[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D.

WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General
Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon
the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them
and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated
as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination
of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts
and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to
be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use
of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that
the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY;
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No.
548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which
the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims
to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired
by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state (U.S. vs. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and, personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn
from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated
 to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of
a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J :
p

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and

as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition
for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams,
as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio
Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic
Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11
p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed
in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public
Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval
of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the
closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be
limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August
10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and
the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places
above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act
No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because
it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This
contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The
rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case
decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of
cases, namely: 'The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.
Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10
Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom
it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
'necessity' of the case."
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as
follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads
and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval
of the President, may contain provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other structures
within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all
classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his
duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of
the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications."
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was
said in Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is
less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event
or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to
fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it
can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the
wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to
the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of
inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
(Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R.
Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and
in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this
Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation
of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental
powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a
larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive
officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and
regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful
interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the
right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace
to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218).
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn
from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as
civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs.
Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business
lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a
menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to
yield to the public good." And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil.,
440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing
within the police power of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population,
the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the
part of the masses and of the government to look after and care
for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought
within the police power many questions for regulation which
formerly were not so considered."
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people. The promotion of social
justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle
of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
 and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for
is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno.
JJ. concur.

||| (Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, [December 2, 1940], 70 PHIL 726-735)

[G.R. No. L-43800. July 29, 1977.]

LEONILA LAUREL ALMEDA and VENANCIO

ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO
GONZALES, respondents.

Dizon & Vitug and Cornell S. Valdez for

petitioners.
Dennis B. Recon, Juanito
Hernandez and Oseas A. Martin for private
respondent.

DECISION

MARTIN, J : p

This is an agrarian case. Three questions of consequential

effects are raised: first, is there a tenant's right of redemption in
sugar and coconut lands; second, is prior tender or judicial
consignation of the redemption price a condition precedent for
the valid exercise of the right of redemption; and third, does the
Court of Agrarian Relations have jurisdiction over complaints for
redemption of sugar and coconut lands.
 Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share
tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana, Maria, Sebastian, Rufina,
Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their
46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted
to sugar cane and coconuts. On September 30, 1968, the
landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila
Laurel Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying
respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. The document of sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas
on March 21, 1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the
redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March 27, 1971,
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of
Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa
City.
Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state,
among other things, that long before the execution of the deed
of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first
offered the sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter
said that he had no money; that respondent-tenant, instead, went
personally to the house of petitioners-spouses and implored
them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the
land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that respondent-tenant is
a mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the land;
that respondent-tenant made to tender of payment or any valid
consignation in court at the time he filed the complaint for
redemption. cdrep

