Labor Law Reviewer
Labor Law Reviewer
1. Constitutional Provisions
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investments.
Bill of Rights
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
------------
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the Labor
Code. Employees have the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective
bargaining or for their mutual aid and protection. The constitutional right to self-organization is better
understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to
Organize), to which the Philippines is a signatory. [UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio, Jr., G.R. No. 131235,
November 16, 1999, 318 SCRA 185, Panganiban, J.] Workers and employers, without distinction
whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to
job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization; [Standard Chartered Bank
Employees Union (NUBE) v. Confesor, G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004, 432 SCRA 308, 320-321] and
that workers' organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitution and rules and to elect their
representatives in full freedom, free from any interference from public authorities. [UST Faculty Union v.
Bitonio, Jr., supra]
Labor
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality
of employment opportunities for all.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the
right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and
growth.
Women
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and
such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them
to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
2. Civil Code
Contract of Labor
Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws
on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
3. Labor Code
3.1. Article 3
d. Article 255
Labor Code
NOTES:
It should be noted that the definition of “recruitment and placement” in Art. 13(b), does
not make any of the eleven (11) acts enumerated therein illegal per se. What makes it a case of
illegal recruitment is when any of said recruitment activities are “undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority”. [Art. 38(a)] Such that an employee, who introduces an applicant to
owner-employer agency, committed an act of referral, a “recruitment activity”. There is an illegal
recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. [People
vs. Goce, 247 SCRA 780, 789 (1995)]
A non-licensee means a person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not
issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or
authority has been suspended, revoked, or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A
licensee authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private employment agency, while authority
is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities. [Rodolfo vs. People, G.R. No.
146964, August 10, 2006]
When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
BUT,
RA 8042 removed this distinction and redefined illegal recruitment as follows:
(a) charging an amount greater than that specified;
(b) publishing false notice in relation to recruitment;
(c) giving away false information or any act of misrepresentation for securing a license/authority;
(d) inducing a worker to quit present work in place of another
UNLESS, to free the worker from oppressive terms and conditions;
(e) influencing any person/entity not to employ a worker who has not applied through the former’s
agency;
(f) recruiting workers in jobs that are harmful to public health or morality;
(g) obstructing inspection by the Secretary of Labor;
(h) failing to file reports as required by the Secretary;
(i) substituting or altering DOLE-approved employment contracts;
(j) becoming a Board member of a travel agency, directly or indirectly;
(k) withholding applicant worker’s travel documents for monetary considerations;
(l) failing to actually deploy a worker without a valid reason; and
(m) in case of non-deployment of worker without his fault, failing to reimburse expenses the latter
incurred.
In sum,
a licensee can be liable only for 13 illegal recruitment/prohibited acts (under Sec. 6, RA 8042),
UNLESS he conspires with a non-licensee in the commission of any of the illegal acts in Art.
13(b).
Illegal recruitment is a matter of evidence. [People vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 664 (1986)]
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By
using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
Absence of money or any valuable consideration as payment for services of the recruiter
still considers the recruitment illegal under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code as recruitment maybe for
profit or not. [People vs. Jamilosa, supra]
1.2.7. Liabilities
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or
modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
( The so-called theory of imputed knowledge, that is, knowledge of the agent
is knowledge of the principal. [New Life vs. CA, G.R. No. 94071 March 31, 1992]
For the liability of the agent to attach, this theory states that the agent knew of and
consented to the extension of period of employment. Otherwise, the liability of the
recruitment agency shall expire from the termination of the worker's original
contract. [SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
161757, January 25, 2006, Carpio Morales, J.]
NOTES:
Rules on Repatriation of Overseas Workers
(1) Without fault of the worker, his repatriation shall be borne by the local agency and/or
principal over the:
(2) Repatriation due to the fault of migrant worker shall be borne by the migrant worker.
[Sec. 15, par. 1, RA 8042]
(4) Repatriation of underage migrant worker shall be mandatory upon discovery, done
by the responsible officers of the foreign service where the underage migrant worker is
found. [Sec. 16, RA 8042]
Art. 31. Bonds. All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash
and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance
with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and
conditions of employment as may be appropriate.
Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private
fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged
any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually
commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the appropriate
receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate
a schedule of allowable fees.
Art. 14. Employment promotion. The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power and authority:
Art. 36. Regulatory power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power
to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies
within the coverage of this Title and is hereby authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this Title.
Art. 37. Visitorial Power. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives may, at any time, inspect the premises, books of accounts and
records of any person or entity covered by this Title, require it to submit reports
regularly on prescribed forms, and act on violation of any provisions of this Title.
NOTES:
The Supreme Court declared Art. 38, par. (c) unconstitutional and null and void, stating
that only a judge may issue warrants of search and arrest. [Hortencia Salazar vs. Tomas D.
Achacoso and Ferdie Marquez, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990]
Where to file: POEA Director of Licensing & Regulatory Office (LRO), which office is under the
wing of the Deputy Administrator for Adjudication and Employment Regulation.
1 Under the POEA Rules on Overseas Land-based Employment (2002), both the POEA
Administrator and DOLE Regional Director has the power to issue a CLOSURE ORDER
against an erring overseas recruitment and manning agency.
2 BUT, Under the new Omnibus Rules Implementing RA 10022 (amendment to RA 8042), it
is the POEA Administrator who has the authority to issue a CLOSURE ORDER upon
preliminary finding of guilt against an overseas recruitment agency. [Sec. 11]
HOWEVER,
Prior to the issuance of a CLOSURE ORDER, an investigation takes place whereby the POEA
Administrator may issue a preventive suspension upon the recommendation of the POEA
Director of LRO. [Sec. 9, Omnibus Rules implementing RA 10022]
Closure Order may be lifted upon filing a Motion before the POEA Director of LRO, which motion
shall be resolved by the POEA Administrator. [Sec. 18, Omnibus Rules Implementing RA 10022]
Categories:
When only one complainant filed individual complaints, there is no illegal recruitment in large
scale BUT the three conspiring recruiters can be held guilty of illegal recruitment by a syndicate.
[People vs. Hernandez, K. Reichl, and Y.G. de Reichl, G.R. Nos. 141221-36, March 7, 2002.]
Where illegal recruitment is proved but the elements of “large scale” or “syndicate” are absent,
the accused can be convicted only of “simple” illegal recruitment.
VENUE: The RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
C. LABOR_STANDARDS
1. Hours of Work
Art. 84. Hours worked. Hours worked shall include (a) all time during
which an employee is required to be on duty or to be at a prescribed workplace;
and (b) all time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work.
Omnibus Rules
Book III, Rule 1
1.1. Coverage/Exclusions
Omnibus Rules
Book III, Rule I
NOTES:
For purposes of the exemption, managerial employees “are those whose primary duty
consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department
or subdivision.” [Peñaranda vs. Baganga Plywood Corp., G.R. No. 159577, May 3, 2006]
A purported “manager” whose function is simply to carry out the company’s orders, plans
and policies is not a managerial employee. If their functions, duties and responsibilities do not
bear relation with the management of the establishment, nor participate in the formulation of its
policies, nor in the hiring and firing of its employees, then they are NOT managerial employees.
[NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766 (1964)]
Managerial employee is not required to report at a fixed hour or to keep fixed hours of work.
[International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Vs. NLRC, 287 SCRA 213 (1998)]
(4) who do NOT devote more than 20% of their hours of work in a week to activities
which are not directly and closely related to management of the establishment.
[Peñaranda vs. Baganga Plywood Corp., supra, citing Section 2(c), Rule I,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations]
An employee tasked to supervise the engineering section of the plant, and whose work
involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in said
section, is considered part of the managerial staff. His functions require the use of discretion and
independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the plant. The term FOREMAN implies
that he was the representative of management over the workers, and the operation of the
department. [Peñaranda vs. Baganga Plywood Corp., supra] Likewise, an employee with
powers of supervisor/manager is part of the managerial staff. [Quebec vs. NLRC, 301 SCRA
627 (1999)]
N.B.:
Managers and members of managerial staff are NOT entitled to:
a. Overtime pay [Art. 87; Salazar vs. NLRC, supra]
b. Service incentive leave pay [Art. 95(b]; Quebec vs. NLRC, supra]
c. Holiday pay (Art. 94)
In Union of Filipro Employees vs. Vivar, Jr., [(205 SCRA 200 (1992)], it was held that the phrase
“whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty” must be read in
conjunction with the meaning of field personnel in Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules, whereby “field
personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer.” [Mercidar
Fishing Corp. vs. NLRC, 297 SCRA 440 (1998)] The term “other employees” should NOT be understood
as a separate classification of employees who are not covered under Article 82 of the Labor Code, rather
should be regarded as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field personnel as those
“whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.” [Auto Bus
Transport vs. Bautista, 458 SCRA 578 (2005)]
N.B.:
Field Personnel are NOT entitled to the following benefits:
a. Overtime pay; [Union Filipro Employees vs. Vivar, Jr., supra, citing San Miguel Brewery
vs. Democratic Labor Organization, 8 SCRA 613 (1963)]
b. Service incentive leave pay [Sec. 1, Rule V, Implementing Rules; Auto Bus Transport
vs. Bautista, 458 SCRA 578 (2005)]
c. 13th month pay [PD 851]
The definition of domestic servant or househelper contemplates one who is employed in the
employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family. [Apex Mining Company vs. NLRC, 196 SCRA 251 (1991)]
On the other hand, a personal driver of the owner of the company cannot claim regular
employment with the company itself absent proof of his employment relations therewith. [Ultra
Villa Food Haus vs. Geniston, 309 SCRA 17 (1999) at 23]
N.B.:
Domestic servants are NOT entitled to the following benefits:
a. Overtime pay;
b. Holiday pay;
c. Premium pay for holiday and rest days
d. Service Incentive Leave pay. [Ultra Villa Food Haus vs. Geniston, supra at 24]
And while the mode of compensation is on piece-rate basis, they are considered as regular
employees for as long as the nature of the tasks they perform are necessary and desirable in the
usual business of the employer, and their employment is not dependent on specific projects or
season. [Labor Congress vs. NLRC, 290 SCRA 509 (1998); in rel. Art. 280, LC; see also:
Villuga vs. NLRC, 225 SCRA 537 (1993)] As such, they are entitled to:
a. minimum wage
b. ECOLA
c. 13th month pay [Makati Haberdashery, Inc. vs. NLRC, 179 SCRA
448 (1989)]
Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any
employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.
