQUIABAS vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948
Facts:
A writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus
Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a
General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense over which the said court has no
jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines, who
has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United States
Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States. He has been arrested for that reason
and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to
15 years imprisonment, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review. As a rule that the
Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but
it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall
exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory.

Issue:
Whether or not the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the
case?

Held:
No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed is not within a US base for it is not names
in Annex A or B of Article XXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) and is merely part of the
temporary quarters located within presented limits of the city of Manila. Moreover,
extended installations and temporary quarters are not considered to have the same jurisdictional
capacity as permanent bases and are governed by Article XIII paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar,
therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.

MARIO GUMABON vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

Facts:
A writ for Habeas Corpus have been filed by the five
petitioners for their release from imprisonment. Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May
5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson
and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954
and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on
Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.

Issue: WON judicial decisions favorable to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied
retroactively?
Held: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on
Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the
accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional
right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by
the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES
UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC.,
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

FACTS:
A petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a duly recognized and
existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No.6132 and the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and
duties thereunder. Kay Villegas Kami Inc. impugns only on the first paragraph of R.A. No. 6132 Sec.8(a)
claiming it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression, and that it is
an ex post facto law.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is unconstitutional and is in the nature of an ex post facto
law
RULING:
No, Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional and is not in the nature of an ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is a law that: a) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; b) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed; c) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed; d) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; e)
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful ; and f) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled such as protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Given such, the constitutional inhibition pertains
only to criminal laws which are given a retroactive effect.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

Facts:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez
together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George
Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the
hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At
the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez. At that time,
appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he
arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented
from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So, he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if
possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good,' addressing the
deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit,
proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer,
hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep,
appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shooting.
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

Issue: WON that the fines that may be imposed for nonpayment of civil indemnity constitute a
retroactive effect?

Held: Yes, while he is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465
made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused,
indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after
its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it
may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

People of the Philippines vs.

Augusto Loreot Ringor, Jr.
G.R. No. 123918. December 9, 1999

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A
witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and
poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun,
entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six
times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an
unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed
firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove
Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced
to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a
sentence of 17 to 20 years.
ISSUES: Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 constitutrs an expost facto law?

Held: No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase his penalty from
reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it
becomes an ex post facto law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 100210 April 1, 1998b

Facts:
On 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a member of a communist
party of the Philippines, and its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No.
1026387 and with six (6) live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof
from competent government authority

Issue: Whether or not the Charge under RA No. 1700 which was repealed by RA No. 736 should have
constituted retroactive effect?

Held: Yes. The subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the
subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700,
as amended, has substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said
repealing law being favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect. Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondents
case has never been raised as an issue by the parties obviously because the said law came out only
several months after the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated and while the
present petition is pending with this Court we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of justice by
applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of whether or not the accused or any party
has sought the application of the beneficent provisions of the repealing law. That R.A. No. 7636 should
apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No.
1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The
legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for
the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. PANFILO M. LACSON
G.R. No. 149453. May 28, 2002

Facts:
Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a
shootout with the police, two witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-
out. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director or Investigation, filed murder
charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG.
The nextof- kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and
personnel.
On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11
informations of murder against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the
respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the
informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of
charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not due to jurisdictional
questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were
committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A.
No. 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the
prosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants submitted their
affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance
of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The cases
were dismissed.
It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new
affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate and to file with the RTC. The
respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals denied. On June 6,
2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged
as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of
probable cause and an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be
provisionally dismissed and the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000,
the cases were dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the
respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.

RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed.
There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There
can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is
need of proof to show the following facts:
(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party
(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed
(4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period.

The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether the notices to the
offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double
Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to
the 2-year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant must be given
ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PANFILO M. LACSON
GR No. 149453, Apr 01, 2003
Facts:
The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven male person... bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its...
application are attendant.
It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for... its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in court
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied... retroactively.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application
were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of
On, March 29, 1999.The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs
of the victims were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were... served
with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit... retroactively to the criminal cases against the
respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair,
reduce, and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former
should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive... periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred
beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may
be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question... since '[t]he State's witnesses were
ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it
became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.'[29] According to the respondent, penal
laws,... either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.
[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years
thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State... to fairly indict him.[31] In any event,
the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is
to be punished.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement
the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule,... its purpose and effect, and
whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be
remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.

Issue: Whether or not there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period

Held:
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule
should not be applied retroactively against the State.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the... intendment of the
new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so.
If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three
months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should
not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State
and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Principles:
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the
factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:

"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PANFILO M. LACSON
GR No. 149453, October 7, 2003
Facts:
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the
recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they were
appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the integral
portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and
decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition.6 On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a
motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary
inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent’s Motion dated March 18,
2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of
the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-
SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court who had actually participated in the
deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the
inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that they were
appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already
been submitted for decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the respondent.7 The
Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court:
The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by the
respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to the
Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been
and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for
reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice
Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution
of the Court.

Issue:
Whether Prospective or Retroactive the Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Held:
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying
penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied
prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to
the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply
to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was
purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to
a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently
and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since
Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have
retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly,
prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and
equal protection of the law.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused.
In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent
anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before
the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the
Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in
violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.

In their comment on the respondent’s motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective application of
Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that
the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude
the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then
Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule.

ROBERT SIERRA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009

Facts:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old was playing with her friend in the second floor of her family’s house in
Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told the thirteen-year-old and her friend that he
wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed one of the girl and had sexual intercourse with
her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting
his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
The thirteen--year-old subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores
Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied the child to the barangay office. The
child was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent
with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner
was charged with rape under the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister and
the thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.
Invoking RA 9334, Juvenile Justice act of 2006, that Robert Sierra was exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9344 constitutes retroactivity?

Held:
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor
(he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total
exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.[41] As we explained in discussing
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344[42] in the recent case of Ortega v. People
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of
the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICLs age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICLs age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
[Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended,
which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is
not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a
habitual criminal.

ISIDRO BERNARDO and CAYETANO BERNARDO vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983
Facts:
Petitioner Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from
October 1972 to August 1974. At the time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his family's
dwelling. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, was staying with him in said house as his helper in
tilling the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the landholding and transferred to San Nicolas, Bulacan without
the knowledge of the landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa. Before leaving the landholding, however, Isidro
transferred his tenancy rights to his son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, who continued to reside in
subject house. Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole riceland, through her overseer
Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.
A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against herein petitioners, Isidro Bernardo and
Cayetano Bernardo, before the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost before the inferior
court as well as in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Likewise, petitioners lost in their petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain criminal case for alleged violation of
presidential decree no 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offence or violation
of said law

RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal
statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by the statute. Based on its preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in urban
areas and not to agricultural lands.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 100210 April 1, 1998b

Facts:
On 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a member of a communist
party of the Philippines, and its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No.
1026387 and with six (6) live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof
from competent government authority

Issue: Whether or not the Charge under RA No. 1700 which was repealed by RA No. 736 should have
constituted retroactive effect?

Held: Yes. The subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the
subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700,
as amended, has substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said
repealing law being favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect. Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondents
case has never been raised as an issue by the parties obviously because the said law came out only
several months after the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated and while the
present petition is pending with this Court we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of justice by
applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of whether or not the accused or any party
has sought the application of the beneficent provisions of the repealing law. That R.A. No. 7636 should
apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No.
1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The
legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for
the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists.

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
 G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue: Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?

Held:
No. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR. vs.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969

Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It
was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel
for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon,
petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be
exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the
witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure
to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.

Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case
may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If
petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property
but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well
the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight.
The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens.

EVANGELINE LADONGA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 7068 – 7070. In May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited
with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the
amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55), payable to
Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of
rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee
bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the
United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Alfredo Oculam in the afforested amount.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced
but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator?

Held: No. The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the
accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the
present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner
is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to
mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ELIAS RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. L-13981 April 25, 1960

Facts:
On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba, Laguna. The accused filed to motion to quash on the
ground that the crime with which he is charged is already alleged as a component element or ingredient
of the crime of rebellion with which he was charged in Criminal Case No. 16990 of the court of First
Instance of Manila. Upon denial of his motion to quash the justice of the peace court proceeded with the
preliminary investigation wherein the accused tried to prove that the firearm and ammunition in
question did not belong to him for they were merely left with him by another person who had
disappeared, his failure to report the same to the authorities being merely due to his work. He
disclaimed animus posidendi

Issue: Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of involuntary manslaughter?

Holding: No, Bench trial found def guilty of involuntary manslaughter. New trial denied. Order and
judgment reversed. Involuntary manslaughter “is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice,
in the commission of a crime, not a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or w/o due caution and circumspect . . ." Criminal negligence is a required
element of this crime. Criminal negligence is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act of the slayer
tended to endanger life and that the fatal consequences of the negligent act could reasonably have been
foreseeable.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 14560 (November 19, 2001)

Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659
Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear
violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.

Issue:
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum?

No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case
of plunder that predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the
larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster
the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that
so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of people it governs over.

Lozano v Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419
18 Dec 1986
Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied
by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General,
commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying
their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of
lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed is punishable as malum prohibitum?

Held: Yes. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not
malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

ORIEL MAGNO
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

Facts:
Oriel Magno lacked funds to purchase necessary equipment to make his car repair shop business
operational. He approached Corazon Teng, who in turn referred LS Finance and Management
Corporation, who could accommodate him and provide him credit facilities. LS Finance required a
warranty deposit (30%
of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased), which Teng advanced, unknown to
Magno. When the equipment were delivered to Magno, he issued a postdated check to LS Finance,
which delivered it to Teng. When the check matured, Magno requested that the check not to be
deposited as he no longer banks with Pacific Bank. To replace the check, Magno issued 6 postdated
checks, 2 of which were deposited and cleared, the other 4 were held momentarily by Teng, on the
request of Magno for they are not covered with
sufficient funds. As Magno cannot pay the monthly rentals fro the equipment, the same were pulled out.
Only then did Magno learned that Teng was the one who advanced the deposit. Magno promised to pay
her but payment never came. When the checks were deposited, they were dishonored. Magno was
found guilty of violation of BP22 when the cases were adjudicated.

Issue: Whether there was a violation of BP 22.

Held: The crux of the matter rest upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by Magno, i.e.
whether they were drawn or issued “to apply on account or for value,” as required under Section 1 of BP
22. When viewed against the definitions of “warranty” and “deposit,” for which the postdated checks
were issued or drawn, the alleged crime could not have been committed by Magno. Furthermore, the
element of “knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank....:” is inversely applied in the case. From the beginning, Magno never hid the fact that he
had no funds. Magno, thus, was acquitted of the crime charged.

THE UNITED STATES,

vs.
GO CHICO G.R. No. 4963
September 15, 1909
Facts:
On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of
the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the
form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio
Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the
one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the
medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On
the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the
purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the
windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law
against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts
above stated are admitted.
The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September
1908. After hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs
of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place
prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant
appealed to this court.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of
the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Held: No, In the opinion of the court is that, it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with
the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who
commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act
complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In
those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the
intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this.
The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the
Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental
authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The
display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large
class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the
public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

FAUSTA GONZALES
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

Facts:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like
to surrender to the authorities. At the autopsy report, it was found that the deceased body acquired
several wound stabs, and died due to massive hemorrhage due to multiple laceration.
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in
the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and
protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime constitutes a felony?

