Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand

Perceptions and Experience of Households

Report of a nationwide survey

Pasuk Phongpaichit
Nualnoi Treerat
Yongyuth Chaiyapong
Chris Baker

Political Economy Centre

Chulalongkorn University
Bangkok

30 August 2000
 Contents

Major findings ....................................................................................................... 3

Major findings (Thai)............................................................................................ 5
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 9
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. 10
List of tables......................................................................................................... 11
List of figures ....................................................................................................... 12

Section 1: Perceptions ......................................................................................... 13

Perception of corruption as a national problem ........................................ 14

Perception of public institutions................................................................ 20
Vocabulary of corruption .......................................................................... 22
Perception of trends in corruption............................................................. 24
Perception of public offices....................................................................... 26

Section 2: Bribe solicitation at public offices .................................................... 29

Bribe solicitation at public offices ............................................................ 30

Bribery and service evaluation.................................................................. 35
Who gets asked for bribes? ....................................................................... 37
Demographics of bribe solicitation ........................................................... 41
Mechanics of corruption............................................................................ 44

Section 3: Schools, courts and votes .................................................................. 46

Corruption in education............................................................................. 47
Corruption in the judicial system .............................................................. 49
Vote buying ............................................................................................... 55

Section 4: Combating corruption ...................................................................... 57

Combating corruption ............................................................................... 58

Reporting corruption ................................................................................. 59

Final comments.................................................................................................... 62

Appendices ........................................................................................................... 65

Sample details ........................................................................................... 66

Technical notes.......................................................................................... 68
List of appendix tables ............................................................................. 72
 Major findings

Household heads rank corruption in the public sector as the third most serious national
problem, following the poor economy and cost-of-living, and closely followed by drugs.
They view politicians as more corrupt than bureaucrats. They believe corruption is
getting worse, especially among politicians.

Among public institutions, the police and MPs are rated as the least honest, followed by
the Ministry of Interior, and Customs Department. Among public offices, the customs,
police and land offices are ranked lowest for quality of service.

One tenth of households are solicited for bribes by some public office each year.

The offices where visitors are most likely to be solicited for a bribe are land offices,
customs, police and automobile licensing. The average bribe solicited is highest at the
police, followed by customs, tax offices, and land offices.

Three offices—land, police, and tax—account for 88 percent of the total value of bribes
solicited.

The average amount asked from each solicited household is just under ten thousand baht
(US$250). However, this is very unevenly spread. The vast majority of solicited
households are asked for only small amounts under a thousand baht (US$25). Less than 1
percent of total households account for two-thirds of the total value of bribe solicitation
in amounts of 100,000 baht (US$2,500) or more. Most of these large amounts are
solicited by the police, customs, land offices, and tax offices. Most of the households
solicited for these large amounts are own account workers in commerce, i.e. private
businessmen.

The offices providing households with utilities and public services are generally rated
well for quality of service. The likelihood of being asked for a bribe at these offices is
low, and the amounts asked are small.

Some 3 percent of households with children are asked to pay some amount for gaining
admission to public schools, and some 4 percent are asked for other extra payments at
school. The amounts are usually small.

The judicial system is little used and fuzzily perceived, but almost a third of households
who had been to court in the past two years had been asked for some payment. The
average amount solicited (around 30,000 baht or US$750) is roughly equal to the
legitimate court expenses. It is usually small in relation to the value of the case, but can
be a large imposition on low-income families. These payments are most likely to be
solicited by public prosecutors or by intermediaries (such as police) not directly
connected to the court.

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คอรรปั ชันในภาครัฐ บทสรุปสําหรับผูบ ริหาร

In all some 2.1 million households (13 percent of the total) are solicited for some
payment by a government office or school or in connection with a court case. In total
these payments amounted to 25 billion baht (US$625 million). Around half of this total
value is solicited from less than one percent of total households.

People are generally confident that bribes paid to government offices will ensure a better
service or result. Those solicited for bribes are very confident. Among the small number
of people solicited for bribes over a court case, opinion is more divided on whether the
bribe will ensure the desired outcome.

In sum, corruption at the government offices which provide households with utilities and
services is relatively small in scale and extent. However, corruption is large at offices
which have a role in monetary transactions including land, tax, customs and the courts.
Corruption is also large among the police. Corruption is also perceived to be a major
problem among politicians.

These distinctions are reflected in the vocabulary of corruption. Petty payments made to
bureaucrats are still called ‘gifts of good will’, implying some sense of willingness and
gratitude on the part of the payee. Larger payments made as a contract between an
individual and an official for some significant gain are termed ‘bribery’. And very large
amounts extracted through political power are termed ‘corruption’.

Almost one third of households were offered money to buy votes at the last general
election, with an average offer of 678 baht per household. Vote-buying was also
widespread in municipal elections. Bangkok is the focus of vote-buying, with higher
average amounts at the general election, and greater frequency in local elections.

There is a general feeling that government should make combating corruption a priority.
However people are generally unclear on the channels to report corruption, and reluctant
to report cases of corruption as they fear reprisals and doubt reporting would be of any
use. The most effective institution for combating corruption at present is seen to be the
media, followed by the Counter Corruption Commission, and academics or teachers.

7
 คอรรปั ชันในภาครัฐ : ความเห็นและประสบการณของครัวเรือน
บทสรุปสําหรับผูบ ริหาร

รายงานนีเ้ ปนผลของการสํารวจทัศนคติและประสบการณของหัวหนาครัวเรือนเกี่ ยวกั บการคอร รั ปชั น

ภาครั ฐ เป นการสํารวจระดั บชาติ มิ ใช เป นเพี ยงกรณี ศึ กษา (case study) เฉพาะจุด ครัวเรือน
ทง้ั หมดทีส่ าํ รวจมีจาํ นวน 4,013 รายทั่วประเทศ โดยใชแผนการสุมตัวอยางแบบ stratified multi-stage
cluster sampling ในการเก็บรวบรวมขอมูลเพื่อทําการประมาณคาประชากรลักษณะที่สนใจสํ าหรับ
ครัวเรือนทั้งประเทศ 15.9 ลานครัวเรือน

แบบสอบถามที่ใชเปนแบบสอบถามซึ่งทางธนาคารโลกไดใชทําการสํารวจทีป่ ระเทศอื่น ๆ มาแลว แต

ไดนํามาปรับปรุงใหสอดคลองกับสภาพของประเทศไทย และทําการทดสอบแบบสอบถามลวงหนา
กอนทีจะนํามาใชสอบถามจริง การสํารวจภาคสนามกระทําในเดือนตุ ลาคม - พฤศจิกายน พ.ศ. 2542
โดยได รับความร วมมือจากสํานักวิ จัยเอแบคโพลล มหาวิทยาลัยอัสสัมชัญ

แบบสอบถามแบงออกเปน 3 สวนคือ (1) ประสบการณจากการใชบริการภาครัฐประจําวั นของ

ประชาชนที่ เป นหั วหน าครั วเรื อน รวมทั้ งประสบการณ เกี่ ยวโยงกั บกระบวนการตุ ลาการ ในกรณี
ที่ สมาชิกครอบครัวคนใดคนหนึ่งเคยขึ้นศาล ประสบการณเกี่ยวโยงกับการเลือกตั้งทังระดับทองถิ่น
และการเลือกตั้งส.ส.และประสบการณเกี่ยวโยงกับการสงบุตรหลานเขาโรงเรียน (ตองจายเงินเปน
พิเศษหรือไม) (2) ทัศนคติตอการใชคาํ วาคอรรปั ชันและคําอืน่ ๆ ที่เกี่ยวโยง และ (3) ความเห็นเรื่องการ
ตอตานการคอรรปั ชัน

การสํารวจในครัง้ นี้เจาะเนนทีก่ ารคอรรปั ชันทีเ่ ปนตัวเงิน เชน การใหสินบน การซื้อเสียง โดยไมครอบ

คลุมการคอรรัปชันที่มิใชเปนตัวเงิน เชน การเลนพรรคเลนพวก ซึ่งอยูในขายของการคอรรัปชันเชิง
โครงสราง (structural corruption) และไมรวมถึงเรื่องการซื้อตําแหนง

ผลของการสํารวจที่สําคัญโดยยอ
ประสบการณการใชบริการภาครัฐตอปญหาการคอรรัปชัน

หั วหน าครั วเรื อนทั่ วประเทศใหความสําคั ญกับปญหาการคอร รัปชั น นั่ นคื อมีทัศนคติวาปญหาการ
คอร รัปชั นเปนปญหาระดับชาติอันดับสาม รองจากอันดับหนึ่งคือ ปญหาเศรษฐกิ จซบเซา และ

8
คอรรปั ชันในภาครัฐ บทสรุปสําหรับผูบ ริหาร

อั นดั บสองคื อ ป ญหาค าครองชี พ ส วนอั นดั บสี่ คื อ ป ญหายาเสพติ ด ทั้ งนี้ จากทั ศนคติของหัวหนา
ครัวเรือนแสดงใหเห็นวานักการเมืองคอรรัปชันมากกวาขาราชการและแสดงใหเห็ นถึ ง ความเชื่ อที่ ว า
ป ญ หาการคอร รั ป ชั น จะเลวลงในอนาคต โดยเฉพาะอย างยิ่ งในบรรดานั กการเมือง

ในบรรดาหนวยงาน/เจาหนาทีข่ องภาครัฐทั้งหมด หัวหนาครัวเรือนมีความเห็นวา ตํารวจและสมาชิก

สภาผูแทนราษฎรมีความซื่อสัตยนอยที่สุด (ไดคะแนนความไมซื่อสัตยในระดับเดียวกัน) ตามดวย
กระทรวงมหาดไทย และกรมศุลกากร ในขณะที่ไปรษณียไดรับการจัดอันดับวาซื่อสัตยที่สดุ

ประมาณรอยละ 10 ของหัวหนาครัวเรือนทั่วประเทศมีประสบการณเคยถูกเรียกคาสินบนจากขาราชการ
โดยหนวยงานทีผ่ ตู ดิ ตอมักถูกเรียกรองสินบนในระดับตนๆ ไดแก สํานักงานที่ดิน กรมศุลกากร
ตํารวจ และกรมการขนสงทางบก (ขอใบอนุญาตขับขี่) ฯลฯ ทั้งนี้จํานวนเงินที่ถูกเรียกรองโดยเฉลี่ย
ตอครัง้ มีมลู คาสูงสุดถูกเรียกรองโดยตํารวจ ตามดวยศุลกากร สรรพากร และสํานักงานที่ดิน นอกจากนี้
พบวามูลคาของสินบนทีค่ รัวเรือนทัว่ ประเทศถูกเรียกรองเปนจํานวนประมาณ1,000 บาทตอครัวเรือน

เมื่อคํานวณมูลคาของเงินที่ถูกเรียกรองทั้งหมดในปที่ผานมาพบวา รอยละ 88 ถูกเรียกรองโดยหนวย

งาน 3 แหง คือ สํานักงานที่ดิน ตํารวจ และกรมสรรพากร

เฉพาะครัวเรือนที่ถูกเรียกรองสินบนนั้น มูลคาของเงินที่ถูกเรียกรองเฉลี่ยประมาณ 10,000 บาทตอครัว

เรือน จํานวนเงินที่เรียกรองตางกันมาก นั่นคือจากขอมูลที่เก็บรวบรวมพบวามีผูที่ถูกเรียกรองสินบน
มูลคาสูงถึง 100,000 บาทขึ้นไปตอราย มีนอ ยกวารอยละ 1 ของครัวเรือน แตเทากับ 2 ใน 3 ของเงินเรียก
เก็บทัง้ หมด ประมาณรอยละ 50 ของครัวเรือนถูกเรียกรอง 100 - 1,000 บาท หนวยงานที่เจาหนาที่เรียกรอง
เงินเปนจํานวนตัง้ แต 100,000 บาทขึ้นไปก็คือ ตํารวจ กรมศุลกากร กรมที่ดิน และกรมสรรพากร ทั้งนี้
ครัวเรือนที่ถูกเรียกรองเงินเปนจํานวนมาก สวนใหญทําธุรกิจ หรือคาขาย

หนวยงานของรัฐที่ใหบริการดานสาธารณูปโภค และการบริการทางสังคมทั่วๆไป ไดรับการจัดอันดับ

คุณภาพการใหบริการอยูในระดับดี ไมคอยมีปญหาถูกเรียกเก็บเงิน และถาหากจะมีก็เปนเงินจํานวน
นอย ยกเวนกรมศุลกากร ตํารวจ และสํานักงานที่ดิน ที่ไดรับการจัดอันดับคุณภาพการใหบริการอยู
ในอันดับลางสุด

ครั วเรื อนที่ มี เด็ กวั ยเรี ยน ร อยละ 3 ตอบว าต องจ ายค าแป ะเจี๊ ยะเพื่ อเข าโรงเรียนรัฐบาล รอยละ 4
ตอบวาถูกเรียกใหจายคาอื่นๆ อีกทีโ่ รงเรียนแตจาํ นวนนอย

9
คอรรปั ชันในภาครัฐ บทสรุปสําหรับผูบ ริหาร

ครัวเรือนที่มีประสบการณขึ้นศาลในชวง 2 ปที่ผานมา หนึ่งในสามตอบวาถูกเรียกเก็บเงินพิเศษนอก

เหนือจากคาธรรมเนียมที่ตองจายปกติ โดยเฉลีย่ จายรายละ ประมาณ 30,000 บาท ซึ่งนับวาเปนเงิน
จํานวนต่ําเทียบกับมูลคาของทรัพยสินของกรณี แตถาคิดเปนอัตราสวนของรายไดของครัวเรือนที่มีราย
ไดต่ําแลว จะมาก ผูที่เรียกเก็บเงินมักเปนอัยการ หรือคนกลางซึง่ มักเปนตํารวจ หรืออื่น ๆ ซึ่งมิไดเกี่ยว
โยงกับ ศาลโดยตรง

โดยภาพรวม ครัวเรือน 2.1 ลานราย (รอยละ 13 ของทั้งประเทศ) ถูกเรียกเก็บคาบริการเพิ่มเติมจากคา

ธรรมเนียมของทางการเมือ่ ไปใชบริการภาครัฐ โรงเรียนรัฐบาล หรือขึ้นศาล มูลคาที่ถูกเรียกรองคิด
เปนจํานวนเงินทั้งหมดทั่วประเทศประมาณ 2 หมื่น 5 พันลานบาท ครึง่ หนึง่ ของเงินสินบนนีจ้ า ยโดย
ครัวเรือนเพียงรอยละ 0.3 ของทั้งหมด หรือประมาณ 300,000 ครัวเรือน

ตอคําถามที่วาทานมั่นใจหรือไมวาเมื่อจายคาสินบนแลว จะไดรบั การบริการหรือการแกไขป ญหาที่

รวดเร็ วและเป นไปตามที่ ตองการ ครั วเรื อนโดยทั่ วไปคอนข างมั่ นใจ กล าวคื อรอยละ 53 ตอบวาใช
อีกรอยละ 47 ตอบวาไม สวนในกลุมผูที่จายสินบน มีผูที่ตอบวาใชสูงถึ งร อยละ 67

ในกรณีของหัวหนาครัวเรือนที่เคยขึ้นศาลและถูกเรียกรองเงินคาสิน บน คําตอบในขอนี้แสดงวามีความ
มั่นใจนอยกวาในกรณีที่มีการเรียกรองสินบนทั่ว ๆ ไป กลาวคือเพียงรอยละ 43 ตอบวา ใช

สรุป ปญหาคอรรัปชันจากประสบการณของครัวเรือนนั้นมิใชเรื่องที่โยงกับการรับบริการประจําวัน
ทั่ว ๆ ไป แตเกี่ยวโยงกับการติดตอกับหนวยงานตอไปนี้ คือ ตํารวจ ศุลกากร สรรพากร สํานักงานที่ดิน
และศาล ซึง่ เปนหนวยงานที่มีอํานาจหรือมีบทบาทเกี่ยวโยงกับทรัพยสนิ และการแลกเเปลี่ยนที่ มี มู ลค า
สู ง ทั้ งยั งมี ความเห็ นว าการคอร รั ปชั นของตํารวจเป นป ญหามาก และการคอร รปั ชันของนักการ
เมืองเปนเรือ่ งรายแรง

ทัศนคติตอการใชคําวา “คอรรปั ชัน และคําอื่นๆที่เกี่ยวโยง”

ภาพรวมที่ไดขางบนนี้สอดคลองกับผลการสํารวจเรื่องการใชคําตาง ๆ ทีโ่ ยงกับการคอรรปั ชัน ถาเปน

การจายเงินเล็กนอยใหขาราชการจะเรียกวา “สินน้ําใจ” (คําวา “คาน้าํ รอนน้าํ ชา” ก็ใชเหมือนกัน แต
นอยกวา) ซึ่งอาจจะแสดงความเต็มใจบางระดับจากผูให สําหรับเงินจํานวนมากจะเรียกวา “สินบน”
และมักเปนกรณีที่เกิดจากขอตกลงระหวางผูใหกับผูรับ สําหรับเงินจํานวนทีจ่  ายมาก และในกรณี ที่
จ ายให นั กการเมื อง หรื อเป นการคอร รั ปชั นโดยนั กการเมื อง มั กจะใช คําว า “คอร รปั ชัน”

10
คอรรปั ชันในภาครัฐ บทสรุปสําหรับผูบ ริหาร

สําหรับการซื้อเสียงขายเสียงนั้น 1 ใน 3 ของครัวเรือนเคยมีคนมาเสนอซื้อเสียงในการเลือกตัง้ ส.ส. เมือ่

ป 2539 เฉลีย่ ครัวเรือนละ 678 บาท (คิดเปนมูลคาทั้งหมด 3,066 ลานบาท) ทั้งนี้การซื้อเสียงในการ
เลือกตั้งเทศบาลและผูวากรุงเทพมหานครนั้น มูลคาการซื้อเสียงในกรุงเทพฯ และปริมณฑลสูงกวาที่อื่น

ความเห็นเรื่องการตอตานการคอรรัปชัน

สําหรับเรือ่ งการตอตานการคอรรปั ชัน สวนใหญเห็นวารัฐบาลควรถือเปนนโยบายที่มีความสําคัญ

ระดับตน ๆ

การรายงานกรณีคอรรปั ชัน โดยทั่วไปหัวหนาครัวเรือนไมคอยทราบวาจะรายงานเรื่องนี้ที่หนวยงานใด

และไมอยากรายงานเพราะเกรงวาจะไดรับผลกระทบทางลบในภายหลัง และเห็นวาถึงรายงานก็ไมเกิด
ประโยชนอะไร เพราะรัฐบาลไมเอาจริง

โดยทัว่ ไปมีความเห็นวาองคกรทีป่ อ งปรามคอรรปั ชันไดผลในปจจุบนั คือ สือ่ มวลชน ป.ป.ช. และนัก

วิชาการ/ครู ตามลําดับ

11
 Introduction

This report is based on a questionnaire survey of 4,013 household heads across Thailand.
The sample was selected using multi-stage cluster sampling, and the results have been
weighted to estimate the total population of 15.9 million Thai households. The fieldwork
was conducted in October-December 1999. A full description of the methodology is
contained in the appendix of technical notes.