NOTES:
Article 83 of the Labor Code provides that the normal hours of work shall NOT exceed
8 hours a day, which period does not include meal break. [PAL vs. NLRC, 302 SCRA 582
(1999)]
(Mnemonic) DWSP
- when on DUTY
- when at the WORKPLACE
- when SUFFERED to work
- when PERMITTED to work [PAL vs. NLRC, 302 SCRA 582 (1999)]
to safeguard health
minimize unemployment as employer is forced to resort to more shiftings. [NAWASA vs. NWSA
Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766 (1964)]
Services performed by an employee exceeding the normal 8-hour work period entitles
BUT, shall only be applicable in industries not exempted by law to pay said additional
compensation, such as public utilities and government agencies and instrumentalities,
performing governmental functions. [NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, supra]
EXCEPT, when the company voluntarily agrees to pay its employees additional compensation
for work performed in excess of 8 hours. The obligation of the company is no longer by
compulsion of law, but is based on contracts. [NAWASA vs. NWSA, supra]
1.2.1. Exceptions
Labor Code
Omnibus Rules
Rule I-A
While medical/health personnel are only required to perform work for five (5) days, this does not
mean that work performed for the week entitles them to a full weekly wage for 7 days. Full weekly wage
only arises if work performed for five (5) days amounted to 40 hours of work, consistent with the 8-hour
workday. [San Juan de Dios Hospital Employees Association-AFW/MA vs. NLRC, 282 SCRA 316
(1997)]
NOTES:
Parties are not prohibited from agreeing in a compressed workweek scheme, whereby regular
workweek is shortened but with longer work periods. For as long as employees voluntarily agree to work
for more than 8 hours a day in total in a week of which shall not exceed normal weekly hours of work. In
fact, Department Order No. 21 sanctions this kind of scheme, in consideration of the benefits that employees
may derive therefrom, i.e.,:
(1) savings on costs of transportation, meals, and energy
(2) greater efficiency of employees
(3) lower rate of employee absenteeism
(4) longer weekends is beneficial for rest, leisure, and time for the family. [Bisig
Manggagawa sa Tryco, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 151309, October 15, 2008]
Omnibus Rules
Book III, Rule 1
As a General Rule:
The 8-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that
employees must take their meals within company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out
of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. [PAL v. NLRC, 302 SCRA 582 (1999)]
EXCEPT,
When employees are required to standby for emergency work during their 1-hour meal period and
their unavailability results in disciplinary action, their meal break should be considered as part of hours
worked. [Pan-American Airways, 1 SCRA 527 (1961)]
There are special circumstances where employees, who although considered to be on “forced leave”
during the semestral break, such as full-time professors in a university, are still entitled to compensation.
Professors and teachers, during this period of time, are nevertheless burdened with correcting papers,
evaluating students, meeting deadlines, and submitting grading reports within a given period, such that the
semestral break could not be used effectively for the teacher's own purposes, and thus, should be
considered as compensable “hours worked”. [University of Pangasinan Faculty Union vs. University of
Pangasinan, 127 SCRA 691, 699 (1984)]
On another note, the meaning and scope of the term “workplace” determine whether the time spent
within work premises is considered “hours worked”.
(a) A worker confined within the premises of a boat or a factory shop need not leave said
premises in order to enjoy his “rest period”, it being enough that he (1) cease to work, (2) may
rest completely, and (3) leave or may leave, at his will, the spot where he actually stays while
working, or to go somewhere else. In such cases, the period of rest shall not be counted as
hours worked. [Luzon Stevedoring vs. Luzon Marine Department Union, G.R. No. L-9265,
April 29, 1957]
(b) A worker who continues to report for work at the employer's previous workplace may
not be compensated, if he is aware that the employer's workplace has been transferred to
another area. [Aklan Electric Cooperative vs. NLRC, 323 SCRA 258 (2000)]
(c) A worker who is required to assemble at a designated area at least 30 minutes prior to
the start of their scheduled working hours is not compensated when he is not subject to the
absolute control of the employer during this 30-minute assembly time. [Arica vs. NLRC, 170
SCRA 776 (1989)]
BUT,
A driver who is also required to pick up other employees at certain specified points on
his way to the workplace, and likewise drops them off on his way home is entitled to overtime
compensation, since the assigned task of fetching and delivering employees to the worksite is
primarily for the benefit of the employer. [Rada vs. NLRC, 205 SCRA 69 (1992)]
Art. 87. Overtime Work.—Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours
a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime work an additional
compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five (25%)
percent thereof. Work performed beyond eight hours on a holiday or rest day shall
be paid an additional compensation equivalent to the rate for the first eight hours
on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty (30%) percent thereof.
Overtime Work
Overtime work is actually the lengthening of hours developed to the interests of the employer and
the requirements of his enterprise. It follows that the wage or salary to be received must likewise be
increased, and a special additional amount must be added to serve either as encouragement or inducement.
Wage, on the other hand, is the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being
expressed in terms of money, which is payable by an employer to an employee for work done.
Thus, for purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular wage includes all payments which
the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week. Extra, temporary and contingent
compensation unrelated to work done or service rendered should not be part of the computation. [PNB vs.
PEMA, G.R. No. L-30279, July 30, 1982]
NOTE:
If a worker should incur in undertime during his regular daily work, it should not be
set off by his overtime, for that would place the schedule of working hours dependent on
the employee. [NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, supra]
Night-shift work is more onerous and burdensome, and thus deserves more
remuneration than their day time counterparts. There is no dispute that ordinary and regular
normal work is performed in the daytime, and that night work is exceptional and is only
justified in unavoidable circumstances necessary for the business of the employer. [Shell
Company vs. NLU, 81 Phil. 315 (1948)]
- Cash Wage is the regular wage used in computing night shift and
overtime work [the only premium standards in Chapter I, Title I, Book III
of the Labor Code] [limited only to night shift and OT (Arts. 86 & 90)
- Longevity pay is not included in the computation of overtime pay [PNB vs.
PEMA, supra]. It is not part of regular wages, but a form of gratuity.
2. Wages
The general “no work, no pay” rule should prevail with respect to employees’ wages
during the suspension period, subject to existing CBA terms on leave credits and similar benefits
of employees. The suspension was due to environmental causes that can affect the health and
2.2. Coverage/Exclusions
Employees are entitled to be paid the minimum wage regardless whether they are
regular or non-regular employees, except for those employees enumerated in Section 3, Rule
VII of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code. [SLL International Cables
Specialist, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 172161, March 2, 2011, Mendoza, J.]
In view of the foregoing, we hold that cooperatives may still be exempted from the
statutory minimum wage. [Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 79025,
December 29, 1989]
The term “facilities”, says the Implementing Rule, shall include articles or services for the benefit
of the employee or his family but shall not include:
tools of the trade or articles or service primarily for the benefit of the
employer; or
necessary to the conduct of the employer’s business.
(Book III, Rule VII, Sec. 5)
The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and
over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is supplement; [State Marine Corp. vs. Cebu Seamen's
Association, Inc., 7 SCRA 294 (1963); (1988 Bar, XIIb)] and when said benefit or privilege is part of the
laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item given,
but in the purpose for which it is given. [SLL International Cables Specialist, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. 172161, March 2, 2011, Mendoza, J.] So, if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay
for them just the same. [Atok-Big Wedge Assn. vs. Atok-Big Wedge Co., (97 Phil. 294)]
An employer cannot simply deduct from the employee's wages the value of the board
and lodging without satisfying the ff. requisites: (1) proof that such facilities are
customarily furnished by the trade/business of the employer; (2) voluntary acceptance
in writing by the employees of the deductible facilities; and (3) proof of the fair and
reasonable value of the facilities charged. [S.I.P. Food House, supra; SLL
International, supra]
CASE:
Although it is quite easy to comprehend “board” and “lodging”, it is not so with “facilities”. Thus, Sec.
5, Rule VII, Book III, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code gives meaning to the term as including
articles or services for the benefit of the employee or his family but excluding tools of the trade or articles or
service primarily for the benefit of the employer or necessary to the conduct of the employer's business. The
Staff/Manager's allowance may fall under “lodging” but the transportation and Bislig allowances are not
embraced in “facilities” on the main consideration that they are granted as well as the Staff/Manager's
allowance for respondent PICOP's benefit and convenience, i.e., to insure that petitioners render quality
performance. In determining whether a privilege is a facility, the criterion is not so much its kind but its
purpose. [States Marine Corporation vs. Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc., No. L-12444, 28 February
1963, 7 SCRA 294] That the assailed allowances were for the benefit and convenience of respondent
company was supported by the circumstance that they were not subjected to withholding tax. [Liduvino
M. Millares, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 122827, March 29, 1999, 2nd Division, Bellosillo, J.]
NOTES:
The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa was for the purpose of Article 1708 of the
Civil Code which mandates that, “[t]he laborer’s wage shall not be subject to execution or
attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.” In
labor law, however, the distinction appears to be merely semantics. Paramount and Evangelista
may have involved wage earners, but the petitioner in Espejo was a General Manager with a
monthly salary of P9,000.00 plus privileges. That wage and salary are synonymous has been
settled in Songco v. NLRC. [Equitable Banking Corp v. Ricardo Sapac, 490 SCRA 381 (2006)]
2) a significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the
salary rate of a higher one;
4) The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country [Bankard Employees Union-
Workers Alliance Trade Unions vs. NLRC, and Bankard, Inc., G.R. No. 140689, February 17,
2004, Third Division, Carpio, Morales, J.]
CASE:
In the present case, only three (3) of the union members are receiving wages below P100.00, thus
entitled to the increase. To direct petitioner to grant an across-the-board increase to all of them would be
harsh and unfair to the employer.
However, due to the CBA provision, providing for increased monthly salaries of supervisors and
foremen, such has re-established and broadened the gap, and significantly doubled the P100.00 increase
under RA 6640, which in effect substantially complied with the wage increase under RA 6640. The union is
estopped from claiming wage increase under RA 6640 when it forged the CBA with petitioner after the law
took effect.
xxx [W]age distortion means the disappearance or virtual disappearance of pay differentials between
lower and higher positions in an enterprise because of compliance with a wage order.
The apparent intention of the law is only to upgrade the salaries or wages of the employees specified
therein. (Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108556, November 19, 1996, 264 SCRA
320)
NOTES:
Since under the CBA, “overtime pay was not given to each employee consistently, deliberately and
unconditionally, but as compensation for additional services rendered”, the employer's change of
schedule which is not prohibited by the CBA, resulting in lesser overtime work, does not constitute
a diminution of benefits under Art. 100 of the Labor Code [Manila Jockey Club Employees Labor
Union-PTGWO vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., 517 SCRA 707, 712-713, March 7, 2007]
(a) The grant or benefits is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period;
(c) The practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law; and
Employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish an employee's
compensation without his knowledge and consent [Pacific Banking Corporation vs. Clave,
128 SCRA 112]
NOTES:
* Cf. with PD 902-A, Secs. 5 & 6 on Rehabilitation. [Rubberworld Phils. vs. NLRC, April
14, 1999]
* Receiver – takes hold of assets for the benefit of creditors with possibility of
continued operation.
* Liquidator – takes hold of assets to dispose according to priorities. Operations stop.
