TAXATION CASE DOCTRINES

BAROPS ACADEMIC DIVISION 2018

ION LAWCASE DOCTRINES
BAROPS ACADEMIC DIVISION 2018
 DATE G.R. NO.

G.R. No. 184450/G.R. No. 184508/G.R. No.

JANUARY 24, 2017
184538/G.R. No. 185234

JANUARY 25, 2017 G.R. No. 205045/G.R. No. 205723

FEBRUARY 8, 2017 G.R. NO. 193381

FEBRUARY 8, 2017 G.R. NO. 201326

FEBRUARY 13, 2017 G.R. NO. 203514

FEBRUARY 22, 2017 G.R. NO. 215705-07

FEBRUARY 22, 2017 G.R. NO. 221590

MARCH 6, 2017 G.R. NO. 180654

MARCH 8, 2017 G.R. NO. 215383

MARCH 15, 2017 G.R. NO. 192536

MARCH 22, 2017 G.R. NO. 213943

APRIL 5, 2017 G.R. NO. 222743

APRIL 17, 2017 G.R. NO. 210251

APRIL 17, 2017 G.R. NO. 182582

APRIL 19, 2017 G.R. NO. 201530/G.R. NOS. 201680-81

APRIL 26, 2017 G.R. NO. 205279

JUNE 5, 2017 G.R. NO. 175772

JUNE 5, 2017 G.R. NO. 198485

JUNE 6, 2017 G.R. NO. 211093

JUNE 19, 2017 G.R. NO. 202922

JUNE 28, 2017 G.R. NO. 176703/G.R. NO. 176721

JULY 12 2017 GR. NO. 183408

July 26, 2017 G.R. No. 197526/G.R. No. 199676-77

July 26, 2017 G.R. No. 220835

August 7, 2017 G.R. No. 207306

August 8, 2017 G.R. No. 198146

August 9, 2017 G.R. No. 216161

August 30, 2017 G.R. No. 201665/G.R. No. 201668

 August 30, 2017 G.R. No. 193625

SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 G.R. NO. 205652

SEPTEMBER 27, 2017 G.R. NO. 209306

NOV. 8, 2017 G.R. NO. 220440

NOV. 8, 2017 G.R. NO. 197519

NOV. 22, 2017 G.R. NO. 227544

G.R. NO. 210689-90/G.R. NOS. 210704 &

NOV. 22, 2017
210725
 CASE TITLE
JAIME N. SORIANO, ET AL. VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE/SENATOR MANUEL A. ROXAS VS.
MARGARITO B. TEVES AND LILIAN B. HEFTI/TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TUCP) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DEMOCRITO T.
MENDOZA VS. MARGARITO B. TEVES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND LILIAN B. HEFTI, IN HER CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE/SENATOR FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, ET AL. VS. TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TUCP) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DEMOCRITO T.
MENDOZA VS. MARGARITO B. TEVES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND LILIAN B. HEFTI, IN HER CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SAN MIGUEL

CORPORATION/COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. APO CEMENT CORPORATION

SITEL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ASALUS CORPORATION

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN,

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN, PASTOR B. VICHUACO AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF BATAAN
 HON. KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ST. PAUL
COLLEGE OF MAKATI

DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC.

MEDICARD PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

 SECRETARY OF FINANCE CESAR V. PURISIMA AND COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES VS. PHILIPPINE TOBACCO
INSTITUTE, INC.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE
ASIA TRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE/COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ASIA TRUST
DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.

VISAYAS GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
 MITSUBISHI CORPORATION - MANILA BRANCH VS. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE

MARUBENI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
 MINDANAO SHOPPING DESTINATION CORPORATION, ET AL. VS. HON.
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, ET AL.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SEMIRARA MINING CORPORATION

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA VS. CITY PASIG AND UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE
CLUB, INC./UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. VS. CITY OF PASIG AND
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS LANCASTER PHILIPPINES, INC.

 CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE/REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

INSTITUTE, INC.
BEAUMONTH HOLDINGS CORPORATION VS. ATTY. ROSARIO V.E. REYES, ET AL.

POWER SECTOR ASSET AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION VS.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS,
INC.

EDISON (BATAAN) COGENERATION CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE/REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. EDISON (BATAAN)
COGENERATION CORPORATION
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC. VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS - EN
BANC AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

PROCTER & GAMBLE ASIA VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. HEDCOR SIBULAN, INC.

KATHERINE ROSE SALVAA VS, ILDEFONSO P. MAGPILE

 MINDANO I GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL
REVENUE

COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. TRANSITIONS PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) VS. THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE HEAD REBENUE EXECUTIVE
ASSISTAT, LARGE TAXPAYER SERVICE/COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
VS. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
BAR SUBJECT SUBJECT TOPIC

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF

TAXATION LAW
TAXATION TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION EXCISE TAX

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
TAXATION LAW DOCTRINES IN TAXATION
TAXATION
TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION INCOME TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION EXCISE TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAX REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION

 CONSTRUCTION AND
TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION
INTERPRETATION OF

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAX REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION EXCISE TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAX INCOME TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAXPAYER’S REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAXPAYER’S REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW TAX 1 TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION TAXING POWERS OF CITIES

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION AND

TAXATION LAW
TAXATION INTERPRETATION OF
TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION REAL PROPERTY TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAX REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAX REMEDIES

 LOCAL TAXATION [LOCAL
TAXATION LAW GOVERNMENT CODE (LGC) OF REAL PROPERTY TAX
1991, as amended]

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
TAXATION LAW DOCTRINES IN TAXATION
TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION INCOME TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION INCOME TAX

TAXATION &
LOCAL TAXATION REAL PROPERTY TAX
POLITICAL
TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION VALUE-ADDED TAX

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION TAX REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION

 SUB-TOPIC PONENTE

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS SERENO

REFUND LEONEN

COMROMISE AND TAX AMNESTY LEONEN

ZERO RATED AND EFECTIVELY ZERO
CAGUIOA
RATED

INCOME TAX ON CORPORATION

DEL
(INCOME TAX ON SPECIAL
CASTILLO
CORPORATION)

PERALTA
FALSE OR FRAUDULENT RETURNS MENDOZA

FRANCHISE TAX ABAD

TAX EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS CARPIO

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

BERSAMIN
INPUT TAX

ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND

CARPIO
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD

CONCEPT,
CHARACTERISTICS/ELEMENTS OF VAT- REYES
TAXABLE TRANSACTIONS
 CARPIO

PERLAS-
WITHHOLDING TAX
BERNABE
 COMPROMISE AND ABATEMENT OF DEL
TAXES CASTILLO

RECOVERY OF TAX ERRONEOUSLY OR

REYES
ILLEGALLY COLLECTED
RECOVERY OF TAX ERRONEOUSLY OR PERLAS-
ILLEGALLY COLLECTED BERNABE

RECOVERY OF TAX ERRONEOUSLY OR

CAGUIOA
ILLEGALLY COLLECTED
 BUSINESS TAX PERALTA

TAX EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS CAGUIOA

APPRAISAL AND ASSESSMENT OF REAL
MARTIRES
PROPERTY TAX

ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND

MARTIRES
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
LEONEN
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR

CAGUIOA
ASSESSMENT
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CAGUIOA

CHANGE OR CESSATION OF STATUS AS

VAT-REGISTERED PERSON (CHANGE OF
BUSINESS ACTIVITY FROM VAT CARPIO
TAXABLE STATUS TO VAT-EXEMPT
STATUS)
COMPROMISE AND TAX AMNESTY CARPIO

DEL
WITHHOLDING TAX
CASTILLO
REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
MARTIRES
INPUT TAX

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

CAGUIOA
INPUT TAX
 WITHHOLDING TAX CAGUIOA

REMEDIES OF LGUS FOR COLLECTION

OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES (ISSUANCE
PERALTA
OF NOTICE OF DELINQUENCY FOR
REAL PROPERTY TAX PAYMENT)
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
CAGUIOA
INPUT TAX

ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND

REGLEMENTARY PERIODS (ISSUANCE
LEONEN
OF PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT NOTICE;
GENERAL RULE AND EXCEPTIONS)

TAXING POWERS OF PROVINCES

CAGUIOA
(FRANCHISE TAX)
 FACTS

Petitioners assail the subject RR as an unauthorized departure from the legislative intent of R.A.
9504. They also contest the validity of the RR's alleged imposition of a condition for the availment
by MWEs of the exemption provided by R.A. 9504. Supposedly, in the event they receive other
benefits in excess of ₱30,000, they can no longer avail themselves of that exemption. Petitioners
contend that the law provides for the unconditional exemption of MWEs from income tax and, thus,
pray that the RR be nullified.

BIR argues that "San Mig Light," launched in November 1999, is not a new brand but merely a low-
calorie variant of "San Miguel Pale Pilsen."86 Thus, the application of the higher excise tax rate for
variant products is appropriate and SMC should not be entitled to a refund.
Respondent counters that "San Mig Light" is a new brand; the classification of "San Mig Light" as a
new and medium-priced brand may not be revised except by an act of Congress.

Apo Cement paid the deficiency assessments reflected in the Bureau's Final Decision on Disputed
Assessment, except for the documentary stamp taxes. The deficiency documentary stamp taxes
were allegedly based on several real property transactions of the corporation consisting of the
assignment of several parcels of land with mineral deposits to Apo Land and Quarry Corporation, a
wholly owned subsidiary, and land acquisitions in 1999. According to the Commissioner, Apo
Cement should have paid documentary stamp taxes based on the zonal value of property with
mineral/quarry content, not on the zonal value of regular residential property.

On January 25, 2008, Apo Cement availed of the tax amnesty under Republic Act No. 9480,
particularly affecting the 1999 deficiency documentary stamp taxes.
 On March 28, 2006, Sitel filed separate formal claims for refund or issuance of tax credit with the
One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance for
its unutilized input VAT arising from domestic purchases of goods and services attributed to zero-
rated transactions and purchases/importations of capital goods for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th
quarters of 2004 in the aggregate amount of P23,093,899.59

SLMC filed with petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative protest

SLMC claimed that as a non-stock, non-profit charitable and social welfare organization under
Section 30(E) and (G)[9] of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, it is exempt from paying income tax.

CTA Division rendered a Decision[13] finding SLMC not liable for deficiency income tax

The CTA Second Division found that PAL was able to sufficiently prove its exemption from the
payment of excise taxes pertaining to its importation of alcoholic products and since it already paid
the disputed excise taxes on the subject importation, it is entitled to refund. However, the tax court
ruled that, with respect to its subject importation of tobacco products, PAL failed to discharge its
burden of proving that the said product were not locally available in reasonable quantity, quality or
price, in accordance with the requirements of the law. Thus, it is not entitled to refund for the excise
taxes paid on such importation
Asalus received the Formal Assessment Notice (FAN) stating that it was liable for deficiency VAT for
2007 in the total amount of ₱95,681,988.64, inclusive of surcharge and interest. Consequently, it
filed its protest against the FAN, dated September 6, 2011. Thereafter, Asalus filed a supplemental
protest stating that the deficiency VAT assessment had prescribed pursuant to Section 203 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

On May 12 and 14, 2003 the Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC, calling its attention
to the Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan that held the NPC liable
for the payment of local franchise tax. The NPC replied, however, that it had ceased to be liable for
the payment of that tax after Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took effect on June 26, 2001. The new law relieved the NPC
of the function of generating and supplying electricity beginning that year. Consequently, the
Province has no right to further assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local franchise tax.
 On 22 July 2013, petitioner Kim S. Jacinto-Henares, acting in her capacity as then Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR), issued RMO No. 20-2013, "Prescribing the Policies and Guidelines in the
Issuance of Tax Exemption Rulings to Qualified Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations
under Section 30 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended."

On 29 November 2013, respondent St. Paul College of Makati (SPCM), a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution organized and existing under Philippine laws, filed a Civil Action to Declare
Unconstitutional [Bureau of Internal Revenue] RMO No. 20-2013 with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 before the RTC.

Alcantara now insists on the competence of the RTC to take cognizance of his complaint. He insists
that his complaint is one for the declaration of the nullity of TCT No. T-195677 and TCT No. T-244532
and for the reconveyance of property that fell within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC as provided for in Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended, due to such causes of action being
incapable of pecuniary estimation and involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein; that the CA erred in requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies before going
to the RTC; and that because the CTA had no jurisdiction, and, as such, had no power to declare
certificate of titles as null and void, the CA was the proper appellate forum for him.

PDI is a corporation engaged in the business of newspaper publication.

On 15 April 2005, it filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 2004.

On 10 August 2006, PDI received a letter dated 30 June 2006 from Region 020 Large Taxpayers'
Service of BTR

BIR alleged that based on the computerized matching it conducted on the information and data
provided by third party sources against PDI's declaration on its VAT Returns for taxable year 2004,
there was an underdeclaration of domestic purchases from its suppliers amounting to
P317,705,610.52. In a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) dated 15 October 2007 issued by the
BIR-LTAID, PDI was assessed for alleged deficiency income tax and VAT for taxable year 2004

PDI sought reconsideration of the PAN and expressed its willingness to execute another Waiver
(Third Waiver), which it did on the same date, thus extending BIR's right to assess and/or collect
from it until 30 April 2008.

MEDICARD filed a protest arguing, among others, that that the services it render is not limited
merely to arranging for the provision of medical and/or hospitalization services but include actual
and direct rendition of medical and laboratory services. On June 19, 2009, MEDICARD received CIR’s
Final Decision denying its protest. The petitioner MEDICARD proceeded to file a petition for review
before the CTA.
 On 20 December 2012, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed Republic Act No. 10351 (RA 10351),
otherwise known as the Sin Tax Reform Law. RA 10351 restructured the excise tax on alcohol and
tobacco products by amending pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8424, known as the Tax
Reform Act of 1997 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC). On 21 December 2012,
the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR),
issued RR 17-2012. Section 11 of RR 17-2012 imposes an excise tax on individual cigarette pouches
of 5's and 10's even if they are bundled or packed in packaging combinations not exceeding 20
cigarettes. As a consequence, on 26 February 2013, PTI filed a petition for declaratory relief with an
application for writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. PTI sought to have RR 17-2012 and RMC
90-2012 declared null and void for allegedly violating the Constitution and imposing tax rates not
authorized by RA 10351. PTI stated that the excise tax rate of either P12 or P25 under RA 10351
should be imposed only on cigarettes packed by machine in packs of 20's or packaging
combinations of 20's and should not be imposed on cigarette pouches of 5's and 10's.

Pursuant its Agreement with Solidbank, LHC withheld, and eventually paid to the BIR, the ten
percent (10%) final tax on the interest portions of the aforesaid payments, on the same months that
the respective payments were made to petitioner. In sum, LHC remitted a total ofUS$106,178.69,8
or its Philippine Peso equivalent of ₱5,296,773.05,9 as evidenced by LHC's Schedules of Final Tax
and Monthly Remittance Returns for the said months.
According to Metrobank, it mistakenly remitted the aforesaid amounts to the BIR as well when they
were inadvertently included in its own Monthly Remittance Returns of Final Income Taxes Withheld
for the months of March 2001 and October 2001. Thus, on December 27, 2002, it filed a letter to the
BIR requesting for the refund thereof. Thereafter and in view of respondent the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue's (CIR) inaction, Metrobank filed its judicial claim for refund via a petition for
review filed before the CTA on September 10, 2003, docketed as CTA Case No. 6765
 On March 17, 2000, Asiatrust timely protested the assessment notices.
Due to the inaction of the CIR on the protest, Asiatrust filed before the CTA a Petition for Review
docketed as CTA Case No. 6209 praying for the cancellation of the tax assessments for deficiency
income tax, documentary stamp tax (DST) - regular, DST - industry issue, final withholding tax,
expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefits tax issued against it by the CIR.

On April 19, 2005, the CIR approved Asiatrust's Offer of Compromise of DST - regular assessments
for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1996, 1997, and 1998.

During the trial, Asiatrust manifested that it availed of the Tax Abatement Program for its deficiency
final withholding tax - trust assessments for fiscal years ending June 30, 1996 and 1998; and that on
June 29, 2007, it paid the basic taxes in the amounts of P4,187,683.27 and P6,097,825.03 for the
said fiscal years, respectively. Asiatrust also claimed that on March 6, 2008, it availed of the
provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 9480, otherwise known as the Tax Amnesty Law of 2007.

Asiatrust, insisting that the Certification issued by the BIR is sufficient proof of its availment of the
Tax Abatement Program considering that the CIR, despite Asiatrust's request, has not yet issued a
termination letter

On February 13, 2009, petitioner Visayas Geothermal Company filed with the BIR an administrative
claim for refund of unutilized input VAT covering the taxable year 2007 in the amount of
P11,902,576.07. On March 30, 2009, it proceeded to immediately file a petition for review with the
CTA, as it claimed that the BIR failed to act upon the claim for refund.

The petitioner insists that when it sought an immediate recourse to the CTA without waiting for the
decision of the CIR in the administrative claim, it merely relied on the guidelines that were set forth
in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which provides that a taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of
the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. The petitioner also cites the Court's ruling in CIR v.
San Roque Power Corporation,16 which recognized the effects of a taxpayer's reliance on the said
BIR ruling.

The CIR, on the other hand, maintains that the petition for review filed with the CTA was
prematurely filed, as the petitioner still had to wait for the lapse of the 120-day period allowed for
the resolution of its administrative claim.
 the governments of Japan and the Philippines executed an Exchange ofNotes, whereby the former
agreed to extend a loan to the latter. based on the Exchange of Notes, the Philippine Government,
through the NPC as its executing agency, bound itself to assume or shoulder petitioner's tax
obligations.

the National Power Corporation (NPC), as the executing government agency, entered into a contract
with Mitsubishi Corporation (i.e., petitioner's head office in Japan) for the engineering, supply,
construction, installation, testing, and commissioning of a steam generator, auxiliaries, and
associated civil works for the Project (Contract). petitioner filed its Income Tax Return for the fiscal
year that ended on March 31, 1998 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner included in
its income tax due the amount of P44,288,712.00, representing income from the OECF-funded
portion of the Project. On the same day, petitioner also filed its Monthly Remittance Return of
Income Taxes Withheld and remitted P8,324,100.00 as BPRT for branch profits remitted to its head
office in Japan out of its income for the fiscal year that ended on March 31, 1998 .

On March 27, 2002, Marubeni filed with the BIR a written claim for a refund and/or the issuance of a
TCC, which it later amended on April 25, 2002, reducing its claim to ₱3,887,419.31. On the same
date, Marubeni filed a petition for review before the CTA claiming a refund and/or issuance ofa TCC
in the amount of ₱3,887,419.31. The CTA En Banc agreed with the CTA Second Division that
Marubeni timely filed its administrative claim for refund. 20 But as to Marubeni' s judicial claim for
refund, the CTA En Banc ruled that following Section 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenue Code
(1997 Tax Code) and the Court's ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc. , the filing of the petition for review with the CTA was premature. According to
the CTA En Banc, Marubeni should have filed its petition for review with the CTA 30 days from
receipt of the decision of the CIR denying the claim or after the expiration of the 120-day period
from the filing of the administrative claim with the CIR. Marubeni claims that Aichi cannot be applied
retroactively.
 Petitioners claimed that they used to pay only 50% of 1 % of the. business tax rate under the old
Davao City Ordinance No. 230, Series of; 1990, but in the assailed new ordinance, it will require
them to pay a tax rate of 1.5%, or an increase of 200% from the previous rate. Petitioners believe
that the increase is not allowed under Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, The Local Government Code
(LGC). Consequently, invoking the LGC, petitioners appealed to the DOJ, docketed as MTO-DOJ Case
No. 02-2006, asserting the unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 69 (d), for being unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory and contrary to the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of the
LGC. Petitioners prayed that the questioned ordinance, particularly Section 69 (d) thereof be
declared as null and void ab initio.

As a coal mine operator, SMC sells its coal production, under the COC, to various customers, among
which is the National Power Corporation (NPC), a government-owned and controlled corporation, in
accordance with the duly executed Coal Supply Agreement dated May 19, 1995.

SMC has been selling coal to NPC for years without paying VAT pursuant to the exemption granted
under Section 16 of PD No. 972. However, after Republic Act (RA) No. 9337, which amended certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, took effect on July 1,
2005, NPC started to withhold a tax of five percent (5%) representing the final withholding VAT on
SMC's coal billings pursuant to Section 114(C) of the same law, on the belief that the sale of coal by
SMC was no longer exempt from VAT.

In view thereof, SMC requested for a BIR pronouncement sustaining its position that its sale of coal
to NPC was still exempt from VAT notwithstanding RA No. 9337, which the BIR granted through BIR
Ruling No. 006-2007.

Consequently, on May 21, 2007, January 21, 2008, and January 29, 2008, SMC filed with the BIR
Large Taxpayers Division, Revenue District Office No. 121-Quexon City, letters with supporting
documents requesting for a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in the total amount of
₱77,253,245.39, representing the final withholding VAT withheld by NPC on its coal billing for the
period of July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006.
Petitioner Uniwide conducted and operated business in buildings and establishments constructed on
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 72983, 74003, and PT-74468
(subject properties) issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. In said TCTs, the location of the
parcels of land is indicated as being in Pasig.

In 1989, Uniwide applied for and was issued a building permit by Pasig for its building. Uniwide also
secured the requisite Mayor's Permit for its business from Pasig and consequently paid thereto its
business and realty taxes, fees, and other charges from 1989 to 1996.

However, beginning 1997, Uniwide did not file any application for renewal of its Mayor's Permit in
Pasig nor paid the local taxes thereto. Instead, it paid local taxes to Cainta after the latter gave it
notice, supported by documentary proof of its claims, that the subject properties were within
Cainta's territorial jurisdiction.

Consequently, Pasig filed a case for collection of local business taxes, fees, and other legal charges
due for fiscal year 1997 against Uniwide with the RTC-Pasig on 28 January 1997. Uniwide, in tum,
filed a third-party complaint against Cainta for reimbursement of the taxes, fees, and other charges
it had paid to the latter in the event that Uniwide was adjudged liable for payment of taxes to Pasig

After the conduct of an examination pursuant to the LOA, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment
Notice (PAN) which cited Lancaster for:

1) overstatement of its purchases for the fiscal year April 1998 to March1999; and 2) noncompliance
with the generally accepted accountingprinciple of proper matching of cost and revenue. More
concretely, the BIR disallowed the purchases of tobacco from farmers covered by Purchase Invoice
Vouchers (PIVs) for the months of February and March 1998 as deductions against income for the
fiscal year April 1998 to March 1999.

Lancaster replied to the PAN contending, among other things, that for the past decades, it has used
an entire 'tobacco-cropping season' to determine its total purchases covering a one-year period from
1 October up to 30 September of the followingyear (as against its fiscal year which is from 1 April up
to 31 March of the followingyear); that it has been adopting the 6~month timing difference to
conform to the matching concept (of cost and revenue); and that this has long been installed as part
of the company's system and consistently applied in its accounting books
 The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc ruled that CE Luzon failed to observe the 120-day period under
Section 112(C) of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, it was barred from claiming a refund
of its input VAT for taxable year 2003.31 The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc held that CE Luzon's
judicial claims were prematurely filed.32 CE Luzon should have waited either for the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to render a decision or for the 120-day period to expire before instituting its
judicial claim for refund

The CTA Division found the waivers executed by STI defective for failing to strictly comply with the
requirements provided by Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90 issued on April 4, 1990
and Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No. 05-01 issued on August 2, 2001. Consequently,
the periods for the CIR to assess or collect internal revenue taxes were never extended; and the
subject assessment for deficiency income tax, VAT and EWT against STI, which the CIR issued
beyond the three-year prescriptive period provided by law, was already barred by prescription
This case calls for the interpretation and application of Section 267, Title II (Real Property Taxation),
Book II of the Local Government Code (LGC).

The CA explained that the deposit required in Section 267 is a jurisdictional requirement, the non-
payment of which warrants the dismissal of the action assailing the validity of the tax sale.

PSALM conducted public biddings for the privatization of the Pantabangan-Masiway Hydroelectric
Power Plant (Pantabangan-Masiway Plant) and Magat Hydroelectric Power Plant (Magat Plant) on 8
September 2006 and 14 December 2006, respectively. First Gen Hydropower Corporation with its
$129 Million bid and SN Aboitiz Power Corporation with its $530 Million bid were the winning bidders
for the PantabanganMasiway Plant and Magat Plant, respectively.

On 28 August 2007, the NPC received a letter5 dated 14 August 2007 from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) demanding immediate payment of ₱3,813,080,4726 deficiency value-added tax (VAT)
for the sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway Plant and Magat Plant. The NPC indorsed BIR's demand
letter to PSALM.

