Eropa, 200 Sembilan
Eropa, 200 Sembilan
Social Intelligence
a
Daniela Wawra
a
University of Passau , Innstraße 40, 94030 Passau, Germany
Published online: 21 Aug 2009.
To cite this article: Daniela Wawra (2009) Social Intelligence, European Journal of English Studies,
13:2, 163-177, DOI: 10.1080/13825570902907193
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Daniela Wawra
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
The key to intercultural communication
In this essay it is argued that social intelligence is a necessary prerequisite for being a
successful intercultural communicator. The latest research in the field of social intelligence
is based on the social neuroscience which has been developed in recent years. The research
findings of this young discipline are central to intercultural communication research.
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European Journal of English Studies Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2009, pp. 163–177
ISSN 1382-5577 print/ISSN 1744-4243 online ª 2009 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/13825570902907193
164 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES
there is one central, necessary, if not quite sufficient, characteristic that makes a good
intercultural communicator: Social intelligence.
The latest research in social neuroscience (also known as social cognitive
neuroscience) shows that social intelligence is at the centre of rewarding human
encounters in general, and that non-verbal communication and emotions are much
more important for mutually rewarding intercultural communication than has
previously been recognized, or reflected in intercultural communication training. In
what follows, I will explain in detail what social intelligence involves, provide
arguments to back up these claims, and outline some research results. Findings from
social neuroscience can provide a better understanding of the causes of our behaviour
and show where we have to start when we want to improve intercultural
communicative encounters. The framework is provided by the neurophysiological
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Drawing on social neuroscience, I will argue the case for rethinking current
mainstream training practice.
Gary Berntson (1992: 1025). The introduction of this integrative approach was mainly
based on the insight that ‘neurochemical events influence social processes’ and ‘social
processes influence neurochemical events’ (1020). In 2001 Matthew Lieberman and
Kevin Ochsner introduced the term ‘social cognitive neuroscience’ as an alternative.
From the beginning of the 1990s onwards the new science developed rather slowly
and it took more than a decade until it started to reach a broader audience.2 Today, it
is still an ‘emerging field’ (Goleman, 2006: 9).
Social neuroscience is mainly concerned with ‘how the brain drives social
behaviour and in turn how our social world influences our brain and biology’
(Goleman, 2006: 10). It examines ‘the neural mechanisms that orchestrate our
interactions as well as our thoughts and feelings about people and our relationships’
(10). These mechanisms have also been described as our ‘social brain’ (Brüne et al.,
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our brain’s very design makes it sociable, inexorably drawn into an intimate
brain-to-brain linkup whenever we engage with another person. That neural
bridge lets us affect the brain – and so the body – of everyone we interact with,
just as they do us. Even our most routine encounters act as regulators in the
brain, priming our emotions, some desirable, others not.
(Goleman, 2006: 4–5)
166 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES
The low road is circuitry that operates beneath our awareness, automatically and
effortlessly, with immense speed. Most of what we do seems to be piloted by
massive neural networks operating via the low road – particularly in our
emotional life.
(Goleman, 2006: 16)
The ‘high road’, in contrast, is activated when we deliberately think about and try
to understand phenomena. It allows us to have some control over our emotional life.3
From our everyday experience we know that some people are more in control of
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their emotions than others. Some people influence interactions positively and are easy
to be with, while others are difficult and unpleasant conversation partners. When
people are good at controlling their emotions, this is because they know their
emotions. These two abilities – self-management and self-awareness of one’s
emotions – are the two building blocks of ‘emotional intelligence’ (Goleman, 1995:
43; 2006: 331). Goleman describes emotional intelligence as the ‘sister’ of social
intelligence (2006: 330). Without being aware of and being able to manage one’s
emotions, one cannot act in a socially intelligent way. Emotional intelligence is thus a
necessary condition for social intelligence.
Social awareness. The first category, social awareness, comprises ‘what we sense about
others’. It runs from immediately sensing the inner state of another person to
understanding what the other person feels and thinks (Goleman, 2006: 84). It can be
assumed that people from what Edward T. Hall called high-context cultures will have
a head start in this respect over people from low-context cultures (Hall, 1976: 183–
184; also Chen and Starosta, 1998: 50). Hall explains these terms as follows:
when people communicate, they take for granted how much the listener knows
about the subject under discussion. In low-context communication, the listener
knows very little and must be told practically everything. In high-context
communication the listener is already ‘contexted’ and does not need to be given
much background information.