Held:
Yes. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa)
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Therefore, the act done was provided as stated in Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed, or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

CATALINO APOSTOL
G.R. No. 5126 September 2, 1909

Facts:
On the 16th of December, 1907, five individuals, among them being the accused herein, went to the
house where Pedro Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul were living, and there
inquired after some carabaos that had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned inmates
answered that they knew nothing about the matter, ordered them to leave the house, but as the three
men refused to do so the accused Catalino Apostol, set fire to the hut and the same was burnt down.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted without a criminal intent?

Held:
Yes, the accused acted with criminal intent. As provided in Art. 1, Penal Code, Criminal intent as well as
the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act
which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. In view of the nature of the crime and
considering the circumstances attending the same, recognizes the extreme severity of the penalty;
therefore we apply the remedy afforded it by article 2, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, when a strict
application of the provisions of the code would result in an excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by the crime

THE UNITED STATES vs.

RAFAEL B. CATOLICO
G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911

Facts: The justice of peace of Cagayan had before him 16 separate civil cases initiated by Juan Canillas for
damages resulting from breach of contract. All cases were decided in favour of Canillas and all
defendants appealed the decision and deposited Php 16 and a bond of Php 50 as required by law. It
appears that the sureties of the bond were insolvent and new bonds were not presented on the
extension given. Canillas appealed. The justice of peace dismissed the appeals and ordered the sm of
money attached and delivered to Canillas in satisfaction of the judgment. The judge was prosecuted for
malversation of funds.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of felony.

Decision: Judgment of conviction is reversed and defendant ordered to be discharged from custody.
The judge decided in good faith under the belief that he was acting judiciously and correctly. It was a
result of erroneous exercise of judicial function and not an intention to deprive any person of his
property feloniously. He acted that debts might be paid t those who they are legally and justly due and
not to enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was a mistake not a crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

Facts:

On January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of
Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there)
arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place. When it was
time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz
with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as
Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she
handed to the accused But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a
check for P100,000 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car
again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to
her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo,
he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway

Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

Held:
No. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another
offense primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

People of the R.P. vs.

MARLON DELIM
G.R. No. 142773 January 28, 2003

FACTS
It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto
Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an
adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the
house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both
armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and
alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES:
Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

HELD:
Yes there is Conspiracy, CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony
itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the
existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the
crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed
with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto
On the other hand, there is no since, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed
and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto
was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
Facts:
At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children,
were conversing in the store adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan
del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope
cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and
Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon
seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom
she later Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the main door and
demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his
firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina
hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to
the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by the
Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the man who killed her
husband.
Accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's Army) were not
apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other members- followers of
the New People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass
surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista
public market on November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.

Issue: Whether or not the accused had an intention of killing the deceased?

Held:
Yes, the accused had a criminal intent to kill the deceased. The court held that, Appellant's alleged lack
of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that the defendant's
knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by
members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for
their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the
NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been
positively Identified. The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing
Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an
implied admission of guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

USMAN HASSAN
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988

Facts:
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a
resident of Zamboanga City. At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as
manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-
year-old pushcart cargador.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and the
sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the
Homicide and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for the prosecution.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married, and a
resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business
of the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February 3,
1982.
Jose Samson was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he was
a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the
Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon
who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from the fruit
stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and
that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination
if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name."

Issue:
Whether or not Hassan conviction was valid?

Held:
No, Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the suspension
of his sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more
meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance
on the observation of the judge as had happened in this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that
the accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving
at an accurate determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on
notice that there is the probability that the accused might be exempted from criminal liability due to his
young age. All the foregoing indicates that the accused had not been granted the concern and
compassion with which the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when
judicial and police processes and procedures are thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of
the law and justice being denied the poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment
now, considering the acquittal of the accused herein ordered. Furthermore, no motive was established.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

AH CHONG
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

Facts:
Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at
the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines
along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment
he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In
the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who
had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is
probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door
against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran
out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he
called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages
to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

Issue:

Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable for the act?

Held:
No, By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will
not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was
actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

Facts:
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector
at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or
alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez,
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a
copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were
instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram.
The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that
he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas'
whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial
Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez
taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group
arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks,
and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said
that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room
which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went
to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she
saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that
the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing,
repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon
autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers
were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.

Issue:
WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties.

Held:
No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was
sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

EUTIQUIA CARMEN et. Al
G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001

Facts:
On or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 o’clock p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which
injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.
The trial court rendered a decision and the accused-appellants were all found guiltybeyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder after having performed a cultic healing pray-over which resulted to the
death of Randy Luntayao. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue: WON accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
considering that the information charges them with murder.

Held: Yes. Conviction modified to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Killing a person w/
treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it’s presumed to be the natural
consequence of physical injuries inflicted. In murder qualified by treachery, it’s required only that there
is treachery in the attack, & this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.

Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may
arise from the proof of the criminal act. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended.

The strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent
to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their
actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and not of murder.

THE UNITED STATE vs.

JAMES L. BROBST
G.R. No. L-4935 October 25, 1909
Facts:
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work on a mine
located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native laborers.
Mann discharged one of these number of native laborers. Mann discharged one of these laborers named
Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ
him again, because he was a thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers. A few days
afterwards, some time after 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with
three of four others, went to the mine to look for work. The defendant, who at that time was dressing
himself inside his tent, which was erected on the mining property, when he caught sight of Saldivar,
ordered him off the place, exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move
to leave, and although the order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the defendant, whereupon
the latter became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with his
closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle of Saldivar's bolo lay
against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered
and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's house, which stood about 200 yards
(100 brazas) away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached the door of the house
and was buried some two or three days later.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is criminally liable for the act committed?

Held:
Yes. the defendant is criminally liable since as provided in article 1 of the Penal Code, “Any person
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful
act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit”. However, it was proven, and
the court found that not only did the defendant not intend to kill the deceased but also that he did not
intend to do him any physical injury whatever; but in the case at bar the evidence conclusively
establishes the voluntary, intentional, and unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe blow on the
person of the deceased; and while it is true that the accused does not appear to have intended to take
the life of his victim, there can no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some
injury, at least to the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him, and he is therefore,
criminally responsible for the natural, even if unexpected results of his act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO
G.R. No. L-35574 September 28, 1984

Facts:
On or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon.
Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with
whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated at Pasay City, where
said Elias Day y Pablo was working as a security guard; and the said accused, having in her possession a
bottle containing gasoline suddenly and without warning, poured the contents on the person of her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo suffered
burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.
On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at
Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10)
centavo-worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which... she placed in a coffee
bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry at her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the
latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their
house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she... knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was
opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14, id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline
and poured the contents... thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14 id). Then, she got a matchbox
and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame.
Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity
General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p. 208, rec.) due to
'Pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2°... secondary'.
In that... investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and
thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement

Issue:
whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause
of the victim's death?

Held:
The evidence shows that... pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting
pneumonia as the immediate cause of death... this could not have resulted had not the victim suffered
from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly... so, that with pneumonia having developed, the
burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes immediately or
immediately to the death of such other
It is that every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his
own... acts.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"Art. 4. Criminal Liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended."... the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed;
and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

DANIEL JAVIER AND NILO ILAGAN
G.R. No. 70997 February 28, 1990

Facts:

On or about April 25, 1982 at Brgy. Masaya, Bay, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, of which (sic) Nilo Ilagan is a minor, but who acted with discerment,
while both are conveniently armed with long and short firearms with intent to gain, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with the use of force and intimidation rob, steal and carry away sacks of palay belonging to Justino Lat
and Arnel Lat, and against their will and consent and by reason or occasion thereof, accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with the use of said firearms, with intent to kill, and
with evident premeditation and treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
without justifiable reason, attack, assault and shoot Justino Lat with their firearms, thereby inflicting on
the latter serious and mortal wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused the death
of Justino Lat to the damage and prejudice of the said victims and the surviving heirs.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for the act committed?

Held:
Yes. The appellant and accused Nilo Ilagan who were armed initially ordered the victim and Arnel Lat to
carry two (2) cavans of palay from the pile of palay to a place near the Masaya Elementary School where
they were ordered to stop. This fact clearly demonstrates that the appellant's and his co-accused's
intention at the time was to commit the clime of robbery as they did in fact commit it. The next morning,
the investigator found the said two sacks near the body of the deceased Justino Lat. In view of these
evidence the non-presentation in court of the two (2) sacks of palay and/or pictures of the said sacks is
of no consequence. The elements of robbery are present in accordance with Article 293 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
Who are guilty of robbery — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ROLUSAPE SABALONES
G.R. No. 123485. August 31, 1998

Facts:
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu City stated that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 oclock in the
evening, he was at the residence of Inday Presores, sister of Rogelio Presores, located at Rizal Ave., Cebu
City to attend a wedding. He stayed until 9:00 oclock in the evening and proceeded to the house of Maj.
Tiempo at Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where a small gathering was also taking place. Arriving thereat,
he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo as well as Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo
and Alfredo Nardo. At about 11:00 oclock in the evening, Stephen Lim, who was also at the party, called
their group and requested them to push his car. When the engine started, the former asked them to
drive his car home. Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio
Oliveros and Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of Stephen Lim at Mansueto Compound,
Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them riding in an
owner-type jeep, driven by the latter, in order to bring back the group [as] soon as the car of Mr. Lim was
parked in his home. The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car.
When they arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of
gunfire. He looked at the direction where the gunfire came, and saw [the] persons [who] fired at the
jeep. He identified accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as the persons
who fired at the vehicle. Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was naked from [the] waist up, the gunmen
wore clothes. After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the car they were riding[,] hitting Nelson
Tiempo on the throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite the injury he sustained, Nelson
Tiempo was able to maneuver the car back to their residence. He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo
about the incident and the lat[t]er brought the victims to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

Issue: Whether or not the accused incurred a crime of aberattio Ictus?

Held:
No, the case is better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather
than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the
other due to imprecision in the blow. the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the
extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of
evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the
recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon the
arrival of the victims vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez,
appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability.
The Court has held that mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the
accused zeroes in on his intended victim.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

JULIO GUILLEN
 G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950

Facts:
Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the
defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate,
assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of
the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged
failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of
looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called
"parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the
opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent
in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech
expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the
Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to
Filipino nationals be adopted.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said
firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He
had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañang, or
following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon)
where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to
carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for the act committed?

Held:
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4
of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any... person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice there’s a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea
of reckless imprudence

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ
G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933
Facts:
Who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living children, has been suffering from
partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and has lost control of the movement of his right
arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters was
named Maria and another, are married, while still another one is a nun. With the exemption of the other
married daughter and the nun, of all of them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they
depend for support.

Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate relations
later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that the appellant
became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. The relations between
Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his
daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the
information that she had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to
the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with
her child.

Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared sad and
worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because the child meant an
added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some time the appellant wrote
letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to
legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child. Although the
deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never complied with his
promise.

The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the deceased
worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went downstairs. What
happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant
inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his death.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant intended to cause grave injury?

Held:

No. The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the
deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant
emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar on the
face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but
never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at
least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to the deceased
by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of
the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely
to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of
paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of the
deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, and acted
under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in favor of the
appellant.
 Bataclan v. Medina
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]
At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and
driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to
Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on
the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not
get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed passengers, including the driver and
the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside
the vehicle.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned
bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the
four passengers trapped inside it.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC.
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that
burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.