At the hearing of May 29, 1973 the parties waived their

right to present evidence and, instead, agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the court
would be based.
On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered
judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant, Eulogio Gonzales,
to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the said amount to
be deposited by him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian
Court and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. On
January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however, affirmed the
decision of the Agrarian Court. Denied of their motions for
reconsideration, petitioners-spouses instituted the present
petition for review.
 We find the appeal to be impressed with merits.
1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code (RA 3844), no right of preference in the sale of the land
under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer. The absence
of this right freely opened the way to the landlords to ease out
their tenants from the land by ostensible conveyance of said land
to another tenant who, in turn, sues for the ejectment of the first
tenant on ground of personal cultivation. While many of these
sales were simulated, the tenant is oftenly evicted from the land
because of the formal transfer of ownership in the land. 1 On
August 8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed,
impressed with the policy of the State, among other things, "(t)o
establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm
as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified
existence of the small farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices; to make the small farmers more
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source
of genuine strength in our democratic society." 2 More
importantly, a new right was given to the tenants-farmers: the
right of pre-emption and redemption. It bolsters their security of
tenure and further encourages them to become owner-
cultivators. 3 Thus, Section II provides: "In case the agricultural
lessor decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee
shall have the preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions . . . The right of pre-emption
under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty
days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner
on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform.
If the agricultural lessee agrees with the terms and conditions of
the sale, he must give notice in writing to the agricultural lessor
of his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption within the
balance of one hundred eighty days' period still available to him,
but in any case not less than thirty days. He must either tender
payment of, or present a certificate from the land bank that it shall
make payment pursuant to section eighty of this Code on the
price of the landholding to the agricultural lessor. If the latter
refuses to accept such tender or presentment, he may consign it
with the court." As protection of this right, Section 12 was
inserted: "In case the landholding is sold to a third person without
the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the
right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration. . . . The right of redemption under this section may
be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in
writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees
affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right
of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale." 4In the
precedential case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 5 this right was held
applicable to both leasehold tenants and share tenants.
Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this
right of redemption available to tenants
in sugar and coconut lands? We answer yes. Among those
exempted from the automatic conversion to agricultural
leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian
Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states: "Agricultural
share tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is
hereby declared contrary to public policy and shall be
automatically converted to agricultural leasehold upon the
effectivity of this section. . . . Provided, That in order not to
jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to
crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject
of a separate proclamation by the President upon
recommendation of the department head that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives marketing
agreement, or similar other workable arrangements, have been
made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring
synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of
such crops . . ." Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by
marketing allotments. In other words, this section recognizes
share tenancy in sugar lands until after a special proclamation is
made, which proclamation shall have the same effect of an
executive proclamation of the operation of the Department of
Agrarian Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants in the
lands affected will become agricultural lessees at the beginning
of the agricultural year next succeeding the year in which the
proclamation is made. 6 But, there is nothing readable or even
discernible in the law denying to tenants in sugar lands the right
of pre-emption and redemption under the Code. The exemption
is purely limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the
other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-
emption and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are
exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration
and tenancy system prevailing, implying that in other matters —
the right of pre-emption and redemption which does not refer to
the consideration of the tenancy — the provisions of the Code
apply. Thus, Section 35 states: "Notwithstanding the provisions
of the preceding Sections, in the case of fishponds, saltbeds and
lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee,
durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the
approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy
system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as
amended."
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property
ownership is impressed with social function. Property use must
not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The
State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regular the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition
of private property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership
and profits." 7 One governmental policy of recent date projects
the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and the
transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. This
is Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that
all tenant farmers "of private agricultural lands devoted to rice
and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether
classified as landed estates or not" shall be deemed "owner of a
portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irrigated and there (3) hectares if irrigated." 8
2. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenant-
farmer this right of redemption, in particular, the exercise thereof
must be in accordance with the law in order to be valid. "The
timely exercise of the right of legal redemption," said the Court
in Basbas v. Entena, 9"requires either tender of the price or valid
consignation thereof." The statutory periods within which the
right must be exercised "would be rendered meaningless and of
easy evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make an
actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be reasonable
price of the land sought to be redeemed." "The existence of the
right of redemption operates to depress the market value of the
land until the period expires, and to render that period indefinite
by permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either
party unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate the
action, would render nugatory the period of two years (180 days
under the new law) fixed by the statute for making the redemption
and virtually paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the
value of his land. No buyer can be expected to acquire it without
any certainty as to the amount for which least his investment in
case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowner's needs and
obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such result was
intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that effect." 10 In
Bona-fide redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and
valid tender of the entire repurchase price. The right of a
redemptioner to pay a "reasonable price" does not excuse him
from the duty to make proper tender of the price that can be
honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances, without
prejudice to final arbitration by the courts. "It is not difficult to
discern why the redemption price should either be fully offered in
legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such
means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is
one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be
expected to entertain an offer of redemption without attendant
evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish
the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the
buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well
as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
contrary to the policy of the law. While consignation of the
tendered price is not always necessary because legal
redemption is not made to discharge a pre-existing debt
(Asturias Sugar Central v. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a
valid tender is indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of
course, consignation of the price would remove all controversy
as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time." 11
In the case before Us, neither prior tender nor judicial
consignation of the redemption price accompanied the filing of
the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian Court had yet to order,
when it rendered its decision on October 10, 1973 (complaint
was filed on March 27, 1971), respondent-tenant to deposit the
amount of P24,000.00 as redemption price with the Clerk of
Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. The
absence of such tender or consignation leaves Us, therefore,
with no alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant had
failed to exercise his right of redemption in accordance with
law.cdphil

3. Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v.