(Hall, 1976: 183–184)
Primal empathy. We show primal empathy when we feel with others, that is, ‘sense
their nonverbal emotional signals’. Primal empathy is based exclusively on the low-
road circuitry of our brain (Goleman, 2006: 84). This means that it happens
automatically, rapidly and unconsciously. It is mainly activated by our ‘mirror
neurons’ (Miller, 2005: 938–40; Goleman, 2006: 85). There are multiple systems of
such mirror neurons in our brains, many of which are situated in the premotor
cortex. The premotor cortex governs movement and intentions to move as well as
speaking. ‘Mirror’ neurons are so called because that is what they do: ‘they reflect
back an action we observe in someone else, making us mimic that action or have the
impulse to do so’ (Goleman, 2006: 41). Mirror neurons are also responsible for the
contagiousness of emotions: They make the emotions that we see flow through us
(42). They are an ‘invisible link’ between us and other people and make our minds
‘permeable’ (Stern, 2004: 76). Thus:
This means that ‘when it comes to emotions, we cannot not communicate’. Even
if we try to suppress them, we always send non-verbal or paraverbal signals that leak
them. Non-verbal signals might be microexpressions in our ‘mimicry’ or facial
expressions (Ekman, 2001: 17, 128), body posture (113) or gestures (17, 40).
Paraverbal signals can involve tone of voice, pitch, loudness and rate of speech (for
example, Lahiff and Penrose, 1997: 382–383). Our social skills depend on mirror
neurons: They ‘allow us to grasp the minds of others not through conceptual
reasoning but through direct simulation; by feeling, not by thinking’ (Giacomo
Rizzolatti, the discoverer of mirror neurons, as quoted in Blakelee, 2006: C3).
Attunement. Attunement to another person means listening to him or her with ‘full
receptivity’ and giving him or her our full attention (Goleman, 2006: 84, 86).
Attunement in communication means that we do not talk at our conversation partner
but listen to him or her. When interactants talk at each other, they do not connect but
encapsulate themselves in monologues. When we attune in a conversation, we are
‘responsive to what the other feels, says, and does’. Our message fits the ‘other
168 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES
Empathic accuracy. Empathic accuracy involves understanding what the other person
thinks, feels and intends. It is based on primal empathy and on listening (Goleman,
2006: 91) but adds the cognitive aspect of understanding and consciously reflecting on
another person’s intentions. This means that it involves both the low and high road of
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our neural circuitry, and thus the amygdala and neocortex (Preston and de Waal,
2002: 11–12; Goleman, 2006: 84).
Social cognition. Social cognition implies ‘knowledge about how the social world
actually works’ (Goleman, 2006: 90).5 This means that you know what is expected of
you in social situations and that you are able to decode social signals. It can also
manifest itself in the ability to gather the relevant information for solving social
problems, to think through possible solutions and to come up with a good solution
(90). Social cognition is a complex high-road capacity (84). It is enhanced by the
preceding three components of social awareness (91).
Social cognition has long been seen as the central if not exclusively relevant
characteristic of social intelligence. However, it only comprises our knowledge about
interpersonal matters and ignores what we do when we interact with others. This has
resulted in social intelligence tests that leave aside how we actually succeed or fail in
social situations. But people can fare well as regards social cognition, that is, have
ample theoretical knowledge about social situations – including intercultural ones –
and be good at the other components of social awareness but still fail in social
situations (Goleman, 2006: 91) and also in intercultural communication: ‘Simply
sensing how another feels, or knowing what they think or intend, does not
guarantee fruitful interactions’ (84). And this is all the more true for intercultural
negotiations: Cognitive abilities do not suffice; cultural knowledge and even a correct
interpretation of your conversation partners’ goals and emotions are not enough for
successful, rewarding intercultural encounters. All these prerequisites for satisfying
intercultural communications can be fulfilled, but the communication might still fail.
Social awareness must be accompanied by social facility if a person is to be
characterized as truly socially intelligent and consequently a competent intercultural
communicator.
Social facility. Social facility is rooted in social awareness and consists of four
components that involve low-road and high-road capacities (Goleman, 2006: 84).
These are synchrony, self-presentation, influence and concern.
