to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with

2. DELIZO VS. DELIZO

prior to the death of the first wife.
GR Nos. and Date:
G.R. Nos. L-32820-21, January 30, 1976
Under Art 926, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become
absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One of
FACTS:
the most important requirements is that the “person filing the application shall
1. These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of
prove by two credible witnesses that they have resided upon and cultivated the
2 marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo, the first of which lasted for 18 years,
land for the term of 5 years immediately succeeding the time of filing the
the second for 46 years. The action for partition was instituted by the children of
application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been
the first marriage against their father and second wife.
alienated or encumbered.

2. The father died less than a month after the action had been instituted and was
The decisive factor in determining whether a parcel of land acquired by way of
substituted by his children of the second marriage.
homestead is conjugal property of the first marriage, is not necessarily the
issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the
3. The lower court distributed the properties as follows
requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the
a. ½ pro indiviso to the 3 children of the first marriage
patent.
b. ¼ pro indiviso to the surviving spouse
c. ¼ pro indiviso into 13 parts to the children of both marriages,
Where the capital of the first and second marriage or the contribution of each
nine of whom were begotten during the second marriage
spouses cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of
the properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in
4. The present petition for review was interposed, petitioners-appellants
proportion to the duration of each partnership.
contending that 67 hectares of the property located in Caanawan, San Jose,
Nueva Ecija could not have belonged to the first marriage because they were
Application:
then homesteads or public lands and it was only during the second marriage that In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into account the
fact that the respondents-appellees are in possession of the Munoz lands, while
the requirements of the law were complied with resulting in the confirmation,
the petitioners-appellants have been in possession of the Caanawan properties
registration and issuance of a Torrens title over said properties to their father as well as the house and lot at 562 P. Campa St, Sampaloc, Manila, as directed in
the trial court’s order of April 23, 1958. Should it be convenient for the parties,
and his second wife.
their respective shares should be taken from the properties presently under
their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is unnecessary to resolve the other
5. The SC ruled that the CA erred in holding that the entire Caanawan Properties
legal questions raised in the appeal.
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage but considering that a
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the CA is hereby modified as herein
portion was cultivated and rendered productive during a period from 1905-1909
indicated. The records of theses cases should be, as they are hereby, remanded
(first marriage) justice and equity demand that the rights to said properties be to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this judgment. No
costs.
apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements
of the public land law had been complied with during the existence of each
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE
conjugal partnership and held that since the capital of either marriage or the HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION,respondents.
contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision,
the total mass of the properties should be divided between the two conjugal FACTS:
 On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.
partnership in proportion to the duration of each partnership.
(PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its
Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note
ISSUE:
for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an
WON CA acted under a misapprehension of the facts or decided the legal issues interest rate of 14%per annum.
in a way which is not in consonance with law?
 ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of
P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per
annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching,
executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June
RULING: 29, 1981. This was renewed once for a period of one month.
The fact that the parcels of land were acquired as homesteads during the period
 The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August
of the first marriage does not necessarily mean that they should be considered 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the
as properties of the first marriage. Being homesteads, they were part of the
P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
public domain, unless it is shown that the requirements of the Homestead Law charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo
 Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be
of the PBMCI. liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by
 The trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the ABC and the husband for the benefit of the
rendered the attachment bond of P6,350,000. conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the
 On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her same purpose, in the cases where she
husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on may legally bind the partnership.
attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on (2)
by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their This provision provides that all the properties acquired during the
marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is not
contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired
PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties
She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are
third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the
properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract manner in which the properties were acquired does not
with Alfredo Ching. appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties
will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the
 Encarnacion T. Ching adduced in evidence her marriage contract to conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the
Alfredo Ching to prove that they were married on January 8, 1960; marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
that the articles of incorporation of Citycorp Investment Philippines convincing evidence to overcome the same.
dated May 14, 1979; and, the General Information Sheet of the
corporation showing that petitioner Alfredo Ching was a member of The fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate
the Board of Directors of the said corporation and was one of its top books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-
twenty stockholders husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal
ISSUE: partnership, owned the same.
Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash
the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should
Investment Philippines? appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership
RULING: responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to
YES. SC agreed with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No. solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit.
142729.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
In Ong v. Tating, we held that the sheriff may partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of
attach only those properties of the defendant against executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the court. respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the
When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
seizes the property of a third person in which the said presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband
defendant holds no right or interest, the superior entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the
authority of the court which has authorized the execution conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
case
Upon application of the third person, the court It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the
shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and
determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would
wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that
of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has the petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits
not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those
order the sheriff to release the property from the directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off
erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. of the loan itself.
The aggrieved third party may also avail himself
of the remedy of "terceria" by executing an affidavit of his Petition is granted in favour of Ching.
title or right of possession over the property levied on
attachment and serving the same to the office making the 6. DOLORES PINTIANO-ANNO, petitioner, vs. ALBERT ANNO (deceased) and
levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an PATENIO SUANDING, respondents
action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the G.R. No. 163743. January 27, 2006.
unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally
separate and distinct action from the former case. Topic: Conjugal Properties

