The         Supreme             Court       consistently
defined just compensation as 'the full and fair equivalent of
       the property taken from its owner by the expropriator,' and that
       the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the
       owner's loss. In order to be 'just,' the payment must be real,
       substantial, full, and ample. The concept of just
       compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
       the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but also the
       payment of the land within a 'reasonable time' from the taking
       of the property.
               Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
       considered 'just' inasmuch as the property owner is made to
       suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his
       land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
       actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his or
       her loss.
               In this case, the DAR literally took respondent's land
       without her knowledge and participation, and without paying
       her just compensation. Worse, from the time of the taking of
       respondent's land in 1993 to the time this case reached the
       Supreme Court until it was decided on 11 August 2014, LBP
       has not compensated respondent although DAR has already
       distributed the lands to the farmer beneficiaries for more than
       twenty-one (21) years ago. Justice and equity require that the
       unreasonable, even oppressive, delay in the payment
       of just compensation be        appropriately   remedied      by
       the award of       legal interest in    respondent's      favor.
       Legalinterest is the measure of damages arising from
       delay (mora solvendi) under the Civil Code. We thus
       RECOMMEND 12% interest per annum, computed from
       November 17, 1993 to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from
       July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction in the nature of
       damages for the delay in payment.
 (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Galle, G.R. Nos. 171836 & 195213
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(Resolution), [October 2, 2017])
             Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
       equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The
       measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
       The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the
       owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would
       deprive the owner of his property without due process,so
       too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of
       the public. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
             In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lajom,11 the Court made the
      following pronouncement as well:
                    As a final word, the Court would like to emphasize that
            while the agrarian reform program was undertaken primarily
            for the benefit of our landless farmers, this undertaking should,
            however, not result in the oppression of landowners by
            pegging the cheapest value for their lands. Indeed, although
            the taking of properties foragrarian reform purposes is a
            revolutionary kind of expropriation, it should not be carried out
            at the undue expense of landowners who are also entitled to
            protection under the Constitution and agrarian reform laws.
 (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Galle, G.R. Nos. 171836 & 195213
|||
(Resolution), [October 2, 2017])
                  In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador
            Encinas,this Court reiterated this long-established principle,
            thus:
                          The 'taking of private lands under
                   the agrarian reform program partakes of the
                   nature of an expropriation proceeding.' In
                   computing           thejust compensation for
                   expropriation proceedings, the RTC should
                   take into consideration the 'value of the land
                   at the time of the taking,not at the time of the
                   rendition of judgment.' 'The time of taking is
                   the time when the landowner was deprived
                   of the use and benefit of his property,such as
                   when      title  is    transferred     to    the
                   Republic.' 19 (Emphasis supplied; citations
                   omitted)
            In Alfonso,the Court reiterated the settled doctrine that the
      ultimate determination of just compensation in expropriation
      proceedings remains a judicial prerogative,stating thus:
                   For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public,
            we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as
            the concerned implementing agency, courts should
            henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA
            6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR
            formulas in their determination ofjust compensation for the
            properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their
            judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of
            said formulas is not warranted under the specific
            circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate
         or depart therefrom,provided that this departure or deviation
         is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the
         evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess
         the    power     to    make     a    final   determination
         of justcompensation.
    (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Galle, G.R. Nos. 171836 &
   |||
195213 (Resolution), [October 2, 2017])
    In expropriation cases, interest is due the landowner if there was
delay in payment. The imposition of interest was in the nature of
damages for the delay in payment, which in effect makes the obligation
on the part of the government one of forbearance. It follows that
the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was
prompt and valid payment of just compensation. 52 In Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 53 we stressed
that interest on just compensation is imposed only in case of delay in the
payment thereof, which must be sufficiently established. (Land Bank of
                                                             |||
the Phils. v. Kumassie Plantation Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 177404 & 178097,
[June 25, 2009], 608 PHIL 523-548)
 LBP is liable to pay legal interest
 from the time of the taking of the
 property until full payment thereof.
        As to the manner of interest, Apo claimed that the 12% legal
 interest due from LBP because of its delay in paying the just
 compensation should be computed at the time of the taking of the
 subject property, i.e., on December 9, 1996, until full payment has
 been made and not until May 9, 2008.
