Tobias v.

Abalos 239 SCRA 106

Facts:

Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of

Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the
law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.

The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill
provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second,
it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond
that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5.
Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that
the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional

district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section
49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards
to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its
conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.

Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, October 6, 2000

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, June 26, 2001

Facts:

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which

approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on
their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

Ruling:
 Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which
is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be

disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the
COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party list
applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

FACTS:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc. BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and
 mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of
party list representatives provided by the Constitution.

The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats
of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC formula.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation
and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing
the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling

Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat is constitutional

How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?

RULING:

The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives

cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Sen. Benigno Aquino v. Commission on Elections, April, 7, 2010

Facts:

Petitioners Benigno Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo contended R.A. No.
9716 which originated from House Bill No. 4264 that was signed by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on October 12, 2009. The said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur.

Petitioners also add that R.A. 9716 runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative
district. The petioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis.
They, the petitioners, claim that the reconfiguration by R.A. No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 173,383.

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal
of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds. On procedural
matters the petitioners were said guilty of two (2) fatal defects: 1) they committed error
in choosing to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari
and Prohibition under rule 65 of the Rules of Court; 2) the petitioners have no locus
standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9716. And on substantive matters, the
respondendts calls attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces
drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The court focused more on the arguments on their content and substance, that
the issue of overreaching signifance to society is much more important.

Issue:

Whether or not a population of 250,00 is an indipensable constitutional

requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Held:

We deny the petition. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district.

Based on the Local Government Code, the requirement of population is not an

indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable
income requirement.

Rai Sandra Sema v. Commission on Elections, July 16, 2008

Facts:

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative

districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of
Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No.
6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in
the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
 Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus,
what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part
of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff
Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).

Sema who was a candidate in May 2007 elections for Representative of “Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City” prayed for the nullification of resolution and exclusion
from canvassing of votes in cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that
Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to 1 representative in Congress.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 19, Art.6 of RA 9054 delegating to ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is
constitutional.

Ruling:

The petitions have no merit. The Court rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

COMELEC en banc v. AKB etal., April 23, 2013

Facts:

This is the consolidation of cases filed against The Commission on Election

which constitutes 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
COMELEC disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and showed their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.

The COMELEC disqualified AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-
PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO,
AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA,
KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP,
BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st
KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the said elections.
However, these groups were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of
the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This
Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54
consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
elections.

Ruling:

No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two afore stated cases. The COMELEC
must use the following parameters: Three different groups may participate in the party-
list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been
the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing.The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is not
reserved for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-
defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for
small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system.
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 300

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the

position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995 providing information in Item No. 8 of Certificate of
Candidacy declaring her residency in Leyte to be seven months. On March 23, 1995,
private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement
for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made
by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of
Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
cancelling the certificate of candidacy." On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s
proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended
in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. In a Supplemental Petition
dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to
satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Ruling:
Yes. The court is in favour of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte. Residence is synonymous with
domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo
lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favour of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence,
not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May
25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Aquino v. Comelec 248 SCRA 400

Facts:

Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City on March 20,
1995. In his certificate of candidacy, the petitioner stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district for 10 months. On April 24, 1995, Respondents Move Makati, a
duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP
of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. A day after said petition
for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending
the certificate. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided
in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one year and thirteen days.
Aquino was allowed to run on the May 8 elections and won the said elections. On May
10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc
issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. Aquino then filed a Petition of
Certiorari assailing the suspension orders.

Issue:
 Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency
requirement mandated by Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution of against the
petitioner is valid.

Ruling:

COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement mandated

by Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution against the petitioner is valid. The
Supreme Court agrees with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter
"must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. “Petitioner
in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of
the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during
his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile
of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.” While property ownership is not and should
never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner
himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact,
of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire new residence or domicile "but only
to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City."
Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin
is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. The petition was therefore dismissed.
Co v. HRET 199 SCRA 692

Facts:

Petitioners Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co filed a petition for certiorari asking the
HRET to reverse and set aside its decision with regards to the case of private
respondent, Filipino-Chinese, Jose Ong Jr. Petitioners questioned HRET’s decision
declaring private respondent as a natural born citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar. Petitioners, together private respondent vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar. Respondent Ong
was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said district.

Petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:

Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born Citizen;

Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Ong Jr was a natural born citizen.

Whether or not Jose Ong Jr. was a resident of Laoang Northern Samar.

Ruling:

Article IV of the Philippine constitution provides the requisites in order for one to
be considered as a natural born citizen of the country.