In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy FACTS:
on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner- Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno and respondent Albert Anno (spouses Anno)
husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, were married on January 23, 1963. Petitioner contends that during their
not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and marriage, they acquired a 4-hectare public, unregistered, virgin, agricultural land
suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file in Lamut, Becket, La Trinidad, Benguet.In 1974, the land was declared for tax
the motion for said relief. purposes solely in the name of Albert Anno, under tax declaration no. 12242.
Dolores contends that she and her spouse had been in open, continuous,
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3] of the exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land; that they
Family Code of the Philippines) provides: both worked on the land, and, that they also hired a caretaker to oversee it.
  However, a careful examination of the records shows that petitioner's
evidence failed to prove that the subject land belongs to the conjugal
Petitioner Dolores contends that without her knowledge, respondent Albert
partnership of spouses Anno.
executed two documents of transfer covering the subject land. In an Affidavit of
Waiver (dated January 30, 1996) Albert waived and quitclaimed in favor of  Petitioner failed to substantiate by preponderance of evidence her
Dolores's first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion of claim that the subject land was conjugal in nature. She did not
the subject land. More than a year later, Albert conveyed to respondent identify when she and her husband, respondent Albert, first
Suanding the remainder of the land in a Deed of Sale (dated November 29, occupied and possessed the land. Neither did she present any
1997). witness to prove that they first occupied the land during their
marriage and that they both worked on the land.
 Indeed, even the documentary evidence adduced by petitioner failed
In both documents, Albert declared that he is the lawful owner and possessor to show when exactly the spouses Anno first took possession of the
of the subject land. Thus, the documents of transfer did not bear the signature land. While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated 1974,
and written consent of petitioner as the wife of the vendor, Albert. Thereafter, it cannot be automatically deduced therefrom that occupation of the
the subject land was transferred by respondent Suanding to third persons. subject land was likewise done in the same year. To so conclude will
amount to speculation or conjecture on the part of the court.
Petitioner filed a case against respondents Albert and Suanding with the MTC of  More importantly, the 1974 tax declaration presented by petitioner
La Trinidad, Benguet. In her complaint, petitioner alleged that the subject land cannot be made a basis to prove its conjugal nature as the land was
belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno, and thus could not have declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband,
been validly conveyed by respondent Albert to respondent Suanding without respondent Albert, who sold the land as his exclusive property. In a
her written consent as spouse. long line of cases, this Court has held that tax declarations, especially
of untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
To prove that spouses Anno acquired the subject land during their marriage,  The foregoing circumstances do not show when the
petitioner presented her 1963 marriage contract with respondent Albert and the property was acquired by spouses Anno. The presumption of the conjugal
initial1974 tax declaration over the property. She likewise testified that she and nature of the property allegedly acquired by the spouses Anno during the
her husband diligently paid the taxes thereon and worked on the land. subsistence of their marriage cannot be applied. Consequently, we uphold the
findings of the Court of Appeals that the subject land is the exclusive property
Albert did not file an Answer. For his part, Suanding testified that Albert of respondent Albert Anno which he could validly dispose of without the
represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the land was part consent of his wife.
of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his marriage to
petitioner. He likewise presented a 1997 Certificate from the Office of the JOSEFA FERRER, petitioner vs MANUEL FERRER, ISMAEL FERRER, respondents
Municipal Assessor of La Trinidad, Benguet, stating that no improvements were TOPIC: Conjugal Partnership of Gains (Article 120 of the Family Code)
listed in their records as introduced by Albert on the subject land.
FACTS:
MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. It found that both parties failed to sufficiently Josefa Ferrer alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo),
prove by convincing evidence the nature of ownership of the subject land. a half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer
However, the MTC applied Article 116 of the Family Code and ruled that the (Ismael).
subject land is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno. Before Josefa’s marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot,
It held that the conveyance of the land to respondent Suanding was void as it covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
was done without the marital consent of petitioner, the wife of vendor- He applied for a loan with the Social Security System (SSS) to build
respondent. improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment
building.
However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was
Upon appeal, the RTC found for respondent Suanding. It ruled that as petitioner
made using the couple's conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner
failed to adduce evidence that the subject land was acquired by the spouses
posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot.
during their marriage, the presumption that the property belongs to their