Both receivership/liquidation – personality of corp. continues [PVB v. NLRC, Oct. 26, 1999]
Worker’s claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy
or judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer. [Barayoga vs. Asset Privatization
Trust, 473 SCRA 690]
Art. 119. False reporting. It shall be unlawful for any person to make
any statement, report, or record filed or kept pursuant to the provisions of this
Code knowing such statement, report or record to be false in any material respect
CASE:
Special Steel Products, Inc. vs. Lutgardo Villareal, et al.,
G.R. No. 143304, July 8, 2004
Petitioner contends that as a guarantor, it could legally withhold respondent Villareal’s monetary
benefits as a preliminary remedy pursuant to Article 2071 of the Civil Code, as amended. As to respondent
So, petitioner, citing Article 113 of the Labor Code, as amended, in relation to Article 1706 of the Civil Code,
as amended, maintains that it could withhold his monetary benefits being authorized by the memorandum
he signed.
“ART. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited.—It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages (and benefits) of a worker or induce him
to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever
without the worker’s consent.”
The above provision is clear and needs no further elucidation. Indeed, petitioner has no legal
authority to withhold respondents’ 13th month pay and other benefits. What an employee has worked for,
his employer must pay. Thus, an employer cannot simply refuse to pay the wages or benefits of its employee
because he has either defaulted in paying a loan guaranteed by his employer; or violated their memorandum
of agreement; or failed to render an accounting of his employer’s property.
NOTES:
Wage Deduction
NOTES:
Attorney's Fees
* Art. 111(a) is extraordinary attorney's fees. It does not require proof that the employer
acted with malice or bad faith in withholding the wage. Proof that lawful wages were not paid
is enough [PAL Shipping Phils., Inc., et al. vs. NLRC, et al. [G.R. 153031, Dec. 14, 2006]
* The award of attorney's fees, though not prayed for, is sanctioned by law and must be
upheld [Marivel Trading, Inc. vs. NLRC, 525 SCRA 708, 733 (2007).
Rules:
(1) In actions for (1) recovery of wages or (2) where an employee was forced to litigate
and thus incurred expenses to protect his rights and interests, a maximum award of ten percent
(10%) of the monetary award by way of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable under Art.
111 of the Labor Code. Xxx
Forced to litigate recovery of wages – basics of attorney’s fees [Rutaquio vs. NLRC, (Oct. 19,
1999); Marsaman Manning Agency vs. NRLC, (Aug. 25, 1999)
(2) No attorney’s fees when complaint is represented by PAO – Lambo vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 111042, Oct. 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 420.
- guaranteed wages
- standard for 8 hours work recognized learnership
(Apprenticeship adjusted)
3. Rest Day
NOTES:
(a) Weekly rest period of not less than 24 hours after every 6 consecutive normal work days.
(c) Worked:
Regular Holiday + Rest day = 230%
[Arts. 93(a) & 94(b)]
Special day = 130% [Art. 94(c)]
Special day + Rest day = 150%
[Art. 93(c), where
“such” refers to special day]
For work on Sundays and legal holidays, the employer must pay:
2. a Monthly-Paid Employee:
N.B.:
The premium payments for Sundays, legal holidays, and rest days are based on the rule enunciated
in De Leon.
Art. 92. When employer may require work on a rest day. The
employer may require his employees to work on any day:
(a) In case of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious
accident, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic or other disaster or
calamity to prevent loss of life and property, or imminent danger to public safety;
(b) In cases of urgent work to be performed on the machinery,
equipment, or installation, to avoid serious loss which the employer would
otherwise suffer;
(c) In the event of abnormal pressure of work due to special
circumstances, where the employer cannot ordinarily be expected to resort to other
measures;
(d) To prevent loss or damage to perishable goods;
(e) Where the nature of the work requires continuous operations and
the stoppage of work may result in irreparable injury or loss to the employer; and
(f) Under other circumstances analogous or similar to the foregoing as
determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
NOTES:
[OT may be required when the country is at war/local or national emergency declared
by Congress/President (difference between rest day and OT)]
4. Holidays
NOTE:
Holiday pay
Exception:
In retail/service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) employees
Legal holiday falling on a Sunday creates no legal obligation on the part of the employer to pay extra
pay.Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation vs. Trajano, G.R. No. 114698, July 3, 1995.
Note: This ruling is no longer applicable in light of RA 9492, which moved holidays falling on a Sunday to
the next Monday.
“Apparently, the divisor of 314 is arrived at by subtracting all Sundays from the
total number of calendar days in a year, since Saturdays are considered paid rest
days, as stated in the inter-office memorandum. Thus, the use of 314 as a divisor
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the ten legal holidays are already included
therein.” [Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100701,
March 28, 2001, Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.]
The foregoing seems to follow Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of Implementing Rules that “Employees who
are uniformly paid by the month irrespective of number of working days therein (but) with a salary not less
than minimum wage (worked or not) shall be presumed to be paid their holiday pay”. But in IBAA
Employees Union vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, the Supreme Court held that such rule is void. [In Villuga
vs. NLRC, 225 SCRA 537 and Union of Filipro Employees vs. Vivar, 205 SCRA 200, the Court held that
this IBAA ruling is prospective in application following the “Operative Fact” doctrine.
Closer to this case is the Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Hon. Ople (G.R. L-44717, August 28,
1985) where the Court held that if all nonworking days are paid – the divisor is 365. Thus, if divisor is 251
[365 – 52 Sundays = 313 – 52 Sat. = 261] 10 regular holidays is not paid otherwise 261 – 10 is 251. But if
261 is divisor, then regular holidays are considered paid [251 + 10 R.H. = 261].
* This erroneous ruling in Producers Bank was followed, worsely, by SMC vs. Del Rosario (Dec.
13, 2005) where the Court held that “a monthly paid regular employee”, is not entitled “to holiday pay”
pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
Holidays are:
Note changes made in RA 9492
holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled
to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same
date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled
to receive. [Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144664,
March 15, 2004]
AZUCENA:
Regular Holidays
1) IF Holiday is the employee's Regular Workday, and
▪ unworked – 100%
▪ If worked:
1st 8 hours – 200% (the given hourly rate)
excess of 8 hours – plus 30% of hourly rate
Special Day
1) IF unworked, no pay shall accrue unless otherwise provided in
a CBA, or established company practice to grant wages on this given day
2) IF worked:
1st 8 hours – plus 30% of the daily rate (100%)
excess of 8 hours – plus 30% of hourly rate on that day
3) IF it falls on employee's Rest Day, and worked
1st 8 hours – plus 50% of the daily rate of 100%
excess of 8 hours – plus 30% of hourly rate on that day
On the issue of holiday pay, however, two (2) contradictory views exist in jurisprudence:
(1) In Labor Congress vs. NLRC, (290 SCRA 509) the Supreme Court held that piecerate
workers are granted holiday pay based on Section 8(b), Rule IV, Book III. The argument is that the
Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code exclude certain employees from receiving benefits such as
night differential pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay, i.e., “field personnel and
other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer, including those who are
engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for
performing work irrespective of time consumed in the performance thereof.” BUT that piece-rate workers
do not fall under this group.
(2) In Makati Haberdashery, Inc. vs. NRLC, (179 SCRA 448) on the other hand, piece-rate
workers are NOT entitled to holiday pay, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule IV, Book III.
(1) In Labor Congress vs. NLRC, (290 SCRA 509) the Supreme Court held that piecerate
workers are granted holiday pay based on Section 8(b), Rule IV, Book III. The argument is that the
Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code exclude certain employees from receiving benefits such as
night differential pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay, i.e., “field personnel and
other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer, including those who are
engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for
performing work irrespective of time consumed in the performance thereof.” BUT that piece-rate workers
do not fall under this group.
(2) In Makati Haberdashery, Inc. vs. NRLC, (179 SCRA 448) on the other hand, piece-rate
workers are NOT entitled to holiday pay, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule IV, Book III.
The Supreme Court in said case reasoned that since piece-rate workers are not entitled
to service incentive leave pay, because they fall under one of the exceptions in Section 1(d),
Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules, they being “paid at a fixed amount for performing
work irrespective of time consumed,” for this same reason, thus, they are not entitled to
holiday pay as well.
HOWEVER,
In the case of Lambo vs. NLRC, [317 SCRA 421 (1999)] the Supreme Court recognized
that there are two categories of employees paid by results:
(1) those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer – where
an element of control and supervision over the manner work is to be performed, especially if
worker performs his work in the company premises; and
(2) those whose time and performance are unsupervised – the employer's control
is over the result of the work only.
. Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-rate payment
is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the company premises, while
payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry, such as
in sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify.
[Lambo vs. NLRC, supra at 426]
“Petitioners Lambo, et. al. belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees.”
However, the Court further held – “The awards for overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month
pay are in accordance with our finding that petitioners are regular employees” [ibid., at 431-
433] forgetting that Art. 82 excluded “workers who are paid by results” from the coverage of
Title I, Book III of the Labor Code – which includes “overtime work” (Art. 87) and “holiday pay”
(Art. 94).
In short, what the S.C. should have held is – Lambo, et. al. are employees, their work
being supervised (control); but they are not entitled to overtime pay and holiday pay due to Art.
82, Labor Code.
c) Grant of leave benefits in excess of what is provided here “shall NOT be subject of arbitration
or any court action”.
Convertible to cash.
d) V/L (as SIL) – are among those incomes intended as replacements for regular income that
depend on days worked. [Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez, 220
SCRA 197] The vacation leave privilege was not intended to serve as additional salary, but as
a non-monetary benefit. To give the employees the option not to consume it with the aim of
converting it into cash at the end of the year would defeat the very purpose of the vacation
leave. [PNCC Skyway, supra]
VSEV: This rule is proof that SIL does not have to depend on
authorized absences for an employee to be entitled
thereto.
e) Grant of V/L and S/L – is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of management. [Virginia
Sugue vs. Triumph Int’l. Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 164804, Jan. 30, 2009]
5.2.1. Coverage
5.2.3. Availment
The maternity benefits provided under this section shall be
paid only for the first
four (4) deliveries or miscarriages;
RA 8187 grants paternity leave of 7 days with full pay to all married male employees in the private
and public sectors. Paternity leave is available only for the first four deliveries of the legitimate spouse with
whom the husband is cohabiting. The purpose of paternity leave is to enable the husband to lend support
to his wife during the period of recovery and/or in the nursing of the newly-born child.
5.3.1. Coverage
5.3.3. Availment
RA 8972 grants a solo parent employee parental leave of not more than 7 working days every year.
5.4.1. Coverage
You are a parent left alone with the responsibility of parenthood because of the
death of your spouse.
You are a parent left alone with the responsibility of parenthood because of any
physical and/or mental incapacity of your spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner.
You are a parent left alone with the responsibility of parenthood because you have
legally separated from your spouse or because you have been separated for at least one
year and your child is in your custody.
You are a parent left alone with the responsibility of parenthood because your
marriage was annulled by a court or a church decree, and your child is in your custody.
You are a parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood because
your spouse abandoned you for at least one year.
5.4.3. Availment
Unused parental leave is not convertible to cash unless otherwise
provided in CBA.
5.5.1. Coverage
Leave available to an Employee (not only for women) who are victims of violence, either
physical, sexual or psychological.
A requirement to apply for the battered woman leave is a certification obtained from the Barangay
Captain or Kagawad or prosecutor or the clerk of court that an action based on R. A. 9262 has been
filed and is pending.