PSALM remitted under protest to the BIR the amount of ₱3, 813, 080, 472, representing the total
basic VAT due.

On 21 September 2007, PSALM filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for the
adjudication of the dispute with the BIR to resolve the issue of whether the sale of the power plants
should be subject to VAT. The case was docketed as OSJ Case No. 2007-3.

On 13 March 2008, the DOJ ruled in favor of PSALM.

Phil. Aluminum Wheels filed with the BIR an application for the abatement of its tax liabilities under
Revenue Regulations No. 13-2001 for the taxable year 2001.7 In a letter dated 12 September
2007,8 the BIR denied respondent's application for tax abatement on the ground that the FDDA was
already issued by the BIR and that the FDDA had become final and executory due to the failure of
the respondent to appeal the FDDA with the CTA. The BIR contended that the FDDA had been sent
through registered mail on 12 April 2007 and that the FDDA had become final, executory, and
demandable because of the failure of the respondent to appeal the FDDA with the CTA within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the FDDA.

In a letter dated 19 September 2007, respondent informed the BIR that it already paid its tax
deficiency on withholding tax amounting to ₱736,726.89 through the Electronic Filing and Payment
System of the BIR and that if was also in the process of availing of the Tax Amnesty Program under
Republic Act No. 9480 (RA 9480) as implemented by Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 55-2007 to
settle its deficiency tax assessment for the taxable year 2001. On 21 September 2007, respondent
complied with the requirements of RA 9480 which include: the filing of a Notice of Availment, Tax
Amnesty Return and Payment Form, and remitting the tax payment. In a letter dated 29 January
2008, the BIR denied respondent's request and ordered respondent to pay the deficiency tax
assessment amounting to ₱29, 108, 767 .63

On February 2, 2004, Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation [EBCC] received from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a Formal Letter of Demand and Final Assessment Notice
dated January 23, 2004 assessing EBCC of deficiency income tax, Value Added Tax (VAT),
withholding tax on compensation, Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) and Final Withholding Tax (FWT)
for taxable year 2000 in the total amount of ₱84,868,390.
On 26 September 2002, AICHI filed with the BIR District Office in San Pedro, Laguna, a written claim
for refund and/or tax credit of its unutilized input VAT credits for the third and fourth quarters of
2000 and the four taxable quarters of 2001. AICHI sought the tax refund/credit of input VAT for the
said taxable quarters in the total sum of P18,030,547.776 representing VAT payments on
importation of capital goods and domestic purchases of goods and services.

As respondent CIR failed to act on the refund claim, and in order to toll the running of the
prescriptive period provided under Sections 229 and 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenue Code
(Tax Code), AICHI filed, on 30 September 2002, a Petition for Review before the CTA Division.

On March 22, 2007 and May 2, 2007, P&G filed applications and letters addressed to the BIR
Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 49, requesting the refund or issuance of tax credit certificates
(TCCs) of its input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales covering the taxable periods of January
2005 to March 2005, and April 2005 to June 2005.9

On March 28, 2007, P&G filed a petition for review with the CTA seeking the refund or issuance of
TCC in the amount of P23,090,729.17 representing input VAT paid on goods or services attributable
to its zero-rated sales for the first quarter of taxable year 2005. The case was docketed as CTA Case
No. 7581.10

On June 8, 2007, P&G filed with the CTA another judicial claim for refund or issuance of TCC in the
amount of P19,006,753.58 representing its unutilized input VAT paid on goods and services
attributable to its zero-rated sales for the second quarter of taxable year 2005. The case was
docketed as CTA Case No. 7639.11

On July 30, 2007, the CTA Division granted P&G's Motion to Consolidate CTA Case No. 7581 with
7639, inasmuch as the two cases involve the same parties and common questions of law and/or
facts.
 On April 21, 2008, HSI filed with the BIR its Original Quarterly VAT Returns for the first quarter of
2008.6

On May 20, 2008, HSI filed with the BIR its Amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the first quarter of
2008, which showed that it incurred unutilized input VAT from its domestic purchases of goods and
services in the total amount of P9,379,866.27, attributable to its zero-rated sales of generated
power. Further, HSI allegedly did not have any local sales subject to VAT at 12%, which means that
HSI did not have any output VAT liability against which its unutilized input VAT could be applied or
credited.

On March 29, 2010, HSI filed its administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT for the first
quarter of taxable year 2008 in the amount of P9,379,866.27.

On March 30, 2010, or one day after filing its administrative claim, HSI filed its judicial claim for
refund with the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 8051

on June 30, 1980, petitioner filed with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Makati a Sworn
Statement of the current and fair market value of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 215195 as
well as the improvements thereon, with an area of 262 square meters described as Lot No. 10, Block
7 of Psd 1754 located at No. 1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati under Tax Declaration No. 001-
00780. That a one and one-half residential house is constructed on the lot. That in the Sworn
Statement, petitioner stated therein that the postal address is at 1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati,
Metro Manila
On August 16, 2005, [Ml] filed a letter-request for the issuance of [TCC] with the BIR Large Taxpayers
Service arising from its excess and unutilized creditable input taxes in the amount of
[₱]9,470,500.39, accumulated from the first to fourth quarters of taxable year 2004. However, said
application for issuance of [TCC] remains unacted (sic) upon by respondent [Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR)] despite the lapse of the one hundred twenty (120)-day period provided
under Section l 12(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended.

On April 28, 2006, Transitions Optical received Letter of Authority No. 00098746 dated March 23,
2006 from Revenue Region No. 9, San Pablo City, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It was signed
by then Officer-in-Charge- Regional Director Corazon C. Pangcog and it authorized Revenue Officers
Jocelyn Santos and Levi Visaya to examine Transition Optical's books of accounts for internal
revenue tax purposes for taxable year 2004.

On October 9, 2007, the parties allegedly executed a Waiver of the Defense of Prescription (First
Waiver). In this supposed First Waiver, the prescriptive period for the assessment of Transition
Optical's internal revenue taxes for the year 2004 was extended to June 20, 2008. The document
was signed by Transitions Optical's Finance Manager, Pamela Theresa D. Abad, and by Bureau of
Internal Revenue's Revenue District Officer; Myrna S. Leonida.

Section 14(5) of PD No. 1869 also states that PAGCOR "is authorized to operate such necessary and
related services, shows and entertainment;" and "[a]ny income that may be realized from these
related services shall not be included as part of the income of [PAGCOR] for the purpose of applying
the franchise tax, but the same shall be considered as a separate income of the [PAGCOR] and shall
be subject to income tax."

On January 1, 1998, Republic Act (RA) No. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
(1997 NIRC) took effect wherein PAGCOR, under Section 27(C) thereof, was included among the
government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs) exempt from the payment of income tax.

On July 14, 2008, PAGCOR received a letter dated July 2, 2008 from the Head of Revenue Executive
Assistant (HREA) of the Large Taxpayers Service, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), requesting for an
informal conference on the results of an investigation regarding all its internal revenue tax liabilities
for the taxable years 2005 and 2006
 ISSUE

WON THE RR issued by the BIR is

constitutional

WON The SMC is entitled to a refund for

higher excise tax paid

WON APO had fully complied with all the

requirements to avail of the tax amnesty
granted under Republic Act No. 9480.
 WON Sitel is entitled to a refund

WON SLMC is liable for income tax under

Section 27(B) of the 1997 NIRC insofar as
its revenues from paying patients are
concerned

WON PAL is entitled to a refund

 WHETHER RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO
REPORT IN ITS VAT RETURNS ALL THE
FEES IT COLLECTED FROM ITS MEMBERS
APPLYING FOR HEALTHCARE SERVICES
CONSTITUTES "FALSE" RETURN UNDER
SECTION 222(A) OF THE 1997 NIRC, AS
AMENDED

WON the case can be decided having NPC

the party alone.
 WON the issued RMO is constitutional

WON the RTC had jurisdiction to try the

case

WON BIR is bound by estoppel

Should the amounts that MEDICARD

earmarked and eventually paid to the
medical service providers still form part of
its gross receipts for VAT purposes?
 WON RR- 17-2012 is consitutional

WON Metrobank's claim for refund relative

to its March 2001 final tax had already
prescribed.
WON An application for tax abatement is
considered approved only upon the
issuance of a termination letter.

WON the claim for refund is filed

prematurely
whether petitioner is entitled to a refund

WON Aichi is applicable in this case

 WON tax ordinance is violative of the
Local Government Code, specifically
Section 191, in relation to Sections 143
and 151

WON SMC is still exempt

 Whether the RTC-Pasig and the CA were
correct in deciding in favor of Pasig by
upholding the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title over the subject properties, despite
the pendency of the boundary dispute
case between Pasig and Cainta; and if so,
whether they properly decided the
manner in settling the obligations due to
Pasig

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFICIENCY TAX

ASSESSMENT AGAINST PETITIONER FOR
THE TAXABLE YEAR 1998 SHOULD BE
CANCEILED AND WITHDRAWN BY
RESPONDENT
 Whether CE Luzon Geothermal Power,
Inc.'s judicial claims for refund of input
Value Added Tax for taxable year 2003
were filed within the prescriptive period

WHETHER OR NOT PRESCRIPTION HAD

SET IN AGAINST THE ASSESSMENTS FOR
DEFICIENCY INCOME TAX, DEFICIENCY VAT
AND DEFICIENCY EXPANDED
WITHHOLDING TAX
Whether the CA erred in rendering the
assailed Decision and Resolution.

DID THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ACT IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE·NO
VAT ON THE PRIVATIZATION, SALE OR
DISPOSAL OF GENERATION ASSETS
Whether respondent is entitled to the
benefits of the Tax Amnesty Program
under RA 9480.

WON EBCC is liable for deficiency final

withholding tax for the year 2000.
 Whether AICHI was entitled to a refund or
issuance of a tax credit certificate of
unutilized input VAT attributable to zero-
rated sales and unutilized input tax on
importation of capital goods for the period
1 July 2000 to 31 December 2001 (or six
consecutive taxable quarters). Corollary
thereto was the issue on whether the
administrative claim (refund claim with
the BIR) and judicial claim (Petition for
Review with the CTA) were filed within the
statutory periods for filing the claims.

Whether the CTA En Banc erred in

dismissing P&G's judicial claims for refund
on the ground of prematurity.
Whether the CTA properly took cognizance
of and the case

Whether or not the Notice of Levy was

deemed to have been received by the
petitioner
 Whether the CTA En Banc erred when it
dismissed Ml's judicial claim for being filed
out of time.

Whether the waivers were valid

WON PAGCOR is subject to all form of

taxes
 RULING/DOCTRINE

NO. An administrative agency may not enlarge, alter or restrict a provision of law. It cannot add to t
requirements provided by law. To do so constitutes lawmaking, which is generally reserved for Congr

YES. When respondent launched "San Mig Light" in 1999, it wrote the Bureau of Internal Revenue o
October 19, 1999 requesting registration and authority to manufacture "San Mig Light" to be taxed
P12.15. The Bureau of Internal Revenue granted this request in its October 27, 1999 letter. Contrary
BIR's contention, the registration granted was not merely for intellectual property protection 134 but
internal revenue purposes only". Because the Bureau of Internal Revenue granted respondent's reque
its October 27, 1999 letter and confirmed this grant in its subsequent letters, respondent cannot b
faulted for relying on these actions by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the case involves th
collection of taxes, an exception can be made when the application of the rule will cause injustice aga
an innocent party.136

Respondent had already acquired a vested right on the tax classification of its San Mig Light as a ne
brand. To allow petitioner to change its position will result in deficiency assessments in substantia
amounts against respondent to the latter's prejudice.

YES. APO had fully complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9480. Hence, the Court of Ta
Appeals properly cancelled the remaining assessment for deficiency documentary stamp taxes. Th
submission of the documentary requirements and payment of the amnesty tax is considered full
compliance with Republic Act No. 9480 and the taxpayer can immediately enjoy the immunities an
privileges enumerated in Section 6 of the law.
 NO. Sitel failed to prove that the recipients of its call services are foreign corporations doing busine
outside the Philippines. As correctly pointed out by the CTA Division, while Sitel's documentary evide
which includes Certifications issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Agreements bet
Sitel and its foreign clients, may have established that Sitel rendered services to foreign corporation
2004 and received payments therefor through inward remittances, said documents failed to specific
prove that such foreign clients were doing business outside the Philippines or have a continuity o
commercial dealings outside the Philippines.

Thus, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the CTA Division denying the refund of
P7,170,276.02, allegedly representing Sitel's input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales.

YES. To be a charitable institution, however, an organization must meet the substantive test of charit
Lung Center. The issue in Lung Center concerns exemption from real property tax and not income ta
However, it provides for the test of charity in our jurisdiction. Charity is essentially a gift to an indefi
number of persons which lessens the burden of government. In other words, charitable institutions pro
for free goods and services to the public which would otherwise fall on the shoulders of governmen

In short, the last paragraph of Section 30 provides that if a tax exempt charitable institution conducts
activity for profit, such activity is not tax exempt even as its not-for-profit activities remain tax exem
This paragraph qualifies the requirements in Section 30(E) that the [n]on-stock corporation or associa
[must be] organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes . . . It likewise qualifies
requirement in Section 30(G) that the civic organization must be 'operated exclusively' for the promo
of social welfare.Thus, even if the charitable institution must be 'organized and operated exclusively
charitable purposes, it is nevertheless allowed to engage in 'activities conducted for profit' without lo
its tax exempt status for its not for profit activities. The only consequence is that the 'income of what
kind and character' of a charitable institution 'from any of its activities conducted for profit, regardles
the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to tax.' Prior to the introduction of Section 27(B
tax rate on such income from for profit activities was the ordinary corporate rate under Section 27(A).
the introduction of Section 27(B), the tax rate is now 10%.

NO. Upon the amendment of the 1997 NIRC, Section 22 of R.A. 9337 abolished the franchise tax an
subjected PAL and similar entities to corporate income tax and value-added tax (VAT). PAL may
nevertheless remains exempt from taxes, duties, royalties, registrations, licenses, and other fees a
charges, provided it pays corporate income tax as granted in its franchise agreement. Accordingly, PA
left with no other option but to pay its basic corporate income tax, the payment of which shall be in li
all other taxes, except VAT, and subject to certain conditions provided in its charter.
 YES. Under Section 248(B) of the NIRC,21 there is a prima facie evidence of a false return if there is
substantial underdeclaration of taxable sales, receipt or income. The failure to report sales, receipts
income in an amount exceeding 30% what is declared in the returns constitute substantial
underdeclaration. A prima facie evidence is one which that will establish a fact or sustain a judgme
unless contradictory evidence is produced. Applied in this case, the audit investigation revealed that t
were undeclared VA Table sales more than 30% of that declared in Asalus' VAT returns. Moreover, Asa
lone witness testified that not all membership fees, particularly those pertaining to medical practition
and hospitals, were reported in Asalus' VAT returns. The testimony of its witness, in trying to justify w
not all of its sales were included in the gross receipts reflected in the VAT returns, supported the
presumption that the return filed was indeed false precisely because not all the sales of Asalus we
included in the VAT returns.

Hence, the CIR need not present further evidence as the presumption of falsity of the returns was n
overcome. Asalus was bound to refute the presumption of the falsity of the return and to prove that it
filed accurate returns. Its failure to overcome the same warranted the application of the ten (10)-ye
prescriptive period for assessment under Section 222 of the NIRC. To require the CIR to present additi
evidence in spite of the presumption provided in Section 248(B) of the NIRC would render the said
provision inutile.

NO. Section 49 of the EPIRA created the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporati
(PSALM Corp.) and transferred to it all of the NPC's "generation assets" which would include the Bata
Thermal Plant. Clearly, the NPC had ceased running its former power transmission and distribution
business in Bataan by operation of law from June 26, 2001. It is, therefore, not the proper party subje
the local franchise tax for operating that business. Parenthetically, Section 49 also transferred "all exi
xx x liabilities" of the NPC to PSALM Corp., presumably including its unpaid liability for local franchise
from January 1 to June 25, 2001. Consequently, such tax is collectible solely from PSALM Corp.

An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter and in whos
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effec
complete or equitable.2 Here, since the subject properties belong to PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO, they
certainly indispensable parties to the case that must be necessarily included before it may properly
forward. For this reason, the proceedings below that held the NPC liable for the local franchise tax i
nullity. It did not matter where the RTC Decision was appealed, whether before the CA or the CTA
 NO. But the case must be denied on the ground of mootness taking judicial notice that on 25 July 20
the present CIR Caesar R. Dulay issued RMO No. 44-2016 which reiterated the constitutional exemptio
Section 30 (H) of the 1997 Tax Code

NO. The allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of
action as well as which court has jurisdiction over the action. The nature of a pleading is determined
allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and the prim
objective of the party filing the same. Accordingly, a review of the allegations is proper in order to
determine the real nature of the cause of action pleaded in the complaint.

YES. There is no evidence to prove fraud or intentional falsity on the part of PDLSince the case does
fall under the exceptions, Section 203 of the NIRC should apply.

Waiver was not a unilateral act of the taxpayer; hence, the BIR must act on it, either by conforming t
by disagreeing with the extension. A waiver of the statute of limitations, whether on assessment o
collection, should not be construed as a waiver of the right to invoke the defense of prescription bu
rather, an agreement between the taxpayer and the BIR to extend the period to a date certain, with
which the latter could still assess or collect taxes due. The waiver does not imply that the taxpaye
relinquishes the right to invoke prescription unequivocally.

Since the three Waivers in this case are defective, they do not produce any effect and did not suspend
three-year prescriptive period under Section 203 of the NIRC.

No. The VAT is a tax on the value added by the performance of the service by the taxpayer. It is, thus
service and the value charged thereof by the taxpayer that is taxable under the NLRC.
 YES. Section 145(C) of the NIRC is clear that the excise tax on cigarettes packed by machine is impo
per pack. "Per pack" was not given a clear definition by the NIRC. However, a "pack" would normally
to a number of individual components packaged as a unit.[10] Under the same provision, cigarett
manufacturers are permitted to bundle cigarettes packed by machine in the maximum number of 20 s
and aside from 20's, the law also allows packaging combinations of not more than 20's - it can be
pouches of 5 cigarette sticks in a pack (4 x 5's), 2 pouches of 10 cigarette sticks in a pack (2 x 10's),

YES. final withholding taxes are considered as full and final payment of the income tax due, and thus
not subject to any adjustments. Thus, the two (2)-year prescriptive period commences to run from t
time the refund is ascertained, i.e., the date such tax was paid, and not upon the discovery by the
taxpayer of the erroneous or excessive payment of taxes.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Metrobank's final withholding tax liability in March 2001 wa
remitted to the BIR on April 25, 2001. As such, it only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative
judicial claims for refund. However, while Metrobank's administrative claim was filed on December 2
2002, its corresponding judicial claim was only filed on September 10, 2003. Therefore, Metrobank's c
for refund had clearly prescribed.
YES. Based on the guidelines, the last step in the tax abatement process is the issuance of the termin
letter. The presentation of the termination letter is essential as it proves that the taxpayer's applicatio
tax abatement has been approved. Thus, without a termination letter, a tax assessment cannot b
considered closed and terminated.

In this case, Asiatrust failed to present a termination letter from the BIR. Instead, it presented a
Certification issued by the BIR to prove that it availed of the Tax Abatement Program and paid the ba
tax. It also attached copies of its BIR Tax Payment Deposit Slips and a Jetter issued by RDO Nacar. Th
documents, however, do not prove that Asiatrust's application for tax abatement has been approved.
all, these documents only prove Asiatrust's payment of basic taxes, which is not a ground to conside
deficiency tax assessment closed and terminated.

NO. The Court ruled in San Roque that "[f]ailure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates
mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and ren
the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acq
jurisdiction over the taxpayer's petition." "The old rule that the taxpayer may file the judicial claim
without waiting for the [CIR's] decision if the two-year prescriptive period is about to expire, cannot a
because that rule was adopted before the enactment of the 30-day period." With the current rule th
gives a taxpayer 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the CIR fails to act within the 120-day period
remedy of a judicial claim for refund or credit is always available to a taxpayer.

As the petitioner correctly pointed out, this general rule that calls for a strict compliance with the 120
day mandatory periods admits of an exception.
 In this case, it is fairly apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 waserroneou
collected from petitioner, considering that the obligation to pay the same hadalready been assumed
the Philippine Government by virtue of its Exchange of Notes with theJapanese Government. Case l
explains that an exchange of notes is considered as anexecutive agreement, which is binding on the S
even without Senate concurrence.

Thus, in line with the tax assumption provision under the Exchange of Notes, Article VIII (B) (1) of t
Contract states that NPC shall pay any and all forms of taxes that are directly imposable under th
Contract, one of which is the subject taxes.

YES. Marubeni therefore failed to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of Section
(C) when it filed its petition for review with the CTA on April 25, 2002, or just 29 days after filing it
administrative claim before the BIR on March 27, 2002.

Since Marubeni filed its judicial claim for refund on April 25, 2002, it could not benefit from BIR Ruling
DA-489-03 that was subsequently issued on December 10, 2003.
 NO. The assailed new tax ordinance is actually the initial implementation by the Davao City local
government of the tax provisions of R.A 7160 (LGC) considering that the old tax ordinance of Davao
was enacted in 1990, or prior to the effectivity of the LGC on January 1, 1992. It then would explain w
the old tax ordinance of Davao City lumped under one business tax and under the same set of tax ra
these two business activities - retail and wholesale. There is no provision under Batas Pambansa Big.
17 the old LGC, which specifically define these business activities. Under Section 131 of R.A. 7160,
however, wholesale and retail are now defined, classified and taxed differently. It cannot be said then
Davao City, on its own, deliberately grouped these two business activities under one business tax.
reiterate, it is only with the implementation of R.A. 7160 that these two business activities, i.e., whole
and retail, were specifically defined, classified in different categories, and, thus, taxed differently.
Corollarily, it is only sound that by analogy, wholesalers and retailers should likewise be treated an
classified differently to provide accuracy to the very meaning of its rootword and to give meaning to
intention of the law.

YES. The Court agrees with the CT A that the tax exemption provided under Section 16 of PD No. 972
not revoked, withdrawn or repealed expressly or impliedly- by Congress with the enactment of RA N
9337.

It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that a special law cannot be repealed or modified b
subsequently enacted general law in the absence of any express provision in the latter law to that eff
A special law must be interpreted to constitute an exception to the general law in the absence of spe
circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.
NO. The location stated in the certificate of title should be followed until amended through proper jud
proceedings.

PD 1529, or the Property Registration Decree (PRD), is an update of the Land Registration Act (Act 4
and relates to the registration of real property. Section 31 thereof provides that a decree of registrat
once issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and it is conclusive upon and against all person
including the National Government and all branches thereof

YES. The issue essentially boils down to the proper timing when Lancaster should recognize its purch
in computing its taxable income. Such issue directly correlates to the fact that Lancaster's 'crop yea
does not exactly coincide with its fiscal year for tax purposes.

Noticeably, the records of this case are rife with terms and concepts in accounting. As a science,
accounting 40 pervades many aspects of financial planning, forecasting, and decision making in busin
Its reach, however, has also permeated tax practice.

To put it into perspective, although the foundations of accounting were built principally to analyze fina
and assist businesses, many of its principles have since been adopted for purposes of taxation.41 In
jurisdiction, the concepts in business accounting, including certain generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), embedded in the NIRC comprise the rules on tax accounting.
YES. Section l 12(C) of the National Internal Revenue Code provides two (2) possible scenarios. The fi
when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue denies the administrative claim for refund within 120 da
The second is when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue fails to act within 120 days. Taxpayers m
await either for the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or for the lapse of 120 days be
filing their judicial claims with the Court of Tax Appeals. Failure to observe the 120-day period renders
judicial claim premature.

In the present case, only CE Luzon's second quarter claim was filed on time. Its claims for refund o
creditable input tax for the first, third, and fourth quarters of taxable year 2003 were filed premature
did not wait for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to render a decision or for the 120-day period
lapse before elevating its judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.

However, despite its non-compliance with Section 112(C) of the National Internal Revenue Code, C
Luzon's judicial claims are shielded from the vice of prematurity. It relied on the Bureau of Interna
Revenue Ruling DA-489-03, which expressly states that "a taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lap
the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the [Court of Tax Appeals] by way of a Peti
for Review."

YES. The Waivers of Statute of

Limitations, being defective and
invalid, did not extend the CIR's
period to issue the subject
assessments. Thus, the right of the
government to assess or collect the
alleged deficiency taxes is already
barred by prescription.
 As worded, Section 267 operates only within the purview of real property taxation (Title II). The pertin
tax involved is only real property tax or realty tax. Thus, the reason for the "sale at public auction of
real property or rights therein" in Section 267 is obviously because of non-payment of realty tax and
other. Accordingly, the precondition for the operation of Section 267 is the realty tax delinquency of
property. If the property is current in its realty tax or not realty tax delinquent, then it should not be
subject of a sale at public auction as contemplated in Section 267. The "taxpayer" referred to in th
Section is none other than the declarant of the property in a real property tax declaration, who is gene
its owner, and his declared property is realty tax delinquent. The "taxpayer" in Section 267 refers to
other person.

