THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA
ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO
C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO,
REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA
L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing
them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their
Reply to respondents' Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la
Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,

1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The
designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1,
1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S.
Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the
pertinent portions of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I
among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all
the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February
8,1987;

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9.
1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and
void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on
June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up
to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated
on March 25, 1986, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation
or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution.

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the
1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any
of the events mentioned. 1

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive
order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not
the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period
which ended on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in
keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents
to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the
barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.2 Similarly, the 1987
Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local
governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for
elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as
still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is
granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners'
positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective
mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . .
.5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by
the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched
the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to
lay down conditions under which business may be done."9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests
who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimonyof the nation. What is more, the mandate of
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its
own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of
the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege
of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition
giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner
has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform
the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing
. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style.
If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference
to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To
qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens
or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis
supplied by respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it
is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then
a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision
may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on
personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to
the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion
of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very
terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources
but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected
by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the
1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that theFilipino First Policy provision
is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment
would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS
WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation
wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be
100-percent Filipino.

MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to
individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise
is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means
that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the
national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better
known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions . . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
"qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even
some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical
life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In
fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even
before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When
the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of
applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not
the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the
Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is
not how constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
"state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction.
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS,
a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under
obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified
for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match
the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm
and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we
would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is
worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress
and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division
against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal
system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it
is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no
higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most
important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where
heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity
of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played
and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history
and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-
Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,

COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed
to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DIGEST)

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).

3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to
 the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.

4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.

3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power
of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent
is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

 1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make
rules.

2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.

2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No.
6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M.
GONZALES,petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.,
and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C.
Nakar for respondents.

Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No.
6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were
held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.

It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art.
XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on
the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.

After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2
and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending
the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed
of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of
their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two
delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of
Representatives,"1 "and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates,
election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an
implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Resolution."2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914.3

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether
elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and
employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the
same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law.
Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld.4

II

Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-
making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a
three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the
expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as
well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively
pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with
any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized
in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no
argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it
is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

III

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance
with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself,
without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly
require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each
congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one
delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid
having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of
delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each representative district,
they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the
representative districts.5

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be
apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The
presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such
apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary
computation to effect the desired proportional representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No.
6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the
delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and
Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable
apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to
Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of the population,
we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill
77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the
delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon
your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night, we are
submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the above-stated method."

Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such
apportionment.6 The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-
represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a
population very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only
two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the
apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is
not required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census
cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by
the constant movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis
employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4
fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted
to Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation
formula adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable
and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional
representation.

In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as
unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces
with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted
only two delegates, which number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with
more population. The present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould of the
doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.

The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it
directs that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly
as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member"
(Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be
according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only
approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional representation
with mathematical precision or exactitude.

IV

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate
from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position
in any branch of the government government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional
Convention."

That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and
define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer.
Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory
inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned
inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or
vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the
nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may
endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the
disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for
concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally
adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals.
Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the
several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of
the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but
only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not extend
beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately
seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.

As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision
prohibiting a member of Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to
any civil office which may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased while
he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)

As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged
disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as
such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment
to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived
of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from
controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire
to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right
to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise
constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to
the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.7 The function of a delegate is
more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public
officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the
government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other
laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No
other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves,
propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of
the community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the
proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the
enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.

Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the
second Tuesday of November, 1970.

Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly
and freedom of association.

This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful
assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they
are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged
to serve appropriate and important public interests.8

In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine
whether a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise
of police power.9

Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention

(a) from representing, or

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other
organizations or organized group of whatever nature from

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election.

The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or
otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of
the members of his family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign
staff composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of
his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit
to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The
right of a member of any political party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is
preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may
belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to
disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms,
programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional
rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the
aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of the
limitation on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:

The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in
character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or
political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than one
hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier
than ninety days immediately preceding an election.

The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they
may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic
right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there
infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its
validity. We do so unanimously. 10

In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an election
campaign or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned
constitutional guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences,
meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting,
or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and
(c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this Court, which
could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious
substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in
existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's
eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;

Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed
to muster the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a)
making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of
any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13

The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major
compelling interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a)
of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due
recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral
process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo
Tañada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to
be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger
but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities
in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of
remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the
responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be
ignored or disregarded." 15

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded
by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo
Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of
chances. 16 The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of
another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on
their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and
Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as against
the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion, predicated
as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience. Both Senators
stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major
political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate
mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or
organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the principle that the
guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal
opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in
the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that
Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita
when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support
proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated.

Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support." 18

The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test. 19

In the apt words of the Solicitor General:

It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful
endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social and political problems besetting the country.
Instead of directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention
which shall have the task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the
people. Because what is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the
Constitutional Convention be composed of delegates truly representative of the people's will. Public
welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of
a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of people, be they religious,
political, civic or professional in character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes
and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that "the function of a constitution is not to
represent anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the expense or disadvantage
of the candidates — but to encompass all the interests that exist within our society and to blend them
into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not the predominance
of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."

So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is
necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and
conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who, because they
have been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently
representative of the people. Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of narrow political,
religious or economic interest and not of the great majority of the people. 20

We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly
subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or
group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The
discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or
professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the
debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidates
and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery
and other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support, does not
have. The fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as
efficient as that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it still has that much built-in
advantage as against the individual candidate without similar support. Moreover, these civic religious
and professional organization may band together to support common candidates, who advocates the
reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by petitioner
Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D",
wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to
support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the convention, which organized
support is nullified by the questioned ban, Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and
working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and supervision over our
leaders — the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they
"could have presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."

The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be exempted
from the ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the
campaign machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization
engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that
the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional associations usually prohibit the
association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office.
Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.

The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any
existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a
political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy
does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances.
As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate
with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize
their services if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Tañada for the invalidation of
par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of
our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the
challenged ban transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5,
and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE
DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON,

NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions 1proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but
nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the
wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise
as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of petitioners
cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth,
we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13
respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a
comment on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly
argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the
submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted
for decision.

It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It
then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of
January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says
is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter,
as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a
positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black 10 and
Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not
only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere
dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point
is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of
the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. 13

2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments
and how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be
introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a
proper submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged
resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.

(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."14 One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of
the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand
E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly
beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being
assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question
of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. In Occena v.
Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question
was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by
Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at theInterim Batasang Pambansa,
as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17

(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and
not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del
Rosario v. Commission on Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is
no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or
revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people." 19 There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as
legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed
to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.

(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard
for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their
favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-
fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the
agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover,
even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority
was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse
before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been
called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly
informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter
should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7,
1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the
contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time,
as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the
retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it
cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendment [ s ]." 22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G.
BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.

Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional
amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to
eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1
of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring
said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such
plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be
done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of
the Constitution of the Philippines.

As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required
that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its
President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its
answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the
fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts
sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the
Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made
respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and
the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.

For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible
confusion, and considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their
interests would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from
the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the
respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la
Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all
distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that
with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply
represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to
intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates
and some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by
the result of this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without
value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.

The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by
virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969
respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said
resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of
Resolution No 2 read as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have
the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to
the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and
provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.

After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and
other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which
began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971,
the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .

CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO

AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18

BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:

Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months preceding the election.

Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.

Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage
shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire
Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from
its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there
be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days
per diem.

By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec
"to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:

September 28, 1971

The Commission on Elections Manila

Thru the Chairman

Gentlemen:

Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(see above)

Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional
Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:

Sincerely,

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President

On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold
the plebiscite on condition that:

(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns
and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;

(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of
said ballots and election forms; and

(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could
be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be
used in the elections on November 8, 1971.

What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of
the genesis of the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the
Resolution.

This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then
transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.

The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the
plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of
transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).

RECESS RESOLUTION

In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored
by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1,
1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution
No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9
and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION

On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz
confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1,
including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said
implementation.

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as
laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight
senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of
Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by
said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by
the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised
by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment
in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for
the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority
of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that
this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and
manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of
these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend
that the issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the
highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the
Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined
intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention
expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a
justifiable one.

Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case
of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in
their opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its
jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of
Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.

There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter,
those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case
of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point.
Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one of
the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law,
Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof."

It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as
a political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the
people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force
of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil.
818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957)
and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers
and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number
of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first
party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the House
of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in
these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is
beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is
part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as
ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising
the same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of aconstituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution —
they are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have
the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they
could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power
to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and,
to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra)
the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this
point.

No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not
supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point
otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and
derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has
not been called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first
Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or
of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to
such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without restrain and
omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can
belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a
joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the
present Constitution which provides:

ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.

True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally
beyond the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can
be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose
cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it
necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on
constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone
of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that
assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose
amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or
members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny
to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in
disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention
validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property without just compensation or for
the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a
special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment
in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of
the distribution of powers in the Constitution.

It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much
less exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the
Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to
the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very
essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave
constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess that the
integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no
intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and
craftsmanship in constitution-making.

We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the
irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:

... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies.
If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly the limitations
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our
Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the
authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the
previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void
be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." .

As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just
quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the
government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them,
on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in
Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the
other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us
by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present
Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already
demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..

Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present
case. It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that
the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the
Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per
Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing
Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this
case.

II

The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification
of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the
manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution
of the Convention?