The use of the ten-day leave is at the option of the employee.
It shall be used for the days that she need to attend to medical and legal concerns.
Leaves not availed of are non-cumulative and not convertible to cash. Indeed, the battered woman
leave is useful for victims of violence. Lastly, this law is only applicable in the Philippines.
5.5.3. Availment
Leave of up to ten days in addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code, or other
laws.
6. Service Charges
6.1. Coverage
6.2. Exclusion
NOTES:
Tip, not normally part of salary, it being paid by customer [Ace Navigation Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 70]
6.3. Distribution
All service charges collected by Hotels, restaurants and similar establishments
shall be distributed at the rate of:
Supervisors – are considered as rank-and-file per Sec. 2, Rule VI, as they are not
managerial in Art. 212(M)
In case the service charge is abolished, the share of the covered employee shall be
considered integrated in their wages
6.4. Integration
AZUCENA:
Concept:
Benefit – a 13th month pay for employees whose salary was “not more than P1,000”.
Implementing Rules dated December 22, 1975 provided for who are covered vs. whose who
are not covered, issued by then Sec. Blas Ople.
c) Private school teachers – YES, regardless of months taught - Provided taught at least 1 month
Managerial employees are not entitled to 13th month pay as per Memorandum Order No. 88, “13th
month pay has mandatory effect only on all rank and file employees” [Serafin Quebec, Jr. vs. NLRC,
et al., G.R. No. 123184, January 22, 1999
“Where an employer pays less than 1/12 of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay the
difference. [Framanlis Farms, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor, G.R. Nos. 72616-17, March 8, 1989]
“Thus, if he worked only from January up to September, his proportionate 13 th month pay should be
equivalent to 1/12 of the total basic salary he earned during that period. [International School of Speech vs.
NLRC and M.C. Mamuyac, G.R. No. 112658, March 18, 1995]
“Difference on how to compute the 13th month pay does not justify a strike; in other words, it is a nonstrikeable
issue and a strike held on that ground is an illegal strike.
“If the commissions may properly be considered part of the basic salary, they should be included
in computing the 13th month pay. If the commissions are not integral part of the basic salary,
then they should be excluded. What commissions are part of the salary and what commissions
are not, are illustrated respectively in the Philippine Duplicators' and the Boie-Takeda's types of
- vs -
the 13th month pay of the bus drivers and conductors who are paid a fixed or guaranteed minimum
wage in case their commissions be less than the statutory minimum, and commission only in case
where the same is over and above the statutory minimum, must be equivalent to one-twelfth (1/12)
of their total earnings during the calendar year. [Phil. Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers
Union (PACIWU)-TUCP vs. NLRC and Vallacar Transit, Inc., G.R. No. 107994, August 14, 1995)]
But if the CBA did provide for a bonus in graduated amounts depending on the length of service of
the employee, the intention is clear that the bonus provided in the CBA was meant to be in addition
to the legal requirement. [Universal Corn Products vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 60337, August 21, 1987]
Ruling: The bonus under the CBA is an obligation by the contract between the management and
workers while the 13th month pay is mandated by law.
Under the circumstances, the 7-day bonus is in addition to the legal requirement.
But as it is, the provision for the continued payment of a year-end bonus was incorporated in the
CBA without any qualification, from which the only logical conclusion that could be derived is that
PAL intended to give the members of ALPAP a year-end bonus in addition to its obligation to grant
a thirteenth-month pay.” [Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) vs. NLRC & Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP), etc., G.R. No. 114280, July 26, 1996]
Rules:
Managerial employees are not entitled to 13th month pay as per Memorandum Order No. 88,
“13th month pay” has mandatory effect only on all rank and file employees”. [Serafin Quebec, Jr.
vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 123184, January 22, 1999]
Piece rate workers are entitled to 13th month pay [Mark Roche International and/or Edmundo
Dayot vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 123825, August 31, 1999].
Christmas gift is not christmas bonus, milling bonus, amelioration bonus, year-end productivity
bonus. It cannot therefore be considered as equivalent of 13 th month pay. [UST Faculty Union
vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 215, Oct. 2, 1990]
13th month pay and other similar benefits is an exclusion from the gross income,
provided it must not be more than P30,000.00. The Secrtary of Finance, however, may
increase the ceiling of P30,000.00, upon recommendation of the Commissioner, after
considering, among others, the effect or the same of the inflation rate at the end of the
taxable year. [Sec. 32(7), NIRC]
An employee who has been separated from service before the time for payment of
the 13th month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time he
worked during the year, reckoned from the time he started working during the calendar
year up to the time of his separation. [Basay vs. Hacienda Consolacion, G.R. No.
175532, April 19, 2010, Del Castillo, J.]
8. Women Workers
Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided
in this Article or any violation of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to
Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this
Code: Provided, That the institution of any criminal action under this provision
shall not bar the aggrieved employee from filing an entirely separate and distinct
action for money claims, which may include claims for damages and other
affirmative reliefs. The actions hereby authorized shall proceed independently of
each other. (As amended by Republic Act No. 6725, May 12, 1989)
The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's sexually
but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry “foul” provided
the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is
expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the
needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee [Philippine Aeolus
Automotive United Corp., et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000, Second Division,
Bellosillo, J.]
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment
as defined in the law, or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without
which it would not have been committed, shall also be held liable under the law.
committed when:
(1) the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring, or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
(2) the above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) the above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee. [Section 3 (a), Republic Act No. 7877]
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and
normal development of the child;
(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation
or discrimination taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and
the duration and arrangement of working time; and
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval
and supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for training and
skills acquisition of the child.
In the above-exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the
employer shall first secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the
Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirements.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall apply to all persons
under eighteen (18) years of age."
(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be allowed to work between
eight o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning of the following day and
no child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall be allowed to work
between ten o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning of the following
day."
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and
normal development of the child;
(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation
or discrimination taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and
the duration and arrangement of working time; and
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval
and supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for training and
skills acquisition of the child.
Art. 141. Coverage. This Chapter shall apply to all persons rendering
services in households for compensation.
10.1. Definition
10.3. Termination
a. Definition
DO No. 5
Regulations on Employment of Homeworkers
SEC. 2. Definitions.—
(a) “Industrial Homework” is a system of production under which
work for an employer or contractor is carried out by a homeworker at his/her
RA 7796
TESDA
CASES:
The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship
agreement with an employer. One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special Workers)
of the Labor Code is to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices. [Century
Canning Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152894, August 17, 2007]
HOWEVER,
In order to be an apprentice, the apprenticeship program the worker agreed to undergo should first
be approved by the DOLE (now transferred to TESDA) before he can be hired as an apprentice. Otherwise,
the person hired will be considered a regular employee. [Century Canning Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, supra]
BUT,
A prior approval obtained from DOLE (now transferred to TESDA) is a preliminary step towards its
final approval. Thus, pending final approval of the apprenticeship program upon a person’s assumption of
work does not instantaneously give rise to employer-employee relationship. [Century Canning Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, supra]
Republic Act No. 7796, which created TESDA, has transferred the authority over
apprenticeship of the DOLE to the TESDA. RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of
the apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. [Century
Canning Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra]
The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of apprentices was
further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004 xxx,
which provides the guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of the
government, [and which] specifically states that no enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its
While the employer may argue that there is a need to train its employees through
apprenticeship, this phase should not be more than six months, and upon expiration of the
agreement, the retention of the employees for all intents and purposes, makes them regular
employees. A second apprenticeship for a second skill not mentioned in the apprenticeship
agreement is a violation of the Labor Code. [Atlanta Industries, supra]
APPRENTICESHIP LEARNERSHIP
Period of training not to exceed six months [Art. 61, Not to exceed three (3) months
LC] [Art. 75, LC]
Type of Work Highly technical work in an Industry Semi-skilled and other Industrial
[Art. 60, LC] work [Art. 73, LC]
Qualifications At least 14 years of age with When no experienced worker is
vocational aptitude and capacity, and available in the industry [Art. 74,
ability to comprehend and follow oral LC]
and written instructions [Art. 59, LC]
Salary Not less than 75% of applicable Not less than 75% of applicable
minimum wage, [Art. 61, LC] minimum wage, [Art. 75, LC]
EXCEPT if training is required by the EXCEPT for learners in piecework,
school or training program, or where salary shall be paid in
requisite for graduation or board according to the minimum wage
examination. [Art. 72, LC] imposed. [Art. 76, LC]
Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, these terms are
defined as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different
abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an
activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being;
Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, these terms are
defined as follows:
NOTES;
1. Employer-Employee Relationship
EMPLOYER
Art. 212(e), LC Includes any persons acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly.
Excludes “labor organization” or any of its officers or agents
Except,
when acting as an employer.
Art. 97(b) Includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee. [cf. Art. 106, LC]
Includes the government and all its branches, subdivision and
instrumentalities, all GOCCs, as well as non-profit private
institutions, or organizations.
EMPLOYEE
Art. 212(f) Includes any person in the employ of an employer.
Includes any individual whose work has ceased as a result or
in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any
ULP if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent
and regular employment.
EER is basically a question of fact. [127 SCRA 454 (1984); Traders Royal
Bank vs. NLRC, 321 SCRA 467 (1999); Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. vs. Andales,
G.R. No. 159668, March 7, 2008; TAPE, Inc. vs. Servaña, G.R. No. 167648, January
28, 2008]
EXCEPT in,
(1) Article 106 - labor-only contracting [Filsystems vs. NLRC,
418 SCRA 404 (2003)];
(2) Article 138 - Massage/GRO;
(3) Article 155 - Homeworkers
Selection/Hiring
Payment of Wages
BUT,
A salesman who is paid 3% commission of his gross sales is not an
employee, even if commission is part of wage under Art. 97(f). Commission
as a form of remuneration, may be availed of by both an employee or non-
employee. [Abante vs. La Madrid Bearing Parts Corp., May 28, 2004]
BUT,
An insurance agent who is paid with salary plus commission is an
employee. [Grepalife vs. Judico, December 21, 1989]
BUT,
An insurance agent who does not have any license to work as an insurance
agent is NOT an employee. [Grepalife vs. NLRC, 150 SCRA 601, 608
(1987)]
STILL,
absence of license should not be considered a legal obstacle as what applies
here is the Labor Code, and not the Insurance Code. [Grepalife vs. NLRC,
187 SCRA 694 (1990)]
Dismissal
The allegation that a person was legally dismissed for abandonment admits
of a fact that said person was an employee. [R. Transport vs. Ejandra,
supra] Likewise, an allegation that the employee's position was found
redundant to justify his dismissal, notwithstanding the employer allegation
of a valid job contracting. [Fulache, supra]
On the other hand, direct application for employment to the principal upon
the termination of the service contract between the alleged employer and
the principal, clearly shows that employment relationship exists between the
employees and the job contractor. [S.I.P. Food House, et al. vs. Batolina,
et al., G.R. No. 192473, October 11, 2010, Brion, J.]