The questionnaire was based on an example provided by the World Bank and already
used in other countries. This questionnaire was significantly adapted to suit Thai
conditions, and was field-tested before the final survey. The fieldwork was carried out by
ABAC-KSC Internet Poll Research Centre at Assumption University.

The questionnaire was designed to capture corruption which directly involves

households, particularly bribes solicited at government offices. The study does not
attempt to measure structural corruption such as the favours extended by government
officials and politicians to their relatives or associates, or the rewards businessmen extend
to retired officials and ex-politicians as repayment for past favours.

The results are reported here with two forms of breakdown—by area and household
income. ‘Bangkok’ here means Greater Bangkok including three outer provinces (Samut
Prakan, Pathumthani, Nonthaburi). ‘Urban’ here means the municipal (thesaphiban) areas
in the provinces excluding Bangkok. ‘Rural’ means the non-municipal areas.

The ‘low’ income households are those reporting a household income of 10,000 baht or
below, and the ‘high’ income households reported a higher amount. This split divides the
sample in the ratio of roughly 2:1. Five percent of households did not report an income,
and they have been excluded from this breakdown. ‘HH’ is used as an abbreviation for
‘households’ in the tables.

The data on which the graphics are based are contained in the appendix tables.

The study was supported by the World Bank and the Asia Foundation.

The major findings were presented at a seminar on Yutthasat Kan To Tan Khorrapchan
Nai Prathet Thai (Strategy to Combat Corruption in Thailand) organized by the Civil
Service Commission in Bangkok on 28 August 2000.

During the time of the survey, the value of the baht was in the range of 38-40 to 1 US
dollar.

12
 Acknowledgements

Many people and institutions have made this study possible. We would like to thank in
particular Khunying Dhipavadee Meksawan, the secretary-general of the Civil Service
Commission, who encouraged the research team at Chulalongkorn University to carry out
the study; Dana Wiest, Stefan Koeberle and Pamornrat Tansanguanwong of the World
Bank Thailand office who negotiated part of the financial support from the World Bank;
Dr J. R. Klein at the Asia Foundation for assistance in securing part of the funding for the
survey; and Noppadon Kannika and Thiti Ratanachot of ABAC-KSC Internet Poll
Research Centre, who helped with the survey work. Special thanks are due to Pablo
Zoido-Lobaton at the World Bank Institute for sharing with us his technical expertise and
survey experience. The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at Copenhagen provided a quiet
and very amenable atmosphere where the draft of the report was written; many thanks
indeed. Also we must thank the 4,016 interviewees whose responses form the basis of
our analysis. Lastly, we are grateful to colleagues and staff at the Political Economy
Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University for their support and co-
operation, especially Sumalee Pitayanond, Suthiphan Chirathiwat, Voravidh Charoenlert,
Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, Pairin Plaikaew, Chaiyos Jiraphrukphinyo, Phinit Wongyikhun,
Kunathip Sangchay, Suthi Phanthulap and Supaporn Trongkitvirot.

14
 List of tables

1: Amount willing to pay to eliminate national problem perceived as most serious ......16
2: Amount willing to pay to eliminate corruption in the public sector (worst problem) 16
3: Amount willing to pay to eliminate corruption in the public sector (all households).17
4: Vocabulary for corruption situations ..........................................................................22
5: Number of visits to public offices in past year ..........................................................26
6: Percent of households visited each public offices in past year ...................................26
7: Registering complaints at public offices ..................................................................... 28
8: Total bribes solicited per household in past year ........................................................37
9: Method of bribing (all households).............................................................................44
10: Method of bribing (those solicited)...........................................................................44
11: Certainty about efficacy of bribe...............................................................................45
12: Households with students..........................................................................................47
13: Extra payments for education....................................................................................47
14: Perception of public education..................................................................................48
15: Views on judicial system ..........................................................................................49
16: Number of court appearances in past 2 years............................................................50
17: Court appearances in what capacity..........................................................................50
18: Corruption in the judicial system ..............................................................................51
19: Distribution of payments over court cases ................................................................52
20: Total payments solicited in court cases.....................................................................52
21: Does payment make court decision more certain .....................................................53
22: Contemplated court case but decided against it ........................................................53
23: Vote-buying offered at elections in past 2 years.......................................................55
24: Reporting a case of corruption ..................................................................................59
25: Effectiveness of corruption reporting process...........................................................59
26: Witnessed case of corruption in past 2 years ............................................................60

16
 List of figures

1. Seriousness of national problems...............................................................................14

2. Seriousness of national problems, by area .................................................................14
3. National problem perceived as most serious..............................................................15
4. Corruption: perception and experience: 1 ..................................................................17
5. Corruption: perception and experience: 2 ..................................................................18
6. Corruption: perception and experience: 3 ...................................................................19
7. Honesty/dishonesty of public institutions ..................................................................20
8. Attitudes to corruption ...............................................................................................24
9. Who is most corrupt, politicians or bureaucrats......................................................... 24
10. Trends in corruption ..................................................................................................25
11. Quality of service at public offices ...........................................................................27
12. Incidence of bribes solicited......................................................................................30
13. Incidence of bribes solicited, by area ........................................................................30
14. Average bribe solicited..............................................................................................31
15. Average bribe solicited, by area................................................................................31
16. Total bribes solicited in past year, by office ............................................................. 32
17. Distribution of bribes solicited by area .....................................................................33
18. Distribution of bribes solicited by income ...............................................................34
19. Service ratings vs. frequency of bribe solicitation ....................................................35
20. Complaints registered vs. frequency of bribe solicitation.........................................35
21. Cumulative distribution of bribes solicited ...............................................................38
22. Distribution of bribes solicited by value ...................................................................38
23. Distribution of bribes solicited by household ...........................................................39
24. Bribe incidence and household income.....................................................................40
25. Demographics of bribe solicitation: 1 .......................................................................41
26. Demographics of bribe solicitation: 2 .......................................................................42
27. Demographics of bribe solicitation: 3 .......................................................................43
28. Attitudes to the judicial system .................................................................................49
29. Distribution of payments made to influence court cases...........................................51
30. Obstacles to use of judicial system ........................................................................... 53
31. Alternatives for settling serious disputes outside judicial system.............................54
32. Vote buying ..............................................................................................................56
33. Attitudes to combating corruption.............................................................................58
34. Effectiveness in combating corruption......................................................................58
35. Reasons for not reporting corruption ........................................................................60
36. Suggestions for combating corruption ...................................................................... 61
37. Distribution of bribe solicitation by amount .............................................................62

18
 Section 1

Perceptions

20
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Perceptions of corruption as a national problem

Corruption in the public sector is perceived

Fig. 1: Seriousness of national problems
(mean score, 7-point scale)
as a serious national problem, but not the
Nationwide worst (fig. 1 and 2). Out of a list of 11
Po o r eco n o my national problems, Bangkokians rated drugs
and the poor economy as the most serious,
Co s t o f liv in g
while upcountry urban and rural chose the
Corru p tio n , p u b lic poor economy and high cost of living. The
Dru g u s e & trad e survey was conducted in late 1999 after two
years of the country’s most serious
Co s tly s erv ices
economic recession ever, so it is not
Co s tly ed u catio n surprising that the economy figures so
Bad ro ad s strongly.
Co s tly h ealth care
All areas ranked corruption in the public
Bad s erv ices sector as the third worst national problem.
Crime & v io len ce By contrast, corruption in the private sector
ranked last among the eleven problems
Co rru p tio n , p riv ate
listed. Costly services, costly education,
3 4 5 6 poor roads and costly health care all ranked
[Appendix table 1]
as worse national problems than crime and
violence.

Fig. 2: Seriousness of national problems, by area

(mean, 7-point scale)

Bangkok Provincial urban Rural

Poor economy

Cost of living

Corruption, public

Drug us e & trade

Cos tly s ervices

Cos tly education

Bad roads

Cos tly health care

Bad s ervices

Crime & violence

Corruption, private

4 5 6 3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6
[Appendix table 1]

21
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

When asked to indicate the single most serious problem, corruption in the public sector
remained third-ranked in Bangkok, but slipped to fourth outside—following the
economy, drugs, and cost-of-living—and also bad roads in the rural area (fig. 3).

Fig.3: National problem perceived as most serious

(percent selecting)

Bangkok Provincial urban Rural

Po o r eco n o my

Co s t o f liv in g

Dru g u s e an d trad e

Co rru p tio n , p u b lic s ecto r

Few/b ad ro ad s

Co s tly ed u catio n

Co s tly h ealth care

Co s tly p u b lic s erv ices

Crime an d v io len ce

Bad p u b lic s erv ices

Co rru p tio n , p riv ate

0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
[Appendix table 2]

22
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Two-fifths are prepared to pay some money to eliminate the problem they identify as
worst (table 1). On average they will pay 3.8 percent of annual household income or baht
5,676, yielding a national total of 35 billion baht. The largest amount—11.8 billion,
almost a third of the total—would be donated to overcoming the poor economy. The
second largest amount—9 billion—would be donated to overcoming the drug problem.
Corruption in the public sector was again ranked third.

Table 1: Amount willing to pay to eliminate national problem perceived as most serious
Number
consider % willing ------of those willing-----
this worst to pay to % of annual total
problem eliminate income amount amount
Problem considered worst (000) problem (baht) (mil. baht)
Poor economy 6,566 35 4.0 5,110 11,825
Drug use and trade 2,076 56 3.9 7,778 8,977
Corruption, public sector 1,153 49 4.5 9,275 5,202
High cost of living 3,266 28 3.1 2,797 2,549
Corruption, private sector 179 34 4.6 26,463 1,609
Crime and violence 274 55 3.8 8,390 1,258
Few/bad roads 718 52 4.6 2,761 1,037
Costly education 395 44 2.8 4,170 726
Bad public services 260 64 1.7 2,640 439
Costly health care 311 53 3.1 2,617 433
Costly public services 281 35 3.1 4,168 413
Other 138 38 5.1 11,977 636
Total 15,617 39.6 3.8 5,676 35,104

Among those identifying corruption in the public sector as the worst problem, half will
pay an average of 4.5 percent of annual household income or 9,275 baht, yielding a
national total of 5.2 billion baht (table 2). The proportion willing to pay and the
percentage of annual income are lowest in Bangkok and highest in the rural areas. Even
so, because Bangkok incomes are so much higher, two-thirds of the total donation comes
from Bangkok

Table 2: Amount willing to pay to eliminate corruption in the public sector (perceived as worst
problem)
----HH income----
Total Bangkok Urban Rural Low high
Base, all identify corruption as 1,153 407 225 522 553 570
worst problem (000):
% willing to pay 48.6 38.8 47.5 56.8 53.4 46.6

% of income 4.5 3.9 4.1 5.1 5.5 3.4

average amount (baht) 9,275 21,763 9,681 2,482 2,262 17,057
total amount (m baht) 5,202 3,432 1,035 736 667 4,535

23
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

When all households were asked directly what they would pay to eliminate corruption in
the public sector, almost one third would pay some amount (table 3). Each is willing to
pay 3.3 percent of annual household income or 5,088 baht, yielding a national total of 26
billion baht, equivalent to 2-3 percent of the government’s annual budget. The amount
people are willing to pay as a percentage of income varies little across regions and
income groups. Again Bangkokians are slightly less willing to pay, and slightly less
generous with their donation as a percentage of income.

Table 3: Amount willing to pay to eliminate corruption in the public sector (all households)
----HH income----
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high

% willing to pay 32.2 27.2 33.6 33.2 32.6 36.6

% of income 3.3 3.0 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.6

average amount (baht) 5,088 10,727 7,714 2,682 1,491 13,324
total amount (mil. baht) 25,903 8,230 9,318 8,354 5,282 20,620

Those households which had had more contact with government offices in the past year
are more likely to rate corruption as the worst national problem and were more willing to
pay something to eliminate it (fig. 4). The proportion of income they are willing to pay
for this elimination does not increase in step. But those who visit government offices the
most (over 40 times a year) are willing to pay significantly higher than average in
absolute terms—indicating that these are also relatively wealthy people.

Fig.4: Corruption: perception and experience 1

(percentages)

----------visits to government offices in past year---------

The more times that none 1-5 6-10 11-20 21-40 over 40
households have contact
with government offices...
15

… the more likely they are 10

to rate public sector 5
corruption as the worst
0
national problem...
50
… and the more likely
they are willing to pay
something to eliminate 30
public sector corruption...
10
5
… but the average percent 4
of income they are willing
to pay declines... 3

… but the average

absolute amount increases 8 , 0 0 0
at the high end.
3 ,0 0 0
[Appendix table 3]

24
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Those who have been solicited large amounts of money as bribes over the past year (see
below) rate corruption more seriously as a national problem, and are more likely to
identify corruption as the most serious national problem (fig. 5). Those who have been
solicited bribes are more prepared to pay some money to eliminate the problem. But this
tendency does not progress according to the size of the amount solicited. Indeed, those
who have been solicited the largest amounts are the least willing to pay of all.

Fig.5: Corruption: perception and experience 2

(percentages)

------------------total bribes solicited in past year (baht)-----------------

As the amount of bribes zero <100 100- 1,000- 10,000- >100,000
solicited from the 1,000 10,000 100,000
household increases...

6
… the perception that
public sector corruption is
a serious national problem 5
increases...
4
60
… and the percent
40
identifying public sector
corruption as the most 20
serious national problem
increases... 0

50
… but the percent willing
to pay some of their
40
income to eliminate public
sector corruption does not 30
increase in step... 4
… nor does the percent of
their income they are 2
willing to pay...
0

[Appendix table 4]

25
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Similarly, as the burden of bribes solicited as a percentage of income increase, so does

the perceived seriousness of public corruption, and the willingness to pay something to
eliminate it. But the amount willing to pay is not so elastic (fig. 6).

Fig.6: Corruption: perception and experience 3

(percentages)

----------total bribes solicited in past year as % of income---------

As the amount of bribes zero <1% 1-5% 5-10% >10%
solicited as a percent of
income increases...
6
… the perception that
public sector corruption is 5
a serious national problem
increases...
4
20
… the percent identifying
public sector corruption as
the most serious national
problem increases... 0

50
… and the percent willing
to pay some of their
40
income to eliminate public
sector corruption
30
increases...
4
… but the percent of their
income they are willing to 3
pay does not increase in
step... 2

[Appendix table 5]

26
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Perception of public institutions

The police and MPs are viewed as the least honest public institutions (fig. 7). Among a
long list of public institutions, these two were rated equal lowest, followed by the
Ministry of Interior and the Customs Department.

