...

WAR,

PEACE,ond

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS

THIRD EDITION

David W Ziegler

WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY

,
BOSTON TORONTO

r,
•
.1
20 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES

the industrial economies of the countries fighting them. This was seen
as a barrier to any drawn-out war. Among the demands imposed by
war was that armies depended on reservists who had to be drawn
Chapter 2

away from their civilian jobs for the duration of the war. If they were
gone too long, industrial strength would decline and industrial strength
was seen as the basis for military prowess. That was the third lesson.
The German military victory had depended on the German railroad
network, the German steel industry, and all the other advances of the
new industrial technology. Technology was considered decisive; not
only the possession of modern weapons such as breech-loading rifles
but practice in using them and careful planning long in advance were
necessary.
The years following the wars of Bismarck were peaceful ones for
Europe. Some wars did occur, but on the fringes the Boer War in
South Africa, the wars in the Balkans. In the meantime the military
World War Iand

staffs were busily applying the lessons of the Bismarck wars, acquiring
new weapons, training soldiers in their use, drawing up detailed mo­
bilization schedules, all in an effort to be among the winners and not
World War II

the losers of the next rapid war.

NOTES For the forty years following the wars of Bismarck, the military staffs of
1. Yom Kriege (On War), originally published 1832, Chapter II Part 24. all the major European countries based their planning on three lessons
2. There are a number of standard works on Bismarck and the creation of learned in those wars. Wars are an inexpensive means of attaining for­
modern Germany. A very readable one IS by Hajo Holborn, A History of t'v10dern Ger­ eign policy goals. Because they are short, they do not disrupt economic
1840-1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).
Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb and political life back home. The side that strikes first with the latest
Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973), Chapter 6; Richard A. Preston, Sydney F. weapons will win. World War I showed that all these lessons were
and Herman O. Werner, Men in Arms (New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1962), Chap­ wrong.
ter 1S.
4, A general discussion of this problem, although without specific reference to The war that began in August 1914 was a great shock. It came after
Bismarck, is Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University four decades when major European countries had not been at war with
Press, 1971). each other; it followed more than a century of no wars at all in the
S. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development 01 Germany (Princeton' Prince­
ton University Press, 1963), p. 134. heartland of Europe involving all the major countries. It also cruelly
violated the assumption that war was a useful instrument of policy. In
the first full month of war, the French demonstrated that they had
learned the lessons of rapid mobilization by putting 1,300,000 troops
into combat. From that number they suffered in August 1914 alone
600,000 casualties (casualties are men no longer capable of fighting
because they are dead seriously wounded, captured by the enemy, or
l

missing). On one day alone, July 1, 1916, the British attacked with
140,000 troops and suffered 60,000 casualties. On another occasion it
cost the French 160,000 casualties to gain 7,000 yards. At Passchendaele
it cost the British 370,000 casualties for no gain at all.

21
22 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 23

People tend to form their beliefs about social and political condi­ Before all this became apparent, many people in all countries wel­
tions on the basis of very little evidence. This was the case in the years comed the coming of the war. Crowds gathered in Paris to cheer the
before 1914. The peace that Europe had enjoyed in the decades before reservists marching off to their units. Germans gathered in a square
World War I was not seen as the result of luck (the chance combination and sang, "Now Thank We All Our God." A British poet wrote, "Now,
of a number of favorable circumstances) but as proof of theories about God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour."2 The myth of the
society. We might call the two most popular views the Myth of Social­ short, decisive war was even more entrenched than those about Social­
ist Solidarity and the Myth of Capitalist Solidarity. The socialists, all ist Solidarity or Capitalist Solidarity. Yet it was held on the basis
good followers of Karl Marx, took seriously Marx's statement that lithe equally flimsy evidence. True, the three wars Prussia had fought for
workingmen have no countr>y.,11 They believed that a German worker, German unification were short and decisive. But there had been other
exploited as he was by the German ruling class, would have more wars which did not conform to this model; as with many pieces of
sympathy for a French worker than for a German capitalist. Many evidence that do not fit a hypothesis, they were ignored. The American
leaders of the various national parties of socialists believed that a war Civil War (1861-1865) was long and destructive, although in the end
on a world scale was not possible because the workers would decisive. The British began fighting the Dutch settlers (Boers) in South
refuse to fight. A declaration of war by governments would be met Africa in 1899 and found it difficult to inflict a decisive defeat on them
by a declaration of a general strike by socialists, making war impossible. despite Britain'S clear industrial superiority. The Russians and Japanese
You couldn't run a war without foot soldiers, any more than you could fought each other in 1904 and 1905. Although the decisive engagements
run a factory without workers. The actual outbreak of war quickly took place at sea, the land warfare was a war for position rather than
shattered this myth - French socialists and German socialists marched one of movement, dominated by trenches and barbed wire and other
off to war against each other, each singing their socialist songs, each features that would become familiar during World War I.
convinced that victory by their country would hasten world socialism. When military observers brought back reports of these wars, their
Paralleling the Myth of Socialist Solidarity was the Myth of Capi­ assessments were dismissed with the argument that the experience did
talist Solidarity, articulated by British writer Norman Angell in his not apply to Europe.) The planners went ahead trying to create the
international best seller The Great Illusion. Angell argued, convincing conditions that would have led to a perfect victory in the wars of
millions of readers, that war was not profitable and in fact was harmful the nineteenth century. The problem was that when both sides were
to capitalism. Far from making greater profits in time of war, capitalists prepared, with rapid mobilization using railroads, central direction
did much better in peacetime. War interrupted access to international using the telegraph, and concentrated firepower using breech-loading
markets and sources of raw materials. A war that lasted any length of rifles, neither could win a decisive, sudden victory. The Germans with
time, Angell believed, would destroy the capitalist system. Therefore, their Schlieffen Plan intended to pour into France toward the north
there could be no great war - it would be irrational. along the English Channel; the French with their Plan 17 prepared to
pour into Germany toward the south near the Swiss Alps. If both plans
had succeeded the armies would have passed each other as in a re­
WAR AS "TOTAL WAR"
volving door. In fact, both plans failed, mostly because of a further
It quickly became apparent that the war which began in August technological development that nullified the great advantage the offen­
1914 was not going to be another of the quick, decisive wars of the late sive side had' enjoyed in the Prussian wars. That development was the
nineteenth century. As months passed and no decisive victories were machine gun, a model improved over the one used unsuccessfully by
achieved, more and more men were conscripted into the armies. More the French in the Franco-Prussian War and, more important, now
and more resources were devoted to war production. Civilians far from correctly deployed. The bold assaults of the French and, to a lesser
the front were affected as much as the soldiers by such things as extent, of the Germans ground to a bloody halt against the concen­
rationing of food, mobilization into munitions production, and (later trated firepower of this new piece of technology. In this transformation

