G.R. No.

142840 May 7, 2001 civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen
x x x.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
CONCURRING OPINION District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
DISSENTING OPINION
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
KAPUNAN, J.: Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen."1 On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6
1935 Constitution.2
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps following grounds:
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act 1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such
law reads: citizenship on his part.

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of 2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
the following ways and/or events: jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
xxx
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said Philippine citizenship.
foreign country; or
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his The petition is without merit.
 In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, and Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8 Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways
of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
natural-born citizen thereof.9 R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10 accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced citizenship.
policies.14
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by Constitution as follows:
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and Philippine citizenship.
none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23 because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Philippines citizenship.
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), EN BANC
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who
are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain vs.
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, respondents.
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the CONCURRING OPINION
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he PANGANIBAN, J.:
is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives. I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral
Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress.
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Let me just add a few points.
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the The Facts in Brief
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to
reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2),1 Article IV of
assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case. the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine
citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Section 22 of the same Article IV.

SO ORDERED. It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States
Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an
American citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1
(4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines
and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the
benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting
Commission in, the Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On
the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

Main Issue

The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C.
Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the
answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.

1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship

First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a
person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent – being clearly and
the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law.5 He concededly not naturalized – is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.15
defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain
condition."6 Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage of With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they
repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x."7 In naturally reacquire their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In
relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost
of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship. citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen,
nothing less.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again."8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his
becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status upon 3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
repatriation. To rule otherwise – that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen – would not be
consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization, Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the with Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress.
which he has previously been endowed. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether
the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings,
x x x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims simply because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for
to be a natural-born citizen. that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.

2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of
Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, qualifications their respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that the
because was not naturalized. Let me explain. power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they
remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond judicial
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would properly
fall under the second category (naturalized).11 "The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications Constitution calls for remedial action."
and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens. In
contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born citizen is a True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier
citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth." explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the former
citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation
are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III made in good faith and grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave
of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows: abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or
the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of
the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship.
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial
considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's actions
does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship.13 Thus, under on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law.20
the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusion of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto
were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon attribute to it "grave abuse of discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.14 grave abuse.21

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
"[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be grave
meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable
contemplation of law."22 Filipino is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for
about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their
upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as representative in Congress.
gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of
passion or hostility" in such exercise. I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law
bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails prerogatives.

Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured
legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and
unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. EN BANC
The votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his
opponents combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the
people.24 ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the respondents.
ballot.25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount
considerations in election controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's DISSENTING OPINION
choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.27
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will
in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and, therefore, must be
in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy disqualified as a member of Congress.
to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the Who are natural-born citizens?
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities of
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution citizens – have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral issues resolved by this
and laws so zealously protect and promote."28 Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their
representatives in Congress.
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization.29 the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the constitutional requirement of
Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is
of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era qualified to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a
is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the natural-born Filipino citizen.
suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being
considered potential sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital.1âwphi1.nêt Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino
parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service for almost
want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of
of the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American
their former citizenship. citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then
decided to return to the Philippines.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign
countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of
welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil "2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and
issued him an Identification Certificate. "3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the
HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of despite
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of status."
the United States.
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House
Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor of Representatives.
for one term.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring
himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate "Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
Antonio Bengson, III. having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx."

On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained
District of Pangasinan. in the above provisions.

Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representative Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite
Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not
March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at one time,
should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits,
Constitution which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." 1994, he had to comply with requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the
constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-
supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his born". Since he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a
representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus: natural-born citizen.

"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and
is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has
May 11, 1998 elections. been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be sent to natural-born citizen.
the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the
Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio." more in its legal connotation.

On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as
same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48. Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traces the grant of
natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
that:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States and
despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renuciation of such such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United
citizenship on his part. State under the laws of the United State, if residing therein."
 I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11th of April, of citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine
Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental law, we were referred to as "Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
"people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING
not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.3 UNITED STATES, provides:

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non- Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or
existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years. Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4 Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship."

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the
resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship
subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law and constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the
directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even people who adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used according to their plain,
at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to
conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship.5 the common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed,
born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not
subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it. phrased in general language which may call for construction of what the words imply.

Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,6 this Court held:
of natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens
enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit: "Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning,
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship say."
upon reaching the age of majority; and
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law." according to its natural sense.

Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of
citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in
then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic
approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned elected to the National Assembly.11 Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution was amended
can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
citizen. Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed
Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court.14
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice
A.R. Melo:8 The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of
being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the fulfillment of
certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime
process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended), he, nevertheless, Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of
would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state the Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the cabinet must be natural-born
and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. citizens.16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of
It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens.17
have to perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable
him to reacquire his citizenship. willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment
to claim citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import
Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who have been of natural born citizen and citizenship in general.
collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less that the
Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural born
to public office.)" Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a constitutional
amendment. Clearly respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution is
so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been
allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he
government directly involved and given the dedicate task of legislation." cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born
Filipino citizens.
The dissenting opinion further states:
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.1âwphi1.nêt
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later
adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer
to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship,' and to those ' who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and
again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the laws speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation – there is only room for
application. The phrase 'from birth indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship and
this citizenship should be continuous, constant and without interruption."

Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a
member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman.
Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such position can
be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.
G.R. No. 221697
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by
the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
United States) guide and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more vs.
narrow and bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable to the x-----------------------x
President and Vice Persident.10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be
G.R. No. 221698-700 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
vs. Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents. On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
DECISION 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to
the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
PEREZ, J.:
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her
SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July
2004. 16
The Facts
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of
September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire
of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1 decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester;20
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As early as 2004, the
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2
the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a
lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth
in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4 The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5 petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began
attending Philippine private schools.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and some of the family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on
DD156616.7 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
company in July 2006.33 Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015. 58
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition
of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has
her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed
BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up
Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
names of her three (3) children. 39
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that
2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42 citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the that status when she became a naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had
following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
American passport.48 natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement
of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner
an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29
July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51 (1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a
petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52 July 18, 2006 Order;

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) (2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54 misrepresent on her part;

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55 (3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and
residency qualifications for:
 In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency
citizens; and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.72

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
where they are found; unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens
since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225; statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to
for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
not been withdrawn or recanted;
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status; claim that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state
early as May 24, 2005; practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
No. 9225; reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest
mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten
domicile; (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon
City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S.
decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68 domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the
U.S.82
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution. In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA
No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have
of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
CANCELLED.69 requirement for President.