Fig. 7: Honesty/dishonesty of public institutions

(mean score, 7-point scale)

Most dishonest Police

MPs
Ministry of Interior
Customs Department
Ministry of Communications
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Commerce
Land Department
Bangkok Municipality
Bangkok Ward Councils
Budget Bureau
Ministry of Agriculture
Dept of Transport
Revenue Department
Bank of Thailand
Provincial Councils
Ministry of Industry
Dept of Accelerated Rural Devt
Attorney General
Municipal Councils
Sanitary Dt Councils
Tambon Councils
Dept of Irrigation
NGOs
Ministry of Health
Chambers of Commerce
Commercial Banks
Telephone Organisation (TOT)
Private education institutions
Village heads
Ministry of Education
Counter Corruption Commission
Ministry of Justice
Armed Forces
Supreme Court
Most honest Post Office

2 3 4 [Appendix table 6] 5

The proportion of people who have an opinion about the dishonesty of these three
institutions is very high (especially the police and MPs), and the ratings are the poorest.
For the Bangkok and urban population, the Land Department should also be included
with these three, but the rural population rates this department marginally better.

In the second rank of dishonest public institutions come the Ministry of Communications,
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, Land Department and (for Bangkokians) the
Bangkok Municipality and Ward Councils.

27
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Bangkokians also have a poor opinion of the Department of Transport, the Revenue
Department and the Ministry of Agriculture. Bangkokians also give bad ratings to the
village heads and Tambon Councils, which are viewed rather less critically by the rural
population which has actual experience of these institutions.

The Post Office rates as easily the most honest public institutions, followed by a group
including educational and judicial institutions, the Armed Forces, the Counter Corruption
Commission, and village heads.

28
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Vocabulary of corruption

The vocabulary of corruption is very varied (table 4).

If an official delivers good service and is given a tip, this is usually described as a ‘gift of
good will’, implying that the ‘will’ is largely on the side of the giver. This phrase may
also be used to describe a payment to a policeman in lieu of a formal traffic fine. But it is
seen as inappropriate for transactions where a bribe is actively requested or where the
amount is large.

Table 4: Vocabulary for corruption situations

Gift of Tea Improp Dishon- Under Bribery Corrup
good money er esty in table tion
will behav- duty money
iour
(percents run horizontally) % % % % % % %
Traffic fine paid direct to policeman 21.4 21.7 5.4 6.5 3.7 32.0 3.2
Official paid for good service 64.4 18.9 1.5 1.1 4.2 5.5 1.2
Official paid to speed up 7.0 18.6 11.0 6.8 14.5 32.9 3.9
Official pays money to get promotion 1.0 1.7 14.1 13.2 13.8 38.7 11.1
Commission to get construction permit 1.2 2.5 4.5 8.3 24.4 33.7 17.4
Commission on arms purchase 0.7 1.2 9.2 17.8 14.6 19.4 28.6
Payment to minister for concession 0.6 0.9 4.6 5.9 31.1 28.7 21.5
Official car used for personal affairs 43.5 27.1 21.6
Promotion by nepotism not merit 0.9 0.5 42.0 32.8 2.4 3.8 5.9
Official works short hours 53.1 32.4 4.2

‘Tea money’ is considered an appropriate term for various kinds of small payment, but is
never the most appropriate term. It may have become old-fashioned.

‘Improper behaviour’ is reckoned the most appropriate term for situations where an
official abuses his office, but not for large-scale gain. Such situations include: when
someone is promoted by nepotism rather than merit, when an official uses an official car
on personal business; and when an official works shorter than standard hours.
‘Dishonesty in duty’ is a slightly less popular alternative for the same usage. These terms
show some precision in identifying situations in which an official takes advantage of the
privileges and powers of office, but not to extract money.

‘Bribery’ is the most appropriate term for payments which are in a sense contractual
(both parties understand the agreement being made) and substantial. Examples are the
purchase of official positions (position buying), payments made in search of a
considerable advantage such as a concession or construction permit, and payments
deliberately solicited by an official. It is also appropriate for traffic fines paid directly to
policemen.

29
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

‘Under the table money’ is reserved for the situation where someone pays a minister or
similar decision-maker to gain a permit, contract or concession.

The term ‘corruption’ is reserved for more serious incidents involving large amounts of
money, such as commission fees on arms contracts, construction contracts, and
concessions. It is particularly appropriate for payments involving ministers and
politicians. Its usage is similar to that of ‘bribery’ but less common and stronger. It is not
appropriate to describe minor payments to officials, or official malpractice such as
working short hours, nepotism or position-buying.

A similar question was asked in a survey five years ago. As the sample and framing of
the question are different in the two surveys, the results are not strictly comparable.
However, the two results are broadly similar with two suggestive differences. First, the
usage of the term ‘corruption’ appears to have narrowed down to defining large-scale
misappropriation, and is less appropriate than before for describing minor
misdemeanours. Second, these major misappropriations are less likely than before to be
labelled with other, less pejorative terms such as ‘improper behaviour’. In sum, there
seems to be an increasingly clear separation into four types:

1. Small and somewhat conventional payments to officials (gifts of good

will, tea money, perhaps bribery);

2. Misuse of office for personal advantage but not for large monetary gain
(improper behaviour, dishonesty in duty);

3. Larger, contractual-style payments to officials for a major financial gain

(bribery, under-table money, perhaps corruption)

4. Similar to 3 but involving politicians (usually corruption).

30
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Perception of trends in corruption

Corruption is perceived as being perpetuated by politicians not by ordinary people (fig.

8). Politicians are definitely not to be trusted. Bureaucrats are also not to be trusted, but
not to such a radical extent as politicians. On the media, opinions are roughly evenly
divided whether they should be trusted or not. Ministers are definitely perceived to think
of their personal benefit rather than public benefit.

Fig. 8: Attitudes to corruption

(7-point scale)

Corruption is perpetuated by politicians Corruption is perpetuated by the people

The media can be trusted The media cannot be trusted

Bureaucrats can be trusted Bureaucrats cannot be trusted

Ministers think only of their

Ministers think only of the public benefit
personal benefit

Politicians can be trusted Politicians cannot be trusted

[Appendix table 7]

On most of these issues, the views from Bangkok are more emphatic than from other
areas. But there is no difference of opinion among areas.

Almost three-fifths of people

Fig 9: Who is more corrupt: politicians or bureaucrats
(percent) believe that politicians are more
corrupt than bureaucrats, and most
Politicians Same Bureaucrats others think the two are equally
corrupt (fig. 9). Only 4 percent
Nationwide think bureaucrats are more corrupt
than politicians. In Bangkok
people are even more emphatic
Bangkok that politicians are the more
corrupt.

Urban
A survey conducted five years ago
found opinions much more evenly
divided between politicians and
Rural
bureaucrats. Although the two
[Appendix table 8] surveys are not strictly

31
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

comparable, the difference in results is so extreme it can be counted as significant. Over

recent years, people have come to perceive politicians as more corrupt than bureaucrats.

Indeed, people believe that over the past 2–3 years, corruption has increased among both
politicians and bureaucrats, but more among politicians (fig. 10). For bureaucrats, 56
percent believe corruption has increased while 18 percent believe it has decreased—a
ratio of 3:1. For politicians, 72 percent believe it has increased and only 9 percent believe
it has decreased—a ratio of 8:1.

As to the trend of corruption over the next 2-3 years, the view is the same only a little
more optimistic (fig 10). For bureaucrats, the number who believe corruption will
increase is twice as many as those who think it will decrease. For politicians, the ratio is
three times. On these trends, the views of Bangkok and other regions are not
significantly different.

Fig. 10: Trends in corruption

(7-point scale)

<<Decrease Increase>>

Decrease Increase Ratio

Past 2-3 years, among bureaucrats 17.6 56.2 1:3

Past 2-3 years, among politicians 9.2 71.5 1:8

Next 2-3 years, among bureaucrats

26.9 45.5 1:2

Next 2-3 years, among politicians

18.7 60.2 1:3

[Appendix table 9]

32
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Perception of public offices

Households have a lot of contact with government offices and service establishments
(table 5). Only 6 percent of households had no contact with a government office over the
past year, and the average number of contacts per household was 17

Table 5: Number of visits to public offices in past year

---HH Income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
None 5.7 7.0 5.5 5.5 6.1 2.9
1 – 5 times 24.8 20.7 17.5 28.8 28.0 14.6
6 – 10 times 15.1 14.0 10.9 17.0 16.4 12.2
11 – 20 times 23.5 23.2 23.3 23.6 23.8 22.8
21 – 40 times 22.4 23.5 27.2 20.3 20.2 30.7
Over 40 times 8.4 11.7 15.5 4.8 5.6 16.8
Average visits per HH 16.8 18.5 21.7 14.5 14.7 23.6
Base, all households(‘000): 15,697 2,794 3,555 9,348 10,774 4,159

In the past year, 62 percent of households had some contact with a hospital, 57 percent
with the amphoe (district) office, 51 percent with driving/auto licensing office, and 40
percent with a post office (table 6). Schools, police, land offices, tax offices, and the
suppliers of electricity, telephone services and water were all visited by more than a
quarter of households.

Table 6: Percent of households visited each public offices in past year

---HH Income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
Public hospital 61.8 49.0 61.1 65.9 63.8 58.2
Amphoe (district) 57.3 55.4 49.7 60.8 58.1 57.7
Driving/Auto licences 50.8 38.6 56.6 52.3 48.6 59.3
Post offices 39.7 38.0 44.7 38.2 36.8 51.1
Government schools 32.4 29.6 33.5 32.9 32.9 33.7
Police 29.2 32.9 32.1 27.1 27.7 35.5
Land Offices 28.4 22.5 31.5 29.0 27.1 33.3
Electricity supply 27.1 36.0 29.9 23.4 24.9 35.4
Public telephone 26.8 40.9 42.6 16.5 17.8 52.3
Tax Offices 26.6 36.1 39.5 18.7 17.6 51.2
Water supply 12.5 25.6 18.6 6.3 8.9 23.0
Trash collection service 6.4 9.3 15.5 2.1 5.1 10.7
Passport office 3.6 11.0 3.3 1.4 1.8 8.5
Customs 2.7 4.9 4.7 1.4 1.4 6.4
Irrigation offices 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.4
Base, all households(‘000): 15,697 2,794 3,555 9,348 10,774 4,159

33
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

The quality of service

provided by government
Fig. 11: Quality of service at public offices offices is rated quite
(7 point scale, higher means bettter)
highly (fig. 11). On a 7-
point scale, all offices are
P o s t o ffic e rated an average score
Irrig a t io n above 4 by those who had
S c h o o ls visited the offices in the
T e le p h o n e past year. The offices
P a s s p o rt rated most highly are the
E le c t ric it y post office, schools,
A mp h o e telephone, electricity and
T ax district office. The
T ra s h passport office and
A u to
irrigation offices, which
W a ter
are visited by much
H o s p it a l
smaller numbers of
La n d
people, are also rated
P o lic e
highly. Rural households
Cu s to ms
also rate the electricity
supply service quite
3 4 5 6 highly, while provincial
urban households do the
[Appendix table 10]

same for tax offices and

trash collection

The three offices rated worst for the quality of service are the customs, police, and land
offices. Among public utilities, water supply is rated worst. Bangkok also gives poor
service ratings to hospitals and tax offices.

The impressions whether the service had improved or deteriorated over the past two years
generally follows the same pattern (appendix table 11). The ratings are generally
favourable, and the rank order much the same. Differences across regions and income
groups are not significant.

34
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Perceptions

Relatively few register complaints at public offices. Only 6 percent of households had
registered a complaint in the past year.

The highest numbers are at the trash collection services where 7 percent of all visitors
complained (table 7), followed by water supply (5 percent) and police (5 percent). Those
not registering a complaint mostly explain that they do not feel it would be any use.

Table 7: Registering complaints at public offices

--reason for not making complaint--
Base: all Made a Would take No use Tried but
visiting complaint too long could not
(000) % % % %
trash collection 1,012 7.0 2.3 14.2 -
water supply 1,959 5.4 6.8 15.9 0.2
police 4,636 5.0 2.6 28.1 0.4
land office 4,505 3.8 5.0 22.3 0.7
electricity 4,160 3.3 4.0 13.0 0.4
tax office 4,203 3.1 4.0 21.1 0.2
telephone 4,244 2.9 4.3 14.0 0.1
passport 564 2.8 6.0 11.1 -
hospital 9,735 1.7 3.4 22.8 0.3
customs 435 1.6 1.2 17.0 0.4
amphoe 9,088 1.0 2.6 18.3 0.6
auto license 8,048 0.9 2.1 22.0 0.2
school 5,668 0.9 2.6 18.1 0.2
post office 6,272 0.7 2.3 12.4 0.1
irrigation 137 - 5.3 15.0 79.7

35
 Section 2

Bribe solicitation at public offices

36
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Bribe solicitation at public offices

The office where visitors are most

Fig. 12: Incidence of bribes solicited likely to be asked for a bribe is the
(% of visitors)
land office (fig. 12). In all 12 percent
Nationwide
of all who visited a land office in the
Lan d
past year had been asked for a bribe on
Cu s to ms
at least one occasion. Other offices
Po lice
where bribe solicitation is common are
A u to the customs (10 percent of visitors),
Irrig atio n police (9 percent) and the driving/auto
Tras h licence issuers (8 percent). In Bangkok
Pas s p ort (fig. 13), the frequency is also high at
Tax trash collection services (7 percent),
A mp h o e and in the rural areas at the irrigation
Scho o ls
offices (5 percent).
Electricity
At post offices, bribe solicitation is
Ho s p ital
virtually unknown. It is also very, very
W ater
small at the suppliers of utilities—
Teleph o n e
telephone, electricity, water. In other
Po s t offices, only 1 to 3 percent of visitors
are asked for bribes.
0 5 10
[Appendix table 10]

Fig. 13: Incidence of bribes solicited

(% of visitors)

Bangkok Provincial urban Rural

Land The frequency of
Customs bribe solicitation
Police differs greatly by
Auto
area. In Bangkok the
Irrigation
highest frequency is
Trash

Passport
at customs. In the
Tax
provincial urban and
Amphoe rural areas, it is at
Schools the land office.
Electricity
Hospital

Water

Telephone

Post

0 5 10 0 5 10 15 0 5 10
[Appendix table 10]

37
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

The average bribe solicited is highest at

the police—9,588 baht (fig. 14). The
Fig. 14: Average bribes solicited
(baht) value of bribes solicited by the police
Nationwide ranged from one baht to 280,000 baht.
Po lice Many of these high-value bribes were
Cu s to ms solicited by the police from low-income
Tax households in the rural area.
Land
Sch oo ls The average bribe solicited was also high
W ater at customs (8,428 baht), tax offices
Hos pital (6,287) and land offices (3,179). These
Electricity are all offices involved in transactions
Pas s p ort concerning money or property.
A mp hoe

A u to
Bribes solicited from offices supplying
Tras h
services are much lower. Three other
Telep hon e
places where the average bribe solicited
Pos t
is fairly high are hospitals in Bangkok
Irrigatio n
(2,478 baht), government schools in the
0 5000 10000 provincial urban areas (2,943 baht), and
[Appendix table 13]
amphoe offices in the provincial urban
areas (2,225 baht) (fig. 15).

Fig. 15: Average bribe solicited, by area

(baht)

Bangkok Provincial urban Rural

Police

Customs

Tax

Land
Schools

Water

Hospital

Electricity

Passport

Amphoe

Auto
Trash

Telephone

Post

Irrigation

0 5000 10000 15000 0 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

[Appendix table 13]

38
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

The average bribe solicited differs by area. In Bangkok, the highest amounts are solicited
by the customs and tax offices. In the provincial areas, the highest amounts are solicited
by the police and the land and tax offices. In the rural area there is only one office
soliciting bribes of any size—the police.

The total amount of bribes solicited over the past year is highest at the land offices—5.1
billion baht (fig 16). This is followed by the police at 4.8 billion and the tax offices at 3.5
billion. These three offices account for 88 percent of the total amount of 15.4 billion
solicited in bribes by these fifteen government offices over the past year.

Fig 16: Total bribes solicited in past year, by office

(million baht)

Nationwide
Land
Police
Tax
Auto
Customs
Amphoe an
kok . urb
l
Schools ng ov ra
Ba P r Ru
Hospital
Trash
Electricity
Passport
Water
Telephone
Post
Irrigation

0 2000 4000 6000

[Appendix table 14]

The driving/auto offices, customs, amphoe offices and government schools each account
for over 100 million baht in bribes solicited each year.

The amounts solicited by public services including electricity, water, telephone, postal,
hospitals and trash collection are minimal.

39
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Bribe solicitation differs markedly in different areas. In Bangkok (fig. 17), the largest
amount of bribes solicited is in tax offices (2.6 billion baht), followed by the customs (0.5
billion). In the capital, bribe solicitation is associated with business and financial
transactions. Amounts involved arising from contact with utilities and other services are
very small, with the exception of the auto/driving licensing offices.

