BOOK IV

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to

give, to do or not to do.1

Concept of Obligations. — Evidently, the above definition of

an obligation is adopted from Sanchez Roman’s classic definition of
an obligation as “the juridical necessity to comply with a prestation.”2
Manresa, on the other hand, defines it as a “legal relation established
between one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to the
fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of him.’’3
It must be observed, however, that obligations may be either
civil or natural.4 A civil obligation is one which has a binding force in
law, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing it
against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the obligation
which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation, on
the other hand, is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which
is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to

1
New provision.
2
4 Sanchez Roman 53.
3
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 21.
4
Art. 1423, Civil Code.

1
Art. 1156 OBLIGATIONS

the natural law.5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordance

with the statute of limitations, a natural obligation still subsists,
although the civil obligation is extinguished. This may be illustrated
by the following example: If A has a right of action, evidenced by
a promissory note, to collect one thousand pesos from B, and such
promissory note prescribes after the expiration of ten years from
the time it accrues,6 although the latter is no longer bound to pay
the obligation in accordance with the statute of limitations, he is
still bound to pay in accordance with equity and natural law.7 It is,
therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a natural obligation may
be distinguished from each other as follows:
(1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a natural
obligation is based on equity and natural law; and
(2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while the
latter is not.8
Requisites of Obligations. — An obligation has four essential
requisites. They are:
(1) A juridical or legal tie, which binds the parties to the
obligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or unilateral
acts of persons;
(2) An active subject known as the obligee or creditor, who
can demand the fulfillment of the obligation;
(3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor, against
whom the obligation is juridically demandable; and
(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object
of the obligation.9
The form in which the obligation is manifested is sometimes
added as a fifth requisite. As a general rule, however, it cannot be
considered as essential. Obligations arising from law, quasi-con-
tracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do not
require any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question regard-

5
3 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2394-2395.
6
Art. 1144, Civil Code.
7
Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 40.
8
Art. 1423, Civil Code.
9
Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Vol. 1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p. 20.

2
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156

ing their validity or binding force. It is only in obligations arising

from certain contracts that it becomes essential. Thus, in a con-
tract involving a donation of personal property whose value exceeds
P5,000.00, the law requires that the donation and the acceptance
shall be made in writing;10 in a contract of sale of a piece of land or
any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that the
authority of the latter shall be in writing;11 in a contract of simple
loan or mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with respect
to interest shall be expressly stipulated in writing;12 in a contract of
antichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal and
of the interest shall be specified in writing;13 in a contract involving
a donation of immovable property, the law requires that the dona-
tion shall be made in a public document, while the acceptance shall
be made either in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document;14 in a contract of partnership where immovable property
or real rights are contributed to the common fund, the law requires
that the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an inven-
tory of the property or real rights, signed by the partners, must be
attached;15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law requires that
the personal property which is the subject matter of the contract
shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a security
for the performance of an obligation;16 and in a contract involving
the sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale or
transfer shall be registered.17 Non-compliance with such formalities
would have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void or
inexistent.

Classification of Obligations. — The following is the primary

classification of obligations under the Civil Code:
(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).
(2) With a period (Arts. 1193-1198).
(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).

10
Art. 748, Civil Code.
11
Art. 1874, Civil Code.
12
Art. 1956, Civil Code.
13
Art. 2134, Civil Code.
14
Art. 749, Civil Code.
15
Arts. 1771, 1773, Civil Code.
16
Art. 2140, Civil Code.
17
Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art. 1581, Civil Code.

3
Art. 1156 OBLIGATIONS

(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).

(5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).
(6) With a penal clause (Arts. 1226-1230).
There are, however, other classifications of a secondary char-
acter which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the Civil
Code, such as:
(1) Legal, conventional and penal;18
(2) Real and personal;19
(3) Determinate and generic;20
(4) Positive and negative;21
(5) Unilateral and bilateral;22
(6) Individual and collective;23
(7) Accessory and principal.24
The following, on the other hand, is the classification of
obligations according to Sanchez Roman:25
(1) As to juridical quality:
(a) Natural — when the obligation is in accordance with
natural law.
(b) Civil — when the obligation is in accordance with
positive law.
(c) Mixed — when the obligation is in accordance with
both natural and positive law.

18
Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.
19
Arts. 1163-1168, Civil Code.
20
Arts. 1163-1166, Civil Code.
21
Arts. 1167-1168, Civil Code.
22
Arts. 1169-1191, Civil Code.
23
Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code.
24
Arts. 1166, 1226, et seq., Civil Code.
25
8 Sanchez Roman 20-40.

4
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156

2. As to parties:
(a) Unilateral and bilateral — unilateral, where only
one party is bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mu-
tually or reciprocally bound.
(b) Individual and collective — individual, where there
is only one obligor, and collective, where there are several ob-
ligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable only
for his proportionate share of the obligation, or solidary, when
each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.
3. As to object:
(a) Determinate and generic — determinate, when the
object is specific; generic, when the object is designated by its
class or genus.
(b) Simple and multiple — simple, when there is only
one undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertak-
ings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of the
undertakings are demandable at the same time, or distribu-
tive, when only one undertaking out of several is demandable.
Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alterna-
tive, when the obligor is allowed to choose one out of several
obligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative,
when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation for
one which is due and demandable.
(c) Positive and negative — positive, when the obligor
is obliged to give or do something; negative, when the obligor
must refrain from giving or doing something.
(d) Real and personal — real, when the obligation con-
sists in giving something; personal, when the obligation con-
sists in doing or not doing something.
(e) Possible and impossible — possible, when the ob-
ligation is capable of fulfillment in nature as well as in law;
impossible, when the obligation is not capable of fulfillment
either in nature or in law.
(f) Divisible and indivisible — divisible, when the obli-
gation is susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, when
the obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.

5
Art. 1157 OBLIGATIONS

(g) Principal and accessory — principal, when it is the

main undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an undertaking
to guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation.
4. As to perfection and extinguishment:
(a) Pure — when the obligation is not subject to any
condition or term and is immediately demandable.
(b) Conditional — when the obligation is subject to a
condition which may be suspensive, in which case the happen-
ing or fulfillment of the condition results in the birth of the
obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or ful-
fillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of the
obligation.
(c) With a term or period (a plazo) — when the obligation
is subject to a term or period which may be suspensive or from
a day certain, in which case the obligation is demandable only
upon the expiration of the term, or resolutory or to a day certain,
in which case the obligation terminates upon the expiration of
the term.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

1. Law;
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and
5. Quasi-delicts.26
Sources of Obligations. — In Roman law, the sources of
obligations are: (1) contractu; (2) quasi-contractu; (3) maleficio;
and (4) quasi-maleficio.27 These sources are preserved in the Civil
Code with the addition of law or lege.28 The addition of lege as an
independent source of obligations, however, has been criticized as
theoretically erroneous. Thus, according to the Supreme Court:

26
Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.
27
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 35.
28
Art. 1157, Civil Code.