In the present case, the very issue raised in the Petition is the invalidity of the auction sales on the gr
that the subject properties are not tax delinquent. On the assumption that the subject two lots are no
delinquent, then there is no need for the deposit requirement under Section 267 because the realty t
due on the subject two lots have already been paid and there are no tax delinquencies to be collecte
satisfied.

YES. The CIR posits that the VAT exemption accorded to PSALM under BIR Ruling No. 020-02 is als
deemed revoked since PSALM is a successor-in-interest of NPC. Furthermore, the CIR avers that prior t
sale, NPC still owned the power plants and not PSALM, which is just considered as the trustee of the
properties. Thus, the sale made by NPC or its successors-in-interest of its power plants should be sub
to the 10% VAT beginning 1 November 2005 and 12% VAT beginning 1 February 2007.

We do not agree with the CIR's position, which is anchored on the wrong premise that PSALM is a
successor-in-interest of NPC. PSALM is not a successor-in-interest of NPC. Under its charter, NPC is
mandated to "undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production
electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power
nationwide basis."58 With the passage of the EPIRA law which restructured the electric power industry
generation, transmission, distribution, and supply sectors, the NPC is now primarily mandated to perf
missionary electrification function through the Small Power Utilities Group (SPUG) and is responsible
providing power generation and associated power delivery systems in areas that are not connected to
transmission system.59 On the other hand, PSALM, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
created under the EPIRA law to manage the orderly sale and privatization of NPC assets with the obje
of liquidating all of NPC's financial obligations in an optimal manner. Clearly, NPC and PSALM have
different functions. Since PSALM is not a successor-in-interest of NPC, the repeal by RA 9337 of NPC's
exemption does not affect PSALM.

In any event, even if PSALM is deemed a successor-in-interest of NPC, still the sale of the power plan
not "in the course of trade or business" as contemplated under Section 105 of the NIRC, and thus, n
subject to VAT.
 YES. Respondent submitted its Notice of Availment, Tax Amnesty Return, Statement of Assets, Liabili
and Net Worth, and comparative financial statements for 2005 and 2006. Respondent paid the amne
tax to the Development Bank of the Philippines, evidenced by its Tax Payment Deposit Slip dated 2
September 2007. Respondent's completion of the requirements of the Tax Amnesty Program under
9480 is sufficient to extinguish its tax liability under the FDDA of the BIR.

In Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,24 this Court ruled that th
liability of Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. was fully settled when it was able to avail of the Tax
Amnesty Program under RA 9480 in February 2008 while its Petition for Review was pending before
Court. This Court declared the pending case involving the tax liability of Asia International Auctionee
Inc. moot since the company's compliance with the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480 extinguishe
company's outstanding deficiency taxes.

YES. RR No. 02-98 provides that the term payable refers to the date the obligation becomes due,
demandable or legally enforceable. Clearly, EBCC's liability for interest payment became due and
demandable starting June I, 2002. And considering that under RR No. 02-98, the obligation of EBCC
deduct or withhold tax arises at the time an income is paid or payable, whichever comes first, and
considering further that under the said RR, the term "payable" refers to the date the obligation beco
due, demandable or legally enforceable, we find no error on the part of the CT A EnBanc in ruling th
EBCC had no obligation to withhold any taxes on the interest payment for the year 2000 as the obliga
to withhold only commenced on June 1, 2002, and thus cancelling the assessment for deficiency FWT
interest payments arising from EBCC' s loan from Ogden.
 NO. On the judicial claim for refund or tax credit of AICHI, the CTA did not validly acquire jurisdiction
such judicial claim because the appeal before the court was made prematurely. When the CTA acts wi
jurisdiction, its decision is void. Consequently, the answer to the second issue, i.e., whether AICHI can
question the CTA ruling, becomes irrelevant.

The present case stemmed from a claim for refund or tax credit of alleged unutilized input VAT attribu
to zero-rated sales and unutilized input VAT on the purchase of capital goods for the third and four
quarters of 2000 and the four taxable quarters of 2001. The refund or tax credit of input taxes
corresponding to the six taxable quarters were combined into one administrative claim filed before th
on 26 September 2002. On the other hand, the judicial claim was filed before the CTA, through a pet
for review, on 30 September 2002, or a mere four days after the administrative claim was filed. It is
disputed that the administrative claim was not acted upon by the BIR.

From the submission of the complete documents to support the claim, the CIR has a period of one hun
twenty (120) days to decide on the claim. If the CIR decides within the 120-day period, the taxpayer
initiate a judicial claim by filing within 30 days an appeal before the CTA. If there is no decision within
120-day period, the CIR's inaction shall be deemed a denial of the application. In the latter case, th
taxpayer may institute the judicial claim, also by an appeal, within 30 days before the CTA.

NO. In this case, records show that P&G filed its judicial claims for refund on March 28, 2007 and Jun
2007, respectively, or after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichi
promulgated. Thus, even though P&G filed its judicial claim without waiting for the expiration of the 1
day mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the case because the claim was filed wit
the excepted period stated in San Roque. In other words, P&G's judicial claims were deemed timely fi
and should not have been dismissed by the CTA.
YES. Here, records show that HSI filed its judicial claim for refund on March 30, 2010, or after the issu
of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichi was promulgated. Thus, even though H
claim was filed without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA may still
cognizance of the case because the claim was filed within the excepted period stated in San Roque.
Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of HSI's judicial claim from the vice of prematurit
The CTA En Banc was therefore correct in setting aside its earlier Decision dismissing HSI's claim on
ground of prematurity; and remanding the case to the CTA Division for a complete determination of H
entitlement to the claimed VAT refund, if any.

NO. In this case, the notice of tax delinquency was not proven to have been posted and published
accordance with the requirements of the LGC.1âwphi1 Specifically, Salva failed to support her claim
the City Treasurer, her deputy or any authorized officer actually caused the posting of a notice of
delinquency in the Makati City Hall and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in Baranga
Bangkal where the property is purported to be located. Likewise, she failed to substantiate the fact t
the notice was published. The Affidavit of Publication of the newspaper's publisher as well as the issu
the newspaper where the notice was published were not presented as proof.

The notice of delinquency, which was allegedly sent via registered mail, was improperly addressed.
agree with Magpile's contention that the billing statements, notice of realty tax delinquency, and war
of levy were all sent by the City Treasurer to "2118 Apolinario St., Bangkal, Makati City," which is a
address other than the one indicated in his tax records. Notably, TCT No. 215195 showed Magpile'
address as "2118 Apolinario, Makati, Rizal," while the Sworn Statement stated his address as "177
Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati, M.M." In the absence of a registry return card or an affidavit of service
cannot be definitely ascertained that the documents were in fact received by Magpile or any of hi
authorized representative.
 NO. The Petition calls into question the proper application of: (i) the two (2)-year period under Secti
112(A); and (ii) the one hundred twenty (120) and thirty (30)-day periods under Section 112(C). The
questions, however, have long been put to rest in the cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A
Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi) and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation26 (San Roque).

In Aichi, the Court unequivocally ruled that the two (2)-year period under Section 112(A) should b
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made consistent with the plain im
of the NIRC. The Court also clarified that the two (2)-year period only applies to administrative claims
does not extend to judicial claims. Anent judicial claims, the Court held that the one hundred twenty (
and thirty (30)-day periods under Section 112(C) are mandatory and jurisdictional, such that judici
claims filed before the denial of the taxpayers' administrative claim or the lapse of the one hundre
twenty (120)-day period in case of the CIR's inaction would be deemed premature, while judicial cla
filed beyond the thirty (30)-day period after such denial or lapse would be deemed filed out of tim

Both parties were estopped. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was at fault when it accepted responde
Waivers despite their non-compliance with the requirements of RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO No. 05-0

Nonetheless, respondent's acts also show its implied admission of the validity of the waivers. First
respondent never raised the invalidity of the Waivers at the earliest opportunity, either in its Protest t
PAN, Protest to the FAN, or Supplemental Protest to the FAN.41 It thereby impliedly recognized thes
Waivers' validity and its representatives' authority to execute them. Respondent only raised the issu
these Waivers' validity in its Petition for Review filed with the Court of Tax Appeals.

NO. The Court En Banc rendered a Decision upholding PAGCOR's contention that its income from gam
operations is subject only to 5% franchise tax under PD No. 1869, as amended; while its income fro
other related services is subject to corporate income tax pursuant to PD No. 1869, as amended, in rel
to RA No. 9337. The Court En Banc clarified that RA No. 9337 did not repeal the tax privilege granted
PAGCOR under PD No. 1869, with respect to its income from gaming operations. What RA No. 933
withdrew was PAGCOR's exemption from corporate income tax on its income derived from other rela
services, previously granted under Section 27(C) of RA No. 8424
 DATE G.R. NO.

JANUARY 11, 2016 G.R. NO. 169507

JANUARY 20, 2016 G.R. NO. 180235

JANUARY 20, 2016 G.R. NO. 180434

JANUARY 20, 2016 G.R. NO. 205785

JANUARY 27, 2016 G.R. NO. 208731

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 G.R. NO. 180402

FEBRUARY 29, 2016 G.R. NO. 202695

MARCH 2, 2016 G.R. NO. 182737

APRIL 6, 2016 G.R. NO. 213394

APRIL 18, 2016 G.R. NO. 215534/G.R. NO. 215557

APRIL 18, 2016 G.R. NO. 197136

APRIL 20, 2016 G.R. NO. 167679

MAY 30, 2016 G.R. NO. 180110

MAY 30, 2016 G.R. NO. 204277

JUNE 11, 2016 G.R. NO. 195147

JUNE 13, 2016 G.R. NO. 190506

JUNE 20, 2016 G.R. NO. 194065

JUNE 20, 2016 G.R. NO. 215950

JUNE 21, 2016 G.R. NO. 199422

August 3, 2016 G.R. NO. 216130

August 10, 2016 G.R. NO. 213157 / G.R. NO. 213558

August 10, 2016 G.R. NO. 212530

August 16, 2016 G.R. NO. 198756

September 14, 2016 G.R. NO. 205721

September 14, 2016 G.R. NO. 175651

October 5, 2016 G.R. NO. 183416

October 12, 2016 G.R. NO. 199480

October 19, 2016 G.R. NO. 193321

November 7, 2016 G.R. NO. 211072

 G.R. NO. 196596/G.R. NO. 198841/G.R.
November 9, 2016
NO. 198941

November 9, 2016 G.R. NO. 177387

November 9, 2016 G.R. NO. 215957

November 14, 2016 G.R. NO. 209303

November 21, 2016 G.R. NO. 181007

November 29, 2016 G.R. NO. 210588. NOVEMBER 29, 2016

December 1, 2016 G.R. NO. 197980

December 5, 2016 G.R. NO. 195876

December 7, 2016 G.R. NO. 191856

December 7, 2016 G.R. NO. 209776
 CASE TITLE

AIR CANADA VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

ALTA VISTA GOLD AND COUNTRY CLUB VS. THE CITY OF CEBU, HON. MAYOR
TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF CEBU, AND TERESITA C.
CAMARILLO, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY TREASURER
 COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION

HELEN B. LUKBAN VS. OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION VS. BUREAU OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, ET AL.
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. GJM PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING,

INC.

SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

SPOUSES EMMANUEL D. PAQUIAO AND JINKEE J. PAQUIAO VS. THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS (1ST DIVISION) AND THE COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. LIQUIGAZ PHILIPPINES

CORPORATION/LIQUIGAZ PHILIPPINES CORPORATION/COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE

ROMEO PUCYUTAN, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE CITY OF MUNTINLUPA, METRO

MANILA AS ITS CITY TREASURER VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.
ING BANK N.V. ENGAGED IN BANKING OPERATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS ING
BANK N.V. MANILA BRANCH VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. VS. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS, THE

PROVICIAL ASSESO OF BATANGAS, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF AND
ASSESSOR OF NASUGBU BATANGAS

PROCTER AND GAMBLE ASIA PTE LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

CORAL BAY NICKEL CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

PHILIPPINE BANK COMMUNICATIONS VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

TRIDHARMA MARKETING CORPORATION VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, ET AL.

COMMISSIOER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. KEPCO CORPORATION

COMMISSIONER INTERNAL REVENUE VS. GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES, INC.

NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OFELIA M. OLIVIA/OFELIA
M. OLIVIA VS. NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

BLOOMBERRY RESORTS AND HOTELS, INC. VS. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES

BANCO DE ORO, ET AL. VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

 HARTE-HANKS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

PILMICO-MAURI FOOD CORPS VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

PROVICIAL ASSESOR OF THE AGUSAN DEL SUR VS. FILIPINAS PALM PLANTATION,
INC.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TESS S. VALERIANO

TEKENAKA CORPORATION - PHILIPPINE BRANCH VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. DEUTSCHE KNOWLEDGE SERVICES,

PTE. LTD.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC./DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE/COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY,
INC.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. FITNESS BY DESIGN, INC.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BENGUET,
ET AL.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. WILLIAM SINGSON AND TRITON SHIPPING

CORPORATION

SECRETARY OF FINANCE CESAR B. PURISIMA AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES VS. REPRESENTED CARMELO F. LAZATIN AND
ECOZONE PLASTIC ENTERPRISES COPORATION
DEUTSCHE KNOWLEDGE SERVICES PTE. LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. COMMISSION ON CUSTOMS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GMCC UNITED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

ET AL.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. UNITED CADIZ SUGAR FARMERS
ASSOCIATION MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
BAR SUBJECT SUBJECT

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW JUDICIAL REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE OF

THE PHILIPPINES (P.D. No. 1464), as
amended by the CUSTOMS
TAXATION LAW
MODERNIZATION AND TARIFF ACT
(Republic Act No. 10863, which took
effect on June 16, 2016)

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE OF

THE PHILIPPINES (P.D. No. 1464), as
amended by the CUSTOMS
TAXATION LAW
MODERNIZATION AND TARIFF ACT
(Republic Act No. 10863, which took
effect on June 16, 2016)

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION
 TOPIC SUB-TOPIC

INCOME TAX ON DOMESTIC

INCOME TAX ON CORPORATIONS CORPORATIONS AND RESIDENT
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

TAXING POWERS OF PROVINCES

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION
(AMUSEMENT TAX)
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

COLLECTION OF REAL PROPERTY TAX

REAL PROPERTY TAXATION (REMEDIES OF LGUS FOR COLLECTION
OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES)

TAX PAYERS REMEDIES PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST

 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND

TAX REMEDIES
REGLEMENTARY PERIODS

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND

TAX REMEDIES
REGLEMENTARY PERIODS

TAX REMEDIES ASSESSMENT

 TAXATION ON COMPENSATION INCOME -
INCOME TAX ON INDIVIDUALS
EXCLUSIONS

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT

PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM/APPLY FOR THE

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF
ISSUANCES OF TAX CREDIT
EXCESS INPUT TAX
CERTIFICATES
 DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES
(CONCEPT AND NATURE ONLY)

DESTINATION PRINCIPLE / CROSS

VALUE-ADDED TAX BORDER DOCTRINE

DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES

(CONCEPT AND NATURE ONLY)
 ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND
TAX REMEDIES
REGLEMENTARY PERIODS

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX

TAXPAYER’S REMEDIES TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS

 REAL PROPERTY TAXATION IMPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES

INCOME TAX ON CORPORATIONS INCOME TAX ON SPECIAL CORPORATION

CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME SUBJECT

GROSS INCOME
TO TAX (PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME)
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

CONSTRUCTION AND
TAX LAWS
INTERPRETATION OF

REAL PROPERTY TAXATION IMPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES

 INSTITUTION AND PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL CASES
CRIMINAL ACTIONS

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)
DOCTRINES IN TAXATION EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION

VALUE-ADDED TAX PERSONS LIABLE

ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND

TAX REMEDIES
REGLEMENTARY PERIODS
 REAL PROPERTY TAXATION IMPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES

REMEDIES (GOVERNMENT
ACCRUAL AND PAYMENT OF TAX (ADMINISTRATIVE/EXTRAJUDICIAL 1.)
AND DUTIES SEARCH, SEIZURE, FORFEITURE,
ARREST))

DESTINATION PRINCIPLE / CROSS

VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
BORDER DOCTRINE
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

ACCRUAL AND PAYMENT OF TAX REMEDIES (TAXPAYER

AND DUTIES (ABANDONMENT))

GENERAL CONCEPTS (PRESCRIPTIVE

TAX REMEDIES
PERIOD FOR ASSESSMENT)
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) VAT-EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
 PONENTE

LEONEN

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
REYES

CARPIO

CARPIO
REYES

PERALTA

SERENO
SERENO

MENDOZA

PERALTA
LEONEN

PERALTA

BRION
BERSAMIN

BERSAMIN

SERENO
BERSAMIN

PERALTA

PERLAS-
BERNABE
CARPIO

PEREZ

LEONEN
REYES

REYES

LEONEN
 REYES

BERSAMIN

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
 BRION

BERSAMIN

LEONEN
PERALTA

REYES

BRION
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO

VELASCO, JR.

LEONEN
BRION
 FACTS

Petitioner claims that the general provision imposing the regular corporate income tax on
resident foreign corporations provided under Section 28(A)(1) of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code does not apply to "international carriers," which are especially classified and
taxed under Section 28(A)(3). Petitioner argues that to impose the 32% regular corporate
income tax on its income would violate the Philippine government’s covenant under Article
VIII of the Republic of the Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty not to impose a tax higher than 1½
% of the carrier’s gross revenue derived from sources within the Philippines. It would also
allegedly result in "inequitable tax treatment of on-line and off-line international air
carriers[.]"

Petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating a golf course in Cebu City.
Petitioner steadfastly refused to pay the amusement tax arguing that the imposition of said
tax by Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, was irregular,
improper, and illegal. Petitioner reasoned that under the Local Government Code,
amusement tax can only be imposed on operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, or
places where one seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a show or performance.
Petitioner further cited that under Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the
Lo.cal Tax Code of 1973, the province could only impose amusement tax on admission from
the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses,
and other places of amusement, but not professional basketball games. Professional
basketball games did not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert
halls, and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the
former catered to sports and gaming.
 On March 11, 2002, MPC filed before the BIR an administrative claim for refund of its input
VAT covering the taxable year of 2000, in accordance with Section 112, subsections (A) and
(B) of the NIRC. Thereafter, or on March 26, 2002, fearing that the period for filing a judicial
claim for refund was about to expire, MPC proceeded to file a petition for review before the
CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 6417,9 without waiting for the CIR’s action on the
administrative claim.

The City Treasurer issued petitioner Lukban a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property
to Purchaser, acknowledging receipt of her payment. Lukban then paid the realty taxes,
capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and all other internal revenue taxes due on the
property but there is an annotation more than 12 years ahead of the Notice of Levy for tax
delinquency.

The CIR denied PAGCOR's claims of exemption with the issuance of its 18 July 2011 letter.
The letter asked PAGCOR to settle its obligation of P46,589,507.65, which consisted of tax,
surcharge and interest. PAGCOR's failure to settle its obligation would result in the issuance
of a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy and a Warrant of Garnishment.
 Pilipinas Shell sold and delivered petroleum products to various international carriers of the
Philippines or foreign registry for their use outside the Philippines for the period of
November 2000 to March 2001. Pilipinas Shell subsequently filed two separate claims for the
refund or credit of the excise taxes paid on the foregoing sales, totaling P49,058,733.09.
Due to the inaction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on its claims, Pilipinas Shell
decided to file a petition for review with the CTA.

On April 12, 2000, GJM filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1999. CIR found out
that GJM had tax deficiencies due to disallowances/understatements, therefore, CIR had the
right to assess GJM within the 3 year prescriptive period under Sec. 203 of the NIRC or until
April 15, 2003. On February 17, 2003, CIR delivered the Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN)
to GJM. Subsequently, on April 14, 2003, the Formal Assessment Notice (FAN) were delivered
by the CIR. GJM denied having received any assessment from the BIR, thus, such right of
assessment by the latter has prescribed.

Petitioner sought to recover the VAT it paid on imported capital goods for the 2nd quarter of
2001. On 16 October 2001, it filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center, Department of Finance, an application for a tax credit/refund in the
amount of P9,038,279.56.14. On 4 September 2002, petitioner also filed for a tax
credit/refund of the VAT it had paid on imported capital goods for the 3rd and 4th quarters of
2001 in the amounts of P1,420,813.0415 and P14,582,023.62,16 respectively. Because of
the continuous inaction by respondent on the administrative claims of petitioner for a tax
credit/refund in the total amount of P25,041,116.22,17 the latter filed separate petitions for
review before the CTA.
Petitioner sought to recover the VAT it paid on imported capital goods for the 2nd quarter of
2001. On 16 October 2001, it filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center, Department of Finance, an application for a tax credit/refund in the
amount of P9,038,279.56.14. On 4 September 2002, petitioner also filed for a tax
credit/refund of the VAT it had paid on imported capital goods for the 3rd and 4th quarters of
2001 in the amounts of P1,420,813.0415 and P14,582,023.62,16 respectively. Because of
the continuous inaction by respondent on the administrative claims of petitioner for a tax
credit/refund in the total amount of P25,041,116.22,17 the latter filed separate petitions for
review before the CTA.

On April 2008, Liquigaz received a letter purporting to be a Notice of Informal Conference

(NIC), as well as detailed computation of its supposed tax liabilities. On May 2008, it
received a copy of Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN), together with the attached details
of discrepancies for the calendar year ending Dec 2005. Thereafter, on June 2008, it
received a Formal Letter of Demand (FLD) / Formal Assessment Notice (FAN), together with
its attached details of discrepancies, for the calendar year ending December 2005. The total
deficiency withholding tax liabilities under the FLD was Php 24, 332, 347.20.

assessor of Muntinlupa discovered that MERALCO misdeclaed and/or failed to declare

anumber of real properties. A certifciation of non-payment of real property taxes was issued
and notices of delinuency.
 NG bank was assessed for withholding taxes on bonuses accruing to its officers and
employee. He argues that the liability of the employer to withhold the tax does not arise
until such bonus is actually distributed

Provincial Assessor and Treasurer issued assessments of RPT against Capitol. It contested
and filed a petition for prohibition. RTC dismissed for failure to pay under protest

PGAPL filed with BIR quarterly VAT returns. It filed an admin claim for tax refund for input VAT
attributable to its zero-rated sales. It elevated the case to the CTA which dismissed the same
because of 120 + 30 days (Aichi)
 PNB had deficiency payments of DST, withholding taxes on compensation, and expanded
withholding. CIT issued FAN, it protested and was denied. It paid under protest but CIR
denied the same. It elevated it to the CTA which partially granted the petition.

Petitioner VAT entity registered with BIR also registered with PEZA. It filed VAT return
declaring unutilized input tax from domestic purchases. Due to inaction it elevated the same
to CTA which denied ground that the petitioner was not entitled to the refund of alleged
unutilized input VAT following Section 106(A)(2)(a)(5) of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1997,

Petitioner purchased DocStamps from BIR and loaded them to its DS metering macine.
Petitioner executed several repurcahse agreements with BSP. The DocStamps were
imprinted on petitioner's DS metering machine. Petitioner filed with the BIR an administrati'e
claim for the issuance of tax credit certificates for the alleged erroneous payment of the DST
claiming that the repurchase agreements were not subjct to the DST
 the petitioner received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). the petitioner received from the BIR a Formal Letter of Demand. The
petitioner filed with the CIR a protest through a Request for Reconsideration which was
denied. It appealed to CTA which required it to pay surety bond

Respondent KEPCO ILIJAN Corporation filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its
claim for refund for input tax. For failure of petitioner BIR to act upon respondent’s claim for
refund or issuance of tax credit certificate, respondent filed a Petition for
Review.Subsequently, Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) First Division rendered a Decision, holding
that respondent is entitled to a refund for its unutilized input VAT paid.

the Board of Directors of respondent authorized the redemption of preferred shares.

respondent filed an application for relief from double taxation before the International Tax
Affairs Division of the BIR to confirm that the redemption was not subject to Philippine
income tax, pursuant to the Republic of the Philippines (RP) - US Tax Treaty. respondent filed
an administrative claim for refund or issuance of TCC. petitioner maintained that
respondent's claim must be denied, considering that: (a) it failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by prematurely filing its petition before the CTA; and (b) it failed to submit
complete supporting documents before the BIR.
 GCP received from the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City, three (3) Final Notices of
Demand petitioner NGCP paid the total amount demanded under protest. The City Treasurer
of Cebu did not act on [NGCP’s] written protest. Petitioner NGCP, with main office in [Quezon
City], sent its appeal, by way of registered mail on to the LBAA of Cebu City which dismissed
the same it appealed to CBAA which dsmissed.