        As to the 12% interest, LBP claimed that there was no delay on
 its part in the payment of just compensation. LBP already paid in full
 the initial valuation for the subject property in the
 amount of Php3,814,053.53 before TCT No. 113359 was cancelled
 and transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
 Therefore, LBP should not be held liable to pay legal interest if it
 already paid in full the preliminary valuation of the subject property. 52
         In Republic of the Phils. v. CA, 53 this Court held that:
                The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
         considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
         value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed
      by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary
      course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the
      property as between one who receives, and one who desires
      to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
      government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
      compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction
      over the case, the final compensation must include interests
      on its just value to be computed from the time the property is
      taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
      deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
      property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
      order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not
      better than) the position he was in before the taking
      occurred. 54
       The award of interest is intended to compensate the property
owner for the income it would have made had it been properly
compensated for its property at the time of the taking. "The need for
prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest is to
compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for
property already taken." 55 "The award of interest is imposed in the
nature of damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the
obligation on the part ofthe government one of forbearance to ensure
prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity
loss of the owner." 56
       In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Phil-Agro Industrial Corporation, 57 We had the occasion to rule that
the mere fact that the LBP made an initial payment of the just
compensation does not mean that the government is not liable for any
delay in the payment of just compensation, thus:
            It is doctrinal that to be considered as just, the
      compensation must be fair and equitable, and the landowners
      must have       received   it without any delay. The
      requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere
      deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional
      compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its
      subsequent release to the landowner after compliance
      with the legal requirements set forth by R.A. No. 6657.
      (Emphasis ours)
      In the present case, LBP merely deposited the
amount of Php3,814,053.53      as     initial  payment of the    just
compensation. The RTC's valuation in its decision 58 as just
compensation for the subject property is Php149,783,000.27. There is
a staggering difference between the initial payment made by the LBP
and the amount ofthe just compensation due to Apo. It should be
noted that the subject property has already been taken by the
government on December 9, 1996. Up to this date, the just
compensation has not been fully paid. During the interim, Apo is
deprived of the income it would have made had it been properly
compensated for the properties at the time of the taking. It is therefore
necessary to hold LBP liable to pay for the legal interest due to its
delay in fully satisfying the payment of the just compensation.
      Thus, LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted from
December 9, 1996, the time of the taking until June 30,
2013. 59 Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013 until fully paid, the just
compensation shall earn 6% legal interest in accordance with Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of2013.
      As to the award of attorney's fees, while the general rule is that
attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of the damages because
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate, 60 We deem it
proper to affirm the award of 10% attorney's fees in favor of Apo.
     We quote with confirmity the ruling of the CA in justifying the
award of attorney's fees, thus:
              Despite pragmatic considerations and actualities,
      convincing figures and statistics, [LBP] and DAR stood firm on
      their unreasonableness. P16.50 per [sq. m.], the
      valuation of [LBP] and DAR, is way off P134.00. The disparity
      is too obvious; their stubbornness, impossible (sic). [LBP] and
      DAR should not delude themselves that they are being robbed
      merely because another deserves to be paid justly. Every
      person, especially government entities, must, in the
      exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
      with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
      good faith.TAIaHE
             Simple fairness dictates that the [DARAB] should have
      resolved the matter of just compensation brought before it.
      The lapse of six years without the adjudication board acting
      on the case not only compelled Apo Fruits to litigate, this
      refusal to satisfy Apo Fruits' plainly valid, just and
      demandable claim is also tantamount to gross and evident
      bad faith. 61
      It must be emphasized that the subject property has been
transferred in the name of the government as early as December 9,
1996 despite Apo's rejection ofLBP's valuation of the subject property.
To make matters worse, when Apo filed a complaint for
determination of just compensation with the DARAB, the latter
 unjustifiably and without any reason failed to act upon the complaint
 for almost six years, thus, prompting Apo to file a complaint with the
 RTC for determination ofjust compensation. Further, despite the ruling
 that the valuation of the subject property is Php130.00, LBP still
 maintained its conviction that only the amount ofPhp16.50 per square
 meter is due to Apo. The award of attorney's fees is justified by LBP's
 refusal to satisfy Apo's valid claim which forced the latter to litigate to
 protect its property rights.
    (Apo Fruits Corp. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
   |||
217985-86 & 218020-21, [March 21, 2018])