6
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1158

“This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes that

the quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed by
law are of different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi,
criticizes this assumption and says that the classification embodied
in the Code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one
or the other of these categories should have been suppressed and
merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish
Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9) The validity of the criticism is, we think,
self-evident and it is of interest to note that the common law makes
no distinction between the two sources of liability. The obligations
which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those
arising ex lege, are in the common law system merged into the
category of obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated
implied contracts.’’29

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not pre-

sumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in
special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the
precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what
has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.30
Obligations Arising from Law. — Unlike other obligations,
those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently, only
those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws are
demandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the precepts
of the law which establishes them, and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.31
How can we determine whether an obligation arises from
law or from some other source, such as a contract, quasi-contract,
criminal offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted that in the birth or
generation of an obligation, there is always a concurrence between
the law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or condition
upon which the obligation is based or predicated. According to
Manresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act or
condition upon which it is based is nothing more than a factor for
determining the moment when it becomes demandable, then the law

29
Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.
30
Art. 1090, Spanish Civil Code.
31
Art. 1158, Civil Code.

7
Art. 1159 OBLIGATIONS

itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law merely
recognizes or acknowledges the existence of an obligation generated
by an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract, criminal
offense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate such
obligation, then the act itself is the source of the obligation and not
the law.32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount to B in a game of chance,
according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the former may recover his
loss from the latter, with legal interest from the time he paid the
amount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the source of
the obligation of B to refund to A the amount which he had won from
the latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-
delict, but the law itself.33 The same can also be said with regard to
the obligation of the spouses to support each other,34 the obligations
of employers under the Labor Code,35 the obligations of the owners of
the dominant and servient estates in legal easements,36 and others
scattered in the Civil Code and in special laws.

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the

force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.37
Obligations Arising from Contracts. — A contract is a
meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.38
As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all of the consequences
which according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.39 These contracts are commonly called consensual
contracts. Once the contract is perfected, the valid contract has the
force of law binding the parties to comply therewith in good faith,
where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of the
other. (Tiu Peck vs. CA 221 SCRA 618 [1993]) There are certain

32
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48.
33
Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.
34
Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs. Lauron, 12 Phil. 453.
35
Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.
36
Arts. 634, 687, Civil Code.
37
Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form.
38
Art. 1305, Civil Code.
39
Art. 1315, Civil Code.

8
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1160

contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge

and commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the
object of the obligation.40 Whether the contract is consensual or real,
the rule is that from the moment it is perfected, obligations which
may be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations
are those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged to
do or to give something; unilateral obligations, on the other hand,
are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged to do
or to give something.
Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from contracts
are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting parties.
This is clearly deducible not only from the nature of contracts, but
also from Art. 1169 of the Code which declares that such obligations
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should
be complied with in good faith. “Compliance in good faith’’ means
performance in accordance with the stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code recognizes
the right of such contracting parties to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.41 Good faith must, therefore, be observed to prevent
one party from taking unfair advantage over the other party. In
the case of Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 608
(1986), it was ruled that evasion by a party of legitimate obligations
after receiving the benefits under the contract would constitute
unjust enrichment on his part. However, in default of an agreement,
the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such obligations are
applicable.42

Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts

shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of
this Book.43
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. — Quasi-
contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary

40
Art. 1316, Civil Code.
41
Art. 1306, Civil Code.
42
Art. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.
43
New provision.

9
Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS

and unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become bound

to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another.44 The most important
of these juridical relations which are recognized and regulated
by the Civil Code are negotiorum gestio45 and solutio indebiti.46
Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever a
person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another without any power or authority from
the latter.47 In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or officious
manager has assumed the agency or management of the business or
property, he shall be obliged to continue such agency or management
until the termination of the affair and its incidents,48 exercising such
rights and complying with such obligations as provided for in the
Code.49 Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the juridical relation
which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through
mistake to another who has no right to demand it.50 In this type of
quasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the person to whom
the delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to return the
property delivered or the money paid.51
The Civil Code provides other instances of quasi-contract.
Examples are those found in Articles 2159, 2164 to 2175.
In the case of Perez vs. Palomar, 2 Phil. 682, it was significantly
noted that in a quasi contract where no express consent is given by
the other party, the consent needed in a contract is provided by law
through presumption (presumptive consent). Presumptive consent
gives rise to multiple juridical relations resulting in obligations for
delivery of the thing and rendering of service.

Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses shall

be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of
Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,

44
Art. 2142, Civil Code.
45
Art. 2144, Civil Code.
46
Art. 2154, Civil Code.
47
Art. 2144, Civil Code.
48
Ibid.
49
Arts. 2144-2152, Civil Code.
50
Art. 2154, Civil Code.
51
Ibid.

10
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161

Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of

this Book, regulating damages.52
Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. — As a rule,
every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable.53 This principle
is based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect — the
criminal aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects are
separate and distinct from each other in the sense that one affects
the social order and the other, private rights, so that the purpose of
the first is to punish or correct the offender, while the purpose of the
second is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it
is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liability
itself.
Please note, however, that there are offenses and special crimes
without civil liability. Examples are crimes of treason, rebellion,
illegal possession of firearm and gambling. But a person who is not
criminally liable may still be civilly liable.
Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. — In general and
prior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the following
rules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil liability
arising from criminal offenses:
(1) Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party (i) expressly waives
the civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it separately, or
(iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
(2) Independent civil action. — In the cases provided in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

52
Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.
53
Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is subject to the rules stated
in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code.