Held:
The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected.
The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through
its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus.
The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.
In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina Transportation
failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of
the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the
blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as
instructed by Mariano Medina.
The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed
to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA
G.R. No. L-1896 February 16, 1950

Facts:
On or about the 22nd day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of estafa
through falsification of a security directly by overt acts, to wit; by then and there tearing off at the
bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket
thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at
the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear
the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw
last June 29, 1947, and presenting the said ticket so falsified on said date, September 22, 1947, in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding
cash that said number has won, fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of
P359.55 so won by said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29, 1947,
but the said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the crime of
estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than this
spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused presented
said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by
the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended
and arrested the said accused right then and there.

Issue: Whether or not the act committed by the accused constitutes an impossible crime?

Held:
Yes, It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as
that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the
falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to
article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was not
punishable but is now under article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following: (1) When one tries
to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is
common salt; and (2) when one tries to murder a corpse. Judging from the appearance of the falsified
ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to
consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for
the payment had not exercised due care. This is because in the way the alleged falsification was done, it
was inherently inadequate or ineffective and according certain to be detected. Stated otherwise, the
appellant could not have succeeded in cashing the ticket. Flor who would cash a ticket which, in the first
place, has a missing portion and, in the second place, contains a number written in ink. Not even boy
agents who conduct their trades on street sidewalks, and much less the employee of the Sweepstakes
Office to whom it was presented. As a matter of fact, the falsification was readily detected by said
employee. The crime is just as impossible as passing a counterfeit paper bill concocted in regular
newsprint and in ordinary handwriting.
SULPICIO INTOD vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Facts:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house... and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan.
He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed. At about 10:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day. Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It
turned out; however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by
the gun fire. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by the accused constitutes impossible crime?

Held:
Yes. The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, [7] and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or
carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property.[8] The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2)
the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of... accomplishment. [11] There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible... crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the... consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
made them punishable.

WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime

Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties... provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.

THE UNITED STATES, vs.

PROTASIO EDUAVE
G.R. No. L-12155 February 2, 1917

REFER TO THE DOWNLOADED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 99838. October 23, 1997

Facts:
On 5th of June 1990, a buy-bust operation was held to capture the Ernesto Enriquez, who is allegedly
selling marijuana. The buy-bust operation was carried by several officers including Sgt. Cerrillo who
handed the buy-bust money to Pat. Maramot. Sgt. Cerrillo sought the assistance of ADAM members
Joseph Mendoza, Amado Betita and Alex Trinidad. The team, including "Danny," were briefed by Sgt.
Cerrillo. The plan called for Pat. Maramot and Mendoza to pose as the couple interested in buying
marijuana and for Trinidad, Betita and Sgt. Cerrillo to act as the "back-up" men. Pat. Maramot was to nod
her head as soon as the sale was consummated.
At about 11:35 a.m., the group, using two vehicles, proceeded to the vicinity of Pier 10 at the North
Harbor. At the corner of Moriones Street and Radial Road 10, Pat. Maramot and Mendoza sat on a bench
by a store to wait for the return of Danny, who had meanwhile left to fetch Bulag, while Sgt. Cerrillo,
Trinidad and Betita strategically positioned themselves at a billiard hall, mingling with spectators and
pretending to be bystanders. The billiard hall was only about ten meters away from Pat. Maramots
group, and it afforded a good view of the place.
Moments later, Danny arrived with accused Wilfredo Rosales, a.k.a. Bulag. Rosales talked with the
poseur-buyers. After about five minutes, the poseur-buyers, Rosales and the informant entered an alley,
walking along shanties, until they reached a house numbered 1349.

A half-naked man in green shorts emerged from one of the doors of the house. The man, later identified
to be accused Ernesto Enriquez, a.k.a. Nene, asked Pat. Maramot in Visayan accent, Dala mo ba ang
pera? Pat. Maramot took out from her pocket the bundle of the marked money and showed it to
Enriquez. The latter allowed Maramots group to enter the house.[7] Minutes later, as so pre-arranged,
Sgt. Cerrillo followed and proceeded to house No. 1349. Finding the door closed, he went around the
house. Sgt. Cerrillo saw Pat. Maramot, Mendoza and the informant exit through the back door. Rosales,
carrying a plastic bag, was with them. Again, Sgt. Cerrillos group followed Pat. Maramot and Rosales until
the latter reached a nearby waiting shed for jeepney passengers. At this point, Pat. Maramot announced
that she was a policewoman. Sgt. Cerrillo held Rosales and took his bag. Sgt. Cerrillo opened the sack,
and inside it was another sack containing marijuana wrapped in plastic.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed should be accounted as attempted delivery of prohibited
drugs?

Held:
No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
"A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
The subjective phase in the commission of a felony is that portion of its execution starting from the point
where the offender begins by overt acts to pursue the crime until he is prevented, against his will, by
some outside cause from performing all of the acts which would produce the offense. If the subjective
phase has not yet passed, then the crime is only attempted. If that phase has been done but the felony is
not produced, the crime is frustrated. The crime is consummated if, following the subjective phase, the
last of the elements of the felony meets to concur. These rules are inapplicable to offenses governed by
special laws.
Unfortunately for appellant, the crime with which he is being charged is penalized by a special law. The
incomplete delivery claimed by appellant Rosales, granting that it is true, is thus inconsequential. The act
of conveying prohibited drugs to an unknown destination has been held to be punishable, and it is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination of the prohibited drug is reached.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

AGAPITO LISTERIO
G.R. No. 122099. July 5, 2000

Facts:
On or about the 14th day of May 1991 in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together, mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and hit with a lead pipe and bladed weapon one Marlon Araque y Daniel
on the vital portions of his body, thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds which would have
cause[d] the death of the said victim thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produce[d] the crime of Homicide as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of their will, that is by timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Marlon
Araque y Daniel which prevented his death

Issue:
whether or not the act committed constitutes frustrated homicide?
Held:
Yes, By subjective phase is meant [t]hat portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the
act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with
the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward, the phase is objective.
It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that
period between the point where he begins and the point where he voluntarily desists. If between these
two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the
subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he
performs the last act, it is frustrated.
It must be remembered that a felony is frustrated when: 1.] the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony; 2.] the felony is not produced due to causes independent of
the perpetrators will.[73] On the other hand, in an attempted felony: 1.] the offender commits overt acts
to commence the perpetration of the crime; 2.] he is not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony; and 3.] his failure to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause
or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

DOMINGO HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-23916 October 14, 1925

Facts:
On or about the 26th day of February, 1925, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the Domingo
Hernandez wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of force and by intimidating Conrada Jocson
with killing her with a knife which said accused held in his hand if she would not let him have an
intercourse with, the granddaughter of the Conrada Jocson, did then and there lie with and have carnal
knowledge of said Conrada Jocson, a girl under 12 years of age was raped.
He admits that he did so, but maintains that he was intoxicated at the time and did not know what he
was doing. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is, however, to the effect that he did not
show any signs of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime or immediately afterwards.

Issue: Whether or not the crime constitutes frustrated rape?

Held: Yes, The defendant is a man 70 years of age and the offended party is a child of 9 years, the
granddaughter of the defendant's wife. There can be no question as to the defendant's guilt. The
evidence shows that he and the offended party were living in the same house and that taking advantage
of the absence of the other inhabitants of the house, he had intercourse with the child by force and
violence.
The court below found the defendant guilty of frustrated rape and sentenced him to suffer ten years and
one day of prision mayor. In holding that the crime was frustrated, the court seems to have been of the
opinion that there can be no consummated rape without a complete penetration of the hymen. This
view is not accordance with the weight of authority; in fact, it is contrary to practically all modern
authorities. In State vs. Johnson (91 Mo., 439), the court held that "finding the hymen intact is not
always proof that no rape has been committed, nor virginity; for the case are not rare where the hymen
had to be removed after impregnation and in order to permit delivery."

In the same case, the court further said:

Any penetration whether reaching to the hymen or not is sufficient to constitute the crime; for as Lord
Meadowbank said in case in Scotland. "Scientific and anatomical distinctions as to where the vagina
commences are worthless in a case of rape; it is enough if the woman's body is entered; and it is not
necessary to show to what extent penetration of the parts has taken place; whether it has gone past the
hymen, into what is anatomically called the hymen, or even so far as to touch the hymen." (Stewart on
Legal Medicine, p. 137.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito,"
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990

Facts:

March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her home from a party. She knocked
at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife
to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door
which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With
his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her
up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck,
to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With
one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared,
she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted
her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told but
since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid down on his back and
commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he
had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When he
pursued her and climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out
through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house and knocked
on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door.
When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the
stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed
to apprehend him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was
physically examined. Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.

ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

Held:
HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000. Correlating Art. 335 and
Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
(1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will
Attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has
performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists
from proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the
male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ. The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the
genital organ of the victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PRIMO CAMPUHAN
G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000

Facts:
As provided for under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, an automatic
review of the case is brought before the Supreme Court. That on May 27, 1997, Primo Campuhan was
convicted guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death. The
conviction was based on the statements of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan, the mother of the victim Chrystel,
saying that on April 25, 1996, she found the accused kneeling down on his 4-year old daughter with his
pants down and “forcing his penis into Chrystel’s vagina”. However, the accused kept his innocence and
contested that Pamintuan’s statements were not credible for the latter has ill will against him.

Issue:
WON the accused committed a consummated statutory rape
Held:

The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primo’s penis was able to penetrate
Chrystel’s vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be considered
consummated rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Also, there were no
physical signs of injuries on the witness’ body to conclude a medical perspective that a penetration has
taken place. In rape cases, it is important that a valid testimony and medical certificate complements
each other, for relying alone on testimonial evidence may create unwarranted or mischievous results. It
is necessary to carefully establish a proof that the penis, in reality, entered the labial threshold of the
demale organ to accurately conclude that the rape was consummated. WHEREFORE, the decision of the
court on convicting Campuhan guilty of statutory rape is MODIFIED. Hence, convicted of ATTEMPTED
RAPE instead.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

TOMAS ADIAO
G.R. No. L-13785 October 8, 1918

Facts:
Base on the downloaded
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA vs.
People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

Facts:
May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a
security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw
Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push
cart with cases of detergent of “Tide” brand and unloaded them in an open parking space, where
Calderon was waiting. He then returned inside the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with more
cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, he left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the
parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the
taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon reacted
by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon
were apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090. Valenzuela,
Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred
to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police but only Valenzuela and Calderon were charged
with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor. They pleaded not guilty.
Calderon’s statement says, On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw
from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the queue for the ATM was
long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. While they were eating, they
heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so they went out to check what was transpiring and when they did,
they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard.
Moreover, according to Valenzuela’s statement, He is employed as a “bundler” of GMS Marketing and
assigned at the supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot,
walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw
the security guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon to start running. Then they were apprehended by
Lago.
The RTC judged them as guilty of consummated theft, in addition the Court of appeals confirmed RTC
and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended,
he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.