Fig. 17: Distribution of bribes solicited by area

Nationwide P rovincial urban

Tax Offices (1.0)
AmphoeOther 13%
Customs 3%
2% Schools
Auto licences 3%
Police (1.7) 2%
4%
23% Auto
Land Offices (5.1) 2%
34%
Other
2%

T ax offices (3.5)
23%

Police (4.8)
Land Offices (4.3)
31%
58%
Rural
B angkok
Auto
Amphoe
Land Offices Other 6%
Land offices (0.7) 7%
2%
Auto licences 3% 18% Hospital
7% 1%

O ther
Po lice (0.4) 2%
9%

Custo ms (0.5
12%

Tax Offices (2.6)

67%

P olice (2.7)
66% [Appendix table 14]

In the provincial urban areas, the major source of bribe solicitation is the land office (4.3
billion) followed by the police (1.7 billion) and the tax office (1 billion).

In the rural areas, by far the major source is the police (2.7 billion) followed by the land
offices (0.7 billion) and the amphoe (district—0.3 billion).

40
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

The poor and the rich are solicited by different offices (fig. 18). Low-income households
(under 2,500 baht a month) are mainly solicited by the land offices. High-income
households (over 50,000 baht a month) are mainly solicited by the tax office. Those in the
middle-income ranges are solicited by land offices, tax offices and the police.

Fig. 18: Distribution of bribes solicited by income

Under 2,500 baht/month 2,500-10,000 baht/month

other auto (0.3)

amphoe
auto 3% 5% other
3%
10% 1%

polic e
12%
p olice (3.2)
43%

land (3.6)
48%

land (0.6)
75%

Over 50,000 baht/month customs

10,000-50,000 baht/month 5%
land
police
customs (0.4) 7%
3%
land (0.7) 9%
18% auto trash
6% 1%

other
hospital
2%
4%
amphoe
other
1%
1%

tax (1.0)
25%

police (1.4) tax (2.5)

36% 82%
[Appendix table 15]

41
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Bribery and service evaluation

The evaluation of the service provided by government offices is related to their

propensity to solicit bribes (fig. 19). The customs, police and land offices have the
highest frequency of soliciting bribes, and the lowest ratings for service quality. The post
office has the best service rating and the lowest frequency for soliciting bribes.

F ig. 19: Service rating vs frequency of bribe solicitation

Water supply and
trash collection are
15 Customs also rated poorly—as
measured by the
service ratings and
the incidence of
% of visitors solicite d

10
Land complaints. But they
Police Auto are not prominent in
5
soliciting bribes.
Tax

0
4 4.5 5 5.5 6

se rvice rating (1-7)

[Appendix table 16]

However, there is not such link between bribe solicitation and registering complaints (fig.
20), presumably because people have no faith that complaints will be effective. Yet
households which
have been solicited
F ig. 20: Complaints registered vs frequency of bribe solicitation for bribes (and
15
especially high
bribes) are more
Land likely to register
complaints. Of the
% of visitors solicited

Customs
10
Police
households which
Auto had registered some
complaint at a public
5 office, 31 percent
Trash
had been solicited
for bribes at an
0
Water
average amount of
0 2 4 6 8 29,122 baht per
pe rce nt of visitors complaining household. [Appendix table 16]

42
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

In sum, bribe solicitation is not a major factor in the delivery of everyday household
services (electricity, water, postal, hospitals etc), and households are generally happy
with these services with a few exceptions. Bribe solicitation is a major factor in any
government office involved with transactions concerning money or property—especially
the land and tax offices which have dealings with large numbers of people, and also the
customs office where the number visiting is much smaller, but the average amount
solicited is high.

Bribe solicitation is also a major problem with the police which demanded the highest
average amount, and ranked second in the total amount solicited.

43
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Who gets asked for bribes?

On average, every household in the nation is solicited bribes of 970 baht per year from
various offices (table 8). The average per household is highest in the provincial urban
areas, largely because of high amounts solicited by the police.

Ten percent of all households were solicited for some bribe over the past year. This
proportion was similar across regions and income groups. Among those households
which were solicited, about half were solicited for a small total amount in the range of
100 to 1,000 baht. However, the average was 9,722—distorted upwards by a small
number of large amounts, mostly solicited by the police, customs, tax, and land offices.
The total amount solicited was 15.4 billion baht.

Table 8: Total bribes solicited per household in past year

---HH Income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high

Any bribe solicited (%) 10.0 9.6 11.6 9.5 9.4 12.0
Average annual bribes 970 1,378 2,055 432 753 1,640
solicited per HH (baht)
Average of annual bribes 9,722 14,311 17,732 4,566 7,974 13,690
per solicited HH
----total annual amount, percent of all solicited households----
<100 baht 16.3 5.8 11.5 21.7 22.5 4.7
100-1000 baht 48.1 53.7 45.7 47.5 46.3 51.4
1000-10,000 baht 25.3 26.5 25.9 24.6 23.1 29.5
10,000-100,000 baht 8.8 12.5 13.8 5.4 6.4 13.0
>100,000 baht 1.5 1.5 3.1 0.8 1.7 1.4
Total amount (bt mil) 15,399 3,893 7,429 4,077 8,177 6,947
Base, all households (‘000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438 10,864 4,236

44
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

The “average” figure is

Fig. 21: Cumulative distribution of bribes solicited misleading because the
distribution of bribe
100
amounts is very uneven
(fig 21). Among the 10
80 percent of households
who are solicited for
percent of money

60 bribes, around two-

thirds are solicited for a
40
thousand baht or less
over the year. The total
solicited in this way
20
represents less than
three percent of the
0
grand annual total. At
0 20 40 60 80 100
the other end of the [Appendix table 17]
percent of people
scale, less than two
percent of the solicited
households account for almost two-thirds of the total amount solicited, in amounts of
100,000 baht or more.

These large-scale bribes

Fig. 22: Distribution of bribes solicited by value of 100,000 baht or more
are solicited by only
>100,000
percent of total bribe value in amounts:
10,000-100,000 1,000-10,000 <1,000 baht
four offices: customs,
land offices, police, and
tax offices (fig 22). For
ta x
the tax office, these
p o lic e
large sums account for
c u s to m s

la n d
around 90 percent of all
a m p ho e
bribe solicitation. For
tr a s h
customs, land and
sc ho o l
police, the proportion is
h o s p ita l
between 50 and 60
a u to
percent.
e le c tr ic ity

w a te r Indeed, the 100,000+

p o st bribes solicited by the
p ho ne police, land, and tax
ir r ig a tio n offices account for 60
p a s s p o rt percent of all bribe
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% solicitation.
[Appendix table 18]

45
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

By far the majority of

Fig 23: Distribution of bribes solicited by households households solicited for
bribes are solicited for
percent of total households solicited for bribes of amounts:
>100,000 10,000-100,000 1,000-10,000 <1,000 baht very small amounts—
usually less than a
ta x
thousand baht (fig 23).
c u s to m s

p o lic e
The large scale
la n d
solicitation in amounts
a m p ho e
of over 100,000 baht
tr a s h
affects only some
scho o l
30,000 households.
h o s p ita l

a u to
The households
e le c tr ic ity solicited for large
w a te r (>100,000 baht) bribes
p o st tend to be headed by an
p ho ne own account worker in
ir r ig a tio n commerce with a higher
p a ssp o rt secondary education and
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
a provincial urban
[Appendix table 19]
residence.

46
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Bribery falls most heavily on the poor (fig. 24). The likelihood of being asked for bribes
is much the same for households across income classes—around 10 percent of
households. But among those households solicited for bribes, the amount solicited is a
much higher proportion of income for poorer households compared to richer households.

Fig. 24: Bribe incidence and household income

----------------------monthly household income (baht)-----------------

As household income <2,500 2,500- 5,000- 10,000- 20,000- 50,000 >100,000
increases... 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000 100,000

20
… the likelihood the 15
household is solicited for 10
bribes increases only a 5
little...
0

3
… and the proportion of 2
income solicited as bribes
is higher among the poor... 1

30
… especially when 20
calculated just for those
households which are 10
solicited.
0

[Appendix table 20]

47
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Demographics of bribe solicitation

Female household heads have a lower propensity to be solicited for bribes, but on average
are solicited for a much larger amount than males (fig, 25).

Younger people have a higher propensity to be solicited, and tend to be solicited for
higher amounts.

Among occupations, the highest frequency and amounts are found among ‘own account
workers’, most of whom are probably private businessmen (the term ‘own account
workers’ includes businessmen and self-employed professionals).

Fig. 25: Demographics of bribe solicitation: 1

Percent of hous eholds s olicited Average amount per HH ('000 baht)

m ale

fem ale

below 30

30 -3 9

40 -4 9

50 -5 9

60 up

em plo y er

go v t em plo y ee

p rivat e em plo y ee

o wn acco unt wo rk er

ret ired

h o use work er

un em p lo y ed

ot h ers

0 5 10 0 10 20 30 40
[Appendix table 21]

48
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

The highest amounts are solicited from own account workers in sales—in other words
from small private traders (fig. 26).

Both the propensity to be solicited, and the total amount, tends to increase with greater
education and higher income.

Fig. 26: Demographics of bribe solicitation: 2

Average amount per HH ('000 baht)

Percent of hous eholds s olicited
p rofessional

administrative

sales

agriculture

general labour

service

p rimary 4-6

secondary school

higher secondary

tertiary , vocational

tertiary , academic

U p to 2500 baht

2501-5000 baht

5001-10000 baht

10001-20000 baht

20001-50000 baht

>50000 baht

0 5 10 15 0 10 20 30 40
[Appendix table 21]

49
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

The fact of having any official in the household appears to depress the propensity to be
solicited or the amount only very slightly (fig. 27). Households including teachers or
soldiers were solicited for higher than average amounts. Households including a
policeman were still solicited in 7 percent of cases, but the average amount was very low.

Fig. 27: Demographics of bribe solicitation: 3

Percent of hous eholds s olicited Average amount per HH ('000 baht)

Househ o ld m em ber

-T each er

-Soldier

-P olice

-Ot h er o fficial

-No o fficial

-An y o fficial

ban gk o k

n o rt h urban

n o rt h east urban

cen t ral urban

so ut h urban

n ort h rural

n ort h east rural

cent ral rural

sout h rural

0 5 10 15 20 0 10 20 30 40
[Appendix table 21]

50
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

Mechanics of corruption

Most people are uncertain about the method to negotiate a bribe with an official (table 9).
Only just over half could specify what happens in the majority of cases. Most replied that
they felt a need to pay without being requested, but were uncertain of the amount.
However, they noted that situations in which the official asked or hinted, or where the
procedure (and amount) was generally known, were also quite common.

Table 9: Method of bribing (all households)

---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
The official requests or hints 53.9 55.9 49.1 55.4 54.2 53.5
You feel the need to pay 60.5 60.8 61.3 60.1 61.1 59.7
without being requested
It is known beforehand how 43.3 36.7 46.1 44.3 42.9 44.3
and what to pay
Base, all able to specify 8,261 1,520 2,095 4,646 5,703 2,368
method (000):

The ten percent of the sample who had been solicited for bribes over the past year were
more definite (table 10). They indicated that the official was likely to ask or hint for the
bribe. This was especially true in the rural area.

Table 10: Method of bribing (those solicited)

---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
The official requests or hints 61.9 50.9 49.5 71.1 66.2 55.9
You feel the need to pay 50.9 46.6 50.6 52.4 55.5 43.1
without being requested
It is known beforehand how 47.0 40.4 50.1 47.6 46.5 49.0
and what to pay
Base, all solicited 1,584 272 419 893 1,026 507
for bribe (000):

51
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Bribe Solicitation at Public Offices

People are relatively confident that a payment will increase the chance that a problem
with an official would be resolved speedily and effectively (table 11). Over half are
positive that a bribe will be effective, while less than a quarter are negative. On a 7-point
scale, the mean is 4.7, with little variation across regions and income groups.

Those who had been solicited for bribes in the past year are more confident. Over two-
thirds are positive that a bribe will be effective, and the mean is 5.4.

Table 11: How confident are you that bribe will have desired result
---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
All answering
No (%) 22.2 30.2 20.5 20.5 20.1 24.6
Neutral (%) 25.3 21.2 22.9 27.3 25.9 23.2
Yes (%) 52.6 48.6 56.6 52.1 54.0 52.2
Mean (7-point scale) 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.6
Base, all answering (‘000): 14,757 2,495 3,428 8,833 10,147 3,949
All solicited for bribe
No (%) 14.7 20.3 20.4 10.3 11.6 21.5
Neutral (%) 18.0 13.7 13.4 21.4 17.4 16.8
Yes (%) 67.4 66.0 66.2 68.3 71.0 61.8
Mean (7-point scale) 5.4 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.0
Base, all solicited (‘000): 1,571 272 413 886 1,022 501

52
 Section 3

Schools, courts and votes

54
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

Corruption in education

Almost two-thirds of households include one or more students (table 12).

Table 12: Households with students

---HH Income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
Kindergarten 12.4 8.5 13.3 13.3 13.0 11.6
Primary 30.9 24.7 29.6 33.3 34.7 21.9
Secondary 28.1 22.7 28.0 29.8 28.6 27.6
College (academic) 9.8 12.7 12.5 7.9 7.5 16.5
Vocational 6.2 5.9 7.1 6.0 6.0 7.0
Any 64.4 53.8 64.0 66.0 65.9 59.2
Students per household 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
Base, all households (´000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438 10,864 4,236

Of these households, 2.8 percent were asked to pay some amount to gain placement in a
government school over the past year (table 13). The minimum amount was 100 baht, and
the maximum 60,000 baht. The average amount was a little over 10,000 baht.

In Bangkok the proportion of households asked was higher (4.3 percent) and the average
amount was close to 20,000 baht. In the rural areas, the proportion fell to 1.7 percent and
the amount to around 5,000 baht.

Upper-income households were more likely to be asked. But the average amount was
around the same for upper and lower income households.

Table 13: Extra payments for education

---HH Income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
Any payment for place in gov’t school (%) 2.8 4.3 4.6 1.7 2.2 4.7
Average amount per household (baht) 10,277 20,022 9,016 4,872 10,462 10,435
Total amount (mil baht) 2,627 1,239 965 422 1,391 1,227
Any additional payments at school (%) 4.5 5.1 6.1 3.8 3.8 7.2
Average amount per household (baht) 1,195 2,957 714 899 718 1,835
Total amount (mil baht) 499 212 93 194 172 327
3,126 1,451 1,058 716 1,563 1,554
Base, all households with students (´000): 10,051 1,513 2,314 6,223 7,150 2,508

Besides admission fees, some 4.5 percent of households with students were required to
make some extra, irregular payment to the school over the past year (table 13). The
average amount was 1,195 baht. Again in Bangkok the amount was significantly higher at
2,957.

55
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

In all, these extra payments to public educational institutions amount to 3.1 billion baht a
year, with just under half found in Bangkok.

There is a strong impression that the public education system is improving (table 14). On
a 7-point scale where 1 meant the system had deteriorated badly and 7 meant it had
improved a lot, households with students gave the public education system a rating of
4.98.

In terms of cost, the public education system is seen as slightly expensive. On a 1-7 scale
ranging from cheap to expensive, households with students gave an average rating of
3.89. Rural households were more likely to perceive it as expensive.

Table 14: Perception of public education

---HH income---
Base Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
(000) -----------mean score, 7-point scale-----------
All HH with students
Has public education system 10,052 4.98 4.79 4.96 5.03 5.07 4.75
improved (7) or deteriorated(1)
over past 2 yrs
Is public education cheap (1) or 10,048 3.89 3.46 3.86 4.01 3.94 3.75
expensive (7)
All HH made extra payments
Has public education system 675 4.62 4.52 4.88 4.50 4.91 4.23
improved (7) or deteriorated(1)
over past 2 yrs
Is public education cheap (1) or 675 4.25 3.80 4.16 4.47 4.26 4.23
expensive (7)

Those households which had been asked to make irregular extra payments for schooling
had a slightly less favourable view of the progress of the public education system. They
were also more likely to perceive the system as expensive—especially in the rural area.

56
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

Corruption in the judicial system

Views on the judicial system are not at all clear (fig. 28). The judicial system is perceived
as deserving of trust, but only by a small margin. Opinions are equally divided whether it
is independent of the bureaucracy or not. By a small margin, it is considered to be for
everyone rather than just the rich and powerful. However, this favourable margin is
mostly contributed by the rural sample. Both judges and public prosecutors are
considered to be honest. On all these opinions, Bangkok is a little more sceptical.