11
Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS

(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases

not included in the preceding rules, the following rules are observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
(b) If the civil action has been filed ahead of the criminal
action, and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the
civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before final
judgment it may be found, until final judgment in criminal
action has been rendered. However, if no final judgment
has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the
same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the criminal action. If the
application is granted, the evidence prevented and admitted
in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced
in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of
additional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case
of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall be
tried and decided jointly;
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to
the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person who may be liable
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the
damage suffered.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure 2000, however, it is stated that except for civil actions
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The action
contemplated, as pointed out by Justice Oscar Herrera in his
Treatise on Criminal Procedure, is a civil action arising from a crime
if reserved or filed separately and a criminal case is filed if it has to
be suspended to await final judgment in the criminal action.
The rule clarifies that, “During the pendency of the criminal
action, the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot

12
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161

be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended

shall not run.’’ Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of the
civil actions under Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall not be
suspended because they can be instituted separately. This refers to
civil actions arising from the offense charged which have not been
reserved or civil actions that have been filed ahead of the criminal
action but have been suspended. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise
on Historical Development and Highlights of Amendment of Rules
on Criminal Procedure, February 2001).
(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability
is no bar to a criminal action.
(5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of
a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the fiscal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000
provides for the elements of a prejudicial question. They are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action which involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Section 7 limits a prejudicial question to a “previously insti-
tuted civil action’’ in order to minimize possible abuses by the sub-
sequent filing of a civil action as an after thought for the purpose of
suspending the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise
on Criminal Procedure, February 2001)
At a glance, therefore, the following are the salient changes
brought about by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000,
as more specifically discussed hereunder by Justice Herrera in his
Treatise on Criminal Procedure:
a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988.
Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil liability
arising from crime including the civil liability under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising

13
Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS

from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly instituted

with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from
the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
b. Under the former rule, a waiver of any of three civil
actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the res-
ervation of the right to file any of said civil actions separately
waives the others. This is no longer provided for. The reserva-
tion and waiver refers only to the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even with-
out a reservation.
c. The rulings in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo
City, 167 SCRA 376, allowing a third-party complaint, and the
ruling in Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA
376, as well as Cabaero vs. Cantos allowing a counterclaim are
no longer in force. Under the 2000 Rules, these pleadings are
no longer allowed. Any claim which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the
filing of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for
which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of the
check involved. In other cases, no filing fees shall be required
for actual damages.

Idem; Id. — Effect of acquittal. — If the accused in a

criminal action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil action
for damages based on the same act or omission still be instituted?
This question requires a qualified answer. If the acquittal of the
accused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages based

14
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161

on the same act or omission may still be instituted.54 In such case,

mere preponderance of evidence shall be sufficient in order that
the plaintiff will be able to recover from the defendant.55 On the
other hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground that he did not
commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing, if
the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as a
general rule, no longer possible.56

Idem; id. — Effect of independent civil actions. — As a

rule, the civil action to recover damages from the person criminally
liable is not independent from the criminal action. This is true even
where it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the injured
party from the criminal proceedings either by reserving his right to
file a separate civil action or by commencing the action to recover
damages ahead of the criminal action. In the first, the right to file a
civil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal action, while
in the second, once the criminal action is instituted, the action to
recover damages shall be suspended.57 There are, however, certain
exceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the civil
action to recover damages is entirely separate and independent from
the criminal action, although the act or omission which is the basis
thereof may be a criminal offense. They are: first, where the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a criminal offense or felony;58 and second, where the
law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action
which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.59 As
a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that these
cases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule that if
the accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground that he
did not commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution of a
civil action is no longer possible.

54
Art. 29, Civil Code.
55
Ibid.
56
Sec. 3(c), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.
57
Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.
58
Arts. 31, 177, Civil Code.
59
Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.

15
Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS

With regard to the first, it must be noted that where the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action may
proceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of the
result of the latter.60 It is evident that in such case the basis of the
civil action may be an obligation arising from the law, contract,
quasi-contract, or quasi-delict. Thus, a postmaster, who has been
charged criminally for malversation of government funds under
his custody, may still be made a defendant in a civil case for the
recovery of the funds, not on the ground of malversation, but on
the ground that under Sec. 633 of the Revised Administrative Code,
he can be held accountable therefor.61 The basis of the civil action
in such case is not the obligation arising from the criminal offense
of malversation, but the obligation arising from the law. Similarly,
if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to recover
damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries sustained in
an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the criminal
prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may, therefore,
be continued regardless of the result of the latter. Consequently,
he can still recover damages even if the driver is acquitted in the
criminal action, because it is clear that the action in such case is
based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission of the
driver complained of as felony.62 The same principle is also applicable
if the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa aquiliana
or quasi-delict under the Civil Code.63 In such case, the injured party
can always institute a civil action to recover damages independently
of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter. This
is so even granting that the accused is acquitted in the criminal
action either on the ground of reasonable doubt or on the ground
that he did not commit the offense charged. The reason for this is
that the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal liability of
the defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort.64

60
Art. 31, Civil Code.
61
Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 121.
62
San Pedro Bus Line vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 840; Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Trans.
Co., 7 SCRA 276.
63
Art. 2176, et seq., Civil Code.
64
Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Dyogi vs.
Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112; Stanvac vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109.

16
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161

With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are

five exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which is stated
in Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expressly
grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which
is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. They
are: (1) interferences by public officers or employees or by private
individuals with civil rights and liberties,65 (2) defamation,66 (3)
fraud,67 (4) physical injuries,68 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city or
municipal police officer to render aid or protection in case of danger
to life or property.69 In all of these cases or instances, although the
act or omission may constitute a criminal offense in accordance
with our penal laws, the injured party may institute a civil action
to recover damages which is entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action. Once the action is instituted, then it may proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.70
Idem; id.; id. — Effect of failure to make reservation. —
Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: “In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided that the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section.’’ The insertion
in the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section, resulted in a debate among
academicians which lasted for more than twenty years.
Finally, interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court,
in Garcia vs. Florido,71 declared:

“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act

causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.

65
Art. 32, Civil Code.
66
Art. 33, Civil Code.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Art. 34, Civil Code.
70
Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.
71
52 SCRA 420. This case was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91
SCRA 113.

17
Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS

The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is

a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its
own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the
view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result
of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
were drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to
the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law.’ x x x’’

Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe,72 the Supreme Court declared:

“The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only result

in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional
doubt. Article 33 is quite clear: ‘In case of x x x physical injuries,
a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only preponderance of evidence.’ That is a
substantive right not to be frittered away by a construction
that would render it nugatory, if through oversight, the
offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for
damages in a civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this Court
both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter
does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of
substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as
would give rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The law as an
instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm,
particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to
a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged
right.’’

Thus, in Elcano vs. Hill,73 where the first defendant had

been previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide and
subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act is not criminal,

72
57 SCRA 106.
73
77 SCRA 98.

18
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the Supreme

Court held, despite the fact that the plaintiffs (who are the parents
of the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their right
to institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, that
acquittal is not a bar to the civil action against him. The same
ruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta.74 In effect, the procedural
requirement provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules
of Court is not mandatory.
Removal of Reservation Requirement For Independent
Civil Actions
Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court was likewise
amended to read as:

“SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.

— In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.’’ (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000).

Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only be

allowed if there is a reservation, or were filed ahead of the criminal
action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure,
February 2001).