Control
Among the 4 principal tests used in the determination of an EER, the so-
called control test is commonly regarded as the most crucial and
determinative indicator. Such element is present where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the
end achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching
that end. [Abante vs. La Madrid, supra]
BUT,
Not every form of control that the hiring party reserves to himself over the
conduct of the party hire in relation to the services rendered maybe
accorded the effect of establishing an EER.
Company rules designed to promote the result create no EER
NOTE:
The Grepalife case wherein the agent brothers appointed as zone supervisor and
district manager were considered as “employees” of Grepalife, because of the presence of
the element of control in their contract of engagement, a fact which is not attendant in the
Tongko case. The Insular Life case is neither in point, since in the Tongko case no other
contract was presented apart from the “Agency Agreement” executed at the beginning of
engagement, and was never superseded by any other agreement even when the
complainant became an area manager of Manulife. [Tongko, June 2010, supra]
In Justice Velasco's dissenting opinion, he opined thus: “the mere fact that no
management contract (as in Insular Life case) was reduced into writing does not make
the duties and undertaking performed by a branch manager still within the sphere of
the 'Agency Agreement'.”
Secondary Tests:
SSS registration as employee. [Flores vs. Funeraria Nuestro, 160 SCRA 568; Bautista
vs. Inciong, 158 SCRA 665; Corporal vs. NLRC, 341 SCRA 658 (2000)].
“A company physician who billed professional fees every month, who never complained “since
1981” that he was not covered by SSS, who was subjected to 10% withholding tax not as
employee but as “professional fee”, whose relationship is terminable at will by either parties, and
who was not subjected to control of company – is NOT an employee.” [Phil. Global
Communications, Inc. vs. Ricardo de Vera, G.R. No. 157214, June 7, 2005]
Payment of ECC (State Insurance Fund) under Arts. 168, Labor Code, which is
“compulsory upon all employers and their employees not over sixty (60) years of age” [also,
Art. 183(a), L.C.; in fact 183 (c) of L.C. Requires the employer to pay the employee
contribution].
Pag-Ibig Fund
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, one of the
requirements for the issuance of an employment permit is an employment
contract. (Section 5, Rule XIV) [Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. vs.
ID cards, even with “employee's name”, if used on to obtain entrance. [Lopez vs.
Bodega City, 532 SCRA 56 (2007)]
CASES:
If the parties themselves practically agreed on every terms and conditions of the worker’s
services in the company, it negates the element of control in their relationship, and thereby
negating the existence of EER. [Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. de Vera, G.R.
No. 157214, June 7, 2005, Garcia, J.]
Article 157 of the Labor Code clearly and unequivocally allows employers in non-
hazardous establishments to engage ‘on retained basis’ the service of a dentist or physician.
Nowhere does the law provide that the physician or dentist so engaged thereby becomes a
regular employee. The very phrase that they may be engaged ‘on retained basis’, revolts
against the idea that this engagement gives rise to an employer-employee relationship.
[Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. de Vera, G.R. No. 157214, June 7, 2005,
Garcia, J.]
It is a standard stipulation in security service agreements that the client may request the
replacement of the guards to it. Service-oriented enterprises [Manila Electric Company vs.
Benamira, et al., G.R. No. 145271, July 14, 2005, Austria-Martinez, J.]
An employee occupies no office and generally is employed not by the action of the
directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines
the compensation to be paid to such employee. [Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. vs.
King, G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005, Corona, J.]
Where a person who works for another performs his job more or less at his own pleasure,
in the manner he sees fit, not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is
compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, no employer-
employee relationship exists. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economic reality in
analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of applying the Labor Code ought
to be the economic dependence of the worker on his employer. [Wilhelmina S. Orozco vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and Leticia Jimenez
Magsanoc, G.R. No. 155207, August 13, 2008]
Definition
PROBATIONARY Refers to one who, for a given period of time, is being observed
EMPLOYEE and evaluated to determine whether he is qualified for permanent
employment. [Woodridge School vs. Pe Benito, 570 SCRA 164,
October 29, 2008]
Rules
Period of Probation
While there is no statutory cap on the minimum term of probation, the law sets a
maximum “trial period” during which the employer may test the fitness and efficiency of
It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term
of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference
that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary period. [Magis Young
Achievers' vs. Manalo, supra]
Nature of Probation
The employee knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and
his performance of his assigned duties and functions would be under continuous
scrutiny by his superiors. [Philippine Daily Inquirer vs. Magtibay, Jr., supra]
Standards under which a probationary employee will qualify as a regular employee
shall be made known to him “at the time of engagement”. Otherwise, he shall be
deemed a regular employee. [Clarion Printing House, Inc. vs. NLRC, 461 SCRA
272, 298-95 (2005)]
Evaluation is made before expiration of the probationary period. [Alcira vs. NLRC,
supra] In the absence of any evaluation, one cannot conclude that the employee
failed to meet the standards for probationary employment. [Dusit Hotel Nikko vs.
Gatbonton, 489 SCRA 671, 677 (2006)] And when he is allowed to work after a
probationary period, he shall be considered regular. [Art. 281, LC cited in Philippine
National Bank vs. Cabansag, 460 SCRA 514 (2005)]
HOWEVER,
In the case of PAL vs. Pascua, regularization is NOT a management prerogative. The
employer cannot just put its employees in part-time regularization instead of full-time
regularization, especially if only full-time regular employees are covered by CBA and
entitled to its benefits. [PAL vs. Pascua, G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003,
Quisumbing, J.]
NOTES:
(1) regular employees or those whose work is necessary or desirable to the usual
business of the employer;
(2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee,
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season; and
(3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees. [Rowell
Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 691, March 7, 2007, citing
Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, 12 July 2004, 434 SCRA
159, 169; Pedy Caseres, et al. vs. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp., et al.,
G.R. No. 159343, September 28, 2007; Glory Philippines, Inc. vs.
Buenaventura B. Vergara, G.R. No. 176627, August 24, 2007]
Regular Employment
Regular employees may be classified into: (1) regular employees by nature of work;
and (2) regular employees by years of service. [Rowell Industrial Corporation vs. CA, supra]
By years of service:
A casual employee who has rendered at least one (1) year of service,
whether continuous or broken is a regular employee. The status of regular
employment under this category attaches to the casual worker on the day
immediately after the end of his first year of service as such casual employee. [Kay
Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 464 SCRA 544 (July 28, 2005)] He shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. [Kasapian
ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola (Kasamma-CCO)-CFW Local 245
vs. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 487, 508 (2006)]
Article 281 of the Labor Code also considers a regular employee as one who is allowed
to work after a probationary period. [Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc., et al.
versus Jeff B. Boclot, G.R. No. 173849, September 28, 2007]
If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance
is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
Example:
Length of service provides a fair yardstick for determining when an employee initially
hired on a temporary basis becomes a permanent one, entitled to security and benefits
of regularization. [William Uy Construction Corp. vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. 183250,
March 10, 2010, Abad, J.]
By nature of work
Employee performs work that is usually necessary and desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. [Caparoso vs. CA, 516 SCRA 30 (February
15, 2007)] The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the
work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade
in its entirety. [Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc., et al. versus Jeff
B. Boclot, G.R. No. 173849, September 28, 2007]
Examples:
Issuance of a regular appointment is not necessary. [Efren Paguio vs. NRLC, G.R.
No. 147816, May 9, 2003]
Article 280 should not be interpreted as a way as to deprive employers of the right and
prerogative to choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an
employee a regular status. Management has rights which should also be protected.
[Rowell Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 691 (March 7,
2007)]
Employee performs work that is usually necessary and desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer. [Caparoso vs. CA, 516 SCRA 30 (February 15, 2007)] The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. [Pier 8 Arrastre
& Stevedoring Services, Inc., et al. versus Jeff B. Boclot, G.R. No. 173849,
September 28, 2007]
A continuing need for respondents' services is sufficient evidence of the necessity and
indispensability of their services to petitioner's business. [Glory Philippines, Inc. vs.
Vergara, G.R. No. 176627, August 24, 2007] Necessity or desirability is tied up to
employer's “usual business”. [Magsalin vs. NOWM, G.R. No. 148492, May 9, 2003]
What determines whether a certain employment is regular or otherwise is not the will
or word of the employer, but the business, taking into account all the circumstances,
and in some cases the length of time of its performance and its continued existence.
[ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 164156, September
26, 2006]
(a) Whether one is assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and
scope of which are specified at the time of engagement for a project.
(b) Duration of work to be performed must be defined in the employment contract, and
(c) Terms and conditions of employment must be made clear to the employee at the time
of hiring. [Abesco Construction and Development Corp. vs. Alberto Ramirez, April
10, 2006; Dacuital, et al., supra; Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees
Union-ALU-TUCP vs. PNOC-EDC, G.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011, Nachura, J.]
(1) Employees drawn from a “work pool” are not necessarily employees “by
(2) Manual services or those for special skills like those of carpenters or
masons, are, as a rule, unschooled. But this fact alone is not a valid
reason for bestowing special treatment on them or for invalidating a
contract of employment. [Villa vs. NLRC, 284 SCRA 105, (1998)]
(3) Employees who are hired for carrying out a separate job, distinct from the
other undertakings of the company, the scope and duration of which has
been determined and made known to the employees at the time of the
employment, are properly treated as project employees. [Hanjin Heavy
Industries and Construction Co., Ltd., Hak Kon Kim and/or Jhunie
Adahar versus Felicito Ibañez, et al., G.R. No. 170181, June 26, 2008]
(4) The length of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of
employment tenure, but whether or not the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. [PNOC-
Energy Development Corporation versus NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
169353, April 13, 2007]
(6) The absence of a written contract does not by itself grant regular status
to respondents, but is evidence that respondents were informed of the
duration and scope of their work and their status as project employees.
[Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd., vs. Felicito
Ibañez, et al., supra]
(7) When a project employee is dismissed, such dismissal must still comply
with the substantive and procedural requirements of due process.
Employers who hire project employees are mandated to state and prove
the actual basis for the employee's dismissal once its veracity is
challenged. [Gregorio S. Saberola vs. Ronald Suarez and Raymundo
Lirasan, Jr., G.R. No. 151227, July 14, 2008]
In the case of Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC, the farm workers, after performing their
designated task in the farm or at the end of the season for which they were hired,
their employment relationship with the company is considered severed, and are
free to look for work from other farms, are considered as seasonal workers under
Art. 280 of the Labor Code. [HIND SUGAR CO., INC. vs. HON. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., G.R. No. L-13364 July 26, 1960, 108 Phil
1026]
And if the employer give preference to its former employees and laborers in hiring
workers every season, as in workers in a “work pool”, they should be considered
as “regular seasonal workers” insofar as the effect of temporary cessation of
work is concerned. These workers, however, “do not receive salaries and are free
to seek other employment during temporary breaks in the business. [Integrated
Contractors & Plumbing Works, Inc. vs. NLRC, August 9, 2005]
BUT,
In a case where the employer failed to prove that its farm workers worked only for
the duration of one particular season, but have been serving the employer for
several years already, these farm workers should be regarded as regular — not
seasonal — employees. [Hacienda Fatima, et al. vs. National Federation of
casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees.
[Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, 12 July 2004, 434
SCRA 159, 169]
Fixed-Term Employment
Some workers perform tasks which are necessary or desirable “without being hired as
an employee” (such as an independent contractor) [Philippine Global
Communications, Inc. vs. De Vera, supra] In fact, Article 280 does not proscribe or
prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period, [Rowell Industrial Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 691 (March 7, 2007)] provided it is not intended to
circumvent the employee's security of tenure. [Labayog vs. M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc.,
494 SCRA 486, 491 (2006); Caparoso vs. Court of Appeals, 516 SCRA 30 (2007)]
(1) that the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating
his consent; [E. Ganzon, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 123769, December 22,
1999]
(2) it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former on the latter. [Rowell Industrial Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 517 SCRA 691 (March 7, 2007), citing PNOC-EDC vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 97747, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 695, 699; Caparoso vs. Court of Appeals,
516 SCRA 30 (February 15, 2007)]
(3) Stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions should not be contrary to law,
NOTE:
The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only contractor unless such contractor overcomes
the burden of proving that it has substantial capital, investment, tools and the like. [7k Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 148490, November 22, 2006; Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. Alan M. Agito, et al.,
G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009]
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of
his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the
extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
Labor-only contracting would give rise to: (1) the creation of an employer-employee
relationship between the principal and the employees of the contractor or sub-
contractor; and (2) the solidary liability of the principal and the contractor to the
employees in the event of any violation of the Labor Code. [Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils., Inc. vs. Alan M. Agito, et al., supra]
2. Termination of Employment
Labor Code
NOTES:
Security of tenure is a paramount right of every employee that is held sacred by the
constitutional guarantees as an act of social justice. The right of every employee to security of
tenure is all the more secured by the Labor Code by providing that the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee, except for a just cause or when authorized by law. [Julito Sagales vs.
Rustan’s Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 166554, November 27, 2008] However, in the case
of private school teachers, their entitlement to security of tenure is governed by the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code. [Aklan College Incorporated vs. Rodolfo
P. Guarino, G.R. No. 152949, August 14, 2007]
WILLFUL
DISOBEDIENCE
i. Requisites
(3) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer. [Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
124617, April 28, 2000; Premiere Development vs. Mantal, supra; Solid
Development Corporation Workers Association vs. Solid Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 165995, August 14, 2007]
(b) the order violated must have been reasonable and lawful, made known to the employee,
and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge. [Westin Philippine Plaza
Hotel vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121621, May 3, 1999, Quisumbing, J.; Cosmos Bottling Corporation
vs. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008]
HABITUAL The repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time.
NEGLECT [Chua vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 146780, March 11, 2005 citing JEB
& Associates vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 457 (1996)]
i. Requisites
Habitual Neglect
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect by the employee of
his duties is a sufficient and legal ground to terminate employment. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated
failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
[Carlos V. Valenzuela vs. Caltex Philippines, Inc., G.R. Nos. 169965-66, December 15,
2010, Villarama, Jr., J.] In dismissing an employee for gross and habitual neglect of duties,
the employer must be able to identify what specific duties the employee violated and whether
the violations were gross and habitual. [Benjamin vs. Amellar Corporation, G.R. No.
183383, April 5, 2010, Carpio Morales, J.]
Absenteeism
While management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers, pursuant to company rules and regulations, however,
such management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws and valid agreements. Nevertheless, it may terminate an
employee only for a just cause, his prerogative to dismiss must be exercised without abuse
of discretion. Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding.
[Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Joey B. Teves, G.R. No. 143511,
November 15, 2010, Peralta, J.]
BUT,
Loss of trust and confidence can be based on gross
negligence [School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City vs.
Taguiam, G.R. No. 165565, July 14, 2008]
Rationale
The basic premise for dismissal on this ground is that the employee concerned holds
a position of trust. [Cañeda vs. PAL, G.R. No. 152232, February 26, 2007] An employer
cannot be compelled to continue the employment of an employee who is guilty of acts inimical
to the interest of the employer and which justifies the loss of confidence in the employee.
[Philippine Military Veterans Security and Investigation Agency vs. CA, G.R. No.
139159, January 31, 2006; Divine Word College of San Jose vs. Aurelio, G.R. No.
163706, March 29, 2007]
Loss of trust and confidence is premised on the fact that an employee concerned
holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity
to duty is correspondingly expected. This includes managerial personnel entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, such as custody, handling or care and protection of the
employer's property. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an
i. Requisites
(1) There must be an actual breach; [Salas vs. Aboitiz One, Inc, G.R. NO.
178236, June 27, 2008]
(3) It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal,
improper, or unjustified;
(5) It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken
in bad faith; [Tolentino vs. PLDT, G.R. No. 160404, June 8, 2005; Weh
Yueh Restaurant vs. Jayona, G.R. No. 159448, December 16, 2005;
Perez vs. PT&T, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009]
(6) The employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence [Molina
vs. Pacific Plans, Inc., G.R. No. 165476, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA
498]
(7) proof beyond reasonable doubt need not be established to prove loss of
trust and confidence, as reasonable ground is enough. [P.J. Lhuillier, Inc.
vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158758, April 29, 2005; Norsk Hydro (Phils.), Inc.
vs. Rosales, Jr., G.R. No. 162871, January 31, 2007]
(9) breach of trust and confidence as ground for dismissal must be related to
the performance of the duties of the employee such as would show
unfitness to continue working for the employer. [Blue Dairy Corp. vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 129843, September 14, 1999; Rentokil (Initial)
Philippines vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 176219, December 23, 2008]
Elements of Abandonment
3. employer should have reported such fact to the nearest Regional Office of DOLE in
accordance with Rule XXIII, Section 7, Book V, DO 9-97 [R. Transport Corporation vs.
Ejandra, G.R. No. 155264, May 6, 2005] The operative act that will ultimately put an end
to this relationship is the dismissal of the employee after complying with the procedure
BUT,
If employer alleges that employee was never even dismissed, the presumption
does not hold. [Abad vs. Roselle Cinema, 485 SCRA 262, 272 (2006)]
BECAUSE,
Sometimes the complaint for illegal dismissal is only made as leverage to gain
monetary benefits. [Arc-Men Food Industries Corp. vs. NLRC, May 7, 1997]
THUS,
The rule is that an employee must positively prove first that he was indeed
dismissed before the burden of the employer under Article 277(b) applies.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the
union security clause in the CBA. [Alabang Country Club, Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
170287, February 14, 2008]
The rights of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to
reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his
own union are not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a
collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a
company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which
could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and hence
dismissal from his job. [General Milling Corporation vs. Casio, et al. and Pino, et al.,
G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010, Leonardo-de Castro, J.]
The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period
of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring
employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken singly and separately.
Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of
aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While
it may be true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this does not and
should not mean that his employment record would be wiped clean of his infractions. After
all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that
should be meted out since an employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be
taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions
Definitions
(1) Due to business losses or reverses; and NOT due to losses [JAT General Services
vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 148340, January 26, 2004, Quisumbing, J.]
(2) Closure or cessation of business operations is allowed even if the business is not
undergoing economic losses. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no
law can compel anybody to continue in it. It would be stretching the intent and spirit
of the law if we were to unjustly interfere with the management’s prerogative to close
or cease its business operations, just because said business operations are not
suffering any loss or simply to provide the worker’s continued employment. [Manatad
vs. PT&T, supra; Espina vs. CA, G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007]
NOTES:
Mere failure to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure
does not amount to a patently unlawful act. [Carag vs. NLRC, 520 SCRA 25 (2007)] A
written notice that is short of the 30 days prior to notice rule will constitute substantial
compliance if the period not covered is compensated even if unworked. [Kasapian ng
Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola vs. CA, 487 SCRA 487, 510-11 (2006), citing
Serrano vs. NLRC, 331 SCRA 331 (2000)]
Where retrenchment undertaken by the employer is bona fide, the same will not be
invalidated for its failure to serve prior notice on the employees and the DOLE. The employer
shall only be liable to pay nominal damages at a reasonable rate of P50,000.00 for each
employee. [Eastridge Golf Club, Inc., supra]
The amount of separation pay must be computed from the time the employee
commenced employment until the cessation of operations of the employer’s business.
[JAT General Services vs. NLRC, supra]
Under Sec. 10, Rule I, Book VI, Omnibus Rules, the computation of termination pay
of an employee under Art. 283 shall be based on his latest salary rate, unless the
same was reduced by the employer to defeat the intention of the Code, in which case,
the basis of computation shall be the rate before its deduction.
BUT,
Car and insurance benefits should not be included in the computation of separation
pay as they are benefits granted only during the course of employment. [Dr. Pedrito
F. Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. 154448, August 15, 2003, Ynares-Santiago, J.]
(1) good faith on the part of the employer in abolishing the redundant position; and
fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant, and accordingly abolished. [AMA Computer College vs. Garcia, G.R.
No. 166703, April 14, 2008]
(a) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven;
(b) written notice to the employees and to DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment;
(c) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. [AMA Computer
College, Inc. vs. Garcia, supra; Manatad vs. PT&T, G.R. No. 172363, March 7,
2008; TPI Philippines Cement Corp vs. Cajucom VIII, 483 SCRA 494, 502-03
(2006)]
(d) the employer exercised its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and
(f) the employer must first exhaust all other means to avoid further losses without
retrenching its employees. [FASAP vs. PAL, G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008]
(a) the closure/cessation of business is bona fide – its purpose is to advance the
interest of the employer and not to defeat or circumvent the rights of employees
under the law or a valid agreement;
(b) a written notice was served on the employees and the DOLE at least one month
before the intended date of closure/cessation of business; and
(c) IN CASE OF CLOSURE NOT DUE TO FINANCIAL LOSSES, that the employees
affected have been give separation pay equivalent to ½ month pay for every year
of service or one month pay, whichever is higher. [Eastridge Golf Club, Inc.,
supra]
Redundancy
The ground of redundancy does not require the exhibition of proof of losses or
imminent losses. [Coats Manila Bay, Inc. vs. Ortega, supra]
Adequate, credible and persuasive evidence of dire financial straits from drastic
business losses must be presented by the employer. [Filipinas (Pre-Fabricated
Bldg.) Systems “Filsystems”, Inc. vs. Gatlabayan, 487 SCRA 673 (2006)]
Although when the law uses the phrase “retrenchment to prevent losses”, it simply
means that the employer may retrench “before the losses anticipated are actually
sustained or realized. [TPI Philippines Cement Corp. vs. Cajucom VII, supra]
BUT,
Financial statements that will show the financial condition of the company are pieces
of evidence that may justify, among others, the enforcement of its retrenchment
program. [Bernadeth Londonio, et al. vs. Bio Research, Inc., et al.,G.R. No.
191459, January 17, 2011, Carpio Morales, J.] Financial statements must be
prepared and signed by independent auditors, otherwise, they may be assailed as
self-serving. [FASAP vs. PAL, supra]
i. Requisites
(b) A certification from a competent public authority that the disease of the employee
is incurable within a period of 6 months even with proper treatment. [Duterte vs.