Fig. 28: Attitudes to the judicial system

(7-point scale)

The judicial system is only for The judicial system is

the rich and powerful for everyone

Most judges are honest Most judges are dishonest

The judicial system The judicial system does

deserves all our trust not deserve our trust

Most public prosecutors are honest Most public prosecutors

are dishonest

The judicial system is totally The judicial system is not at all

independent of the bureaucracy independent of the bureaucracy

[Appendix table 22]

However, on all these opinions, large numbers (between 24 and 43 percent) selected the
middle box (=4) denoting a neutral opinion (table 15). The overall impression is that the
attitude to the judiciary is either indistinct or moderately favourable. Even among those
who have had recent experience of the judicial system (see below), the mean scores were
not significantly different from the overall sample, and the numbers selecting the middle
box only slightly less.

Table 15: Views on judicial system

% selecting middle box
All Bkk Used
court*
The judicial system deserves all of our 33 30 29 The judicial system does not
trust deserve any trust
The judicial system is totally independent 40 31 33 The judicial system is not at all
of the bureaucracy independent of the bureaucracy
The judicial system is only for the rich and 24 16 16 The judicial system is for
powerful everyone
Most judges are honest 35 35 35 Most judges are dishonest
Most public prosecutors are honest 43 37 39 Most public prosecutors are
dishonest
*=all appeared in courts in past 2–3 years (= 7.5% of sample)

57
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

Views on the judiciary are probably unclear because most people have little direct
experience (table 16).

Eight percent of households had made a court appearance in the past two years. The
proportion was slightly higher in urban areas and among upper-income households.
Almost all had made a single appearance, and the maximum was six.

Table 16: Number of court appearances in past 2 years

----HH income----
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
Any 7.5 8.8 9.1 6.5 6.9 8.9
1 6.2 6.4 7.9 5.4 5.8 6.9
2 0.9 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.6 1.6
3 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4
5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2

Slightly more appeared as defendants rather than plaintiffs (table 17). The cases were
equally divided between criminal and civil.

In 31 percent of cases, a bribe was solicited to get a favourable decision. This proportion
was the same for civil and criminal cases, and slightly more common for plaintiffs (35
percent) as against defendants (28 percent). An estimated 364,000 households were asked
for a bribe to secure a favourable court decision over the past two years (2.3 percent of all
households in the country).

Table 17: Court appearances in what capacity

---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
Plaintiff 42.2 48.7 35.0 43.4 38.8 48.8
Defendant 57.8 51.3 65.0 56.6 61.2 51.2
Criminal 47.2 33.5 42.3 55.4 51.0 37.3
Civil 49.7 63.8 54.1 41.5 45.3 60.2
Both 3.1 2.7 3.6 3.0 3.7 2.5
Bribe solicited 30.7 27.5 27.6 33.6 29.6 33.0
Base, all making court 1,188 248 330 611 745 377
appearance (‘000):

58
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

In over half (56 percent) of those cases when a bribe was requested, the amount required
was indicated (table 18). These amounts ranged from a low of 1,500 baht to a high of
150,000 baht. Most fell in the range of 10,000 to 50,000 baht, and the mean was 34,531
baht. This was slightly higher than the amount (32,003 baht) which the same households
paid on average for their official expenses such as attorney fees. The total estimated value
of these indicated bribes was 6.6 billion baht over two years.

Table 18: Corruption in the judicial system

Percent of number of
households households
Total households 100.0 15,878,000
Total involved in court cases 7.5 1,181,000

----- based on all households involved in court cases (1.2 million)------

Percent of number of baht total
households households
% asked for a bribe 30.7 364,000
% asked for bribe and amount indicated 17.3 205,000
- average value of bribe 34,531 6.6 billion
- average court expenses (legal fees etc) 32,003
% bribe indicated and case with economic value 8.9
- average economic value 542,598
- average bribe amount indicated 19,133
- bribe as % of economic value 3.5
Note: Some respondents did not reveal amount solicited. The total value is based only on those who revealed

In half of the cases that a bribe amount was indicated, the court case had some economic
value (e.g. property). In these cases the average economic value of the case was just over
half a million baht, and the bribe indicated averaged 3.5 percent of this value.

The main recipients of bribes in

F ig. 29: Distribution of payments solicited to influence court cases court cases are public prosecutors
(fig. 29). In just under half of the
Judge
11% estimated 205,000 cases when a
bribe amount was indicated,
O ther
C ourt Secretary payments was made to a public
9%
32%
prosecutor. Frequency of payments
to judges, court secretaries or court
clerks was much less—around 13-
Court Clerk 15 percent of cases. In all these
10%
instances the average amount paid
was around 20,000 baht.

In 43 percent of cases, payments

Police
8% were made to someone other than a
court officer, usually a police
Public Prosecutor
30% officer, lawyer or someone else
acting as an intermediary.
[Appendix table 23]

59
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

When itemized in this way, the estimated total value of bribes paid in court cases is 6.7
billion baht, slightly over the earlier unitemized estimate of 6.6 billion (table 19).

Table 19: Distribution of payments over court cases

----- based on all households involved in court cases and bribe amount indicated (0.2 million)------
Percent Number of Average Total amount
Households (‘000) amount (baht) (mil. baht)
Payments to judge 15.5 31 24,489 743
Payment to court secretary 13.7 27 21,829 585
Payment to court clerk 15.7 31 22,369 685
Payment to public prosecutor 47.0 94 25,245 2,030
Payment to police 21.1 42 15,887 552
Payment to others 23.1 46 46,191 2,142
Total 6,737

Although the samples are small, some of the sub-sample variation is worth pointing out.
None of the payments to court functionaries (judge, clerk, secretary) were made in
Bangkok. All were provincial, and mostly rural. Payments to public prosecutors and
‘others’ were found in all areas.

The average total value of bribes per case was not significantly different in Bangkok,
urban and rural areas (table 20). In all over half the total bribe amount derived from the
rural area. The average bribe value for lower-income households was half that for upper-
income households, but as a percentage of those lower-income households’ annual
income it was much higher—41 percent against 14 percent.

Table 20: Total payments solicited in court cases

---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
Average total payments 32,948 34,846 33,664 32,082 21,604 45,045
per case (baht)
Total payments over 6,737 1,220 1,717 3,800 2,398 3,586
past 2 years (mil. baht)
Total bribe as percent of 20.3 18.9 15.8 24.3 40.9 14.4
annual HH income
Base, all asked for
payment in court 200 35 50 115 111 75
case and amount
indicated (‘000):

60
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

Those who had been asked for bribes over a court case were uncertain whether payment
made the outcome more certain (table 21). Forty-two percent felt the bribe did make the
outcome more certain, but 33 percent disagreed and 24 percent were neutral.

Table 21: Does payment make court decision more certain

---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
No % 33.3 36.7 19.1 38.9 31.5 33.8
Neutral % 24.0 19.7 23.7 25.4 21.5 27.2
Yes % 42.7 43.6 57.2 35.7 47.0 39.0
Mean (7-point scale) 4.1 3.8 4.6 4.0 4.2 4.2
Base, all asked for payment 320 56 85 180 180 121
in court case (‘000):

Five percent of households had contemplated going to court over a dispute in the past two
years but had decided against it (table 22).

Table 22: Contemplated court case but decided against it

---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
Yes (%) 5.2 6.2 7.0 4.3 4.7 7.1
Base, all (‘000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438 10,864 4,236

Fig 30: Obstacles to use of judicial system Delay in resolving a case was the
biggest obstacle deterring
Delays in resolving case households from going to court,
Lack of objective decisions
followed by lack of objective
decisions, and uncertainty over the
Uncertainty over execution of decision
execution of decisions (fig 30). In
Extra payments other words, people believe that
Costs of legal counsel
court process is slow, erratic and
ineffective. The cost element—both
Professionalism and preparedness of judges
in terms of official and unofficial
30 50 70 90 payments—is a secondary concern.
(% believe this reason important) Indeed, when it came to rating the
[Appendix table 24]
different obstacles, extra payments
was narrowly ranked bottom.

61
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

For those who decided against a court

Fig 31: Alternatives for settling serious disputes outside the case, the most common alternative
judicial system
way to resolve major disputes is
Through friends and relatives

Through a police officer

through the intercession of friends
Private negotiation by lawyer
and relatives (fig. 31). If an outsider
Through a high-rank official
is brought in to help, it is most likely
Through a prestigious personality to be a police officer. Lawyers, high
Through an entrepreneur officials and prestigious personalities
Through threats or use of force may also figure. Entrepreneurs and
Through someone in Armed Forces military men are less appropriate, and
Through an NGO NGOs even less so. These
0 20 40 preferences hold true across regions
(% used this method in past 2 years) and income classes
[Appendix table 25]

As many as 1.5 percent of households admitted to using threats or force to resolve a

dispute. In Bangkok, this figure rose to 3 percent.

62
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

Vote buying

Almost one third of households had been offered vote-buying at the last general election
in November 1996 (table 23). The proportion was much the same across regions and
income groups.

Around one fifth of those with the right to vote had been offered vote-buying at elections
for municipalities and sanitary district councils over the past 2 years. Thirty percent of
those living in the rural areas falling inside Greater Bangkok had been offered vote-
buying at tambon council elections.

The incidence of vote-buying for provincial council elections, and for tambon councils
outside Bangkok, is much less.

These figures are probably highly underestimated. Other estimates of the proportion of
voters offered money at general elections have run as high as 70 percent. However, the
relative importance of vote-buying at different types of election may still be significant.

Table 23: Vote-buying offered at elections in past 2 years

Base: all ---HH income---
have right Total Bkk Urban Rural Low high
to vote (000) % % % % % %
Last general election 15,878 30.6 27.2 30.7 31.6 31.3 30.8
Municipal election 3,991 19.5 37.9 19.2 21.4 17.9
Provincial Council 13,657 6.5 6.7 8.1 5.8 6.7 5.6
Sanitary district council 562 20.1 8.7 22.5 24.3 11.7
Tambon (sub-district) council 9,468 9.3 29.7 8.2 9.8 9.5
Bangkok Ward Councils 1,830 4.5 4.5

At the last general election, the average amount offered as vote-buying ranged from 10
baht to 13,000 baht (N.B. the respondent was asked to estimate for the whole household
which might include several voters). The average per household was 678 baht (fig. 28). In
Bangkok the average was significantly higher at 1,142 baht per household, and in the
rural areas it fell to 554 baht.

The total amount involved nationwide was around 3 billion baht, with around half offered
in the rural area.

In local elections, although the proportion of households offered money is less than in the
general elections, the amounts tend to be higher. The average per household is in the
range of 700 to 1,000 baht. The highest average was for sanitary district elections at
1,043 baht. The exception is the provincial council elections where the average is only
333 baht.

63
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Schools, Courts and Votes

The total amount offered in all these elections amounts to 4.7 billion baht (fig. 32). After
the general election, the next highest amounts are for the tambon council elections (593
million) and municipalities (570 million).

Fig. 32: Vote-buying

Households offered vote-buying Amount per household Total amount

Ge n e ra l
e le c t io n

Pro v in c ia l

M u n ic ip a l

Sa n it a ry

T a mb o n

0 2.5 5 0 500 1000 0 1 2 3

million HH baht per HH baht million
[Appendix table 26]

Donations to electoral candidates are insignificant. Only 0.3 percent had donated money
to a candidate at the last general election. For local elections, the incidence was even less.

64
 Section 4

Combating corruption

66
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Combating Corruption

Combating corruption

Combating corruption is highly problematic (fig. 33). People clearly believe that officials
should be dealt with more harshly than common citizens over corruption issues, and that
the government should definitely make the fight against corruption one of its priorities.
There is almost no dissent from these views. However it is also believed that most people
only talk about corruption but have no sincere desire to do anything about it. There is also
no conviction that either the Civil Service Commission, or international institutions (such
as the World Bank) can help combat corruption. On these two questions, over half opted
for the middle box, probably indicating that they had no knowledge or opinion.

Fig. 33: Attitudes to combating corruption

(7-point scale)

Officials should be dealt with more harshly Common citizens should be dealt with more
than common citizens in cases of corruption harshly than officials in cases of corruption

Government should make the fight against Government need not make the fight against
corruption one of its priorities corruption one of its priorities

The Civil Service Commission The Civil Service Commission

can help fight corruption cannot help fight corruption
International institutions like the World International institutions like the World
Bank can help fight corruption Bank cannot help fight corruption
Most people have a sincere Most people only talk about
desire to fight corruption corruption but do nothing
[Appendix table 27]

Fig. 34: Effectiveness in combatting corruption

The media are considered to be
Media
the most effective institution in
Counter Corruption Commission
combating corruption, followed
Academics & teachers
by the Counter Corruption
NGOs Commission and academics/
Armed forces teachers (fig. 34). These three
Office of the Attorney General institutions are rated clearly
Police better than others.
MPs

3 4 5
The least effective are police
(mean, 7-point scale) [Appendix table 28]
and MPs.

67
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Combating Corruption

Reporting corruption

There is no clear and generally known mechanism for reporting cases of corruption. Only
3-in-10 people know how to report a case of corruption (table 24). Of these, 61 percent
believe it should be reported to the Counter Corruption Commission, and 57 percent to
the police.

Table 24: Reporting a case of corruption

HH income
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
Know how to report (%) 30.1 31.1 34.4 28.1 25.9 44.1
Don't know how to report (%) 69.9 68.9 65.6 71.9 74.1 55.9

Report to who ----------percent of those who know how to report--------

Police 56.7 45.4 56.3 60.7 63.9 45.9
Counter Corruption 61.0 70.5 66.2 55.5 54.0 72.2
Commission
MPs 19.5 18.2 17.8 20.8 19.9 19.1

People are not sure about the effectiveness of the procedures for reporting corruption
(table 25). On a 7-point scale ranging from low to high effectiveness, the mean answer
came at the mid-point. Bangkokians are more sceptical than the average. Those who
earlier said they knew how to report a case of corruption were only marginally more
confident about the effectiveness of the process.

Table 25: Effectiveness of corruption reporting process

HH income
Base Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
(‘000) ---------means (7-point scale)-------------
Effectiveness(7 point scale)
- all answering 15,399 3.52 3.22 3.53 3.61 3.57 3.48
- all know how to report 4,737 3.80 3.55 3.85 3.86 3.82 3.76

68
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Combating Corruption

A fifth believed they had witnessed a case of corruption in the past 2 years (table 26). In
Bangkok, the proportion rose to a third. Of those who had witnessed, only 5 percent
reported the matter.

Table 26: Witnessed case of corruption in past 2 years

HH income
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
Witnessed a case (%) 20.5 32.5 24.5 15.4 16.4 33
Did not witness a case (%) 79.5 67.5 75.5 84.6 83.6 67

Report it or not ----------percent of those who witnessed--------

Reported it 4.9 6.7 5.1 3.6 3.3 6.4
Did not think to report it 39.1 28.0 48.0 40.7 44.6 32.5
Thought but didn't 56.0 65.2 46.9 55.7 52.1 61.1

Fig. 35: Reasons for not reporting corruption Corruption goes unreported
because of fear of reprisals and
No protection against reprisals
doubt that anyone will be
Pointless as culprits would not be punished

Everybody knows and nobody reports

punished (fig. 35). Almost 9-in-
Those who report suffer consequences
10 of all those who had
Could not prove it
witnessed a case of corruption
Trivial, not worth reporting felt these two factors might
Did not know where to report it influence a decision not to report
Do not want to betray anyone the case.
Those who report just want to create problems

30 50 70 90

(% believe this reason important)

[Appendix table 29]

69
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Combating Corruption

At the tail-end of the survey, household heads were prompted to suggest their own
solutions to corruption (fig. 36). One suggestion, made by three-fifths, dominated the
responses: tougher suppression with more severe penalties.

Fig. 36: Suggestions for combating corruption

Su pp res s co rru ptio n s erio u s ly an d imp os e s ev ere p en alties o n

wro n gd o ers includ in g d is mis s al

Es tab lis h co mmittees to o vers ee tran s p aren cy in d ifferen t s ecto rs

In s til citizens with co ns cio u s n es s of th eir rig hts s o th ey can

camp aig n ag ain s t corru p tio n

In v es tigate s ub o rd inates clo s ely

In s til g oo d co n s cien ce in p u b lic s erv an ts s o th ey p ut p rio rity o n

commo n g o o d

Refo rm th e b u reau cracy fo r tran s p aren cy and efficien cy , in clud in g

ad ju s tin g p ay s cales

Solv e eco n o mic, s o cial an d p o litical prob lems p ro mp tly fo r better

p u blic well-bein g

Stamp o u t d rug p ro blems

Sup erio rs mu s t s et g oo d examp le to th eir s u b o rdin ates an d th e

g en eral p u b lic

0 20 40 60
[Appendix table 31]

70
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Combating Corruption

Final comments

In all some 2.1 million households, or 13.4 percent of the sample, had been solicited for
some bribe by a government office or school within the past year, or in connection with a
court case within the past two years.

The average total payment per solicited household was 11,925 baht, and the sum total 25
billion baht. However, over half of the solicited households had been asked for total sums
of a thousand baht or less (fig. 37). Only 5 percent of the solicited households (less than 1
percent of total households) had been solicited for a total amount exceeding 50,000 baht.
However these large-scale bribes contributed over half the total amount.

