SCRIPT
In December 1971, a short but fierce war was fought between India and Pakistan
that lasted a little less than two weeks. The war changed the importance of Indian
Navy in the eyes of the defence planners forever. It was crucial from the maritime
standpoint as the Indian Navy played a decisive role in defeating the enemy. It all
began with a feeble attempt by Pakistan as a pre-emptive strike on Indian airfields
and elsewhere at dusk on the 3rd of December 1971 and ended with an
UNCONDITIONAL surrender of the East Pakistan's Armed Forces to their Indian
counterparts on 16th December 1971. Hence, was born a new South Asian nation,
Bangladesh. The conflict of 1971 for the liberation of Bangladesh remains one of the
most significant chapters in the history of Indian military. The war not only forged the
contemporary constitution of Bangladesh but also continues to shape the mind-set of
Bangladeshi citizens till this very day.
Respected ________________________________________, a very warm welcome
to all. Team Dega stands before you today, to deliver a talk on Indian Navy's
Operations in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 War.
The aim of this presentation is to bring out the significance of Maritime Operations
during the 1971 Indo-Pak War while deriving valuable lessons for the leaders of the
future.
SCOPE
To analyze and understand an event, it is crucial to look into its genesis and history.
Therefore, we would like to start off the presentation by emphasizing upon the
political developments leading up to the war.
Having familiarised with the historical events, we will elaborate the intricacies
involved in the planning and conduct of the Indian Naval Operations on the Eastern
Seaboard and their aftermath.
We will then advance on to the analysis of the campaign while drawing comparisons
with the Principles of War, so as to derive valuable lessons which can be imbibed for
a better conduct of operations in the future.
1. Political Developments
a. Partition
Following the devastating effects of World War II, the British had to give up their
control over the Indian subcontinent leading to its partition in 1947. The partition was
eventually set forth in the Indian Independence Act of 1947, resulting in the
dissolution of the British Raj. Being a Muslim majority area, Bangladesh was
integrated as East Pakistan. Despite the massive geographical distance, cultural and
linguistic differences, religious affinity was given priority.
b. Discrimination by West Pak
The partition itself, according to leading politicians such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah
(leader of the All India Muslim League), and Jawaharlal Nehru (leader of the Indian
National Congress), should have resulted in peaceful relations. The Muslims of
Bengal hoped that in the new Muslim state they would finally achieve a better
standard of life. Given their past inferiority to Hindu landlords, Bengal Muslims were
looking forward to the West-Pakistani government to ensure their fundamental rights.
However, events did not unfold as the Bengali people had hoped. The West-
Pakistani government proved even more discriminatory towards the people of East-
Pakistan in all spheres of life - social, political and economic.
c. Political Discrimination :-
The political representation of the different ethnic groups was not equal in the central
government in West Pakistan and was dominated by the elite groups. The
government’s headquarters were established in the Western Wing. Minority ethnic
groups, such as the Bengali population, did not have significant representation in the
government. Consequently, control over state-owned organizations, governmental
mechanisms and the armed forces were in the hands of the dominant ethnic group.
The Bengali population did not even have satisfactory political representation in their
own province. Even for higher government posts such as “Governor-General,”
Bengalis were not considered good enough.
At the initial stages of the government’s creation, the West-Pakistanis sought various
mechanisms to avoid handing over power to East Bengal, which harboured the
majority in terms of population size. The elites of West-Pakistan tried several ways to
capture the control and succeeded in their attempts to dominate East Bengal through
the central government in West-Pakistan. However, the power struggle continued
between different political parties and the Western elites were forced to accept the
role of Bengalis in politics, through the process of creating and abandoning several
drafts of the National Assembly, that gave Bengalis a satisfactory share of
representation in the constitution of 1956. Before this could yield any positive
outcome for the unification of the two wings of Pakistan, the country fell prey to
military rule and previous assemblies were again dissolved.
d. Social Discrimination:-
Since the very formation of Pakistan, the Western part branded the Eastern as
inferior, because it considered the Muslims in the Eastern Wing subordinate due to
their social and cultural affiliation with the Hindu population, which were powerful,
rich and dominating in East-Pakistan before the partition of the subcontinent. The
West-Pakistani government was critical about the intimacy between the Muslim and
the Hindu population. Even though the Muslims of the East Wing supported the
partition, they were not willing to give up their own culture or language for the sake of
becoming a Pakistani as envisioned by the elite of West-Pakistan. The West-
Pakistani government remained insensitive to the cultural sentiments of the East-
Pakistani people. The selection of a national Pakistani language became a
contentious issue since the onset of its genesis. Denying Bengali its status of a State
language and its intended extinction were unacceptable to the Bengali people.
