SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000]

CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present appeal by certiorari is the decision dated November 27, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 12037, (a) affirming in toto the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, and (b) denying her Motion
for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 25, 1993. The Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch
40, rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in
Criminal Case No. C-2313, and likewise found petitioner liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in Civil Case No. R-3733.
Only the criminal case is before us for review. h Y
The uncontroverted facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch,
Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside
the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of
fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually
counted was P3,850,000.00 as against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a
total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the records
and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00.
The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager. The second was
by the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then, the banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted
an independent investigation. Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these
investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the banks
Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. Jksm
On November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accuseds service with the bank
was terminated.
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a Civil Case for Sum of Money
and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and
her husband, Antonio Burce. Esm
Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa was filed against petitioner:
"That on or about the 16th day of August 1985, and for a period prior and subsequent thereto, the above-
named accused, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, and with intent to defraud, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, in her capacity as Cash Custodian of the Metrobank, Calapan Branch,
take from the Banks Vault the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
which is under her direct custody and/or accountability, misappropriate and convert to her own personal
use and benefit, without the knowledge and consent of the offended party, despite repeated demands for
her to account and/or return the said amount, she refused and failed, and still fails and refuses to the
damage and prejudice of the Metrobank, Calapan Branch, in the aforementioned amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS.
Contrary to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, November 27, 1985."[1]
Both civil and criminal cases were raffled to the same branch of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 40. Esmsc
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, viz., that the resolution of the civil case was determinative of her guilt or innocence in the criminal case. [2] The
trial court, over the vehement opposition of the private and public prosecutors, granted the motion and suspended the trial
of the criminal case.[3] On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that there was no
prejudicial question.[4]
Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty.[5] While the trial of the criminal
case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted
for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective
evidence in the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case. [6] The trial court ordered the parties to submit
their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. [7] Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by
her counsel, with the conforme of the public prosecutor, entered into the following pre-trial agreement:[8]
"COMES NOW, the accused, assisted by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
submits this Pre-Trial agreement:
1. That the evidence already adduced by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-3733 will be adopted by the
prosecution as its evidence in Criminal Case No. C-2313;
2. That the evidence to be adduced by the defendant in Civil Case No. R-3733 will also be adopted as
evidence for the defense in Criminal Case No. C-2313.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is prayed that the foregoing pre-trial agreement be admitted in
compliance with the Order of this Court dated April 19, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, August 20, 1990.
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE (sgd.)
Accused
Assisted By:
RODRIGO C. DIMAYACYAC (sgd.)
Defense Counsel
San Vicente, Calapan
Oriental Mindoro
IBP O.R. No. 292575
May 11, 1990
Quezon City
With Conformity:
EMMANUEL S. PANALIGAN (sgd.)
Prosecuting Fiscal
Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Adopt Evidence.[9] Both the pre-trial agreement
and said Motion were granted by the trial court.[10]
On March 18, 1991, the trial court rendered a consolidated decision[11] finding petitioner (a) guilty of estafa under Article
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in the criminal case, and (b) liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in the civil case.
The dispositive portion of decision provides -
- In Criminal Case No. C-2313 -
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Cristeta Chua-Burce guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa, punishable under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, which
imposes a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period
but considering that the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided for shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total amount not to
exceed twenty years. Esmmis
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be one degree lower as minimum
of arresto mayor with a penalty range of One Month and One Day to Six Months, as minimum to prision
mayor in its maximum period, as maximum, or a penalty of Six years to Twelve Years. Considering the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the court hereby imposes upon the accused to suffer
imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor, in its minimum period, as maximum. The civil liability shall not be imposed in
this case due to a separate civil action. Esmso
- In Civil Case No. R-3733 -
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Metrobank, ordering defendants
Cristeta Chua-Burce and Antonio Burce, spouses, to pay Metrobank the amount of P150,000.00
representing the amount misappropriated with the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from August
15, 1985 until fully paid and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction in the criminal case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a separate
appeal in the civil case.
In a decision dated November 27, 1992,[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.[13] Hence, the recourse to this Court. Msesm
Petitioner raises the following issues:[14]
1. IS THE RESULT OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?
2. CAN THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS ALREADY DENIED ADMISSION IN THE ORDER OF THE FORMER JUDGE
OF THE SAME COURT?
