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Nation-Building

Technical Report · January 2006

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 Nation-building
Sinclair Dinnen

I. Nation-building – Conceptual and Definitional Challenges

Though widely used, the term ‘nation-building’ remains imprecise and contested. In
much of the policy documentation, its meaning is assumed rather than defined.
There is also a tendency to use the term ‘nation-building’ interchangeably with that
of ‘state-building’. Despite this, many observers would maintain that, while closely
related, ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ are distinct processes. ‘State-building’
is seen as the task of building functioning states capable of fulfilling the essential
attributes of modern statehood. ‘Nation-building’, on the other hand, refers to more
abstract process of developing a shared sense of identity or community among the
various groups making up the population of a particular state. Distinguished in this
way, ‘state-building’ focuses on the practical task of building or strengthening state
institutions, while ‘nation-building’ is more concerned with the character of
relations between citizens and their state. ‘State-building’ has long been a focus of
international development assistance with a wide range of capacity-building
programs directed at strengthening key institutions. ‘Nation-building’, on the other
hand, has often been viewed as a more nebulous process with a limited role for
external assistance.
These distinctions have been obscured by the very particular usage of the term
‘nation-building’ in current international security and foreign policy discourses,
especially since the attacks against the United States in September 2001. ‘Nation-
building’ now provides the rationale for militaristic interventions in countries that
are deemed to constitute serious threats to the international security, as well as for
external engagements with post-conflict countries whose states are considered to
have ‘failed’ or be at risk of ‘failure’. The focus here is not on ‘nation-building’ in
the literal sense of building a shared sense of community. Rather, it is about regime
change or democratisation, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the reconstruction of states
that have collapsed or been seriously weakened as a result of internal conflict, as in
the cases of Timor-Leste or Solomon Islands. Advocates of this version of ‘nation-
building’ claim that it can be organised from outside by the international community
of states and view its principal strategic objective as the enhancement of regional
and international security (Ottaway 2002). Questions concerning the democratic
capacity of the structures being built and the role of the population concerned are
often overlooked in favour of a rather mechanistic reconstruction of the state
concerned. ‘Nation-building’ in this sense is more about building states than nations.
This usage – which is particularly favoured in the United States – has been

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criticised by some for reflecting America’s own historical experience of constructing
a political order in a newly settled country without deeply rooted peoples, cultures,
and traditions. Reflecting a very different history, European commentators argue
that nations need to evolve organically and that they are rarely constructed
successfully by external powers. ‘Nation-building’ is, in other words, an
evolutionary rather than revolutionary social process. This perspective recognises
that as well as a functioning state, ‘nation-building’ also requires nurturing a sense
of community where none previously existed, or shoring up one that was not firmly
or properly constructed, or whose existence has been undermined by war or internal
conflict.
These different meanings illustrate the continuing lack of consensus over what
constitutes ‘nation-building’, let alone how best it can be achieved in practice. In
recent years, the term has become progressively entangled in wider debates relating
to regional and international security, regime change, democratisation, and so on.
The growing prominence of foreign and security policy perspectives has also
detracted from more development-oriented views of ‘nation-building’. Arguably, the
domain of development policy is itself being increasingly defined around
contributions towards strengthening the functionality of ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ states.
The narrower focus of current conceptions of ‘nation-building’ is exemplified in the
definition provided by the widely cited 2003 RAND study of American experience
in external ‘nation-building’ exercises, one of the few definitions on offer.
According to this study, ‘nation-building’ is “the use of armed force in the aftermath
of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy”.
While few would disagree with the proposition that functioning states capable of
fulfilling their basic roles are a pre-requisite for the pursuit of other development
objectives, it is important that broader conceptions of development are not obscured
by the current concern with strategic and security considerations. The narrowing of
these discourses in the sense of a broader understanding of security makes the task
of formulating a distinct position on ‘nation-building’ from a development policy
perspective all the more necessary. Development policy aims to help shape
conditions in recipient countries on the basis of a partnership basis between external
and local actors using civil and structural instruments. It also presupposes that this
co-shaping process is desired, necessary and possible. ‘Nation-building’ that goes
beyond intervention purely in accordance with international law or military
intervention comes under the area of responsibility of development policy. Contrary
to many contemporary accounts, ‘nation-building’ does not commence with the end
of violent conflict or, indeed, other processes of decline. It is an ongoing process in
all countries aimed at establishing and reproducing an integrated national society
based on shared values and goals.
Many of the same issues arising in current debates about ‘nation-building’ were
the subject of an earlier, though, sadly, rarely acknowledged, academic literature.
Indeed, ‘nation-building’ was a central concern of the comparative study of newly
independent former colonial states in Asia and Africa during the late 1950s and