Hidalgo 12 as excuse for the failure to make the requisite tender
or consignation in court, because the Court did not rule therein
that prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price
is not required for the valid exercise of the right of redemption. In
that case, the spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales
were the share tenants of Policarpio Hidalgo on his 22, 876-
square meter agricultural land in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas,
while the spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo were his
tenants on a 7,638 square meter land. Policarpio Hidalgo sold
these lands without notifying his tenants; and so, the tenants filed
petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking the
redemption of the lands under Section 12 of the Code. The
Agrarian Court dismissed the petitioners for the reason that the
right of redemption is available to leasehold tenants only but not
to share tenants. On review, the Court ruled that while the
Agrarian Court "correctly focused on the sole issue of law" —
whether the right of redemption granted 12 of Republic Act No.
3844 is applicable to share tenants — it (Agrarian Court) "arrived
at its erroneous conclusion that the right of redemption granted
by Section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold
tenants only but not to share tenants." The Court said that "(t)he
Code intended . . . to afford the farmers
who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its
enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by
virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same
priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who
upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier
converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to
acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their
voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by
expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority." But, the Court
did not rule that tender of payment or consignation of the
redemption price in court is not a requisite in the valid exercise
of the right of redemption. In fact, it said that "(i)n the absence of
any provision in the Code as to the manner of and amounts
payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
apply in a suppletory character" which, of course, imposes tender
of payment or judicial consignation of the repurchase price as
condition for valid redemption. Besides, it is noteworthy that in
that case petitioners-tenants' possession of funds
and compliance with the requirements of
redemption were not questioned, the case having been
submitted and decided on the sole legal issue of the right of
redemption being available to them as share tenants.
 4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has
jurisdiction over suits for redemption, like the present case, of
sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, as amended, states: "The Court of Agrarian
Relations shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over (1)
all cases or actions involving matter, controversies, disputes, or
money claims arising from agrarian relations . . ." Since this case
involves a matter, controversy or dispute "arising from agrarian
relations" — whether respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut
lands has the right of redemption — it is definite that the Agrarian
Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the same. 13The Court
of Agrarian Relations came into being for the enforcement of all
laws and regulations governing the relations between capital and
labor on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions, matters,
controversies, or disputes involving or arising from such
relationship. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondent Eulogio
Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly exercised his right of
redemption over his tenanted agricultural land. No costs. cdll

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Muñoz Palma,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., reserved his vote.
 [G.R. No. L-47178. May 16, 1980.]

ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner, vs. VIRGILIO

IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or
IMPERIAL FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION
APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of
Labor, respondents.

Felizardo R. Moreno for petitioner.

Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.
E. V. Español for public respondent.

DECISION

FERNANDO, C.J :p

The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the

claim for compensation filed by petitioner, the mother of one Jose
Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of private
respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the
failure to do so, it is admitted that there was no controversion.
Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized by
the filing of a motion to dismiss based on the alleged absence of
an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however,
is that subsequently, in the hearing of such claim, private
respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer
and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased, a fisherman,
was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but
after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel,
and thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored
the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the
effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my
co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with said
fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22,
1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The hearing
officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. 2 A motion
for reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August
29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople,
denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 3 Hence
this petition for review.
1. In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 4 this Court explicitly held that the failure to
controvert "is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose.
So we have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the
clear and express language of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility." 5 The
opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Bachrach Motor Co.
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 to Northwest Orient
Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission. 7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 such a doctrine was
reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions had
been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 9 to Abong v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent
Secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host
of decisions that speaks to the same effect had been
promulgated. 11 It clearly, appears, therefore, that the failure of
the referee to grant the award ought to have been remedied and
the motion for reconsideration granted.
2. The deceased in this case met his death because of
drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, 12 there
was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was
drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that could be
alleged was that he "was lost at sea while in the employ of
petitioner." 13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was
sustained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v.
Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact that the
employee was found missing while on board the petitioner's
vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao' became known to the captain of the
vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956
when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent Compensation
WCC Form No. 3 stating that the employee was 'Lost at sea and
presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,' and that it was
controverting the respondent's claim." 15 In the present case,
there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was
not controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to grant
the claim finds no justification in law.
prcd

3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and

categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while
"in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping
enterprise of private respondent. Even without such evidence,
the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or
disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden of
overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the
claim. Time and time again this Court has stressed such statutory
provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to
April of this year. 16 An appraisal of the counter affidavits
submitted by two employees of private respondent and thereafter
beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for
a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to
negate the force of the presumption of compensability.
4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse
to the claim warranted because of the doctrine that the findings
of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due
weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 17 finds pertinence:
"The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized
to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported
by substantial or credible evidence." 18
5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the
award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly
followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant.
So it has been since the first leading case of Francisco v.
Conching, 19 decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took
effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss: "There is need, it
seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other
employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the
Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of
social justice and protection to labor." 21 Further: "No other
judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly
expressed legislative determination which antedated the
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection
to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on
resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would
result in frustrating such a national policy." 22 Lastly, to quote
from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the
principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and
vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these
cases is not equality but protection." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and
petitioner Estrella B. Ondoy is awarded the sum of P6,000.00 as
compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for
burial expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision
is immediately executory. Costs against private respondent
Virgilio Ignacio.
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De
Castro, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., is on leave.
 [G.R. No. L-47088. July 10, 1981.]

CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA assisted by her husband

WENCESLAO SALONGA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JULITA B.
FARRALES, and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY, defendants-
appellees.

Jose S. Sarte for plaintiff-appellant.

Gregorio Dolojan for defendants-appellees.

SYNOPSIS

In an ejectment case filed by the appellee Farrales, the titled owner of the land in
question against the possessors, the appellants Salongas, who erected a house
thereon, the Olongapo City Court rendered a decision ordering the Salongas to vacate
the land and Pay the rentals in arrears. When aforesaid decision was affirmed by the
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City and the decision was partially
satisfied by the payment of rentals, Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales said land
but the latter persistently refused. Instead Farrales insisted on the execution of the
judgment. Salonga filed a complaint against Farrales and the Sheriff with the Court of
First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City for specific performance which was
dismissed on the ground that there exists no legally enforceable compromise
agreement by which Farrales can be compelled to sell the land in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals certified this case to the Supreme Court on purely question of law.
The Supreme Court held that: (a) no compromise agreement to sell the land was ever
perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the Plaintiffs-appellants as
vendees and (b) under Art. 1678 of the New Civil Code the Salongas as lessees, may
remove the improvements should Farrales refuse to reimburse them but the former do
not have the right to buy the land.
Appeal dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; CONSENT; ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR EXISTENCE OF

CONTRACT. — It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of
a contract, and where it is wanting, the contract is non-existent. The essence of consent
is the conformity of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of
the offer made by the other. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract. Where there is
merely an offer by one party, without the acceptance of the other, there is no consent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRACT TO SELL IS NON-EXISTENT, WHERE OFFER TO BUY THE
LAND IS REJECTED; CASE AT BAR. — Where the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita
B. Farrales not only did not accept, but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants,
spouses Salonga to buy the land in question, there is no contract to sell to speak of,
there being no consent. The fact that defendant-appellee sold portions of the land to
the other lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants Salonga does not change the
situation because as to said other lessees, a perfected contract of sale existed, which
was not the case with the plaintiff.
3. ID.; ID.; COMPROMISE AGREEMENT TO SELL THE LAND; UNENFORCEABLE
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS; CASE AT BAR. — The alleged compromise
agreement to sell the land in question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
and thus, renders all the more ineffective the action for specific performance in the
court a quo.
4. ID.; LEASE; RIGHTS OF THE LESSEE ON IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN GOOD FAITH.
— The plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are neither builders in good faith nor in bad
faith. Their rights are governed not by Art. 448 but by Art. 1678 of the New Civil Code.
As lessees, they may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse
them, but the lessee dues not have the right to buy the land.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; SOCIAL JUSTICE; CANNOT NULLIFY
THE LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS. — Social Justice provided for in Sec.
6, Article II of the New Constitution cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under the Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.
The Social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights
from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea
for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore,
beyond the power of the Courts to grant.