in the war) air raids from dirigibles. The German economy was put in the first weeks of World War I from a war of movement to one of
under a central direction so pervasive that it was called "war socialism." position we see a lesson that was not to be proved false by future wars:
A German first used the name for this new experience: "total war." political leaders and military planners cannot fully comprehend the
24 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 25

new technology with which they must work. The one consistent winner (July 30) Russian mobilization went into effect. It was this act that
of modern warfare has been technology; the consistent loser has been in the Germans.
humanity. German preparation for war followed the Schlieffen Plan, which
rested on several assumptions. One was that any major war in Europe
would be for the Germans a two-front war, against Russia in the east
TECHNOLOGY AND THE OUTBREAK Of WORLD WAR I
and against France (allied to Russia) in the west. Another assumption
Technology, you could argue, was even responsible for the war in was that the huge Russian army would be impossible to defeat; the
the first place. The typical explanation of World War I begins with the most the Germans could hope would be to keep the Russian army
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. from defeating them. The one advantage that the Germans had, the
But how did this event result in the German invasion of France on Plan assumed, was technological superiority, particularly
August 3, 1914? The connection is not at all obvious and needs to be the ability to mobilize quickly. They assumed they could mobilize in
carefully traced. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was heir to the throne of two weeks; the Russians, with more territory and less developed
the Austrian Empire. It was widely believed that when his aging uncle, networks, would need six weeks. Therefore, the Schlieffen
Franz Josef, died it would be difficult to keep the diverse for a major offensive first against France, to knock it out of
nationalities of the empi re together. Germans in Austria, Czechs in before turning the German army against the more difficult
Bohemia, Magyars in Hungary, Serbs in Bosnia each would want ing the Russian army. For this reason, the Russian mobilization was
their own state. The problem in Bosnia, where Franz Ferdinand was greeted with alarm in Berlin. If the Schlieffen Plan were to work (and
visiting when he was shot, was acute because its inhabitants made up for all practical purposes it was the only plan the Germans had), then
only about half of the Serb nation; the rest were in the neighboring it was essential that the Germans begin mobilizing as soon as the
independent state of Serbia. To make matters worse, Archduke Franz Russians did. Otherwise they would lose the advantage afforded them
Ferdinand was visiting the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo on June 28, a day by their superior technology. Never mind that the Russian mobilization
of national importance to the Serbs, commemorating a national defeat was directed against Austria. The ((ucial factor, in German eyes, was
centuries before. Sending the Archduke to visit on this day was like mobilization.
having the Prince of Wales visit Dublin on Easter Sunday. It is not when the Germans in their turn delivered an ultimatum to
surprising that young Serb nationalists, with weapons acquired from a Russia on July 31, demanding that they demobilize, it was not so much
semiofficial Serbian organization, sneaked across the border and assas­ in defense of Austria as in defense of thei r own strategic situation.
sinated When Russia declined to demobilize, the Germans mobilized. The
The Austrians were aware that this was part of the Serbian national­ French, realizing what was coming, did so too. On August 1, Germany
ist attack on their control of Bosnia and on July 23, 1914, sent an declared war on Russia; on August 3, Germany declared war on France.
matum to Serbia, demanding that that country curb nationalist The advance of troops began two weeks later; the fi rst battle of the
for the liberation of the Serbs in Bosnia. An ultimatum is a demand for war was fought within three weeks of its declaration.
some kind of behavior coupled with a threat that will be implemented connecting thread, from the assassination in Sarajevo to the
after a set time has elapsed if the demand is not met. Despite a basically German attack on France, was military planning. Yet no one thought
conciliatory reply by Serbia, when the time ran out Austria chose to anything was wrong with military planning. Because wars were ex­
declare war on Serbia. The Serbs had been issued a similar ultimatum pected to be swift, planning in advance was believed necessary. There
in 1909 and had complied fully with it then, but in 1914 they were less would be no time to improvise once war had declared. Once
willing to be totally subservient because they were receiving more sup­ the best conceivable plan was devised, preparation and practice were
port from Russia. Russia, in the name of Slavic solidarity, encouraged geared to it. That war broke out over an event that had not been fore­
the Serbs to stand up to the Austrians and, to back them up, on July 29 seen, over an issue indirectly related to the major countries fighting,
ordered mobilization of the Russian army to be held in readiness for was not important. Each state had war to come sooner or later

possible use against Austria. The Russian tsar showed some hesitation, and had prepared for it. Preparations in one country had only increased
at first agreeing to mobilization and then canceling it, but the next day the suspicions of neighboring countries, leading them to preparation of
 26 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II
27

their own. In a climate of mutual distrust, a minor incident like for peace. The crucial event of Russian mobilization, Beck argued, was
the assassination of Franz a war. no justification for Germany's declaration of war because it was legal.
A Beck declared, has the right to mobilize so long as its
not cross the border.