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall

be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of the
Book, and by special laws.75

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. — As it is used

in this part of the Civil Code, the term “quasi-delicts”76 refers to all
of those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-

74
91 SCRA 113.
75
Art. 1093, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.
76
In Spanish law, “cuasi-delitos’’ is sometimes known as “culpa aquiliana’’ or
“culpa extra-contractual.’’

19
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

contracts, or criminal offenses.77 Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil

Code and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the
fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connected
or unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation,
causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the equivalent of
the term “tort” in Anglo-American law.78

Idem; Persons liable. — Obligations arising from quasi-

delicts are demandable not only from the person directly responsible
for the damage incurred,79 but also against the following:
(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, with respect to damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company;
(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who live
in their company;
(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise, with respect to damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions;
(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry;
(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains; and
(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades, with respect to damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.80
It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above
persons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they have

77
Report of the Code Commission, p. 161.
78
See Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98.
79
Art. 2176, Civil Code.
80
Art. 2180, Civil Code.

20
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent

damage.81
Idem; Requisites of liability. — In actions based on quasi-
delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from the
defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following
facts:
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.82
Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. — Quasi-delicts and crimi-
nal offenses are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other.
However, they may be distinguished from each other in the follow-
ing ways:
(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are
only of private concern;
(2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs
the damages incurred;
(3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal and
civil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and
(4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them,
while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.83
Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. — In Elcano vs. Hill (G.R. No.
L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that quasi-delicts
include acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the exact language
of the Court, “it is ‘more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress,’ to hold, as

81
Ibid.
82
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8.
83
Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607.

21
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence,

covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.’’

The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is

startling. It expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond what
was originally contemplated by the lawmaker.
Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the scope
of obligations arising from the law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
and acts or omissions punished by law is well-defined. Their
boundaries are clearly delineated and drawn with precision. It
is only with respect to obligations arising from quasi-delicts that
there is a problem and this is natural because of the very nature
of such obligations. Under our system of liabilities, quasi-delicts
must necessarily be a sort of “dumping ground’’ or “garbage can’’
for all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the purview
of the four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the original
plan envisaged by the lawmaker is as follows:
The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap with
crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and
which we can very well call the general rule) are: first, negligent
acts or omissions not punishable as criminal offenses; second,
intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those regulated by
Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code; and
third, the so-called strict liability torts where there is neither
negligence nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in the
case contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the case of
actionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705 of the Civil Code.
The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with acts
or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (and
which we can very well call the exceptions) are: first, criminal
negligence; and second, acts or omissions punishable as crimes
under the Revised Penal Code but the Civil Code expressly
declares that the civil action arising therefrom is separate and
independent from the criminal action. (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code)
We believe that the above arrangement was deliberately
planned. Thus, according to the Code Commission in its Report:
“The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting
the word ‘tort’ from Anglo-American law. But ‘tort’ under that
system is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept
of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. ‘Tort’ in
Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but

22
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false

imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine
legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed by
the Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the
Project.’’ (Report, pp. 161-162)

Idem; Character of remedy. — In Padua vs. Robles,84 in his

concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: “It is by now beyond
all cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a
negligent act, such as that committed in this case, gives rise to at
least two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil
liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability
arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.
These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other that
exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other.
Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately
and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil
Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent
act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts
awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had already
been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the
amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case
only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he had
already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not
recover anymore in the second case.’’
The above opinion was confirmed in Elcano vs. Hill.85 Thus,
according to the Supreme Court: “Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
the civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered

84
66 SCRA 485.
85
77 SCRA 98.

23
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by

a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.”
However, in Mendoza vs. Arrieta,86 a more recent case, there was
a return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this case, the
Supreme Court categorically held that since the offended or injured
party had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised Penal
Code by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the
criminal action, and since the court had expressly declared that the
fact from which the civil liability did not exist, therefore, the civil
action for damages subsequently commenced by said injured party
against the defendant has already been extinguished in consonance
with Sec. 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if plaintiff’s
cause of action against defendant is not ex-delicto, the end result
would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal
case that defendant’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable
doubt.
Thus, the problem is still very much with us. The debate rages
on.

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario

73 Phil. 607

This case come up from the Court of Appeals which held

the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for
the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,
on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,
there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by
Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court
in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed

86
91 SCRA 113.

24
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino

Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March
7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,
1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages
in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the
date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest
from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla’s negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was
driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo’s responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
“* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla’s employer.
There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. (See p. 22, appellant’s brief.)
In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile
Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violations which appeared in
the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public
and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under
the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.’’
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of
Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,
his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The petitioner’s
brief states on page 10:
“* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being
sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla
to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,
the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case Article
1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter 11, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes
said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime
as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book lV of the Civil Code, in precise words of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code itself, is applicable only to “those (obligations) arising
from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by
law.’ ’’
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed
thus:

25
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

“* * * We cannot agree to the defendant’s contention.

The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is
not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor
(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in
Article .1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the
selection or supervision of his servant or employee.”

Speaking through Justice Bocobo, the Supreme Court held:

“The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs

may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly responsible under
Article 1903 (now Art. 2180, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code as
an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,
according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To
decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has,
in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos
and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or
negligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now Arts. 2176 to 2194,
New Civil Code) of the Civil Code.
“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or
“culpa aquiliana’’ is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers
may be safely anchored.
xxx
“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article.1902
of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver’s
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions “not punishable by law.’’ But
inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes
the “confusion worse confounded.’’ However, a closer study
shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent
acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos

26
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing

damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.
xxx
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault of negligence under
Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for
fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render
it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the
defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under
Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.
“Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 366 punishes
not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law according to the literal import
of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to
be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

27
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

“Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,

proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
“Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make de-
fendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount
to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy un-
der our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defen-
dant under Article. 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law
is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that profes-
sional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually
do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why,
then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
“At this juncture, it should be said that the primary
and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen
and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers
who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should
guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personal and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, “they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.” And
according to Manresa, “It is much more equitable and just that
such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director
who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not
upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection
and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director.” (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also

28
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle

of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos
says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third
persons the employer and employee “vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien
le emplea y utiliza” (“become as one personality by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.”) All these observations acquire a peculiar force
and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is
need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners
of motor vehicles.
“Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character
and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown
up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there
is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on
culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual.
“In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendant-petitioner.’’