DECISION

FERNANDEZ, J : p

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District,
Branch III, Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 1144-0, entitled "Consolacion Duque
Salonga, assisted by her husband, Wenceslao Salonga, Plaintiff, versus Julita B.
Farrales, and The Sheriff of Olongapo City, Defendants," the dispositive part of which
reads:
"FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiff's complaint, as well as defendants' counterclaim.
"Costs against plaintiff.
"SO ORDERED." 2
The records disclose that on January 2, 1973, the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga
assisted by her husband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of
Olongapo City with the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third
Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo City, seeking the following relief:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:
"a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land
containing an area of 156 Square Meters, more or less, where the house of
strong materials of plaintiff exists.
"b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful
possession or occupation of the land by plaintiff, until a final decision is
rendered in this case.
"c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and
"d) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity.
"Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, December 28, 1972."; 3
that on January 9, 1973, plaintiff-appellant Salonga filed an urgent petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was duly amended on January 16,
1973, 4 with the following prayer:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff, assisted by counsel most respectfully prays the Hon.
Court the following relief:
"a) That a restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition
for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining defendants,
particularly the Sheriff of Olongapo City to restrain from enforcing the Writ of
Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case 650
for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City;
"b) That after due hearing of the present amended petition, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon a reasonable bond be issued
enjoining the defendants, particularly, the Sheriff of Olongapo City, to restrain
from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 650 for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo
City, in order to maintain the status of the parties; in order to prevent the
 infliction of irreparable injury to plaintiff; and, in order that whatever
judgment may be rendered in this case, may not become moot, academic,
illusory and ineffectual; and
"c) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity;"
that on January 22, 1973, the Court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining the
carrying out of the writ of execution issued pursuant to the judgment rendered by
the City Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 650, a suit for ejectment filed by
defendant-appellee Farrales against five defendants, among whom the herein
appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga; 5 that on January 23, 1973, defendant-
appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny the motion for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction for being vague and her answer with counterclaim to the
complaint; 6 that an opposition to the amended petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction was also filed by the defendant-appellee Farrales on January
25, 1973; 7 that in an order dated January 20, 1973, the court a quo denied the
petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and lifted the restraining order
issued on January 22, 1973; 8 that plaintiff-appellant moved for a reconsideration of
the order denying the motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction on January 5,
1973; 9 which was also denied by the court a quo on February 21, 1973; 10 that after
the trial on the merits of Civil Case No. 1144-0, the trial Court rendered the
judgment under review, dismissing plaintiff's complaint; 11 that on August 13, 1973,
the plaintiff, Consolacion Duque Salonga, appealed from the said decision to the
Court of Appeals; 12 that on February 25, 1974, the plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion
Duque Salonga, filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in aid of appeal; 13 that in a resolution dated March 6, 1974,
the Court of Appeals denied the said motion on the ground that "the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to restrain the enforcement of the
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 650 for Ejectment, which is not involved in
this appeal, and there being no justification for the issuance of the writ . . ."; 14 that
on January 13, 1975, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal has become moot and academic
because "the house of the plaintiffs-appellants, subject matter of this appeal was
demolished on October 21, 1974, Annex 'A', Sheriff's return and the land where this
house was built was delivered to her and she is now the one in possession . .
."; 15 that the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to comment on the said motion to
dismiss when required by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 16,
1975, 16 the Court of Appeals resolved to submit the motion for decision in a
resolution dated April 17, 1975; 17 and that, likewise, the plaintiffs-appellants having
failed to show cause why the case should not be submitted for decision without the
benefit of appellant's reply brief when required to do so in a Court of Appeals
 resolution dated May 14, 1975, 18 the Court of Appeals resolved on July 8, 1975 to
submit the case for decision without the benefit of appellants' reply brief. 19