HELD: YES, Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be
attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful taking).
Moreover, Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies. A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.” It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.” It is attempted “when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.”
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
1. subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which
begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime. if the offender never passes the subjective phase
of the offense, the crime is merely attempted
2. objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached. subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
The determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession
that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The determination of whether the
felony was “produced” after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular
statutory definition of the felony. “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” - ordinarily, evil intent must
unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent” and “essential for criminal liability.” Statutory definition of our mala in se
crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
In addition, Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by the actor involved
in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things - descriptive circumstances

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

AURELIO LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935

Facts:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted robbery.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when
the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

Held:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor. It is necessary to
prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the
offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property
belonging to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident
intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective,
once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to
commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must
be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). The relation existing between the facts
submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice.

Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under consideration
does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Against the accused must be
taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch
as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him
— and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

BIENVENIDO SALVILLA
G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990

Facts:
The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with homemade guns and hand
grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office. In the office of Rodita; her two daughters Mary and
Mimmie were also inside. One of the accused asks Mary to get the paper bag which contained money.
All accused held victims as hostage when the police and military authorities had surrounded the lumber
yard. After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police makes their move in assaulting the robbers thus
Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused also got an injury.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated

Held:
Yes. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.
BASILIO BORINAGA
G.R. No. 33463 December 18, 1930

Facts:
The victim Harry Mooney, an American who resided in Calubian Leyte,contracted with Juan Lawaan for
the construction of a fish corral. Lawaanattempted to collect the whole amount of the contract even
though the corralis not yet finished.
Upon Mooney‘s refusal to pay, Lawaan warned and threatened him that something would happen to
him.On that evening, Mooney was in the store of his neighbor, sitting with his back towards a window
when suddenly Basilio Borinaga struck him with a knife. Theknife imbedded on the back of the seat
though. Mooney fell off from theimpact but was not injured. Borinaga left the scene but after ten
minutes, hereturned to have another attempt at Mooney but was warded off by Mooneyand his
neighbor frightening him by turning a flashlight on him.

Issue: Whether or not the crime is frustrated murder.

Held:
YES. As an essential condition of a frustrated crime, Borinaga performed all theacts of execution,
attending the attack. There was nothing left that he could dofurther to accomplish the work. The cause
resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of his will. Borinaga also
voluntarilydesisted from further acts. The subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

SY PIO
G.R. No. L-5848 April 30, 1954

Facts:
September 3, 1949, he was employed as an attendant in a restaurant belonging to Ong Pian. Defendant-
appellant's wife by the name of Vicenta was also employed by Ong Pian's partner, Eng Cheng Suy. Prior
to September 3 the relatives of his wife had been asking the latter for help, because her father was sick.
Defendant-appellant asked money from Ong Pian, but the latter could only give him P1. His wife was able
to borrow P20 from her employer, and this was sent to his wife's parents in Cebu. Afterwards defendant-
appellant was dismissed from his work at the restaurant of Ong Pian, and he became a peddler. Ong Pian
presented a list of the sums that defendant-appellant had borrowed from him, and these sums were
deducted from the salary of his wife. Defendant-appellant did not recognize these sums as his
indebtedness, and so he resented Ong Pian's conduct.
few days before September 3, 1949, defendant-appellant had been able to realize the sum of P70 from
the sales of medicine that he peddled. He laid his money in a place in his room, but the following
morning he found that it had disappeared from the place in which he had placed it. Tan Siong Kiap and
Jose Sy, upon the discovery of the loss of money, told defendant-appellant that he must have given the
money to his wife, and that nobody had stolen it. After this incident of the loss, the defendant-appellant
used to hear Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy and other Chinamen say that the money had not been actually
stolen, but that he lost it in gambling. Because of these accusations against him, he nurtured resentment
against both Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy.
So early in the morning of September 3, while a Chinaman by the name of Ngo Cho, who the possessor
of a caliber .45 pistol, was away from his room, defendant-appellant got his pistol and tucked it in his
belt. With this pistol he went to the restaurant at 822 Ongpin, and there shot Ong Pian. After shooting
him, he proceeded to 511 Misericordia, in store where Jose Sy and Tan Siong Kiap were, and there he
fired at them. Then he escaped to Legarda Street, in Sampaloc, where he borrowed P1 from his relatives.
From there he went to Malabon, to the house of his mother, to whom he told he had killed two persons
and from he asked money.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed constitutes murder?

Held:
No, In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit, but he
was able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to escape, which appellant must
have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to his his
victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually
all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And as it does not appear that the
defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwards a
reasonable doubt exist in our mind that the defendant-appellant had actually believed that he has
committed all the acts of execution or passed the subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be
resolved in favor of the defendant-appellant.
The court find the defendant-appellant guilty of frustrated murder, as charged in the information. We
only find him guilty of attempted murder, because he did not perform all the acts of execution, actual
and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention that he had to kill his victim might be carried out.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

EMELIANO TRINIDAD
G.R. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989

Facts:
Lolito was a fish dealer, He had two helpers, Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa. While the three were driving
on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano Trinidad asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte.
Tan, the driver at the time, suddenly heard two gunshots—Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both
were hit on the head. Trinidad used his gun in killing the two victims. Tan was able to get off the jeepney
however he was followed by Trinidad. Tan clung to a passing jeepney, but Trinidad fired two shots in
which Tan was hit in the thigh and fell from the jeepney where he clung. A Philippine Constabulary
member helped Tan and brought him in the nearest hospital.
Trinidad was charged with frustrated murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Trinidan should be charged with attempted murder?
Held:
Yes, TRINIDAD can only be convicted of Attempted Murder. TRINIDAD had commenced the commission
of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which
TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.
Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted
on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not
having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PEDRO RAVELO
G.R. No. 78781-82 October 15, 1991

Facts:
Accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano on May 21, 1984.
They then detained Reynaldo at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused. Accused-appellants
assaulted, attacked, and burned Reynaldo Gaurano and latter die as consequence thereof.
On May 22, 1984; the accused-appellants kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman and was brought
to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. Lugatiman was able to escape.
Lugatiman reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted the
accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman.
In this appeal, counsel contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to kill,
which is an essential element of the offense of frustrated murder.

Issue:
Whether the statement by the accused stating that “Lugatiman” would be killed is sufficient proof of
intent to convict a person of frustrated murder.

Held:
No, In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the
actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not sufficient to
show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a statement of the
aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow
while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

FELIPE KALALO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-39303-39305 March 17, 1934

Facts:
Prior to October 1, 1932, the date of the commission of the three crimes alleged in the three
informations which gave rise to the aforesaid three cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo or Calalo and Isabela Holgado or Olgado, the latter being the sister of the deceased
Arcadio Holgado and a cousin of the other deceased Marcelino Panaligan, had a litigation over a parcel
of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang of the municipality of San Luis, Province of Batangas. On
September 28, 1931, and again on December 8th of the same year, Marcelo Kalalo filed a complaint
against the said woman in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. By virtue of a motion filed by his
opponent Isabela Holgado, his first complaint was dismissed on December 7, 1931, and his second
complaint was likewise dismissed on February 5, 1932. Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in question
during the agricultural years 1931 and 1932, but when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all
that had been planted thereon.
On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased, decided to
order the aforesaid land plowed, and employed several laborers for that purpose. These men, together
with Arcadio Holgado, went to the said land early that day, but Marcelo Kalalo, who had been informed
thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by his brothers Felipe and Juan Kalalo, his brother-in-law
Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro Garcia, who were later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia
Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively, of the first three.
The first five were all armed with bolos. Upon their arrival at the said land, they ordered those who were
plowing it by request of Isabela and Arcadio Holgado, to stop, which they did in view of the threatening
attitude of those who gave them said order.1ªvvphi1.ne+
Shortly after nine o'clock on the morning of the same day, Isabela Holgado, Maria Gutierrez and Hilarion
Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Before the men resumed their work, they were
given their food and not long after they had finished eating, Marcelino Panaligan, cousin of said Isabela
and Arcadio, likewise arrived. Having been informed of the cause of the suspension of the work,
Marcelino Panaligan ordered said Arcadio and the other laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos
to continue the work already began. At this juncture, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio,
while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn, approached Marcelino
Panaligan. At a remark from Fausta Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is detaining
you?" they all simultaneously struck with their bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing Arcadio
Holgado, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino
Panaligan, inflicting upon them the wounds enumerated and described in the medical certificates
Exhibits I and H. Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received by
them in the presence of Isabela Holgado and Maria Gutierrez, not to mention the accused. The plowmen
hired by Arcadio and Isabela all ran away.
After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant Marcelo
Kalalo took from its holster on the belt of Panaligans' body, the revolver which the deceased carried, and
fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene inorder to save his own life.

Issue:
WON the appellants are guilty of murder or of simple homicide in each of the cases?

Held:
HELD:It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder, the circumstance
of “abuse of superior strength”, if proven to have been presented, raises homicide to the category of
murder;but it is also to be borne in mind that the deceased were also armed, one of them with a
bolo,and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties and their strength
wasalmost balanced because there is no doubt but that, under circumstances similar to those of
thepresent case, a revolver is as effective as, if not more than three bolos. For this reason, this court is of
the opinion that the acts established in cases Nos. 6858 and 6859 (G.R. Nos. L-39303 and
39304,respectively), merely constitute two homicides. As to the third case, the evidence shows that
Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene
of the crime in order to be out of reach of the appellants and their companions and save his own life.
The fact that the said appellant, not having contended himself with firing only once, fired said successive
shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to the circumstance that immediately before doing so he and his co-
appellants had already killed Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-law,
respectively, of the former, shows tha the was then bent on killing said Hilarion Holgado. He performed
everything necessary on his pat to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by
reason of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim
succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed by the said
appellant Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968

Facts:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs
inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by
virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation
and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined
in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issue:
Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

Held:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of
a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express
or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in
order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.
Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission
of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that
there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all
the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going
from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO
G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974
Facts:
Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married on June 7, 1956, at
a ceremony solemnized by the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Ormoc City.2 The marriage
was not a happy one and before the end of the year 1957 the couple separated. Late in the evening of
January 2, 1958, Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio Barabad and Kakong Sacay,
drank "tuba" in a certain house in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. At about midnight, Francisco Caballero and his
companions proceeded home. On the way, they saw Francisco's wife, Cunigunda, standing at the corner
of the yard of Igmedio Barabad Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter approached her,
Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a knife. Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital, personally
attended to the victim and found a "punctured wound on the left lumbar region measuring 1 inch
externally". On January 4, 1958, Francisco Caballero was brought to Cebu City on board the "MV Ormoc"
but the trip proved futile because the victim died at noontime of the same day from the stab wound
sustained by him.
Contention
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted in defense of her person?

Held:
Yes, All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case.
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.
The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise present. Here we
have a woman who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious
by the strong pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her
reach to save herself from impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle
that the reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense does not depend upon the harm
done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. And so the fact that there was no visible injury
caused on the body of the appellant which necessitated medical attention, a circumstance noted by the
trial court, is no ground for discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was imminent peril to
appellant's life caused by the unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt
afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from being
strangled and choked to death.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

DIOSCORO ALCONGA
G.R. No. L-162 April 30, 1947

Facts:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality of San Dionisio,
Province of Iloilo several persons were playing prohibited games. The deceased Silverio Barion was the
banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the prosecution, was one of those
playing the game. Upon invitation of the said Maria de Raposo, the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her
as a partner, each of them contributing the sum of P5 to a common fund. Maria de Raposo played the
game while the said accused posted himself behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of the
latter and communicating by signs to his partner. The deceased appears to have suffered losses in the
game because of the team work between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga. Upon discovering
what the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant and expressed his anger at the
former. An exchange of words followed, and the two would have come to blows but for the intervention
of the maintainer of the games. In a fit of anger, the deceased left the house but not before telling the
accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give you a breakfast", which expression would seem to
signify an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered under such circumstances.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of May 29, 1943, when
the latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home guard".
While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the deceased came along and,
addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing of his
"pingahan. The accused avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with the intention to
crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench
instead The accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While the
deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a crawling position, fired
at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the ground. Rising to his feet, the deceased
drew forth his dagger and directed a blow at the accused who, however, was able to parry the same with
his bolo. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away but was
followed by the accused. After running a distance of about 200 meters, the deceased was overtaken, and
another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one which slashed the cranium —
was delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, besides many other blows
deliver right and left. At this instant, the other accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the
leader of the "home guards" of San Dionisio, placed under his custody the accused Alconga with a view
to turning him over to the proper authorities.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted in defense of his person?