Continuous political, economic and social exploitation took part before Bangladesh
could achieve its Independence.
e. International Developments.
The developments in the international arena were also taking place very rapidly. In
June 1971, the US administration informed PM Indira Gandhi that in the event of a
Chinese attack on India, the US won't be able to come to her rescue like it did during
1962 war. This led to the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship, peace
and cooperation in the month of August 1971. One of the main objectives of India in
concluding the treaty with Soviet Union was to make sure that the Soviets would stop
arms supply to Pakistan and that India would be the sole beneficiary of Soviet
military hardware. The Indian government also expected unqualified Soviet support
in its confrontation with Pakistan
PRECURSOR TO THE REAL ACTION
a. Triggering Point
It was not until 1970 that the Bengalis saw a ray of hope, when General Yahya Khan
came to power. He promised to hold the first General Elections in Pakistan and
eventually fulfilled his pledge in 1970. For the first time in history, a political group
from East Pakistan was to gain power in Pakistan. However, dominant political
leaders of the political parties in the Western Wing including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of
Pakistan’s Peoples Party and other army officials convinced Gen Yahya Khan to
cancel the National Assembly. The cancellation announcement on 1st March 1971,
triggered a civil unrest spread over East Pakistan and mass demonstrations flooded
the streets. The spark of Liberation War of Bangladesh was ignited.
b. Operation Searchlight
It was a planned campaign of mass genocide in East Pakistan aimed to arrest and
kill unarmed, innocent Bengalis in a single night to suppress the Bengali nationalist
movement, and subsequently eliminate all opposition, political or military, within a
month. The immediate focus of the operation was on arresting students and teachers
of Dhaka University as well as political activists of East Pakistan. They planned to
disconnect East Pakistan from the entire world by capturing radio stations, telephone
exchanges, armed force bases and disrupting the foreign consulates. The
operational premises were very clear and conditions for success was to eliminate
any one with any connection with Awami League or those who supported the
movement of the martial law. On the night of 25th Mar 1971, East Pakistan witnessed
one of the cruellest genocides and massive bloodsheds in history. East Pakistan
Army under General Tikka Khan struck against the Bengali community with the
vengeance and brutality that has few parallels in history. The immediate fallout of the
military operations was the mass exodus of Bengalis into India, a vast majority of
them being Hindus, which were particularly targeted by the military. By the end of
Operation Searchlight, civilian death toll was estimated to be three million, with
roughly 10 million refugees fleeing to India.
THE REAL BATTLE
a. Pre-Planning
There was phenomenal requirement of logistics for the entire administrative and
military machinery. Pakistan would be facing a dire situation in the East with respect
to the line of retreat from the land back to west. If Indian Navy could exercise some
level of control of the Bay of Bengal, it would ensure that there would be neither a
line of ingress nor egress to and from East Pakistan. Troops and logistic support
together with their naval escorts at sea could be annihilated, thus bottling up East
Pakistan completely. The entire area of Bay of Bengal was considered to be the
Area of Operations for the Indian Navy in the Eastern Seaboard. Denial of use of the
oceanic route to and from East Pakistan was the focus area of the Indian Navy and
thereafter graduating to carrying out strikes from sea towards the latter part of the
engagement.
Tasks allotted to the IN. The task allotted to the IN were:-
       (a)    Carry out strikes on airfields, fuel dumps, installations at Cox’s Bazaar,
       Chittagong, Khulna & Chalna.
       (b)    Choking the SLOCs of East Pak.
       (c)    Provide gunfire support.
       (d)    Encircle retreating Pak forces through amphibious landings south of
       Cox’s Bazaar.
b. Plan of Action
The security of the aircraft carrier Vikrant had to be ensured at all costs. By a careful
analysis of the submarine threat, it became evident that Pakistan would deploy its
most powerful submarine PNS Ghazi with the sole aim of destroying Vikrant. There
would be more reliance on deception and other measures against the underwater
threat, while the air threat would be tackled by the Indian Air Force. The plan of
action for the Eastern Fleet would constitute of the following actions: -
   (a) Attack from sea on Chittagong harbour.
   (b) Attack from sea on Cox’s Bazaar, Chulna, Khulna and Mongla.
   (c) Destruction of enemy shipping off the ports of East Pakistan and at sea.