3. DOES PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION EXISTS (sic)
AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHEN THERE WERE OTHER PERSONS WHO HAD DIRECT AND
GREATER ACCESS IN THE CASH-IN-VAULT?
4. IS RULE 111 SECTION 2 (a) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE APPLICABLE
IN (sic)THE CASE AT BAR?
5. WAS THERE A VALID PROCEEDING WHEN THE FISCAL WAS NOT ACTUALLY PRESENT AND
DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE? Exsm
In gist, (1) petitioner contends that the trial court erred in taking into account the results of the polygraph examination as
circumstantial evidence of guilt considering the inherent unreliability of such tests, and the fact that the previous trial judge
who handled the case already ruled such evidence as inadmissible; (2) petitioner insists that there can be no presumption
of misappropriation when there were other persons who had access to the cash in vault; and (3) petitioner questions the
validity of the trial of criminal case considering that the pre-trial agreement dispensed with the intervention of the public
prosecutor in a full-blown trial of the criminal case. Kyle
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the following facts which were duly established during trial - first, petitioner was the cash custodian who was
directly responsible and accountable for the cash-in-vault. Second, the other persons who had access to the vault facilities
never used the duplicate keys to open the safety deposit boxes and the cash safe from where the P100.00 bill
denominations were located. In fact, the duplicate keys were offered in evidence still in their sealed
envelopes. Third, alterations and superimposition on the cash-in-vault summary sheet were made by petitioner to cover
the cash shortage. Lastly, there was a valid joint trial of the civil and criminal cases.
The crucial issues, in our mind, are (1) whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case, and (2) whether the elements
of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code were duly proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Kycalr
First, petitioner assails the validity of the proceedings in the trial court on the ground that the public prosecutor did not
intervene and present any evidence during the trial of the criminal case. The records clearly show that the pre-trial
agreement was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner filed
a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5 of Rule 110[15] requires that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons."[16] The records show that the public prosecutor actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties
agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule
118 of the Rules of Court[17] which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters
as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, [18] reduced to writing
such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-
trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.[19]
On the second issue. Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.[20] In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b)
by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person.[21] Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of confidence, since the breach of confidence
takes the place of the fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. [22]
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are: [23]
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial
on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or
any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession andjuridical possession of the thing
received.[24] Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner.[25] In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily
responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both
being mere bank employees. Calrky
In People v. Locson,[26] the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for the bank. He was
found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. We explained
in Locson that -
"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of
the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence,
removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the
taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."[27]
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals,[28] a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to return to
his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable
for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained
the distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability -
"The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that
appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their
proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received
by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of
funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to
the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and
 has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the
other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for
advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew
Civil Code; Article 1730, old)." Mesm
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of
juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b)
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED from custody unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause. No costs. Slx
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123696. March 11, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICKY HIJADA y VILLANUEVA,
DANILO ALCERA y ALFON and RODELIOVILLAMOR y RABANES, appellants.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellants Ricky Hijada y Villanueva (Ricky), Danilo Alcera y Alfon (Dante) and Rodelio Villamor y Rabanes (Rodel)
were charged with the crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, [1] under the
following information:[2]
The undersigned accuses RICKY HIJADA Y VILLANUEVA @ RICKY, DANILO ALCERA Y ALFON @ DANTE
and RODELIO VILLAMOR Y RABANES @ RODEL of the crime of ROBBERY WITH MULTIPLE HOMICIDE committed
as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of September, 1992 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and
intimidation against persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the residence
of FILONILATUPAZ located at No. 32 Pantaleona Street, Don Jose Subd., Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, accused, pursuant to their conspiracy, went to the
residence of said FILONILA TUPAZ and then and there hogtied FILOMENA GARCIA and ROSEMARIE DIAZ and
thereafter carted away the following personal properties, to wit:
1. Six (6) blank Checks of BPI
2. Two (2) Units Vacuum cleaner (Red & blue)
3. One (1) White garnet necklace
4. Two (2) pcs. Gold filled necklace
5. One (1) Cal. .38 revolver, 2 inches barrel, paper weight, bearing SN-510960 with six (6) live ammunitions
6. One (1) brown holster for snub-nose cal. .38
7. Assorted coins of different denominations amounting to P36.00
8. One (1) unit tire gauge
of still undetermined value and belonging to said FILONILA TUPAZ, and on the occasion of said robbery, the accused
pursuant to their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab FILONILA TUPAZ, FILOMENA GARCIA and ROSEMARIE DIAZ, thereby inflicting upon them serious and grave
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said FILONILA TUPAZ, FILOMENA GARCIA and ROSEMARIE DIAZ in such amount as may be awarded to them under
the provisions of law.