Held:
Yes, It thus shown that the accused never pursued the deceased. On the contrary, the deceased tried to
continue his assault started during the first stage of the fight, and the accused had been avoiding the
blows by stepping backward. The fact that Barion died with many wounds might be taken against
appellant and may weaken the theory that he acted only in legitimate self-defense. To judge, however,
the conduct of appellant during the whole incident, it is necessary to consider the psychology of a
person engaged in a life or death struggle, acting under the irresistible impulses of self-preservation and
blinded by anger and indignation for the illegal aggression of which he was the victim. A person placed in
such a crucial situation must have to summon all his physiological resources and physical forces to rally
to the one and indivisible aim of survival and, to that end, placed his energies on the level of highest
pitch. In that moment of physical and spiritual hypertension, to ask that a man should measure his acts
as an architect would make measurements to achieve proportion and symmetry in a proposed building
or a scientist would make a calibration, so that his acts of self-defense should stop precisely at the
undeterminable border line when the aggressor ceases to be dangerous, is to ask the impossible.
Appellant's conduct must be judged not by the standards which may be exacted from the supermen of
the future, if progressive evolution may happen to develop them. Appellant's conduct can only be tested
by the average standards of human nature as we found it, which has many limitations and defects. If in
trying to eliminate an actual danger menacing his own existence, appellant was not able to moderate his
efforts to destroy that menace, to the extent of actually killing his aggressor, he is certainly not
accountable.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

ANDERSON MACK
G.R. No. L-3515 October 3, 1907

Facts:
The night of May 4, 1906, the accused, a negro soldier, shot and killed a municipal policeman named
Estanislao Indic.
Just before the shooting, the accused was sitting on a bench a few feet back from the street, in the town
of Tacloban, in the Province of Leyte, in open space some 3 or 4 feet, width, between the tienda or
content of a woman named Olimpia and another building. The deceased, with another policeman,
approached the place directed Olimpia to close her tienda, and, later, ordered the accused and another
soldier who was standing nearby to go to their quarters. The accused did not obey this order, and it is
probable that some words passed between the soldiers, the policemen, and the woman which angered
the deceased, though the weight of the evidence clearly maintain the contention of the accused that he
did and said nothing to provoke or offend the deceased, except in so far as his failure to obey the order
to go to his quarters may have had that effect. The deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12 feet from
the accused, cursing and abusing him for his failure to obey the order, wrought himself into a passion
dragged himself free from his companion, who was endeavoring to restrain him and take him away, and
started toward the accused, at the same time drawing his bolo and brandishing it in a threatening
manner. Thereupon the accused got up, drew his revolver, and the deceased having then approached
within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet, the accused fired three shots, one of which took effect in the left
breast of the deceased, just above the nipple, and another in the back of his head.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense?

Held:
Yes. It is suggested that since the first shot inflicted a fatal wound there was no necessity for the firing of
the two succeeding shows in order to prevent or repel the attack. The record discloses that there shots
were fired in rapid succession. Not every wound which proves fatal is sufficient to stop an enemy’s
attack, and the accused and his assailant were so close at hand that until the assailant fell to the ground
it can be said that the accused was out of danger. Even a wounded man with a drawn bolo in his hand
might prove to be no mean antagonist at close quarters.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

JULIAN SUMICAD
G.R. No. L-35524 March 18, 1932

Facts:
On the 23rd of February, 1931, Sumicad along with his fellow workers saw Segundo Cubol passing along
their place. Sumicad demanded that his five and on half days service should be paid. Cubol in shout
asked for clarification as to what Sumicad asked then hit Sumicad with his fist. Sumicad rose from the log
trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. Sumicad continued to
recede then found himself cornered by a pile of logs.

Cubol lunged at Sumicad with evident intention of wrestling the bolo of Sumicad. Sumicad struck Cubol
and delivered a blow on his right shoulder and two deep cuts on his forehead. This was witnessed by
Francisco Villegeas. Villegeas turned to Sumicad and told to put up his bolo and go to the poblacion.
Sumicad testified that Cubol attempted to draw a knife from his pocket when he struck him with his
bolo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sumicad acted on self-defense.

Held:
Yes. It is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the death of Segundo Cubol was of his own making,
and that Julian Sumicad was not materially to blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the elements
of self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the aggressor and that
there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

NATIVIDAD LUAGUE
G.R. No. L-43588 November 7, 1935

Facts:
In the morning of February 18, 1935, while the accused Natividad Luague was in her house situated in
Lupuhan, barrio of Agpañgi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros, with only her three children of
tender age for company, her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare having gone to grind corn in
Juan Garing's house several kilometers away, Paulino Disuasido came and began to make love to her;
that as Natividad could not dissuade him from his purpose, she started for the kitchen where Paulino
followed her, notwithstanding her instance that she could by no means accede to his wishes, for Paulino,
bent on satisfying them at all costs, drew and opened a knife and, threatening her with death, began to
embrace her and to touch her breasts; that in preparing to lie with her, Paulino had to leave the knife on
the floor and the accused, taking advantage of the situation, picked up the weapon and stabbed him in
the abdomen; and that Paulino, feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the window and
falling on some stones, while the accused set forth immediately for the poblacion to surrender herself to
the authorities and report the incident. Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido.
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted in defense of her honor?

Held: Yes. The court finds that the accused Natividad Luague in wounding Paulino Disuasido to death,
acted in legitimate self-defense, and that the other accused Wenceslao Alcansare had no participation in
said act. The act constitutes the exempting circumstance denned in article 11, subsection 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, because, as stated by a commentator of note, "'aside from the right to life on which
rests the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to
honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony”. It is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled,
wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this
article and subsection since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the
only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs.
REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-41674 March 30, 1935
Facts:
On the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida Vistada; his sister, Baltazara
Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of the defendant and
asked her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of Maria Inguit.
About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started home. They were followed about five minutes
later, according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in the
house where the wake was held. He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook
defendant's party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that
time the members of the defendant's party were walking in single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead
and the defendant was the hindmost. She was about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of
her. Francisco Ramos, the only one of defendant's companions, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios mio".
He went back and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded
man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid defense of honor?

Held:
Yes. The appellant claims to have cried for help, but so far as the record shows her cries were not heard
by any of her companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do so
because of the suddenness with which the deceased grabbed her and the fright which it naturally
caused, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from
criminal liability. this court held that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting wounds or
her assailant with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance might
have been heard by people nearby.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

NICOLAS JAURIGUE
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946
FACTS:
Defendant/Respondent Avelina Jaurigue found guilty of homicide (for killing Amado Capiña) by Court of
First Instance of Tayabas. Defendant appealed to the CA contending that the lower court erred in not
holding appellant had acted in defense of honor therefore she's completely absolved by criminal liability
ISSUE W/N respondent should be completely absolved of criminal liability considering her act done in
defense of her honor. (Art 11 of RPC)
HELD: Yes. Defendant Jaurigue cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability. With
the modification of the judgment appealed from, defendant is sentenced to indeterminate penalty
ranging from 2 months and 1 day arresto mayor minimum to 2 years 4 months and 1 day maximum with
necessary penalties of P2,000. REASON According to the facts established by the evidence and found by
the learned trial court, when Amado Capiña (deceased) sat beside the defendant near the chapel door
placing his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted
and there were already several people. Under these circumstances, there was and there could be no
possibility for her to be raped. And so when she struck Capiña with a knife on his neck resulting death,
the means she employed to defend her honor was excessive.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs APOLINAR DANDO
G. R. No. 120646 - February 14, 2000
FACTS:
That on or about 6:19 o'clock in the evening of November 20, 1991 at Barangay M. Pandeño,
Municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused while conveniently armed with a deadly weapon (cal. 45) with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot several times one CESAR CASTRO y VALMONTE with the said weapon, thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim.
ISSUE: whether or not Apolinar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder?
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that “inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather
than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed. Alibi is one of the
weakest defenses in criminal cases and it should be rejected when the identity of the accused is
sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape this case, accused-appellant, whose face was covered by a handkerchief, approached the victim,
who was merely standing by the gate in front of his house, and shot him. The victim was undoubtedly
caught unaware and had no chance of putting up any defense. Clearly, treachery attended the
commission of the crime since the attack, although frontally, was no less sudden and unexpected, giving
the victim no opportunity to repel it or offer any defense of his person.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

RAFAEL BUMANGLAG, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-5318 December 23, 1909

FACTS:
On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, an inhabitant of the pueblo of San Nicolas, Province
of Ilocos Norte, missed 4 baares or 40 bundles of palay which were kept in his granary, situated in the
place called "Payas," barrio No. 16 of the said pueblo, and on proceeding to search for them on the
following morning, he found them in an inclosed filed which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance
of about 100 meters from his granary; thereupon, for the purpose of ascertaining who had done it, he
left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino
Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who might return to get the palay. A man, who
turned out to be Guillermo Ribis, made his appearance and approaching the palay, attempted to carry it
away with him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with
sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued the person attacked
fell down and died instantly, Bumanglag and his companions believing that Guillermo Ribis was the
author of several robberies and thefts that had occurred in the place.

ISSUE:
WON defense of property (palay) should extinguish the crime committed by respondents

HELD:
NO. It is only a mitigating circumstance which will lower the penalty. Mitigating circumstance No. 7 of Art
9 of Penal Code should be taken into account because the defendant acted with loss of reason and self-
control on seeing that Ribis was taking material possession of the palsy seized and hidden by him the
previous night thus prejudicing the respondents who laboured to provide themselves and their families
with subsistence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

FACTS:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez
together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George
Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the
hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At
the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n.,
Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were
being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant
would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the
group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is
good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however,
answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun
and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a
gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript).
Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's
Brief, p.161, rec.).

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the defendant despite the fact that he was acting in
defense of his person and of his rights?
HELD:
YES. The defense of one’s person or rights is a justifying circumstance, but three prerequisites must be
present.
Unlawful aggression due to utterance of Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaez’s property was clear. The
pending case regarding ownership was decided only over a year after the incident, and even then,
Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to leave the land.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

PONCIANO ESMEDIA and MENA ESMEDIA
G.R. No. L-5749 October 21, 1910

FACTS:
Ciriaco Abando, his wife, and their son, Santiago, lived in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sibalom,
in the barrio of Bongboñgan, Province of Antique. Gregorio Esmedia, father of these two accused, son-
in-law of Ciriaco Abando and brother-in-law of Santiago Abando, lived in the same barrio. These tow
families lived very near to each other and owned adjoining rice lands. Before this trouble occurred there
had been a dispute between these two families relative to the ownership of the rice land then occupied
by Ciriaco Abando. About 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th of June, 1909, Ciriaco Abando
instructed his son, Santiago, to go to a certain place in his rice field to let out the water in order that they
could plant rice the said field. In compliance with these instructions of his father, Santiago proceeded to
the place designated, and while at work doing what he had been ordered by his father to do, Gregorio
Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago. Soon thereafter Gregorio drew a
dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back. Santiago fell to the ground, but arose immediately and
attacked Gregorio with his bolo, inflicting several wounds on the said Gregorio in consequence of which
he fell to the ground. Before this trouble finally terminated the two accused and Ciriaco Abando
appeared in that immediate vicinity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the two accused can be criminally responsible for the death of Ciriaco and Santiago
Abando?