   (d) Subsequent and similar offensive actions on opportunity targets
   (e) Diversionary or real amphibious landing.
c. Onset of War
On the evening of 3rd December 1971, Pakistan attacked several Indian cities by
aerial strikes. The administrative authorities of Vishakhapatnam were asked to order
a total and immediate blackout switching off all navigational lights including the
Dolphin   Nose    lighthouse   by   Eastern   Naval   Command.     The   orders   for
commencement of hostilities against Pakistan had been received in ENC Maritime
Operations room. The shore defences of Vishakhapatnam were put on alert and the
coast battery was brought to the first degree of readiness.
d. The Lurking Hunter and the Destroyer.
The Pakistan Navy had deployed its Daphne class submarine PNS Ghazi on a
mission to target INS Vikrant. PNS Ghazi left Karachi on 14 November on her
marauding mission
….to be decided
e. Aerial Strike on East
On the morning of 4 December, Vikrant and her ships were within striking distance of
Cox’s Bazaar. At 11 AM the eight Seahawks screamed off the deck of Vikrant and
pounded the Cox’s Bazar airfield, which was heavily devastated. The continuing
night raids by the Alizes kept up the unceasing pressure. Orders were given for
continuous raids on the port towns of Chittagong, Dohazari, Chalna, Khulna and
Mongla.
On 8th December, the Alizes carried out a night attack under moonlight conditions. A
strike of six Seahawks was undertaken on the Barisal, Bakarganj and Patuakhali
areas. Three enemy barges, laden with troops, arms and equipment were destroyed
and, in addition, substantial damage was imparted on the Pakistani troop
concentration and gun positions.
The Birth of MuktiBahini.
On 9th December, a commando operation was launched under Commander M. N.
Samant of Indian Navy in which men from MuktiBahini took part. Commander
Samant was appointed as the senior officer of ‘Force Alpha’ with instruction to
liberate Khulna, Mongla and Chalna. They entered the ports of Chalna and Khulna
and attacked the enemy forces.
LESSONS LEARNT
General
       The campaign that was conducted for the liberation of Bangladesh in the East
and containing our adversary in the West was a great achievement by any
standards. While recounting the program of ops through the 14 day long Indo - Pak
war of 1971, one comes across a series of imp lessons for the posterity. Some of
these lessons are enumerated in succeeding paras. The entire Indian state worked
in harmony & stood united to thwart Pak attempts at the political, diplomatic &
military level.
Defence Mechanism
       The imp principles on which country’s higher defence mechanism should be
based on are as under: -
       (a)        The civ authority must be supreme & well informed & conversant with
       the mechanism of defence. It should have well organised institutions to
       impose its will through direct orders & continuation of funds.
       (b)        There should be a well-defined civil machinery consisting of qualified
       persons to formulate the country’s defence policy at the ministerial level.
       (c)    The organisation for giving professional military advice to the national
       policy makers, through stat assessments, should consist of the persons who
       should also be responsible for executing the country’s mil policy.
       (d)    The relationship between b & c above, i.e., between the civ machinery
       and the professional advisers must be well defined & unambiguous. Team
       work between the civ & the mil experts within the given resources is as imp as
       coop amongst the three services, to generate military effort of any
       consequence.
Selection & Maintenance of Aim
Selection of Dhaka as the final objective to meet the political aim in the East was
maintained throughout & all the ops were directed towards that end.          In      the
final analysis, it was abundantly clear that Pak was forced into war w/o any national
aim. Planning at the national level was altogether missing. This reinforced the
principal of sound political aim & effective military strategy to win war.
Direct Style of Command
There was no adhering to a rigid plan. Instructions given were that whichever thrust
or thrusts looked like being the winner, should be explored. The Army Cdr had
implicit faith in the Cdrs & troops which laid the foundation of the victory. In Pak
between 1955 & 1971, those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of
outlook were invariably removed from service. As a result, Yahya Khan was
surrounded by a coterie of officers who were incapable of taking decisions & not
morally strong to use their authority.
Security & Intelligence
In the Eastern Sector, we had developed an efficient intelligence network with the
help of Mukti Bahini & local population. Unlike on the previous two occasions this
time the nature of security threat & the countermeasures needed to neutralise it,
were clearly discernible to our political & military planners’ months in advance. Indian
forces from the earliest days of confrontation on the borders were almost invariably
in possession of detail info regarding LOC. The lightening campaign proved the imp
of intelligence. One of the reasons why the swift bypassing moves during the
campaign were so effective was the availability of info at every stage of the battle.
Once the Indians had broken the Pakistani code, India was able to conduct an
intelligence action by a combination of psychological warfare & deception to adopt a
course beneficial to Indian interest.
Morale
This was a major battle winning factor. The morale of Indian troops was very high
from the word go & continued to be same throughout. On the other hand, Pak had a
poor state of morale due to weak leadership, inconsistent policies & lack of faith in
the cause of the war.