Synchrony. Synchrony is the basis of social facility. When it fails, interactions will
suffer severely. It works through the low-road of our brain, and oscillators and mirror
neurons play an important role. Oscillators are groups of neurons that constantly
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 169
adapt their firings to the rhythm of incoming signals. They are ‘timekeepers’ that put
and keep us in synch, for example with our conversation partners (Goleman, 2006:
34–7, see also Port and van Gelder, 1995; Bernieri and Rosenthal, 1991). In order to
reach synchrony in a conversation, we have to read non-verbal messages immediately
and react smoothly. This usually happens unconsciously. Typical non-verbal signs that
show people are in synch ‘include the range of harmoniously orchestrated
interactions, from smiling or nodding at just the right moment to simply orienting
our body toward the other person’ (Goleman, 2006: 91). ‘Dyssemic’ people have a
deficit in noticing and interpreting other people’s non-verbal signs correctly. This is
mostly because they did not have enough opportunities to train their ability to read
non-verbal signs in their families and peer groups (92).
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People adept in such control are self-confident in just about any social situation,
possessed of savoir faire. Those for whom poised performances come easily will
be naturals in any situation where a nuanced response is crucial, from sales and
service to diplomacy and politics.
(Goleman, 2006: 94)
Influence. This aspect of social facility describes the ability to ‘constructively’ shape
‘the outcome of an interaction, using tact and self-control’ (Goleman, 2006: 95). In
order to be able to do so, one needs self-control, empathy and social cognition. It is
especially important to find the right dose of expressivity that a situation requires:
sometimes, for example, it is better for a relationship if one refrains from making a
comment (95–6).
Concern. When we feel another person’s need and want to help, we show concern.
Concern makes us take action and responsibility. In professional contexts, concern
translates into ‘good organizational citizenship’: We do what has to be done and are
willing to invest our time for the good of the group. Concern makes the difference
and is crucial when it comes to distinguishing social intelligence from mere
manipulation:
this aspect of social facility should most strongly identify antisocial types, who do
not care about others’ needs or suffering, let alone seek to help them.
(Goleman, 2006: 97)
share the same cultural background. This will make it still more difficult to
interpret the other person’s non-verbal communication and emotions correctly as
the display of both is dependent on culture. In an intercultural encounter – just like
in any other interaction between humans – we can trigger emotions in our
conversation partners and vice versa through our verbal and above all non-verbal
behaviour, without being aware of it. Yet those emotions influence the outcome of
such interactions: They set the tone for intercultural communication situations. In
the end, it depends to a great extent on our emotions whether the outcomes of
intercultural negotiations will be perceived as successful or not. When negative
emotions outweigh positive ones, this will usually result in unsuccessful, unsatisfying
and unrewarding encounters. But the more that positive emotions outweigh
negative ones, the more successful, satisfying and rewarding intercultural
communication will be. The important contribution of social neuroscience to
intercultural communication research is that emotions are much more important in
intercultural encounters than has been recognized so far: Emotions are at the heart
of intercultural negotiations and not a peripheral aspect. If we look at some current
books on intercultural communication, emotions are usually dealt with very briefly:
for example, only four pages are partially dedicated to them in Martin and
Nakayama (2008: 28, 30, 217, 218) and three in Tuleja (2005: 46–8). The former
state very generally ‘[c]ulture also involves our emotions and feelings’ (Martin and
Nakayama, 2008: 28). Later, they explain:
When we are in our own cultural surroundings we feel a sense of familiarity, and a
certain level of comfort in the space, behaviour, and actions of others. We might
characterise this feeling as a kind of embodied ethnocentrism, which is
normal . . . the stronger your identification with a particular space or cultural
situation, the more difficult it might be to change spaces without experiencing a
lot of discomfort – actual psychological and physiological changes.
(Martin and Nakayama, 2008: 30; emphasis in original)
cultures differ in their emotional displays in conflicts; some cultures show a more
emotionally expressive style in conflicts, some prefer a more restrained one. Cultures
in which an emotionally expressive style dominates ‘think that this outward display of
emotions means that one really cares and is committed to resolving the conflict. In
fact, one’s credibility is based on the ability to be expressive’ (Martin and Nakayama,
2008: 217). This style is described as usually predominating in individualistic cultures,
where ‘the concern is with individuals preserving their own dignity’ (217). Cultures
preferring the restrained style think that conflicts are best solved ‘in an emotionally
calm manner’ (Martin and Nakayama, 2008: 217). In these cultures:
it’s important to control and internalize one’s feelings during conflict and to avoid
nonverbal emotion. They are uncomfortable with emotional expression and think
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that such expressions may hurt others. People who use this approach think that
relationships are made stronger by keeping one’s emotions in check and
protecting the ‘face’ or honor of the other person. Credibility is demonstrated by
maintaining tight control over one’s emotions.