OTHER CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I

isticview,

No one can deny how important military planning and military war while it was being fought and in
preparation were in the outbreak of World War \.4 Yet scholars have following, provoked a reaction among Ar;~f1~'m'lr
identified other causes as well. The literature on the causes of the war Because they were trying to revise the standard view of World War I
is enormous, with many authors of books and articles working as hard Germany crossed the frontier fi rst, therefore Germany was guilty­
to attack the theories of others as to advance their own. The war is a they called themselves Revisionists. Most prominent among them was
ground for those looking for evidence to prove some Sidney B. Fay, whose book The Origins of the World War, published in
the all-time best seller on the causes of World War I 1928, was the monument of this schooL? Fay's primary point was that
IS ImperialiSm, by V. \. Lenin.s He argued that the capitalist system in all the major powers were more or less responsible, but because no
general and the leading capitalist countries in particular were responsi­ one was deliberately working to bring about a general European war,
ble for the war. The essence of capitalism, wrote Lenin none was guilty.lo But after making this claim, Fay went on to apportion
Karl Marx) is constant expansion. Profits must be some blame anyhow. France and Italy were accused of being at least
I
more profits or the system collapses. The collapse of capitalism had not break out because it gave them the chance to
'I'
"

come about as rapidly as Marx had predicted, Lenin wrote, because the the French territory (Alsace and Lorraine) had
capitalist countries had found a new outlet for their surplus capital in war was not a mitigating factor in
investments overseas. This newest form of capitalism, in which banks Fay's eyes. Serbia was blamed for the assassination of Franz
rather than manufacturers took a leading role, Lenin called imperialism. and Russia was blamed for backing up Serbia;
At first it worked, giving capitalism a respite, but by 1914 all the un­ nationalism got little sympathy from Fay. On the other hand, Austria
claimed areas of the world had been divided into colonies or spheres and Germany were forgiven for their part in the events of 1914 because
influence. The countries that were left out, particularly Germany Fay believed they were acting in self-defense, Austria from the threat
to speak of), wanted to see the world redivided of dismemberment voiced in the nationalist claims of the Serbs and
r benetlt. As Lenin put it, the war was to decide whether "the Germany from the threat posed by Russian mobilization. ll
or German group of financial marauders was to receive the All this scholarly debate is not very satisfying to the student who
share. lfb wants a clear answer to the question, "What caused World War I?"
who was writing at the time of the war, blamed the whole But there is no agreement on an answer, and for whatever view you
system as it then existed. But many writers at that time picked out par­ prefer, you can find an authority to back you up (although in some
ticular states and attributed the war to them. A typical book from the Lenin might not be considered an authority and in other places
early days of the war is by James Beck, an American political figure, than Lenin might not considered an authority). This
The Evidence in the Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization as to the lack of agreement on the causes of the war goes back to the years of
Moral Responsibility for the War, published in 1914.7 As we would ex­ the war itself. It has been argued, in fact, that this is one of
pect of a man who wanted the United States to enter the war on the sons the conflict escalated to total war: no country ever speCified ex­
side of the British, Beck found that Germany and Austria were guilty of actly what it was fighting for, and in the absence of such
the war. He accused them "in a time of profound peace" each country assumed the worst of its enemies. The French never said,
of secretly conspiring "to impose their will upon Europe in a matter "We are fighting only to get back Alsace and Lorraine," so the Germans
the balance of power."s Beck believed Austria was guilty of assumed they were trying to turn the clock back past 1870 and split the
thereby threatening the Russians in the German Empire into small states again. The Germans never said, "We
of not stopping Austria. England, are fjghting only to annex Luxembourg," so the French assumed they
were all sincerely working were going to annex Luxembourg, Belgium, and a slice of France as
26 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR 27

their own. In such a climate of mutual distrust, a minor incident like for peace. The crucial event of Russian mobilizat ion, Beck argued, was
the assassination of Franz Ferdinand could trigger a war. no justification for Germany's declaration of wa ::r be cause it was legal.
A sovereign state, Beck declared, has the right to mobilize so long as its
troops do not cross the border.
OTHER CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I
This extremely legalistic view, which dominat .ed much of the
No one can deny how important military planning and military about the war while it was being fought and in the years immediately
preparation were in the outbreak of World War 1. 4 Yet scholars have following, provoked a reaction among academic historians in the 1920's.
other causes as well. The literature on the causes of the war Because they were trying to revise the standard view of World War I
is enormous, with many authors of books and articles working as hard - Germany crossed the frontier first, therefore C::::::::;ermany was
to attack the theories of others as to advance their own. The war is a they called themselves Revisionists. Most promi !:lent among them was
rich hunting ground for those looking for evidence to prove some Sidney B. Fay, whose book The Origins of the W c---:>rld War, published in
theory. Probably the all-time best seller on the causes of World War I 1928, was the monument of this school. 9 Fay's ~ rimary point was
is Imperialism, by V. I. Lenin.s He argued that the capitalist system in all the major powers were more or less resport sible, but because no
general and the leading capitalist countries in particular were responsi­ one was deliberately working to bring about a general European war,
ble for the war. The essence of capitalism, wrote Lenin (drawing on none was gUilty.lO But after making this claim, Fa). went on to apportion
Karl Marx) is constant expansion. Profits must be reinvested to produce some blame anyhow. France and Italy were acc used of being at least
more profits or the system collapses. The collapse of capitalism had not pleased that war did break out because it gav~ them the chance to
come about as rapidly as Marx had predicted, Lenin wrote, because the acquire territory. That the French territory ce and Lorraine) had
capitalist countries had found a new outlet for their surplus capital in been seized by Germany in the last war was not=: a mitigating factor in
investments overseas. This newest form of capitalism, in which banks Fay's eyes. Serbia was blamed for the assassinati <:::::>n of Franz Ferdinand
rather than manufacturers took a leading role, Lenin called imperialism. and Russia was blamed for backing up Serbia; the claims of Serbian
At first it worked, giving capitalism a respite, but by 1914 all the un­ nationalism got little sympathy from Fay. On tl1:::. e other hand, Austria
claimed areas of the world had been divided into colonies or spheres and Germany were forgiven for their part in the ~ven ts of 1914 because
of influence. The countries that were left out, particularly Germany Fay believed they were acting in self-defense, ~_ustria from the threat
had no colonies to speak on, wanted to see the world redivided of dismemberment voiced in the nationalist cI~ ims of the Serbs and
ll
for their benefit. As Lenin put it the war was to decide whether "the Germany from the threat posed by Russian mobil :ization.
British or German group of financial marauders was to receive the lion's scholarly debate is not very satisfyi r - l g to the student who
share."6 wants a clear answer to the question, "What caused World War I?"
Lenin, who was writing at the time of the war, blamed the whole But there is no agreement on an answer, and f.;;:::::> r vvhatever view you
system as it then existed. But many writers at prefer, you can find an authority to back you -up (although in some
ticular states and attributed the war to them. A places Lenin might not be considered an author i ty and in other places
early days of the war is by James Beck, an American political figure, anyone other than Lenin might not be consider-ed an authority). This
The Evidence in the Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization as to the lack of agreement on the causes of the war goe 5 back to the of
Moral Responsibility for the War, published in 1914.7 As we would ex­ the war itself. It has been argued, in fact, that t:his is one of the rea­
pect of a man who wanted the United States to enter the war on the SOns the conflict escalated to total war: no cou "..,try ever specified ex­
side of the British, Beck found that Germany and Austria were guilty of actly what it was fighting for, and in the absenc.:: e of such information
starting the war. He accused them "in a time of profound peace" each country assumed the worst of its enemies. -.-he French never said,
of secretly conspiring Uto impose their will upon Europe in a matter "We are fighting only to get back Alsace and Lorr- aine," so the Germans
affecting the balance of power."s Beck believed Austria was guilty of assumed they were trying to turn the clock back :::;:::>ast 1870 and split
going to war with Serbia, thereby threatening the Russians in the German Empire into small states again. The Ger -roans never said, "We
Balkans, and Germany was gUilty of not stopping Austria. are fighting only to annex Luxembourg," so the Fre nch assumed they
France, Italy, and Russia, on the other hand, were all sincerely working Were going to annex Luxembourg, Belgium, an a slice of France as
28 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 29