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as
the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70 SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's
2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700 period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's
P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division. Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence
in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine
domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed
by the Philippine immigration laws.88
 Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments: National Elections.

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds
for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90 Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for
certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92 from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The
Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this
country. The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL
and SET ASIDE the:
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is 1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares.
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A.
No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the 2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated
Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent.
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and 3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a
change of domicile are complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement that The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted
renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
choice.101 CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
was a mistake made in good faith.102 course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven of the candidate.
(11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX,
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads: C, Section 2:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. rules for the purpose.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by
inspectors, and registration of voters. the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and Can the COMELEC be such judge?
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 §
or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign 1, the following:
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their candidate.
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art.
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from
the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art.
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all IX, C, §2(3)]
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
directive, order, or decision. declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall. from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that: holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office.
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4. disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as
before election the qualifications of a candidate. presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the
lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
proclamation will be set aside.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior
the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that
the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction. residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned
in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the
election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
as the case may be.106
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led
to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that: unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
candidate.107 foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that
her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to: certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability
whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128: that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the
to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
improbability of the fact in issue. Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%.
99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising
and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15- abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child
49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. excess baggage that is best left behind.
In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970,
there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there
there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child
not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
was Filipino.112 Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval separate disciplines.
face.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
on Evidence. adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
words of the Solicitor General: Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
99.9%.
xxxx
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children President:
in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
 Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to
Sr. Rafols: the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of
natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents. delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

Sr. Montinola: During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of
Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ... believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of
Sr. Rafols: the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino. of the proposed amendment.

Sr. Montinola: This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment. Oral Arguments:

Sr. Rafols: We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the
The amendment should read thus: proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas
children of unknown parentage." which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Sr. Briones: Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage. of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even
wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola
Sr. Rafols: and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
unknown.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and
President: the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not? Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried
over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
Sr. Rafols: paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal.
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina 118
with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think
those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and
be considered as Filipinos. humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications
President: of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status
Briones. of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and
Sr. Busion: inflict this across the board marginalization."
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature? We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
Sr. Roxas: exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every
constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116 enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
their unfortunate status. evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said: principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have Bill of Rights.129
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied) Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to thereof states:
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act 1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include nationality.
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. Article 7
This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by his or her parents.
by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national
not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular
such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 where the child would otherwise be stateless.
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on
13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Article 24
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at
the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit: "generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.

Article 14 Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America,
and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the
child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also,
cases where the parentage is known. the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied) international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which
the foundling is found.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he
is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle
Statelessness: of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on
Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the
Article 2 Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the
nationality of that State. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the
ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been .... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court
content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
Latin America, and State Practice in the United States. deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular. respected."148

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows: Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his biological parents which are precisely unknown.
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also
repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said that "[t]he adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the
v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or
(under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship." institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The
law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole adoptee.
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination. same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous.
The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean On Residence
at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
third category for repatriated citizens:
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up
such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her
loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in good from the U.S.
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed
all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146 When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house)
petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24
and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband
March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the
home). law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases. society upon their return to the country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed
as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan
maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-
all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary
petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend
that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
July 2006 cannot be counted. cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her facts-of-the case basis.
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as
citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired false.
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven- As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the
month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said
"such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency." that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house
was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Verified Answer.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her
the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of side this Court's pronouncement that:
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not
have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague. Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his
and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children. should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and one's qualifications to run for public office.168
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying
period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the
a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to
has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency. jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in
took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else,
R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her
had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her
claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has
good faith. been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013
Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not
2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
purposes of her senatorial candidacy. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy.
There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner]
matters of public record and were not hidden. enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in
Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo was already old enough to go to school.
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer
who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora." NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of
the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the 4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Philippines on 11 March 2006. Resolution of the First Division.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
family's abandonment of their address in the US. POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
SO ORDERED.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they
eventually built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall
under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned
by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
(DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
BALUA, Respondents.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain
DECISION true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities.
SERENO, CJ.:
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
THE CASE evasion.8

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC elections.9
En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado
y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport. that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his
FACTS claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5 certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states: pertinent travel records:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of PASSPORT : 057782700
evasion.6
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states: NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all PASSPORT : 05778270012
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent
States of America. to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
and belief.7 evidence ex-parte.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements: garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is
April 2009; hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 take effect.20
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time The Motion for Reconsideration and
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his the Motion for Intervention
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009. allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION 3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for 4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the
disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17 5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s 6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the
claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18 case; and

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of 7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
xxxx and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the
to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a the winner.
person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested
himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his
nationals.19 Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer,
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted
by the final adjudication of the case.
First Division reads:
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, during that time.25
inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned." In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, "The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or
the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption
Local Government Code to take effect. stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and
for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of of citizenship."26
proclamation.
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises: Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance
to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the
First: privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship
runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May
time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again. 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.

xxxx Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of
them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office,
his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of
not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification
the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is requirements regarding his citizenship.
misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a
naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received
maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex
then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who
bar. expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27
xxxx
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified Mercado v. Manzano28
to run for public office.
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First
Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
order." judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first. and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made. Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En
Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be
after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office. prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case. Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
OUR RULING elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this
Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case
Intervention of a rival candidate in a originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
proclamation of the winner. act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a one to run for an elective position.
Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the
latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections. political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First xxxx
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646: public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be x x x31
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
strong. Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. the United States of America."38
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status
for public office. as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32 This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after elective local position.
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33 Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only
he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign
thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office. citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights
and privileges granted by the United States of America. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days,
or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any after renouncing his American citizenship.
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign This Court has previously ruled that:
country which granted the citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared: the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he
citizenship. in fact did.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the
act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is Local Government Code of 1991.
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
public office.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43 The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing
use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country. irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office."
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of
his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If the two situations, thus:
indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009. Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots
he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the
US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that
US passport. the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it
cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is
civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly
other. speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not,
We now resolve the next issue. strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest
in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot
an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First
The Facts of the case are as follows: Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person
who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction
office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at
Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281.
the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president." occupy elective positions in our republic.