(Martin and Nakayama, 2008: 217–18)
For example, Latin American, European, and Mediterranean cultures are among
the most expressive; North American . . . Eastern European, and African cultures
vary their levels of expression; and German and Asian cultures are among the
most reserved. In Middle Eastern cultures, it is considered natural for people to
show warmth and expression by speaking in animated tones, moving close to
another person and looking him or her in the eye, or by touching – an arm
around the shoulder, a kiss on either side of the cheeks.
(Tuleja, 2005: 46)
Tuleja also mentions that differences in emotional displays among cultures can
cause misunderstandings and problems in intercultural encounters: ‘people who
come from more-reserved cultures such as Thailand may interpret loudness and
animated gestures as a sign of anger or disapproval’ (Tuleja, 2005: 46). She also
recommends for ‘some high-context cultures in which preserving face and following
hierarchical rules for respect are important, people may be more comfortable with
neutral expressions over expressions of affection’ (46). Tuleja then outlines culture-
specific rules of eye contact (‘direct’, ‘sustained’, ‘firm’, ‘intense’ and ‘indirect’ are
the adjectives she uses to describe the differences), greeting rituals (handshake,
bow) and finally also turn-taking. Here, Tuleja makes just a brief remark on
interruptions:
business contacts out of respect and also because they are completely comfortable
with silence.
(Tuleja, 2005: 48)
In relationships between people, reason and emotion both play a role. Which of
these dominates will depend upon whether we are affective, that is we show our
emotions, in which case we probably get an emotional response in return, or
whether we are emotionally neutral in our approach.
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998: 70)
Until now, the general goal of intercultural training programmes has usually been to
build up and improve people’s competence to act adequately in intercultural
encounters and thereby enhance the success of intercultural negotiations. This goal
can be subdivided into three main components (von Helmolt, 2007: 763; Kinast,
2005: 183): the cognitive training goal, the affective training goal and the behavioural
training goal. Theoretically, intercultural training can include content that to a greater
or lesser degree enhances all three goals, or the training can just concentrate on one
goal (Kinast, 2005: 183). In practice, however, it is prototypically the cognitive goals
that predominate in intercultural training programmes for business purposes (von
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 173
Helmolt, 2007: 766): Learning about the basic principles of communication and
possible problems, reflecting on communicative norms and alternative strategies for
avoiding miscommunication, improving language skills, cultural awareness and
cultural knowledge. This, however, only corresponds to the knowledge about that was
described above in relation with social cognition and was shown to be insufficient for
successful action in social and intercultural encounters. As Bennett and Castiglioni
(2004: 249; emphasis in original) put it: ‘Once again, awareness or knowledge of a
culture is insufficient – one also needs to have a feeling for it’. A competent
intercultural communicator must be endowed with all the other cognitive and non-
cognitive abilities that were subsumed under ‘social awareness’, plus those of ‘social
facility’. Some of these components of social intelligence fall under the traditional
affective and behavioural training goals.
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The affective training goal has been described as the general willingness to
change perspectives and deal with the unfamiliar or unknown (von Helmolt, 2007:
763) and also as the ability to control one’s emotions when dealing with people
from other cultures (Kinast, 2005: 183). Cultures that are characterized by a
relatively high uncertainty avoidance (France, Spain and Germany, for example)
(Hofstede, 2006; Wawra, 2008: 387–89) tend to have greater problems with
intercultural encounters (unfamiliar terrain, ambiguities) than people from low
uncertainty avoidance cultures (cf. Wawra, 2008: 218–20). Behavioural goals
comprise being able to behave according to typical patterns of conduct of the target
culture (Kinast, 2005: 183) or simply the application of the cognitive and affective
aspects in one’s actions (von Helmolt, 2007: 763). However, the behavioural parts
of intercultural training usually focus predominantly on behavioural patterns and
neglect training in behavioural flexibility when one is confronted with surprising,
unforeseen situations. Finally, not much time and effort is usually spent on the
affective training goals (cf. for example the prototypical contents of intercultural
training cited by Kinast, 2005: 199). This might be because they are not considered
to be as important as the cognitive and behavioural goals. It is likely that this is
especially true for low-context cultures, where emotions and other people’s feelings
are usually not regarded as important in interactions as they are in high-context
cultures. In low-context cultures, there is a strong belief that everything can be
solved by direct verbal communication (cf. Wawra, 2008: 210–211). This is even
more true for professional contexts, where emotions are often totally neglected and
even denied. Managers then proudly announce: It is only facts and figures that
count for me; emotions are for sentimental fools – I am not interested in them!
