G.R. No.
206020, April 14, 2015
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided
for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national
and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the
prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - During the campaign period, it is
unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of
authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
x x x x
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and
tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
In its letter dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its president, Melencio F.
Vargas, sought clarification from the COMELEC as regards the application of
Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals.
On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner's request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 9615 violates the equal protection clause
HELD: YES.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free
speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on
which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. "Equal protection requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."
"The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken."
Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in
fact, be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the class.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the
purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since
it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the
law.
A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and
other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the
government either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out
earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition
does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and
transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already
explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for
use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are
allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign
materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right
to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and
properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is
likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other
properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs
and transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election campaign
materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,
commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no
reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against
posting of election campaign materials.
Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of
private vehicles and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and
opportunity to candidates in elections.
In sum, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
violate the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties.