At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and
unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very
clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-
year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in
truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here
involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to
comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking.
Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point
of whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by
the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in
the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions
and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a
matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in
the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the existing
Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment
therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of
the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be
understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the members of
the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote,
simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that,
once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said
proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.

Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not
blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the
Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and
purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before
Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure
brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in
particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful
changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions, including the
provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the
underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our
natural resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving
such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or
unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the youth of the
Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and
violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what
they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of
ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to
allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the
rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than
when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution
imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting
and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act
violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.

During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to
the point of being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this
Court would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional
Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing
Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself
draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without
persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective
judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it, can
limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete
substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable
as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be
properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised
by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent
wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative
obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost importance that the
Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as
signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up
doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that
it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the
existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions
are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is
founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other
coordinate departments of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost
in a unique footing in that regard.

In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came
into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution,
already quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal
operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the
Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution.
Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to
the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same
ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power,
second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have
chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the
people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing
and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in
haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of
the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be
conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters
of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or
inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent
conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that
their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely
personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last
for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies
of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or
less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them
limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the
process of their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original
constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore
and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original
counterparts.

Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and
the scope and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the
Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or
not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the
Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the
said power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court
takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and
important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members
of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of
the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our
views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is
as important and decisive as any can be.

The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on
the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the
condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment
now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We
hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people
on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of
the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that
either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose
amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress
or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that
"such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus
leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.

(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this
provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as
constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it
if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable
as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and
reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and
national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a
constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts..

A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the
original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for
when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an
integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can
examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document
the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an
amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can
study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or
any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that
under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided
the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of
the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage,
there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed
amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the
reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances,
and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will
ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he
render on the proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not
have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can
say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in
that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in
almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the
reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of
which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to
the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis
for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other
parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present
state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal
or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present
Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the
rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that
intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the
eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the
Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez,
speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".

III

The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention.
Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen
years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the
Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the
mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of
the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from,
the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution
No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section
1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to
be proposed by this present Convention.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar
as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the
respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void.
The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional
Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution.
In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately
executory. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

(Digest)

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution
of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus
subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but
they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1
violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to
the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately
but together.

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

MARTIN, J,:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of
the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his
present powers.1

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text
of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.2

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to
the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a
plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of
the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law,
shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different
regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective
sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the
members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall
have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to
discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution.

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime
Ministers as he may deem necessary.

5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have
been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters
of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers,
and composition may be altered by law.

Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may
be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding
any important matter whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full
force and effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they
have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well
as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections,
The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.

On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-
44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII
of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL
M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.

These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the
proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to
lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.

Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of
such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement.
At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No.
991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired
into.

2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into
a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,
within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution
provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process
confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum
fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.10

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme
Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this
inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of
the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-
political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on
the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the
Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the
Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice
Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We
rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new
Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it
partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the
Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971,
despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda,
insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply.
For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,
the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief
Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the
same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and
plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and
constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases
partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."

II

The amending process as laid out

in the new Constitution.

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by
a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in
an election.

SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision.

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions
is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by
a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.

2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country."
Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen
the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of
the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a
matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was
rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of
the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of
February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially
convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already
resolved against it.

3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in
the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for
the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science
a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.17Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19

III

Concentration of Powers

in the President during

crisis government.

1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today
are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded
as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually
independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of
constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a
total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary
governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a
decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in
the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action,
even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one
man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet
the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important
harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be
to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded;
it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on
the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside
the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative power had not
provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the
government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal
times restored.

2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That
sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions,
thus:23

The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the
interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then
exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective
even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National
Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the
exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would
be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely
important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation
of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase
in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino
people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet
the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the
same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25

IV

Authority of the incumbent

President t to propose

amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the
President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions
of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its
gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim
National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges
of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For
the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal
times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant
voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like
the President now, are mere agents of the people .26

2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay,
and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same
number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-
provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the
abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and
amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a
referendum to be held on October 16 .28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under
Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with
cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16,
the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial
law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of
the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate
the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the
National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.

The People is Sovereign

1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines,
a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized
assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the
concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is
sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any
subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes
said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment."34 "The necessities of orderly
government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to
permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting
decision of the people when they adopt it. 35

2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign
power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from
the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only
into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal
vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-
plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the
President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.

VI

Referendum-Plebiscite not

rendered nugatory by the

participation of the 15-year olds.

1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be
continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by
the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt
to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the
proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite
aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it
would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results.
The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the
plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in
consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of
proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds
above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing
the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of
voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age
and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained
in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the
age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes.38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely
consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted
to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the
executive power of the President.39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless
of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts .40 A "plebiscite," on the other
hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy,
property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.