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having
been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. Records clearly
showed that Ong was born to a natural born Filipino mother.
 With regards to the private respondent’s residence, the domicile of origin of the
private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present.

Petition was dismissed; the court reaffirms HRET’s decision, Jose Ong. Jr is a
natural born Filipno and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779

Facts:
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo an elected Representative of Lanao del Sur in 1987
decided to file a certificate of candidacy to run for Governor of Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao in the year 1990.
Speaker of the House Hon. Mitra removed Dimaporo’s name in the roll of
members in the House of Representatives, when he decided to run for another position,
pursuant to section 67 article IX of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 881.
When Dimaporo lost the election he then wrote and later petitioned to resume
duties as the representative of Lanao Del Sur, arguing that cutting his term short is
unconstitutional, stating merely filing a certificate of candidacy did not constitute
renunciation of his position as Congressman as he still did not hold a official position as
governor.
Issue:
Is the filing of certificate of candidacy can be considered as “voluntary
renunciation” under Section 7 paragraph 2 Article VI of the Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes, Section 67 article IX of B.P Blg.881 that considers the filing of certificate of
candidacy as resignation from previous office, is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation stated in par. 2 Section 7 Article VI of the constitution.
Furthermore, court added that it was a mere shortening of “tenure” meaning the
number of years in actual service not the cutting of “term” which is fixed number of
years for the position. This is to uphold public trust, and encourage officials to finish their
terms in public office.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876

Facts:
This is a civil action for the plaintiffs Colonel. Nicanor Jimenez for damages
against a libelous letter of defendant Hon. Bartolome Cabangbang a member of the
House of Representatives. The said letter was published in several Newspapers of
general circulation.
Defendant claims that the letter is not libelous and is a “Privileged
communication” in a session of Congress therefore he is not liable for any damages, as
stated in section 11, article VI of the constitution.
Issue:
Can the letter be considered as a “privileged communication”?
Ruling:
No, the letter was revealed in November 14, 1958, when the Congress was
presumed to be not in session when the defendant caused the publication of the letter.
The phrase “any speech or debate in the Congress” in Section 15, Article VI of
the constitution refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions within a session, so the letter of the defendant is absolutely not
privileged. Petition is dismissed.

People v. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689

Facts:

Accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos is a Congressman confined at the national

penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos argued that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress, and therefore, as a covenant
with his constituents made through the intervention of the State, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. Such, according to him, cannot be defeated
by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Issue:

Whether or not a Congressman may be exempt from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in order to perform his functions as a member of
Congress?

Ruling:

No. In spite the importance of election as the expression of the sovereign power
of the people, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. All top officials of Government—executive, legislative and
judicial are subject to the majesty of law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred
from the duties of a position.
The Constitutional provision granting an immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators, members of the House of Representatives as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. The exemption applies only to civil
arrests because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace.
To protect the public, a congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from
arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal, x x x For offenses punishable by more than six
years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
Moreover, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Antero Pobre v. Sen. Mirriam Defensor-Santiago, Aug. 25, 2009
Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133, 143-145

Facts:

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
who are currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended
by Republic Act No. 1797.

On June 21, 1957, R.A No. 910 which provides retirement pensions for Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals was amended by Sec. 3-A of R.A
1797, which provides that the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers
and enlisted members of the AFP. However, President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree 644 authorizing the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries.

Upon realizing the discrimination and unfairness of the said decree, Congress
approved a bill entitled House Bill No. 16297 which seeks the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. President
Aquino, however vetoed the said bill on the ground that according to her "it would erode
the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and
enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic
Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She
further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of
officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential
treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."

Issue:

Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional or valid.

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
needs require. They must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge
of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers.

In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for
augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly
in consonance with the above stated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs
the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in
contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."

Puyat v. De Guzman 113 SCRA 31

Facts:

After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo
warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for
respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional
ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,”
and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon

request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’
purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI
shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to
intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, may

intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution
( now Section 14, Article VI of 1987 Constitution).

Held:

No, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His

appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI
in respect of the matter in litigation.

The prohibition is contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution (now
Section 14, Art. VI of 1987 Constitution) To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. A ruling upholding the
"intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
prohibited.
Santiago v. Guingona 298 SCRA 756

Facts:

The Senate, presided by Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña, convened on July 27,
1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress for the election of officers.
Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the
position of Senate President. By vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared
President of the Senate.

With the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Senator Tatad

established, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for
him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also
manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP with seven
members, had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, received a letter from the seven members
of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority
leader. The Senate President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of
the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, which
according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No. The Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and
a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by Section 16
Article VI of the constitution. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by the Supreme Court.
 The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, at any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature that it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work.