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early 1960s (see, for example, Bendix 1969, Deutsch and Foltz 1963, Fallers 1977,
Geertz 1963 and Pye 1962). The term ‘nation-building’ came to possess both a
general and a restricted sense. In general, the term referred to the policies and
projects by which newly independent governments would purposively effect the
transition from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’. This quest or transition entailed a total and
massive effort of social engineering’ in which all elements of a modern state were
assembled. These elements included the administrative, legal, extractive, and
coercive organizations recognised by the social theorist Max Weber as the core of
any state. The crucial element for establishing a modern state, however, was the
establishment of an independent political apparatus distinct from any individual
ruler and which indeed the ruler had a duty to maintain. Thus, in its more general
sense, ‘nation-building’ implied and encompassed ‘state-building’.
In its more restricted sense, ‘nation-building’ referred to the self-conscious
production and dissemination of national consciousness and sentiment – of a felt
sense of national identity. This task was to be undertaken by a small minority of
intellectuals and state officials. ‘Nation building’ in this sense effectively denoted
the cultural and psychological dimensions of the transition to ‘modernity’, whereas
‘state-building’ denoted the social, political and economic dimensions. Accordingly,
students of ‘nation-building’ focused their attention on cultural and educational
policies in the new states. Anthropologically inclined investigations examined the
particular ways in which the construction of identity was implemented and
communicated through schooling, mass media, child socialisation, and the
iconography and ceremonies of the nation-state.
More recent academic interest has rejected two related key presuppositions of the
earlier work on ‘nation-building’. First, the analytical framework of ‘modernisation’
has been abandoned. It is no longer assumed that the formation of national identity
occurs within the constraints of an inexorable historical (eg, evolutionary) process in
which ‘traditional’ communities must yield to ‘modern’ forms of social life.
Secondly, current approaches to the construction of national identities dispense with
the assumption that ‘nation-building’, in both its general and restricted senses, is
exclusively the concern of newly independent colonial states or ‘transitional’
societies. On the contrary, recent work in the ‘old’ states of Europe – not to mention
active separatist movements – makes it clear that the construction and maintenance
of national identities is now and always has been a live, contested issues.
The current bout of international interventionism under the auspices of ‘nation-
building’ has generated its own burgeoning literature. Major studies include Simon
Chesterman’s You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and
State-Building; the RAND study of the American and UN experiences with ‘nation-
building’; the US Institute of Peace volume Turbulent Peace; and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies report Winning the Peace. As ever, the gap
between the policy and scholarly literature remains a wide one. A rich scholarly
literature addresses nationalism and the historical processes of the formation of
nation-states in Europe (see, for example, Guibernau 1996 and Tilly 1975). Mention

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has already been made of the earlier literature examining the challenges of building
nation-states in various colonial and, more recently, post-colonial settings. It is hard
to find any references that addressing the practicalities of external assistance to the
building of national identities. This is largely because ‘nation-building’ in this sense
has not been a major focus in development assistance. Where it has arisen, it has
often been implicit or otherwise subsumed within broader ‘state-building’ programs.
The bibliography at the end of this paper provides an indicative – rather than
comprehensive - list of relevant policy and academic literature.

II. Evolution of the Concept of Nation-building

Despite its newly acquired prominence in contemporary international politics, the
practice of ‘nation-building’ has a lengthy history. A glance at how dramatically the
political map of the world has changed over the centuries provides ample evidence
that ‘nation-building’ has been around for a very long time indeed. The purpose of
the following discussion of the evolution of different forms of ‘nation-building’ is
(a) to acknowledge that the US-led military-style regime changes currently
underway in Iraq and Afghanistan under the rubric of ‘nation-building’ are
essentially distortions of what are otherwise reasonably sound, if by no means
precise, concepts and (b) to remind us of the importance of understanding the history
of earlier ‘nation-building’ exercises in order to better address today’s challenges
and (c) to make clear that a one-size-fits-all approach is wholly inappropriate in this
context and (d) to stimulate thinking about the critical elements that compromise
‘nationhood’ that can serve to inform a more development-oriented approach to
nation-building’ as envisaged in the recent White Paper.
Looking back at the 19th and 20th centuries indicates that the principal types of
‘nation-building’ with the most lasting impact on the modern world have been
nationalism and colonialism. Some have also proposed the post-World War II
reconstruction of Germany and Japan as examples of successful external ‘nation-
building’ but, as argued below, this is not a particularly convincing claim.