(Mast, 2006: 411). Against the background of current research on social
intelligence, however, this attitude is a fallacy: Non-cognitive skills in general are
central for successful (intercultural) interactions and negotiations, especially as
regards the management of emotions. Consequently, the affective component
should be adequately represented in training programmes.
Neglect of the affective component up to now is certainly also due to the
widespread view that non-cognitive abilities cannot be enhanced by training. Social
neuroscience, however, has refuted this belief: We are not at the mercy of our
emotions and the ‘low road’ of our brain’s neural circuitry. We can check them with
the help of the ‘high road’ (Goleman, 2006: 16, 17). It is in our hands whether
positive or negative emotions dominate in an interaction – we can influence them
174 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES
and the readiness for reciprocity (bao). Three further principles of Chinese
communication should also be considered: Verbal and non-verbal implicit
communication (hanxu), communication that focuses on listening (tinghua) and
politeness, as well as on the avoidance of disharmony (keqi). All these aspects are
important building blocks of social intelligence.
Taking into account also the research in the field of social neuroscience, I would
like to propose an integrative approach to intercultural training. All the traditional
components of intercultural training can be subsumed under the concept of social
intelligence: Social awareness and social facility with their subcategories comprising
cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects. The traditional ‘affective’ component of
intercultural training can be subsumed under the non-cognitive aspects. However, the
non-cognitive aspects go far beyond the concept of traditional affective training goals.
Furthermore, when we take a look again at the subcategories of social awareness and
social facility, it is clear that they do not distinguish between cognitive, non-cognitive
and behavioural aspects. They are all intertwined and influence each other in complex
ways. A holistic and integrative approach to intercultural negotiations is therefore
needed.
I would consequently suggest that we assume two major, equally important,
training goals: To enhance both ‘intercultural awareness’ and ‘intercultural
facility’. By doing this, we avoid the separation into cognitive, behavioural and
affective training goals and emphasize the special focus shared by the sub-
categories: Improving people’s social intelligence in intercultural encounters. With
these goals in mind, the typical components of intercultural training should be
scrutinized. Certainly, some components will still prove to be important to reach
these goals while others might seem superfluous. In any case new parts will have
to be added that concentrate on the enhancement of the different components of
social intelligence. Goleman (1995; 2006) and Ekman (2001) have already
developed and proposed numerous practical training programmes for this purpose.
They can be directly used for or adapted for intercultural communication training.
Thus, ‘[t]he new science of social intelligence offers us tools’ with which we can
overcome antagonisms like ‘them’ versus ‘us’ and with which we can ‘extend our
empathy to understand one another despite our differences, and to bridge those
divides. The social brain’s wiring connects us all at our common human core’
(Goleman, 2006: 319). And this is at the heart of successful intercultural
negotiations.
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 175
Notes
1 The concept of ‘social intelligence’ that is used here goes beyond the standard
psychological definition (see, for example, Kihlstrom and Cantor, 2000: 359–79).
2 The first conference on social cognitive neuroscience was held in 2001 at University
College of Los Angeles (UCLA). In 2007, Oxford University Press launched the first
journal in the field, called Social Neuroscience (Goleman, 2006: 10, 338).
3 The ‘low road’ runs through the amygdala, which is situated in the middle of the
brain below the cortex. The ‘high road’ comes to a crossroad in the prefrontal cortex
(Shallice and Burgess, 1996: 1405–12).
4 The five styles of (high-context) ‘Asian Communication’ are described as intuitive,
empathizing, silent, restrained and subtle, and they are combined with a special
sensitivity towards non-verbal messages (Henze, 2007: 307).
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5 Goleman’s use of the term ‘social cognition’ is more restricted than it usually is in
social psychology (see, for example, Kunda, 1999).
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