RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO ( 39 PHIL.

660 )FACTS:

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It
was alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincialofficials of that
province. The petitioners were said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,Mindoro and one
Dabalos is said to be under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison of Calapanfor having run away
from the reservation.In a resolution adopted by the provincial board of Mindoro it was stated that several
attempts andschemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro which
were all afailure, and that unless other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of the province, no
successfulresult will be obtained toward educating those people, and that it is deemed necessary to oblige
them tolive in one place, designated in Tigbao, in the interest of law and order .. It was also provided that
anymangyan who shall refuse to comply with the order shall be imprisoned upon conviction. The saidresolution
has been duly approved by the Secretary of Interior and subsequently, the provincial governor approved of the
same pursuant to Administrative Order of 1917, enacted by the legislature, ordering thenon-Christians to take
up their habitation on the site provided and their failure to abide shall be a groundfor imprisonment.
Petitioner Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within thereservation of Tigbao
and are liable in accordance with Sec. 2759 of Act 2711. The provincial governor and the provincial board
directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao.Petitioner however, challenges the
validity of the said Administrative Code. It shall be noted that that thesubstance of the law in question is not
new to Philippine law. Antecedent laws make use of the term non-Christians with reference to uncivilized
elements of the islands.

The court made a long enumeration of antecedent laws before and after the acquisition of the UnitedStates of
the Philippine Islands. These laws denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the non Christianinhabitants of
the Philippines and settled and consistent practice with reference to the method to befollowed for their
advancement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.Whether or not Sec 2145
of Administrative Oreder of 1917 is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the Petitioners were not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberlty. More so,Sec.
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
Constitutional.
RATIO:
***Constitutional Issues*** Delegation of Legislative Power.
Petitioner contends that the order of the governor, directing the Maguianes to habitate themselves inTigabo, is
an undue delegation of legislative power.The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealouslyprotected. Judge Ranney in the case of Ohio stressed that: “The true distinction
therefore is between thedelegation of power to make the law which necessarily involveds a discretion as to
what it shall be, andconferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
pursuance of the law.The first cannot be delegated; the latter no objection can be made. As held in Wayman
vs. Southard,Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department or official. In the case
at hand,the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board,and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law and such discretion
isindeed necessary. Furthermore, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice,permits
the central legislative to delegate powers to local authority. As officials charged with theadministration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select siteswhich are favorable for
improving the people who have misfortunes of being backward in the society.
Religious Discrimination
The words non-Christian have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippinesstatute
books as a descriptive adjective applied to tribes, people, or inhabitants dwelling in more or lessremote districts
and provinces throughout the islands. It denotes low grade of civilization of the individualsincluded in the class
to which they apply.
Liberty: Due Process of Law; Equal Protection Clause
Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and workwhere he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, an for that purpose toenter into
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out these purposes to asuccessful
conclusion. Liberty as understood in democracies is liberty regulated by law. Whenever andwherever the
natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rightswhich are also and
equally natural, such as assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. Theauthority conferred upon
executive officials by the law in question does not unduly interfere with the libertyof the citizen when the degree
of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.Due process of law and equal protection clause are not violated
by the law in question. There exist a law which is reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of
procedure; and it applies to allmembers of the same class.
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another.Confinement in the reservations in accordance with the said Administrative Code of 1917 does
notconstitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
Police Power
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self preservation. The Philippines has both onreason
and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the generalwelfare and the
public interest. Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Order of 1917 is a pure exercise of policepower and the court
cannot declare that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting thesaid law.
Legislative Intent
The fundamental objective of government policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
andadvancement in civilization. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of
btheGovernment are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health
andmorals—to begin the process of civilization. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the Stae
isconcerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcingit, are
to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of the great Island.

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of
a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an
amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the
supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential
employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider
the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a
certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due
process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable
opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a
hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted
to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity
to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process.
He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid
exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate
slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to
the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE [203 SCRA 140; G.R. No.
81756; 21 Oct 1991]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City

filed an "application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against
petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the
presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to
the saidapplications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972.
Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama
Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves,cigarette and
joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at
any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence of his father Comedes
Silva and to open aparadors, lockers,cabinets, cartons and containers to look
for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money
belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on
the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.

Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers
abused their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.

Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to
examine the witness in the form of searching questions andanswers. The
questions asked were leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no. Such
questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The
questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in
their answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of
her money.