1. Nationalism

Nationalism was an important, though by no means the only, factor in the

development of the first European nation-states. The formation of nations in this part
of the world generally preceded the establishment of states. The theory propagated
by nationalist leaders at the time was that each nation, embodying a shared
community of culture and blood, was entitled to its own state. This brand of
nationalism contributed to the reunification of Italy in 1861 and Germany in 1871,
as well as to the break-up of Austria-Hungary in 1918. There were, of course, many
other factors involved. Building a sense of nation took a very long time - often
hundreds of years - and was almost invariably achieved through warfare and serious

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conflict as centralised administrations forcefully took over the role and authority of
smaller political units. It was the result not only of political leadership but also of
changes in technology and economic processes (the agricultural and then industrial
revolutions), as well as issues of communication, culture and civil society. ‘Nation-
building’ of this kind was most successful where governments were relatively
capable, where powerful states decided to make room for new entrants, and where
populations were not deeply divided. For example, Germany had a capable
government and was highly successful in forging a national identity. By contrast,
Yugoslavia was dramatically less successful as demonstrated by its disintegration in
the post-Cold War period

2. Colonialism and the creation of ‘States without Nation’

Processes of state-formation throughout most of what is now called the developing

world followed a very different trajectory to that of the original European model.
The manner in which these states were initially created has contributed greatly to the
challenges’ they have faced since gaining independence. During the 18th, 19th and
first half of the 20th centuries, the major European powers established dozens of
new states as they conquered vast swaths of territory. Arbitrary borders created
during this time typically contained a myriad of different peoples and autonomous
societies, often with lengthy histories of rivalry and animosity. Colonial states were
by definition non-democratic entities, and structured primarily to promote the
political and economic interests of the metropolitan powers rather than the
advancement of colonial subjects. Building a sense of common identity among the
indigenous subjects of these territories was not part of the colonial agenda. Indeed,
many colonial regimes used divide and rule tactics to maintain their domination and,
in the process, accentuated divisions among their subjects. Where nationalist
movements arose, these were often in the form of independence movements directed
at the overthrow of colonial rule. In other words, a sense of unity was more likely to
be generated by opposition to external intervention rather than because of it. In some
places, including Melanesian countries like PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, the
absence of significant independence movements perpetuated high levels of internal
diversity.
Few colonies were prepared for the challenges and responsibilities of
independent statehood. The institutions of the modern state were often assembled
hastily in the years preceding independence, with little familiarity or expertise to run
them among the local population. Economies remained skewed towards the interests
of departing colonial powers, essential infrastructure was often minimal, and in
many cases there was little sense of shared identity among the ‘citizens’ of the new
state. For most rural villagers, pre-colonial institutions associated with small-scale
‘stateless’ societies continued to provide the main point of reference in their daily
lives. In brief, the wave of decolonisation that commenced after the Second World
War created large numbers of what were, in effect, states without nations. Unlike the

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original European nation-states, the creation of state has preceded the building of
nation in much of the colonial and post-colonial world. The artificial and imposed
character of the state accounts for many of today’s problems.
The demise of authoritarian colonial regimes was often accompanied by the
emergence or re-surfacing of ethnic and regional divisions. Many new states were
plagues by what outsiders called 'tribalism'. Internal divisions and conflict
sometimes threatened the national integrity of newly independent countries, such as
the attempt by Biafra to secede from Nigeria. The division of Pakistan into Pakistan
and Bangladesh is another example where ethnic and religious differences, aided by
geographic distance, tore apart a post-colonial state. While less dramatic than
elsewhere, a wave of micro-nationalist and secessionist movements greeted the
creation of independent states in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu
respectively. In these and many other countries, political decentralisation - in the
form of provincial governments or other kinds of locally-directed administration -
was seen as an important instrument for promoting political participation and
national unity in the face of multiple pressures for local autonomy. The nation-
building dimensions of decentralisation were, for example, made explicit in the
deliberations of PNG’s Constitutional Planning Commission (CPC):