well. But whatever the ultimate goals of the war, no one doubted that raged over whether this low ratio of those killed to those merely
had to keep fighting for the immediate goal of not losing. wounded makes it a more or less humane weapon).13
The Germans also pioneered another weapon, the submarine. As
with poison gas, the weapon was not decisive. Despite the role that
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN WARFARE:
German-British naval competition had played in creating tensions be­
POISON GAS, SUBMARINES
tween the two countries in the years preceding the war, when the
new military technology decisively influenced the outbreak of fighting broke out the Germans found that their navy was useless. In
war in 1914. The Germans attacked when and how they did because any encounter with the larger British navy, it would have been decisively
their strategy was based on exploiting their industrial superiority. The defeated. Therefore the Germans turned to submarines, which could
war failed to develop as preceding wars had because of even newer damage the British in an area vital to the British Isles: importation of
technology, particularly the machine gun. Technology continued to in­ food, munitions, and other materials needed to fight the war. The sub­
fluence the war throughout its duration. New forms of warfare made marine proved an effective weapon in sinking ships but the Germans
their appearance, although they were introduced with little under­ were limited by international law in how far they could apply this
standing of what they could accomplish or how effective weapon. According to law, attacks on neutral ships were illegal, and
would be. it was neutral ships, particularly those under the American flag, which
One of these technological innovations was poison gas. As industry were carrying a large part of the goods. After much debate in German
developed and expanded during the nineteenth century, dangerous in­ policy-making circles, the General Staff convinced the political leaders
dustrial chemicals such as chlorine went into widespread use. Before to agree to "unrestricted" submarine warfare attacks on all ships
some planner began thinking about how such chemicals could be going to England, neutral or not.
applied to warfare. The idea was already so widespread in 1899 that in The German military's justification for this policy illustrates again
a conference that year at The Hague, many states agreed to outlaw the difficulty of comprehending the effects of technology even when
artillery shells designed to fire poison gas. But sixteen years later, frus­ the utmost care is given to calculation. The German General Staff
trated by seeing their plans fail as mobile warfare turned into war of argued that they would be able to sink 600,000 tons of shipping a
position, with lines of trenches facing each other from Switzerland month and that after six months the British economy would collapse.
to the North Sea, the Germans began to consider whether the use of They also predicted that unrestricted submarine warfare would bring
poison gas might break the stalemate. On April 1915, the Germans the United States into the war on the side of the British but that it
used chlorine gas against the French along the front in Belgium, releas­ would not matter because America would take a year to mobilize and
ing it from canisters in the ground so that technically they did not even then German submarines could sink United States troop transport
violate the Hague Gas Declaration. The gas was successful beyond ships before they reached Europe. 14
German expectations. French troops fled, leaving a gap four miles wide The German technical predictions were remarkably accurate. The
through which the Germans could have marched to Paris. But because average amount of shipping sunk during the crucial first five months
the Germans were not expecting any such success, they were not pre­ was 658,000 tons a month, a little over the predicted average. The
pared to follow it up. By the time they had completed the necessary Germans went wrong in their prediction of what effect these losses
preparations and were ready to use gas again, on May 1, 1915, they would have on British policy. Perhaps if the British had been fighting
found the French were equipped with gas masks and able to stop alone they would have accepted the hopelessness of their position and
assault. From then on, both sides began to use gas (and gas masks) in given up. But the other German prediction that America would enter
increasing quantities, in artillery shells and grenades as well as in bu ried war came true, and this changed the British calculation. They
canisters, until in the 1918 German offensive, 50 per cent of the shells deCided they could hold out until American help arrived. The German
fired carried gas. 12 The initial advantage of surprise on April 1915, technical prediction was correct but their estimation of the effect of
was not exploited and from then on the war was stalemated again, only technical factors on political deciSions was entirely wrong. 1S

t~ -.''.

at a higher level of violence. During World War I, 1.3 million casualties United States entry into the war was one of the factors (although
were attributed to gas, 91,000 of them fatalities (although debate has not the only one) which eventually led to victory by the Western allies.