VII

1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the
freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of
Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice.
To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of
that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing
freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he would not
countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes"
or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters
soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a
settled matter.43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to
participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues.44

VIII

Time for deliberation

is not short.

1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates
or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of
the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago.
The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the
contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society,
15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the
women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937
(Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to
the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the
bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was
fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting
the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)."45

2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme
court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body
or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor,
the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when
there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable
implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done
contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has
relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment
may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by proper body

IN RESUME

The three issues are

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?

2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set
up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor
a sufficient and proper submission?

Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G.
Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar,
Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.

Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz
Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is
concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the
power of the President to propose amendments.

Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion
Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the
hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and
Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and
cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ
Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to
propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient
information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in
the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).

Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion,
Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted
to grant the petitions.

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, J, in the result.

(Digest)

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)

Facts:

On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Presidential Decree 991

calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") toresolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, thepowers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for
the exercise bythe President of his present powers.20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the
President issued another related decree,

Presidential Decree 1031

, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable
to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quiterelevantly, Presidential Decree 1031
repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.On the same date of 22 September 1976, the
President issued

Presidential Decree 1033,

stating thequestions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976.

TheDecree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening
of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru
aconstitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitteddirectly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on
Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.Sanidad, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking toenjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite onOctober 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar asthey propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as itdirects the Commission on Elections
to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They
contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutionsthere is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution.As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis.On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional
Convention,asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during t
hetransition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, ArticleXVII
of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on
5October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714,

to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-

Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Anyamendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon avote of three-fourths of
all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assemblymay, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority voteof all its Members,
submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election."Section 2 thereof
provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be validwhen ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than threemonths a after the
approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, theinterim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amendingpower. Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon specialcall by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendmentsto this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with ArticleSixteen hereof." There are,
therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of thenation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending processmay be initiated by the proposals of the
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all theMembers of the National Assembly. However the
calling of a Constitutional Convention may besubmitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of theNational Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may
be proposed by a majority vote of all theMembers of the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister. The Courtin Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the
incumbent President is vested with thatprerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when heshall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with
the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on theTransitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President wasgiven the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly. The President'sdecision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the peoplethemselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-
15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim NationalAssembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies
("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National
Assembly. Again, in the referendumof 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim
National Assembly shall beinitially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress
and delegates of
theConstitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people
hadalready resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes
theproposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It
isnot legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for
inArticle XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
theTransitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of
thelegislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of
theConstitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made betweenconstituti
onal content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction,however, is one
of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposedamendment is a
misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies onlyto the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution

[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments
or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as innovative.[3] Indeed it is, for both under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition)[5] wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative,[6] a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all
over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is
likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,[8] and Section 8 of Article X[9] of the Constitution.Attached to the
petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution[10] embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order[11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of
the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in
three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete
Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of,
or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).[12] Senator Roco, on
that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.[13]

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitledAn Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which
petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle
II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the
law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law
which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending
or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peoples
initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180
million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayers and legislators
suit.[14] Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a
signature drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment[15] on the
petition. They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE
COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL
FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES
AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF
THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY
LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED
FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT
6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING
TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E,
PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN
AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097
PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment[16] which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory
Pleading or Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the
substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the
day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite
it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.

In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same
as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentionsinitiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed
that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No.
6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted
the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed
him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might
appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and
on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties.[19] A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and
local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as
many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance.[20]

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file
the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the
petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard
for a valid delegation of power.

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention.[21] He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is
the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the
respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in
an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required
number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment
cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if
warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative
to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress
or a constitutional convention.[22]

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to
file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of
the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda.[24]

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears
to pose a prejudicial procedural question.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN

PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin.
This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an
urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of
man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution.[25]

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.[26] The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by
setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence
to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]

A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,

INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). [30] That section
reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the
Constitution.[31]

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments
to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.[32]

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to
the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed
through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that
within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing
the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried out - is it
possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature
rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote
in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for
ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent
power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have
a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection
in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to
the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover
all the conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]

xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which
is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.[35]

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:

xxx

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod,
Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section
2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment.[36]

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to
the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly
by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved
by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the
voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by
way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary sessions.[39]

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON
A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.[40]

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.[41] Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article
was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the second paragraph so
that said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.[44] This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A.
No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:

The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how [the right] is to be carried
out.[46]

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and
(b) House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt with initiative and
referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference
Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate[50] and by the House of Representatives.[51] This
approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit
the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems ofinitiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph
(c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).