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled: pronounced:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is alone.
rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new
and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
ordered.49 especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical. supplied)

Let us examine the statement: This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court
ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots." We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a
sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions
candidate? relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the
winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?" The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our
express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that
of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive
right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to
cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with
The popular vote does not cure the false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
ineligibility of a candidate. qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and (Citations omitted)
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case
who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth disqualifications of candidates?
the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1 strong.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
he obtained the highest number of failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer
votes from among the qualified on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
candidates.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that
a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado
was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government
the winner of an election. Code.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall
the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already
who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the proclaimed the winner.
rules to be eligible as candidates.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches
favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all
be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting in the May 201 0 elections.
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is
not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
the qualified candidates. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation. This Decision is immediately executory.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides: Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
vs. opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents. but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with
the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
KAPUNAN, J.: pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
election."2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community."3 On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a
vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4 Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months)
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked
Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
"an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
candidacy."7 since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that: Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides,
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition persuasive.
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
devoid of merit. graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
detriment of the integrity of the election. Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile.
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995
will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
respondent's contention that it was an error. of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
xxx xxx xxx choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
this Commission.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
xxx xxx xxx "since childhood."

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution. Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC- she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her
not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18 Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home",
"a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19 Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various
of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief. There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
may be classified into two general areas: place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria
II. The Jurisdictional Issue of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
a) Prior to the elections with domicile.

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
Article 78 of the said Code. place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
b) After the Elections Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections. concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court
has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
I. Petitioner's qualification intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
 7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly
are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven
xxx xxx xxx Months.

Mrs. Rosario Braid:The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
than actual residence. stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the
first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile. circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District
and not physical residence. 30 of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32 she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter.
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months? if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space [T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus: A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-
in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of do not agree.
abandonment for another.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on respondent's averments.
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35 Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
Resolution: 36
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in new one; and
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from
1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
Manila. act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well- Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
upon marriage. established in some other
place. 41
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero. the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
fixed, husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place
to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence. courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded,
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England,
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus: instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
fidelity and render mutual help and support. sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v.
Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by
should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains: procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for
the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who
another. had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby,
36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
xxx xxx xxx the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148). illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her
husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and
in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this Leyte.
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her II. The jurisdictional issue
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been
followed by imprisonment for contempt. Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it
was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has
of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual enforcing the letter of the law.
agreement between the spouses. 46
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new be directory.
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This prescribed period.
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction
in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
"homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile
the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity
of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote,
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power the husband and wife "to live together."
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit
of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit
the mistakes of the past. that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of
the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña,6
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of . . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
Leyte. acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have
their own independent domicile. . . .
SO ORDERED.
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by
Feliciano, J., is on leave. the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110
of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the
domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the
husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile
Separate Opinions but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the
PUNO, J., concurring: family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman.
At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not
things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal
candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was
VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in
guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang
propositions: Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the
incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he
were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman
the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband,
initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."7
as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she
continued living there even after reaching the age of majority. Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989
of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He
and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband
until she makes an actual change.
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
(Emphasis supplied) husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the
Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the
husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from xxx xxx xxx
him.9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first
reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."10 The matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is
second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing
governed by the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the
have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of
law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3)
denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into
seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big partnership without the husband's consent.
blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate
courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common
law surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to
the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3,
this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment
modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every
purpose known to the law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
(Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the
view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the
now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20 system of conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over
their persons as well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of the family;25
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise
common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no of profession, occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is
choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the
Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero,
cited a few of them as follows:21 Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.
xxx xxx xxx
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions
or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and
giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without her husband's wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified
consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:28
relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is (2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain
sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes cases like:
"serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
 women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist
common life impossible; on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122); petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also
92); restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her
and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban
Sula, CA, 34 OG 129); domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their
domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
329); should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile.
There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La.
Ann. 70). But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less
than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee xxx xxx xxx
of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my
xxx xxx xxx return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government
to issue me my passport.
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife
from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the 37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President
family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and
They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the welfare.
persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband
will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. 38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban
(Emphasis supplied) City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been
destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the 39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in
wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my
the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect
in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary 40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
determination of her dead husband. brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my
sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of 40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated,
dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a unearthed and scattered.
gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous 41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo
fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it for permissions to —
explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make
them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate
of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the
to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8,
Dear Col. Kempis, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the
disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy.
sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban,
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more
undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to overwhelmingly voted for her.
her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any
xxx xxx xxx public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached
reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's
Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify
In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, her, she averred:36
Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
xxx xxx xxx
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It
is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City 10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is
and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a
Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo)
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a
with the constitutional requirement of residence resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit,
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
the May 8, 1995 elections. completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with
the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove
is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a
Registration Record on January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as
in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the
First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence,
her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 199532 where to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence
in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this xxx xxx xxx
original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent
"since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein)
bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this
As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.: move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the
matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of
Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture,
Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated
petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a
Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of
"Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed.
Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of
the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, I vote to grant the petition.
petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a
voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Second District.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated
a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of
reads: Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any
District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs. purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose
constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative
District. Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family,
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of
invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5).
cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for
equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of
has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence
the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness. or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c)
an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or
Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None
can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution. In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means
domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections
of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that
Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement.
Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and
electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the
towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment. rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise Constitution.
petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
I vote to grant the petition.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due
to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an
actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable. Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was
disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying
legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1
of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration
marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously
any meaningful purpose. reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
suspended.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon
her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the
respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the aspirants for a Congressional seat.1
party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of
origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for
supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First
former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during
one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may
to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other
in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran separate opinions.
for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan,
Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
certificate2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From
this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence
residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to
in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later
transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of
Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to
had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one
will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then
one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as
a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound
defined by the law be is subject to. itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The
Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and
things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the
as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights
of women, no less than men. CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its
rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are
century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."17
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as
the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family
rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the
purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and
partnership without the husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the common child21 and several others.
mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her
personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts
fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the equal to that of men are:
wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is
sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious (1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and
and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective credit arrangements under the same conditions as men;
prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her
husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a (2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs
subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in
father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12
Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave. (3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance
contracts; and
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no
protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations (4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for
and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their
Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been spouses.
overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter
was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and
supplied) that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the
family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware
burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun. The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and
administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office.
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
same, regardless?
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound residency requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is
by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only
of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not
are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her reviewable by this Court.
election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile),
official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition. he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is
VITUG, J., separate opinion: the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling
rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates. 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only
mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence. acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
121 SCRA 51). change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read: Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
immediately preceding the day of the election. Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is
just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may properly done.
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
returns and qualification" of its members. choice of the people of Baguio City.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA
case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected
881, each providing thusly: after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
xxx xxx xxx three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another
two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando,
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final C.J.)
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente,
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas
strong. and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar,
J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881 Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:

xxx xxx xxx . . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding
sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs.
Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the
Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to
(Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
first Labo decision: only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in
the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in
the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered § 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body. judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings strong. (Emphasis added).
against winning candidates.
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a
candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates. § 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, sentence;
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to (b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after (d) Those with dual citizenship;
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added) (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his (g) The insane or feeble-minded.
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub- "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added) than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of
(Emphasis added) certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to
declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646): explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a
candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body. candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of candidate.
certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false
representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied
residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX,
proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners. A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art.
before election the qualifications of a candidate. IX, C, § 2(3))

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
proclamation will be set aside.6 hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in remove the incumbent from office.
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.
officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"8 through the use of
jurisdiction. "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results
of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives assuming office even though in end he prevails.
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the
election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election
President, as the case may be. protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within
10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either
qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art.
about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition
OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the
of candidates unless they have been elected. case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
§ 1 the following:
House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation
cases against such candidates. In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in
order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95- disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the he desires to be a candidate.
eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First
District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET. The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several
residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, most advantageous for him.
1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
should considered void.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner. "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and
actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
Narvasa, C.J., concurs. fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar
with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-
PADILLA, J., dissenting: year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr.
Justice Kapunan. In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end en banc) —
with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that — In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
"no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from
of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6) went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered
as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
numerous cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her
that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
intention.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February
which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
than one year" would fit. 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter
only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her
before the election. registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in
order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B,
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of
case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in
residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
congressional representative for the district. Leyte.
 . . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition). election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)

On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows: elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte stray, void or meaningless.

Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months . . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
COUNTRY. the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the
obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge. of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its
concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified
(Signature of Candidate)2 candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court
or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted"
holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply
district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate
(8 May 1995)." who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate not being counted or considered.
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte,
the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has
representative in said district. been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early
1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from 10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte. Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for
"Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy"
REGALADO, J., dissenting: wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
at the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated
"on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case." The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied
with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are the 1987 Constitution.
pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be
permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in
schools in that city. contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural
laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954. Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and
inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and
having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have
San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila. taken our jurisprudential bearings.

4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the
right of suffrage. acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that
petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
his residence and invariably voted in all elections. domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place
of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of
and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences. origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law
subsequently acquired by the party.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate
of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not
Manila. only international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile
of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the City.
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may
"be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila,
this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to
she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her
Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and
his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against
Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of
registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months. domiciles of choice.5
 One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be
requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the
attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or
of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose. Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice
(unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that,
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of
(domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying
the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar. that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment
of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has
advances this novel proposition. the right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased
husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law and will continue after his death. 11
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos
Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles
origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code,
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive
reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied). how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the
domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power
law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy.
putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her
that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that own domicile of choice.
petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the
equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile. I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial
accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's
reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.
by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there
marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present.
domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the
unsuccessfully tried to do. election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner.
 Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over
some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to
fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification. exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege
desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a
the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to
Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile §
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner. 48, 37).

My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the
COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and
cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook
misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence. on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her
that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's
First Congressional District of Leyte. marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is
that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or,
or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death
her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her
was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a power to acquire her own domicile.
candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
holding to the contrary would be arbitrary. Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at
the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said
from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the elections in that place.
Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows: On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B,"
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states: attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted
this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15
March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration
Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile,
Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila. the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She
miserably failed to discharge that burden.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa,
Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of I vote to deny the petition.
Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did
intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer Separate Opinions
of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? PUNO, J., concurring:
While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is
concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while
abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other
her power of recollection or blurred her memory. candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original propositions:
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business
in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in
place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her
educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin
force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she
institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course,
Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law,
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
have expressly mentioned the same.
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3
affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that (Emphasis supplied)
her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon
this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife
Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the
in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote,
acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
Domicile, [1934], 214, 326). harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated
the husband and wife "to live together."
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely
committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former
residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit
and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of
To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth. the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the
exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña,6
NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]).
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the . . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have
opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her their own independent domicile. . . .
legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere
the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common
of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the law surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of
domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of
husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under
but also because they are contrary to law and public policy. modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law
theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the purpose known to the law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the
At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife
Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal
and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic
elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no
San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of
Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender
incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero,
was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he cited a few of them as follows:21
did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman
on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, xxx xxx xxx
no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."7
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989
of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without her husband's
echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the
until she makes an actual change. relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the
husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from xxx xxx xxx
him.9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first
reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."10 The matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is
second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing
governed by the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the
have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of
law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3)
denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into
seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big partnership without the husband's consent.
blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child. The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from
the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee
eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment
of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22 xxx xxx xxx

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the
joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code.
system of conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the
their persons as well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of the family;25 persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband
the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
of profession, occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the
family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus: In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides
shall decide. the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its
repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall determination of her dead husband.
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and guarantees of due process and equal protection of
wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her
the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:28 dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a
gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous
cases like: fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it
explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life; women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of
women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist
common life impossible; on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122); petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also
92); restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her
and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban
Sula, CA, 34 OG 129); domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their
domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
329); should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile.
There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La.
Ann. 70).
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to 43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed.
affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred: In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
xxx xxx xxx
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City
return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both
to issue me my passport. Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President with the constitutional requirement of residence
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and ". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e.,
welfare. the May 8, 1995 elections.