To agree to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial

legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for
this argument alone, the petition would easily fail. In the end, the petition is hereby
dismissed

Osmeña v. Pendatun, supra

Facts:

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A

Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia
and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the
lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and
that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to
disciplinary actions by the lower house. Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said
resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.

Issue:

Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

Held:

No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary

immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s
petition is dismissed.

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, January 28, 1997

FACTS:
On January 21, 1976, Paredes, Jr., Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, applied
for a free patent for a land, Lot No. 3097 and was favorably granted upon by the Land
Inspector. Eight years later, Lot No. 3097 had been designated and reserved as a
school site. On June 27, 1984, Resolution No. 40 was passed to recover the said land
from Attorney Paredes. A perjury charge, Civil Case No. 512 was filed against Attorney
Paredes, Jr. by the Republic in the Regional Trial Court. On October 28, 1986, a former
vice-mayor filed with the Tanodbayan a criminal complaint and was referred to Fiscal
Brocoy for preliminary investigation, charging Attorney Paredes with having violated
Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly
used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce the Land
Inspector to favorably indorse his free patent application. Fiscal Brocoy issued
summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. however, the summons did not reach Attorney
Paredes. Nevertheless, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. Fiscal issued a resolution finding a
prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019. Attorney Paredes filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution but was denied. On 1988, Attorney Paredes
was elected governor of Agusan del Sur. The RTC rendered a decision annulling
Governor Paredes’ Free Patent and restoring the land to public domain. On August 28,
1988, an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan and a
warrant for his arrest with fixing bail. He refused to post bail in “protest against the
injustice to him as Governor”. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife against
the Sandiganbayan alleging that the warrant for her husband’s arrest was void because
the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information
against him had already prescribed. On the other hand, the Ombudsman argued that
the Sandiganbayan was improperly made respondent in this case because it does not
have custody of Governor Paredes.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation affects the court's
jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No. A remedy is that if there is no preliminary investigation and the defendant,

before entering his plea, calls the attention of the court to the absence of a preliminary
investigation, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so
that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. Moreover, whether the crime may
still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a
special proceeding of habeas corpus..
U.S. v. Pons 34 PHIL 729

Facts:

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the
steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine.
The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered
5barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the
said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed
merchant( Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of
opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and
Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act
2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He
said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at12MN on February 28,
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
Ruling:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against
the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC
passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 SCRA 347

Facts:

Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., which is engaged in the

manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood
and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues several
times in November and December 1959, and paid therefor the aforementioned margin
fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign
exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor. Prior thereto, petitioner
had sought the refund of the first sum and second sum relying upon Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of
the Bank, respondent Pedro Gimenez refused to pass in audit and approve said
vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for
petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the
provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609.

Issue:

Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment
of the aforesaid margin fee.

Ruling:

No, "urea" and "formaldehyde" are not exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee. "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently
distinct and different from “urea” and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends,
however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"
between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress
intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But,
said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less
do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives.

Arroyo v. De Venecia 277 SCRA 268

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation
of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected
to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker
Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the
Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not, R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was pass in violation of
the rules of the House.

Held:
The Supreme Court finds no ground for holding that congress committed grave
abuse of discretion in enacting Republic Act 8240. It is clear from the facts of the case
that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. 8240 are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House rather than the constitutional requirement for
the enactment of a law, that is, Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987 Constitution,
pertaining to the existence of the quorum.

Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No. 7198 by
speaker of the House and President of the Senate and certification by secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of
its due enactment. In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
dismissed.
Lazatin v. HRET 168 SCRA 391

Facts:

During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent Lorenzo Timbol objected to the
inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on
his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the
COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to
proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect.
Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation
void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming
office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume
office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's
proclamation void ab initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's
proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in
accordance with Sec 9 of the HRET Rules.

Issue:

Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?

Held:

Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code is misplaced. The COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials
[Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the
ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the
HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not
only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of
the Constitution itself. Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed
within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to
hear the case.

Bondoc v. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the
LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of
whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a
decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the
LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping
to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in
Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from
the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:

May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of
a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein?

RULING:
 No. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence
from the political party to which they belong. Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11
of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal
as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. Hence,
disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
“conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.

Chavez v. Comelec 211 SCRA 315

Pimentel v. HRET 393 SCRA 227

Facts:

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. This sought to promote
the proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a Party-list system in pursuant of Sec. 2 of R.A. 7941.