L_

30 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 31

Several times during the war changes in tactics or technical improve­ Bosnia and other Slavic areas to form Yugoslavia or "South Slavs" state.
ments in weapons were introduced that might have made a decisive Slavic peoples in the middle of Europe, the Czechs and the Slovaks,
difference even if the United States had not entered. It is easier to see were put together in the state of Czechoslovakia. The states of
the today, with the benefit of hindsight, than it was then. In 1918, Hungary, and Austria were also given borders on the principle of na­
the German military finally panicked and insisted that their poli­ tional self-determination. But this principle was not applied to the
ticians make peace, it was easier to draw a more obvious conclusion, Germans. First, the state of Austria, although consisting primarily of
that the United States with its large industrial capacity and its reserve German-speaking members of the old Austrian Empire, was forbidden
of manpower was the decisive factor in the Western victory. to unite with Germany. Second, the new state of Czechoslovakia in­
cluded about two million people who spoke German. They lived in
regions in the Sudeten Mountains and were known as the Su­
THE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR I: deten Germans. Before World War I they had been part of the Austrian
THE VERSAILLES TREATY Empire but now they were put under a government controlled by Slavs
instead of being allowed to join either Germany or Austria. Third, the
The results of World I were embodied in the Versailles Peace southern portion of the Austrian province of Tyrol was put under Italian
Treaty of 1919. The treaty was quite long, running to several hundred rule mainly as a reward to the Italians for joining the war on the side of
clauses, but we can summarize its four most important features. the British and French.
1. New Borders for Germany. In the west, the provinces of Alsace 3. German Disarmament. The Versailles Settlement imposed se­
and Lorraine were returned to France, removing one of the grievances vere limitations on German armaments, justifying this restriction as the
that had made the French eager for war in 1914. But at the same time step toward general European disarmament. Germany would go
the French ignored the obvious lesson that this exchange seemed to for after all, Germany had lost the war, but the other states would
teach about the price a state pays for detaching territory from follow. The army was limited to 100,000 men, and each soldier had to
proceeded to detach territory from Germany for thei r own serve a minimum of twelve years (to keep the Germans from using the
This was the Saar, bordering on Lorraine and like Lorraine a army as a training school for reserves). The navy was limited to 15,000
steel producing area but just as German in its population as Lorraine men and a few ships. An air force was forbidden altogether. Portions
was French Figure 1.3). The French did not go quite as far as the of Germany were turned into a demilitarized zone, where no troops
Germans had; they did not annex the Saar but put it under the admin­ could be stationed and no fortifications built. This area extended 50
istration of the new League of Nations, taking over control of its mines kilometers on the east bank of the Rhine along the stretch of river that
and ind ustry. formed the boundary with France and on the entire west bank of
In the east, new boundaries between Germany and Poland were Rhine for the rest of its length Figure 2.1).
drawn but the problem was too complex to be so simply. Ger­ 4. Reparations. The issue that probably held the interest
mans lived in the middle of Polish villages were scattered among for the public was reparations. The Germans had imposed reparations
German villages, and no border could be totally satisfactory. The 1919 on the French after 1871, to make them pay for the war, and in 1919
border was no more fair than any other; it differed from the prewar a number of French and British politicians were determined to make
border only by including more Germans under Polish jurisdiction. the Germans pay for this much more expensive war just completed.
2. New States. The Versailles Treaty with Germany was only one In the end the demands were so extravagant, far beyond any reason­
of negotiated at the end of the war. The whole package, which able ability on the part of the Germans to pay, that no figure was set
we might call the Versailles Settlement, created a number of new states and the treaty merely set forth the principle that the Germans would
in central and eastern Europe on the principle of national self­ pay. The part of the treaty that laid down this principle, Clause 231,
determination, replacing the old multinational empire of the Austrian was similar to an economic liability clause in a commercial contract
rulers. Under this principle, nationalities or closely related groups of but became known as the "war guilt" clause. The section on repara­
nationalities were given states of their own. The Serbs were united with
lL:~'~".'

tions also specified that Germany could be occupied by foreign troops
32 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II B

not invited to participate in the Versailles conference but was instead

N handed the completed treaty and told to sign within seven days.
It is easy to construct an argument that the Versailles Treaty is
GERMANY

t responsible for the rise of Hitler and hence for World War II. But this
is not the only argument you could make. You could also say the
Versailles Treaty was a mistake, assuming the victors had no will to
enforce it. If it had been enforced with the same sternness with which
it was drawn up, it might have worked. We will never know, because
the only part ever to be enforced was the least essential: the provisions
for reparations, not those for disarmament. And even when the French
occupied the industrial area of the Ruhr in 1923 they discovered that
not mine coal with bayonets. Right-wing extremists and
communists cooperated to resist foreign occupation and in the end the
to withdraw without getting any reparations.
The French effort in 1923 failed, yet it was at least an effort to
enforce the treaty, more than the victors did to prevent rearmament.
It was something of an open secret in Germany that rearmament was
fRANCE
to have an air force but the gov­
ernment was encouraging "sport flying" clubs. The airline Lufthansa
opened six "pilot schools," turning out 100 pilots a year in a system of
education that had many military elements. The Germans set up
Miles . 100 ITALY tories abroad in return for some of the production. In the Soviet Union
II
they set up two airplane factories, three artillerv shell factories. and a
poison gas factory.16
2. 1 The Demilitarized Zone Along the Rhine As time went on the Western democracies became
interested in enforcing the Versailles Treaty. Partly it was because of
in fact did in 1923 when the nature of these societies, which gave priority to pursuit of private
if it failed to meet its payments, as
happiness over the concerns of state; there was no public support for
a great inflation led to the collapse
maintaining a large army of occupation in Germany. Partly it was the
result of widespread pacifism, particularly encouraged by left-wing
GERMAN REACTION TO VERSAILLES political parties. And partly it was the result of influence exerted by
AND THE RISE OF HITLER academic historians such as Sidney Fay, who were arguing that no
one country (and certainly not Germany) was guilty of starting the war.
Imagine that you are a German radical looking for topics for beer
With no war gUilt, the justification for such a harsh treaty was hard
hall speeches. What a gold mine you would find in the to
Treaty. Alsace and Lorraine are taken away (on the argument that it
in Western self-confidence was paralleled in Germany
is wrong to detach territory from another state) at the same time that
rise to power of a political leader with total self-confidence,
the Saar is being detached from Germany. New states are being set up
Hitler had first come to world attention in 1923, when,
everywhere on the principle of national self-determination but Ger­
imitating Benito Mussolini, he tried to take over the government in
mans in the Sudeten land, Austria, and South Tyrol are denied this
Munich. But unlike Mussolini, whose march on Rome had been suc­
Germany must disarm and pay for the war because of "war
cessful, Hitler failed and went to jail. While there, he wrote a book
guilt." You could add that it was a dictated peace - Germany was
 34 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESE:S WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 35