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner
City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election
destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me. Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period
of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Registration Record on January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence
daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati. in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the
First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence,
sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private
respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 199532 where
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence
renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this
unearthed and scattered. original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a
for permissions to — bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right.
As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make
them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate
of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the
to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8,
Dear Col. Kempis, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the
disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy.
sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban,
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more
undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to overwhelmingly voted for her.
her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any
xxx xxx xxx public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached
reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal
obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the
representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth
her, she averred:36 District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
xxx xxx xxx Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was
devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban
voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a District.
resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit,
Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We
the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of
pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who
respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to
it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community
judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ."
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can
claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will
xxx xxx xxx of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the
Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate
to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean
move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of
Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture,
Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated
petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a
Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of
"Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed.
Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of
the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, I vote to grant the petition.
petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a
voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Second District.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated
a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of
reads: Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon
present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private
which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino,
intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969) supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or
former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of
origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional
Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991
himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay
a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran
or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan,
an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence
Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law certificate2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City
which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered
ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August
the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7). when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in
order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year
domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration
v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that
misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro
petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later
Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and
registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner,
rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Constitution.
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise
petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin. I vote to grant the petition.

It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was
actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable. disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she
should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1
The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration
of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously
having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
any meaningful purpose. suspended.
 rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal
aspirants for a Congressional seat.1 partnership without the husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children
under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title,
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious
his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective
refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her
subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a
separate opinions. subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband,
father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no
domiciliary tie imposed by her husband. protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations
and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been
or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter
his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the
ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present. dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis
supplied)
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of
origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the
be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights
will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as
a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound
defined by the law be is subject to. itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The
Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and
things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the
as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights
of women, no less than men. CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its
rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are
century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."17
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as
the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family
domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that
common child21 and several others. mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic
function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
equal to that of men are:
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
credit arrangements under the same conditions as men; 121 SCRA 51).

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in fundamental law. These provisions read:
agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
contracts; and able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for immediately preceding the day of the election.
passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their
spouses. Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun. The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and
administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office.
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
same, regardless?
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound residency requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is
by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only
of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not
are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her reviewable by this Court.
election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile),
official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition. he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is
VITUG, J., separate opinion: the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling
rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch
7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus: BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term xxx xxx xxx
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall
conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to disqualification is sought.
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding
domicile must be actual. sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution. much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey.
Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs.
just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and,
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices
properly done. Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza
(Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the first Labo decision:
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
returns and qualification" of its members. choice of the people of Baguio City.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA
case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected
881, each providing thusly: after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
xxx xxx xxx three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another
two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando,
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final C.J.)
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente,
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas
strong. and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar,
J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and § 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority
Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held: insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the § 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.) is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21) has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion: candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in (Emphasis added)
the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered
valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body. § 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
against winning candidates. strong. (Emphasis added).

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned § 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The
with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial
or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code: elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
sentence; reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.6
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265,
(d) Those with dual citizenship; Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications
to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled
"For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the
Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the President, as the case may be.
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of
candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent
Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or
representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy. OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications
of candidates unless they have been elected.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of
certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25,
explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a § 1 the following:
candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body. candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of candidate.
certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false
representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied
residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX,
proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners. A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art.
before election the qualifications of a candidate. IX, C, § 2(3))

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or PADILLA, J., dissenting:
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr.
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for Justice Kapunan.
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office. As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end
with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that —
that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4. he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"8 through the use of as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results numerous cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved
of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is
for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from intention.
assuming office even though in end he prevails.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less
protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within than one year" would fit.
10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice
Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person
with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year
IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition before the election.
must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the
case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the congressional representative for the district.
House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation
cases against such candidates. In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in
order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95- disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the he desires to be a candidate.
eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First
District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET. The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several
residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, most advantageous for him.
1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
should considered void.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner. "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and
actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
Narvasa, C.J., concurs. fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar
with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-
year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not 10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
versatility. COUNTRY.

In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey
en banc) — the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the
obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from
1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's (Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. (Signature of Candidate)2
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her preceding the election."
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st
congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February of election (8 May 1995)."
1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte,
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of
and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her representative in said district.
registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in
order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec,
Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early
Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. . . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows: vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:

9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED . . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the 3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in
intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte,
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the
of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its right of suffrage.
concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even
during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified 5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained
or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified. 6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" 7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes. of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply
because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate 8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the
who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may
candidate not being counted or considered. "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed
this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan,
Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of 9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's
registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from 10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte. Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for
"Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy"
REGALADO, J., dissenting: wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
at the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated
"on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case." The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied
with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are the 1987 Constitution.
pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be
permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in
schools in that city. contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural
laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954. Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and
inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of
the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos
domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of
taken our jurisprudential bearings. origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the
acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City. necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission
of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that
domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the
marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law
subsequently acquired by the party. Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in
accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss
only international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her
of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by
City. the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila,
thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby
have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen
having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally
his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile,
in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of unsuccessfully tried to do.
domiciles of choice.5
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be
requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the
attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or
of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose. Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice
(unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that,
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of
(domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying
the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar. that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment
of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has
advances this novel proposition. the right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased
husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law and will continue after his death. 11
 the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code,
the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof
how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the
domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true First Congressional District of Leyte.
that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that
has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission
gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in
Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately,
own domicile of choice. was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a
candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and
statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own
is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase. from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the
Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner. Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage
in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to
continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege
Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification. desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that
they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison,
176 SCRA 84 [1989]). Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of
law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile §
Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the 48, 37).
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of
COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and
dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and
on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102). legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course,
Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should
marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is have expressly mentioned the same.
that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the
last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her
on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that
until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon
(25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent."
power to acquire her own domicile. Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it
was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely
of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving
elections in that place. and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing.
To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs.
voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]).
Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the
attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority
this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her
March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That
Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile,
Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila. the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She
miserably failed to discharge that burden.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa,
Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of I vote to deny the petition.
Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did
intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer
of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte?
While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is
concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or
abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished
her power of recollection or blurred her memory.