Elcano vs. Hill

77 SCRA 98

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Quezon City dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs
for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of occurrence, and his father, defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, of which
when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted
on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of
intent to kill, coupled with a mistake. According to the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Barredo:
“As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the

29
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for

civil liability was not reserved?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence
from his father, was already legally married?
“The first issue presents no more problem than the need
for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation
which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the
basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature
of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and
earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can
result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also
under the Civil Code.
“Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon
a reading of x x x Garcia — that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only
acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts — deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to
fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to
the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent
act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations which
are derived from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence,
not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter
II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)’’ And it is
precisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable by law,’’
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
“killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life’’ hence, the ruling
that “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910
of the Spanish Civil Code.’’ And so, because Justice Bocobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,

30
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the
term, “not punishable by law,’’ thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or
negligent. Thus, the corresponding provision to said Article 1093
in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, “Obligations
derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book (on quasi-delicts), and by
special laws.’’ More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:

“ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence

under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.’’

According to the Code Commission: “The foregoing provi-

sion (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of an-
cient origin, having always had its own foundation and indi-
viduality separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cu-
asi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be
a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.”
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally
refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bocobo about construction that upholds “the spirit that giveth
life’’ rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles .29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3(c), Rule III, contemplate also the same separability, it is “more

31
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more
in harmony with modern progress,’’ to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers
to “fault or negligence,’’ covers not only acts “not punishable by
law’’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed, by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in
the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion
that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the
minor (child),” it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.’’

32
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

Now, under Article 2180, “The obligation imposed by Article

2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.’’ In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
“It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa,
id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to
it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any
litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable
for the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering of
real property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
“Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies
to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
“WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and
the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.’’

Mendoza vs. Arrieta

91 SCRA 113
The records show that a three-way vehicular accident
occurred involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by
Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and a sand-and-gravel truck owned by Felipino Timbol

33
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of the mishap,

two separate criminal actions for damage to property through
reckless imprudence were instituted. The first was instituted
by Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was instituted
by Salazar against Montoya. There was no reservation made
by both complainants of their right to institute a civil action
separately. After hearing the two cases jointly, the court
rendered judgment acquitting Salazar on the ground that his
jeep was bumped from behind by the truck causing it to collide
with the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on the other hand, was
convicted on the ground that his guilt was established beyond
reasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to Salazar the amount
of P972.50 for actual damages to the latter’s jeep. After the
termination of the criminal cases, Mendoza filed a civil case.
against both Salazar and Timbol, either in the alternative or
in solidum, for indemnification for damages. Upon motions of
both defendants, the respondent court dismissed the case. The
plaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the Supreme Court by
means of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of the orders
of dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the Supreme
Court held:
“We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated
September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner’s Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol.
“In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner,
respondent Judge sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civil
suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.
SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate
civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively
participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against
jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch
as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one
solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
“Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites
must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have
been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
identity of cause of action.
“It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata
are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is

34
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-

227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said
criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for
damage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neither
was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the
trial Court had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot
recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he
(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar
in Criminal Case No. SM-228.’’ And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the
civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is
based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.:

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the

separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is
a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility
for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render
it inescapable to conclude that the employer, in this case
the defendant-petitioner, is primarily and directly liable
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”
“The petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the Civil
case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the
complaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along
MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and
driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner’s) lane and
collided with his car; that the sudden swerving of Salazar’s jeep
was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie
Montoya, Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel-and-
sand truck in the same direction as Salazar’s jeep; and that as a
consequence of the collision, petitioner’s car suffered extensive
damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred
actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney’s
fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action
must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff’s primary right, i.e., that
he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz; and (2) defendants’ delict
or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s primary
right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner

35
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

Salazar or of Timbol’s employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,

causing Salazar’s jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner’s
car, were alleged in the Complaint.
“Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action being based on
quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when
he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
“Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obliga-
tion not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.”
“But it is truck-owner Timbol’s submission (as well as
that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner’s failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action bars the institution of such separate
civil action, invoking Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which
says:
“Section 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency
of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section, Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.’’
“Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs.
Florido, said:
“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent
act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon
quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding from criminal negligence and regardless of
the result of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2
of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit

36
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

of the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x x

and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The
proviso, which is procedural may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32,
33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the
reservation required in the proviso.’ x x x”

“In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice

Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct
and different from the civil action arising from the offense of
negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of
Rule 111 is inoperative, “it being substantive in character and
is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate;
and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand
because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of
the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.”
“We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner
Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the
fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his
right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
“The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different
picture altogether.
“At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil
liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence
cases, the offended party has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery
of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on
culpa criminal under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by
the offended party.
“The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields
the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of
action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and
not on culpa aquiliana, as evidenced by his active participation
and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against
said Salazar. The latter’s civil liability continued to be involved
in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case,

37
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file
a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed
impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
“Neither would an independent civil action lie. Noteworthy
is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the
criminal case, expounded by the Trial Court in this wise:
“In view of what has been proven and established
during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held
liable for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the
jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar.
“Considering that the collision between the jeep
driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven
by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the
rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya,
this Court believes that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot
be held liable for the damages sustained by Edgardo
Mendoza’s car.”
“Crystal clear is the trial court’s pronouncement that
under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot
be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner’s car. In
other words, “the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.’’ Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner’s cause of action
as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be
held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c),
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.

— In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:
xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. x x x’’

“And even if petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-

owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would
be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal
case that Salazar’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable
doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer
be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the
Civil Code quoted hereunder:

38
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

“Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution

is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. x x x
“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.’’
‘’In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge’s Order
dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on
different grounds.

“WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970

dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent
Felipino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his
successor, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the
merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February
23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803
against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.’’

As discussed by Justice Herrera in his Treatise on Criminal

Procedure:

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 2000 is a

virtual return to the 1940 Rules of Court which deemed as
instituted with the criminal action only the civil liability arising
from the offense charged. The civil liability is deemed instituted
— not merely “impliedly” instituted with the institution of the
criminal action. The amendment modified the recommendation
of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court to deem
as impliedly instituted only the civil liability of the accused from
all sources of obligation arising from the same act or omission.
The purpose of the Committee was to limit the civil liability to be
instituted with the criminal action to that of the accused and not
the employer. The court, however, went further by limiting the
civil action that is deemed instituted with the criminal only to
the civil liability arising from the offense charged. ALL decisions
to the contrary are no longer controlling. The independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 are no longer deemed
or impliedly instituted with the criminal action or considered as
waived even if there is no reservation. The reservation applies

39
Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS

only to the civil liability arising from the offense charged. The
employer may no longer be held civilly liable for quasi-delict in
the criminal action as ruled in Maniago (infra.); San Ildefonso
Lines (infra.) and the pro hac vice decision in Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation (infra.), and all other similar cases, since
quasi delict is not deemed instituted with the criminal. If at
all, the only civil liability of the employer in the criminal action
would be his subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code.
The rule has also done away with third-party complaints and
counterclaims in criminal actions. These claims must have to be
ventilated in a separate civil action.’’
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000 “is similar
to the original rule in Rule 107 of the Rules of Court.’’

“Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended party

desires to press his right to demand indemnity from the accused
in the criminal case which he may assert either in the same
criminal case or in a separate action. Under this rule, a waiver
from failure to reserve does not include a cause of action not
arising from civil liability involved in the criminal case but from
culpa contractual, such as a civil case is based on alleged culpa
contractual incurred by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. because of
its failure to carry safely the deceased passenger to his place of
destination. The criminal case involves the civil liability of the
accused, who bear no relation whatsoever with said entity and
are complete strangers to it. The accused are complete strangers
to the respondent company. The latter is not in any way
involved therein. Plaintiff is concerned with the civil liability of
the latter, regardless of the civil liability of the accused in the
criminal case. The failure, therefore, on the part of the plaintiff
to reserve her right to institute the civil action in the criminal
case cannot in any way be deemed as a waiver on her part of the
right to institute a separate civil action against the respondent
company based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana
under Articles 1902 to 1910 to of the Civil Code. The two actions
are separate and distinct and should not be confused one with
the other.’’ (Parker vs. Panlilio, 91 Phil. 1 [1952])

“The rule has abandoned Maniago vs. Court of Appeals,

253 SCRA 174 and San Ildefonso Lines vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 119771, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 568, which deemed
the employer’s liability on quasi delict as instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of a reservation. The present
rule virtually adopted the ruling in Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA
98 (1977), where it was expressly held that the extinction of the

40
 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162

civil liability referred to in par. (c), Sec. 2 of Rule 111, refers ex-
clusively to civil liability arising from crime; whereas, the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Both actions may pro-
ceed separately; the only limitation is the prohibition to recover
damages twice based on the same act or omission.’’

Finally, in his Treatise on Criminal Procedure, Justice Herrera

discussed the effect of death on the civil liability of the accused
during the pendency of the criminal action as follows:

Death of Accused on Appeal

“The death of the accused after arraignment and during
the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict.
The original proposal of the Committee was to require
the criminal court to proceed with the determination of the civil
liability that is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action other than the civil liability arising from the crime to
modify the ruling in Bayotas vs. Court of Appeals, which then
held that since death extinguished the civil liability of the
accused and the corresponding civil liability arising from a
crime, the offended party should file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability arising from other sources of civil liability.
The ruling was then criticized. Since the civil liability arising
from other sources were deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action unless there is a waiver, reservation or separate
civil, then the same should be resolved in the same proceedings
despite the death of the accused. Since, however, The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure limited the civil liability to what
is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action to civil
liability arising from crime, there would have been no need for
the amendment as death of the accused would only extinguish
such civil liability. The rule was, however, retained by the court
to apply to the civil actions under Section 3 of the Rule. The
rule would, however, apply only if any of the civil actions under
Section 3 is consolidated with the criminal action, otherwise,
since the actions under Section 3 are purely civil actions, the
effects of death of a party are to be governed by the Rules on
Civil Procedure.’’ (Rule 3, Secs. 16, 17 and 20, 1997 RCP)

41
 OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER 2
NATURE AND EFFECT OF OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also

obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good
father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the
parties requires another standard of care.1
Art. 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the
thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises.
However, he shall acquire no real right over it until the same
has been delivered to him.2
Art. 1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinate
thing, the creditor, in addition, to the right granted him by
Article 1170, may compel the debtor to make the delivery.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may ask that
the obligation be complied with at the expense of the debtor.
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the
same thing to two or more persons who do not have the same
interest he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until
he has effected the delivery.3
Art. 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing
includes that of delivering all its accessions and accessories,
even though they may not have been mentioned.4

1
Art. 1094, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form.
2
Art. 1095, Spanish Civil Code.
3
Art. 1096, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form.
4
Art. 1097, par. 1, Civil Code.

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 NATURE AND EFFECT OF OBLIGATIONS Arts. 1163-1166

Obligations To Give. — An obligation to give a thing may

be either determinate or generic. It is determinate when the object
is particularly designated or physically segregated from all others
of the same class.5 It is generic or indeterminate when the object
is designated merely by its class or genus without any particular
designation or physical segregation from all others of the same class.
In other words, in the first the object is a concrete, particularized
thing, indicated by its own individuality, while in the second the
object is one whose determination is confined to that of its nature —
to the genus to which it pertains, such as a horse or a chair.6 Thus,
when the obligor or debtor binds himself to deliver to the obligee or
creditor the white horse which won the Senior Grand Derby in 1979,
the object of the obligation is said to be determinate. Since it has
already been individually determined, the obligor cannot fulfill his
obligation by delivering another horse as a substitute.7 On the other
hand, when the obligor or debtor binds himself to deliver “a horse” or
“ten horses,’’ the object of the obligation is said to be indeterminate
or generic. Since the horse or horses have not yet been particularly
designated or physically segregated from all others of the same
class, the obligor can fulfill his obligation by delivering any horse or
horses which are neither of superior nor inferior quality.8
Idem; Nature of right of creditor. — In obligations to give,
the obligee or creditor has a right to the thing which is the object
of the obligation as well as the fruits thereof from the time the
obligation to deliver it arises. This is evident from the provision of
Art. 1164 of the Code. The question, however, is — when does the
obligation to deliver the thing and the fruits arise? The answer to
this question depends upon the nature of the obligation itself. In
case of obligations arising from the law, quasi-contracts, criminal
offenses, and quasi-delicts, the obligation to deliver arises from the
time designated by the provisions of the Civil Code or of special
laws creating or regulating them. In case of obligations arising from
contracts, the obligation to deliver arises, as a general rule, from the
moment of the perfection of the contract. The basis for the latter rule
can be found in Art. 1537 of the Code which states that the vendor is
bound to deliver the thing sold and its accessions and accessories in

5
Art. 1460, par. 1, Civil Code.
6
Soriano vs. De Leon, 48 Off. Gaz. 2245; 8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 102.
7
Art. 1244, Civil Code.
8
Art. 1246, Civil Code.