he called Four and a Half Years of Struggle Against Lies, Stupidity, and and it lulled the Poles into thinking they could pursue a policy of
Cowardice. (His publisher got him to cut the title down to My Struggle, independent neutrality and thus made them less willing to cooperate
in German, Mein Kampf.) Consciously echoing Bismarck he wrote, "We with France against Germany.
must clearly recognize the fact that the recovery of the lost territories In January 1935, Hitler got the kind of foreign policy victory that,
is not won through solemn appeals to the Lord or through pious hopes had it come five years earlier, might have meant a Hitler never would
in a League of Nations, but only by force of arms."'? By 1933 he was have come to power. The League of Nations conducted a plebiscite in
Chancellor of Germany. the Saar to see whether its citizens wanted to return to Germany. (They
did, overwhelmingly.) Hitler had little to do with bringing about this
vote. A plebiscite had been scheduled for fifteen years after the Saar
HITLER'S FOREIGN POLICY AND
was detached from Germany. But Hitler got all the credit for recover­
WESTERN APPEASEMENT
ing this piece of "lost territory." The final piece of Hitler's policy in
I,'
Hitler's own statements and the policies he later followed are Phase I was his announcement, in March 1935, of compulsory univer­
grounds for saying that he alone was responsible for World War II. sal military service; in other words, his denunciation of the disarma­
But on closer examination, it is not quite 50 simple. For one thing, his ment clauses of the Versailles Treaty.
views on the treatment of Germany after World War I were widely At any time during Phase I it would have been easy for the West­
shared. The unwillingness of Western statesmen to make any conces­ ern democracies to move against Hitler. Germany was still disarmed
sions to Hitler's more moderate predecessors made more plausible his and Hitler's own position in Germany was not totally secure. Yet noth­
argument that only force of arms would bring change - Germany had ing Hitler did was unequivocally threatening to the Western countries.
not even been admitted to the League of Nations until 1926. For an­ Rather than make the effort to stop Hitler, it was easier to find a justi­
other, had Western statesmen followed different policies once Hitler fication for each of his actions. Even denouncing the Versailles Treaty
did take office, he never would have gotten a weak and disarmed could be justified. Far from fulfilling the pledge of Versailles to disarm
Germany into a position from which it could hope to make war against down to the German level, France had just doubled the term of service
all the other countries of Europe with any chance of success. for its soldiers. Hitler himself was careful to keep his announced in­
Yet without question the story of the outbreak of World War II tentions limited; although he was introdUCing universal military service
is in large part the personal story of Hitler and his diplomacy. This he pledged not to rearm the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
diplomacy may for convenience be divided into two phases. Phase I Hitler's tactics are an example of what a contemporary strategist has
begins with Hitler's accession to power in January 1933. His first years called, "Give me that last piece of toast or I'll blow my brains out on
were spent consolidating domestic control and he made few foreign your new suit!" Of course if you called his bluff, it would hurt him
policy moves. One thing he did was to take Germany out of the League more than it hurt you, but if you calculate rationally you will decide
Nations in October 1933, on the argument that Germany was being that a piece of toast is less expensive than a dry cleaning bill.'s
denied equal rights on the question of arms. Germany had disarmed In Phase II Hitler engaged in foreign policy acts that were increas­
but the other states had not followed. Now, said Hitler, either the ingly threatening to Germany's neighbors. In March 1936, he ordered
others disarm down to our level or we have the right to arm up to German troops into the demilitarized zone along the Rhine, even
theirs. The League, which was sponsoring a disarmament conference though he had explicitly promised not to do so only a year earlier.
at this time, was unable to give an answer and so Germany withdrew. In March 1938, he annexed Austria, against both the prescriptions
Hitler's next move, in January 1934, was to sign a Non-Aggression Pact the Versailles Treaty and the wishes of most of the Austrian people.
with Poland. It was something no moderate German leader would In September 1938, his threat to go to war against Czechoslovakia
have dared without risking a venomous attack from right-wingers such led to the surrender of the Sudeten land to Germany. In March 1939,
as the Nazis. But Hitler's patriotism was above criticism and the Nazis Germany annexed the remaining non-German part of Czechoslovakia.
by now had eliminated most critics. The treaty with Poland served two We might wonder why Hitler was able to get away with these acts.
purposes: it strengthened Hitler's peace image (and he was later to In part it was because statesmen were carefully avoiding the conditions
refer to it as proof of his sincere desire for peace with his neighbors), that led to World War I. In the postwar analysiS everyone agreed that
 36 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 37

I,I

the pre-1914 arms race had been a major source of tension. Spending in one hand and a piece of paper in the other, saying, "I believe it is
for arms therefore was kept low after the war. Although the Western peace for our time.,,21 The paper was important because Chamberlain
democracies were stubbornly refusing to disarm completely, they were had on it Hitler's own promise that this was his last territorial demand
also failing to keep up with weapons development, particularly once in Europe. And it was reasonable to believe him. The German claim
Germany began open rearmament in 1935. At the time of the Sudeten­ to rule Germans in the Sudetenland and Austria was justified by the
land crisis in 1938, England had only one operational wing of modern of national self-determination. The issue of Germans in South
fighter aircraft. 19 The French Chief of Staff of the air force had been so Germans in the areas along the Polish border remained, but
impressed by his visits to German airplane factories that he warned in concluded treaties with both Italy and Poland.
August 1938, "If war comes this autumn, as you fear, there will not be The Western statesmen quickly discovered
one French plane left after fifteen days.,,20 As it became ever clearer policy was mistaken when, only six months later, Hitler took over the
that Hitler did not keep his promises, France and Britain did begin to rest of Czechoslovakia in clear violation of his pledges at Munich. War
rearm, but rearmament with modern weapons is a lengthy process and had become inevitable. In retrospect most Western policy-makers
years were required before new weapons would provide backing for agreed that they should have gone to war to aid Czechoslovakia. But
it was too late for that. The next country to be threatened by Hitler
cause ot World war I was me rallure of the was Poland. Its cause was less just, its regime less compatible with
major states to conciliate states that had grievances, particularly those Western ideas of democracy or even human decency, and its terrain
caused by national feelings. It was the quarrel over nationalism be­ a lot harder to defend. It was, in fact, as Hitler calculated, irrational
tween the Serbs and the Austrians that set the armies in motion. After for the French and British to get into a major war with Germany over
World War! statesmen listened sympathetically to demands for re­ Poland. Nevertheless, the British and French leaders made that irra­
dressing national grievances. This policy of being conciliatory in the tional choice and World War II
face of justified demands was known as "appeasement," a word that
at the time had only favorable connotations. To be against appease­
ESCALATION INTO TOTAL WAR
ment was to be rigid, inflexible, in favor of the policies that had led
to World War I. Hitler was aware that military action against Poland was a gamble
The most famous example of appeasement was the Munich con­ that could turn into a major war. Like Bismarck before him in 1870
ference, at which the Sudetenland was transferred from Czechoslo­ and the German General Staff in 1914, he faced the threat of a two­
vakia to Germany. Hitler had used a branch of the Nazi Party to stir war. Germany, at the center of Europe, could be attacked simul­
up trouble in the Sudeten land, telling them always to ask for so much east and west. The German General Staff had tried to
that they could never be satisfied. He then used these incidents as a solve the problem in 1914 by careful military planning a knockout
pretext for demanding that the Sudeten Germans be put under German blow to the west, followed by an extended campaign in the east­
rule. The Czechs refused to be bullied and mobilized their reserves, but the plan had failed. Hitler chose to imitate Bismarck and
but the rest of the world was afraid of war and insisted on an inter­ a two-front war by diplomacy. I n August 1939, Germany signed a Non­
national conference instead. The conference, so eagerly sought as an AggreSSion Pact with Russia, (Anyone who believed that Mein Kampf
to war by Western leaders (including the American presi­ was a blueprint for Hitler's actions would have been misled here;
was far from a model of impartiality. It was held in the German Hitler had written that he would never ally with the Bolsheviks or, as
city of Munich, site of the Nazi Party's headquarters. It was attended he put it, use the devil to drive out Beelzebub.)ll
by Britain, France, Italy, and Germany but not by the country most With the threat of Russian reaction out of the way, Germany went
directly threatened, Czechoslovakia. As a result of the conference, the to War against Poland in September 1939, the date we usually give for
Czechs were ordered to hand over the Sudctenland, including border the opening of World War II. (In one sense the war in the Pacific had