PAGCOR granted to petitioner a provisional license to establish and operate an integrated

resort and casino complex at the Entertainment City project site of PAGCOR. Petitioner and
its parent company, Sureste Properties, Inc., own and operate Solaire Resort & Casino. Thus,
being one of its licensees, petitioner only pays PAGCOR license fees, in lieu of all taxes, as
contained in its provisional license and consistent with the PAGCOR Charter or Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1869,3 which provides the exemption from taxes of persons or entities
contracting with PAGCOR in casino operations. However, when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9337
took effect4, it amended Section 27(C) of the NIRC of 1997, which excluded PAGCOR from
the enumeration of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) exempt from
paying corporate income tax. respondent issued RMC No. 33-2013 dated 17 April 2013
declaring that PAGCOR, in addition to the five percent (5%) franchise tax of its gross revenue
under Section 13(2)(a) of PD No. 1869, is now subject to corporate income tax under the
NIRC of 1997, as amended.

This case involves P35 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon

treasury bonds issued by the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) denominated as the PovertyEradicatio
n and Alleviation Certificates or the PEACe Bonds. In relation to this, CODE-NGO wrote a
letter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to inquire as to whether the PEACe Bonds are
deposit subtitute subject to withholding tax of 20%. The BIR issued several rulings which
basically say that in determining whether financial assets such
as a debt instrument are deposit substitute, the “20 or more individual or corporate lenders
rule” should apply.
 HHPI is located in Bonifacio Global City in Taguig and, as such, pays VAT to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) using the calendar year (CY) system. During the first quarter of CY
2008, HHPI received income for services rendered within the Philippines for clients abroad. it
filed its original Quarterly VAT Return with the BIR through the BIR Electronic Filing and
Payment System. HHPI filed a claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT of before the BIR.
Asserting that there was inaction on the part of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
and in order to toll the running of the two-year period prescribed by law, HHPI elevated its
claim to the CTA on March 30, 2010. CIR sought the dismissal of HHPI's claim for refund due
to the prematurity of the appeal. Undaunted, HHPI filed a petition for review

The books of accounts of [PMFC] were examined by the [CIR] for deficiency income, value-
added [tax] (VAT) and withholding tax liabilities. As a result of the investigation assessment
notices were issued. PMFC filed its Petition for Review. [CTA] in Division rendered the
assailed Decision affirming the assessments but in the reduced amount of P2,804,920.36
(inclusive of surcharge and deficiency interest) representing [PMFC's] Income, VAT and
Withholding Tax deficiencies for the taxable year 1996 plus 20% delinquency interest per
annum until fully paid.

Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (Filipinas) is a private organization engaged in palm oil
plantation5 with a total land area of more than 7,000 hectares of National Development
Company (NDC) lands in Agusan del Sur. After the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law9
was passed, NDC lands were transferred to Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
beneficiaries who formed themselves as the merged NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc. - NDC-
Guthrie Estates, Inc. (NGPI-NGEI) Cooperatives.10 Filipinas entered into a lease contract
agreement with NGPI-NGEI. It assessed Filipinas' properties found within the plantation area
the Regional Director (RD) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), wrote a Letter to the City
Prosecutor of Manila, recommending the criminal prosecution of Valeriano as
president/authorized officer of the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (Corporation) for
failure to pay the internal revenue tax obligations of the Corporation. Information was filed
with the CTA by Assistant City Prosecutor Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales. Assistant City
Prosecutor Ofrecio-Gonzales failed to comply with the order to submit the approval of the
Commissioner (to file the criminal action), as required

Respondent Takenaka filed its Quarterly VAT Returns for the four quarters of taxable, IR
issued VAT Ruling No. 011-03 which states that the sales of goods and services rendered by
respondent Takenaka to PIATCO are subject to zero-percent (0%) VAT and requires no prior
approval for zero rating based on Revenue Memorandum Circular 74-99. On April 11, 2003,
respondent Takenaka filed its claim for tax refund covering the aforesaid period before the
BIR Revenue District Office No. 51, Pasay City Branch. For failure of the BIR to act on its
claim, respondent Takenaka filed a Petition for Review with this Court, docketed as C.T.A.
Case No. 6886.

DKS filed with the BIR an Application for Tax Credits/Refunds of its excess and unutilized
input VAT even before any action by the CIR on its administrative claim, DKS filed a Petition
for Review with the CTA, . The CTA First Division ruled that the petition for review filed by
DKS on June 30, 2009, or barely twelve (12) days after the filing of its administrative claim
for refund, was clearly premature justifying its dismissal. CTA En Banc reversed citing san
roque.
 DLSU was assessed and made its rental income taxable sed or disposed of.DLSU's
operations of canteens and bookstores within its campus even though exclusively serving
the university community do not negate income tax liability.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid 5% franchise tax imposed to PAGCOR, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) issued several assessments against PAGCOR for alleged deficiency value-
added tax (VAT), final withholding tax on fringe benefits, and expanded withholding tax

Fitness received a copy of the Final Assessment Notice. Fitness filed a protest to the Final
Assessment. According to Fitness, the Commissioner's period to assess had already
prescribed. Further, the assessment was without basis since the company was only
incorporated on May 30, 1995. Fitness filed with CTA, CIR contents that the assessment
became final and executory.
 Municipal Assessor of Benguet assessed the NPC. NPC challenged before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA) the legality of the assessment and the authority of the
respondents to assess and collect real property taxes from it when its properties are exempt
pursuant to Section 234 (b) and (c) of Local Government Code. Respondents alleged that
NPC’s properties were not exempt from tax since the properties were classified in their tax
declarations as “industrial,” “for industrial use,” or “machineries” and “equipment.”

Philippine Navy (PN) apprehended and seized the vessel and its entire rice cargo... for
allegedly carrying suspected smuggled rice... petitioner argues that the 15,000 bags of rice
were unlawfully imported into the Philippines; hence, there was legal ground for the
forfeiture of the rice and its carrying vessel. The petitioner solely rely its argument on the
certification issued by the PCG Station Commander in Manila... there was no vessel named
MV "Gypsy Queen" that logged-in or submitted any Master's Oath of Safe Departure on 15
August 2001. It also found that no personnel by the name [of] PO3 Fernandez, PCG, was
detailed at Pier 18, Mobile Team on said date.

RR requires the payment of value-added tax (VAT) and excise tax on the importation of all
petroleum and petroleum products coming directly from abroad and brought into the
Philippines, including Freeport and economic zones (FEZs).[4] It then allows the credit or
refund of any VAT or excise tax paid if the taxpayer proves that the petroleum previously
brought in has been sold to a duly registered FEZ locator and used pursuant to the
registered activity of such locator. Lazatin, in his capacity as Pampanga First District
Representative, filed a petition for prohibition and injunction[6] against the petitioners to
annul and set aside RR 2-2012.
 Petitioner filed an application for Tax Credit/Refund of its allegedly excess and unutilized
input VAT with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Citing inaction on the part of
respondent, petitioner on April 17, 2009 filed a Petition for Review or [s]eventeen (17) days
after petitioner filed an application for tax credit/refund with respondent based on Section
112 and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended.

etitioner Pilipinas Shell filed its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD) and
paid the import duty of its shipments in the amount of P 11,231, 081 on May 23, 1996.
However, it only received a demand letter from public respondent on July 27, 2000, or more
than four (4) years later. By this time, the one-year prescriptive period had already elapsed,
and the government had already been barred from collecting the deficiency in petitioner's
import duties for the covered shipment of oil. Justice Peralta and the respondent claim that
the government is no longer collecting tariff duties. Rather, it is exercising its ownership
right over the shipments, which were allegedly deemed abandoned by petitioner because of
the latter's failure to timely file the IEIRD.

It was also discovered that in 1999, GMCC sold condominium units and parking slots for a
total amount of P5,350,000.00 to a Valencia K. Wong.15 However, GMCC did not declare the
income it earned from these transactions in its 1999 Audited Financial Statements.In light of
the discovered tax deficiencies, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, on October 7, 2005, filed
with the Department of Justice a criminal complaint for violation of Sections 254,21 255,22
and 267,23 of the National Internal Revenue Code against GMCC.
 A "Certificate of Tax Exemption" was issued in favor of UCSFA-MPC. BIR Regional Director
required UCSFA-MPC to pay in advance the value-added tax (VAT) before her office could
issue the Authorization Allowing Release of Refined Sugar (AARRS) from the sugar
refinery/mill. UCSFA-MPC filed an administrative claim for refund with the BIR, asserting that
it had been granted tax exemption under Article 61 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6938
 ISSUE

WON petitioner Air Canada, as an offline

international carrier selling passage documents
through a general sales agent in the
Philippines, is a resident foreign corporation
within the meaning of Section 28(A)(1) of the
1997 National Internal Revenue Code;

WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF CEBU OR ANY

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN VALIDLY IMPOSE
AMUSEMENT TAX TO THE ACT OF PLAYING
GOLF.
WON the CTA erred in granting MPC’s claim for
refund of its excess input VAT payments on
domestic purchases of goods, services and
importation of goods attributable to zero-rated
sales for taxable year 2000.

Whether the Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s
Decision on the ground that the registered
owner did not receive a copy of the notice of
auction sale.

WON PAGCOR timely filed its petition before the

CTA
 WON Pilipinas Shell is not entitled to a
refund/credit of the excise taxes paid on its
sales and deliveries to international carriers

WON THE FORMAL ASSESSMENT NOTICE (FAN)

FOR DEFICIENCY INCOME TAX ISSUED TO GJM
FOR TAXABLE YEAR 1999 WAS RELEASED,
MAILED, AND SENT WITHIN THE THREE (3)-YEAR
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD UNDER SECTION 203 OF
THE NIRC OF 1997.

WON THE BIR'S RIGHT TO ASSESS GJM FOR

DEFICIENCY INCOME TAX FOR TAXABLE YEAR
1999 HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

WON THE CTA ERRED IN DENYING

[PETITIONER'S] CLAIM FOR REFUND OF ITS
EXCESS / UNUTILIZED INPUT VAT DERIVED
FROM IMPORTATION OF CAPITAL GOODS DUE
TO ITS FAILURE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF
ZERO-RATED EXPORT SALES.
 WON THE CTA ERRED IN DENYING
[PETITIONER'S] CLAIM FOR REFUND OF ITS
EXCESS / UNUTILIZED INPUT VAT DERIVED
FROM IMPORTATION OF CAPITAL GOODS DUE
TO ITS FAILURE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF
ZERO-RATED EXPORT SALES.

When may a Final Decision on Disputed

Assessment (FDDA) be declared void, and in
the event that the FDD A is found void, what
would be its effect on the tax assessment?

Whether or not ING is correct,

 Whether or not ING is correct,

Whether or not Capitol should follow the

administrative remedies first

Whether or not the Aichi Doctrine is still

applicable
 Whether or not the interbank cal loans of PNB
are subject to DST

Was the petitioner, an entity located within an

ECOZONE, entitled to the refund of its
unutilized input taxes incurred before it became
a PEZA registered entity?

Whether or not the date of imprinting the

documentary stamps on the document or the
date of purchase of documentary stamps for
loading and reloading on the DS metering
machine should be deemed as payment of the
DST contemplated under NIRC for the purpose
of counting the 2year prescripti'e period for
filing a claim for a refund or tax credit.
Did the CTA in Division commit grave abuse of
discretion in requiring the petitioner to file a
surety bond despite the supposedly patent
illegality of the assessment that was beyond
the petitioner's net worth but equivalent to the
deficiency assessment for IT and VAT?

Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals en

banc has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
petitioner.

whether or not the judicial claim of respondent

should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies
whether NGCP is liable for the payment of real
property taxes on the subject properties and
whether the correct amount of taxes was paid
and collected

Whether pr not PAGCOR is liable

Whether the PEACe Bonds are "deposit

substitutes" and thus subject to 20% final
withholding tax under the 1997 National
Internal Revenue Code. Related to this question
is the interpretation of the phrase "borrowing
from twenty (20) or more individual or
corporate lenders at any one time" under
Section 22(Y) of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code, particularly on whether the
reckoning of the 20 lenders includes trading of
the bonds in the secondary market
 Whether pr not the case is premature

whether or not the nature of evidence required

to prove an ordinary expense like raw materials
is governed by Section 2914 of the 1977
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and not
by Section 238 as found by the CTA.

whether or not the exemption privilege of NGPI-

NGEI from payment of RPT extends to FPPOP as
lesse of parcel of land.
 Whether the case should proceed

Whether or not PIATCO is entitled to the refund

Whether the CTA En Banc erred in taking

cognizance of the case and holding that DKS's
petition for review was not prematurely filed
the CT A First Division.
Whether DLSU's income and revenues proved
to have been used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes are
exempt from duties and taxes.

whether or not PAGCOR is liable for the

payment of VAT

whether the Final Assessment Notice issued

against respondent Fitness by Design, Inc. is a
valid assessment under Section 228 of the
National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue
Regulations No. 12-99.
 Does NPC need to pay the assessed amount
under protest in claiming for an exception from
the payment of real property tax?

whether or not the CA erred in affirming the

CTA's decision ordering the release of the
15,000 bags of rice and its carrying vessel

WON the RR is valid

 Whether or not the filing of judicial claim is
premature

Whether or not there was an abandonment

whether the applicable prescriptive period for

the tax assessment is the ten-year period or the
three-year period.
WON the sale of refined sugar is VAT exempt
 RULING/DOCTRINE

An offline international air carrier selling passage tickets in the Philippines, through a general sales a
resident foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. As such, it is taxable under Section 28
not Section 28(A)(3) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, subject to any applicable tax treat
the Philippines is a signatory. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Republic of the Philippines-Canada Tax Tr
Canada may only be imposed a maximum tax of 1 ½% of its gross revenues earned from the sale of i
the Philippines.

Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on golf cou
and void as it is beyond the authority of respondent Cebu City to enact under the Local Government
Local Government Code authorizes the imposition by local government units of amusement tax und
140. In the present case, Section 140, in relation to Section 131 (c), of the Local Government Code
explicitly and clearly cover amusement tax and respondent Cebu City must exercise its authority t
amusement tax within the limitations and guidelines as set forth in said statutory provision
 The strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, wheth
during or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Rul
489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again
the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.
MPC's failure to observe the mandatory 120-day period under the law was fatal to its immediate fi
judicial claim before the CTA. It rendered the filing of the CTA petition premature, and barred the tax
acquiring jurisdiction over the same. Thus, the dismissal of the petition is in order. "[T]ax refunds or t
just like tax exemptions - are strictly construed against taxpayers, the latter having the burden to p
compliance with the conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit.

Only the registered owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer who is entitled to a notice of delinq
other proceedings relative to the tax sale. In this case, Atienza received the Warrant of Levy and the
Sale. Whether Atienza received the Notice of Public Auction is a factual issue that was not raised by
Bank because it is an issue that only Atienza, being the registered owner, can raise.
We do not find merit in the claim of Optimum Bank that the issuance of a new TCT in favor of Lukban
its rights as a mortgagee.

PAGCOR has clearly failed to comply with the requisites in disputing an assessment as provided by S
and Section 3.1.5. Indeed, PAGCOR's lapses in procedure have made the BIR's assessment final, exe
demandable, thus obviating the need to further discuss the issue of the propriety of imposition of frin
tax.
 Pilipinas Shell already ruled that petroleum products sold by local manufacturers/sellers to internatio
are exempt from the imposition of excise taxes as these international carriers enjoy exemption from
excise taxes under Section 135(a) of the NIRC. For another the CIR foiled to state with specificity th
these issuances, except that these relate to the BIR's alleged grant of excise tax exemption on pe
products, without even making an effort to present an official copy of these issuances, much less its

CIR has three (3) years from the date of the actual filing of the return or from the last day prescribed
the filing of the return, whichever is later, to assess internal revenue taxes. The three (3)-year prescrip
therefore, was only until April 15, 2003. The records reveal that the BIR sent the FAN through registe
April 14, 2003, well-within the required period. If the taxpayer denies having received an assessmen
BIR, it then becomes incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence that such notice w
received by the addressee. The BIR's failure to prove GJM's receipt of the assessment leads to no othe
but that no assessment was issued. Consequently, the government's right to issue an assessment fo
period has already prescribed.

The applicable provision of the NIRC, as amended, is Section 112. “Upon the filing of an administrat
respondent is given a period of 120 days within which to (1) grant a refund or issue the tax credit ce
creditable input taxes; or (2) make a full or partial denial of the claim for a tax refund or tax credit. Fa
part of respondent to act on the application within the 120-day period shall be deemed a den
Note that the 120-day period begins to run from the date of submission of complete documents supp
administrative claims. If there is no evidence showing that the taxpayer was required to submit – o
submitted – additional documents after the filing of the administrative claim, it is presumed that the
documents accompanied the claim when it was filed.
Considering that there is no evidence in this case showing that petitioner made later submissions of
in support of its administrative claims, the 120-day period within which respondent is allowed to act o
shall be reckoned from 16 October 1 and 4 September 2002.
The judicial claim shall be filed within a period of 30 days after the receipt of respondent’s decision o
after the expiration of the 120-day period, whichever is sooner.
Aside from a specific exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the periods provided by
claim filed in a period less than or beyond the 120+30 days provided by the NIRC is outside the jurisd
CTA.”
 The applicable provision of the NIRC, as amended, is Section 112. “Upon the filing of an administrat
respondent is given a period of 120 days within which to (1) grant a refund or issue the tax credit ce
creditable input taxes; or (2) make a full or partial denial of the claim for a tax refund or tax credit. Fa
part of respondent to act on the application within the 120-day period shall be deemed a den
Note that the 120-day period begins to run from the date of submission of complete documents supp
administrative claims. If there is no evidence showing that the taxpayer was required to submit – o
submitted – additional documents after the filing of the administrative claim, it is presumed that the
documents accompanied the claim when it was filed.
Considering that there is no evidence in this case showing that petitioner made later submissions of
in support of its administrative claims, the 120-day period within which respondent is allowed to act o
shall be reckoned from 16 October 1 and 4 September 2002.
The judicial claim shall be filed within a period of 30 days after the receipt of respondent’s decision o
after the expiration of the 120-day period, whichever is sooner. Aside from a specific exception to the
and jurisdictional nature of the periods provided by the law, any claim filed in a period less than or b
120+30 days provided by the NIRC is outside the jurisdiction of the CTA.”

They lay out the procedure to be followed in tax assessments. Section 228 of the NIRC provides t
assessment shall be void if the taxpayer is not informed in writing of the law and the facts on which it
is, however, silent with regards to a decision on a disputed assessment by the CIR which fails to state
facts on which it is based. This void is filled by RR No. 12-99 where it is stated that failure of the FDD
the facts and law on which it is based will make the decision void. It, however, does not extend to the
of the entire assessment.

No. An assessment fixes and determines the tax liability of a taxpayer. It is a notice to the effect that
therein stated is due as tax and a demand for payment thereof.
 No. Under the National Internal Revenue Code, every form of compensation for personal services is
income tax and, consequently, to withholding tax. The term "compensation" means all remuneration
services performed by an employee for his or her employer, whether paid in cash or in kind, unless s
excluded under Sections 32(B)83 and 78(A)84 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code.85 Th
designated to the remuneration for services is immaterial. Thus, "salaries, wages, emoluments and
bonuses, allowances (such as transportation, representation, entertainment, and the like), [taxabl
benefits[,] pensions and retirement pay, and other income of a similar nature constitute compensation
that is taxable.

Hence, petitioner ING Bank is liable for the withholding tax on the bonuses since it claimed the same
in the year they were accrued.

Yes. The general rule is to require the taxpayer to first avail of admin remdies and pay the tax unde
before allowing any reorrt to a judicial action.

Yes. Under Section 112 of the NIRC,29 if the administrative claim for tax credit or refund of input ta
acted upon by the CIR within 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents in supp
application, the taxpayer affected may appeal the unacted claim with the CTA within 30 days from th
of the 120-day period.

In Aichi, this Court ruled that observance of the 120- and 30-day periods is crucial in the filing of an ap
the CTA. By "crucial," this Court meant that its observance is jurisdictional and mandatory, not merely
 No. nterbank call loans, although not considered as deposit substitutes, are not expressly included a
taxable instruments listed in Section 180; hence, they may not be held as taxable.

No. As such, the purchases of goods and services by the petitioner that were destined for consumptio
ECOZONE should be free of VAT; hence, no input VAT should then be paid on such purchases, rend
petitioner not entitled to claim a tax refund or credit. Verily, if the petitioner had paid the input VAT, t
correct in holding that the petitioner's proper recourse was not against the Government but against
who had shifted to it the output VAT following RMC No. 42-03

No. A DST is a tax on documents, instruments, loan agreements, and papers evidencing the acce
assignment, sale or transfer of an obligation, right or property incident thereto. The DST is actually an
because it is imposed on the transaction rather than on the document.10chanrobleslaw

The rule is that the date of payment is when the tax liability falls due. Jurisprudence has made exce
reckoning the period of prescription from the actual date of payment of tax by instead reckoning tha
the filing of the final adjusted returns, i.e. income tax and other withholding taxes.11 These excep
nevertheless grounded on the same rationale that payment of the tax is deemed made when it fa

In Gibbs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,12 this Court ruled that "[p]ayment is a mode of extin
obligations (Art. 1231, Civil Code) and it means not only the delivery of money but also the performa
other manner, of an obligation. A taxpayer, resident or non-resident, does so not really to deposit an
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, but, in truth, to perform and extinguish his tax obligation fo
concerned. In other words, he is paying his tax liabilities for that year. Consequently, a taxpayer whos
withheld at source will be deemed to have paid his tax liability when the same falls due at the end
year. It is from this latter date then, or when the tax liability falls due, that the two-year prescriptive p
Section 306 (now part of Section 230) of the Revenue Code starts to run with respect to payments
through the withholding tax system." The aforequoted ruling presents two alternative reckoning dat
end of the tax year; and (2) the date when the tax liability falls due.13chanrobleslaw
yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 (R.A. No. 1125),15 as amended by Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
is stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal.
Clearly, the CTA may order the suspension of the collection of taxes provided that the taxpayer ei
deposits the amount claimed; or (2) files a surety bond for not more than double the amoun

No. Instead, what remained as a remedy for the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari under Ru
could have been filed as an original action before this Court and not before the CTA en banc. xxx In
petitioner’s failure to avail of this remedy and mistake in filing of the wrong action are fatal to its c
renders and leaves the CTA First Division’s decision as indeed final and executory. By the time the inst
for review was filed by petitioner with this Court, more than sixty (60) days have passed since petition
discovery of its loss in the case as brought about by the alleged negligence or fraud of its coun

No. the primary purpose of filing an administrative claim was to serve as a notice of warning to the
court action would follow unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or il
refunded. To clarify, Section 229 of the Tax Code however does not mean that the taxpayer must aw
resolution of its administrative claim for refund, since doing so would be tantamount to the taxpayer'
of its right to seek judicial recourse should the two (2)-year prescriptive period expire without the ap
judicial claim being filed.
 Yes. Properties not used

in connection with NGCP’s franchise should be assessed and subjected to real property tax, in accord
the Local Government Code. NGCP’s Tax Liabilities

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), or the Electric Power Industry Reform Ac
(EPIRA), the NPC was responsible for the development, production, and transmission of electric po
nationwide basis.27

As the PAGCOR Charter states in unequivocal terms that exemptions granted for earnings derived
operations conducted under the franchise specifically from the payment of any tax, income or otherw
as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the benefit of and extend tocorporation(s), asso
agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom the PAGCOR or operator has any contractual relationship in c
with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise, so it must be
contractees and licensees of PAGCOR, upon payment of the 5% franchise tax, shall likewise be exemp
other taxes, including corporate income tax realized from the operation of casinos.

For the same reasons that made us conclude in the 10 December 2014 Decision of the Court sitting
G.R. No. 215427 that PAGCOR is subject to corporate income tax for "other related services", we find
that its contractees and licensees shall likewise pay corporate income tax for income derived from su
services."

Simply then, in this case, we adhere to the principle that since the statute is clear and free from am
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain mea
verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.24chan

Plainly, too, upon payment of the 5% franchise tax, petitioner's income from its gaming operations o
casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or amusement places, and gaming pools, defined
purview of the aforesaid section, is not subject to corporate income tax.