Kingswood Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160325, October 4, 2007]
(c) Payment of separation pay of one (1) month salary or one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, whichever is higher, and a fraction of at least 6 months
is considered as one (1) year. [Crayons Processing, Inc. vs. Pula, G.R. No.
167727, July 30, 2007]
The law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of
employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.
Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for
legal justification for dismissing employees. [Century Canning Corporation, et al. vs.
Vicente Randy R. Ramil, G.R. No. 171630, August 8, 2010, Peralta, J.]
The employer is bound to furnish the employee concerned with two (2) written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected. One is the notice
apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought
– and this may loosely be considered as the proper charge. The other is the notice
informing the employee of the management's decision to sever his employment. However,
the decision must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt
of the first notice within which to answer the charge. The requirement of notice is not a
mere technicality but a requirement of due process to which every employee is entitled.
[Erector Advertising Sign Group, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 167218, July 2, 2010,
Peralta, J.]
This rule applies also to seafarers on board a vessel. However, under paragraph
D, Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, the Ship Master is
excused from furnishing a seafarer with the required notice of dismissal if doing so
will prejudice the safety of the crew and the vessel, as in cases of mutiny. BUT just
the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by
substantial evidence of the findings. [NFD International Manning Agents vs. NLRC,
G.R. No. 165389, October 17, 2008]
REMEMBER,
Article 277(b) recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction
as to the cause of their termination, thus, none should be construed. [Suico vs. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 146762, 153584, 163793, January 30, 2007]
Under Article 264, union officers, while terminable for knowingly participating in an
illegal strike are, “as in other termination cases”, entitled to the due process protection
under Art. 277(b) of the Labor Code. Nothing in Art. 264 authorizes an immediate dismissal
of a union officer for participating in an illegal strike. The act of dismissal is not intended
to happen ipso facto, but rather as an option that can be exercised by the employer and
after compliance with the notice requirements for terminating an employee. [Stanford
Marketing Corp. vs. Julian, G.R. No. 145496, February 24, 2004]
BUT,
In Biflex vs. Filflex Industrial, the Supreme Court held that dismissals under
Article 264 can be immediately resorted to, as an exercise of management prerogative.
[Biflex vs. Filflex Industrial, G.R. No. 155679, December 19, 2006]
BUT,
It is not enough for an employer to allege in the first written notice to the employee
“acts of non-compliance” without any specificity, as such allegation is too general
and can encompass just about any malfeasance. The employer must make a
detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that would serve as bases to
terminate the employee which in turn will allow the latter to explain his side and
why he should not be dismissed. [Benjamin vs. Amellar Corporation, G.R. No.
183383, April 5, 2010, Carpio Morales, J.]
ALSO,
The mere fact that the notices were sent to respondents after the filing of the labor
complaint does not, by itself, establish that the same was a mere afterthought. The
surrounding circumstances of this case adequately explain why the requirements
of procedural due process were satisfied only after the filing of the labor
complaint. [New Puerto Commercial, et al. vs. Rodel Lopez, et al., G.R.
No. 169999, July 26, 2010, Del Castillo, J.]
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of procedural due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal or ineffectual. The employer should, however,
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, such as when the
management did not follow or exhaust the grievance procedure under the employment
contract prior to dismissal. [DMA Shipping Philippines, Inc. vs. Henry Cabillor, G.R. No.
155389, February 28, 2005; Philemploy Serices and Resources vs. Rodriguez, 486
SCRA 302, 317 (2006)] The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the
abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay later” scheme, and should depend on the facts of
each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the
employer. [Agabon, vs. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573, 616-17 (2004); LBC Domestic Franchise
Co. vs. Florido, G.R. No. 162577, August 17, 2007]
The indemnity shall be in the form of nominal damages, which the Supreme Court
fixed at a rate of P30,000.00 per employee. [Agabon vs. NLRC, supra]
BUT,
Where the dismissal is based on an authorized cause, the sanction should be stiff
as the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative. Several factors are taken into account:
(1) the authorized cause invoked, whether it was a retrenchment or a closure or
cessation of operation of the establishment due to serious business losses or financial
reverses or otherwise;
(2) the number of employees to be awarded;
(3) the capacity of the employers to satisfy the awards, taken into account their
prevailing financial status as borne by the records; and
(4) whether there was a bona fide attempt to comply with the notice requirements as
opposed to giving no notice at all. [Talam vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 175040, April 6, 2010,
Brion, J., citing Jaka Food Processing]
Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been
removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had
occupied prior to his dismissal. It presupposes that the previous position form
which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which
is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by
the employee. [Pfizer, Inc., et al. vs. Geraldine Velasco, G.R. No. 177467,
March 9, 2011, Leonardo-de Castro, J.]
BUT,
An alien seeking relief from an illegal dismissal is entitled to reinstatement and
backwages only if he has an employment permit before he may be allowed to resume his
employment in the Philippines. [WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. vs. Galera, G.R.
Nos. 169207 and 169239, March 29, 2010, Carpio, J.]
i. Actual reinstatement
After the Labor Arbiter's decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee
may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in
enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the
employer, provided: (1) there must be an actual delay; and (2) the delay must not
be due to the employer's unjustified act or omission. Otherwise, the employer may
still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor
Arbiter's decision. [Islriz Trading/Victor Hugo Lu vs. Efren Capada, et al., G.R.
No. 168501, January 31, 2011, Del Castillo, J.]
Refund Doctrine
If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for
dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement
to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the
accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing
laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was
reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation
received for actual services rendered without need of refund. [Marilou S. Genuino versus NLRC and
Citibank, N.A., et al. versus NLRC, G.R. No. 142732-33, December 4, 2007]
BUT,
Prior to Genuino v. NLRC, there had been no known similar case containing a dispositive portion
where the employee was required to refund the salaries received on payroll reinstatement. In fact, in a
catena of cases, the Court did not order the refund of salaries garnished or received by payroll-reinstated
employees despite a subsequent reversal of the reinstatement order. [Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009, Carpio Morales, J.]
The Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either
re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate
them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the
employee's salaries. [Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra]
After the labor arbiter's decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from
collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was
without fault on the part of the employer – that is: (1) there must be actual delay; (2) the delay must not be
due to the employer's unjustified act or omission – otherwise, the employer may still be required to pay the
salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision. [Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
supra]
Where reinstatement is not feasible, expedient or practical, as where reinstatement would only
exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or where the relationship between the
employer and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable differences, particularly
where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, it would be
more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement. [Johnson & Johnson (Phils.),
Inc., et al. vs. Johnson Office & Sales Union-Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et al., G.R. No.
172799, July 6, 2007]
BUT,
The principle of “strained relations” cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise,
Payment of separation pay as a substitute for reinstatement is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances, viz.: (1) when reasons exist which are not attributable to the fault or are beyond the control
of the employer, such as when employer closes business; (2) when he illegally dismissed employee has
contracted a disease and his reinstatement will endanger the safety of his co-employees; or (3) where a
strained relationship exists between the employer and the dismissed employee. [Composite Enterprises,
Inc. vs. Caparoso, G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007]
Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may
be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity as a measure of social justice
only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct
or those reflecting on his moral character. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. [Tirazona vs. Philippine EDS Techno-
Service Inc. (PET Inc.), G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009; Yrasuegui vs. PAL, G.R. No. 168081,
October 17, 2008]
(c) Computation
Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed “up to the finality of (the)
decision” [Phil. Military Veterans Security & Investigation Agency vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 139159, January 31, 2006]
2.3.3. Backwages
HOWEVER,
If the dismissal was due to cessation of business operations, backwages is not to be
computed beyond the closure of operations, as it is confiscatory. [Retuya vs. Dumarpa, G.R.
No. 148848, August 5, 2003] Likewise, an employer cannot be compelled to continuously pay
an employee who can no longer perform the tasks for which he was hired. Otherwise, it would
be the height of injustice to still require the employer to pay the employee full backwages from
the time of his termination until finality of the decision. [Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Race, G.R. No.
164820, December 8, 2008]
AND,
An employee who was dismissed on the ground of AWOL due to incarceration, is
entitled to reinstatement, and under the principle of “no work, no pay”, his full backwages shall
only commence from the time he is refused work after acquittal. [Standard Electric
Manufacturing Corporation vs. Standard Electric Employees Union-NAFLU-KMU, G.R.
No. 166111, August 25, 2005]
The computation of backwages should be based on the salary the employee was
receiving at the time of his dismissal. [Palmeria, Sr. vs. NLRC, 247 SCRA 57, 63 (1995)]
Annual general increases in basic salary are NOT included in the computation of full backwages
as they are neither allowance nor benefit. Allowances and benefits are granted to the employee
apart from, and in addition to, the wage or salary. [Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Sadac, 490
SCRA 380, 409 (2006); Davao Free Worker Front vs. CIR, 67 SCRA 418; Capital Garments
Corp. vs. Ople, 117 SCRA 473; Durabuilt Recapping Plant & Company vs. NLRC, 152
Yardsticks in the computation of the final amount of liability in Illegal Dismissal Cases
(1) Employees who have been re-employed without loss of seniority rights shall be
paid backwages but only up to actual reinstatement;
(2) Employees who have been re-employed as new hires shall be restored their
seniority and other preferential rights. However, their backwages shall be
computed only to date of actual re-hiring;
(3) Employees who have reached compulsory age of retirement shall receive
backwages up to their only. The same is true as regards the heirs of those who
have passed away;
(4) Employees who have not been re-employed, plus those who have executed
quitclaims and received separation pay or financial assistance, shall be reinstated
without loss of seniority rights, and paid full backwages, after deduction of whatever
amounts already received; and
(5) Employees who had obtained substantially equivalent or even more lucrative
employment elsewhere in 1998 or thereafter are deemed to have severed their
employment with their previous employer, and shall be entitled to full backwages
from the date of their retrenchment only up to the date they found gainful
employment elsewhere. [Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 178083, October 2,
2009, Ynares-Santiago, J.]
NOTES:
INVERSELY,
A bona fide suspension of the employer’s operation of a business or undertaking
for a period not exceeding six (6) months does not amount to termination of employment,
but only a temporary displacement of employees. The paramount consideration should be
the dire exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of its
employees temporarily out of work. [Pido vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 169812, February 23, 2007]
BUT,
If the operation of the business is resumed within six months, it shall be the duty of
the employer to reinstate his employees to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights. [Lagonoy Bus Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 165598, August 14, 2007]
PROVIDED,
That the employee should indicate his desire to resume his work not later than one
(1) month from resumption of operation/undertaking; or relief from military or civic duty.
[Eagle Star Security Services, Inc. vs. Bonifacio L. Mirando, G.R. No. 179512, July 30,
2009]
A complaint for constructive dismissal filed prior to the employee's resumption of work
has no basis, and must be dismissed for want of cause of action. [The University of
the Immaculate Conception, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 181146, January 26,
2011, Carpio, J.]