Creating a nation out of the bewildering diversity of PNG would only be

possible if opportunities for participation at the local level gave rise to the
confidence needed to participate in the wider state; suspicions of
neighbouring groups and apprehension – particularly on the part of both
relatively well-developed and relatively poorly-developed areas – about
independence resulting in loss of opportunities could only be overcome in
this way. In addition, in the absence of widespread nationalism the CPC
sought to foster national identity through an institutional ‘broker’ between
clan and local-level organizations on the one hand and the remote central
government on the other (May and Regan 1997, 11).

Nationalist rulers and intellectuals were confronted with the task of trying to
cultivate a sense of nation to legitimate their new states. This involved attempts to
transform the symbolic framework through which people experienced social reality
and was a cultural task as much as anything else. A common national identity
containing the myths and symbols around which people could unite was needed to
confer significance on the activities of the state, as well as on the civil life of its
citizens. As Geertz observes “the transfer of sovereignty from a colonial regime to
an independent one is more than a mere shift of power from foreign hands to native
ones; it is a transformation of the whole pattern of political life, a metamorphosis of
subjects into citizens” (1993). The shaping of nations throughout most of the
developing world has occurred on the basis of political, rather than ethnic,
communities. Creating a sense of shared community in these circumstances required
the integration of different groups through the infusion of a common language and

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culture. It also needed the development of a common consciousness and a common
political project concerning the future.
Such a project was often outlined in the broad vision of national development set
out in foundational documents like independence constitutions and in the writings of
nationalist intellectuals. The invocation of past memories and experiences is usually
integral to these nationalist visions. Nationalism invokes a common past and selects
and reinterprets certain events to increase a sense of coherence amongst diverse
multi-ethnic populations. Past, present and future are fused to bestow on the
community a sense of continuity upon which the new nation is founded. In the
Pacific islands, this kind of visioning drawing on a traditional past to chart the
national future is found in, often vague, notions like ‘the Pacific Way’ coined by
first prime minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, and ‘the Melanesian Way’
advocated by the PNG intellectual, Bernard Narakobi. An obvious difficulty in
developing national visions linking the pre-colonial past to the post-colonial future
is that pre-colonial history is itself often acutely fragmented and ethnicised,
containing many conflicts and wars between groups which now find themselves in
the same state. This contributes to the difficulties in overcoming the intrinsic
fragility of artificially created states founded upon a heterogeneous population. Most
of today's ‘failed’ states are a product of the vicissitudes of colonial history. The
absence of a coherent civil society capable of exercising some degree of
accountability towards weak post-colonial states in poly-ethnic societies continues
to be one of the greatest obstacles to the stability of emergent nation-states.
There have of course been some cases where the colonial experience helped
foster national identity in the post-independence period. An example would be
India's experience of an extended period of colonial rule under the British. This
contributed to India's sense of itself as a single, unified political space (despite
subsequent religious partitioning). It also contributed to its acquisition of a common
language, a civil service and bureaucratic tradition, an army and other institutions
that were critical to the emergence of a democratic India after independence in 1947.

3. Post-World War II Reconstruction

The reconstruction and transformation of West Germany and Japan into democratic
states by the U.S. and allied powers following World War II is often cited as the
most successful ‘nation-building’ exercise ever undertaken by external powers. This
claim is hard to sustain on a number of grounds. Although defeated and destroyed,
these countries had strong nationalist sentiments (arguably too strong!), state
traditions and highly competent government personnel. The high level of education
and industrial know-how in both countries helped launch their economic recovery in
a manner that is inconceivable almost anywhere else. West Germany and Japan
were, in other words, already mature nation-states. They were both ethnic and
cultural communities as well as political states. What occurred was a re-legitimation
of the new governments on a democratic basis, with the drafting of democratic

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constitutions, and this was eventually followed by assistance in economic
development.