43
Arts. 1163-1166 OBLIGATIONS

the condition in which they were upon the perfection of the contract.
According to Manresa, the principle declared in Art. 1164 is merely
an extension of that declared in Art. 1537 considering the fact that
an obligation arising from a contract of sale is the prototype of all
contractual obligations.9 Generalizing the provision of the latter
article, we can, therefore, say that the obligor or debtor is bound to
deliver the thing which is the object of the obligation as well as the
fruits thereof from the moment the contract is perfected. In other
words, with respect to the thing itself, the obligation to deliver arises
from the time of perfection of the contract; with respect to the fruits,
the obligation to deliver also arises from the time of the perfection
of the contract. It must be noted, however, that these rules are not
absolute in character. In case there is a contrary stipulation of the
parties with respect to the time when the thing or fruits shall be
delivered, such stipulation shall govern. Hence, if the obligation
is subject to a suspensive condition, the obligation to deliver the
thing as well as the fruits shall arise only from the moment of the
fulfillment of the condition, and if it is subject to a suspensive term
or period, the obligation to deliver arises only upon the expiration of
the designated term or period.
If the creditor has a right to the thing as well as to the fruits
thereof from the time the obligation to deliver it arises, what is the
nature of such right? Before answering this question, we must first
know the meaning of personal and real right. According to an eminent
Spanish commentator, a personal right is “a right pertaining to a
person to demand from another, as a definite passive subject, the
fulfillment of a prestation to give, to do or not to do.’’ It is a jus ad
rem, a right enforceable only against a definite person or group of
persons, such as the right of a creditor to demand from the debtor
the delivery of the object of the obligation after the perfection of the
contract. A real right, on the other hand, is a “right pertaining to a
person over a specific thing, without a passive subject individually
determined against whom such right may be personally enforced.’’10
It is a jus in re, a right enforceable against the whole world, such
as the right of ownership, possession, usufruct or easement. It is
clear from these definitions that before delivery, the creditor, in
obligations to give, has merely a personal right against the debtor

9
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, pp. 97-98.
10
3 Sanchez 6-8.

44
 NATURE AND EFFECT OF OBLIGATIONS Arts. 1163-1166

— a right to ask for delivery of the thing and the fruits thereof. Once
the thing and the fruits are delivered, then he acquires a real right
over them, a right which is enforceable against the whole world.
This explains why according to Art. 1164 of the Code, although the
creditor acquires a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the
obligation to deliver it arises, he does not acquire any real right over
it until the same has been delivered to him. Thus, if A and B enter
into a written agreement whereby the former promises to deliver a
parcel of land to the latter for a price of P100,000, the obligations
to deliver the land on the part of the former and the purchase price
of P100,000 on the part of the latter arise only from the moment of
the perfection of the contract. As far as B is concerned, although
he is entitled to all of the fruits of the land from the moment of the
perfection of the contract, at most, he has only a personal right to
compel A to deliver the land and such fruits in case he, himself, is
also ready to comply with what is incumbent upon him.11 In other
words, he does not acquire a real right or right of ownership over the
land and over the fruits thereof, until the same have been delivered
to him. That is why, according to Art. 1477 of the Civil Code, the
ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee only
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
Idem; Rights of creditor in determinate obligations. — If
the obligation to give is determinate, the rights of the creditor are as
follows:
(1) To compel specific performance. This right is expressly
recognized by the first paragraph of Art. 1165 of the Code which
states that the creditor may compel the debtor to make the delivery.
It is complemented by the first paragraph of Art. 1244 which states
that the debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a
different one, although the latter may be of the same value as, or more
valuable than that which is due. Consequently, if the debtor does not
comply with his obligation at the time when the obligation to deliver
arises or if he insists on delivering a different one, the remedy of
the creditor is to file an action against the debtor to compel specific
performance. In such case, the debtor cannot even plead pecuniary
impossibility of performance. It is an undisputed principle of equity

11
Cruzado vs. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil. 17; see also Fidelity and Deposit Co.
vs. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51; Garchitorena vs. Almeda, CA, 48 Off. Gaz. 3432; Lundberg vs.
Gancayco, CA, 50 Off. Gaz. 172.

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Arts. 1163-1166 OBLIGATIONS

jurisprudence, and this is also true in this jurisdiction, that mere

pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the
obligation, nor does it constitute any defense to a decree for specific
performance.12
(2) To recover damages for breach of the obligation. Besides
the right to compel specific performance, the creditor has also the
right to recover damages from the debtor in case of breach of the
obligation through delay, fraud, negligence or contravention of the
tenor thereof.13
It will be observed that the above remedies are not incompatible
with each other. Hence, the creditor may file an action against the
debtor for specific performance under the first paragraph of Art.
1165 and, at the same time, avail of the action for damages against
the said debtor under Art. 1170.14
Idem; Rights of creditor in generic obligations. — If the
obligation to give is generic, the rights of the creditor are as follows:
(1) To ask for performance of the obligation. Whether the object
of an obligation to give is determinate or generic, it is undeniable that
the creditor has the right to ask for the performance of the obligation.
The only difference is that in determinate obligations to give, the
creditor can compel specific performance, while in indeterminate or
generic obligations to give, he can only ask for the delivery of a thing
or object belonging to the class or genus stipulated which must be
neither of superior nor inferior quality.15 Thus, if the debtor binds
himself to deliver ten horses to the creditor, the former must comply
with the obligation by delivering to the latter any ten horses which
must be neither of the highest nor poorest quality. The creditor in
such case cannot compel specific performance by demanding the
delivery of ten horses of superior quality.
(2) To ask that the obligation be complied with at the
expense of the debtor. If the debtor refuses or is unable to comply
with his obligation, the creditor can even ask that the obligation be
complied with at the expense of such debtor.16 Thus, if the debtor

12
Gutierrez Repide vs. Afzelius, 39 Phil. 190.
13
Arts. 1165, par. 1, and 1170, Civil Code.
14
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 103.
15
Art. 1246, Civil Code.
16
Art. 1165, par. 2, Civil Code.

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 NATURE AND EFFECT OF OBLIGATIONS Arts. 1163-1166

had promised to deliver ten horses to the creditor at a specific date,

and upon the arrival of the stipulated date he was unable to comply
with the obligation after demand was made, the creditor can then
order the delivery of ten horses which must be neither of superior
nor inferior quality from any third person and all expenses incurred
shall be charged against him.
(3) To recover damages for breach of the obligation. In case
of failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, or in case of
breach by reason of fraud, negligence, delay or contravention of the
tenor of the obligation, the creditor can demand for indemnification
for damages. Although Art. 1165 is silent with respect to the
applicability of Art. 1170 to indeterminate or generic obligations,
the scope of the article is broad enough to apply even to such class of
obligations.17
Idem; Obligations of debtor in determinate obligations.
— If the obligation to give is determinate, the obligations of the
debtor are as follows:
(1) To perform the obligation specifically. In obligations to
give a determinate thing, the obligor or debtor binds himself to
deliver to the obligee or creditor a thing or object which is particularly
designated or physically segregated from all others of the same class.
Hence, he cannot comply with his obligation by delivering a thing
which is different from that which is designated although belonging
to the same class or genus. This is so even though the thing delivered
may be of superior quality.18 Thus, if he binds himself to deliver to
the creditor a certain 80 Toyota Corona specifically described in the
contract, he must deliver the specified car and no other.
(2) To take care of the thing with the proper diligence of a
good father of a family. This accessory obligation which is expressly
imposed upon the debtor by the provision of Art. 1163 of the Code
and which is applicable only to determinate obligations and not to
generic ones,19 is established merely for the purpose of insuring the
efficacy and performance of the obligation. As a general rule, the
standard of care which must be exercised for the preservation of the

17
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 104.
18
Art. 1244, Civil Code.
19
2 De Diego 65.