The term ‘deposit substitutes’ shall mean an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public (the t
means borrowing from twenty (20) or more individual or corporate lenders at any one time) other tha
through the issuance, endorsement, or acceptance of debt instruments for the borrower’s own accou
purpose of relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations, or financing their own nee
needs of their agent or dealer.
 Yes. It should be noted that the petition for review was filed before the CTA on March 30, 2010, or me
days after the administrative claim for refund was filed before the BIR on March 23, 2010. Evidently,
to wait for the lapse of the 120-day period which is expressly provided for by law for the CIR to grant
application for refund.

In San Roque,27 it has been held that the compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandato
jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at 60 days only, was part of the provisions of the fir
Executive Order No. 273, which took effect on January 1, 1988. The waiting period was extended to
effective January 1, 1998 under Republic Act No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. The 120-day pe
Section 112(C) has been in the statute books for more than 15 years before respondent San Roque
judicial claim.28chanrobleslaw

The Court finds that the alleged differences between the requirements of Section 29 of the 1977 NIRC
PMFC, on one hand, and Section 238 relied upon by the CTA, on the other, are more imagined than r
rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the c
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservie
general intent of the whole enactment. The law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions m
in relation to the whole law. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as deta
isolated expression, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the mea
of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.

Under Section 133(n) of the Local Government Code, the taxing power of local government units shal
to the levy of taxes, fees, or charges on duly registered cooperatives under the Cooperative Code.6
234(d) of the Local Government Code specifically provides for real property tax exemption to coop

NGPI-NGEI, as the owner of the land being leased by respondent, falls within the purview of the law. S
of the Local Government Code exempts all real property owned by cooperatives without distinction.
the law suggests that the real property tax exemption only applies when the property is used by the c
itself. Similarly, the instance that the real property is leased to either an individual or corporation is n
for withdrawal of tax exemption.
No. The prerequisite approval of the BIR Commissioner in the filing of a civil or criminal action is prov
Section 220 of the 1997 NIRC, which states that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 220. Form and Mode of Proceeding in Actions Arising under this Code. - Civil and criminal acti
proceedings instituted in behalf of the Government under the authority of this Code or other law enfo
Bureau of Internal Revenue shall be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines and
conducted by legal officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue but no civil or criminal action for the r
taxes or the enforcement of any fine, penalty or forfeiture under this Code shall be filed in court wi
approval of the Commissioner. (Emphasis ours)

No. the petitioner's situation is actually a case of late filing. The petitioner submitted sales invoices,
receipts, to support its claim for refund. In light of the aforestated distinction between a receipt and
the submissions were inadequate for the purpose thereby intended. The Court concurs with the concl
CTA En Banc, therefore, that "[w]ithout proper VAT official receipts issued to its clients, the payments
respondent Takenaka for providing services to PEZA-registered entities cannot qualify for VAT zero-rat
it cannot claim such sales as zero-rated VAT not subject to output tax."1

NO. Respondent's assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing o
claim as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescrip
has no legal basis.

There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent's view. Subsection (A) of the said
states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero- rated may, w
years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a
certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales." The phrase "with
years x xx apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund
with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection
same provision, which states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents
of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the
 YES.
The requisites for availing the tax exemption under Article XIV, Section 4 (3), namely: (1) the taxpaye
the classification
non-stock, non-profit educational institution and (2) theincome it seeks to be exempted from taxatio
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes

No. R.A. No. 7716 indicates that Congress has not intended to repeal PAGCOR's privilege to enjoy
franchise tax in lieu of all other taxes. A contrary construction would be unwarranted and myopic n

No, Compliance with Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code is a substantative requireme
not a mere formality.142 Providing the taxpayer with the factual and legal bases for the assessment
before proceeding with tax collection. Tax collection should be premised on a valid assessment, wh
allow the taxpayer to present his or her case and produce evidence for substantiation.
 Yes. Settled is the rule that should the taxpayer/real property owner question the excessivene
reasonableness of the assessment, LGC directs that the taxpayer should first pay the tax due before
can be entertained. A claim for exemption from the payment of real property taxes does not actually q
assessor’s authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or correctn
assessment by the local assessor. Every person who shall claim exemption from payment of real prop
imposed upon said property shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor sufficient docu
evidence in support for such claim. The burden of proving is upon whom the subject real property is
the property being taxed has not been dropped from the assessment roll, taxes must be paid under p
exemption from taxation is insisted upon. NPC’s failure to comply with the mandatory requirement o
under protest in accordance with Section 252 of the LGC was fatal to its appeal.

The said certification is not sufficient to prove that the respondents violated the TCC

Nonetheless, the TCC requires the presence of probable cause before any proceeding for seizure and/
is instituted... to warrant the forfeiture of the 15,000 bags of rice and its carrying vessel, there must
showing of probable cause that: (1) the importation or exportation of the 15,000 bags of rice was e
attempted contrary to law, or that the shipment of the 15,000 bags of rice constituted prohibited imp
exportation; and (2) the vessel was used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of the rice, or in
or transporting the rice, if considered as contraband or smuggled articles in commercial quantities, in
any Philippine port or place... the records showed that the 15,000 bags of rice were of local origin, ha
purchased from NFA Zambales

From the foregoing, it is clear that the respondents had sufficiently established that the 15,000 bags
of local origin and there were no other circumstances that would indicate that the same were frau
transported into the Philippines.

No. it illegally imposes taxes upon FEZ enterprises, which, by law, enjoy tax-exempt status, and b) it
amends the law (i.e., RA 7227, as amended by RA 9400) and thereby encroaches upon the legislativ
reserved exclusively by the Constitution for Congress. Under RA 9400 and its Implementing Rules, C
considered a customs territory separate and distinct from the Philippines customs territory. Thus, as
importations into and establishments in the Philippines customs territory, which are fully subject to
customs and tax laws, importations into and establishments located within the Clark FEZ (FEZ Enterp
special incentives, including tax and duty-free importation. More specifically, Clark FEZ enterprises
entitled to the freeport status of the zone and a 5% preferential income tax rate on its gross income
national and local taxes.
 yes. In fine, we find that the Aichi Case is the prevailing doctrine in so far as the mandatory observa
120-30 day period under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997 before filing an appeal with the Court of Ta
and that the Atlas Case and Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC are not applicable in the instant ca

No, As expressly provided in Sec.1801(b) of the TCC, the failure to file the IEIRD within 30 days from
the only requirement for the doctrine of ipso facto abandonment to apply. The law categorically requi
be preceded by due notice demanding compliance. To recapitulate, the notice in this case was only s
petitioner four (4) years after it has already filed its IEIRD.1âwphi1 Under this circumstance, the Court
that due notice was given, for when public respondent served the notice demanding payment from p
no longer had the right to do so.

t is the threeyear prescriptive period that applies in this case. power to assess and collect taxes is l
Section 203 NIRC. The respondents may have erred in reporting their tax liability when they recorded
transactions in the wrong year, but such error stemmed from the wrong application of the law and
indication of their intent to evade payment. If there were really an intent to evade payment, respond
not have reported and subsequently paid the income tax, albeit in the wrong year.
For internal revenue purposes, the sale of raw cane sugar is exempt from VAT40 because it is conside
its original state.41 On the other hand, refined sugar is an agricultural product that can no longer be
to be in its original state because it has undergone the refining process; its sale is thus subject t

Although the sale of refined sugar is generally subject to VAT, such transaction may nevertheless qual
exempt transaction if the sale is made by a cooperative. REQS: First, the seller must be an agric
cooperative duly registered with the CDA. Second, if the cooperative only sells its produce or good
manufactures on its own, its entire sales is VAT-exempt.. Respondent satisfies these requisites in the p
 DATE G.R. NO.

January 13, 2015 G.R. No. 198756

January 14, 2015 G.R. No. 188016

January 14, 2015 G. R. No. 168950

G.R. Nos. 193383-84; G.R. Nos. 193407-

January 14, 2015
08
January 21, 2015 G.R. No. 203351

January 28, 2015 G.R. No. 206526

February 4, 2015 G. R. No. 172509

February 4, 2015 G.R. No. 185666

February 18, 2015 G.R. No. 185115

June 15, 2015 G.R. No. 181756.

JULY 1, 2015 G.R. No. 192024

JULY 1, 2015 G.R. No. 204117

 G.R. No. 209353-54/G.R. Nos. 211733-
JULY 6, 2015
34

JULY 8, 2015 G.R. No. 187631

JULY 15, 2015 G.R. No. 207791

JULY 15, 2015 G.R. No. 175188

JULY 15, 2015 G.R. No. 207843

JULY 15, 2015 G.R. No. 207575

JULY 15, 2015 G.R. No. 160206

JULY 22, 2015 G.R. No. 167679

JULY 29, 2015 G.R. No. 192173

 JULY 29, 2015 G.R. No. 210646

AUGUST 5, 2015 G.R. No. 166102

AUGUST 10, 2015 G.R. Nos. 195175 & 199645

AUGUST 26, 2015 G.R. No. 200841-42

SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 G.R. No. 210836

SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 G.R. No. 193253

DECEMBER 2, 2015 G.R. No. 196415

DECEMBER 7, 2015 G.R. No. 212825

DECEMBER 8, 2015 G.R. No. 207112
 CASE TITLE

BANCO DE ORO, ET. AL VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,ET. AL.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE VS.TEAM (PHILS.) ENERGY CORPORATION (formerly MIRANT (PHILS.) ENERGY
CORPORATION
ROHM APOLLO SEMICONDUCTOR PHILIPPINES VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE

CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

PANAY POWER CORPORATION (formerly A VON RIVER POWER HOLDINGS CORPORATION)
VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

WINEBRENNER & INIGO INSURANCE BROKERS, INC., VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

 NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILIPPINES) CO.RP. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

NORTHERN MINDANAO POWER CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) VS. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU,

ET AL.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS. CITY TREASURER OF MANILA

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL) / COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL)

BATANGAS CITY, MARIA TERESA GERON, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY TREASURER OF

BATANGAS CITY, ET AL. VS. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

THE CITY OF DAVAO REPRESENTED BY THE CITY TREASURER OF DAVAO CITY VS. THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF AMADO S. DALISAY, REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
ATTY. NICASIO B. PADERNA
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC. (LTDI) [NOW
GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS (SECOND

DIVISION) AND PETRON CORPORATION
 HEDCOR, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 AND CARGOES OF 6500 SACKS OF IMPORTED RICE, ET AL.
VS. HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND THE DISTRICT
COLLECTOR OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
 ING BANK N.V. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMSSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. AIR LIQUIDE PHILIPPINES, INC.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. THE CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY TREASURER OF LUCENA
CITY
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. TOLEDO POWER COMPANY

CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
 CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. THE HONORABLE AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ET AL.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. TOLEDO POWER COMPANY/TOLEDO POWER
COMPANY VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. NEXT MOBILE, INC.

PILIPINAS TOTAL GAS, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
 BAR
SUBJECT
SUBJECT

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW JUDICIAL REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW LOCAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW EXCISE TAX

TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE OF

TAXATION LAW
THE PH
TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION
 TOPIC

GROSS INCOME

FILING OF RETURNS AND PAYMENT OF INCOME TAX

VALUE-ADDED TAX

VALUE-ADDED TAX
 VALUE-ADDED TAX

INPUT AND OUTPUT TAX

DOCUMENTARY STAMP
 VALUE-ADDED TAX

INVOICING REQUIREMENTS

REAL PROPERTY TAXATION

 EXCISE TAX

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES
 EXCISE TAX

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION

REAL PROPERTY TAXATION

 Documentary Stamp

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over civil tax case

 TAX PAYERS REMEDIES

JURISDICTION OF THE CTA

 DOCTRINES IN TAXATION

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES
TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES
EXCISE TAX ON IMPORTATION OF PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS

UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION
 TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES (VAT)

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES
 SUB-TOPIC

CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX (PASSIVE INVESTMENT

INCOME)

WITHHOLDING OF TAXES
REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

DETERMINATION OF OUTPUT/INPUT TAX (SUBSTANTIATION OF INPUT TAX

CREDIT)

BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

CONSEQUENCES OF ISSUING ERRONEOUS VAT INVOICE OR VAT OFFICIAL

RECEIPT

IMPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES (EXEMPTION FROM REAL PROPERTY

TAXES)
 REFUND

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST)

 REFUND

TAXING POWER OF CITIES

COLLECTION OF REAL PROPERTY TAX (REMEDIES OF LGUs FOR COLLECTION

OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES)
 Exemptions-DST

Cases within the jurisdiction of the court in divisions

 PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST

CASES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IN DIVISIONS

 TAX AMNESTY

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST

PROTEST OF ASSESSMENT
PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST

PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST

 EXEMPTION

UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION; OTHER FRAUDULENT PRACTICES

PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
PERIOD TO FILE PROTEST
PONENTE

LEONEN

BERSAMIN
 SERENO

PERLAS-BERNABE
PERLAS-BERNABE

MENDOZA

SERENO
 PEREZ

SERENO

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
MENDOZA

MENDOZA
SERENO

PERALTA

MENDOZA
 DEL CASTILLO

PERLAS-BERNABE
SERENO

BERSAMIN
LEONEN

PEREZ
 MENDOZA

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
 SERENO

PERLAS-BERNABE
BERSAMIN

PERALTA
DEL CASTILLO

VELASCO
MENDOZA
 FACTS

This case involves P35 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon

treasury bonds issued by the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) denominated as the PovertyEradication and
Alleviation Certificates or the PEACe Bonds. In relation to this, CODE-NGO wrote a letter to the Bureau
Internal Revenue (BIR) to inquire as to whether the PEACe Bonds are deposit subtitute subject to
withholding tax of 20%. The BIR issued several rulings which basically say that in determining whethe
financial assets such
as a debt instrument are deposit substitute, the “20 or more individual or corporate lenders rule”
should apply.

Petitioner asserts thenecessity of submission of thequarterly return of therespondent to prove

itsentitlement to the refund pursuant to Sec. 76 of the NIRC because such quarterly returnswould
establish the correctnessof the total amount of paymentsmade and the taxes due asreported on the
adjusted returnat the end of the year. 
 Petitioner, instead of filing a judicial claimwithin 30 days from the lapse of the120-day period on 10
April, or until10 May 2001, Rohm Apollo filed aPetition for Review with the CTAdocketed as CTA Case N
6534 on11 September 2002. It was under the belief that a judicial claim had to befiled within the two
year prescriptive period ending on 30September 2002.

CBK Power raised the lone issue of whether or not an ITAD ruling is required before it can avail of the
preferential tax rate. On the other hand, the Commissioner claimed that CBK Power failed to exhaus
administrative remedies when it filed its petitions before the CTA First Division, and that said petition
were not filed within the two-year prescriptive period for initiating judicial claims for refund.
 On December 29, 2005, petitioner filed an administrative claim for refund/credit of its unutilized inpu
VAT in the amount of P14,122,347.21 before the Revenue District Office No. 51 of the BIR. Thereafter
on January 20, 2006, petitioner filed a judicial claim for tax refund/credit by way of a petition for revie
before the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 7402. CTA Division dismissed its claim for tax refund/credi
outright on the ground that petitioner filed its judicial claim for tax refund/credit on January 20, 2006,
a mere 22 days after it filed its administrative claim on December 29, 2005. The CTA Division held th
the observance of the 120-day period provided under Section 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenu
Code (NIRC) is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of a judicial claim for tax refund/credit, thus
concluding that petitioner’s judicial claim for tax refund/credit must be dismissed for being premature
filed.

On April 15, 2004, petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return for CY 2003. About two years thereaft
or on April 7, 2006, petitioner applied for the administrative tax credit/refund claiming entitlement to
the refund of its excess or unutilized creditable withholding tax (CWT) for CY 2003.

CTA Denied the petition for the reason that petitioner should have presented as evidence its first,
second and third quarterly Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for the year 2004 to prove that the unutilized CW
being claimed had not been carried over to the succeeding quarters.

For the taxable years 1982 to 1986, CBC was engaged in transactions involving sales of foreign
exchange to the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), commonly known
SWAP transactions. Petitioner did not file tax returns or pay tax on the SWAP transactions for those
taxable years.

Petitioner received an assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) finding CBC liable for
deficiency documentary stamp tax (DST) on the sales of foreign bills of exchange to the Central Bank
 Petitioner's amount of total sales attributable to zero-rated sales would be P24,826,667.61. Under th
premise that it is entitled to a refund of the amount of P24,826,667.61, petitioner filed four separate
applications for tax credit/refund on September 24, 2001.

Receiving no resolution from OSSAC-DOF, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on April 24,
2002 pursuant to Section 112 in relation to Section 229 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended.

Petitioner filed an administrative claim for a refund on 20 June 2000 for the 3rd and the 4th quarters
taxable year 1999, and on 25 July 2001 for taxable year 2000 in the sum of P6,411,892.84.

Alleging inaction of respondent on these administrative claims, petitioner filed a Petition with the CT
on 28 September 2001. The CTA First Division denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Court in Division found that the term "zero-rated" was not
imprinted on the receipts or invoices presented by petitioner in violation of Section 4.108-1 of Revenu
Regulations No. 7-95. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim for a refund and to strictly comply wit
the invoicing requirements of the law and tax regulations.

Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes under the following provision of
Republic Act No. 6958: Section 14. Tax Exemptions- The Authority shall be exempt from realty taxes
imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalitie
Provided, that no tax exemption herein granted shall extend to any subsidiary which may be organize
by the Authority.

On September 11, 1996, however, this Court rendered a decision in Mactan-Cebu International Airpo
Authority v. Marcos4 (the 1996 MCIAA case) declaring that upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 716
(The Local Government Code of 1991), petitioner was no longer exempt from real estate taxes.
Petitioner filed a claim for tax credit or refund under Section 229 of the NIRC for erroneously or illegal
collected specific taxes covering the period June to December 31, 2004 in the total amount of
Php219,566,450.00.

On January 15, 2007, CBC paid the amount of P267,128.70 and protested, thru a Letter dated Januar
12, 2007.

The CTA Division noted that the petition for review was filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary
period allowed by Section 195 of the Local Government Code (LGC) to taxpayers who wished to appe
a denial of a protest due to the inaction of the City Treasurer. Consequently, the CTA Division ruled th
the City Treasurer’s assessment against CBC had attained finality.
The case stemmed from a claim for a refund by respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) of the amou
of P4,469,199.98 representing the alleged erroneously paid excise tax for the period covering July 200
to February 2006.

The CIR argued that Presidential Decree No. 1590, particularly Section 13 thereof, had already been
expressly amended by Republic Act No. 9334.

On February 20, 2001, petitioner Batangas City, through its City Legal Officer, sent a notice of
assessment to respondent demanding the payment of P92,373,720.50 and P312,656,253.04 as
business taxes for its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products.

Respondent filed a protest on April 17, 2002 contending among others that it is not liable for the
payment of the local business tax either as a manufacturer or distributor of petroleum products.

The City avers that the period commences from the date of the forfeiture, that is, the date of the
auction. On the other hand, the Estate insists that the redemption period begins from the date when
the declarations of forfeiture were issued.
Petitioner posits that DST is levied on the exercise of the privilege to convel real proeprty regardless
the manner of conveyance. Thus, it is imposed on all conveyances of realty, including realty transfe
during a corporate merger. Respondent, on ther other hand, contends that DST is imposed only on
conveyances, deeds, intruments or writing where realty sold shal be conveyed to a purchaser or buye
In this case, there is no purchaser or buyer as merger is neither a sale nor a liquidation of corporate
proeprty but a consolidation of proeprties, powers, and facilities of the constitutet companies

The CIR asserts that the interpretation of Sec. 148€ of the NIRC embodied in CMC No. 164-2012 is an
exercise of her quasi-egislative function which is reviewable by the Secretary of Finance, whose
decision, in turn, is appealable to the Office of the President and ultimitlely to the regular courts, and
that only her qusi-judicial functions or the authority to decide disputed assessments, refunds, penaltie
and the like are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. The CTA took cognizance o
the caseand explained that should be regarded as other matters arising under the NIRC under Sec. 4(
of the NIRC, thus, falling within the CTA's jurisdition
CTA en banc denied the Petition and ruled that the judicial claim had been filed out of time. It held th
under Section 112( C) of the NIRC, the 120-day period for the BIR to act on the claim should be
reckoned from the date of filing of petitioner's administrative claim with the tax agency. Counting 12
days from 28 December 2009, the BIR had until 27 April 2010 to decide the administrative claim.
Thereafter, petitioner had until 27 May 2010 or 30 days to appeal to the CTA either the decision or th
Inaction of the BIR. Thus, the filing of the Petition for Review with the CTA Division on 6 July 2010 wa
clearly beyond the period allowed by law

The respondents contend that the petitioners did not appeal the April 19, 1999 decision of BOC Depu
Commissioner Rosqueta on the forfeiture of the 6,500 sacks of rice; and that in accordance with Secti
11 of R.A. No. 1125 the decision consequently became final and executory 30 days from their receipt
the decision.

The petitioners countered that the April 19, 1999 decision of BOC Deputy Commissioner Rosqueta di
not yet attain finality because they had been belatedly furnished a copy of it; and that the responden
raised the issue of jurisdiction only after receiving the adverse decision of the CTA.
Petitioner ING Bank asserts that it is qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under Section 5 [of Republi
Act No. 9480] and not disqualified under Section 8 [of the same law].Respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenueclaims that petitioner ING Bank is not qualified to avail itself of the tax amnesty
granted under Republic Act No. 9480 because both the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc and Second
Division ruled in its favor that confirmed the liability of petitioner ING Bank for deficiency documenta
stamp taxes, onshore taxes, and withholding taxes.

The respondent contends that the CIR can no longer assess it for the deficiency tax because the
waivers that were executed were not in accordance with the provisions of RMO No. 20-90
 The CIR contends that the CTA Division did not acquire jurisdiction over ALPI’s petition because of its
failure to observe the 120+30 day rule in filing a judicial claim for refund or tax credit certificate.
Moreover, ALPI could not benefit from the consolidated cases of San Roque. In those cases, the
taxpayers relied in good faith on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 which allowed the seeking of judicial relie
without waiting for the lapse of the 120-day period.

The City Treasurer of Lucena, in his letter dated October 16, 1997, sought to collect from MERALCO th
amount of P17,925,l 17.34 as real property taxes on its machineries, plus penalties, for the period o
1990 to 1997, based on Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 issued by the City Assessor of
Lucena. MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 with the LBAA, but instead
paying the real property taxes and penalties due, it posted a surety bond in the amount of PI
7,925,117.34.
 The CIR mainly points out that the law requires the submission of complete supporting documents to
the BIR before the 120-day audit period shall apply, and before the taxpayer can avail itself of the
judicial remedies provided for by law. TPC alleged that Section 229 of the NIRC of 1997, which gives
taxpayers two years within which to claim a refund, should be applied to this case, considering that th
prevailing rule at the time the Petitions were filed was that the 120-30 day period was neither
mandatory nor compulsory. Also, TPC posits that Aichi should not be applied retroactively, and that
there are differences between the factual milieu of this case and that of Aichi.

The CTA En Banc set aside the CTA Division's findings, holding that CE Luzon's premature filing of its
claim divested the CTA of jurisdiction. It ruled that the filing of a judicial claim must be made within
thirty (30) days to be computed from either: (a) the receipt of the CIR's decision; or (b) after the
expiration of the 120-day period for the CIR to act. It noted that CE Luzon's petition was filed only aft
the lapse of 34 days from the time it filed its administrative claim with the BIR on Thus, considering
that CE Luzon hastily filed its petition, its judicial claim must be dismissed for being filed prematurel
 The CTA ruled that petitioner Chevron is not entitled to any refund or issuance of tax credit certificat
on excise tax paid on its importation of petroleum products sold to CDC because the SC held in one
case that the exemption from excise tax is conferred on international carriers who purchased the sam
for their use or consumption outside the PH. The oil companies which sold such petroleum products t
international carriers are not entitled to a refund of excise taxes previously paid on the petroleum
products sold

Private respondents were charged with unlawful importation and various fraudulent practices that ar
contrary to the TCCP.
The CIR contends that TPC is not entitled to a refund or credit in the reduced amount of P7,598,279.2
representing its alleged unutilized input VAT for taxable year 2002 because it failed to comply with th
rules on exhaustion of administrative remedies. TPC argues that itcomplied with the rule on exhausti
of administrative remedies as it waited for the CIR to rule on its administrative claim before filing the
judicial claim.