Evidence for the Prosecution
SPO1 Rolando Aguilar[3]testified that he was the police investigator who took the statement of Dante on September
19, 1992. Rolando Aguilar said that before taking down Dantes statement, he duly informed the latter of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have counsel present. Dante signified that he was waiving these rights and executed a
document to this effect. Thereafter, Dante gave a statement confessing to having robbed the house of Filonila Tupaz.He
also implicated Ricky and Rodel as having taken part in the robbery and pointed to Ricky as the person who killed the three
victims.
Rolando Aguilar, however, admitted that both the waiver and the confession were not signed in the presence of counsel
as required by the Constitution, although there were a number of media men who witnessed the whole interrogation
proceedings.
 Furthermore, Rolando Aguilar identified the items that were found in the possession of appellants upon their arrest,
which included those purportedly taken from the house of Filonila Tupaz, as well as the weapon allegedly used in stabbing
the victims. He also identified pictures taken from the crime scene.
SPO4 Juan S. Aguilar[4] testified that he was the head of the investigation team which apprehended appellants. He
said that on September 17, 1992, Rolando Aguilar handed to him a cartographic sketch of one of the suspects. He then
showed the sketch to an informant who positively identified the person in the drawing as Ricky.
Through another informant, the police were able to obtain the address of Ricky in Marikina. They proceeded to that
address where they met Jeffrey Ambrosio who told them that he knew something about the crime and was willing to
cooperate on the condition that he be first placed under arrest and brought to the police station so that his neighbors wont
see that he spoke to the police.
In the police station, Jeffrey Ambrosio said that Ricky attempted to recruit him for the robbery. Jeffrey Ambrosio also
gave the addresses of Dante and Rodelwhom he identified as participants in the robbery. The police and Jeffrey Ambrosio
went first to the residence of Rodel in Capitol Hills, Quezon City where they chanced upon Dante and Rodel leaving the
house. A brief chase then ensued that ended in the apprehension of the said two appellants.
The police recovered from Dante and Rodel a necklace and a traveling bag. Inside the traveling bag were a .38
revolver, some religious chains, 36 pieces of coins with different denominations, six booklets of blank checks, assorted
goods and their baon. Most of those items were later identified as the victims stolen belongings.
According to Juan Aguilar, after being arrested, Dante and Rodel voluntarily disclosed that they were on their way
to 8th Street in New Manila to meet Ricky.The police immediately proceeded to the aforesaid location, spotted Ricky walking
along 8th Street and placed him under arrest. The police recovered from Ricky one necklace and six rounds of live
ammunition.
Ricky was thereafter brought to his residence in Tondo where he surrendered a bladed weapon stained with
blood. They returned to New Manila, to the house of Rickys parents, where Rickys father surrendered to the police two
vacuum cleaners, allegedly taken from the house of Filonila Tupaz.
SPO1 Orlando Gacote,[5] who was part of the team led by Juan Aguilar, testified substantially to corroborate the latters
testimony.
Mrs. Trinidad Albarracin,[6] sister of Filonila Tupaz and niece of Filomena Garcia, identified the items recovered from
appellants as those belonging to the victims.[7] She also testified that Ricky was once hired by Filonila Tupaz to fix the roof
of the latters house.