Josefa averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
conjugal partnership could not be made to apply. The RTC thus declared the land
apartment building, as well as the warehouse;
to be the exclusive property of the vendor, respondent Albert, which he could
In September 1991, Manuel stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging
validly sell without the consent of petitioner-spouse.
that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. It likewise found spouses. The first TCT was cancelled, and a new TCT was issued and registered in
petitioner's evidence insufficient to prove that the subject land was acquired by the names of respondents.
spouses Anno during their marriage. It is petitioner's contention that on 2 October 1989, when Alfredo
was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a
ISSUE: W/N the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of document, purported to be his last will and testament. The document,
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo's lot and the improvements
consent of the other. thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo led with the RTC of Pasig, a
RULING: Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents. The RTC
NO. Petition is DISMISSED. dismissed the same. CA also dismissed the same.
The RTC found that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are
Rule: not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be
Article 116 of the Family Code complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no compelling reason
under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was armed by the Court of Appeals.
Application: Subsequently, on 7 November 1994, this Court, in G.R. No. L-117067, finding no
 Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in reversible error committed by the appellate court in affirming the dismissal of
nature. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who the RTC, affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's
qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
partnership. RULING (SUPREME COURT):
DENIED THE PETITION (AFFIRMED LOWER COURTS’ RULING)
 Petitioner's Complaint failed to state a cause of action against the
However, on July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as
respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in
dismissing the same. lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a
period of 25 years.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts a legal right in her favor by
relying on the Decision of the RTC. It can be recalled that the aforesaid case is an
action for Annulment led by Alfredo and petitioner against the respondents to
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
seek annulment of the Deed of Sale, executed by Alfredo in respondents' favor
and covering the herein subject premises. The Complaint was dismissed by the Joselyn without his (Benjamin's) consent; Benjamin instituted an action for
RTC, and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court.
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and
Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
spouses.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in Joselyn's husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement
of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as contract involving the property.
the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial court
premises, are not petitioner's spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the
refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned
owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs
rested. transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on the last page of the
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the
document and not on every page thereof.
conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the
case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to
respect petitioner's right to be reimbursed.
CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC.
It can be said, thus, that respondents' act of acquiring the subject
property by sale was not in violation of petitioner's rights. The same can also
be said of the respondents' objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no
If, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the
correlative obligation exists on the part of the respondents to reimburse the
petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that their refusal to parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase "with my consent"
reimburse constituted a violation of petitioner's rights. As has been shown in the
instead of "signed in the presence of." CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an
foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under the law exists.
SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was unnecessary for
MATTHEWS VS. TAYLOR
Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement.
G.R. No. 164584
June 22, 2009
These circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null
Topic: Conjugal Properties
and void having been entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject,
Whether or not the marital consent of Benjamin Taylor is no longer required in
married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while
the agreement of lease between Matthews and Joselyn Taylor?
their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294
RULING:
square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island,
The court ruled in favor of Matthews saying that aliens, whether individuals or
Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, by virtue of the constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
financed by Benjamin. Also using the Taylor’s funds, they constructed
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is
improvements and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist the conservation of the national patrimony. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty
resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for
percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyn's sister. Application:

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
When Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions
Philippsen, she executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and
more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through
into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
another.

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no
right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and Hence, the burden of proof is on the party
public lands in the Philippines.
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is
Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said counter-balanced by the requirement that the
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
properties must first be proven to have been
This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds for acquired during the marriage before they are
such acquisition. By entering into such contract, knowing that it was illegal, no
presumed conjugal.
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of
the conjugal/community property of the spouses. those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties
He had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent
lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was during the period of cohabitation is governed
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property.
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
10. OCAMPO VS OCAMPO Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of

G.R. NO. 198908 (AUGUST 3, 2015) parties who are legally capacitated and not barred

TOPIC: Conjugal Properties by any impediment to contract marriage, but

FACTS: whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this

 On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed case.

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
 The RTC granted the petition and the decision became final, since no and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property

party appealed the judgement annulling the marriage. acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
 The parties having failed to agree on a project of partition of their governed by the rules on co-ownership.
conjugal properties, a hearing ensued where the parties adduced
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
evidence in support of their respective stand.
 The trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to

declared by the parties to belong to each one of them on a 50-50 have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or

sharing. industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For

 The wife contends that her husband should be deprived of his share purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
psychological perversity. be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
ISSUE: thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
WON respondent should be deprived of his share maintenance of the family and of the household.
in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of  From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through

bad faith and psychological perversity. their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is

SUPREME COURT RULING: NO prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint

While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the

on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code property shall be considered as having contributed to the same

provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of

which will govern the property relations between the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the

Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition

before the effectivity of the Family Code. of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates industry.
that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal  Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the

partnerships established before the Family Code parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to

without prejudice to vested rights already prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
 The CA decision is affirmed and the case
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus,
REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.
under the Family Code, if the properties are
14. HONORIO L. CARLOS, vs . MANUEL T. ABELARDO [G.R. No. 146504. April 9,
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is 2002.]
that they are conjugal.
TOPIC: Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
 G.R. No. 164201 dated December 10, 2012
FACTS:
 Petitioner averred in his complaint filed in October 1989, respondent Facts:
and his wife (Teresa) approached him and requested him to advance - Husband (Efren) and Wife (Melecia) and others were accused of murder
the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot before RTC of Surigao City.
located at Paranaque. Hence, petitioner issued a check to the seller of
the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in - RTC acquitted husband but convicted wife and others and sentenced
full payment of the property. them to death penalty and payment of civil indemnity and damages. On appeal,
 When petitioner inquired from the spouses as to the status of the penalty was modified to reclusion perpetua but retained with modifications the
amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation payment of civil indemnities.
but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite
settlement of the same. - Upon motion for execution, RTC ordered the issuance of writ, levying
 Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of real properties of the spouses.
US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and - Husband and wife filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming
damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not separate assets of wife who
Court of Valenzuela liable for the civil indemnities and damages.
 As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing
of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. -Both RTC and CA denied motion, hence this petition.
 Wife admitted securing a loan with her husband, from petitioner. She
claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so - In this petition, husband contended that the spouses’ property regime
she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of falls under Conjugal Partnership of Gains since they were married prior to the
the full amount. Respondent tried to rebut petitioner's evidence by enactment of the Family Code.
claiming that the US$25,000.00 was not a loan but his share in the
profits of H.L. Carlos Construction (owned by petitioner). - He further contends that under the CPG regime, the payment of
 RTC decided in favor of petitioner but upon reaching the CA, the personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
decision was reversed. marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family, neither shall fines and pecuniary
ISSUE: indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
1. W/N the loan shall be paid using the conjugal partnership?
Issue: Under the CPG regime, WON the payment of civil indemnities as well
RULE: as damages attached to the penal sanction of the wife can be chargeable to the
 The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article conjugal property?
121 of the Family Code:
Ruling:

Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: Yes. Paragraph 3, Article 122 of the Family Code governing CPG regime
xxx xxx xxx provides that “the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the before the marriage, that fines and indemnities upon them, as well as the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 have
consent of the other; been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership,
consent of such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-
the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If mentioned.”
the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance Since wife has no exclusive property, the civil indemnity in the murder
with their separate properties. case imposed on her may be enforced against the spouses’conjugal assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the FC have been covered.
APPLICATION:
1. Respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the SC further provides that no prior liquidation of conjugal assets is
profits and income of the corporation. There was no showing that necessary for the purpose of payment of such indemnity. However, upon
respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name liquidation of the partnership, the offending spouse (wife) shall be charged for
does not appear in the Articles of Incorporation as well as the what has been paid by the innocent spouse (husband) for that purpose.
Organizational Profile of said company either as stockholder or
officer. Not being a stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits G.R. No. 155043
or income of said corporation. Neither did respondent prove that he ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner, vs. DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR.,
was an employee or an agent so as to be entitled to salaries or respondent.
commissions from the corporation. Facts:
2. Respondent did not and refused to sign the Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land in
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the Makati.
Armed with a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988, purportedly issued
loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to by his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA)
purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of dated October 17, 1989, in favor of respondent, binding himself to sell to
respondent the subject property. On November 16, 1989, Esther, through her
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack attorney-in-fact, executed in favor of respondent, a Contract to Sell the property
of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall to the extent of her conjugal interest therein.
In a letter dated December 7, 1989, Galicano informed the couple that he has
be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife. prepared a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid
for the land. He demanded that the land be delivered to him but the spouses
EFREN PANA, petitioner vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. AND JOSE JUANITE failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses.
Issue:
JR., respondents  WON there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano.
  WON the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is
binding.

Held:
No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the
same cannot be valid. At best, the agreement
between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of
privilege to purchase to Galicano. Granting for the
sake of argument that the RMOA is a contract of
sale, the same would still be void not only for
want of consideration and absence of
respondent’s signature thereon, but also for lack
of Esther’s conformity thereto.

Quite glaring is the absence of the signature of Esther in the RMOA,

which proves that she did not give her consent to the transaction
initiated by Arturo. The husband cannot alienate any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.

The nullity of the RMOA as a contract of sale

emanates not only from lack of Esther’s consent
thereto but also from want of consideration and
absence of respondent’s signature thereon. Such
nullity cannot be obliterated by Esther’s
subsequent confirmation of the putative
transaction as expressed in the Contract to Sell.

The RMOA which Arturo signed is different from the deed which
Esther executed through her attorney-in-fact. For one, the first is
sought to be enforced as a contract of sale while the second is
purportedly a contract to sell only. For another, the terms and
conditions as to the issuance of title and delivery of possession are
divergent.

The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for

the valid disposition of conjugal property. Where the conveyance is
contained in the same document which bears the conformity of both
husband and wife, there could be no question on the validity of the
transaction. But when there are two documents on which the
signatures of the spouses separately appear, textual concordance of
the documents is indispensable. Hence, in this case where the wifes
putative consent to the sale of conjugal property appears in a
separate document which does not, however, contain the same terms
and conditions as in the first document signed by the husband, a valid
transaction could not have arisen.