I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business
in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other
place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service;
educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air
force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the
instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:
petitioners-appellants,
vs. First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may hereafter
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants. be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero
and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee. The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to
mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a
BARREDO, J.: citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and
49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of
as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
thus:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a
of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO
plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be
was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence. naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March 13,
1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these: Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) Philippines."
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the
of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having
filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the
would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to
of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be
or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau permitted.
Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On
January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her
bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, 5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on
she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao
English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil.
Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the decided THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A
cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME
Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which reads: WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER
AUTHORIZED STAY.
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign IV
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF
for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE
Immigration Act of 1940). COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO
DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A
laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in FILIPINO CITIZEN.
relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a
quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of V
Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be
disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A
talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write either language. TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in VI
the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in
the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN
course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged
marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the
child by her husband." two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus: That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period
I of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay
permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se
HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil.
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN Immigration Law);
MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE
TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the
NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW. latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay,
II Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily
NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our
MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER discussions, more or less, on said objections.
SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-
PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940. I

III The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants'
second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of
fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into
the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of
the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they
consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd
503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice
note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had
become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have ... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of
held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of
required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law. her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from
would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond
Immigration Act providing: deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the
depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all
undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines
for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only
because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore,
become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose,
and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor II
confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that
residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the
Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said: record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by
the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General
voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau
benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization,
representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case,
promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions,
and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of
encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855,
limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs.
should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that
and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who
here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with
port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization
inherent in such ruling are self-evident. proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a applicant for naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as
temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us,
leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even
the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated
incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3
means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, (f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case,4 one almost identical to the socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely
departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during the
married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the period of such war;
Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a
Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does
acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of
the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not
she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite
appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question,
Justice, spoke for the Court, thus: there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of
political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a
The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino case against the respondents-appellants.
justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines
on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had
her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in
naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce
for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall
be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above
Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the decision as regards the following propositions: .
Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be
reads: lawfully naturalized";

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who 2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization
by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign the decision;
wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section 15 excludes, from 3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action
the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group
of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; 5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left
the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications,5 specially considering that the
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior
or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act
No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character,
etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of
persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex
parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself be lawfully
Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.) naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires
proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be Naturalization Law.
lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications
of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe
merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940) Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed
no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she can anyway
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the
results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the
citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.) For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties
concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization
to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this
wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she
the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows: thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not
possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is,
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above provision, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary
means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven.
disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this
28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in Court,6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of
the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned which held: .
in the law.
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine
Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the
well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary.
parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776,
being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo
Nepomuceno.) This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this
101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
facts: disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a
passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of
said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, xxx xxx xxx
however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation
proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that: Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a
warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the alien naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a
finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be invoked alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and
to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may,
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the
of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.) meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage
by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order
to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion
follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is
not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond — failure to depart from the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting receipt of notice — were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino
or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.) citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must
possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the
promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the
limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly
in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary
Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series
Barrera.) of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office,
I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be
Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the
No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc.,
of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by
Gatmaitan.) Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed
that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in
was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter
follows: dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer
Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua
bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice, v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record
otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining
the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice
confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly
Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the
bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for said first two decisions.
his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15,
Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of
rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, Section 3.Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act,
1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of
Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her permit,
and when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being
claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each
affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in of the following qualifications:
the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial
judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years,
to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of except as provided in the next following section;
residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law.
Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: . government as well as with the community in which they are living;

It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos,
decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and
of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be a person of the class or
race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for
citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his
"If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign
a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.
must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood, alien
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have existed at the women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the
time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the
or difficult to find.") Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the
United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the
woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents and purposes.
respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to
be qualified. But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June
17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this
Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization act which
Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are
provided: related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political
Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that
Section 1.Who may become Philippine citizens — Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be understood in the context in
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who Leonard v. Grant.
under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the
Section 2.Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons citizens of the Philippines.
defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for
the success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong
mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a
the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war. proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified
is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the
"qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship.7
that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien
woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14
was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the
she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had
race of persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization — the assumption being always submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice
that she is not otherwise disqualified. Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30,
1965, 14 SCRA 539.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an
alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand
husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying
Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino requirements of the law."9
citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of
this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving. Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice
Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the dependency of the
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L- naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as
20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show
previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above,
granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786,
Justice Barrera held: May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.

In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point
November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October now under discussion is settled law.
31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized citizen does not
automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section
possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a
Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman, who is now or may
naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay. naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall
876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua be considered citizens thereof.
Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung,
Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in
and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only
the law. during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor,
in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice
Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered
March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register
January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to
the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last take the necessary oath of allegiance.
visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her
husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man
well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from
to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all
the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to
Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to
the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United States, and
circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United
matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice
Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to
tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands,
just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically United States if residing therein.
repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha.
Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of
indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration. marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil
Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed
Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of
from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien
reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage,
adventure of doubt. although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner
American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may
of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor
Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of
of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones the petitioner.
Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and
immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that
practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
own; everything was American.
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: . and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to the Philippine Islands.
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
1912, by adding a provision as follows: Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.
 words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the naturalization laws of the two countries and hence there was reason to accord here
the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision
decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.
in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to
Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the
naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial
Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered. restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been
maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision — that
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who might herself
clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman
is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications
time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the that the woman "might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage,
qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in
Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in
provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a
to become a Filipina by marriage. privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to
anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines,
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
"like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who customs and traditions.
alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as
Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even,
providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a
favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who Philippine citizen.
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under
Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same
support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be conclusion thus:
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified
persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14 On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the
Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write
qouted: English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate
wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino
and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being
may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act
San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in
Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the woman be not
1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to the court for a possible disqualified under section 4.
reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United
States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue
of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in
law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under
this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, Filipino citizen by naturalization.
under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter country if residing therein.
The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule
in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an
alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be lawfully naturalized," SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be
means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b)
also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or
(San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L- foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if
20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L- residing therein.
20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of
Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965). and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of
race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act
under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it could not have been
violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only — done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act
of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In truth,
therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence
Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished
a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the
such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended
for citizenship "must be of good moral character." purpose of the amendment.