Ruling:
Potenciano and Mena Esmedia are exempted from criminal responsibility for causing the death of
Santiago Abando because of the mitigating circumstance of loss of reason and self-control. Any
personwho, in depending his father against an unlawful attack, while he still honestly believes him to be
in agreat danger, causes the death of the attacking party, is exempt from criminal responsibility. But the
twoaccused is guilty of homicide with aggravating circumstance for the death of Ciriaco Abando.
Consideringthe age of Ciriaco, 80 years of age and arrives upon the scene of an altercation after it has
terminated,and is thereupon attacked and killed, the aggravating circumstance must be considered in
fixing thepenalty because of the disregard and lack of respect for age

People of the Philippines vs.

Norma Hernandez
G.R. No. 175603 February 13, 2009
Facts:
2nd day of February, 2000, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RENATO ESPAOL @ Atong, being then legally married to
one GLORIA ESPAOL, with intent to kill the latter, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and criminally,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by shooting her, hitting her on vital part of her
body, thereby causing her death shortly thereafter due to Hypovolemic shock, hemorrhage, massive, due
to multiple gunshot wound as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Benjamin Marcial Bautista, Rural Health
Physician, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, GLORIA ESPAOL, in the
amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, and other
consequential damages.

ISSUE: Whether Or Not Norma should be convicted on the ground of serious slander by deed HELD: NO,
SC reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant. Agreement to marry cannot be held liable for
Slander by Deed.
HELD: A party to an agreement to marry who backs out cannot be held liable for the crime of slander by
deed , for then that would be an inherent way of compelling said party to go into a marriage without his
or her free consent, and this would contravene the principle in law that what could not be done directly
could not be done indirectly; and said party has the right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going
through a loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
One of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act of the
appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to the marriage
after mature consideration. Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the
complainant & appellant before the incident. There always existed good relations between them for they
were neighbors, so it cannot be sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately
frustrating the marriage. Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry
and it would be utterly inconsistent.
Ty vs People
G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
Facts:
This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22against Ty before the RTC of
Manila. The said accused drew and issue toManila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value to
Editha L.Vecino several post-dated checks. The said accused well knowing that atthe time of issue she did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with thedrawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from thedate hereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for “Account Closed” and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, saidaccused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of thechecks or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)banking days after receiving said notice.Ty
claimed that she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.” She claims
that she was forced to issue the checks toobtain release of her mother whom the hospital inhumanely
and harshlytreated, and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.The trial court rendered
judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appealwith the CA and reiterated her defense that she issued the
checks “under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil
or injury.” The appellate court affirmed the judgment of thetrial court with modification. It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos P
60,000.00equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal
liability?
Held:
No.
Uncontrollable fear
- For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1)
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury
is greater than or at least equal to that committed. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not applicable It must appear that the threat that caused the
uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to
it.It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a
future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to
leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
Speculative fear
The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the
checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for
fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of
the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

FELIPE DELIMA
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922
Facts:
Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Policeman Felipe Delima found him in the house of Jorge Alegria,
armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered his surrender but
Napoleon answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didn’t hit
Napoleon. The criminal tried to run away, not throwing his weapon; the policeman shot him dead.
Delima was tried and convicted for homicide; he appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Delima should be acquitted?

Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held that the killing was done in
performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to surrender and his disobedience with a
weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The action was justified by the circumstances.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES
[G.R. No. 124670. June 21, 2000]

FACTS: 16th of February, 1990 at 9:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, inside the campus of Pili
National High School, at Barangay Pili, Municipality of Bacacay, Province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery, taking advantage of
nighttime, employing means to insure or afford impunity, with the use of high powered firearm, and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, suddenly, unexpectedly and without any
warning, attack, fire and shoot successively with an armalite rifle (M-16) FERNANDO B. BATALLER while
the latter was intoxicated, thereby hitting and inflicting upon him multiple serious and mortal wounds on
his head, at the right lower face, the chest (front) at the left antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below but
lateral to the left nipple, at the left lateral waistline, thereby lacerating the liver, hitting the stomach
portions of the large and small intestines and lower vertebrae, and the chest (back) at the middle back
and another at the left back, lateral level of the lower rib, which caused Fernando B. Batallers direct and
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
Accused was convicted of murder. He interposed self-defense and that he acted in the fulfillment of a
duty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is acting in the fulfillment of a duty?
HELD:
Self defense cannot be appreciated. Where the accused admits to killing the victim in self defense, the
burden of evidence shifts to him. For a person not to incur criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty;
(2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
right or office. However, second requisite here was not proved since killing need not be a necessary
consequence of his duty.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955

FACTS:
Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, operating as a guerrilla unit in
the province of Abra
In a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold, it authorized them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to
investigate persons accused of treason, espionage, or aiding and abetting of the enemy. The list of those
persons included elected mayor of La Paz, Arsenio Borjal Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed
Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. Charges of
espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were led against Borjal. The jury found Borjal guilty
and imposed upon him, death penalty.
A radiogram from Col. Volckmann, overall commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, called the attention to the
illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence which was unknown to Beronilla
Accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpo Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico were convicted of
murder for allegedly conspiring the execution of Borjal
The late President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons
who committed acts penalized under RPC anent the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy resulting the dismissal of some bolomen involved in the jury but still
convicting Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco, and Adriatico because the crime was committed after the
expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation, hence this appeal
ISSUE
W/N eronilla et al’s actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to lawful order of
superior
HELD/ RATIO: YES
Lt. Col. Arnold, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of
criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to
conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo).
The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants
allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed
treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be
captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or
personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal"
Appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon
orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good
faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we cannot say
that criminal intent has been established
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent
to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of be innocent."
SC DECISION:
Judgement appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CELESTINO BONOAN
G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937

Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which
caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on
the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at the Psychopathic
Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s complete record
of mental condition from the hospital and defendant’s admission to the hospital for personal
observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan may be
discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and sentenced
him to life imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia
only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not
establish the defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which consequently
exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other
hospital for the insane. This ruling was based on the following evidence:

Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital and
diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments
were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they have no control of
their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression psychosis
Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to act
according to Dr. Francisco
Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the police’s
doubt of his mental normalcy
Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson

People vs. Ambal

GR NO. L-52688 OCT. 17, 1980
100 SCRA 325
FACTS: Honorato Ambal was married with Felicula for 15 yrs. She appeared to be a shrew and neglectful
wife. She stayed away from the conjugal home at times. He killed her when the latter failed to buy a
medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated altercation. Felicula
told her husband that it would be better if he were dead. That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled
him to attack his wife.

He went to the barangay captain and informed that he killed his wife. After making that oral confession,
Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman.

During the trial, he pleaded not guilty and, thru his counsel de oficio, the defense of Ambal was insanity.
Dr. Balbas stated during trial: Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission
of the crime, normal, but during the commission of the crime, that is what we call “Psychosis” due to
short frustration tolerance.

The Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicted him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua
and ordering him to pay an indemnity of Php12,000 to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-
Ambal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ambal was insane and is not guilty of the crime of parricide.

RULING: Art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane
person unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (US vs. Martinez, 34 Phil 305). The law always presumes all
acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously. In order that
insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence
in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality
of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser
penalty should be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and that absence of
aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ROSALINO DUNGO
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

Facts:
On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office
with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the
victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal. Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified
that sometime in February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was
requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR. The
accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense:
• Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in
deep thought always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also
times that her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were
not.
• On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bo
ther to buy medicine as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But
when Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her
way home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-
law's house with people milling around. She asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino
answered, "That's the only cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a
number of days, I
would die.” That same day, the accused went to Manila.
Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was
confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports
of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the
commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to
cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to
stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that
Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic.
Issue:
WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged.
Held:
No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there
be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ERLINDO YAM-ID
[G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999]

FACTS: On April 1, 1994, at around 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Julius Cantutay was with his 6-year-old
cousin Jerry to deliver benignit, a local delicacy, to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. On their way, they passed
by Yam-id’s house who greeted them “good evening.” Yam-id suddenly unsheathed a long bolo. Julius
pushed Jerry and told him to run but Yam-id caught up with Jerry and stabbed him with the bolo on the
left portion of his back, held him by his head and hacked him on the nape and stabbed him on the right
side of his back. Jerry died on the spot and Yam-id knelt over the body and sucked the blood from his
neck. Julius ran towards the house of Danilo Tejamo, Jerry’s father, and narrated the harrowing incident
to Aniceta Tejamo, Jerry’s mother. They both ran to the site of the incident and Danilo asked Yam-id the
whereabouts of his son. Yam-id instead answered “I will kill all of you” and hacked
Danilo. Danilo was able to doge the attack but he slipped and fell to the ground. He got hit on the bridge
of his nose. He tried to stand but he was hit on the head and fell on the ground again, bloodied. Aniceta
shouted that Danilo was already dead. Yamid took hold of Danilo’s collar to finish him off but the tip of
the bolo hit his stomach and blood oozed from the wound. Yam-id ran towards his house and threw the
bolo on the ground. Danilo regained consciousness and sought treatment. During trial, he denied killing
Jerry and pleaded self-defense for his assault on Danilo. He contended that Danilo fired at his house
because of a land dispute between his family and the in-laws of Danilo. Judgment of Trial Court: guily of
murder and sentenced with death penalty for killing Jerry; guilty of frustrated homicide and
imprisonment of 6 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum to 10 yrs of prision mayor in its
maximum period. In this automatic review, Yam-id admits killing Jerry and pleaded insanity and seeks
reversal on his attack on Danilo on the ground that prosecution failed to prove his intent to kill.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
WON the appellant can invoke insanity as an exempting circumstance in this case –
HELD:
NO For insanity to be appreciated as an exempting circumstance, it must be present immediately before
or at the very moment the crime was committed. In this case, no evidence was presented to prove the
same. The defense of insanity was not raised during the trial of the case. It was only invoke on appeal,
giving the court the impression that is but an afterthought. The only intimation of insanity could at is the
non-medical opinion of the PAO that he was suffering from schizophrenia because he sipped his victim’s
blood and tried to kill himself afterwards. No medical certificate was presented and no testimony was
given to support the allegation. There is also treachery when an adult person illegally attacks a child of
tender years without any means to defend himself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RANDY BELONIO
[G.R. No. 148695. May 27, 2004]

Facts:
Rammy Tamayo who bought a cigarette from a store a few meters from their house was bumped by the
accused Randy Belonio in trying to force his way in the small opening of the store, Jennifer Ramy’s first
cousin saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look. The accused left but after few minutes he
returned and stabbed Ramy with a dagger in his right chest which causes his death, then fled but was
arrested from one of the houses near the barangay hall. The accused raise the defense of insanity for his
mental sickness that he was not in his right mind when the killing took place. Dr. Gauzon, certifies that
he was suffering from schizophrenia. The accused was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death

Issue: Whether or not the accused defense of insanity exempt him from his criminal offense of murder
Ruling: The Supreme Court responds to the defense of the accused in negative, the defense utterly failed
in proving that the accused was insane. They found the evidence to be insufficient; there must be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, to establish his claim that he was insane. And
the crime of murder was affirmed and sentenced him with death penalty Belonio, after giving the victim
a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter and conversed with him. Afterwards he stabbed Tamayo
then escaped and went into hiding; these acts tend to establish that the accused was well aware of what
he had just committed. Philippine courts have established a more stringent criterion for acceptance of
insanity as an exempting circumstance. A mere abnormality of mental faculties is not enough; there
must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. The appellants past does not
discredit the facts that he did not act with complete absence of power to discern, he was not deprived of
reason and he was not totally deprived of his will.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

POTENCIANO TANEO
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
FACTS:
On January 16, 1932, in the house of Potenciano Taneo’s parents in Dolores, Ormoc, Leyte, because of
severe stomachache, Potenciano slept early. While sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a
bolo in hand and upon meeting his wife who tried stop him, he wounded her int eh abdomen. Several
others were also attacked, this includes his father, and his guests, Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. It was
claimed that he was dreaming when the crime happened. The trial court found Potenciano guilty of
parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant is criminally liable.
HELD:
No. The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts with which he was charged were not voluntary in
the sense of entailing criminal liability. The expert witness claimed that the defendant was under the
influence of hallucination and not in his right mind. The defendant is not criminally liable however, he
was ordered to be confined in an insane asylum.

ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]

Facts:
On November 14, 1995, P/Supt Joseph Castro received an information from an unnamed informant that
a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking. Acting on
such report,SPO1 Bonifacio Gueverra was assigned to act as a posweur buyer. They positioned their cars
at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and out. In the afternoon a
Toyota Corolla arrived, Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant
approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1Bonifacio Guevarra and
informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Guevarra offered to buy
the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money. Guevarra said yes. He
showed the a fore cited bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the
shabu and handover to Guevarra. SPO1 Guevarra, inturn, handed the bundle of "money bills. Then the
other police approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga
and Alvin Jose. The RTC finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425.On appeal to the CA, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision
appealed from with modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin
Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime. Appellant
Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari , alleging that under paragraph 3,
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability.
Issue:
Whether or not Alvin Jose can be exempt from criminal liability underthe mitigating circumstances of
minority.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with
a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove
his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor
of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime. In the present case, the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when
the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-
buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner
merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the
accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside
the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed,
the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young
boys in their transactions for illegal drugs.
Llane vs. people
Facts: Neil Llave, 12 years old, raped Debbielyn. The victim was pulled from a vacant lot. The accused
ordered her to lie down on the cement. He then removed the victim’s shorts and underwear and his
own. He penetrated his penis into the victim’s vagina and had a push and pull movement. Teofisto, the
witness, saw the incident and shouted. The accused then hurriedly fled the scene. During the trial, the
accused argued being a minor, he is presumed that acted without discernment under par 3 of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment?
Held:
Yes, the accused acted with discernment. The factual circumstance which bolstered that he acted with
discernment is when the acussed stated that he was an outstanding student. This allegation proves that
he acted with full knowledge and intelligence. He was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years
thus was able to distinguish which conduct is wrong or right. Hence, the accused is not exempt from
criminal liability.
ROBERT SIERRA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009
Facts:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old was playing with her friend in the second floor of her family’s house in
Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told the thirteen-year-old and her friend that he
wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed one of the girl and had sexual intercourse with
her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting
his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
The thirteen--year-old subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores
Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied the child to the barangay office. The
child was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent
with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner
was charged with rape under the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister and
the thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.
Invoking RA 9334, Juvenile Justice act of 2006, that Robert Sierra was exempt from criminal liability.
Issue: whether or not petitioner can invoke paragraph 1, section 6 of RA No 9344 to exempt him from
any criminal liability?
Held: Yes the petitioner can invoke section 6 par 1 of RA 9344 to exempt him from any criminal liability.
The court of Appeals was wrong with it when it rejected the testimonial evidence showing that the
petitioner was only 15 year old at the time committed the crime. The age of the child may be
determined from his birth certificate, baptismal certificate and other pertinent documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of
the child and other relevant evidence. In the case at bar, the petitioner and his mother both testified
regading his minority.
However, the contention that the prosecution has the burden of proof disproving his claim is untenable.
The defense has the burden of showing by evidence that petitioner was indeed 15 years old when he
committed the crime charged.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

DONATO BINDOY
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931

Facts:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She refused and
Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted
to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached
Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime
of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and
without malicious intent.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of accident?
HELD:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. There is no
evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. No evidence that Bindoy was
aware of Omamdam's presence. No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy
& Omamdam. On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other. The
witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so
violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy's seeing
him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by
any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound
his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since
whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act
done is different from that which he intended. This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound
Pacas. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away
from him. His conduct was perfectly lawful.

ROWENO POMOY vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]

Facts:
Policemen arrested Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Concepcion, Iloilo, for he was allegedly connected with a robbery. He was brought to the
Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni in Iloilo where he was
detained. Roweno Pomoy, a member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company, directed the latter to
come out, for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. Petitioner had a gun hanging from his
bolster. After that, 2 gunshots were heard. Petitioner was seen holding his .45 caliber pistol facing Balboa
who was lying in a pool of blood. Balboa died.

Issue:
ON the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident in his fulfillment of duty?

Held:
YES. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. Exemption from
criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the fault or
negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled. Thus,
in
determining whether an “accident” attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual
standards of
lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore
the main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very
moment the shots were fired? YES. that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The
deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart
those attempts.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

APOLONIO CABALLEROS
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905

Facts:
Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to the crime of assassination or
murder of four American school-teachers, having buried the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime.
They were allegedly coerced.

Issue:

WON the defense under Art12(5) is tenable

Held:

Yes. Not only is Baculi’s confession that he only assisted in the burial of the corpses because he was
compelled by the murderers, but this was corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Sabate.
Sabate said that he was present when the Americans were killed; that Baculi was not a member of the
group of murderers but he was in the banana plantation gathering some bananas; that when he heard
the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidro, the leaders of the band;
that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns forced him to bury the corpses.
As for Caballeros, there was no proof that he took any part in the execution of the crime; there was
conclusive proof to the contrary. Sabate and Baculi declared that Caballeros did not take any part in the
burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took
place. Their failure to report the crime is not an offense punished by the Penal Code.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

LIBERATO EXALTACION
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904

Facts:
Facts:

Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchino were charged with the crime of rebellion for swearing
allegiance to the Katipunan Society, which aimed to overthrow the Government of the United States
governing the Philippine Islands. Seized documents from the encampment of a so-called General
Contreras showed that they signed the documents and allegedly made such allegiance.

The two, however, contend that they were captured by brigands, who compelled them to take an oath
supporting the Katipunan Society under threats of death. They produced several witnesses which
corroborated the fact of their capture and of their subsequent report to Don Tomas Testa, municipal
president of Meycauayan, who was also kidnapped.

Issue:
W/N duress relieves them from criminal liability of rebellion

Held:
Yes. The Court reversed the decision and acquitted the defendants because the documents were
insufficient to prove their guilt. Documents signed under compulsion (under threat of death) and while
in captivity relieve the two from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

ISIDRO VICENTILLO
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911

Facts:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary
detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
The defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to
be detained for a period of three days without having him brought before the proper judicial authority
for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested.

Issue:
Whether or not the failed to perform an act when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause?

Held:
No. in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as
"practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven
at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the
municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was
necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable
dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities
for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint,
which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not
appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of
proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions,
changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made
the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the
two adjoining municipalities.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

JOSEFINA BANDIAN
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
Facts: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to
respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on
Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the
thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth
in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The
evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers
him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew
of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The
appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable,
due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into
the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened
by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who
so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

DOMINGO URAL
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974

Facts:
Alberio went to the municipal building and saw Ural, a policeman inside the jail where he was boxing
prisoner Napola (who was imprisoned for being drunk). When Napola fell to the ground he kicked him
and poured some liquid on Napola and then ignited Napola’s body. Dr. Luzonia Bakil who treated the
victim, said that he sustained 2nd degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one half of the
body including the back. She also testified that without any medical intervention, the burns would have
caused death. Napola died on Aug 25 1966. Death certificate indicated burn as the cause of death.
During the trial, the prosecutors failed to present the detention prisoners who saw the burning of
Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased. Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of murder,
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and wasordered to pay for costs
Issue: Whether the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt?
Held: Ural had his own version of the story. According to him he heard a scream for help from Napola
whose shirt was in flames when found by him, he removed the shirt, but did not summon the doctor
because he thought that the burns were not serious.
According to the Supreme Court this statement cannot prevail over the testimony of Alberio. This
statement does not prove that he was not the one who burned Napola, at most thiscould only mean that
he was alarmed by the consequences of his evil act. Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as a witness,
saying that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder in the past.
Wouldn’t preclude him from being a credible witness. Since there was no police investigation (accused a
police officer), the investigation that ensued was done by a special counsel of the fiscal’s office. A
possible explanation of alberio not being listed at first. The statements of the witnesses for the defense
were not inconsistent with that of Alberio’s. Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in Alberio’s
testimony. The present case is covered by article 4 (par.1-result greater than what was intended).
Aggravating circumstance: art 14(1). TC erred in not appreciating the Mitigating circumstance “that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed” No intent to kill but only to
maltreat the drunk napola who might have beenmaking a nuisance of himself. He realized the fearful
consequence of his felonious act, he allowed Napola tosecure medical treatment at the municipal
dispensary.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR
[G.R. No. 125053. March 25, 1999]
Facts:
15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and against the will of
complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the
person of said complainant did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest her cash money
worth P900.00 and Titus wrist watch valued at an undetermined amount, belonging to said Ma. Teresa
Tarlengco, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on the
occasion of the said Robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without justifiable reason,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco,
thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds which caused her death.

Issue: Whether or not, the accused is guilty of crime committed under mitigating circumstances of
stabbing the victim due to sufficient provocation?

Held:
No. CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and bad words justify retaliation with a knife. Such claim is
undeserving of belief and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance
prior provocation by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation as, according to him, he
momentarily blacked out and instantly found his fan knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengcos chest. To be
blinded by passion and obfuscation is to lose self-control,[34] not consciousness. Moreover, courts
cannot appreciate passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that there were causes
naturally tending to produce such powerful excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-
control.[35] As we discussed earlier, the events leading to the stabbing precluded any natural tendency
to produce a powerful excitement in CHRISTOPHER
THE UNITED STATES vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR,
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917

Facts:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos, Province of Occidental
Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten,
proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was;
"There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as
explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up
behind him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death the following day.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance?

Held:
Yes. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating circumstance which on cursory
examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating circumstance was that the act was
committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

LEANDRO PAJARES
 G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992

Facts: 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought to insure and better accomplish his
criminal design, in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with five (5) others whose true names, real Identities, and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation, and treachery, attack, assault. and use personal violence upon one
DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by then and there mauling him and hitting him with a baseball bat at the
back of the head, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN
a club wound on the head which was the direct and immediate cause of his death.

Issue: whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be
appreciated in favor of the accused?

Held: No. While it may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions
of the deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter
(Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's
brother himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a
lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of
time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People v. Benito, G.R. No. L-
32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.