~
~
fortifications and economic resources as well as about 700,000 Czechs begun in 1937 with the fighting between China and Japan; in another
who would now go under German rule. Yet Neville Chamberlain, the sense it did not truly become a world war until the Japanese attacked
British prime minister, came back from Munich with his black umbrella Pearl Harbor in 1941.) The Germans were staging a victory parade
, "

", ~~~"

38 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 39

through the streets of Poland's capital long before French and British the Sudeten ensls In 1938, 38 million gas masks were distributed in
forces could come to Poland's aid. Hitler hoped that the French and Britain. Yet during World War II poison gas was not used at all between
British would see how unreasonable it was to continue in a state of war belligerents. (The one exception was its limited use in 1941 by
with Germany, once Poland was defeated. After a winter with no fighting, the Japanese against the technologically less advanced Chinese.)
when he was unable to persuade the French and British to make peace, The prediction that airplanes would attack cities was correct (al­
Hitler launched a lightning campaign against France in the spring of though they did it with high explosive bombs, not gas). But the pre­
1940. Within six weeks France surrendered. Hitler now seriously un­ diction that these attacks would be decisive was wrong. World War II
dertook to defeat England. As a London news vendor put it, "French was eventually won on the ground, not from the air. Airplanes were
sign peace treaty: we're in the finals. fl2l But before any invasion could decisive when used tactically (that is, coordinated with ground
be undertaken, the Germans felt they had to destroy British defenses, but not when used strategically. There were a number of reasons for
and so mounted an aerial campaign that became known as the Battle this. One was that anti-aircraft defense was more effective than ex­
of Britain. pected; a loss of more than 10 per cent in planes for each attack (such
Subduing England from the air was more difficult than many pre­ as the Germans suffered in the Battle of Britain) was enough to make
war advocates of air power had predicted. Paradoxically, the air raids too costly. British and American raids in 1942 and 1943 often
had an advantage precisely because they had delayed so long in re­ suffered losses much higher than that. Another reason was the gross
arming. If they had heeded the warnings of men like Winston Churchill inaccuracy of bombing. In 1941, the Royal Air Force of Britain deter­
and rearmed in 1933, they would have been massively equipped mined that fewer than 20 per cent of the bombers it sent out had
inferior aircraft. The British won the Battle of Britain in large part be­ bombed within a circle 75 square miles in area around the designated
cause of their superior fighter aircraft, but the prototype of the Hurri­ target area. In heavily defended areas such as industrial targets, only
cane was first flown only in November 1 the prototype of the 7 per cent were dropping bombs within 75 square miles. News stories
Spitfi re in March 1936 u of "pinpoint" attacks were nothing more than war propaganda. 2s Still
decisive role of technology in the Battle of Britain reinforces another reason for the failure of strategic bombing was that the United
pessimistic conclusions that had emerged from studies of the con­ States and Britain did not devise a successful strategy for employing
duct of World War I, one of which was the increasing importance of bombers. Only in June 1944 did they finally begin to use them in a
technology. Another was the decreasing ability of human beings to way that would be decisive, in a single-minded concentration on de­
manage technology. Britain won the Battle of Britain because of su­ stroying petroleum products to deprive the German armed forces of
perior airplanes; Germany would have won if it had developed its jet fuel. But by the time this aerial strategy began to take hold the war
planes a little sooner. But the British succeeded by luck, not careful had already begun to turn against the Germans on the ground. 26
planning. The crucial question in modern warfare is: When do we stop Predictions of the horror of aerial warfare were finally vindicated
developing new weaponry and go into production? The Germans were on August 6, 1945, when the United States dropped the first atomic
a bit too early. At the other extreme, the French were a bit too late; bomb on Hiroshima. This was not the most destructive raid of the
their aircraft were still on the assembly lines when the Germans at­ war - raids with high explosive and incendiary bombs on Tokyo and
tacked. The British got it right, but only by luck. Dresden killed more people. But the atomic raid required only one
airplane and one bomb; the amount of destruction for the area it
covered was much greater than that of conventional bombs. Yet the
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN WARFARE: dropping of the atomic bomb is only a further illustration of human
AIRPLANES, THE ATOMIC BOMB inability to come to terms with modern technology. One question has
troubled many people since Hiroshima: Was the use of the atomic
Before fighting began in 1939 many predicted how horrible the bomb necessary at all? It was built, after all, out of fear that the
coming war would be because of the new technology. On the horror Germans would develop one first. It turned out that the Germans had
of the war the predictions were correct but not on much else. The made managerial mistakes and were nowhere close to haVing a bomb
most popular prewar version was that poison gas would be Widely the time they surrendered. If the United States had been at war
used, most likely dropped from airplanes onto cities. At the time of with Japan alone there never would have been an expensive crash
 40 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 41