In a resolution promulgated on September 15, 1977 the Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court because the issue raised in the appeal is purely legal. 20
The plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors:
"I — THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING SAID APPELLANTS' RELIEF TO PURCHASE
FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JULITA FARRALES THE PIECE OF LAND IN
QUESTION.
"II — THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE
SUIT AT BAR, SECTION 6, UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION,
WHICH CONTROLS, DELIMITS AND REGULATES PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
PRIVATE GAINS." 21
The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred
in dismissing the complaint for specific performance on the ground that there exists no
legally enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee
Farrales can be compelled to sell the piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant,
Consolacion Duque Salonga.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are:
"At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts —
"(1) THAT the personal circumstances of the parties as alleged in the
complaint are admitted:
"(2) THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land
situated in Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, identity of which is not disputed, formerly
acquired by her from one Leoncio Dytuco who, in turn, acquired the same
from the Corpuz Family, of which only 361 square meters, more or less, now
actually belong to said defendant after portions thereof had been sold to
Marciala Zarsadias, Catalino Pascual and Rosalia Quiocson*, (*Per Deed of
Absolute Sale, Exhibit B, the vendee is actually Dionisio Quiocson);
"(3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales of the land
aforesaid, plaintiff was already in possession as lessee of some 156 square
meters thereof, on which she had erected a house, paying rentals thereon first
to the original owners and later to defendant Farrales;
"(4) THAT, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an
ejectment case for non-payment of rentals against plaintiff and her husband-
jointly with other lessees of other portions of the land, to wit, Jorge Carvajal,
 Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias, and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson — Civil Case No. 650 of the Olongapo City Court, Branch I, in which,
on November 20, 1968, and reiterated on February 4, 1970, a decision was
rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering the therein defendants,
including plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the portion occupied by
them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney's fees and costs;
"(5) THAT the decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 581-0 thereof, and, in
a Decision dated November 11, 1971 of Branch III thereof, the same was
affirmed with modification only as to the amount of rentals arrears to be paid;
"(6) THAT the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance aforesaid is
now final and executory, the records of the case had been remanded to the
Court for execution, and the corresponding writ of execution had been issued
partially satisfied, as far as plaintiff herein is concerned, by the payment of all
rentals in arrears although the removal of said plaintiff's house from the land
still remains to be carried out by the defendant Sheriff; and
"(7) THAT, even before the rendition of the affirmatory decision of the Court of
First Instance, by common consent amongst themselves defendant sold to
Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson the areas respectively occupied by them; while, with respect to
Jorge Carvajal, in a suit thereafter filed between him and defendant Farrales, a
compromise agreement was entered into whereunder said defendant
undertook to pay for Carvajal's house on her land, so that the decision
aforesaid is now being executed, as far as ejectment is concerned, only against
plaintiff herein." (Pre-Trial Order, May 17, 1973, pp. 2-5) 22
The lower court explained its conclusion thus:
. . . "From the very allegations of the complaint, it is clearly admitted —
"5. That plaintiff herein, in view of the sale to three tenants-defendants of the
portions of land occupied by each of said three tenant-defendants, by
defendant Julita B. Farrales, also offered to purchase from said defendant the
area of One Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more or less, where plaintiff's
house of strong materials exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales, despite the
fact that said plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and
reasonable persistently refused such offer, and instead, insisted to execute the
judgment rendered in the ejectment case, before the City Court of Olongapo City,
thru the herein defendant Sheriff of Olongapo City, with the sole and only
purpose of causing damage and prejudice to the plaintiff (Complaint, p. 3,
italics supplied).
"Being a judicial admission, the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot
subsequently take a position contradictory thereto or inconsistent therewith
 (Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil., 248;
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil., 227). Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase was,
as aforesaid persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of
the minds took place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale,
was ever perfected between them. This is only firmed up even more by
plaintiff's admission on the witness stand that no agreement respecting the
purchase and sale of the disputed land was finalized because, while defendant
Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash, plaintiff did not have any
money for that purpose and neither were negotiations ever had respecting
any possible arrangement for payment in installments. On all fours to the case
at bar, therefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
31018, June 29, 1973, which was a case for specific performance to compel the
therein respondent Magdalena Estate, Inc. to sell a parcel of land to petitioner
per an alleged contract of sale in which the Supreme Court ruled:
'It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that
the petitioners themselves admit that they and the respondent still had
to meet and agree on how and when the down payment and the
installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it
cannot, therefore be said that a definite and firm sales agreement
between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question.
Indeed this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on
the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in
the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.'
"Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection (Articles
1315 and 1475, Civil Code of the Philippines; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Atkins, Kroll and Co.,
Inc., vs. B. Cua Hian Teck, G.R. No. L-9817, January 31, 1958), and there is here
no perfected contract at all, it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely
nothing to enforce against defendant Farrales, and the fact that defendant
Farrales previously sold portions of the land to other lessees similarly situated
as plaintiff herein, does not change the situation because, as to said other
lessees, a perfected contract existed — which is not the case with plaintiff." 23
The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in
question was ever perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the
plaintiffs-appellants as vendees. 24
It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and
where it is wanting, the contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the
conformity of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the
offer made by the other. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract. Where there is
merely an offer by one party, without the acceptance of the other, there is no
consent. 25
It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not
only did not accept, but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to
buy the land in question. There being no consent there is, therefore, no contract to sell
to speak of.
Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the
land in question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, 26 and thus, renders all
the more ineffective the action for specific performance in the court a quo.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are
neither builders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their rights are governed not by Article
448 but by Art. 1678 of the New Civil Code. 27 As lessees, they may remove the
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse them, but the lessee does not have
the right to buy the land. 28
Anent the appellants' claim that since the appellee sold to the three (3) other
defendants in the ejectment suit the three (3) portions of the land in question occupied
by them, it follows that "she must also sell that portion of the land where appellants'
residential house was found to appellants" is unmeritorious. The trial court correctly
ruled that the fact that defendant-appellee sold portions of the land to the other
lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants Salonga does not change the situation
because as to said other lessees, a perfected contract of sale existed which, as
previously shown was not the case with the plaintiff. 29
As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the
case at bar, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on
the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection. The social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take
away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts,
and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.

There is no showing that the trial court committed any reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed
from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Salonga v. Farrales, G.R. No. L-47088, [July 10, 1981], 192 PHIL 614-624)