The tax court held the waivers have no binding effect on respondent because she signed the waiver
without any notarized written authority from respondent's Board of Directors. Petitioner's witness
explicitly admitted that he did not require respondent to present any notarized written authority from
the Board of Directors of respondent, authorizing her to sign the Waivers. Petitioner's witness also
confirmed that Revenue District Officer Raul Vicente L. Recto (RDO Recto) accepted the Waivers as
submitted and that the respective dates of their acceptance by RDO Recto are not indicated.
 CTA En Banc ruled that the CTA Division had no jurisdiction over the case because Total Gas failed to
seasonably file its petition. Counting from the date it filed its administrative claim on May 15, 2008, th
CTA En Banc explained that the CIR had 120 days to act on the claim (until September 12, 2008), an
Total Gas had 30 days from then, or until October 12, 2008, to question the inaction before the CTA.
Considering that Total Gas only filed its petition on January 23, 2009, the CTA En Banc concluded tha
the petition for review was belatedly filed
 ISSUE

Whether the PEACe Bonds are deposit substitutes and thus subject to 20% final
withholding tax under the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code. Related to this
question is the interpretation of the phrase borrowing from twenty (20) or more
individual or corporate lenders at any one time under Section 22(Y) of the 1997
National Internal Revenue Code, particularly on whether the reckoning of the 20
lenders includes trading of the bonds in the secondary market

Whether or not the respondent

proved it’s entitlement to the refund?
Whether or not the CTA acquired jurisdiction over the claim for the refund ortax credit
of unutilized input VAT?

Whether or not the BIR may add a requirement prior application for an ITAD ruling
that is not found in the income tax treaties signed by the Philippines before a
taxpayer can avail of preferential tax rates under said treaties?
 Whether or not the CTA En Banc correctly affirmed the CTA Division’s outright
dismissal of petitioner’s claim for tax refund/credit on the ground of prematurity?

Whether or not the submission and presentation of the quarterly ITRs of the
succeeding quarters of a taxable year is indispensable in a claim for refund?

Whether or not the right of the BIR to collect the assessed DST from CBC is barred by
prescription?
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a tax credit certificate (TCC) in the amount of
P24,826,667.61.

Whether or not Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 7-95 which
expanded the statutory requirements for the issuance of official receipts and invoices
found in Section 113 of the 1997 Tax Code by providing for the additional
requirement of the imprinting of the terms “zero-rated” is constitutional?

Whether or not Petitioner is a Government Instrumentality exempt from paying Real

Property Taxes?
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of petitioner's claim
for tax refund?

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Tax Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the
law and interest of substantial justice by reversing the ruling of the trial court solely
because of its assumed pronouncement that the original petition was filed one (1)
day beyond the reglementary period?
 Whether or not Sections 6 and 10 of R.A. 9334 repealed Section 13 of P .D. 1590?

Whether or not a Local Government Unit is empowered under the Local Government
Code to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the business of
manufacturing and distribution of petroleum products?

Whether or not the one (1) year redemption period of forfeited tax delinquent
properties purchased by the local government for want of a bidder is reckoned from
the date of the auction or sale or from the date of the issuance of the declaration of
forfeiture?
 WON the CTA erred in ruling that respondent is exempt from payment of DST

WON the CTA properly assumed jurisdiction over the petition assailing the imposition
of excise tax on Petron's importation of alkylate based on Section 148 (e) of the NIRC.
WON the CTA gravely erred in denying the petition because it was filed out of time.

WON the CTA had jurisdiction to resolve the issue on the forfeiture of the 6500 sacks
of rice and of the vessel
 WON petitioner ING Bank may validly avail itself of the tax amnesty granted by
Republic Act No. 9480

WON petitioner's right to assess respondent for deficiency income tax, final income
tax - FCDU, and EWT covering taxable year 1998 has already prescribed under
Section 203 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, for failure to comply with the
requirements set forth in RMO No. 20-90 dated 4 April 1990, pertaining to the proper
and valid execution of a waiver of the Statute of Limitations, and in accordance with
existing jurisprudential pronouncements.
WON the CTA division acquired jurisdiction over ALPI's petition for review.

WON posting of a surety bond qualifies as payment under protest.

 WON TPC is entitled to the refund of its alleged unutilized input VAT

WON the CTA En Banc correctly ordered the outright dismissal of CE Luzon's claims
for tax refund of unutilized input VAT on the ground of prematurity
WON Chevron was entitled to the tax refund or the tax credit for the excise taxes
paid on the importation of petroleum products that it had sold to CDC, a tax-
exempted entity

WON allegations against private respondents in the BOC's complaint-affidavit

constitute the offenses of unlawful importation under Section 3601 and various
fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP.
 WON the petition was filed within the required timeframe

WON the CIR's right to assess respondent's deficiency taxes had already prescribed.
WON Total Gas seasonably filed its judicial claim for refund
 RULING/DOCTRINE

The definition of deposit substitute under 1997 National Internal Revenue Code placed the 20-lender
instrument shall mean “
an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public (the term 'public' means borrowing from twenty
one time) other than deposits, through the issuance, endorsement, or accep
for the borrower’s own account” The determination as to
a deposit substitute will be imposed with 20% final withholding tax rests on the number of lenders.
transaction for a specific bond issue, the seller is required to withhold the 20% final income tax on th
cited Sections 24(B) (1), 27(D)(1), and 28(A)(7) of the 1997 NIRC. These provisions state the imposi
interest from any currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit sub
considered as deposit substitutes, these will be subjected to regular income tax. The prevailing pro
substitute involves less
than 20 lenders in a transaction, the income is considered as “income derive

The phrase “at any one time” for purposes of determining the “20 or more lenders” would mean ever
market in connection with the purchase or sale of secu

The requirements for entitlement ofa corporate taxpayer for a refund or theissuance of tax credit ce
follows:
1. That the claim for refund was filed within the two-year reglementary period purs
2. When it is shown on the ITR that the income payment re
being declared part of the taxpayer’s
gross income; and
3. When the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the withholding tax statement, duly issue
paid and income tax withheld from that amount.

The court do not expound anymore on the first requirement because even the petitioner does not c
and judicial claim for refund within the statutory period. With regard to the second requirement, it is
Division are not to be disturbed without any showing of grave abuse of discretion considering that th
to analyze the documents presented by the parties. Consequently, we adopt the findings of the CTA
“that the total amount of Creditable
Withholding Tax per Annual ITRs for calendar years ended December 31, 2002 and December 31,
Withholding Tax
presented on petitioner’s Schedule of
Creditable Withholding Tax Certificates for the calendar years ende
2002 and December 31, 2003.”
With respect to the third requirement, the respondent proved that it had met the requirement by p
withheld at source. The petitioner did not challenge the respondent’s
requirement.
On 11 December 2000, petitioner filed with the BIR an application for the refund or credit of accumula
had a period of 120 days from 11 December 2000, or until 10 April 2001, to act on the claim. It failed
treated the CIR’s inaction as a denial of its claim. Petitioner would then have had 30 days, or until 10
Rohm Apollo filed a Petition for Review with the CTA only on 11 September 2002. The judicial claim wa
that the taxpayer may file the judicial claim, without waiting for the Commissioner's decision if the tw
apply because that rule was adopted before the enactment of the 30-day period. The 30-day period w
so that under the VAT System the taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim even if
does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period always available to the taxpaye
refund or credit of input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the expiration of t
mandatory and jurisdictional.” As a general rule, the 30-day period to appeal is both mandatory and j
is when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was still in force, that is, between 10 December 2003 and 5 Octob
declaring that the taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could
for Review. Premature filing is allowed for cases falling during the time when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-0
prohibited even for cases falling within that period. The petitioner filed its judicial claim with the C
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003. Thus, Rohm Apollo could not have bene
not a case of premature filing of its judicial claim but one of late filing. To repeat, its judicial claim wa
2001, the last day of the 30-day period for appeal. The case thus falls under the general rule – the

G.R. Nos. 193383-84: The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the obje
with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and unduly discourages foreig
prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be remedied throug
imposition of a fine or penalty. But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit
administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief. CBK Power could not have
payment of the final withholding tax on the interest paid to its lenders precisely because it erroneou
prescribed by the NIRC, and not on the preferential tax rate provided under the different treaties
requirement under RMO No. 1-2000 then becomes illogical. Since CBK Power had requested for confi
28, 2002 before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative claim for refund of its excess final withhold
compliance with RMO No. 1-2000.

G.R. Nos. 193407-08: The petition of the Commissioner in G.R. Nos. 193407-08 is denied for lack of m
for refund of its excess final withholding taxes covering taxable year 2003 were filed within the two-y
the failure on the part of CBK Power to give him a reasonable time to act on said claim is violative
remedies and of primary jurisdiction. CBK Power maintains that it would be prejudicial to wait for the C
since it only has 2 years from the payment of the tax within which to file both its a
 In Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, the Court reconciled the pronouncements in the Aichi and San
the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that during the pe
489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants n
file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CT A. Before and after the aforemention
2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim
its administrative and judicial claims for refund/credit of its input VAT on December 29, 2005 and Ja
when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As suc
period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is deemed timely filed. In view of th
outright petitioner's claim on the ground of prematur

Requiring that the ITR or the FAR of the succeeding year be presented to the BIR in requesting a ta

Section 76 of the Tax Code does not mandate it. The law merely requires the filing of the FAR for th
Indeed, any refundable amount indicated in the FAR of the preceding taxable year may be credited
taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable year. However, nowhere is there even a tinge of a hint i
taxable year following the period to which the tax credits are originally being applied should also be p
like in all civil cases, is to prove the prima facie entitlement to a claim, including the fact of not havin
quarters or taxable year. It does not say that to prove such a fact, succeeding quar

The running of the statute of limitations was not suspended by the request for reinvestigation. Th
requested a reinvestigation did not toll the running of the three-year prescriptive period. S

“Sec. 320. Suspension of running of statute.—The running of the statute of limitations provided in Sec
the beginning of distraint or levy or a proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any deficiency,
Commissioner is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning distraint or levy or a proceedi
taxpayer requests for a re-investigation which is granted by the Commissioner; when the taxpayer ca
return filed upon which a tax is being assessed or collected: Provided, That if the taxpayer informs
running of the statute of limitations will not be suspended; when the warrant of distraint and levy
representative, or a member of his household with sufficient discretion, and no property could b
Philippines.”

A request for reinvestigation alone will not suspend the statute of limitations. Two things must concu
the CIR must have granted it. In the present case, there is no showing from the records that the CIR e
CBC. That being the case, it cannot be said that the running of the three-year prescript
 The claim for refund is by prescription BARRED.

Section 112(D) of the NIRC of 1997 categorically states that in case of failure on the part of the respo
period prescribed by law, petitioner only has 30 days after the expiration of the 120-day period t
petitioner’s judicial claim for the aforementioned quarters for taxable year 2000 was filed before the
the mandatory 120+30 days to seek judicial recourse, such noncompliance with the mandatory pe
ground of prescription. The CTA has no jurisdiction over petitioner's judicial appeal considering th
mandatory 30-day period pursuant to Section 112(D) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, and con

Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 7-95 is constitutional. In fact, this Court has consistently held as fatal t
invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even if th
9337. Clearly then, the present Petition must be deni

A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of goods or services to the buyer, while a VAT rece
goods or services received from the seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confuse
Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used alt

The petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actua
consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are
respondent City is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties. The 2006 MIA
MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code,

“SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise p
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrum

There is no question, therefore, that unless the Airport Lands and Buildings are withdrawn by law or
properties of public dominion, owned by the Republic and outside the
 Petition of Petitioner is denied. Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and
photocopied documents to prove its claim. The other documentary evidence submitted by petit
photocopies. In this case, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason as to why the
not be produced before the CTA or any reason that the application of any of the foregoing exception
one (1) witness to prove its claim, it appears that this witness was not even a signatory to any of t
evidence, even if considered, fails to prove that it is entitled to its claim for refund. Clearly, it is petit
claim for refund. For a claim for refund to be granted, the manner in proving it must be in acco

This Court is simply pointing to the rule that claims for refunds are the exception, rather than the ru
granted, must be clearly set forth and established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As it h
refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which result in loss of revenue for the government. U
payments rests the burden of justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too cat
nor be allowed solely on the ground of equity.

The period within which the City Treasurer must act on the protest, and the consequent period to app
from January 15, 2007, the date CBC filed its protest, and not M

Section 195 of the LGC is clear: SECTION 195. Protest of Assessment. -When the local treasurer or hi
taxes, fees, or charges have not been paid, he shall issue a notice of assessment stating the nature o
the surcharges, interests and penalties. Within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notice of asses
the local treasurer contesting the assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and exe
within sixty (60) days from the time of its filing . If the local treasurer finds the protest to be wholly or
wholly or partially the assessment. However, if the local treasurer finds the assessment to be wholly o
partly with notice to the taxpayer. The taxpayer shall have thirty (30) days from the receipt of the den
day period prescribed herein within which to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction othe
unappealable.

Time and again, it has been held that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the perio
jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the ca
 A reading of the pertinent provisions of P.D. 1590 and R.A. 9334 shows that there was no express rep
PAL provided in Sec. 13 of PD 1590 has not been revoked by Sec. 131 of the NIRC of 1997, as amende
PD 1590 is a special law, which governs the franchise of PAL. Between the provisions under PD 1590 a
amended by 9334, which is a general law, the former necessa

The franchise of PAL remains the governing law on its exemption from taxes. Its payment of eithe
whichever is lower - shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registrations, licenses, and oth
The phrase "in lieu of all other taxes" includes but is not limited to taxes, duties, charges, royalties, o
commissary and catering supplies, provided that such articles or supplies or materials are importe
nontransport operations and other activities incidental thereto and are not locally available in reason
amendment of the 1997 NIRC, Section 22 of R.A. 9337 abolished the franchise tax and subjected PA
value-added tax (VAT). PAL nevertheless remains exempt from taxes, duties, royalties, registrations
pays corporate income tax as granted in its franchise agreement. Accordingly, PAL is left with no othe
the payment of which shall be in lieu of all other taxes, except VAT, and subject to cert

It is already well-settled that although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true f
by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide.
kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs: (1) excise taxes on articles enumerated under the N
petroleum products.

Strictly speaking, as long as the subject matter of the taxing powers of the LGUs is the petroleum pro
to the petroleum products, such as manufacturing and distribution of said products, it is covered by th

Section 143 of the LGC defines the general power of LGUs to tax businesses within its jurisdiction.
Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the specific exception or exemption in Section 133(h) o
statutory construction that specific provisions must prevail over

Section 263 of the LGC lacks definiteness as to the reckoning point for the redemption of tax delinque
one (1) year from the date of such forfeiture."

the arguments of the City point toward a more just and fair resolution of the pe
The better theory that is consistent with the subject matter of the provision is that forfeiture of tax
purchase made by the city due to lack of a bidder from the public. This happens on the date of the sa
forfeiture. The Court, sees no reason to depart from the general rule. As the lost of the right of re
 No. The CTA is correct in ruling that the respondent is exempted from

DOCTRINE: DST imposed by the NIRC does not include the transfer of real proeprty from one corpora
shows that DST is only imposed on the transfer of realty by way of sale and does not ap

RULING: The respondent is not subject to DST. The transfer of a corporation to the respondent was
merger, the real proeprties are not deemed sold to the surviving corporation and the latter could not
proeprties subject of the merger were merely absorbed by the surviving corporation by operation of l
transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without furt

No. It was improper for the CTA to assume jurisdiction imm

Doctrine: the phrase "other matters arising under this Code," as stated in the second paragraph o
pertaining to those matters directly related to the preceding phrase "disputed assessments, refund
penalties imposed in relation thereto" and must therefore not be taken in isolation to invoke the jur
used only in reference to cases that are, to begin with, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
CIR had exercised her quasi-judicial functions or her power to decide disputed assessments, refunds
penalties imposed in relation thereto, not to those that involved the CIR's exerci

Ruling: The petition filed before the CTA is premature. The BOC's assessment was not yet final when
firsts been brought witht he COC. The CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the cu
COC that the aggrieved party may file an appeal to the
 Yes. The petition was filed out of time

Doctrine: Strict compliance with the 120+30 day period is necessary for a claim for a refund or cre
mandatory period was, however, recognized in San Roque during the period between 10 December
and 6 October 2010, when the Court promulgated Aichi declaring the 120+ 30 day period mandatory
489-03.

Ruling: Since the claim of petitioner fell within the exception period, it did not have to observe th
Roquedoctrine. The present case, though, is not a case of premature filing.The CTA here found that
120+30 day prescriptive period; hence, it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The BIR ruling all
means non exhaustion of the 120-day period for the commissioner to act on an administrative claim
because the petition was filed out of time

Yes.

Doctrine: An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assi
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (2) matters not assigned a
assigned; and (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination o

Ruling: the forfeiture of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft is anchored on its being used unlawfully in the tr
from any Philippine port. Consequently, the determination of the legality of the forfeiture of the M/V
the customs authorities had validly and properly seized the shipment of 6,500 sacks of rice on acco
correlation, the CTA could not be divested of its jurisdiction to determine the legality of the forfeiture
case, it has wide discretion to look upon matters which, although not raised as an issue, would give
Court recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to con
 Yes.

Doctrine: Qualified taxpayers with pending tax cases may still avail themselves of the tax amnesty
known as the 2007 Tax Amnesty Act. Thus, the provision in BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 1
ruled by any court (even without finality) in favor of the BIR prior to amnesty availment of the taxpa
and null and void.2 The duty to withhold the tax on compensation ari

Ruling: Neither the law nor the implementing rules state that a court ruling that has not attained fina
the Tax Amnesty Law. Both R.A. 9480 and DOF Order No. 29-07 are quite precise in declaring that "[t]a
the courts" are the ones excepted from the benefits of the law. In fact, we have already pointed out t
Banking Corporation. Thus, petitioner ING Bank is not disqualified from availing itself of the tax amne
before this court.

Doctrine: outline the procedure for the proper execution of a w

1. The waiver must be in the proper form prescribed by RMO 20-90. The phrase "but not after __ 19
agreed upon to assess/collect the tax after the regular three-year period of pre
2. The waiver must be signed by the taxpayer himself or his duly authorized representative. In the c
any of its responsible officials. In case the authority is delegated by the taxpayer to a representativ
notarized.
3. The waiver should be duly notarized.
4. The CIR or the revenue official authorized by him must sign the waiver indicating that the BIR has a
acceptance by the BIR should be indicated. However, before signing the waiver, the CIR. or the reven
the waiver is in the prescribed form, duly notarized, and executed by the taxpayer or
5. Both the date of execution by the taxpayer and date of acceptance by the Bureau should be bef
before the lapse of the period agreed upon in case a subsequent agre
6. The waiver must be executed in three copies, the original copy to be attached to the docket of th
third copy for the Office accepting the waiver. The fact of receipt by the taxpayer of his/her file copy
the taxpayer was notified of the acceptance of the BIR and the perfecti

Ruling: These were not followed in the present case, thus, the waivers were invalid. The
 Yes.

Doctrine: BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was a general interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers can rely on
December 10, 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on October 6, 2010, where it was held
jurisdictional. In other words, the Aichi ruling was prospective in

Ruling: In the present case, ALPI can benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. It filed its judicial claim fo
within the interim period from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010, so there was no need to wait
(c) of the NIRC. The BIR ruling is a general interpretative rule, thus, it applies to all taxpayers a

Yes.

Doctrine: It is settled that the requirement of "payment under protest" is a condition sine qua

Ruling: By posting the surety bond, MERALCO may be considered to have substantially complied with
said bond already guarantees the payment to the Office of the City Treasurer of Lucena of the total a
Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394. This is not the first time that the Court allowed a surety
property tax before protest/appeal as required by Section 252 of the Local Government Code. In Ca
Board of Assessment Appeals39 the Court affirmed the ruling of the CBAA and the Court of Tax Appe
requirement in Section 252 of the Local Government Code and remanding the case to the LBAA for "f
payment, either in cash or surety, of realty tax on the subjec
 Rules on the determination of the prescriptive period for filing a tax refund or credit of unutilized inp
Code, as follows:

(1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable q
sales were made.

(2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the adm
grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year
the claim is filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the 120-day period expires without any de
may be considered to be denied by inaction.

(3) A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIR's decisio
expiration of the 120-day period without any action from

(4) All taxpayers, however, can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10
Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictio

Ruling: The petition was party granted. Some of the claims were filed well within the prescriptive p

No.

Doctrine: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefo
(when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgate
day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before a
10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-dav period is mandatory and ju

Ruling: Here, records show that CE Luzon's administrative and judicial claims were filed on Novemb
during the period of effectivity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 and, thus, fell within the window period s
need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. Verily, the CTA En
petition on the ground of prematurity.
 Yes.

Doctrine: Pursuant to Section 135(c), supra, petroleum products sold to entities that are by law exem
excise tax. The phrase which are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes describes the entities
order to render the exemption operative. Section 135(c) should thus be construed as an exemption
excise tax was levied in the first place. The exemption cannot be granted to the buyers – that is, th
indirect taxes – because they are not under any legal duty to pay

Ruling: Inasmuch as its liability for the payment of the excise taxes accrued immediately upon impo
products from the customshouse, Chevron was bound to pay, and actually paid such taxes. But the st
excise taxes would be confirmed only upon their sale to CDC in 2007 (or, for that matter, to any of th
the NIRC). Before then, Chevron did not have any legal basis to claim the tax refund or the

Consequently, the payment of the excise taxes by Chevron upon its importation of petroleum produc
of the petroleum products to CDC. Section 204 of the NIRC explicitly allowed Chevron as the statuto
excise taxes thereby paid.

No.

Doctrine: In unlawful importation, also known as outright smuggling, goods and articles of commerce
importation documents, or are disposed of in the local market without having been cleared by the B
evade the payment of correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and articles do not unde
BOC, and are not declared through submission of import documents, such as the import entry and
misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the v
the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement shall constitute a prima facie evide

Ruling: The allegations do not constitute the crime of unlawful importation under Section 3601 of
commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the State Prosecutor's dismissal the BOC's com
reading of the BOC's complaint-affidavit would show that there is no allegation to the effect that p
misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the v
the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement which constitute prima facie evid
intentionally committed undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the
complaint-affidavit fall short of the acts or omissions constituting the various fraudulent acts against
the Acting Secretary of Justice correctly ruled that there was no probable cause to belie
 Yes.

Doctrine: Pursuant to Section 112 (A)42 and (D)43 of the NIRC, a taxpayer has two (2) years from th
sales were made within which to file with the CIR an administrative claim for refund or credit of unut
on the other hand, has 120 days from receipt of the complete documents within which to act on the a
taxpayer has 30 days within which to appeal the decision to the CTA. However, if the 120-day perio
taxpayer may appeal the, inaction to the CTA within 30 days from the expira

Ruling: In this case, TPC applied for a claim for refund or credit of its unutilized input VAT for the taxab
did not act on its application within the 120-day period, TPC appealed the inaction on April 22, 2004
claims were filed within the prescribed period provided in Section

Yes.

Doctrine: Section 222(b) of the NIRC provides that the period to assess and collect taxes may only b
CIR and the taxpayer executed before the expiration of the three-year period. It is very clear that u
revenue official to ensure that the waiver is duly accomplished and signed by the taxpayer or his aut
to signify acceptance of the same. It also instructs that in case the authority is delegated by the tax
official shall see to it that such delegation is in writing and duly notarized. Furthermore, it mandate
concerned BIR office and official unless duly notarize

Ruling: The deficiencies of the Waivers in this case are the same as the defects of the waiver in Kud
because of the following flaws: (1) they were executed without a notarized board authority; (2) the d
therein; and (3) the fact of receipt by respondent of its copy of the Second Waiver was not indica
 Yes.

Doctrine: it is apparent that the CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete docum
creditable input taxes. The taxpayer may, within 30 days from receipt of the denial of the claim or a
considered a "denial due to inaction," appeal the decision or unacte

Ruling: Applying the foregoing precepts to the case at bench, it is observed that the CIR made no eff
submitted by Total Gas. It neither gave notice to Total Gas that its documents were inadequate, no
substantiate its claim. Thus, for purposes of counting the 120-day period, it should be reckoned from
"submission of complete documents to support its application" for refund of excess unutilized input V
BIR had 120 days to decide the claim or until December 26, 2008. With absolutely no action or notice
30 days or until January 25, 2009 to file its judicial cla

Total Gas, thus, timely filed its judicial claim on January 23

 DATE G.R. NO.