Alvin Monares[8] was the witness who gave a physical description of Ricky, on which the police based the suspects
cartographic sketch. He testified that he was employed as a painter-helper by the neighbor of Filonila Tupaz. On two
occasions during the month of July, he saw Ricky on the rooftop of the house ofFilonila Tupaz. He also declared that in the
morning of September 14, 1992, at around 8:30, he saw all three appellants outside the residence of Filonila Tupaz, with
Ricky standing in front of the house while Dante and Rodel sat beside a gutter.
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas,[9] a doctor of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, testified that he examined the
two knives that were turned over to him by Rolando Aguilar. He reported that one knife was found to be stained with human
blood while the other resulted in negative findings.
Jeffrey Ambrosio[10] was a former co-worker of Ricky, Dante and Rodel at a construction site. He testified that
on September 12, 1992, he was in the company of appellants mixing cement from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m.,
appellants went the house of Rodel, which was just a meter away from the construction site, to drink gin. He, on the other
hand, decided to work overtime.
After about an hour, Jeffrey Ambrosio joined appellants and had a shot of gin. He heard the three planning to enter the
house of a certain Tupaz where only two old ladies and a child resided. He said that he was invited to join their scheme, but
he declined the proposal and immediately left.
It was in the morning of September 15, 1992 that he saw the three appellants again. When asked by the prosecution
if he observed anything unusual about them, he stated that he saw Ricky wearing a white shirt stained with blood.
Jeffrey Ambrosio further testified that a few days later, Juan Aguilar came to see him to inquire if he had any knowledge
about the crime that occurred in the house of Tupaz. He answered that he knew something about it and so he was brought
to the police station for questioning.
Evidence for the Defense
Victor Hijada[11] is the father of Ricky. Briefly, he testified that on September 18, 1992, at about 5:00 a.m., he was
awakened by his wife who told him that there were armed men inside their house looking for Ricky. He then met with these
men and protested regarding their presence in his house. The men told him that they were looking for Ricky because of his
participation in the robbery at the house of Filonila Tupaz. Victor Hijada informed the armed men that Ricky does not live
with them anymore. Nevertheless, the men continued searching for about twenty minutes but failed to find anything. He
further testified that they failed to show any document of their authority to enter and search his house.
Appellant Dante[12] testified that he was in Laguna on September 14, 1992 and left for Manila only on September 18,
1992. Dante went to see Rodel to inquire about any job available for him. Upon arriving at the residence of Rodel, he first
went to the kitchen to eat. Later, he saw a group of armed men arrive.After talking to Rodel, the armed men started beating
up Rodel. When Dante approached them in order to intercede, he too was beaten up. He said that the armed men were
asking them for the whereabouts of a certain Bianong Bulag, whom they did not know.
In addition, he denied knowing Ricky prior to his arrest on September 18, 1992 and further claimed that he was never
assisted by counsel all throughout his investigation.
 Ricarda Alcera[13] is the mother of Dante. She testified that on September 14, 1992 her son was in Laguna farming
and harvesting rice. She further claimed that Dante stayed in Laguna until September 18, 1992 when he left to visit his uncle
in Quezon City.
Appellant Rodels[14] testimony substantially corroborated the testimony of Dante that in the morning of September 18,
1992, a group of armed men came to his house asking him about a person by the name of Bianong Bulag. When he told
them that he does not know that person, the armed men started beating him up. Dante tried to intervene, but he was also
beaten up.
He and Dante were then brought to a talahiban[15] where the armed men tried to make them confess to the killing that
occurred in the house of FilonilaTupaz. When they denied any participation in the said crime, they were brought to the police
station and again subjected to torture. Rodel said that after three days of torture, he was forced to admit the
crime. Rodel declared, however, that less than two months later, he executed a document repudiating this
confession. Rodel also testified that he saw Ricky only for the first time that day in the police station.
Appellant Ricky[16] testified that he was in Bicol from September 1, 1992 until September 16, 1992. He stated that he
left for Manila sometime onSeptember 19, 1992 because his child was sick and needed to be brought to the
hospital. Thereafter, he went to see his father in New Manila so that he could borrow some money for his childs medicine.
He recounted that, while walking along 8th Street in New Manila, two owner-type jeeps stopped in front of him. He was
forced to board one of the jeeps and was brought to an old house. He was then tortured and accused of being a
killer. Thereafter, he was taken to the police precinct where he was confined for four days and underwent continuous
interrogation.