4. The Cold War and Beyond

The Cold War saw intense rivalry between the world's two major ideological blocs.
On the one hand, this entailed efforts to support 'friendly' states, often with little
concern about the integrity, effectiveness and legitimacy of incumbent governments.
On the other hand, it included equally questionable attempts to undermine or
destabilise 'unfriendly' administrations. ‘Nation-building’, in any sense, was not a
priority in the politics of the Cold War.
The most recent wave of external interventions has taken place against the
growing incidence of internal conflict and state failure mainly in developing
countries - but also in many of the former Eastern bloc countries - after the end of
the Cold War. Numerous conflicts that had been effectively frozen during the Cold
War erupted and this led to a steady deterioration of political conditions.
International humanitarian missions under the auspices of the UN multiplied in the
1990s and met with mixed results. The events of 9/11 and subsequent ascendancy of
the 'war on terror' has imbued recent international nation-building efforts with a
distinct security character. Whereas in the past, state failure was viewed primarily in
humanitarian and developmental terms, viewing them through the prism of the 'war
on terror' has recast them primarily in security terms.

III. ‘Nation-Building’ from a Development Perspective

1. The object of ‘nation-building’

The object of ‘nation-building’ from a development perspective can be said to

comprise three related elements:

(a) Firstly, the development of an effectively functioning state that is accepted – that
is, accorded legitimacy - by the bulk of its citizens. Central to this are the
functions of securing a monopoly of force, guaranteeing security for the
population and neighbouring countries, the rule of law, and the provision of
public assets. These are fundamental attributes of statehood and - although not
the full story - constitute a necessary foundation for ‘nation-building’.
(b) Secondly, ‘nation-building’ also requires a physical, social and communications
infrastructure that is shared by the entire civil society. These assets must be
accessible for all groups of the population and be used by them for transactions
and communication. It is difficult to build a sense of nation in a country
containing regions or areas whose inhabitants are effectively cut-off – physically
and socially – from the rest of the ‘national’ population.

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(c) In addition to these conventional ‘state-building’ components, ‘nation-building’
further presupposes a socio-cultural structuring and integration process leading
to shared characteristics of identity, values and goals. It is not so much the
homogeneity of these characteristics that is crucial, rather it is the acceptance and
toleration of heterogeneity and the facilitation of inclusion. The relevant phrase
used in Papua New Guinea – one of the most socio-linguistically diverse
countries in the word - is “unity in diversity”.

2. The subject of ‘nation-building’

The subject of ‘nation-building’ is the community of citizens that together wants to

form a nation and assume responsibility for this process.
‘Nation-building’ cannot be built solely from the top-down but requires the
active participation of ordinary citizens in the shaping of a common political will. It
is the citizens who must provide the necessary legitimacy to the new state.
Commitment to the common good and to a shared community are essential because
effective collective decision-making often entails imposing on various participants
sacrifices for the common good (eg. to protect the environment for future
generations). If these sacrifices are not backed up by shared values and bonds, the
key elements of community, they will not be treated as legitimate and hence will
either have to be brought about through force, or will not be effectively achieved.
Citizenship is another critical foundation that sustains the modern nation-state.
The working of key institutions such as, for example, the justice and political
systems, is largely dependent on individuals accepting and understanding their status
as citizens with the rights and responsibilities that this entails. Citizenship provides
the basis of the social contract binding individuals to a particular nation-state and
vice versa. Where individual identities and allegiances are founded primarily on
membership of ethnic and other highly localised groups, these can weaken or
undermine the sense of membership of a larger political community. Loyalties to
ethnic group, tribe or clan, remain deeply embedded in many places and in some,
such as the Melanesian countries, are often more important to rural villagers than
membership of the modern nation-state. Where states have never functioned
effectively or have ceased to do so, the appeal of sub-national identities is likely to
persists or even be strengthened, in the process weakening efforts to build a sense of
national community.

3. Practical ways of supporting national integration

There is no blueprint for successful ‘nation-building’ in this broader sense and the
role for external assistance is necessarily a modest and indirect one. Building a
community of shared interests and identity has to be driven by local actors. ‘Nation-
building’ is also an inherently complex and continuing task that does not fit easily

9
into pre-determined analytical frameworks and timeframes set by external parties. At
best, external assistance can help facilitate internal processes aimed at integrating
groups and regions into a national community. The ‘do no harm’ principle of
development assistance (Anderson 1999), translates into the avoidance of initiatives
that fragment and divide local populations and the active pursuit of policies that
promote national integration. Much of the development work currently supported by
external donors in areas such as governance, law and justice, education,
infrastructure development and so on can contribute to the building of national
cohesion. Given that the post-colonial state has to play the critical role in developing
the ideological and institutional infrastructure needed for nationhood, external
support for ‘state-building’ activities is itself an indirect contributor to ‘nation-
building’.