Fig. 37: Distribution of bribe solicitation by amount

(baht per household per year)

Percent of households solicited Percent of total bribe amount

1 - 100

100 - 1,000

1,000 - 10,000

10,000 - 50,000

50,000 - 100,000

100,000 - 1m

0 20 40 0 20 40 60

[Appendix table 30]

On the evidence of this survey, Thailand is not badly afflicted by the sort of low-level
corruption characterised by petty payments solicited regularly from ordinary people for
the pursuit of normal public services. There is some of this, but not much. Despite
frequent contact with government offices, 90 percent of households claim not to be
affected, and a further 6 percent are solicited for rather small sums (less than 1,000 baht
annually).

Even so, public sector corruption remains a major problem, and is perceived as such. This
problem falls into two parts. First, there is bribe solicitation, often on a large scale,
confined to a few offices which have authority over transactions of money and
property—namely the customs, land and tax, offices—plus the police. This practice also
affects the judicial system to some extent, even though the judiciary in general is
perceived as being less afflicted by corruption than the administrative bureaucracy and
politicians.

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Combating Corruption

Second, there is a major problem of corruption in the political system. This does not
affect households directly and hence is not fully captured in this survey. It affects
households indirectly in the numbers of politicians prepared to offer money for their
votes. And it is something which households are aware of. People believe it is a problem
which is bad and getting worse. Whereas a few years ago, they saw bureaucratic and
political corruption as equally problematic, now there is no doubt that political corruption
looms as the more serious problem.

At present people have little knowledge of or faith in mechanisms to combat these two
forms of corruption. They are unlikely to use complaint procedures because they doubt
they will be effective. They do not believe there is currently a strong political will for
reform. They place some hope in the Counter Corruption Commission and in civil society
(media, academics, teachers). But they do not believe that combating corruption is yet a
serious part of the national agenda.

72
Appendices

73
Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix: Sample details

Sample details

These tables shows the sample with weights applied.

Sample details
Total Bkk Urban Rural
% % % %
Sex
male 69.8 62.0 71.2 71.5
female 30.2 38.0 28.8 28.5
Age
below 30 7.0 8.7 5.0 7.2
30-39 23.7 27.5 24.1 22.4
40-49 31.5 32.0 32.7 30.8
50-59 23.0 20.7 23.7 23.5
60 up 14.8 11.1 14.5 16.1
Occupation
employer 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.0
govt employee 10.0 12.4 16.5 6.8
private employee 16.7 27.0 17.6 13.3
own account worker 61.9 39.5 52.6 72.2
unpaid family worker 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2
student 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
retired 3.4 3.4 5.5 2.6
house worker 3.2 5.0 4.1 2.3
unemployed 2.4 5.4 2.1 1.7
others 1.4 5.5 0.3 0.6
Type of work
professional 10.6 11.4 17.6 7.7
administrative 2.8 5.7 4.9 1.1
clerical 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.1
sales 20.9 30.4 35.0 12.7
agriculture 40.3 5.8 13.7 60.9
transport 1.1 2.4 1.2 0.6
general labour 8.2 10.3 10.5 6.7
service 1.5 4.4 1.4 0.6
others 13.4 25.7 14.5 9.4
no answer 0.8 3.0 0.6 0.2
Region
North 20.5 23.7 25.5
Northeast 28.5 27.3 37.4
Central 20.9 31.4 23.2
South 12.3 17.6 13.9
Bangkok 17.8 100.0
Base ('000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix: Sample details

Sample details (continued)

Total Bkk Urban Rural
% % % %
Education
below primary 4 6.7 8.3 3.8 7.3
primary 4-6 54.5 29.6 45.3 65.6
secondary school 11.0 12.6 12.0 10.2
higher secondary 8.6 12.1 12.6 6.1
tertiary, vocational 7.5 17.2 9.1 4.0
tertiary, academic 8.4 15.8 13.2 4.3
master degree or higher 1.1 3.4 1.1 0.5
others 2.1 1.0 3.0 2.1
Monthly HH income
Upto 2500 baht 25.5 3.3 11.3 37.5
2501-5000 baht 22.3 11.4 19.2 26.8
5001-10000 baht 20.6 24.5 25.7 17.4
10001-20000 baht 15.1 25.6 22.5 9.1
20001-50000 baht 9.4 23.8 14.0 3.3
50001-100000 baht 1.7 6.2 1.6 0.5
Over 100000 baht 0.5 2.1 0.3 0.2
No answer 1.3 1.4 2.3 0.9
Don't know 3.6 1.8 3.1 4.4
Miscellaneous
Someone in HH owns 82.5 76.5 79.7 85.4
land
Official in HH 20.2 22.7 29.1 16.0
Someone in HH had 14.2 23.5 15.4 10.9
traffic violation in past
year
Someone in HH had tax 4.1 9.0 4.6 2.5
inspection in past year
Someone in HH 3.1 3.7 2.7 3.0
receives scholarship
Base (‘000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Technical Notes

Survey Design

The survey was based on a methodology already used in several other countries. The
model questionnaire, provided by the World Bank, was adapted and extended for Thai
conditions by the research team.

The survey is designed as a survey of households, and the questionnaire is designed for
administering to the household head.

In consultation between the research team and the World Bank representatives, it was
decided to make the survey nationwide in scope. The target sample size was fixed at
4,000 taking account of the usual trade-offs between cost and quality.

Sample design

The sample design was based on three guiding principles: 1. Use standard formal
techniques; 2. Ensure the sample is widely distributed in order to cover the full range of
cultural and regional variation; 3. Use clustering techniques to minimize costs. The final
sampling scheme was based on a six-stage design with three levels of clustering, as
follows:

Stage 1. Purposive division into three areas: Greater Bangkok, provincial

urban, and rural. The total target sample was purposively allocated to these
three areas, deliberately over-weighting the Bangkok and urban samples on
grounds these would have a denser and more varied response to the
questionnaire. For ‘urban’ the official designation of thesaphiban was used.

Stage 2. Purposive allocation by geographical regions. The upcountry urban

and rural samples were divided into the four regions (north, northeast, central,
south). The Bangkok sample was divided between the inner city, outer city,
and surrounding provinces (Nonthaburi, Pathumthani, Samut Prakan). Again
the allocation of sample numbers was purposive, but roughly in line with the
distribution of population numbers within each stratum.

Stages 3-5. Three stages of cluster selection based on administrative divisions,

with units selected by probability proportionate to size (PPS), using the
Ministry of Interior data on population numbers in administrative divisions.
The three stages were:
inner Bangkok: district (khwaeng), sub-district (khet), electoral unit
provincial and outer Bangkok urban: province, municipality, electoral unit
provincial and outer Bangkok rural: province, district (amphoe), village

Stage 6. Selection of households using interval sampling

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

In all sampling was carried out in 22 election units of Bangkok, and in 93 final sampling
units upcountry spread across 24 of the nation’s 75 provinces.
Thailand

Provincial Urban Rural Bangkok

Region Region Zone

Province Province District

Municipal District Sub-district

Election Unit Village Election Unit

Household Household Household

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

The provinces selected for the regional sampling were as follows

Final sample details

Actual final sample
Total Number
Provinces selected Provinces selected Urban Rural Total
Bangkok 4 4 Bangkok (BMA) 643
Nonthaburi 70 30
Pathumthani 30 45
Samut Prakan 60 30
803 105 908
North 17 5 Chiang Mai 120 210
Phetchabun 50 120
Lampang 60 90
Uttaradit 30 60
Uthai Thani 20 45
280 525 805
Northeast 19 5 Khon Kaen 90 135
Nakhon Ratchasima 140 202
Roi-Et 30 107
Sisaket 20 111
Sakon Nakhon 50 81
330 635 965
Centre 25 5 Chanthaburi 40 75
Chonburi 200 120
Ayutthaya 60 105
Nakhon Pathom 40 105
Phetchaburi 40 60
380 465 845
South 14 5 Nakhon Sithammarat 80 105
Phatthalung 30 30
Narathiwat 20 30
Ranong 10 15
Songkhla 80 90
220 270 490
Total 75 24 2013 1370 4013

Fieldwork

Fieldwork was carried out by ABAC-KSC Internet Poll Research. The questionnaire was
first field-tested in all four regions and subsequently modified by the research team.
Members of the research team traveled to witness the fieldwork in different regions.

The questionnaire responses were keyed by ABAC-KSC Internet Poll Research, then
checked and cleaned by the research team.

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Weighting

For analysis, weights were applied to the data in conformity with the sampling
methodology, in order to deliver results which estimate findings for the population of
households. Calculation of the weights was based on the Ministry of Interior population
breakdowns used for allocating the sample. The Ministry’s 1999 population estimates by
region are as follows:

Ministry of Interior 1999 population estimates

Number of Households
Urban Rural Total
Bangkok 2,298,776 526,647 2,825,423
North 855,699 2,402,856 3,258,555
Northeast 986,658 2,530,982 4,517,640
Centre 1,143,317 2,190,148 3,333,465
South 636,390 1,317,166 1,953,556
Total 5,920,840 9,967,799 15,888,639

The basic formula used for calculating weights was as follows:

Q_W = N_Total * {W2 * (1 / N_a) * N_a *{ W1 * (1 / N_ra) [ (1 / num_l) * (1 / P2 ) * [ (1 /

num_k) * (1 / P1) *[ (Nk / n1) * x ] ] ] } }

Where:

n1 = number of sampled households in each amphoe selected at stage 4 (amphoe)

nk = total households in each amphoe selected at stage 4 (amphoe)
nl = total households in each unit selected at stage 3 (province)
num_k = number of units (amphoe) in sampled provinces
num_l = nmber of provinces selected in each region
N_ra = total households in region r and area a (urban/rural)
N_a = total households in area a
N_Total = total households in Thailand
X = value of the characteristic under study
P1 = probability of selection of that amphoe = Nk / Nl
P2 = probability of selection of that province = Nl / N_ra
W1 = region-level weight = N_ra / N_a
W2 = area-level weight (urban/rural) = N_a / N_total

Analysis

All the computer analysis was carried out by the research team. The original
questionnaires are kept by the research team in Chulalongkorn University.

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Tables

1: Seriousness of national problems.............................................................................. 73

2: National problem perceived as most serious............................................................. 73
3: Corruption: perception and experience: 1 ................................................................. 74
4: Corruption: perception and experience: 2 ................................................................. 74
5: Corruption: perception and experience: 3 ................................................................. 75
6: Honesty/dishonesty of public institutions ................................................................. 76
7: Attitudes to corruption .............................................................................................. 77
8: Politicians or bureaucrats, which are more corrupt? ................................................. 77
9: Trends in corruption.................................................................................................. 77
10: Quality of service at public offices ........................................................................... 78
11: Quality of service at public offices ........................................................................... 79
12: Percent of visitors to public offices solicited for bribe in past year.......................... 79
13: Average bribe solicited per occasion by office ......................................................... 79
14: Total bribes solicited in past year by office and area................................................ 80
15: Total bribe solicited in past year by office and HH income ..................................... 80
16: Service ratings, complaints, and bribe solicitation by office .................................... 81
17: Total bribes solicited in past year by size ................................................................. 81
18: Distribution of bribe amounts by office and size ...................................................... 82
19: Number of bribe solicitations by office and size ...................................................... 82
20: Bribes solicited by household income....................................................................... 82
21: Demographics of bribe solicitation ........................................................................... 83
22: Attitudes to the judicial system ................................................................................. 85
23: Payments solicited to influence court cases .............................................................. 86
24: Obstacles to use of judicial system ........................................................................... 86
25: Alternative methods to resolve serious disputes used in past 2 years....................... 87
26: Amounts offered to households as vote-buying in past 2 years................................ 87
27: Attitudes to combating corruption ............................................................................ 88
28: Effectiveness of institutions in combating corruption .............................................. 89
29: Factors which influence non-reporting of corruption ............................................... 89
30: All payments solicited (offices, courts and schools)................................................. 89
31: Suggestions for fighting corruption ......................................................................... 90

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 1: Seriousness of national problems

-------Mean Scores (1-7)-------
Percent Total Bangkok Urban Rural
Rating % % % %
Poor economy 96.2 5.76 5.72 5.67 5.81
Cost of living 96.2 5.21 5.17 5.10 5.26
Corruption, public 63.2 4.70 5.55 4.58 4.42
Drug use & trade 67.0 4.62 5.85 4.53 4.18
Costly services 82.3 4.37 4.78 4.10 4.34
Costly education 70.1 4.23 4.46 4.19 4.18
Bad roads 77.0 4.13 4.12 3.60 4.31
Costly health care 74.0 4.12 4.59 3.98 4.02
Bad services 76.1 4.00 4.34 3.70 4.01
Crime & violence 61.2 3.99 5.14 3.84 3.57
Corruption, private 42.5 3.95 4.40 3.76 3.83

Appendix Table 2: National problem perceived as most serious

----------areas-------- ---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural Low high
% % % % % %
Poor economy 42.0 32.2 41.3 45.1 43.4 36.2
High cost of living 20.9 11.6 21.4 23.5 24.1 13.9
Drug use and trade 13.3 26.9 15.9 8.3 10.5 21.3
Corruption, public sector 7.4 14.7 6.6 5.6 5.1 13.6
Few/bad roads 4.6 1.6 1.9 6.6 5.1 2.7
Costly education 2.5 1.3 2.3 3.0 3.0 1.7
Costly health care 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.3
Costly public services 1.8 3.0 1.8 1.4 1.7 2.2
Crime and violence 1.8 3.9 2.1 1.0 1.4 2.7
Bad public services 1.7 0.8 2.5 1.6 1.8 1.4
Corruption, private sector 1.1 1.7 1.6 0.8 0.8 2.3
Other 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.7
Base, all respondents (‘000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438 10,864 4,236

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 3: Corruption: perception and experience: 1

----number of visits to government offices in past year -----
none 1-5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 40 over 40
Rating on seriousness of 4.56 4.73 4.56 4.66 5.27 4.7
public sector corruption as
a national problem (7-point
scale)
Percent identifying public
sector corruption as most 4.7 5.1 7.7 7.1 7.1 15.9
serious national problem
Percent prepared to pay
some amount to eliminate 16.7 27.8 29.6 31.3 38.6 46.0
public sector corruption
Average percent of income
willing to pay to eliminate 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2
public sector corruption
Average amount willing to
pay to eliminate public 4,257 3,455 4,871 3,666 4,716 11,428
sector corruption (baht)
Base (000): 884 3,869 2,355 3,670 3,507 1,322

Appendix Table 4: Corruption: perception and experience: 2

----total amount solicited as bribes in past year (baht) -----
Zero <100 100-1,000 1,000- 10,000- >100,000
10,000 100,000
Rating on seriousness of 4.63 4.93 5.17 5.37 5.99 6.31
public sector corruption as
a national problem (7-point
scale)
Percent identifying public 6.7 14.4 13.8 6.3 24.3 57.1
sector corruption as most
serious national problem
Percent prepared to pay 31.4 51.3 41.5 48.2 37.6 -
some amount to eliminate
public sector corruption
Average percent of income 1.0 3.1 1.2 1.7 0.8 -
willing to pay to eliminate
public sector corruption
Base (000): 14,137 258 761 400 136 24

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 5: Corruption: perception and experience: 3

----bribes solicited as % of income -----
none <1% 1–5% 5 – 10 % >10%
Rating on seriousness of 4.63 5.19 5.15 5.26 5.69
public sector corruption as
a national problem (7-point
scale)
Percent identifying public 6.7 15.5 7.4 12.3 14.8
sector corruption as most
serious national problem
Percent prepared to pay 31.4 45.6 39.5 40.7 56.9
some amount to eliminate
public sector corruption
Average percent of income 3.28 3.64 3.77 2.97 3.57
willing to pay to eliminate
public sector corruption
Base (000): 14,295 798 419 90 227

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 6: Honesty/dishonesty of public institutions

Percent ----Dishonesty rating (7-point scale)-----
Rating Total Bangkok Urban Rural
Most dishonest
Police 92.6 4.7 5.4 4.8 4.5
MPs 86.3 4.7 5.3 4.8 4.4
Ministry of Interior 62.3 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.3
Customs Department 43.9 4.3 4.8 4.3 4.0
Ministry of Communications 53.7 4.2 4.6 4.3 4.0
Ministry of Finance 46.7 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.1
Ministry of Commerce 47.3 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.1
Land Department 69.2 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.0
Bangkok Municipality 18.1 4.2 4.2 - -
Bangkok Ward Councils 17.6 4.2 4.2 - -
Budget Bureau 40.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1
Ministry of Agriculture 60.4 4.0 4.3 4.1 3.9
Dept of Transport 65.0 4.0 4.5 4.1 3.8
Revenue Department 54.0 4.0 4.4 3.9 3.8
Bank of Thailand 44.3 4.0 4.2 4.1 3.8
Provincial Councils 56.3 4.0 4.4 4.0 3.8
Ministry of Industry 42.4 3.9 4.1 3.8 3.9
Dept of Accelerated Rural Dev't 58.1 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.7
Attorney General 42.3 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8
Municipal Councils 57.5 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.6
Sanitary District Councils 42.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6
Tambon Councils 75.1 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.5
Dept of Irrigation 50.3 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.6
NGOs 24.8 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.8
Ministry of Health 71.5 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.4
Chambers of Commerce 28.6 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.6
Commercial Banks 44.2 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5
Telephone Organisation (TOT) 64.6 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.4
Private education institutions 42.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4
Village heads 83.0 3.3 4.0 3.3 3.1
Ministry of Education 69.2 3.2 3.6 3.3 3.0
Counter Corruption Commission 52.1 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.0
Ministry of Justice 55.2 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.0
Armed Forces 54.8 3.0 3.3 3.2 2.9
Supreme Court 46.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9
Post Office 76.9 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.3
Most honest

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 7: Attitudes to corruption

-------------7-point scale-------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Corruption is 36.6 14.9 11.7 29.3 2.3 2.2 2.9 Corruption is
perpetuated by perpetuated by the
politicians people
The media can be 11.2 14.6 13.2 43.3 8.7 5.5 3.4 The media cannot
trusted be trusted
Bureaucrats can be 5.4 10.1 12.0 43.0 14.5 8.6 6.4 Bureaucrats cannot
trusted be trusted
Ministers think only of 10.5 5.4 7.0 26.3 9.2 15.5 26.0 Ministers think only
the public benefit of their personal
benefit
Politicians can be 2.6 3.9 6.6 33.1 14.1 16.1 23.7 Politicians cannot
trusted be trusted
-------mean scores (7-point scale)---------
All Bkk Urban Rural low high
Corruption is 2.64 2.55 2.67 2.66 2.62 2.61 Corruption is
perpetuated by perpetuated by the
politicians people
The media can be 3.54 3.65 3.57 3.49 3.47 3.67 The media cannot
trusted be trusted
Bureaucrats can be 4.02 4.29 4.07 3.93 3.99 4.09 Bureaucrats cannot
trusted be trusted
Ministers think only of 4.69 4.90 4.84 4.56 4.67 4.89 Ministers think only
the public benefit of their personal
benefit
Politicians can be 4.95 5.16 5.00 4.87 4.89 5.15 Politicians cannot
trusted be trusted
Base, all (‘000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438 10,865 4,236

Appendix Table 8: Politicians or bureaucrats, which are more corrupt?