Temporary “off-detail” or “floating status” is the period of time when security guards are
in between assignments or when they are made to wait after being relieved from a previous
post until they are transferred to a new one. It takes place when the security agency's clients
decide not to renew their contracts with the agency, resulting in a situation where the
available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its
roster. It also happens in instances where contracts for security services stipulate that the
client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned to it even for
want of cause. [Bebina G. Salvaloza vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 182086, November 24, 2010,
Nachura, J.]
HOWEVER,
An employee who was placed on temporary “off-detail” on the ground of poor
performance and inefficiency, allegations of which were never made known to him, and
instead was given to various assignments amounts to constructive dismissal.
Assignment to different posts despite repeated errors and poor performance is
considered condonation, which the employer cannot invoke to justify placing the
employee on temporary “off-detail”. [Bebina G. Salvaloza vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
182086, November 24, 2010, Nachura, J.]
As a general rule, the employee is not entitled to wages during the period of a valid
preventive suspension. However, if preventive suspension is found to be without basis,
the employer is required to pay the illegally suspended employee his backwages for the
period of his suspension. [Maricalum Mining vs. Decorion, infra]
REMEMBER that
Preventive suspension lasts only for a period of 30 days, and beyond this period, such
suspension may amount to constructive dismissal. [Maricalum Mining Corp. vs.
Decorion, 487 SCRA 182 (2006)]
HOWEVER,
There are cases where a violation of the 30-day suspension period may entail
payment of indemnity of P1,000.00 [JRS Business Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
108891, July 17, 1995] or P3,000.00 [Pepsi-Cola Distributors vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 106831, May 6, 1997]
While another view is that the period exceeding 30 days shall be compensable,
2.3.6. Quitclaims
Consideration received in a quitclaim is credible and reasonable if the amount is not grossly
inadequate vis-a-vis what the employee should receive in full. [Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation vs.
Ativo, et al, G.R. No. 188002, February 1, 2010, Villarama, J.]
(b) An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any
notice on the employer for any of the following just causes:
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one-half (1/2)
month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month
pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive
leaves.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between
the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to
sever his or her employment with the former. RA 7641 pegs the age for compulsory retirement
at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. An employer is,
however, free to impose a retirement age earlier than the foregoing mandates. [Lourdes A.
Cercado vs. Uniprom, Inc., G.R. No. 188154, October 13, 2010, Nachura, J.]
c) Benefits
1. for those paid on “boundary” basis of computation is “average daily income” [R & E Transport, Inc.] – ½
mo./yr. of service, a fraction of 6 mos. = 1 yr.
2. unless more beneficially agreed upon by the parties -1/2 month shall mean/include:
a) 15 days/year
b) 1/12 of 13th mo. pay
c) Cash equivalent of not more than 5 days SIL
A retirement plan giving the employer the option to retire its employees below the
ages provided by law must be assented to and accepted by the latter, without
which, the exercise of such option will amount to deprivation of property without
due process of law. [Lourdes A. Cercado vs. Uniprom, Inc., supra]
Implied knowledge of the existence of the retirement plan does not amount to
While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally
permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised
pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan. Otherwise stated, only the
implementation and execution of the option may be unilateral, but certainly not the
adoption and institution of the retirement plan containing such option. Without the
voluntary and explicit assent of at least the majority of its employees, the option to
unilaterally retire an employee is not valid. [Lourdes A. Cercado vs. Uniprom,
Inc., G.R. No. 188154, October 13, 2010, Nachura, J.]
3.1. Coverage
RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all employees in the private
sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the
method by which their wages are paid. They shall include part-time employees,
employees of service and other job contractors and domestic helpers or persons
in the personal service of another. [Labor Advisory on Retirement Pay Law,
October 24, 1996]
The retirement age is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract.
Absent an agreement, retirement age shall be fixed by law at the age of 65 years, while the minimum age
for optional retirement is set at 60 years. Article 287 of the Labor Code applies only to a situation where (1)
there is no CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits; or there is a CBA
or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits, but it is below the requirement set
by law. The rationale is to prevent the absurd situation where an employee is denied retirement benefits
through the nefarious scheme of employers to deprive employees of the benefits due them under existing
labor laws. [Amelia R. Obusan vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 181178, July 26, 2010, Nachura,
J.]
However, the company retirement plans must not only comply with the standards set by existing
labor laws, but they should also be accepted by the employees to be commensurate to their faithful service
to the employer within the requisite period. Due process only requires that notice of the employer's decision
to retire an employee be given to the employee. [Amelia R. Obusan vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R.
No. 181178, July 26, 2010, Nachura, J.]
Unlike in the case of Jaculbe, the retirement plan of PNB was solely and exclusively funded by PNB,
and no financial burden is imposed on the employees for their retirement benefits. [Amelia R. Obusan vs.
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 181178, July 26, 2010, Nachura, J.]
Retirement pay, on the other hand, presupposes that the employee entitled to it has reached the
compulsory retirement age or has rendered the required number of years as provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), the employment contract or company policy, or in the absence thereof, in
Republic Act No. 7641 or the Retirement Law. [Motorola Philippines, Inc. vs. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 173279,
March 30, 2009]
The receipt of retirement benefits does not bar the retiree from receiving separation pay. Separation
pay is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he/she
is looking for another employment. On the other hand, retirement benefits are intended to help the employee
enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his financial support, and are a
form of reward for his loyalty and service to the employer. [Santos vs. Servier Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
166377, November 28, 2008]
There are two (2) essential requisites in order that R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect:
(1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still in the employ of the employer at the time the statute took
effect; and
(2) the claimant had complied with the requirements for eligibility for such retirement benefits under the
statute. [Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) vs. Caballeda, G.R. No. 156644,
July 28, 2008]
An employer is free to impose a retirement age less than 65 for as long as it has the employees’
consent. [Alpha C. Jaculbe vs. Silliman University, G.R. No. 156934, March 16, 2007]
An employee who has rendered at least 20 years of service may retire under RA 1616, and receive
a retirement gratuity of 1 month salary for every year of service. MC No. 26-96, on the other hand, provides
for the computation of the separation benefit applicable to permanent officials who are not qualified to retire
under any existing law and those who are qualified to retire. Those who are not qualified, as long as they
served for more than a year, may avail of the gratuity corresponding to their length of service. As for those
employees who are qualified to retire, they may only receive a separation pay equivalent to the difference
between the incentive package and the retirement benefit under any existing law. [Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Gabriel Advincula, et al., G.R. No. 179217, February 2, 2011,
Carpio, J.]
When PNB was privatized, its personality as a government-owned corporation ceased, and all the
employees therein are deemed retired. The separated employees are entitled to all the benefits accruing to
them, after PNB cleared them of any accountability, absent PNB's findings of pending administrative case
against them. [Ang vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 178762, June 16, 2010, Abad, J.]
BUT,
Employees who were offered appointments and absorbed by the private concessionaires after
privatization are never separated from service by virtue of the reorganization pursuant to RA 8041.
[Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Advincula, et al., G.R. No. 179217, February 2,
2011, Carpio, J.]
COMMENT: In both cases, some employees were absorbed by the company after privatization took
effect. However, these two cases treated the subsequent appointment of the employees concerned
differently, in that, one considered the absorbed employees as retired from government service and entitled
to retirement benefits, whereas the other treated the absorbed employees as never separated, their service
uninterrupted.
The law does not cover employees of retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations
employing not more than (10) employees or workers and employees of the National Government and its
political subdivisions, including Government-owned and/or –controlled corporations, if they are covered by
the Civil Service Law and its regulations. [Labor Advisory on Retirement Pay Law, supra; Sec. 2, Rules
Implementing the New Retirement Law]
Republic Act No. 7641 amended Article 287 of the Labor Code by providing for
retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan
in the establishment. Even a bus conductor paid on commission basis falls within the
coverage of RA 7641 if no retirement scheme was adopted in the establishment he is
working. Thus, his retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the 5-day service
incentive leave and 1/12 of the 13th month pay. [Rodolfo J. Serrano vs. Severino
Santos Transit, et al., G.R. No. 187698, August 9, 2010, Carpio Morales, J.]
1. If there is no prohibition in the CBA/retirement plan against double recovery of both the retirement
pay and separation pay under the law - the employee can get both. [Aquino vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA
118 (1992)]
2. Otherwise, the employee can only get either. [Carlos F. Solomon, et al. vs. Associate of
International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 156317, April 26, 2005; Ma. Isabel T. Santos vs.
Servier Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 166377, November 28, 2008]
Labor Code
Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one-half (1/2)
month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month
pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive
leaves.
SSS Law
GSIS Law
SEC. 13-A. Conditions for Entitlement.—A member who retires from the
service shall be entitled to the retirement benefits enumerated in paragraph (a) of
Section 13 hereof: Provided, That:
(1) he has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) he is at least sixty (60) years of age at the time of retirement; and
(3) he is not receiving a monthly pension benefit from permanent total
disability.
The provision “as of the date of his retirement” which qualifies the term “primary
beneficiaries” was nullified by the Supreme Court for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. [Dycaico vs. SSS, G.R. No. 161357,
November 30, 2005]
CASE:
The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of
the beneficiaries. Retirement laws should be liberally construed in favor of the retiree, because their
objective is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and even comfort when he no longer has the capability to
earn a livelihood. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to the employer, and
are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of having to
worry about his financial support or upkeep. A pension partakes of the nature of “retained wages” of the
retiree for a dual purpose: (1) to entice competent people to enter the government service; and (2) to permit
them to retire from service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more
so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
A retiree, after receiving retirement benefits under one law, but later on was discovered not qualified
thereunder is not all throughout disqualified to receive retirement benefits under any other existing retirement
law. This does not amount to double retirement nor does it amount to conversion of retirement mode.
The conversion under the law is one that is voluntary choice made by the retiree. On the other hand,
in a case where retiree was later on discovered to be disqualified to receive retirement benefits under one
law, his receipt of retirement benefits based on another retirement law is not conversion, because it is not a
voluntary choice of the retiree, but a consequence of his disqualification.
In this case, retired prosecutors of the National Prosecution Service, pursuant to RA 10071, is not
entitled to receive the benefits granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity thereof.
1) If CBA/Retirement Plan prohibits double recovery of separation pay and retirement benefit –
then grant only one benefit, whichever is greater.
2) If CBA/Retirement Plan contains no prohibition, grant both. [Aquino vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 118,
122-123 (1992)]
3) Same is true with retirement plan vs. CBA. [Aquino, supra, citing BLTB Co. vs. CA, 71 SCRA
470; see also Salomon vs. Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., 457 SCRA
254, 262 (2005)]
Retirement under the CBA is subject to judicial review and nullification. A CBA, as a labor contract,
is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. It can be nullified for being contrary to
law, public morals, or public policy. [Cainta Catholic School vs. Cainta Catholic School Employees
Union, 489 SCRA 468, 485 (2006)]
Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited.
HOWEVER,
When the employer’s retirement plan precludes employees, whose services were terminated for
cause, from availing retirement benefits, such cannot be granted for lack of consensual and statutory basis
for the grant of retirement benefits. [Divina S. Lopez vs. National Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 149674,
Feb. 16, 2004 (423 SCRA 109)]