a. Building Nation Through Strengthening Civic Awareness and Civil Society

Civil society is the realm of citizen activities independent of the state and beyond the
household. It comprises organised groups or associations formed voluntarily by
members of society to protect or advance their interests, values and identities. It is
now widely accepted that civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a critical role
in developing the social and political capacities of the poor, increasing the
effectiveness in influencing governance institutions and making the latter more
responsive to needs. Supporting civil society can include measures that promote
access to information, freedom of expression, developing pro-poor associations, as
examining barriers against political inclusion of the poor.

b. Building Nation Through Enhancing Political Participation

Enhancing political participation is a pre-requisite for building a coherent national

community. Political participation can be enhanced structurally by decentralisation
aimed at enhancing access to the state and making it more responsive to local needs.
This is particularly the case in socially and geographically fragmented countries
where state resources remain concentrated in particular areas and remote from the
bulk of the population. One idea that has been adopted in some deeply divided
societies such as Somalia has been the concept of “building-blocks”, using a
decentralised approach to ‘nation-building’, rather than continuing with discredited
efforts that concentrate on trying to produce a unified administration in one go.
Similar thinking lies behind continuing efforts at decentralisation in the Pacific
islands.
Enabling ordinary citizens to participate in and influence decision-making
processes, especially at local levels, is a key aspect of good governance and effective
nation-building. During the 1990s, discourse on participation originally focused on
community or social participation as ‘beneficiaries; in development project. In 1995,
the World Bank Learning Group on Participation defined participation as a “process

10
through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives
and the decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1995). This
requires an emphasis on engaging people as citizens in activities that traditionally
formed part of the state sphere. Among other things, increased political participation
will improve the efficiency of public services, will make government more
accountable, and will deepen democracy – complementing representative forms with
more participatory forms of democracy.

IV. Building National Communities through Active Citizenship –

Some Implications for Aid Practice
Building national communities requires effective states that, in turn, require
empowered citizens. Donor policy should strengthen the role of active citizens.
More active engagement by citizens with the state can help make it more
accountable, especially to disadvantaged groups. Donors can help build state-citizen
relationships in diverse country contexts by giving careful thought to the aid
instruments they use, what they fund, and how they deploy staff.

Categories of Citizen Action

a. Citizenship awareness – leads to better informed people who can understand
their rights and are able to constructively and effectively claim them through
collective action and political processes.
b. Citizenship participation in Civil Society Organisations – can contribute to
critically (self)reflective democratic and accountable CSOs that are responsive to the
rights, values, aspirations, interests and priorities of the constituencies.
c. Citizen participation in local development and service delivery – results not only
in better services but can also serve as a learning ground for new forms of
cooperation between state officials, politicians and citizens. Research shows that this
approach is as important in fragile post-conflict states as in more stable
environments.

Options for Policy and Practice

State-building and pro-poor change can occur through social movements that are
contesting established values and structural power relations. On this basis, CSOs
that challenge the status quo could warrant support. But support must be
designed so that donors’ procedural and reporting requirements do not
undermine the capacity of citizen’s groups to work together on their own
agendas.

At the same time, it is important that donors’ interventions do not undermine
citizens’ own efforts at problem solving and put at risk the very autonomy that
donors value about civil society. For example, small grants can often be more
effective than larger sums that can lead to donors’ agendas becoming too

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 dominant.

Consideration should be given to funding public space for debate (eg. dialogue
forums), while providing support to those in civil society who help the most
marginalised gain the confidence to make their voices heard. Inviting
marginalised groups is necessary but not sufficient in situations of unequal
power relations (eg. gender relations).

Donors need to be aware that a parallel funding approach runs the risk of placing
state and civil society as polar opposites, missing opportunities to support
networks and organizations that straddle the state/society divide.

Donors can support groups working across state/society boundaries by brokering
connections. Ultimately this is more effective than programs that focus solely on
either governance (state) reform or civil society (society) building. DFID in Peru
has used its strategic impact fund very effectively to support policy networks in
this way (DFID 2005).

More long-term grant support to autonomous research institutions can strengthen
the capacity for evidence-based policy making that is genuinely driven by local,
rather than donor, generated agendas.

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