Teresita Pena[17] is the mother-in-law of Ricky. She testified that Ricky was in Bagamanoc, Catanduanes
from September 1, 1992 up to September 16, 1992, which was the day Ricky left for Manila. To corroborate her claim,
Teresita Pena presented a certification[18] issued by the barangay captain of their residence attesting to the presence of
Ricky in Catanduanes on those dates.
After all the evidence was presented, the trial court rendered its decision on January 16, 1996, with the following
dispositive portion:[19]
WHEREFORE, and after a careful study of the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, this Court is of the opinion,
and so holds, that the guilt of accused RICKYHIJADA y VILLANUEVA @ Ricky, DANILO ALCERA y ALFON @ Dante,
and RODELIO VILLAMOR y RABANES @ Rodel appears duly proven beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with multiple homicide and accordingly hereby sentences all said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH, with
the accessories of article 40 of the Revised Penal Code; each to indemnify the respective heirs of the
deceased Filonila M. Tupaz, Filomena P. Garcia and Rosemarie C. Diaz in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00); and to pay the proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Two Appellants Briefs were filed. One was filed by Atty. Rolando L. Villones for all appellants, which presented the
following assigned errors for consideration:[20]
1. THE COURT A QUO ADMITTED AND CONSIDERED EVIDENCE THAT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS FRUIT
OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN METING OUT THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
The other brief, filed by the Public Attorneys Office for Dante, assigned the following errors: [21]
1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DANILO ALCERA (EXHIBIT A) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DANILO ALCERA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
MULTIPLE HOMICIDE.
3. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DANILO ALCERA COMMITTED THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
Both briefs have assigned substantially similar errors. Hence, the Court will resolve them jointly.
The admissibility of the prosecutions
evidence
Appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Dante is inadmissible in evidence because it was secured in
violation of his constitutional rights. They point to the fact that his extrajudicial confession was made without the assistance
of counsel. Although the police claimed that Dante had waived his constitutional rights, they argue that the waiver was
invalid because it was not made in the presence of counsel, as shown from the testimony of Rolando Aguilar:[22]
Court: Proceed
Q. After informing them of their constitutional right what did Danilo Alcera do?
A. He signed that he was willing to make a voluntary waiver, Your Honor.
Q. In signing was he assisted by counsel?
A. No, Your Honor.
 The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that while confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel
are useless in a court of law, there are instances where the constitutional procedures do not apply. In People
v. Cabiles,[23] for instance, the Court admitted into evidence an uncounselled verbal confession of an accused to the
victim. In People v. Andan,[24] the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide was affirmed based on
an uncounselledconfession to the mayor and the news reporters. The Court therein considered the confession as one that
was made to a confidant and not to a law enforcement officer and, thus, not deemed in response to any
interrogation. In People v. Domatay,[25] the Court held that the accuseds confession to a radio reporter is not covered by the
prohibition because the bill of rights are primarily addressed to the State and does not concern itself with the relation between
private individuals. Lastly, in People v. Faco,[26] it was held that uncounselled statements made to a policeman, not as a
police officer but as a trusted confidant of the accused, are admissible.
The Court finds appellants argument meritorious.
The right to counsel during custodial investigation is guaranteed by no less than Section 12 (1) of Article III of the
Constitution:[27]
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
In the present case, when Dante was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect and was, therefore, under
custodial investigation. He was, thus, entitled to the rights guaranteed by the constitution.[28] Though he waived these rights
in writing, such was not made in the presence of counsel, as admitted by the police. This makes the waiver invalid and the
confession inadmissible.
The cases cited by the Solicitor General do not apply. In those cases the accused made verbal admissions before
private persons or before persons acting in their private capacity. Here, Dante was made to execute a written extrajudicial
confession, upon the instructions of his police interrogators, which confession is being entered into evidence.