THE UNITED STATES, vs.

AUGUSTUS HICKS,
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909

Facts:
For 5 years, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and his mistress Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman,
were illicitly living together. However, Sola quitted living with Hicks. A few days later, she contracted a
new relationship with Corporal Wallace Current, another negro, who then went to live with her in the
house of her brother-in-law. One evening, Hicks, with soldier Lloyd Nickens, went to the said house. He
shooked hands and started conversing with Current. But, Current told Hicks that Sola did not want to live
with Hicks anymore, which promted Hicks to pull out his revolver and fired at Sola who was close by in
the sala. The bullet hit the left side of her breast. Hicks gave himself up to the police even before the
police received the information of the killing. He pleaded not guilty. His defense was that when he fell
backward when Current seized him, his revolver wen off hitting the deceased. The trial court convicted
him with the crime of murder with the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON Hicks can avail of himself of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation when
he killed Sola, his former mistress?
RULING: NO. The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such which originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions. Likewise, the crime was committed with the presence of treachery (alevosia), as Sola was
unexpectedly fired at close range while she was unarmed and unprepared at a time she was just listening
to a conversation. The presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as Premeditation and the fact
that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased. Premeditation was proven when Hicks
asked a leave to be absent from work and that he was carrying a loaded revolver when he had lunch that
day. It was also testified that Hicks was heard that the time of Sola had come.

THE UNITED STATES, vs.

HILARIO DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912

Facts:
The defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida when he caught her in flagrante
in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance?

Held:
Refer to the reviewer

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER
[G.R. No. 126096. July 26, 1999]

Facts:
October 20, 1994, at more or less 1 oclock in the afternoon, at Zone 5, Baikingon, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, as father of
herein complainant, by means of force, violence, and intimidation, while inside our dwelling house at the
afore-mentioned place, and when said accused and herein aggrieved party were alone in their said
dwelling house as the undersigned aggrieved-party-complainants mother was out doing laundry work as
a laundry woman, held and pulled undersigned complainant to accuseds bedroom in said dwelling house
and as the undersigned refused, wrestled and shouted for help, accused boxed and hit undersigneds
stomach to unconsciousness and did then and there, against complainants will and consent, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned who noticed upon regaining
consciousness that she was already stripped of her pairs of panty and pants and feeling extreme pain of
her private parts, and then and there accused threatened the undersigned of death if undersigned
complainant would reveal the incident to undersigneds mother or to anybody else, thus, resulting to
undersigneds pregnancy as examined and found out by the doctor, all against the will and consent of the
undersigned, to her great damage and prejudice.

Issue/ Held
Refer to the reviewer
 EXUPERANCIO CANTA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 140937. February 28, 2001]

Facts:
March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to
Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the
aforesaid owner, to his damage and prejudice in the amount aforestated.

Issue/ Held: Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

FLORO RODIL
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

Facts:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. The accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, which directly caused his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon agent of authority.

HELD:

Yes. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the
prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance
to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack
does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery , the record failed to show that the accused
made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore,
the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of official
duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery
in the commission of the crime.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the
victim. Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling
Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were
charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and
not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to
public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the
charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating
circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT
DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

AMADO DANIEL
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978

Facts:
20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complaint, against her will, and in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad,
Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for it, is present.
Issue/Held: Refer to the reviewer

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS
[G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999]

Facts:
Refer to the reviwer

THE UNITED STATES vs.

THE MORO MANALINDE
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
Facts:
Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

LAUREANO SANGALANG
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
Facts:
at around six o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas,
Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left
inside the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell
to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a
distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her
husband. He was already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His
assailants were about five meters away from him.

She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She
and her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.

Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang
aking asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She
retreated to the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes,
Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her
husband was prostrate, he was already dead.

Issue:
Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

JOSE TORREFIEL
[G.R. No. 115431. April 18, 1996]

Facts:
Refer to the reviewer
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ROLANDO ALFANTA
[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]
Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

FILOMENO CAMANO
G.R. No. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982

FACTS: On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagnay, Province of Camarines Sur,
between four and five in the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the
victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular of Bicol “palas” which is a sharp bladed
and pointed instrument about 2 feet long including the black handle, tapering to the end, about and
one-half inches in width, while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost in front of the
store of one Socorro Buates. Godofredo Pascua sustained two mortal wounds for which he died
instantaneously. After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded to the
seashore and on finding Mariano Buenaflore leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling
position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the latter with the
same bolo.

Issue: Whether or not alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an

aggravating circumstance?
Held:
Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

LUA CHU
G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931

Facts:
Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng were convicted of the illegal importation of opium. On November, 1929, Tieng
wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. Tieng went to Juan Samson's
house and told him that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins for P2 a tin, and that opium is in the
vessel Kolambugan, awaiting shipment direct to Cebu. When the vessel arrived, Tieng was told that he
must pay over the Php6000 before the opium be taken out. The next day, Samson informed of what had
taken place to Colonel Francisco, who then instructed the Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of
the opium owners with Samson. Samson also went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the
same, and asked for a stenographer to note his conversation with Tieng that night and in the presence of
Captain Buenconsejo. On December 17, 1929, Buenconsejo, Fernando, and the stenographer went to
Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood. Samson asked Tieng
where the opium was, and the latter answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18
–
a total of 3,252 tins. Tieng returned later that night with Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of
the opium. Samson then interrogated Chu on when the former was going to get the opium, on whether
Chu had brought the money, on how he had come to bring in the opium; Chu would answer them, while
Buenconsejo listened in. As Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay;
Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two men. After the two to the
Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Buenconsejo and Samson went to Chu's home to
search it and arrest him, and took him to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the
customhouse to examine the cases marked. Contention of the accused: The accused principal defense
was that they were induced by Samson to import the opium in question Contention of the state: The
state contends that the defendants do not deny their participation in the act in question. Samson denied
his connection with the offense for purposes of gain; further contending that he smoothed the way for
the introduction of the prohibited drug, but he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a
successful issue, rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
Issue:
Whether or not the Samson instigated the accused to import opium
Decision:
Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein accused to import the opium in question, but
pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Natividad; not to gain the Php2000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited
drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against
the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for
this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it
simply a trap set to catch a criminal. The mere fact that the Samson pretended to agree a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure
of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
Decision against the accused is affirmed.

AQUILINA R. ARANETA vs.

 COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986
Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Sec. 3-B, R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). Gertrudes Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an employee of the NIA. Upon the death of
her husband, she approached the appellant, a hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit, to
inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation, and she prepared the application
forms and attachments and filed them in San Fernando, Pampanga. Complainant went back to San
Fernando to verify the status of her claim, and was informed that other civil documents were need. She
secured these documents and went back, but was told that her claim papers had been forwarded to the
accused. So she went to see the appellant. The accused told Yoyongco that she had to pay Php100, so
that her claim would be acted upon. The complainant told that if the appellant would process her claim,
she would pay upon its approval. The appellant was adamant. She would not agree to the complainant's
proposal. According to her, on previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they
failed to live up to them. Yoyongco went to her brother-in-law, a colonel and chief of the CIS, Philippine
Constabulary, to inform him of the demand of the appellant. He gave the complainant two 50-peso bills,
and instructed her to go to Col. Laureaga for help. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlos to entrap the appellant.
The bills were marked, and Carlos, Beleno, Balcos and Yoyongco proceeded to the office of the accused.
The complainant and Balcos approached the appellant. Carlos and Beleno stationed themselves outside
the room and observed events through a glass window. There were three other persons inside the office
– entrapped
Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato de Lara, and Gregorio Ocampo. Yoyongco requested once again the
accused to process her claim; she countered by asking the former if she had the money. Yoyongco
brought out the bills and handed them to the accused. As the accused took hold of the money, Balcos
grabbed her hand and told her she was under arrest; whereas, Carlos and Beleno helped in the arrest of
the appellant. Contention of the accused: The accused contends that the CA erred in not acquitting the
petitioner on the basis of entrapment evidence devised by members of the Philippine Constabulary.
Contention of the state: The state contends that the accused confused entrapment with instigation
Issue:
Whether or not the accused confused entrapment with instigation
Decision:
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced
to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit
the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the Idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of
entrapment and instigation are also different. As already stated, entrapment does not exempt the
criminal from liability. Instigation does. Petition made by accused has been dismissed; Decision against
accused was affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS
[G.R. No. 146309. July 18, 2002]
Facts:
That on the afternoon of April 07, 1998, inside Unit #375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II,
Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and dispatch 497.2940 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as SHABU, a regulated drug to undercover NBI
agents who acted as poseur-buyer[s], without the corresponding license, and/or prescription to sell,
distribute and dispatch the aforementioned regulated drug, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic
of the Philippines
Issue:
whether the buy-bust operation is an entrapment and not an instigation?
Held:
Yes. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators
practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals
themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a
legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal
drugs.[10]
A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest of appellant was
indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses must
be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was
thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not.[11] In the present case, the RTC
noted that the prosecution witnesses testified in a clear and straightforward manner in narrating the
events that had transpired before and during the buy-bust operation.
Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner.[12] Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given
to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

ANSELMO DIRIS
G.R. No. L-8578 November 17, 1913
Refre to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

ONG CHIAT LAY
G.R. No. L-39086 October 26, 1934
Refer to the reviewer
Cemetery
THE UNITED STATES vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN
G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913
Facts: Panglima Indanan, accussed is the headman of Parang. On Mar. 24, 1912, Indanan ordered the
killing of Sariol to his men Akiran, Kalyakan & Suhuri in the Chinese Cemetary asserting that Indanan had
an order to that effect from the governor. The CFI found Indanan guilty of the crime of murder &
sentencing him to be hanged.
Issue:
WON Indanan is guilty of murder by inducement? Held: YES. A13(2), of the Penal Code declares those to
be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it." Commenting upon this
paragraph, Viada says: They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear,
for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the
crime. In our commentary on par. 9 of A8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence
acts w/o will & against his will, is no more than an instrument, & therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real
culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other
to commit the crime. One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a
consideration, or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real & moving cause of the crime & w/c
was done for the purpose of inducing
such criminal act & was sufficient for that purpose. We’ve already seen in our commentary
on par. 12 of A8 that the 1 who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by
showing that he acted w/ due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls
entirely upon the 1 who orders, i.e., upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to
commit the act. But in case the obedience of the i
nferior isn’t due to the superior & thus not necessary, & doesn’t, thus, exempt him
from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly
induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime. The pacto by
virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand w/c commits the crime makes him who gives,
promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because w/o such
offer or promise the criminal act
would never have been committed. But this doesn’t mean that the 1 who actually commits
the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility;
on the contrary, such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime. We have heretofore said that
in addition to the precepto & the pacto there are similar means by w/c another may be induced to
commit a crime w/c also make the 1 who offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of
the provisions of A13(2). But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in
simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the
act was committed. Such advice & such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement
condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance &
great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as
powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

KIICHI OMINE
G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935
Facts:
Refer to the reviewer

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988
Refer to the reviewer
Apprehended
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BERTO SIMBRA
[G.R. No. L-39401. September 30, 1982.]

Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BERTO SIMBRA
 [G.R. No. L-39401. September 30, 1982.]

Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CRESENCIO DOBLE
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
Refer to the reviewer

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
Refer to the reviewer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

NEMESIO TALINGDAN
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
Refer to the reviewer

LITO VINO vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
Refer to the reviewer