JANUARY 13, 2014 G.R. NO. 190928

JANUARY 13, 2014 G.R. NO. 197760

'JANUARY 15, 2014 G.R. NO. 191498

'JANUARY 15, 2014 G.R. NO. 198729-30

JANUARY 20, 2014 G.R. NO. 183880

FEBRUARY 4, 2014 G.R. NO. 175723

FEBRUARY 5, 2014 G.R. NO. 194105

FEBRUARY 18, 2014 G.R. NO. 204429

FEBRUARY 19, 2014 G.R. NO. 202071

FEBRUARY 19, 2014 G.R. NO. 184360

FEBRUARY 19, 2014 G.R. NO. 188497

March 12, 2014 GR 182399

APRIL 2, 2014 G.R. NO. 179260

APRIL 7, 2014 G.R. NO. 197561

APRIL 21, 2014 G.R. NO. 180654

JUNE 04, 2014 G.R. NO. 197525

JUNE 04, 2014 G.R. NO. 197192

June 18, 2014 G.R. No. 189440

June 18, 2014 G.R. No. 197591

June 30, 2014 G.R. No. 205543

July 2, 2014 G.R. NO. 197515

July 2, 2014 G.R. NO. 161759

July 9, 2014 G.R. NO. 181836

July 18, 2014 G.R. NO. 205055

 July 30, 2014 G.R. NO. 180651

August 27, 2014 G.R. NO. 212536-37

September 10, 2014 G.R. NO. 158150

September 17, 2014 G.R. NO. 190198

September 29, 2014 G.R. NO. 192398

October 1, 2014 G.R. NO. 177332

October 22, 2014 G.R. NO. 183421

October 22, 2014 G.R. NO. 190021

November 11, 2014 G.R. NO. 125346

November 12, 2014 G.R. NO. 175410

November 19, 2014 G.R. NO. 198076

November 19, 2014 G.R. NO. 185969

 G.R. NO. 175707/ G.R.
November 19, 2014
NO.180035/ G.R. NO. 181092

November 26, 2014 G.R. NO. 201195

December 3, 2014 G.R. NO. 187589

December 3, 2014 G.R. NO. 198928

December 3, 2014 G.R. NO. 165451

December 8, 2014 G.R. NO. 204745

December 10, 2014 G.R. NO. 193100

December 10, 2014 G.R. NO. 215427

 CASE TITLE

TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP.) VS. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE

TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (FOR MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP.) VS. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP

CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL RVENUE VS. TOLEDO POWER COMPANY

THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. VS. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. TEAM SUAL CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT
SUAL CORPORATION)

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS

PROCTED AND GAMBLE ASIA PTE LTD. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY INTEL PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC.) VS.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

CS GARMENT INC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. TEAM (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS
CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT PHILS., OPERATION CORPORATION)

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. CITY OF MANILA, ET AL.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN, ET AL.

VISAYAS GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vs. Minadanao II Geothermal Partnership

Taganito Mining Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

San Roque Power Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

 CIR V. UNITED SALVAGE TOWAGE

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. CIR

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. TEAL SUAL CORP.

 NURSERY CARE CORP V. ACEVEDO

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. PHILIPPINE

AIRLINES, INC.
 AGRIEX CO., LTD. VS. HON. TITUS VILLANUEVA, ET AL.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY,

INC.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION

NAPOCOR V. CITY OF CABANATUAN

COMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.

COMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. BURMEISTER AND WAIN SCANDINAVIAN

CONTRACTOR MINDANAO, INC.
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

SMI-ED PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGY, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

 TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILS., INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, ET AL.

TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. THE STANLEY WORKS SALES (PHILS.),
INCORPORATED

CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

 LG ELECTRONICS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

 SAMAR-I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) VS. THE BUREAU OF

INTERNAL REVENUE, ET AL.
BAR SUBJECT SUBJECT

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW JUDICIAL REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW Local Taxation

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW JUDICIAL REMEDIES

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW Local Taxation

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW NATIONAL TAXATION

TAXATION LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

 TOPIC SUB-TOPIC

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION OF THE CTA
OVER CIVIL CASES
 RECOVERY OF TAX ERRONEOUSLY OR
ILLEGALLY COLLECTED (GROUNDS,
TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES REQUSITES AND PERIOD OF FILING A
CLAIM FOR REFUND OR ISSUANCE OF A
TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE)

TAX AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER

FORMS OF EXACTIONS
 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS

VALUE-ADDED TAX
INPUT TAX (PERIOD TO FILE CLAIM)
 VALUE-ADDED TAX EXCISE TAX

DOCTRINES IN TAXATION COMPROMISE AND TAX AMNESTY

 REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS
VALUE-ADDED TAX INPUT TAX (MANNER OF GIVING
REFUNDS)

REFUND OR TAX CREDIT WRIT OF EXECUTION

TAXING POWERS OF PRONVINCES FRANCHISE TAX

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES
TO FILE PROTEST)
 DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX EXEMPTION

TAX PAYER'S REMEDIES (PROTESTING

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC AN ASSESSMENT-PERIOD TO FILE
PROTEST)
 TAX PAYER'S REMEDIES (PROTESTING
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC AN ASSESSMENT-PERIOD TO FILE
PROTEST)

TAX PAYER'S REMEDIES (PROTESTING

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC AN ASSESSMENT-PERIOD TO FILE
PROTEST)
 TAX PAYER'S REMEDIES (PROTESTING
AN ASSESSMENT-ASSESSMENT
PROCESS AND REGLEMENTARY
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
PERIODS-ISSUANCE OF FORMAL
LETTER OF DEMAND AND FINAL
ASSESSMENT NOTICE)

EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION OF THE CTA
OVER CIVIL CASES
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC ASSESSMENT

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC (SUBMISSION OF SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS)
DOCTRINES IN TAXATION DOUBLE TAXATION

CONSTRUCTION AND
TAX EXEMPTINS AND EXCLUSIONS
INTERPRETATION OF
 ADMINISTRATIVE/EXTRAJUDICIAL-
REMEDIES SEARCH, SEIZURE, FORFEITURE,
ARREST

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX EXEMPTION

LOCAL TAXATION TAXING POWERS OF CITIES

 PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)
 EXCISE TAX

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC ASSESSMENT

 PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)
 RECOVERY OF TAX ERRONEOUSLY OR
ILLEGALLY COLLECTED (GROUNDS,
TAXPAYER'S REMEDIES REQUSITES AND PERIOD OF FILING A
CLAIM FOR REFUND OR ISSUANCE OF A
TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE)

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC ASSESSMENT

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)
COMPROMISE AND TAX AMNESTY

PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT (PERIOD

TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC
TO FILE PROTEST)
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE NIRC ASSESSMENT

CONSTRUCTION AND
TAX EXEMPTINS AND EXCLUSIONS
INTERPRETATION OF
PONENTE

PERALTA

PERALTA

SERENO

SERENO
PERALTA

PERALTA
REYES

CARPIO
 SERENO

VILLARAMA, JR.
VILLARAMA, JR.

SERENO
 PEREZ

J. PERALTA
 ABAD

MENDOZA
 REYES

VILLARAMA, JR.
 PERLAS-
BERNABE

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
PERALTA

BERSAMIN
CARPIO

CARPIO
 BERSAMIN

VELASCO, JR.
BERSAMIN

PERLAS-
BERNABE
VILLARAMA

LEONEN
SERENO

PERLAS-
BERNABE
LEONEN

LEONEN
MENDOZA

PEREZ
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO

MENDOZA
SERENO

PERLAS-
BERNABE
LEONEN

PERLAS-
BERNABE
VILLARAMA

PERALTA
 FACTS

Petitioner filed an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT on December 22, 2003 for
calendar year 2002, but due to respondent’s inaction, the judicial claim for refund was filed on April
22, 2004.

Petitioner filed an administrative claim for cash refund or issuance of tax credit certificate
corresponding to the input VAT reported in its Quarterly VAT Returns for the first three quarters of
2005 and Monthly VAT Declaration for October 2005 on December 20, 2006, while its judicial claim
was filed on April 18, 2007.

Mindanao II filed an application for the refund or credit of accumulated unutilized creditable input
taxes on October 6, 2005, but failed to file an appeal within the 30-day period after the inaction of
CIR (filed only on July 21, 2006).

CBK filed its administrative claims for the issuance of tax credit certificates for its alleged unutilized
input taxes on June 30, 2005 (1st quarter of 2005), September 15, 2005 (2nd quarter) and October
28, 2005 (3rd quarter), and due to alleged inaction of CIR, it filed a petition with CTA on April 18,
2007.
TPI filed an administrative claim for refund or unutilized input VAT for the third and fourth quarter of
2001 on September 30, 2003, but the CIR has not ruled upon its administrative claim so it filed its
judicial claims for refund on October 24, 2003 and January 22, 2004, respectively.

The RTC granted the application for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which
orders were assailed by the petitioners with the CA. However, CA dismissed petitioners' petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition.
 TSC filed its administrative claim for refund/tax credit with the BIR on March 11, 2002. However,
without waiting for the CIR decision or the lapse of the 120-day period from the time it submitted
its complete documents in support of its claim, TSC filed a petition for review with the CTA on April
1, 2002.

Smart filed a petition for review with the CTA assailing the decision of the RTC declaring the
assessment covering the period from 2001 to July 2003 void since Ordinance No. 18 was approved
only on 30 July 2003, and directing the Municipal Government of Malvar, Batangas to assess it only
for the period starting October 1, 2003.
P&G filed administrative claims for the refund or credit of the input VAT attributable to the former’s
zero-rated sales covering the periods July 1-September 30, 2004 and October 1-December 31,
2004, respectively on December 13, 2006, and filed judicial claims on December 29, 2006.

Silicon filed a claim for tax credit or refund representing VAT input taxes which are attributable to
zero-rated sales for the period January 1, 1999 to March 31, 1999 on August 6, 1999 and a second
claim for the period April 1, 2000 to June 30, 2000 on August 10, 2000, but due to the inaction of
the CIR, Silicon filed a Petition for Review with the CTA on March 30, 2001 and June 28, 2002,
respectively.
 Shell argues that excise tax being an indirect tax, Section 135 in relation to Section 148 should be
interpreted as referring to a tax exemption from the point of production and removal from the place
of production considering that it is only at that point that an excise tax is imposed, concluding that
exemption could only refer to the imposition of the tax on the statutory seller, in this case the
respondent.

CS filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that it had availed itself of the government’s tax
amnesty program under the 2007 Tax Amnesty Law, hence it is entitled to all the immunities and
privileges under the law.
 Respondent filed a letter requesting for the refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate
corresponding to its reported unutilized creditable withholding taxes for taxable year 2001 on
March 19, 2003, then filed a Petition for Review before the CTA on March 27, 2003.

After the court ruled on the refund or tax credit in favour of the petitioner, the latter filed for a Writ
of Execution on said judgment. However, it was opposed by respondents and in turn, filed a Motion
to Quash Writ of Execution, for which the RTC granted.
NPC received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the respondent based from its assessment
on the NPC’s sale of electricity that it generated from two power plants in Bataan.

VGPC filed an administrative claim for refund on the ground that it was entitled to recover excess
and unutilized input VAT payments for the four quarters of taxable year 2005 on December 6,
2006, then it filed its judicial claim via a petition for review with the CTA on January 3, 2007.
 Petitioner contends that that since the respondent is not registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), it should not be considered as a cooperative company that is
entitled to the exemption provided under Section 199(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1997.

Respondent filed for a claim for refund or issuance of a TCC of its unutilized input VAT attributable
to its zero-rated sales for the taxable year 2002 on May 30, 2003, then filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA on March 31, 2004.
 Taganito filed an administrative claim for the refund of input VAT covering the period January 1,
2004 to December 31, 2004 on December 28, 2005, and proceeded to file a petition for review
before the CTA on March 31, 2006.

San Roque filed for administrative claims for refund or tax credit of its creditable input taxes for all
four quarters of 2006 on April 11, 2007 (1st quarter), July 10, 2007 (2nd quarter) and August 31,
2007 (3rd quarter & 4th quarter), then it filed for judicial claims on March 28, 2008 (1st, 3rd & 4th
quarters) and June 27, 2008 (2nd quarter).
Petitioner found USTP liable for deficiency income tax, withholding tax, value-added tax (VAT) and
documentary stamp tax (DST) for taxable years 1992,1994, 1997 and 1998, but USTP appealed
alleging, among others, that the Notices of Assessment are bereft of any facts, law, rules and
regulations or jurisprudence; thus, the assessments are void and the right of the government to
assess and collect deficiency taxes from it has prescribed on account of the failure to issue a valid
notice of assessment within the applicable period.

URC and Oilink had interlocking directors when Oilink started its business. The District Collector of
the Port of Manila, formally demanded that URC pay the taxes and duties on its oil imports that had
arrived between January 6, 1991 and November 7, 1995, but Oilink appealed to the CTA, seeking
the nullification of the assessment for having been issued without authority and with grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction because the Government was thereby shifting the
imposition from URC to Oilink.
 The BIR found BPI liable for deficiency DST on its sales of foreign bills of exchange to the Central
Bank, for which BPI received the notice on June 16, 1989.

Team Sual is filed a petition for review with the (CTA), prayed for the refund or issuance of tax
credit certificate for its alleged unutilized input VAT for year 2004. CIR argued that Team Sual failed
to comply with the conditions precedent for claiming refund/tax credit of unutilized input VAT as it
failed to submit complete documents in support of its application for refund/tax credit contrary to
Section 112(C) of the NIRC. CTA Special First Division found that TSC is entitled for a refund.
City of Manila assessed and collected taxes from the individual petitioners pursuant to section 15
(tax on wholesalers, distributors, or dealers) and section 17 (tax on retailers) of the revenue code
of manila. At the same time, the City of Manila imposed additional taxes upon the petitioners
pursuant to section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, as a condition for the renewal
of their respective business licenses. Petitioners requested the Office of the City Treasurer for the
tax credit or refund of the local business taxes paid under protest which was subsequently denied
by then City Treasurer Anthony Acevedo.

PAL was granted under Presidential Decree No. 1590 (PD 1590) a franchise to operate air transport
services domestically and internationally. Section 13 of the decree prescribes the tax component of
PAL’s franchise, PAL shall pay the government either basic corporate income tax or franchise tax
based on revenues and/or the rate defined in the provision, whichever is lower and the taxes thus
paid under either scheme shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties and other fees. RA 9334 took
effect. Of pertinent relevance in this proceeding is its Sec. 6 which amended Sec. 131 of the 1997
National Internal Revenue Code. PAL was assessed excise taxes on its February and March 2007
importation of cigarettes and alcoholic drinks for its commissary supplies used in its international
flights. PAL paid the amounts in protest and thereafter, filed separate administrative claims for
refund before the BIR for the alleged excise taxes it erroneously paid on said dates
 Agriex Co., Ltd., a foreign corporation entered into a contract of sale with PT. Gloria Mitra of
Indonesia and R&C Agro Trade of Cebu City for 180,000 and 20,000 bags of Thai white rice. Vessel
MV Hung Yen was chartered to transport the cargo to the Subic Free Port for transshipment to Fiji
Islands and Indonesia, and Cebu City. When the petitioner requested permission from the Bureau of
Customs to unload the entire shipment of 200,000 bags of Thai white rice because the MV Hung
Yen must return to Vietnam, Commissioner Villanueva issued his 1st Indorsement directing
Collector of Customs Bibit to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) against the 20,000
bags consigned to R&C Agro which was later amended to include the vessel and the 180,000 bag.
The issuance was based on the After-Mission Report that the alleged consignees in Indonesia are
not actually existing and that B.I. Naidu and Sons, Ltd. of Fiji Island is not engaged in the
importation of rice.

CE Luzon filed its VAT return for the third quarter of 2001, in which it declared unutilized input VAT.
On, 2003, CE Luzon filed an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT for the third
quarter of 2001 before the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging inaction on the part of the
CIR, it filed a judicial claim for refund before the CTA on September 30, 2003.
 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) entered into a Plan of Merger with its affiliate, Shell
Philippine Petroleum Corporation (SPPC). In the Plan of Merger, it was provided that the entire
assets and liabilities of SPPC will be transferred to, and absorbed by PSPC as the surviving entity.
The Securities and Exchange Commission approved the merger. PSPC paid to the (BIR)
documentary stamp tax (DST) amounting to P22,101,407.64 on the transfer of real property from
SPPC to PSPC. Believing that it erroneously paid the DST, PSPC file a formal claim for refund or tax
credit.

City of Cabanatuan (the City) assessed the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) a franchise tax
amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of its gross receipts for 1992. NAPOCOR
refused to pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise tax. Consequently, the City filed
a complaint before the RTC of Cabanatuan City, demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due
plus 25% surcharge and interest of 2% per month of the unpaid tax, and costs of suit.
 Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue
District Office (RDO) No. 057, an application for tax credit/refund amounting to ₱5,057,120.95
representing the former’s paid input VAT for the first quarter of year 2003. Aichi claimed that it was
entitled to a refund/credit of the input VAT paid on its purchases of goods, services, capital goods,
and on its importation of goods other than capital goods that were attributable to zero rated sales
in the total amount of ₱149,174,477.94. Respondent filed a Petition with the CTA which rendered a
Decision partly granting the Petition and ordering the refund to respondent of the reduced amount
of 4,138,397.57.

Burmeister and Wain Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc. (respondent) registered as a value-
added tax (VAT) taxpayer subcontracted from a consortium of non-resident foreign corporations the
actual operation and maintenance of two 100-megawatt power barges owned by the National
Power Corporation, which services are subject to zero percent (0%) VAT, pursuant to BIR Ruling No.
023-95. Respondent filed its Quarterly VAT Return for the fourth quarter of taxable year 1998
indicating zero-rated sales and input VAT paid on its domestic purchases of goods and services for
the same period. On July 21, 1999, respondent filed an Application for Tax Credit/Refund of VAT Paid
for the period July to December 1998, which was not acted upon by the CIR.
 These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco imported and locally purchased by
cigarette manufacturers for use as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Under the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (1997 NIRC), before it was amended through RA No. 10351
(Sin Tax Law), stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to an excise tax of P0.75 for each kilogram thereof.
The 1997 NIRC further provides that stemmed leaf tobacco leaf tobacco which has had the stem or
midrib removed may be sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another
without payment of the tax, under such conditions as may be prescribed in the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Finance. The cigarette manufacturers claim that since
Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code and Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39 do not distinguish as to the
type of manufacturer that may sell stemmed-leaf tobacco without the prepayment of specific tax
[t]he logical conclusion is that any kind of tobacco manufacturer is entitled to this treatment.
Respondent counters that under Section 141(b), partially prepared or manufactured tobacco is
subject to specific tax. The definition of partially manufactured tobacco in Section 2(m) of RR No.
17-67 includes stemmed leaf tobacco; hence, stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to specific tax.
Imported stemmed leaf tobacco is also subject to specific tax under Section 141(b) in relation to
Section 128 of the 1977 Tax Code.

SMI-Ed Philippines is a PEZA-registered corporation authorized. SMI-Ed Philippines "failed to

commence operations." It sold its buildings and some of its installed machineries and equipment to
Ibiden Philippines, Inc. then subsequently, dissolved on that same year. SMI-Ed Philippines paid
taxes. SMI-ed, after requesting the cancellation of its PEZA registration and amending its articles of
incorporation to shorten its corporate term, filed an administrative claim for the refund of
₱44,677,500.00 with the BIR. It alleged that the amount was erroneously paid. It also indicated the
refundable amount in its final income tax return filed on March 1, 2001
 Taganito filed with respondent CIR,an application for refund of its excess input VAT paid on its
domestic purchases of taxable goods and services and importation of goods for the period January
1, 2002 to December 3, 2002. CTA Division, and ordered the case dismissed for being prematurely
filed citing the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. CTA En Banc ruled that a violation
of Section 112 would lead to the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal or petition due to prematurity.

AT&T Communications Services Philippines, Inc a domestic corporation principally engaged in the
business of rendering information, promotional, supportive and liaison service, entered into a
Service Agreement with AT&T-CSI, a non-resident foreign corporation whereby compensation for
such services is paid in US Dollars.
Petitioner filed on 13 April 2005 with the BIR an application for refund and/or tax credit of its
unutilized VAT input taxes. There being no action on said administrative claim, petitioner filed a
Petition for Review before the CTA in Division exactly seven [7] days from the time it filed its
administrative claim in order to suspend the running of the prescriptive period provided under Sec.
229 of NIRC of 1997, as amended.
 FBDC (petitioner) commenced developing the Global City, and since October 1996, had been
selling lots to interested buyers. At the time of acquisition, value-added tax (VAT) was not yet
imposed on the sale of real properties. RA No. 7716(the E-VAT Law), restructured the VAT system by
further amending pertinent provisions of the NIRC Section 100 of the old NIRC was so amended by
including "real properties" in the definition of the term "goods or properties," thereby subjecting
the sale of "real properties" to VAT. Petitioner claims that "the 10% value-added tax is based on the
gross selling price or gross value in money of the ‘goods’ sold, bartered or exchanged." Petitioner
likewise claims that by definition, the term "goods" was limited to "movable, tangible objects which
is appropriable or transferable" and that said term did not originally include "real property." What
petitioner seeks to be refunded are the actual VAT payments made by it in cash, which it claims
were either erroneously paid by or illegally collected from it. Each Claim for Refund is based on
petitioner’s position that it is entitled to a transitional input tax credit under Section 105 of the old
NIRC, which more than offsets the aforesaid VAT payments. Respondents averred that petitioner’s
claim for the 8% transitional/presumptive input tax is "inconsistent with the purpose and intent of
the law in granting such tax refund or tax credit."

Taganito filed with CIR a claim for credit/refund of input VAT paid on its domestic purchases of
taxable goods and services and importation of goods. CIR had not yet issued a final decision on the
administrative claim, Taganito filed a judicial claim before the CTA Division with the intention of
tolling the running of the two-year period to judicially claim a tax credit/refund under Sec. 229 of
the NIRC. The CTA denied the claim for refund by Taganito on its input VAT on importation of capital
goods for failure of the latter to substantiate its claim. Taganito insists that the official receipts
issued by the bank authorized to collect import duties and taxes are the best evidence to prove its
payment of the input tax being claimed.
 Stanley Works Sales Phils., Incorporated is a domestic corporation. Stanley Works filed its Annual
Income Tax Return for taxable year 1989 with the BIR. BIR issued to Stanley Works a Pre-
Assessment Notice No. 002523 for 1989 deficiency income tax. Stanley Works filed a protest letter
and requested reconsideration and cancellation of the assessment. A certain Mr. John Ang, on
behalf of the corporation, executed a "Waiver of the Defense of Prescription Under the Statute of
Limitations of the National Internal Revenue Code" (Waiver). The Waiver was not signed by Stanley
Works or any of its authorized representatives and did not state the date of acceptance as
prescribed under RMO No. 20-90. Stanley Works submitted a Supplemental Memorandum alleging
that CIR’s right to collect the alleged deficiency income tax has prescribed.

CBK Power filed before the BIR District Office of Laguna an administrative claim for the issuance of
a tax credit certificate, representing unutilized input VAT on its purchase of capital goods, as well as
unutilized input VAT on its local purchase of goods and services other than capital goods, all for the
calendar year 2003. CBK Power filed its judicial claim for tax refund/credit before the CTA. The CTA
En Banc reversed the CTA Second Divisions ruling and denied CBK Powers claim for refund in its
entirety because CBK Power filed its judicial claim for refund/credit just 20 days after it filed its
administrative claim As such, it failed to observe the mandatory and jurisdictional 120-day period
provided under Section 112(D) of NIRC.
 LG was assessed by BIR of deficiency income tax of 267,365,067.41 for the taxable year of 1994.
LG, an administrative protest with the BIR against the tax assessment. LG filed a Manifestation
dated January 29, 2008 stating that it availed itself of the tax amnesty provided under Republic Act
No. 9480. According to respondent, petitioner cannot claim the tax amnesty provided under
Republic Act No. 9480 for the following reasons: (1) accounts receivable by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as of the date of amnesty are not covered since these constitute government property; (2)
cases that have already been favorably ruled upon by the trial court or appellate courts prior to the
availment of tax amnesty are not covered; and (3) petitioner’s case involves withholding taxes that
are not covered by the Tax Amnesty Act.

Petitioner filed its quarterly VAT returns for the four (4) quarters of 2008 reflecting the amount of
₱6,149,256.25 as unutilized/excess input VAT. Petitioner filed before the BIR an administrative claim
for refund/credit of its unapplied and unutilized input VAT for the year 2008. CIR prayed for the
dismissal of CTA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because judicial claim for refund/credit was
filed only 107 days from the filing of the administrative claim and petitioner’s failure to comply with
the 120-day period prescribed under Section 112 (D) of NIRC.The CTA Division then concluded that
petitioner’s premature filing of its judicial claim for refund/credit warrants a dismissal inasmuch as
the CTA acquired no jurisdiction over the same which was affirmed by CTA EnBanc
 Petitioner filed its 1997, 1998, and 1999 Annual Information Return of Income Tax Withheld on
Compensation, Expanded and Final Withholding Taxes on February 17, 1998, February 1, 1999, and
February 4, 2000. Respondent issued a Letter of Authority (LOA). Respondent sent a Notice for
Informal Conference indicating the allegedly income and withholding tax liabilities of petitioner for
1997 to 1999. Petitioner executed a Waiver of the Defense of Prescription under the Statute of
Limitations, good until March 29, 2002.Respondent issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice which
was received by petitioner and was protested on. However, respondent dismissed petitioner’s
protest and recommended the issuance of a Final Assessment Notice.