On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national

elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including
APEC, ABA, COOP-NATCCO, AKBAYAN, and ABANSE. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11,
1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives
to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties.

On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of
the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives
to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, 12 and against the CA,
its Chairman and Members.13 Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET,14 and 2.4 seats in the CA.15Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its
Resolution of February 8, 2000, 16 the Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R.
No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.

Issue:

Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the HRET.

Ruling:

No. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the

prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would
fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal.

Rep. Jovito Palparan, Jr. v. HRET, Feb. 11, 2010

FACTS:

Shortly after the elections and after the victory of Jovito Palparan Jr as the
representative of Partylist Bantay, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner
Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that
Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Palparan is eligible to represent Bantay in Congress

RULING:

The court upheld the following provisions:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.1avvphi1
 In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent.

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a

nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon
and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized
and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Walden F. Bello v. COMELEC, Dec. 7, 2010

Facts:

On November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, on
March 23, 2010, AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of
Acceptance of its nominees. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807 which prescribed
the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for
purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections. In order not to be disqualified, they must prove
that the party-list group and the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent. Mikey Arroyo was one of the party’s nominees. Here
arose several questions regarding his qualification for, he is not only a member of the
First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives.
Two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s
representative in the House of Representatives. On September 7, 2010, the HRET took
cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to
the two petitions.

Issue:

Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as
AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the
House of Representatives

Ruling:

Yes. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office;
they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party.

In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already
been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions for quo
warranto against Arroyo, now pending before the HRET. Thus, following the lead of
Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions
and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon
Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496

Facts:

The House of representative proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the

Commission on Appointments among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. On the basis of
this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the herein petitioner,
Raul A. Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. Consequently, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
herein petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.

In connection therewith, petitioner came to Supreme Court to challenge his

removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary
injunction, Supreme Court issued a Temporary restraining Order that same day to
prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on
Appointments.

Petitioner contended that he cannot be removed from the Commission on

Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not duly registered political party
and has not yet attained political stability.

Issue:

Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments.

Held:

Yes. The core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution,
wherein, the Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of
the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body
pursuant to the provision of the aforementioned law.

The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in

the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire
in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.
The clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is
to give the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political
parties who are duly registered with the COMELEC. In this case, LDP was granted its
registration as a political party by the COMELEC.

Coseteng v. Mitra 187 SCRA 377

Facts:

When Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized it formed the new
majority in the House of Reps. The 80% of the membership of the House then belonged
to LDP. The next largest party in the Coalesced Majority was the Liberal Party (LP).
Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was the principal opposition party. Thus, the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments (CA) had to be reorganized. CA
then composed of 11 members from the LDP, 1 from LP and another from KBL.
Petitioner Rep. Coseteng, lone member of the Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
(KAIBA) party in the House, contested the validity of their election to the CA on the
theory that their election was violative of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. She also argues that the members representing the political parties
must be nominated and elected by their respective political parties. She alleges further
that she is qualified to sit in the CA having the support of 9 other house reps of the
minority.

Issue:

Is the election to the CA violative of Art VI, Sec 18?

Held:

No. The validity of the election of the newly elected members of the CA—11 from
LDP and 1 from the minority—is unassailable. There is no doubt that the apportionment
of the House membership in the CA was done on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties. LDP represented 80% of the House, and was thus
entitled to 80% of the 12 members of the CA (or 10 of 12 members). The remaining 2
seats were given to the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL as the
principal opposition party. There is also no merit in Coseteng’s contention that the
House members in the CA should have been nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. It is provided in Art VI, sec 18 that they be elected by the House (not by
their party). And even assuming arguendo that KAIBA be considered as an opposition
party, being its lone member, she represents less than 1% of the House membership.
She cannot be entitled to a seat in the CA; having the support of 9 other house
representatives is inconsequential.

Guingona v. Gonzales 214 SCRA 789; MR 219 SCRA 326

Facts:

As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed by the
following by parties: LDP – IS, NPC– 5, Lakas–

3. Applying the mathematical formula agreed by parties they are entitled to twelve
seats. On the organization of the Senate, Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated
eight senators for Commission on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected on the
nomination of Osmeña. Petitioner Guingona filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the recognition of Senators Romulo and Tañada as the member of
the CA as it is a violation of the rule of proportional representation.

Issue:

Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12 senators in the
Commission?

Ruling:

No. Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) senators in
order that the Commission may function. Wherefore, the Court declare the election of
Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission
on Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional
representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator
Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the
functions of members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering the
respondents Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman
of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the membership of the
respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and
participating as members of said Commission.