The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than
the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of
Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves
no room for doubt that the classification is not based on thescope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.It is local initiative if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we
quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:

SEC. 3. Definition of terms --

xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.[53]

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane
to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c)
of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Underscoring supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies....

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency
or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national
and local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:

SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.[55]

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on
the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.[57]

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.[58]

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.[62]

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred
to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING

THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;[65] and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election.[66]

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on
12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revisionof, the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of the petitioners.

Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate, concurring opinions of Justices Puno, Francisco and
Panganiban.

Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., has separate opinions.

(Digest)

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,
filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC
set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the
arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors
to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action
for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the
Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is
valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition
would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of
the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss
the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Lambino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding
Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

HELD:

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on
11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.

AUG

23
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA. G.R. No. L-13250. October 29,
1971

FACTS:

Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a
Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco
up to her death. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines. The CIR then issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes of P369,383.96. Rueda
filed an amended return stating that intangible personal properties worth P396,308.90 should be
exempted from taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal
to Section 122 (now Section 104) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda. The CTA stated that the foreign country
mentioned in Section 122 "refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an
international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon
intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122
of our Tax. Code."

ISSUE: Whether the exemption is valid.

RULING:

YES.

The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the
time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law. A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with the
people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal
competence to exact obedience to its commands.
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the CIR has not
successfully made out a case. The Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
like Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category.

BACANI V NACOCO G.R. No. L-6957, November 29, 1956

FACTS:

Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.

In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they requested for the services of the
stenographers and thereby paid them for the said transcript at the rate of P1 per page, amounting to
P714 in total.

However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of
such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts paid. Consequently, the AG required the
petitioners to reimburse the amounts invoking that the National Coconut Corporation is a government
entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which states
that: “‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the
provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government.”, hence, exempted from the
payment of the fees in question.

ISSUE: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the payments in question?

RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely:
constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are compulsory
in nature, while ministrant is more on public welfare like public works, education, charity, health and
safety. From such, we may infer that there are functions which our government is required to exercise
to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute
of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity
of the people.

The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic life of the
people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled corporation which
is governed by Corporation Law.
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions
of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned.

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the
functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those
arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government.

Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in question;
petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.

Petition GRANTED.

G.R. No. L-32052

65 SCRA 416

July 25, 1975

Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of
their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444.

 Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than
eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental
functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA.
Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from
CA No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and
promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government
necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief
Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now
considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration beDENIED.

Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State (Constituent and Ministrant)

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. 9959

35 PH 728, 751-753

December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer

Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions
provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake.
The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to
Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited
from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various
petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of
the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse
to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of
the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement
against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole
protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which
promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people.
The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that
respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 PHIL 113

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in
petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court during the
Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue
pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was
no de facto government.

ISSUE:

1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and
valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of
said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?

HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military
forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto
governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that
the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not
invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence
of the courts depend upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not
political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by
legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in
cases not of political complexion.

PEOPLE vs GOZO [53 SCRA 476] (G.R. No. L-36409) Oct. 26, 1973Principle of Sovereignty as Auto-
LimitationFacts:

Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,convicting her of a
violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from themunicipal mayor for the
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification,alteration, repair or demolition
thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, itsapplicability to her, by invoking due process
citing the case of

People v. Fajardo

. She contendthat her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed
forceslocated inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of
OlongapoCity and therefore shall be exempted from the Municipal Ordinance No. 14.

Issue:

WON the property of the Appellant shall be exmpeted from the application of the MunicipalOrdinance.

Ruling:

Yes. The appellant’s contention

that because her property was located within the naval baseleased to the American armed forces
located inside the United States Naval Reservation, shemust be entitled of the exemption from
complying with the ordanance was given no merit.Though the property yielded within the Naval base of
US, it is a clear doctrine that thePhilippines still possesses the sovereignty over that area

–
given the record that it is still a partof its territory. Thus, it can still enforce its administrative jurisdiction
by virtue of its governmentinstrumetalities which the people sojourning to that territory must always
adhere andrespect.Citing the case of Reagan vs CIR it states that,

“By the Agreement, it should be noted,

the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction incertain cases.
The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency.The Philippine Government
has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of thePhilippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.Under the terms of the treaty, the United
States Government has prior or preferential but notexclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The
Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictionalrights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as
the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the
express provisions of the treaty."Thus, the Philippine jurisdictional right might be diminished but will
never disappear. Thismanifests

the principle of Sovereignty as auto-limitation

, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the
exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence."WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found theaccused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay
a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is
required to demolish the house that is thesubject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty
days from the finality of thisdecision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure
to do so will thatportion of the appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against the
accused.

LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that
the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended,
and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.

Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533

75 Phil 875

August 20, 1956

Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al.

Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner
and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain
Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the
new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus
allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed
Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an
occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th
Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating
officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition
is hereby DENIED.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such
thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people