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government 2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision
by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in
disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider
disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government," nor the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to
affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein
"defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who
for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris. could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any
idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the
absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act
the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess. 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the
following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived from the
U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who
significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or
v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or
1965. propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific
individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be
study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.
premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not
entirely unassailable. and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under
Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and
who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the
Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of
the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act
Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial
Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus: exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States
Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in
the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the relator took place prior to
Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the
discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17 Revised Statutes.

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed
construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be
Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white women.
of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that the person applying for
amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy."
Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18
Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or
15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the
that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of the
written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting
verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of
enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
the United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held that
naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute must be
Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be
1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she
32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]). possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United
administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and
Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held
1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows: that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had
complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) "There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United,
provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of
United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." persons" who might be lawfully naturalized.

Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided "that any woman, who States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of deporting her. She
citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen." applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter
she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court
Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States
a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue
and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject." of her marriage her husband's domicil became her domicil." .

The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had
Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at
Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who marries a citizen of the that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she
United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United States by was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the
reason of such marriage ..." effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of
that contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's application for
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed." naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined whether the wife's disease was
curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained husband might naturalize her. At the same time he express his opinion that the husband's
under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become
lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that
prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was
cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to
expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as
something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to was contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of
accept them. evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in
a court of competent jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen
while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be excluded, although she It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the
had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the immigration laws would have been Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing
sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for the period
brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a
In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in
and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct that the United States, she and her husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration
laws, it does not affect these relators." In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion
rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a town in
inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken
The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is that, in the former case, before a United States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration
the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her
was celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and
provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the same within three years
administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed at the time the order of exclusion after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States
was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was
executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time
at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her
prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to
plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim
order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American citizen and therefore could not
American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an
under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and American citizen. He held that the words, "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a
ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions
that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens. of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.

In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that
officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage to
1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by the an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not invest such female
immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her
was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this act."
her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
was that the woman had married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her
deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such (1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held that deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.
it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to
authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled (2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of
to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her
to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention would have been
upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited. expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral
found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English
in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools,
impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the
first of the decisions 19 simply held: place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have
come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens
of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above
Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married," do not refer in our of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear
judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section
They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of
of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and
subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His administrative authorities.
citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction
which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above,
would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised
object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from the Act of February 10,
necessity of any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of
reason for the restriction suggested. residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be
considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the
only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855,
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to whom it
Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions. relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the
judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the
existing laws" only limit the application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the person applying for its be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having
benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect
simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is
1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other prescribed.
non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a
naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is
stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. understood that the construction already given to such statute before its being copied constitute
Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or
application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining
facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related to the real
not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and legislative background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law
in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband. Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less
Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-
Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it
being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as
required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act,
without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression
have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this
qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of
corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what should the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements
be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the
with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4? law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a
lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as
Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section
American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act
said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter,
that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who may be
because it had been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under
automatic naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups
submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling
applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1,
already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing,
abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of
judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in the
approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law
settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American
judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining
but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of
Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from
autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old the American statutes.
American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S.
Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What 6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial
then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that militate
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for
Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic,
construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature supra:
adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it a
construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —
possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things
stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15
construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses
modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such
circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance
say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the
independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances here following:
and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot
fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view 1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of
seems to indicate otherwise. the law is that the applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen,
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her
in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her
laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her
Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even
have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess after having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee
them were the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for
any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of an indefinite period of time.
Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law,
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he "must alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in
own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the
or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation." Considering the Civil Code being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former
citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to
Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L- Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed
derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not
have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in
the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2,
Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that such a
woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify
her for citizenship? A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his object, it should receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051;
minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134
Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization ... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if
as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to another possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance
alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression, hardship,
schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public
the interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result
enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. in absurd consequences.
(Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951];
Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency
Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in
her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should
requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown
to have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to
"shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside
only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married 7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for
to a Filipino husband must reside for ten years. aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically
marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than
And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but
was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien
not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate
3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from
precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are
point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening: bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to
believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but
the husband; but the Department of State of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered
that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of
for the husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy the Revised Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was
avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the
sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the
should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that
citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with
But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the
In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over
by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost
courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an in the come. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately
individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American
Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of
Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the
who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American,
whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating
an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of
lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from
of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact. the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it
patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization
it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855
State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating,
had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women
(Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and
Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral
Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did
be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law.
husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
one is that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
because of the theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the
nationality of husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be
law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by
Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of
marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be
law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical
partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other. and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every
case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should III.
be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property and
business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a
of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted,
and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the
foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held
that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect
Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited
claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the
Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without Court might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from
submitting to a naturalization proceeding? that complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance,
considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any
be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the
because there is still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits national policy it seeks to endorse.
grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons
expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in
issue. the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive
and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court: they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case -- that an
of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a
all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization proceedings under
both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying or declaring such
Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has consequences that reach far beyond
petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or the confines of the present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply,
otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women
that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of
void. many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian,
Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and privileges
"petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in conjugal
once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and transferred
Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently considered such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited to
the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in
Philippines." business activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law.
All these married women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law
with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government
Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and charged with the administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines
above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from which would visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination.
marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her
Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs.
before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when Chief Justice Concepcion
for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required observed:
period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle
local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases — although
some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar
intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible — may have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in other
witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the
ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, procedure followed was valid under the law.
but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration. Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor
General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice of the
cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once,
"effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was
promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one
1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the present case was rendered). "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the
the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law
affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957. itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA).
Indeed, the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to
the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative
had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully
have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole
the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated
the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative
therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them. naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently
and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign
religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women
be considered citizens thereof. who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is
whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political
parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is
not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman
only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes
minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-
499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition,
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)
a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register
himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the
take the necessary oath of allegiance. United States statutes from which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held
that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every
Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself,
conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p.
remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct.
undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the
members of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a)
terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and
"considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of
dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts
those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman
also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer who married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a
their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings,
children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be
Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these
Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which
might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the
American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be
as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter.
Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. In
naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance
the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased
requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of
aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt her children, as recipients of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein
the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922. petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the
legal provision that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The
citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the
to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition,
developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the
our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No.
for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case
to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally permissible for is, therefore, premature.
this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent. Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common
and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the
proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: . Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for
reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel:
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner .
should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may
continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered
children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the
the petitioner. power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship,
but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark,
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held: 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines
152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens
16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance
substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original petitioner remain with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship
to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a
becomes executory. citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16 International Law 3).
contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of
inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the Revised
the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase
rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts have
continue the proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of
it would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the
and the minor children. statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US
Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1,
xxx xxx xxx 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be
1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is
and taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum,
become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase,
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had
account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6
or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such
true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be (This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a
"deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized"
being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife depends
Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and
Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours). until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the
law that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she "might herself be lawfully
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the
of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien
statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads: wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those
decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and
(See supra). therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101
Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to the lower court for determination of whether
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become" as used petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the
in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged
provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens change of political status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957],
as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a
citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4
provision concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the claim
is for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is
does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of
fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply
requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to that they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the
acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a
in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which proven fact.
establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the
point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is
Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven
Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue
concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when the child became a citizen in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the
does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a
Philippines and should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes
became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able
Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps, because to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully
it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in question), that she is naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is
one who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen
she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully
the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can
citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship
law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her
status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim
be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
presumption that a representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v.
George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321). Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what
substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be vs.
called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that
as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of
the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship vs.
of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to
"appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler
for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these
are not really binding. GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification
the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the
Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local
considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties: elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order
to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of
follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No.
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the
not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card
or denying the petition. holder.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the
probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition. allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the
touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional
matter be settled once and for all now. elections on May 18,1987.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and
the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he
has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card,
Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown
by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for
basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which
provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his
candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508). departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding
his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies
respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent following information is printed:
resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p.
13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.) Alien Registration Receipt Card.