The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their
authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not
indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc.
Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void.

*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court

Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions andanswers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with their affidavits.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967

ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. MARTINIANO VIVO in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-
appellant.

Engracio Fabre Law Office for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor A. M. Amores for respondent-appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the
Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China
two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her
minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957.

Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a
temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.

On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to
this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.

To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions.
The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. 1äwphï1.ñët

In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her
son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon
failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban
Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to
stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain
the Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending
resolution of this case.1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court
of First Instance rendered judgment, viz:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU
WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel
her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper
dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the
respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;
 (b) Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN, and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining the respondent, his representatives or
subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

(c) Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN
SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00; and

(d) Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940 unconstitutional;

Without pronouncement, as to costs.

Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed.

We will deal with the claims of both appellants in their proper sequence.

1. The Solicitor General's brief assails the trial court's declaration that Chan Sau Wah is a citizen of
the Philippines. The court a quo took the position that "Chan Sau Wah became, by virtue of, and
upon, her marriage to Esteban Morano, a natural-born Filipino, a Filipino citizen.2

Placed to the fore is paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 [Revised Naturalization Act],
which reads:

Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) valid marriage of an alien woman to a citizen
of the Philippines and (b) the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized.

We may concede that the first requisite has been properly met. The validity of the marriage is
presumed.

But can the same be said of the second requisite? This question by all means is not new. In a series
of cases, this Court has declared that the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino citizen does
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must satisfactorily show that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law. 3 Ly Giok Ha alias
Wy Giok Ha et al. vs. Emilio Galang, L-21332, March 18, 1966,* clearly writes down the philosophy
behind the rule in the following expressive language, viz:

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified
under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in
violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —

"(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(b) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,"

 so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted
by a competent court, would not be thereby disqualified; still it is certain that the law did not
intend such a person to, be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an
applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government
by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk," and thus
disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be
disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government," nor
affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments," nor
"defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

Upon the principle of selective citizenship, we cannot afford to depart from the wise precept affirmed
and reaffirmed in the cases heretofore noted.

In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not
possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.

Because of all these we are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan Sau Wah did not become a
Filipino citizen.

2. Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act
of 1940, which reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under
which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant.

Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in
Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of the Constitution, to wit:

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the
legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of
Rights.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure
indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of
deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

The following from American Jurisprudence,5 is illuminating:

It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the
deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive
officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive.

xxx xxx xxx

The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of,
crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may
constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with
the policy of Congress is purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a
criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution
aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.6

The view we here express finds support in the discussions during the constitutional convention. The
convention recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty,
other than by order of a competent court.7

Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on
the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact
that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors
who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by
the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were
admitted as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37 (a), subsection (7); C.A. 613, as amended)." 9

And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was
challengedas unconstitutional, because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section 1,
paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution," this Court declared —

This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is
subject to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among
them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person in
whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such
 condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his
deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would
render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.10

It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is not constitutionally
proscribed.

3. A sequel to the questions just discussed is the second error set forth in the government's brief. The
Solicitor General balks at the lower court's ruling that petitioner Chan Sau Wah is entitled to
permanent residence in the Philippines without first complying with the requirements of Sections 9
and 13 of the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503.

We first go to the law, viz:

SEC. 9 [last paragraph]

An alien who is admitted as a nonimmigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To

obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry
for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.

SEC. 13. Under the conditions set forth in this Act there may be admitted into the Philippines
immigrants, termed "quota immigrants" not in excess of fifty (50) of any one nationality or
without nationality for any one calendar year, except that the following immigrants, termed
"nonquota immigrants," maybe admitted without regard to such numerical limitations.

The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate and certify the
eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his admission into the Philippines. Qualified and
desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under temporary stay may be admitted within the
quota, subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of section 9 of this Act.

(a) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age of a
Philippine citizen, if accompanying or following to join such citizen;

(b) A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the mother, the mother
having been previously lawfully admitted into the Philippine for permanent residence, if the
child is accompanying or coming to join a parent and applies for admission within five years
from the date of its birth;

Concededly, Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a
non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified
and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first,
she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the appropriate
consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the
Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of the immigration Act.
This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a
temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country and
complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. 11

The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila
a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to
family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a
high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in
the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.

Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this
Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a
Filipino would ipso factomake her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to judicial
action. No breadth of discretion is allowed us. We cannot insulate her from the State's power of
deportation.