---HH Income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
% % % % % %
Politicians 56.9 64.9 54.5 55.3 54.4 64.1
Same 39.4 30.9 39.6 42.0 42.0 32.2
Bureaucrats 3.7 4.2 5.8 2.7 3.6 3.7
Base, exclude ‘no 14,522 2,701 3,341 8,480 9,890 4,084
answer’ (‘000):

Appendix Table 9: Trends in corruption

Mean Decrease Increase Increase:
(7-point % % decrease
scale)
In past 2-3 years has corruption among 4.7 17.6 56.2 1 : 3.2
bureaucrats increased or decreased
In past 2-3 years has corruption among 5.3 9.2 71.5 1 : 7.7
politicians increased or decreased

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

In next 2-3 years will corruption among 4.4 26.9 45.5 1 : 1.7
bureaucrats increase or decrease
In next 2-3 years will corruption among 5.0 18.7 60.2 1 : 3.2
politicians increase or decrease

Appendix Table 10: Quality of service at public offices

---HH income---
Base: all Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
visiting(‘000) -----------Mean (7-point scale)----------
Post offices 6,286 5.56 5.24 5.74 5.57 5.64 5.44
Irrigation offices 131 5.44 4.75 5.75 5.63 5.59 5.22
Government schools 5,138 5.34 5.20 5.35 5.37 5.37 5.32
Public telephone 4,243 5.25 5.28 5.42 5.07 5.41 5.12
Passport office 561 5.11 5.19 5.03 4.99 5.14 5.06
Electricity supply 4,299 5.10 4.97 4.78 5.31 5.23 4.89
Amphoe (district) 9,083 5.09 5.11 5.10 5.08 5.13 5.02
Tax Offices 4,211 4.99 4.67 5.20 5.02 5.03 4.97
Driving/Auto licences 8,048 4.92 4.96 5.01 4.87 4.91 4.95
Trash collection service 1,011 4.92 4.48 5.13 4.92 5.02 4.82
Water supply 1,988 4.75 4.75 4.71 4.79 4.79 4.69
Public hospital 9,788 4.73 4.65 4.68 4.77 4.76 4.65
Land Offices 4,509 4.46 4.69 4.32 4.46 4.53 4.31
Police 4,623 4.35 4.23 4.20 4.47 4.34 4.40
Customs 435 4.24 3.96 4.46 4.23 4.51 3.99

Appendix Table 11: Improvement of public offices over past 2 years

---HH income---
Base: all Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
visiting (‘000) -----------Mean (7-point scale)----------
Post offices 6,220 5.58 5.33 5.79 5.57 5.65 5.50
Government schools 5,089 5.42 5.22 5.37 5.50 5.46 5.37
Public telephone 4,170 5.28 5.36 5.42 5.09 5.41 5.17
Passport office 521 5.28 5.44 4.94 5.18 5.30 5.24
Electricity supply 4,234 5.26 5.07 4.97 5.49 5.43 4.98
Amphoe (district) 9,006 5.20 5.20 5.20 5.19 5.21 5.14
Tax Offices 4,176 5.03 4.83 5.15 5.04 5.07 5.00
Driving/Auto licences 7,911 5.02 5.07 5.09 4.98 5.02 5.04
Irrigation offices 137 4.94 4.58 5.08 5.04 5.10 4.74
Trash collection service 1,003 4.92 4.49 5.24 4.59 5.06 4.77
Water supply 1,941 4.84 4.91 4.69 4.93 4.88 4.77
Public hospital 9,703 4.80 4.70 4.74 4.84 4.82 4.74
Land Offices 4,416 4.63 4.70 4.57 4.64 4.71 4.42
Customs 426 4.57 4.11 4.80 4.76 4.77 4.46
Police 4,530 4.47 4.33 4.32 4.60 4.48 4.46

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 12: Percent of visitors to public offices solicited for bribe in past year
---HH income---
Base, all Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
visiting(‘000) % % % % % %
Land Offices 4,509 12.3 9.9 15.1 11.7 12.5 11.8
Customs 435 10.3 19.7 4.3 8.1 7.8 11.7
Police 4,623 8.5 9.0 9.6 7.8 7.2 10.5
Driving/Auto licences 8,048 7.7 7.3 7.8 7.7 8.3 7.0
Irrigation offices 131 3.1 0 0 5.4 5.4 0
Trash collection service 1,011 2.8 7.4 1.7 0 0.9 4.6
Passport office 561 2.1 1.0 0.6 6.0 0 3.3
Tax Offices 4,211 2.0 2.1 3.9 0.4 0.8 2.6
Amphoe (district) 9,083 1.9 1.6 1.0 2.3 2.1 1.2
Government schools 5,138 1.5 1.6 2.2 1.2 0.9 3.2
Electricity supply 4,299 1.0 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.2 0.6
Public hospital 9,788 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.3
Water supply 1,988 0.4 0.8 0.2 0 0 0.6
Public telephone 4,243 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.5
Post offices 6,286 0.1 0 0.4 0 0.1 0.2

Appendix Table 13: Average bribe solicited per occasion by office

---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
------------average bribe requested (baht)----------
Police 9,588 2,688 7,921 13,414 14,773 3,655
Customs 8,428 13,025 3,059 201 188 11,789
Tax Offices 6,287 11,403 4,939 753 457 7,861
Land Offices 3,179 1,489 7,056 1,430 2,905 3,931
Government schools 1,394 1,293 2,943 295 83 2,322
Water supply 880 859 1,000 859
Public hospital 786 2,478 124 634 616 1,161
Electricity supply 721 300 664 767 803 450
Passport office 647 300 500 800 647
Amphoe (district) 639 173 2,225 517 374 1,198
Driving/Auto licences 586 851 784 447 390 1,092
Trash collection service 295 255 378 21 377
Public telephone 288 - 423 - - 343
Post offices 66 66 90 50
Irrigation offices 45 45 45

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Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 14: Total bribes solicited in past year by office and area
---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
------------total bribes solicited (mil. baht) -----------
Land Offices 5,141 130 4,297 714 4,189 903
Police 4,790 360 1,728 2,703 3,259 1,507
Tax Offices 3,535 2,557 960 17 14 3,451
Driving/Auto licences 662 282 147 232 418 242
Customs 523 477 44 2 4 517
Amphoe (district) 356 15 38 303 193 46
Government schools 190 18 161 11 3 187
Public hospital 84 21 1 61 68 7
Trash collection service 50 12 38 - 1 48
Electricity supply 44 11 5 28 26 18
Passport office 10 3 0 6 - 10
Water supply 7 5 2 - - 5
Public telephone 4 - 4 - - 4
Post offices 3 - 3 - 2 1
Irrigation offices 0 - - - 0 0
Total (mil. baht) 15,396 3,893 7,427 4,077 8,177 6,945
Average across all 970 1,378 2,054 432 753 1,640
households (baht):

Appendix Table 15: Total bribe solicited in past year by office and HH income
-------------HH income (baht/month)-------------
<2,500 2,501- 10,001- >50,000 Total
10,000 50,000
------------total bribes solicited (mil. baht) -----------
Land Offices 627 3,562 695 208 5,093
Police 100 3,159 1,425 83 4,766
Tax Offices - 14 986 2,466 3,465
Driving/Auto licences 87 331 224 18 661
Customs 2 2 371 146 521
Amphoe (district) 5 188 45 1 239
Government schools 0 2 177 10 190
Public hospital 4 64 7 - 75
Trash collection service - 1 4 44 49
Electricity supply 14 12 7 11 44
Passport office - - 7 3 10
Water supply - - 3 2 5
Public telephone - - 4 - 4
Post offices - 2 1 - 3
Irrigation offices - 0 - - 0
Total 840 7,338 3,955 2,992 15,125
Base, excluding those not 4,044 6,812 3,885 359 15,100
revealing income(‘000):

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Appendix Table 16: Service ratings, complaints, and bribe solicitation by office
Number Av. Rating Rating Percent of HH solicited Average Average Total
of HH visits for for visitors for bribe as times amount bribes
visiting per service improv filed percent of per year of bribe solicited
office year ement complaint total HH bribe solicited per year
per year visiting office solicited each
time
(000) 1-7 1-7 % % Baht Mil baht
scale scale

Land Offices 4,509 2.4 4.46 4.63 3.8 12.3 2.9 3,179 5,141
Police 4,623 2.6 4.35 4.47 5.0 8.5 1.3 9,588 4,790
Tax Offices 4,211 2.0 4.99 5.03 3.1 2 6.7 6,287 3,535
Driving/Auto licences 8,048 1.4 4.92 5.02 0.9 7.7 1.8 586 662
Customs 435 2.7 4.24 4.57 1.6 10.3 1.4 8,428 523
Amphoe (district) 9,083 3.4 5.09 5.20 1.0 1.9 3.2 639 356
Government schools 5,138 3.0 5.34 5.42 0.9 1.5 1.7 1,394 187
Public hospital 9,788 4.3 4.73 4.80 1.7 0.7 1.6 786 84
Trash collection 1,011 8.6 4.92 4.92 7.0 2.8 6.0 295 50
Electricity supply 4,299 7.3 5.10 5.26 3.3 1 1.4 721 44
Passport office 561 1.9 5.11 5.28 2.8 2.1 1.3 647 10
Water supply 1,988 7.5 4.75 4.84 5.4 0.4 1.0 880 7
Public telephone 4,243 9.2 5.25 5.28 2.9 0.3 1.1 288 4
Post offices 6,286 6.4 5.56 5.58 0.7 0.1 7.2 66 3
Irrigation offices 131 3.1 5.44 4.94 - 3.1 - 45 0

Appendix Table 17: Total bribes solicited in past year by size

Total Bangkok Urban Rural

-----------------------cumulative percentages------------------
% of % of % of % of % of % of % of % of
HH cash HH cash HH cash HH cash
1 - 100 16.3 0.1 5.8 0.0 11.5 0.1 21.7 0.3
101 - 250 30.8 0.4 13.6 0.1 28.4 0.2 37.1 1.0
251 - 500 49.0 1.2 31.7 0.7 42.8 0.6 57.1 2.8
501 - 1,000 64.4 2.6 59.5 2.5 57.2 1.4 69.2 5.1
1,001 - 2,500 76.0 4.8 71.6 3.9 64.3 2.2 82.9 10.5
2,501 - 5,000 84.8 8.4 77.8 5.8 75.8 4.8 91.1 17.3
5,001 - 10,000 89.6 12.4 86 9.8 83.1 8.5 93.8 22.0
10,001 - 50,000 97.9 33 97.4 28.7 95.4 26.1 99.2 49.9
50,001 - 100,000 98.5 37.8 98.5 36.6 96.9 31.9 99.2 49.9
100,001 - 500,000 99.5 73.5 98.5 36.6 99.2 78.4 100.0 100.0
500,000 - 1,000,000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Base, all HH solicited for 1,584 272 419 893
bribes (‘000):

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Appendix Table 18: Distribution of bribe amounts by office and size

----percent of total bribes solicited in amounts of-----
>100,000 baht 10,000-100,000 1,000-10,000 <1,000
Customs 59 33 8 0
Tax office 88 10 2 0
Land office 58 28 13 1
Police 63 29 7 1
Auto licence - 48 32 20
Amphoe - 82 14 4
Telephone - - 45 55
Passport office - - - 100
Gov’t hospital - 52 36 12
Public school - 67 28 5
Post office - - 54 46
Trash collection - 74 12 14
Water supply - - 72 28
Irrigation office - - - 100
Electricity supply - - 81 19
Total 61 27 10 2

Appendix Table 19: Number of bribe solicitations by office and size

----percent of total bribes solicitations in amounts of-----
>100,000 baht 10,000-100,000 1,000-10,000 <1,000
Customs 7 16 49 28
Tax office 9 26 37 28
Land office 2 10 41 47
Police 3 14 38 46
Auto licence - 2 14 84
Amphoe - 9 9 82
Telephone - - 4 96
Passport office - - - 100
Gov’t hospital - 5 16 79
Public school - 8 20 73
Post office - - 8 92
Trash collection - 9 7 84
Water supply - - 43 57
Irrigation office - - - 100
Electricity supply - - 49 51
Total 1 9 27 63

Appendix Table 20: Bribes solicited by household income

----------monthly household income-----------
all < 2500 2501- 5,001- 10,001- 20,001- 50,001- >100,000
5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000 100,000
Percent of households 10.0 9.0 10.0 9.4 11.6 11.4 20.1 6.7
solicited any bribe
Bribes solicited as 1.3 1.4 2.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.0
percent of annual income
(all HH)

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Bribes solicited as 13.54 15.31 29.25 9.74 3.53 3.08 5.99 0.05
percent of annual income
(solicited HH only)
Base (000): 15,828 4,044 3,545 3,267 2,397 1,488 275 83

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92
Appendix Table 21: Demographics of bribe solicitation -------Total bribe per household per year------
Base Average Total Any bribe Average of <100 100-1000 1000-10,000 10,000- >100,000
those solicited
total bribe amount solicited 100,000
(000) baht (Bt mil) % baht % % % % %
15,878 970 15,399 10.0 9,722 16.3 48.1 25.3 8.8 1.5
Total
Sex
male 11,079 755 8,362 11.5 6,566 16.8 49.6 25.0 8.1 0.6
female 4,799 1,466 7,037 6.5 22,667 14.3 42.0 26.5 11.6 5.5
Age
below 30 1,105 3,807 4,207 10.5 36,365 9.1 53.3 14.7 13.9 9.1
30-39 3,762 1,468 5,522 11.8 12,436 12.8 39.1 35.4 10.5 2.2
40-49 4,997 826 4,128 10.7 7,704 16.6 52.4 22.4 7.9 0.8
50-59 3,658 281 1,029 8.7 3,243 19.3 51.1 22.0 7.6
60 up 2,356 218 514 7.3 3,002 23.5 48.7 21.4 6.4
occupation -
employer 56 657 37 8.6 7,600 85.2 14.8
govt employee 1,591 271 432 9.2 2,948 1.3 56.1 36.2 6.3
private employee 2,656 388 1,032 9.5 4,093 19.3 49.2 21.0 10.5
own account worker 9,835 1,380 13,576 10.8 12,819 17.8 46.4 24.7 8.8 2.3
unpaid family worker 52 1,166 61 16.2 7,222 40.8 20.7 38.5
retired 546 323 176 7.3 4,446 29.7 6.8 47.4 16.0
house worker 511 101 52 5.4 1,880 9.7 77.1 10.6 2.6
unemployed 388 57 22 5.7 1,002 18.6 67.9 13.5
others 226 52 12 10.5 498 91.0 9.0
type of work -
professional 1,685 224 378 10.5 2,128 5.0 55.5 36.2 3.2
administrative 445 311 139 4.1 7,635 41.5 35.1 23.4
clerical 60 433 26 2.9 15,000 100.0
sales 3,324 3,225 10,718 13.1 24,599 7.0 46.7 25.2 16.2 4.9
agriculture 6,405 445 2,850 9.0 4,930 26.4 43.5 25.8 3.7 0.6
transport 170 138 23 22.2 623 40.3 58.2 1.5
general labour 1,299 582 756 13.2 4,416 11.5 60.4 15.7 12.4
service 234 443 104 9.8 4,539 45.1 40.8 14.1
others 2,131 186 396 6.0 3,075 13.9 44.8 32.5 8.9