In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States."
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R.
Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United
ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
case. The Court of Appeals held: intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a
visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of the Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets
the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering
(sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that into a country with the intention of residing in it.
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are
appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.) An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence.
As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his
status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
January 18, 1988. country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during
the period of his residence therein.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled to
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and
times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the criminal responsibility.
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are entitled to
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and property and to their
(B.P. Blg. 881) provides: civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a "any person" of life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person the
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said equal protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be
EC). deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)

In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he
question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this
not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if
that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
provides:
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
xxx xxx xxx possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988,
requirement provided for in the election laws.' our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto
was null and void.
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a
candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos.
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States? 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The
election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate annulled. Costs against the said respondent.
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the SO ORDERED.
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006
immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act
or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, vs.
Omnibus Election Code). AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly DECISION
bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor
of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a CALLEJO, SR., J.:
candidate for that office.
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City,
filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from
that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in conducting further proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on
Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's
November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988. Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager,
those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to
preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of
legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is
United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative
officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes at defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
their office address.
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon,
Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As
dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial
her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly
Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for
Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka. purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the
permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled
by respondents on July 20, 2000. Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order
dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting
result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which
reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting further proceedings in Civil
and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Case No. R-3172.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents'
raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to
respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the
improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his
complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is
his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of
contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at
City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the the election of plaintiff.
complaint a quo.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo
Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the
petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or
Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the therein with continuity and consistency.4
filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As
a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the
including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar.
His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term
the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
certificate is not determinative of one's residence. relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a
person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving
interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a stateless persons.
xxxx UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they
hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that
his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis) damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional
Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate
court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and SO ORDERED.12
certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the
same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the
respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the
shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in the place where the principal office instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:
of the juridical entity is located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which
was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision
were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or
conclusive upon him and no longer required proof. with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.

The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone (a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein
district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is
residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the a residence (sic) of said district;
congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is
inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of (c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this
venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
option of petitioner Saludo.
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to
and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.9 Further, vex the respondents.13
fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal
civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court
by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil
defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of justice.10 Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein,
was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents'
affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's The petition is meritorious.
motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience
respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a
powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the
Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was a SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
locality. defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue,
like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or "We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court)
the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,'
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or thus:
may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to
that place.16 'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a
member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to "Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private
comply with the residency requirement of the rule. respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his
manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is
Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or
the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the
in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v.
That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon.
resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in
that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. the aforecited cases, stated:
Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides"
for purposes of venue, thus: "2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal
venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
intention of returning. Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and
situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons. it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary."18
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its
previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that - There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone
district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the
'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a house."19
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis) purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence,"
as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place.
reasons, one intends to return. x x x21 A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
(Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1,
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can
stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence
"residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the residence is also established in some other place.
term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2)
personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in
As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990
residence for the purposes of election law."23 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical
residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to stay there
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. permanently.
Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically,
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then
one's domicile."24 be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman
of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern thereat, when such residence is required by law.28
Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election
laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no
filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does
Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have
"residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
unlimited time." residence.29

Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern
holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this
was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte,
that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be
Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of
had not established that he was actually a resident therein at the time of the filing of his public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice,
manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in that without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its
place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, Constitution.
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27 The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been
explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among
time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally
deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in
therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being
petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial
presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community
bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be where it sits.
considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken
judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the
qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a
residence in the district in which he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be
characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules,
as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by
petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read
the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my own
personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly
constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22,
2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No.
R-3172 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.