Really, it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor,
go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby
skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this
country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the
Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.

Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. 12

The ruling of the trial court on this score should be reversed.

4. It is petitioners' turn to point as error the dismissal of the petition for mandamus and prohibition with
respect to petitioner Fu Yan Fun.

Petitioners' line of thought is this: Fu Yan Fun follows the citizenship of his mother. They cite Section
15, paragraph 3, Commonwealth Act 473, which says that:

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen. . . .

Petitioners' position is based on the assumption that Chan Sau Wah, the mother, is a Filipino citizen.
We have held that she is not. At best, Fu Yan Fun is a step-son of Esteban Morano, husband of Chan
Sau Wah. A step-son is not a foreign-born child of the step-father. The word child, we are certain,
means legitimate child, not a step-child. We are not wanting in precedents. Thus, when the
Constitution provides that "[t]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" are citizens
thereof, 13 the fundamental charter intends "those" to apply to legitimate children. 14 In another case,
the term "minor children" or "minor child" in Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law refers only
to legitimate children of Filipino citizens. This Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, there
said: 15

It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child," used in these provisions,
include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is,
for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word "children" or "child" is used
 in statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the
context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the
Constitution provides that "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines," and "those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines" who shall elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions
[3] and [4]), our fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiongbian vs. De Leon,
46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).

At any rate, Fu Yan Fun entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor. The status of a temporary
visitor cannot be converted into, that of a permanent resident, as we have heretofore held, without
first complying with Section 9 of the Immigration Law.

5. Petitioners finally aver that the lower court erred in authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit
the bond filed by petitioners Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun in the amount of P4,000.00.

Here is petitioners' posture. They enjoyed their stay in the Philippines upon a bond. Now they come to
court and say that as the prescribed form of this bond was not expressly approved by the Secretary of
Justice in accordance with Section 3 of Commonwealth Act 613, which reads —

SEC. 3. . . . He [Commissioner of Immigration] shall issue, subject to the approval of the

Department Head, such rules and regulations and prescribes such forms of bond, reports, and
other papers, and shall issue from time to time such instruction, not inconsistent with law, as
he shall deem best calculated to carry out the provisions of the immigration laws. . . .

that bond is void.

Reasons there are which prevent us from giving our imprimatur to this argument.

The provision requiring official approval of a bond is merely directory. "Irregularity or entire failure in
this respect does not affect the validity of the bond. 16 The reason for the rule, is found in 9 C.J., p. 26
(footnote), which reads:

(a) Reason for rule. — "Statutes requiring bonds to be approved by certain officials are not for the
purpose of protecting the obligors in the bond, but are aimed to protect the public, to insure their
solvency, and to create evidence of an unimpeachable character of the fact of their execution. When
they are executed for a legal purpose, before a proper tribunal, and are in fact accepted and
approved by the officer or body, whose duty it was to approve them, it could serve no useful purpose
of the law to hold them invalid, to release all the obligors thereon, and to defeat every purpose of its
execution, simply because the fact of approval was not indorsed precisely as had been directed by
the Legislature." American Book Co. vs. Wells, 83 SW 622, 627, 26 Ky L-1159. (emphasis supplied)

And another. This bond was accepted by the government. It had been there. The form of the bond
here used is of long continued usage. If the government did not question the form of the bond at all,
then we must assume that it counted with the Secretary's approval. For the presumption is that official
duty has been legally performed.

Surely enough, equitable considerations will stop petitioners from pleading invalidity of the bond.
They offered that bond to enable them to enter and stay in this country. They enjoyed benefits
therefrom. They cannot, "in law, and good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits" of that bond, and
then jettison the same. They are "precluded from attacking the validity" of such bond. 17

Actually, to petitioners the bond was good while they sought entry into the Philippines; they offered it
as security for the undertaking; that they "will actually depart from the Philippines" when their term of
stay expires. Now that the bond is being confiscated because they overstayed, they make an about-
face and say that such bond is null and void. They shall not profit from this inconsistent position. Their
bond should be confiscated.

Conformably to the foregoing, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows:

(1) The portion thereof which reads:

(a) Granting their petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU
WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel
her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper
dues; and declaring preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the
respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

is hereby reversed: and, in consequence —

The petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied;
and the judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing respondent to cancel her Alien
Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction with
respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside; and

(2) In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, J.J., concur.

Separate Opinions