94
Appendix Table 21: Demographics of bribe solicitation (continued) -------Total bribe per household per year------
Base Average Total Any bribe Average of <100 100-1000 1000-10,000 10,000- >100,000
those solicited
total bribe amount solicited 100,000
(000) baht (Bt mil) % baht % % % % %
education -
below primary 4 1,057 41 43 7.9 29.6 58.5 11.9
primary 4-6 8,661 448 3,884 8.4 490 25.2 48.4 18.5 6.9 1.0
secondary school 1,754 297 520 11.5 3,889 10.8 53.1 31.9 4.2
higher secondary 1,372 3,152 4,325 11.6 2,550 7.8 43.4 27.8 14.8 6.2
tertiary, vocational 1,196 2,250 2,692 16.0 19,657 6.8 51.3 26.4 13.9 1.7
tertiary, academic 1,330 457 608 11.2 20,017 1.9 40.4 49.3 8.3
master degree or higher 179 15,672 2,812 20.4 2,239 37.0 31.7 20.0 11.2
others 330 1,562 515 10.5 149,172 35.4 31.6 33.0
Household income -
Upto 2500 baht 4,044 208 840 9.0 2,296 29.6 40.3 24.0 6.1
2501-5000 baht 3,545 1,312 4,650 10.0 13,163 23.0 43.4 23.4 7.4 2.8
5001-10000 baht 3,267 823 2,688 9.4 8,767 13.6 56.8 21.5 5.7 2.4
10001-20000 baht 2,397 736 1,763 11.6 6,362 4.7 51.9 32.6 10.9
20001-50000 baht 1,488 1,473 2,192 11.4 12,936 4.7 56.6 29.4 7.5 1.9
50001-100000 baht 275 10,837 2,985 20.1 53,952 5.2 31.8 13.5 42.1 7.4
Over 100000 baht 83 82 7 6.7 1,226 61.7 38.3
Household member -
Teacher 1,134 1,749 1,983 9.5 18,461 52.9 35.6 8.5 3.0
Soldier 478 3,541 1,694 9.4 37,574 7.9 43.2 36.2 5.6 7.1
Police 552 90 50 7.4 1,221 73.7 26.3
Other official 1,411 237 334 8.1 2,941 15.0 48.8 26.8 9.5
-
No official 12,677 1,024 12,981 10.3 9,924 18.1 47.1 24.1 9.0 1.6
Any official 3,201 755 2,418 8.6 8,767 7.5 52.7 30.6 8.2 1.2
Region -
Bangkok 2,825 1,378 3,893 9.6 14,311 5.8 53.7 26.5 12.5 1.5
north urban 856 243 208 12.8 1,900 18.7 44.3 37.0 -
northeast urban 987 4,138 4,083 12.1 34,103 10.1 32.7 31.6 17.4 8.2
central urban 1,136 663 753 5.1 13,079 6.6 41.0 17.8 34.6
south urban 636 3,749 2,386 20.8 18,051 8.8 60.8 15.1 12.8 2.4
north rural 2,403 114 274 11.5 995 29.8 48.5 20.6 1.2
northeast rural 3,531 307 1,085 9.6 3,200 22.8 42.3 26.4 8.5
central rural 2,190 1,055 2,310 4.9 21,739 20.6 45.8 19.8 6.9 6.9
south rural 1,314 311 408 13.1 2,369 7.3 57.1 30.5 5.1

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Appendix Table 22: Attitudes to the judicial system

-------------7-point scale-------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Judicial System The Judicial System
deserves all of the trust 17.5 17.5 13.6 33.1 7.0 5.7 5.7 does not deserve any
trust
The Judicial System is The Judicial System is
totally independent of 11.4 9.4 9.2 39.5 12.3 9.3 8.9 not at all independent of
the bureaucracy. the bureaucracy
The Judicial System is The Judicial System is
only for the rich and 14.4 7.8 9.7 23.6 8.8 12.9 22.8 for everyone.
powerful.
Most judges are honest. Most judges are
18.4 15.8 12.3 37.6 6.0 5.1 4.7 dishonest
Most public prosecutors Most public prosecutors
are honest 13.9 12.4 11.7 42.6 7.9 5.8 5.8 are dishonest

---mean score (7-point scale)----

Total Bkk Urban Rural Low High
The Judicial System The Judicial System
deserves all of the trust 3.34 3.63 3.32 3.26 3.32 3.40 does not deserve any
trust
The Judicial System is The Judicial System is
totally independent of 3.96 4.10 3.93 3.92 4.03 3.77 not at all independent of
the bureaucracy. the bureaucracy
The Judicial System is The Judicial System is
only for the rich and 4.34 3.92 4.36 4.47 4.32 4.30 for everyone.
powerful.
Most judges are honest. Most judges are
3.31 3.47 3.25 3.29 3.28 3.25 dishonest
Most public prosecutors Most public prosecutors
are honest 3.59 3.67 3.67 3.53 3.68 3.69 are dishonest

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Appendix Table 23: Payments solicited to influence court cases

----------areas-------- ---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural Low high
-- % of all cases where payment requested----
Payment to who:
Judge 15.5 26.7 2.8 31.4
Court secretary 13.7 13.7 18.0 6.0 27.1
Court clerk 15.7 21.9 18.0 9.6 27.1
Public prosecutor 47.0 20.7 63.3 48.1 23.1 83.9
Police 21.1 38.4 37.1 8.8 21.1 25.0
Others 23.1 25.6 20.5 23.5 24.6 13.6
Average amount (baht)
Judge 24,489 24,489 10,000 25,411
Court secretary 21,829 30,000 19,286 30,000 19,286
Court clerk 22,369 30,000 18,571 30,000 18,571
Public prosecutor 25,245 36,785 32,883 18,205 17,886 28,858
Police 15,887 20,950 10,216 15,232 22,661 9,382
Others 46,191 73,377 14,382 49,045 45,480 27,051
Total amount (baht mil)
Judge 743 - - 743 29 602
Court secretary 585 - 191 394 191 394
Court clerk 685 - 305 380 305 380
Public prosecutor 2,030 270 962 797 248 1,765
Police 552 285 112 155 386 166
Others 2,142 665 146 1,331 1,238 278
Total(baht mil) 6,737 1,220 1,717 3,800 2,398 3,586
Base, all solicited with 200 35 50 115 111 75
amount indicated (‘000):

Appendix Table 24: Obstacles to use of judicial system

---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
-----Percent agree this is an obstacle-----
Delays in resolving case 81.4 71.6 73.7 90.5 80.2 82.3
Lack of objective decisions 77.2 74.3 72.3 81.5 78.0 74.3
Uncertainty over execution of decision 69.8 67.5 71.0 70.0 72.9 62.6
Extra payments 69.3 63.4 59.4 78.0 72.4 62.0
Costs of legal counsel 68.3 70.7 70.9 65.7 73.9 56.8
Professionalism and preparedness of judges 45.6 43.7 41.1 49.2 43.9 48.8

---Rating importance of obstacle (7-point scale)---

Delays in resolving case 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.6 5.8 5.8
Costs of legal counsel 5.4 4.7 5.0 6.0 5.4 5.4
Uncertainty over execution of decision 5.4 5.6 5.0 5.5 5.3 5.5
Lack of objective decisions 5.3 5.4 4.9 5.5 5.3 5.2
Professionalism and preparedness of judges 5.3 5.5 4.8 5.4 5.6 4.9
Extra payments 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.1
Base, all decide against going to court (´000) 828 175 252 401 510 299

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Appendix Table 25: Alternative methods to resolve serious disputes used in past 2 years
---HH Income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
By arrangement of friends and relatives 43.4 35.3 49.0 43.6 43.9 45.4
By arrangement with police officer 14.6 18.3 14.2 13.7 13.2 18.9
Through private negotiation by lawyer 6.9 16.5 6.3 4.3 4.5 13.8
By recommendation of high-rank official 6.8 10.6 5.9 6.0 5.3 11.2
By recommendation of prestigious personality 4.7 7.4 4.5 3.9 3.9 6.8
By arrangement made by entrepreneur 1.7 3.6 2.6 0.7 1.0 3.6
Through threats or use of force 1.5 3.0 1.7 0.9 1.0 2.2
By arrangement of someone in Armed Forces 1.2 3.2 0.7 0.7 0.4 3.1
By arrangement of an NGO 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.8
Base: all decide against going to court (´000) 828 175 252 401 510 299

Appendix Table 26: Amounts offered to households as vote-buying in past 2 years

HH income
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
General election Households offered ('000) 4,524 658 1,022 2,844 3,218 1,184
Average offer (baht) 678 1,142 723 554 580 975
Total offered (baht mil) 3,066 752 738 1,576 1,867 1,155
Municipal Households offered ('000) 777 141 637 460 301
Average offer (baht) 734 1,076 658 712 785
Total offered (baht mil) 570 152 419 - 327 236
Provincial council Households offered ('000) 842 53 282 508 642 169
Average offer (baht) 333 731 292 314 306 418
Total offered (baht mil) 280 39 82 159 196 71
Sanitary district Households offered ('000) 115 10 104 88 21
Average offer (baht) 1,043 597 1,088 1,273 211
Total offered (baht mil) 120 6 114 - 112 4
Tambon council Households offered ('000) 814 119 695 696 111
Average offer (baht) 728 837 709 673 923
Total offered (baht mil) 593 100 - 493 468 103
Bangkok ward Households offered ('000) 74 74 30 44
Average offer (baht) 793 793 1,071 600
Total offered (baht mil) 59 59 - - 33 26
Grand total (mil baht) 4,688 1,108 1,353 2,228 3,003 1,685

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Appendix Table 27: Attitudes to combating corruption

-------------7-point scale-------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Officials should be 58.1 13.4 9.5 15.3 1.0 1.0 1.6 Common citizens should
dealt with more harshly be dealt with more
than common citizens harshly than officials in
in cases of corruption cases of corruption
Government should 54.3 16.3 9.6 15.3 1.7 1.3 1.4 Government need not
make the fight against make the fight against
corruption one of its corruption one of its
priorities priorities
The Civil Service 8.4 9.8 10.5 51.5 6.2 5.5 8.0 The Civil Service
Commission can help Commission cannot help
fight corruption fight corruption
International 7.2 7.7 9.5 51.6 6.7 6.5 10.7 International institutions
institutions like the like the World Bank
World Bank can help cannot help fight
fight corruption corruption
Most people have a 14.0 8.8 9.8 20.9 12.7 12.5 21.3 Most people only talk
sincere desire to fight about corruption but do
corruption nothing

---mean score (7-point scale)----

Total Bkk Urban Rural Low High
Officials should be 1.97 1.77 2.02 2.01 1.97 1.89 Common citizens should
dealt with more harshly be dealt with more
than common citizens harshly than officials in
in cases of corruption cases of corruption
Government should 2.03 2.01 2.04 2.04 2.03 1.97 Government need not
make the fight against make the fight against
corruption one of its corruption one of its
priorities priorities
The Civil Service 3.86 4.09 3.76 3.83 3.79 4.01 The Civil Service
Commission can help Commission cannot help
fight corruption fight corruption
International 4.05 4.32 4.23 3.90 3.96 4.29 International institutions
institutions like the like the World Bank
World Bank can help cannot help fight
fight corruption corruption
Most people have a 4.32 4.85 4.21 4.21 4.28 4.51 Most people only talk
sincere desire to fight about corruption but do
corruption nothing

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Appendix Table 28: Effectiveness of institutions in combating corruption

Percent ---HH income---
able Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
to rate ----------mean score, 7-point scale----------
Media 85 4.95 5.14 4.91 4.91 4.89 5.10
Counter Corruption Commission 65 4.84 4.58 4.98 4.89 4.86 4.84
Academics & teachers 81 4.68 4.68 4.63 4.70 4.65 4.73
NGOs 33 3.99 3.80 4.10 4.04 3.97 4.00
Armed forces 67 3.98 3.82 3.84 4.10 4.05 3.82
Office of the Attorney General 55 3.97 3.81 3.95 4.06 3.98 3.98
Police 90 3.41 3.15 3.34 3.52 3.46 3.29
MPs 82 3.12 2.93 2.95 3.26 3.16 2.98

Appendix Table 29: Factors which influence non-reporting of corruption

---HH income---
Total Bkk Urban Rural low high
-- percent agree this is a factor in non-reporting---
No protection against reprisals 88.7 91.3 83.6 90.1 88.5 88.7
Pointless as culprits would not 88.6 92.6 89.8 85.4 87.3 90.0
be punished
Everybody knows and nobody 86.9 93.5 86.2 83.3 87.0 87.8
reports
Those who report suffer 75.4 82.1 70.6 73.9 73.3 78.7
consequences
Could not prove it 71.3 74.3 66.1 72.4 71.7 70.5
Trivial, not worth reporting 58.9 63.6 50.1 61.1 58.3 60.6
Did not know where to report 52.3 57.3 47.3 52.0 58.3 44.0
it
Do not want to betray anyone 40.8 43.0 34.0 43.4 44.7 36.7
Those who report just want to 33.2 34.4 30.3 34.2 35.0 30.7
create problems
Base, all witnessed case of 3,136 884 839 1,413 1,725 1,342
corruption (‘000):

Appendix Table 30: All payments solicited (offices, courts and schools)
---HH income---
Total Bangkok Urban Rural low high
Any payment solicited 13.4 13.3 16.5 12.3 12.5 16.7
----percent of all HH solicited for payment---
1-100 14.3 7.1 10.3 18.8 19.4 5.6
100-1,000 44.3 42.9 44.4 44.8 46.0 41.8
1,000-10,000 25.6 26.0 26.9 24.8 22.2 31.4
10,000-50,000 10.6 15.0 12.4 8.3 8.7 14.2
50,000-100,000 2.5 8.0 2.7 0.6 1.9 2.6
100,000-500,000 2.3 2.7 2.8 1.8 3.4
500,000-1m 0.3 1.1 0.5 1.0
Mean (baht) 11,925 17,413 17,200 7,424 9,052 17,105
Sum (mil. baht) 25,441 6,564 10,268 8,608 12,299 12,106
Base, all solicited (‘000): 2,133 377 597 1,159 1,359 708

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Appendix Table 31: Suggestions for fighting corruption

HH income
Total Bkk Urban Rural Low High
% % % % % %
Suppress corruption seriously and impose severe penalties
on wrongdoers including dismissal 61.1 57.5 61.5 62.0 61.7 63.8
Establish committees to oversee transparency in different
sectors 5.2 2.8 6.9 5.4 4.6 7.6
Instil citizens with consciousness of their rights so they can
campaign against corruption 4.9 3.5 6.4 4.8 4.2 6.9
Investigate subordinates closely
4.8 5.3 4.1 4.9 4.5 6.0
Instil good conscience in public servants so they put
priority on common good 3.8 4.2 5.9 2.9 3.4 5.5
Reform the bureaucracy for transparency and efficiency,
including adjusting pay scales 3.7 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.1 5.7
Solve economic, social and political problems promptly for
better public well-being 3.6 8.8 2.7 2.5 3.2 4.2
Stamp out drug problems
3.1 5.5 2.8 2.5 3.1 3.2
Superiors must set good example to their subordinates and
the general public 3.0 3.8 2.7 2.9 2.4 4.8
Make the corrupt return money to government with
interest, or seize their assets 2.6 4.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 3.7
Penalise those who witnesses corruption but do not inform
their superiors 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.2 2.9 1.4
Eliminate personal connections, select people on merit
1.9 3.1 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.6
Regular monitoring of assets of top administrators and
decision-makers 1.5 1.4 2.3 1.3 1.2 2.2
Regular evaluation of work performance
1.2 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.2 1.5
Closer control on government budget
0.8 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.7 1.2
Establish rewards and protection for those reporting
corruption 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.6
Give opportunities for people to voice their opinions
independently. 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Centralise administration as decentralisation increases
corruption 0.1 - 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
No suggestion 27.7 19.5 27.2 30.4 29.4 19.4
Base, all respondents (‘000): 15,878 2,825 3,615 9,438 10,864 4,236

101