program to build an atomic bomb. But once the time and money had although weakened by losses in the war '10 per cent of its popula­
been invested, it seemed easiest to go on and use it on 25 per cent of its industry - Russia was a major world power
But why, people ask, did we use it to kill people instead of in a second only to the United States. Russia's traditional enem Japan
harmless way that would still have demonstrated its destructive power? in Asia and Germany in Europe, had been eliminated as major rivals
answer is that the scientists could not think of a convincing tech­ by defeat in war. The other traditional powers in Europe had been
director of the removed as major factors as well. Italy was among the defeated coun­
did not think exploding one of them like tries, France was a winner in a technical sense only, having been
desert would be impressive. 11 Another nuclear defeated and occupied by the Germans in 1940. Britain was so weak­
Rabi, said it would have required very detailed in­ ened by the war that it had to give up most of its overseas interests
Japanese, more than were possible during the war. and concentrate on rebuilding at home. In a few years large portions
"You would have to tell them what instruments to bring," Rabi said, of the overseas possessions of France and Britain were to receive inde­
"and where to stand, and what to measure. Otherwise, it would look pendence and others were to move into positions from which they
a lot of pyrotechnics. It would take someone who understood the could demand it.
to realize what he was seeing." lS Part of this inability to devise Germany was treated far more harshly after World War I
an appropriate demonstration came from gross underestimation of the after the first war, yet because the Germans were
new weapon's power. General Groves, the top administrator of the prepared to acknowledge defeat, there was
atomic project, estimated in December 1944 that the bomb would 1918, Germany had not even been entered by enemy
have a force equivalent to 500 tons of TNT. By May 1945 the heads Germany was devastated and occupied. Without even
of the Los Alamos laboratories were predicting 700 to 1,500 tons of peace treaty this time, Germany was divided into
TNT. The actual power of the Hiroshima explosion was close to 14,000 was annexed by the Soviet Union and Poland, the two
tons of TNT, or ten times what scientists were saying in the crucial became separate states). All of ~ admin­
days when the decision was being made. 19 istration and, in Russians and the French,
looted of The troublesome border
problems tal
THE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR II
all Germans from areas now governed by
The dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan on August 6, About ten million Germans became refu­
1945 (and another on Nagasaki three days later) was followed in less gees, most eventually finding their way into West Germany where they
than a week by the Japanese decision to surrender. It was convincing up 25 per cent of the population. Although it was brutal, it did
I
i' proof to much of the world that technology was the decisive winner solve the troubled border issue that had caused friction between
I
of World War II. If a scientific breakth rough had given the Germans Germany and its neighbors after World War I. The Germans accepted
the bomb fi rst, the outcome of the war would su rely have and successfully absorbed the huge refugee population.
ent. The lesson people drew was that a modern industrial economy In the years after World War II it was not from the defeated but from
and a scientific establishment were the major components of mil the victors that the seeds of the next conflict would come.
power. In these the United States excelled. The old term Great Power
was replaced by a new one, Superpower, implying that all other states The two great wars of the twentieth century seemed to demon­
of the world combined could not prevail against such a state armed strate that the precepts of Clausewitz and the optimism of the age of
with the latest weapons. Bismarck were no longer valid. Instead of being short, useful instru­
In another way World War II changed the structures of world ments of state policy, wars turned out to be long and enormously
politics. It marked the emergence from self-imposed isolation of the destructive. Battle deaths in World War I numbered around nine mi
United States. It also marked the emergence of the Soviet Union from lion, yet the political goals were so unclear that w~ still are debating
an externally imposed isolation. Soviet ground forces fighting in east­ the reasons for the war. The reasons for World War II seem
ern Europe had reversed the German tide of fortune in the war. Now, yet the destruction was much greater. In addition to about fifteen
42 CAUSES OF WAR: HISTORICAL CASES AND HYPOTHESES WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II 43

million battle deaths, large numbers of civilians were killed, so that 26. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (princeton: Princeton University
deaths from World War II were around sixty Press, 1959), Chapter 4.
27. Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (New York:
the world's population. 30 The destructiveness of the two wars con­ Coward·McCann, 1965), p. 123.
vinced many people that war was no longer a useful means for settling 28. The New Yorker, October 20, 1975, p. 61.
disputes between states. The development of nuclear weapons during 29. Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 29.
World War II made the need to find an alternative to war a matter 30. Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2nd ed. University of
of urgency. Press, 1965), p. 1543.

NOTES

1. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (first
in 1848), Part II.
2. The British, French, and German reactions arc described Barbara Tuchman
in The Guns of August (New York: Dell, 1962L pp. 94, 111, the poet was Rupert
Brooke, who wrote "The 1914 Sonnets.
3. A dramatic illustration of th~'mi

of the recent wars is proVided by Edward L. 'Katzenbach, Ir., "The Horse

tieth Century," Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public

fiarvard University. ed. Carl I. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, 1958.

4. The importance of military planning is the main thesis of Tuchman's book

cited above.
5. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, first published in 1917 (New
York: International Publishers, 1939).
6. lenin, p. 11.
7. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
8. Beck, p. 198.
9. New York: Macmillan (2 volumes).
10. Fay, Vol. I, pp. 2, 34.
11. Vol. I., pp. 124,403; Vol. II, pp. 55(}"'552, 554.
12. I. Brown, Chemical Warfare (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
196B), p. 43.
M. Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare (Garden City, N. Y.:
1969), p. 2.
14. Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must fnd (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971), pp. 42-50.
15. Ibid.
16. S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the
Reich from 1918 to 1933 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1946)' p. 211.
17. Chapter 13. The most accessible edition in English is translated by Ralph
Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), p. 627.
1B. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1963), p. 127.
19. lain Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (New York: Atheneum, 1962). p. 261.
20. William L Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1969), p. 352.
21. For a defense of Chamberlain, see Macleod, cited above.
22. Hitler, Chapter 14 (p. 662 in Houghton Mifflin edition).
23. Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle (Boston: Uttle, Brown, 1969),
24. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: 194B).
p.128.
25. Charles Kinsley Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Au Offensive
Against Germany, 1939-1945 (london: H.M. Stationery Office, 1961), Vol. I, p. 247