BIR issued RMC No. 33-2013 pursuant to a decision regarding the present parties which clarifies the
income tax and franchise tax Due from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), its Contractees and Licensees. The RMC stated that PAGCOR is no longer exempt from
corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted from the list of government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) that are exempt from income tax. Accordingly, PAGCOR’s income
from its operations and licensing of gambling casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or
amusement places, gaming pools, and other related operations, are subject to corporate income
tax under the NIRC. Further, PAGCOR is also subjected to a franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the
gross revenue or earnings it derives from its operations and licensing of gambling casinos.
PAGCOR filed a Motion for Clarification alleging that RMC No. 33-2013 is an erroneous interpretation
and application of the aforesaid decision.
 ISSUE

WON petitioner timely filed its judicial

claim for refund of input VAT for the first
quarter of 2002

WON petitioner’s claim was

prematurely filed

WON the claim for refund should be

granted

WON the claims for refund were timely

filed
 WON TPI is entitled for a refund

WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a

special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case
WON TSC's petition for review with the
CTA must be denied

WON the CTA has jurisdiction over the

case
 WON the judicial claims were
prematurely filed

WON Silicon should be granted refund

WON Section 135 intended the tax
exemption to apply to petroleum
products at the point of production

WON CS Garment is already immune

from paying the deficiency taxes
WON respondent is entitled for a refund

WON a writ of execution is need in

order for the petitioner to be entitled of
a tax refund or tax credit
 WON NPC is liable for the local
franchise tax

WON VGPC’s judicial claim for refund

was prematurely filed
WON respondent is a cooperative and
thus exempt from documentary stamp
tax

WON respondent must be granted a

refund or tax credit
WON Taganito’s judicial claim for refund
should be granted

WON San Roque’s claims should be

granted
 WON the assessments were valid

WON CTA had jurisdiction over the case

 WON BIR has a right to collect the
assessed DST from BPI

WON the CTA En Banc erred in affirming

the decision of CTA’s decision that TSC
is entitled to a refund or tax credit
because it was able to submit the
legally required documents in its
application for refund?
 WON the collection of taxes under
Section 21 of Ordinance No. 7794, as
amended, constitutes double taxation

WON PAL is entitled for its exemption

from excise tax, as provided in its
franchise under PD 1590
 WON the Bureau of Customs has
exclusive original jurisdiction over
seizure and detention cases in Subic
Bay Freeport of dutiable goods

WON the CTA En Banc correctly ruled

that CE Luzon did not prematurely file
its judicial claims for refund.
WON PSPC be entitled to a refund or tax
credit for its erroneous payment of DST
on the transfer of real properties as
effect of a plan of merger

WON the trial court committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
order dated October 25, 2004, which
adopted respondent's computation and
effectively varied the terms of the
judgment sought to be executed
WON CTA En Banc erred in holding that
respondent is entitled to a refund
considering that respondent failed to
comply with the requirements of a valid
application for a tax refund

WON the CTA En Banc correctly

dismissed the petition for review on the
ground that the issue of prescription
was belatedly raised.
 WON stemmed leaf tobacco imported
by La Suerte, Fortune, and Sterling is
exempt from specific tax under Section
137 of the 1986 Tax Code

I. WON CTA En Banc grievously erred

and acted beyond its jurisdiction when
it assessed for deficiency tax in the first
instance
II. WON CTA En Banc grievously erred in
finding that the machineries and
equipment sold by the petitioner-
appellant is subject to the six percent
(6%) capital gains tax under Section
27(D)(5) of the Tax Code
 WON Taganito’s judicial claim for
refund/credit was prematurely filed

WON petitioner is entitled to a refund or

issuance of a TCC in its favor amounting
to P3,003,265.14 allegedly representing
unutilized input VAT attributable to
petitioner's zero-rated sales
WON petitioner is entitled to a refund of
the amounts of: 1) ₱486,355,846.78 in
G.R. No. 175707, 2) ₱77,151,020.46 for
G.R. No. 180035, and 3)
₱269,340,469.45 in G.R. No. 181092,
which it paid as value-added tax, or to a
tax credit for said amounts.

WON the CTA En Banc erred in applying

the Aichi doctrine
 WON petitioner’s right to collect the
deficiency income tax of respondent for
taxable year 1989 has prescribed.

WON the CTA En Banc correctly denied

CBK Powers claim for refund for being
prematurely filed
WON LG Electronics Philippines, Inc. is
entitled to the immunities and
privileges granted under Tax Amnesty
Act of 1997.

WON CTA En Banc correctly affirmed

the CTA Division’s dismissal of
petitioner’s judicial claim for
refund/credit of input VAT in for being
prematurely filed.
WON the 1997 and 1998 assessments
on withholding tax on compensation
were issued within the prescriptive
period provided by law; and whether
the assessments were issued in
accordance with Section 228 of the
NIRC of 1997

WON Whether PAGCOR’s tax privilege

of paying 5% franchise tax in lieu of all
other taxes with respect to its gaming
income, pursuant to its Charter — P.D.
1869, as amended by R.A. 9487, is
deemed repealed or amended by
Section 1(c) of R.A. 9337
 RULING/DOCTRINE

YES, the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate
anytime within the 2-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the 2- year
prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will then have 120 days from
such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the 120th day or does not
decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA.

NO, the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 ruled that the taxpayer need not wait for the expiration of the
120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA, while it was ruled in the Aichi case
that the 120-30-day period in Section 112 (C) of the NIRC is mandatory and its non-observance is
fatal to the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA. The petitioner filed its judicial claim on April 18,
2007 or after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 but before October
6, 2010, the date when the Aichi case was promulgated.

NO, the general rule is that the 30-day period to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional
(Exception: BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03). However, even though the claim was filed before the
reversal of the BIR Ruling, the rule cannot be properly invoked since it contemplates premature
filing, while the case at bar is one of late filing. Late filing is absolutely prohibited, even during the
time when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in force.

NO, while petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims during the period of applicability of
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, it cannot claim the benefit of the exception period as it did not file its
judicial claim prematurely, but did so long after the lapse of the 30-day period following the
expiration of the 120- day period.
PARTIALLY YES, its judicial claims on 3rd quarter were prematurely filed since CIR had 120 days or
until January 28, 2004, after the submission of TPI’s administrative claim and complete documents
in support of its application, within which to decide on its claim, but the judicial claims on 4th
quarter falls within the exception for premature filing (BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03)

YES, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
 YES, failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law. It
violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature
and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over
the taxpayer's petition.

NO, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. They are not impositions on the building
or structure itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation.
While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental.
 NO, the judicial claims were filed well within the BIR Ruling DA-489-03’s period of validity, which
expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period
before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review."

NO, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper,
whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 when the Aichi
doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and
jurisdictional.
NO, the accrual and payment of the excise tax on the goods enumerated under Title VI of the NIRC
prior to their removal at the place of production are absolute and admit of no exception. The excise
tax imposed on petroleum products under Section 148 is the direct liability of the manufacturer
who cannot thus invoke the excise tax exemption granted to its buyers who are international
carriers.

YES, CS Garment has complied with all of the documentary requirements of the law and no further
assessment by the BIR is necessary, making it entitled to invoke the immunities and privileges
under Section 6 of the law.
 YES, there are 3 essential conditions for the grant of a claim for refund of creditable withholding
income tax, to wit: (1) the claim is filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the two-
year period from the date of payment of the tax; (2) it is shown on the return of the recipient that
the income payment received was declared as part of the gross income; and (3) the fact of
withholding is established by a copy of a statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing
the amount paid and the amount of the tax withheld therefrom. The respondent complied with all
the legal requirements and it is entitled to a refund.

NO, no writ was necessary to cause the execution thereof, since the implementation of the tax
refund will effectively be a return of funds by the City of Manila in favor of petitioner while a tax
credit will merely serve as a deduction of petitioner’s tax liabilities in the future.
 NO, since within 6 months from the effectivity of the EPIRA, the transmission and subtransmission
facilities of NPC and all other assets related to transmission operations, including the nationwide
franchise of NPC for the operation of the transmission system and the grid, was transferred to the
TRANSCO. The NPC ceased to operate that business by operation of law, and since the local
franchise tax is imposed on the privilege of operating a franchise, not a tax on the ownership of the
transmission facilities, it is clear that such tax is not a liability of the NPC.

NO, the judicial claim was clearly filed within the period of exception (BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 and
was, therefore, not premature.
 YES, the NIRC of 1997 defined a cooperative company or association as “conducted by the
members thereof with the money collected from among themselves and solely for their own
protection and not for profit.” Consequently, as long as these requisites are satisfied, a company or
association is deemed a cooperative insofar as taxation is concerned, and registration with the CDA
is not necessary to claim exemption from DST. In this case, the respondent has sufficiently
established that it conforms with the elements of a cooperative as defined in the NIRC of 1997 in
that it is managed by members, operated with money collected from the members and has for its
main purpose the mutual protection of members for profit.

NO, notwithstanding the timely filing of the respondent’s administrative claim, its judicial claim for
tax refund or tax credit had been filed beyond the mandatory and jurisdictional periods provided in
Section 112(C) of the NIRC. Well to remember, the right to appeal to the CTA from a decision or
"deemed a denial" decision of the CIR is merely a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. The
exercise of such statutory privilege requires strict compliance with the conditions attached by the
statute for its exercise.
 YES, Taganito filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund during the period when BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place. As such, it need not have waited for the expiration of the 120-
day period before filing its judicial claim for refund before the CTA.

NO, since San Roque filed beyond the 30-day mandatory period under Section 112(C) of the NIRC
of 1997, as amended, the CTA First Division did not acquire jurisdiction over said cases.
 NO, the law requires that the legal and factual bases of the assessment be stated in the formal
letter of demand and assessment notice. Thus, such cannot be presumed. By not providing the
legal and factual bases of the assessment, the formal letter of demand and the notice of
assessment issued relative thereto are void.

YES, since it is undisputed that what is involved herein is the respondent’s liability for payment of
money to the Government as evidenced by the demand letters sent by the petitioner.
 NO, the BIR is barred by the 3-year prescriptive period to collect the assessed DST and evidence
showed that there was no warrant of distraint or levy served on BPI’s properties, or any judicial
proceedings initiated by the BIR despite the lapse of 3 years. The earliest attempt of the BIR to
collect the tax was when it filed its answer in the CTA on February 23, 1999, which was several
years beyond the three-year prescriptive period.

Under Section 112(C) of the NIRC, the CIR has 120 days to decide the taxpayer’s claim from the
date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Section 112(A) of the NIRC. In Intel Technology v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 522 SCRA 657
(2007), the Court ruled that once the taxpayer has established by sufficient evidence that it is
entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate, in accordance with the requirements of
Section 112(A) of the NIRC, its claim should be granted.
 The Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if the City of Manila is subjected to the taxes
under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on
the same subject matter – the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same
purpose – to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city
revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority – petitioner Cityof Manila; (4) within the same taxing
jurisdiction – within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods –
per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character – a local business tax imposed on gross
sales or receipts of the business.

The doubt, as to the continued entitlement of PAL under Sec. 13 of its franchise to excise tax
exemption on otherwise taxable items contemplated therein, e.g., aviation gas, wine, liquor or
cigarettes, should once and for all be put to rest by the recent pronouncement in Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue wherein the Court, on the premise that the
"propriety of a tax refund is hinged on the kind of exemption which forms its basis," declared in no
uncertain terms that PAL has "sufficiently prove[d]" its entitlement to a tax refund of the excise
taxes and that PAL’s payment of either the franchise tax or basic corporate income tax in the
amount fixed thereat shall be in lieu of all other taxes or duties, and inclusive of all taxes on all
importations of commissary and catering supplies, subject to the condition of their availability and
eventual use.
The treatment of the Subic Bay Freeport as a separate customs territory cannot completely divest
the Government of its right to intervene in the operations and management of the Subic Bay
Freeport, especially when patent violations of the customs and tax laws are discovered. After all,
Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code vests exclusive original jurisdiction in the Bureau of
Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases in the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws

In CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi), 632 SCRA 422 (2010), the Court held that the
observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requisite to the filing of a
judicial claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently, its nonobservance would lead to the
dismissal of the judicial claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aichi also clarified that the two
(2)-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims.
Succinctly put, once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, the
claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a 30-day period to file
his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the
aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period.
 Documentary stamp tax is in the nature of an excise tax because it is imposed upon the privilege,
opportunity or facility offered at exchanges for the transaction of the business. Documentary stamp
tax is a tax on documents, instruments, loan agreements, and papers evidencing the acceptance,
assignment, or transfer of an obligation, right or property incident thereto. Documentary stamp tax
is thus imposed on the exercise of these privileges through the execution of specific instruments,
independently of the legal status of the transactions giving rise thereto. Based on the foregoing,
the transfer of real properties from SPPC to respondent is not subject to documentary stamp tax
considering that the same was not conveyed to or vested in respondent by means of any specific
deed, instrument or writing. There was no deed of assignment and transfer separately executed by
the parties for the conveyance of the real properties. The conveyance of real properties not being
embodied in a separate instrument but is incorporated in the merger plan, thus, respondent is not
liable to pay documentary stamp tax and must be entitled to a refund or tax credit for its erroneous
payment.

Section 168 of the Local Government Code categorically provides that the local government unit
may impose a surcharge not exceeding 25% of the amount of taxes, fees, or charges not paid on
time. SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges.—The sanggunian
may impose a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges
not paid on time and an interest at the rate not exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the
unpaid taxes, fees or charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case
shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months.
 Section 112(A) provides for a two-year prescriptive period after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made, within which a VAT registered person whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable
input tax. In accordance with Section 112(D)of the NIRC of 1997, petitioner had one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application
within which to decide on the administrative claim. Considering that the burden to prove
entitlement to a tax refund is on the taxpayer, and absent any evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that in order to discharge its burden, respondent attached to its application filed on 29
March 2005 complete supporting documents necessary to prove its entitlement to a refund. Thus,
the 120-day period for the CIR to act on the administrative claim commenced on that date.

The taxpayer can file its administrative claim for refund or credit at any time within the two-year
prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day of said period, it is still filed on time.The CIR
will have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the CIR decides the claim on the 120th
day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file its judicial claim with
the CTA;otherwise, the judicial claim would be, properly speaking, dismissed for being filed out of
time and not, as the CTA En Banc puts it, prescribed.The inaction of the CIR on the claim during the
120-day period is, by express provision of law, "deemed a denial" of such claim, and the failure of
the taxpayer to file its judicial claim within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period shall
render the "deemed a denial" decision of the CIR final and inappealable. The right to appeal to the
CTA from a decision or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner is merely a statutory
privilege, not a constitutional right.
 Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section 141(b). It is a partially prepared
tobacco. The removal of the stem or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting stemmed
leaf tobacco a prepared or partially prepared tobacco. Since the Tax Code contained no definition
of“partially prepared tobacco,” then the term should be construed in its general, ordinary, and
comprehensive sense. However, importation of stemmed leaf tobacco is not included in the
exemption under Section 137. The transaction contemplated in Section 137 does not include
importation of stemmed leaf tobacco for the reason that the law uses the word “sold” to describe
the transaction of transferring the raw materials from one manufacturer to another. Finally, excise
taxes are essentially taxes on property because they are levied on certain specified goods or
articles manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sale or consumption or for any
other disposition, and on goods imported. In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited
sense despite the fact that they are paying the specific tax on the raw material and on the finished
product in which the raw material was a part, because the specific tax is imposed by explicit
provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco;
and (2) on cigar or cigarette.

I. term "assessment" refers to the determination of amounts due from a person obligated to make
payments. In the context of national internal revenue collection, it refers the determination of the
taxes due from a taxpayer under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. The power and duty
to assess national internal revenue taxes are lodged with the BIR.Taxes are generally self-assessed.
They are initially computed and voluntarily paid by the taxpayer. The government does not have to
demand it. If the tax payments are correct, the BIR need not make an assessment.
The Court of Tax Appeals has no power to make an assessment at the first instance. On matters
such as tax collection, tax refund, and others related to the national internal revenue taxes, the
Court of Tax Appeals’ jurisdiction is appellate in nature. Section 7(a)(1) and Section 7(a)(2) of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, provide that the Court of Tax Appeals
reviews decisions and inactions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in disputed assessments
and claims for tax refunds.

II.National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 treats the sale of land and buildings, and the sale of
machineries and equipment, differently. Domestic corporations are imposed a 6% capital gains tax
only on the presumed gain realized from the sale of lands and/or buildings. The National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 does not impose the 6% capital gains tax on the gains realized from the sale
of machineries and equipment. Only the presumed gain from the sale of petitioner’s land and/or
building may be subjected to the 6% capital gains tax. The income from the sale of petitioner’s
machineries and equipment is subject to the provisions on normal corporate income tax.
The 2-year period under Section 229 does not apply to appeals before the CTA in relation to claims
for a refund or tax credit for unutilized creditable input VAT. Section 229 pertains to the recovery of
taxes erroneously, illegally, or excessively collected. San Roque stressed that "input VAT is not
excessively collected as understood under Section 229 because, at the time the input VAT is
collected, the amount paid is correct and proper." It is, therefore, Section 112 which applies
specifically with regard to claiming a refund or tax credit for unutilized creditable input VAT. San
Roque settled that Section 112 applies to claims for a refund or tax credit for unutilized creditable
input VAT, thereby making the 120+30 day period prescribed therein mandatory and jurisdictional
in nature. As an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day period,
judicial claims filed between December 10, 2003 or from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03,
up to October 6, 2010 or the reversal of the ruling in Aichi, need not wait for the lapse of the
120+30 day period in consonance with the principle of equitable estoppel.

As a general rule, a taxpayer-claimant needs to wait for the expiration of the one hundred twenty
(120)-day period before it may be considered as "inaction" on the part of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR). Thereafter, the taxpayer-claimant is given only a limited period of thirty
(30) days from said expiration to file its corresponding judicial claim with the CTA. However, with
the exception of claims made during the effectivity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-, petitioner has indeed
properly and timely filed its judicial claim covering the Second, Third, and Fourth Quarters of
taxable year 2003, within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence.
Moreover, in KEPCO Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, that the VAT
invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of the goods or services to the buyer while the VAT
receipt is the buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the seller.
Thus, the High Court concluded that VAT invoice and VAT receipt should not be confused as
referring to one and the same thing. Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used
interchangeably.
Prior payment of taxes is not required for a taxpayer to avail of the 8% transitional input tax credit
provided in Section 105 of the old National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and that petitioner is
entitled to it, despite the fact that petitioner acquired the Global City property under a tax-free
transaction.
Contrary to the view of the CTA and the CA, there is nothing in the provision to indicate that prior
payment of taxes is necessary for the availment of the 8% transitional input tax credit. Obviously,
all that is required is for the taxpayer to file a beginning inventory with the BIR.
To require prior payment of taxes x x x is not only tantamount to judicial legislation but would also
render nugatory the provision in Section 105 of the old NIRC that the transitional input tax credit
shall be "8% of the value of [the beginning] inventory or the actual [VAT] paid on such goods,
materials and supplies, whichever is higher" because the actual VAT (now 12%) paid on the goods,
materials, and supplies would always be higher than the 8% (now 2%) of the beginning inventory
which, following the view of Justice Carpio, would have to exclude all goods, materials, and supplies
where no taxes were paid. Clearly, limiting the value of the beginning inventory only to goods,
materials, and supplies, where prior taxes were paid, was not the intention of the law. Otherwise, it
would have specifically stated that the beginning inventory excludes goods, materials, and supplies
where no taxes were paid.

It was conclusively settled therein that it is Section 112 of the NIRC which is applicable specifically
to claims for tax credit certificates and tax refunds for unutilized creditable input VAT, and not
Section 229. The two-year period under Section 229 does not apply to appeals before the CTA with
respect to claims for a refund or tax credit for unutilized creditable input VAT since input VAT is not
considered excessively collected. Instead, it was settled that it is Section 112 which applies,
thereby making the 120+30 day period prescribed therein mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.
As an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day period, judicial
claims filed from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 up to its reversal
in Aichi on October 6, 2010, need not wait for the lapse of the 120+30 day period, in consonance
with the principle of equitable estoppel. In the present case, Taganito filed its judicial claim with the
CTA on April 17, 2008, clearly within the period of exception of December 10, 2003 to October 6,
2010. Its judicial claim was, therefore, not prematurely filed.
 The period to assess and collect deficiency taxes may be extended only upon a written agreement
between the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) and the taxpayer prior to the expiration of the
three (3)-year prescribed period in accordance with Section 222(b) of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Stanley Works Sales (Phils.),
In Philippine Journalist, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court categorically stated that
a Waiver must strictly conform to RMO No. 20-90. The mandatory nature of the requirements set
forth in RMO No. 20-90, as ruled upon by this Court, was recognized by the BIR itself in the latter’s
subsequent issuances, namely, Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) Nos. 6-2005 and 29-2012.
Thus, the BIR cannot claim the benefits of extending the period to collect the deficiency tax as a
consequence of the Waiver when, in truth it was the BIR’s inaction which is the proximate cause of
the defects of the Waiver. The BIR has the burden of ensuring compliance with the requirements of
RMO No. 20-90, as they have the burden of securing the right of the government to assess and
collect tax deficiencies. This right would prescribe absent any showing of a valid extension of the
period set by the law.

Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that
during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6,
2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day
period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and
after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of
the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.35 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
 Under Republic Act No. 9480 and BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 55-2007, the qualified
taxpayer may immediately avail of the immunities and privileges upon submission of the required
documents. This is clear from Section 2 of RA No. 9480. In Philippine Banking Corporation (Now:
Global Business Bank, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court ruled that the
completion of the requirements and compliance with the procedure laid down in the law and the
implementing rules entitle the taxpayer to the privileges and immunities under the tax amnesty
program. In this case, petitioner showed that it complied with the requirements laid down in
Republic Act No. 9480. Pertinent documents were submitted to the BIR and attached to the records
of this case. Petitioner’s compliance was also affirmed by BIR in its ruling.

Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that
during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6,
2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day
period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and
after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of
the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) In this case, records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and
judicial claims for refund/credit of its input VAT in CTA Case No. 8082 on December 28, 2009 and
March 30, 2010, respectively, or during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place,
i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the expiration of the
120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is deemed timely filed. In
view of the foregoing, both the CTA Division and the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing outright
petitioner’s claim on the ground of prematurity.
 While petitioner is correct that Section 203 sets the three-year prescriptive period to assess
exceptions are provided under Section 222 of the NIRC of 1997. SEC. 222. (a) provides that in the
case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return, the tax may
be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be filed without
assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission:
Provided, That in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall
be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.
In the case at bar, it was petitioner’s substantial under declaration of withholding taxes in the
amount of P2,690,850.91 which constituted the “falsity” in the subject returns — giving respondent
the benefit of the period under Section 222 of the NIRC of 1997 to assess the correct amount of tax
“at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission.”

Under P.D. 1869, as amended, PAGCOR’s income is classified into two: (1) income from its
operations conducted under its Franchise, pursuant to Section 13(2) (b) thereof (income from
gaming operations); and (2) income from its operation of necessary and related services under
Section 14(5) thereof (income from other related services). In the RMC, BIR further classified the
aforesaid income.
Under P.D. 1869, as amended, PAGCOR is subject to income tax only with respect to its operation of
related services. Accordingly, the income tax exemption ordained under Section 27(c) of R.A. No.
8424 clearly pertains only to petitioner’s income from operation of related services. Such income
tax exemption could not have been applicable to petitioner’s income from gaming operations as it
is already exempt therefrom under P.D. 1869. There was no need for Congress to grant tax
exemption to petitioner with respect to its income from gaming operations as the same is already
exempted from all taxes of any kind or form, income or otherwise, whether national or local, under
its Charter, save only for the five percent (5%) franchise tax. The exemption attached to the
income from gaming operations exists independently from the enactment of R.A. No. 8424. To
adopt an assumption otherwise would be downright ridiculous, if not deleterious, since petitioner
would be in a worse position if the exemption was granted (then withdrawn) than when it was not
granted at all in the first place.
TAXATION LAW COMMITTEE
HEAD: MARICAR OCAMPO

MEMBERS: PATRICIA ANNE OCAMPO

EDSELIE JOYCE CATANDUANES
RAFFY MARIANO
ANNA ROSETTE CRUZ
JOANA ROSE CORONEL
LILET SICAT
BEA DE LEON
MARY ANNE GARCIA