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Arts. 1163-1166 OBLIGATIONS

thing must be the diligence of a good father of a family.20 This rule,

however, is subject to two exceptions. The first is if the law requires
another standard of care. Thus, Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods, and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all of the circumstances of each
case. The second is if the parties stipulate another standard of care.
Thus, the parties may agree that the standard to be followed by
the debtor in taking care of the thing pending its delivery or in the
delivery itself shall be either extraordinary care or slight care.
(3) To deliver all accessions and accessories of the thing, even
though they may not have been mentioned. This accessory obligation
is expressly imposed upon the debtor by the provision of Art. 1166
of the Code. The term “accessions’’ signifies all of those things which
are produced by the thing which is the object of the obligation as well
as all of those which are naturally or artificially attached thereto.21
Consequently, it comprehends all of the different kinds of accessions
which are defined and regulated by the provisions of Art. 441 to Art.
475 of the Civil Code, such as accesión discreta (natural, industrial
and civil fruits) as well as accesión industrial (building, planting
and sowing), accesión natural (alluvion, avulsion, abandoned
river beds, and islands formed in non-navigable or non-floatable
rivers) and accession with respect to movable property (adjunction
or conjunction, confusion or commixtion, and specification).
“Accessories,’’ on the other hand, must be understood in its current
and popular sense. It signifies all of those things which have for
their object the embellishment, use or preservation of another thing
which is more important and to which they are not incorporated or
attached. In other words, it includes all of those things which are
necessary or convenient for the perfection of another thing, such as
the equipment of a factory, the spare parts and tools of a machine,
the key of a house, and others of a similar nature.22
It must be noted that under the old law, “accessions” were not
included, in view of which, according to the Supreme Court of Spain,

20
Art. 1163, Civil Code; see Bishop of Jaro vs. De la Peña, 26 Phil. 144.
21
Art. 440, Civil Code.
22
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, pp. 109-110.

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 NATURE AND EFFECT OF OBLIGATIONS Arts. 1163-1166

if a piece of land is sold without mentioning the house thereon, the

sale does not include the house because it is not an “accessory,” but
an “accession.” However, the Code Commission, considering that
when a piece of land is sold, ordinarily all the improvements thereon
are intended as included in the sale, inserted the word “accessions.”23
In the case of Pormellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration,
1 SCRA 375 (1961), it was ruled that a sale of the house and
improvements upon a land is not sufficient to convey title or any
right to the land, thus enunciating the rule that an obligation to
deliver the accessions or accessories of a thing does not include the
thing unless otherwise stipulated.
(4) To be liable for damages in case of breach of the obligation
by reason of delay, fraud, negligence or contravention of the tenor
thereof. This obligation is expressly imposed upon the debtor by
the provision of Art. 1170 of the Code. It must be noted, however,
that this liability does not arise if the breach is due to a fortuitous
event.24 In other words, such liability extends only to a breach which
is voluntary in character, and not to one which is involuntary. Thus,
if the debtor binds himself to deliver to the creditor a specified
automobile by the end of November, 1980, and said automobile was
destroyed when the garage in which it was kept was gutted by a
fire of accidental origin before the date of delivery, the obligation is
extinguished. There can, therefore, be no liability of the debtor for
breach of the obligation.
It must also be noted that under the third paragraph of Art.
1165, it is provided that if the obligor delays, or has promised to
deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do not have the
same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until
he had effected the delivery. It is evident that this rule is applicable
only to obligations to give a determinate thing. This is so because
only a determinate thing can be destroyed by a fortuitous event. An
indeterminate or generic thing, on the other hand, can never perish.
It is also evident that the two cases mentioned in the provision are
exceptions expressly specified by law to the rule that there can be
no liability in case of fortuitous events. In both cases, when the
determinate thing which is the object of the obligation is lost or

23
Capistrano, Civil Code, 1950 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 2.
24
Art. 1174, Civil Code.

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Arts. 1163-1166 OBLIGATIONS

destroyed before the date of the delivery, the obligor or debtor shall
be liable to the creditor.
Idem; Obligations of debtor in generic obligations. — If
the obligation to give is innominate or generic, the obligations of the
debtor are as follows:
(1) To deliver a thing which is neither of superior nor inferior
quality.25 Consequently, the creditor cannot demand a thing of
superior quality; neither can the debtor deliver a thing of inferior
quality. However, in the determination of the quality of the thing
which is to be delivered, the purpose of the obligation and other
circumstances shall have to be taken into consideration.26
(2) To be liable for damages in case of breach of the obligation
by reason of delay, fraud, negligence or contravention of the tenor
thereof.27 This liability includes the obligation to reimburse all
expenses incurred by the creditor in those cases where the latter
avails himself of the right to ask a third person to perform the
obligation at the expense of the debtor.28 It must be noted, however,
that the doctrine enunciated in Art. 1174 of the Code, by virtue of
which the obligation is extinguished in case the object thereof is lost
or destroyed through a fortuitous event, is not applicable to this
type of obligation. This is clearly deducible from the provision of Art.
1263 of the Civil Code which states that in an obligation to deliver
a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same
class or genus as that which constitutes the object thereof shall not
extinguish the obligation. This precept is based on the maxim that
the genus of a thing can never perish (genus nunquam peruit). Thus,
if a certain company agreed to pay a pension to any of its employees
who may have completed 20 years of service and who may have
attained the age of 50, the fact that heavy losses were incurred by
said company during the war does not exempt it from liability on the
ground that such obligation to pay is generic and, consequently, is
not extinguished.29 Similarly, if a certain person promised to deliver

25
Art. 1246, Civil Code.
26
Ibid.
27
Art. 1170, Civil Code.
28
Art. 1165, par. 2, Civil Code.
29
Philippine Long Distance Co. vs. Jeturian, 97 Phil. 78; see also Reyes vs. Cal-
tex, 47 Off. Gaz. 1193.

50