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500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

*
G.R. No. 103982.December 11, 1992.

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, respondent.

Statutes; Administrative Code of 1987; Implied repeal.—In

the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly
depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions)
of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads: “Sec. 27.
Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” The question that
should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It
is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing
provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent
was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an
implied repeal.

Same; Same; Same.—There are two categories of repeal by

implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the
same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act
to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject
of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate to repeal the earlier law. Implied repeal by irreconcilable
inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible
with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and
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both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other. Comparing the two Codes,
it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to
cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found

_______________

* EN BANC.

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Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the

leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims
for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

Same; Same; Same.—Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of

statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. This Court, in a case, explains the principle
in detail as follows: “Repeals by implication are not favored, and
will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to
some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing
necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason
for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every
effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will
not operate as a repeal of the earlier.

Administrative Code of 1917; Allowances in case of injury,

death or sickness incurred in performance of duty; Payment of
compensation under Employees’ Compensation Program does not
bar recovery under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code.—

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Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this

subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on
Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of
the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that
“the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code x x x whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government.”

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

Commission on Audit.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks

to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA,
for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated
January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code
(RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis
from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which
he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total
amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI
Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he
requested reimbursement for his expenses on the 1ground
that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:

“Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred

in performance of duty.—When a person in the service of the
national government or in the service of the government of a
province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in
the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any period of disability thereby
occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months,
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and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the

payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the
case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if
any there be.
x x x      x x x
“In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the
performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head
may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees.”

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, in a 1st

Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of
Justice,

________________

1 As amended by R.A. No. 1232 dated June 7, 1955.

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Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda

Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, “recommending favorable
action thereof.” Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-
connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the
Department of Justice favorably recommended the
payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H.
Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990,
returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having
considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in
its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect
that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim
2
to Director Lim,
with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 dated April 26, 1991
of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary
Drilon, for brevity) stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate
in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including
the particular Section 699 of the latter.”
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th
Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a
6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon
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forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman,

recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground
that Section 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the
same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that
the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director
Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by
Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director
Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with
the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court if he so

_______________

2 Rollo, pp. 26-30

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Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

desires.”
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative
Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC,
this petition was brought for the consideration of this
Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC,
as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the
event that a claim is filed with the Employees’
Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he
would still not be barred from filing a claim under the
subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there
was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
would decide the fate of petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that
the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec.
Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The
COA claims that from the “whereas” clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the
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intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover,

the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion
of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly,
the COA contends that employment-related sickness,
injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees’
Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow
simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on
account of the same contingency would be unfair and
unjust to the Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been
repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a
law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which
expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws,
3
and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause,
that a particular and specific law, identified by its number
or title, is repealed
4
is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals.

________________

3 School Dist. No. 45 vs. Board of County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108.
4 AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 289 (1986).

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VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 505

Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question,

the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code
partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of
the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:

“Sec. 27. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, orders, rules and

regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of

this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or 5designate the
act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is
an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the

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intended repeal under the condition that a substantial

conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and6 repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls
under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that
where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior7
act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the
part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new
law was to abrogate the old one.8
The intention to repeal
must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and
will continue so far as the two acts are the same from

_________________

5 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13

SCRA 377 (1965).
6 CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE 631 (1940 ed.).
7 Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351 (1936)
8 Maceda vs. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).

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Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

9
the time of the first enactment.
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The
first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended 10
as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes
place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter;
they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each
other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and
both cannot be given effect, that is, that
11
one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover not attempt to cover the entire subject
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matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated

in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such
as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the
public bonding law, military reservations, claims for
sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits
of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the
COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699
was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant
that the same section had been repealed. It further
maintained that to allow the particular provisions not
restated in the new Code to continue in force argues
against the Code itself. The COA anchored this argument
on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

“WHEREREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be

enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporates in a

______________

9 Supra, note 7.
10 Supra, note 4.
11 Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971).

507

VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 507

Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

unified document the major structural, functional and procedural

principles and rules of governance; and
x x x      x x x”

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one

Code—the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is
untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since
the new statute may merely 12
be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. What is necessary 13
is a
manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
We come now to the second category of repeal—the
enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former
laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if
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the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole

subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is
the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a
prior law if the former
14
revises the whole subject matter of
the former statute. When both intent and scope clearly
evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of
the prior act that15 are omitted from the revised act are
deemed repealed. Furthermore, before there can be an
implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear
intent of the legislature
16
that the later act be the substitute
to the prior act.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of
Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those
aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure, understandably because of the
many changes that transpired in the government structure
since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The
COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries in the
determination of this

________________

12 Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948).

13 Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974).
14 People vs. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410, 414 (1976).
15 People vs. Benuya, 61 Phil. 208 (1916).
16 Supra, note 9.

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Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

controversy inasmuch as the body which had been

entrusted with the implementation of this particular
provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied
on the rule in administrative
17
law enunciated in the case of
Sison vs. Pangramuyen that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be
loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and
implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This
principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions
may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that 18
the
decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. It has
been held that Opinions of the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Justice are19
material in the construction
of statutes in pari materia.
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Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction

20
that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy
for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not 21
to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as
follows: “Repeals by implication are not favored, and will
not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to some matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only ir-

_______________

17 84 SCRA 364 (1978).

18 Jaculina vs. National Police Commission, 200 SCRA 489 (1991);
Greenhills Mining Co. vs. Office of the President, 163 SCRA 350 (1988).
19 Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova, 145 SCRA 385
(1986).
20 National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Zain B. Angas, G.R. Nos.
60225-26, May 8, 1992; Maceda vs. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991);
Maddumba vs. Government Service Insurance System, 182 SCRA 281
(1990); Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., 164 SCRA 18 (1988); De Jesus vs. People,
120 SCRA 760 (1983).
21 U.S. vs. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208 (1916).

509

VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 509

Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

reconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing

necessarily from the language used, unless the later act
fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless
the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts
stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled,
22
the later act will not operate as a repeal of the
earlier.
Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under
this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under
the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot
be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II,
Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State
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Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended

by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code x x x whose benefits are administered
by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies
of the government.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves
to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., In the result.

Petition granted.

Note.—Repeal by implication is not favored unless it is

manifest that the legislature so intended (Maceda vs.
Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771).

——o0o——

________________

22 Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Estate of Maronilla, 41 Phil. 557 (1916).

510

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