While the Court finds the extrajudicial confession to be inadmissible, the rest of the evidence obtained after appellants
arrests should remain on record.Appellants claim that they were arrested without any valid warrant of arrest or search
warrant. Although this lapse in procedure was admitted by the police,[29]appellants can no longer impugn the validity of their
arrest or the search that they were subjected to, for it has been consistently ruled by the Court that any objection against
an arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused should be made at or
before the arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[30]
Appellants herein have entered their plea of not guilty and the records are devoid of any objection that was ever raised
by them prior to arraignment and trial. As a natural consequence, the searches conducted on appellants, being an incident
to the arrests, should be upheld.[31]
Guilt of Appellants
The perpetrators of the crime saw to it that no one was left alive who could testify against them. Hence, no eyewitness
could be presented who would directly link appellants to the crime. Nevertheless, the Court has held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[32]
After a carefully reading of the entire records of the case, the Court finds that the foregoing conditions have been
satisfied. The following are the factual circumstances correctly found by the trial court to be duly established:
a. Appellants had planned to rob the house of Filonila Tupaz two days before the crime was committed.
b. Appellants were seen in front of the house of Filonila Tupaz in the morning of September 14, 1992, the day the crime
was committed.
c. Ricky was seen the day following the commission of the crime wearing a blood-stained shirt.
d. The stolen items were recovered from the possession of appellants.
Appellants failed to show any strong or cogent reason to convince the Court to disregard the trial courts findings. They
have assailed as incredible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. But against these bare assertions is the settled
rule that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect, absent any
showing of palpable mistake or grave abuse of discretion.[33]
As for the defense of alibi, appellants were positively identified by Alvin Monares as loitering in front of the house
of Filonila Tupaz that same morning when the crime was committed. It is standing doctrine that alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. [34]
Proper Penalty
While the Court considers the guilt of appellants to have been duly proven, the trial court erred in imposing upon them
the supreme penalty of death.
The crime of Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime punishable under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusion perpetua to death.However, at the time the crime was committed, on September 14, 1992, the death
penalty could not be imposed in view of Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Robbery with Homicide was again imposed in 1993 with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 7695.[35] The provisions of Republic Act No. 7695, however, cannot be applied
retroactively, for that would violate Article III, Sec. 22 of the Constitution stating that no ex post facto law shall be enacted,
as well as Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code.[36] Consequently, the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetuashould
be imposed on each of appellants.[37]
 Furthermore, there is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is Robbery
with Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery[38] and even if murder,
physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion. [39]
This brings the Court to the civil liability. The Court sustains the indemnification ordered by the trial court to the heirs
of the victims in the amount of P50,000 each.[40] In addition to the indemnity, each of appellants should also be ordered to
pay the heirs of the victims P50,000 as moral damages, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. [41] Appellants aforesaid
liability is solidary. As no evidence was presented regarding the actual damages, the Court awards none.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, in Criminal
Case No. Q-92-35539, is herebyMODIFIED. Appellants Ricky Hijada y Villanueva,
Danilo Alcera y Alfon and Rodelio Villamor y Rabanes are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants are each further
ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Filonila M. Tupaz, Filomena P. Garcia and Rosemarie C. Diaz the amounts
of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31770 December 5, 1929
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONINO HERNANDEZ, defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
In the judgment appealed from the appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to eight years and one daypresidio
mayor, with the accessaries of law, and the costs.
On February 3, 1929, Miguel Dayrit, the offended party, was living with his children in his house situated in the barrio of
Duque, municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga. At a little past midnight on that date, and after Miguel Dayrit
had retired, he noticed that the thatched roof of his house was on fire. He got up to fetch some water with which to
extinguish the fire, when, looking out of the window, he saw the appellant beside the house, carrying a stick (Exhibit A).
Miguel Dayrit shouted for help, and started to put out the fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a small part of the roof
had burned. In answer to his cries for help, Artemio Tanglao repaired to the place and saw the defendant running away.
Daniel Mallari also came, and on his way to the house met the defendant.
The appellant knew that Miguel Dayrit and his children lived and were in the house that night.
The testimony of the offended party, corroborated by that of Artemio Tanglao and Daniel Mallari, establishes beyond all
doubt the fact that it was the appellant who set fire to the house. The stick which Miguel Dayrit saw in the appellant's
possession on that night was found leaning against the house with the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum
dangling from it. Daniel Mallari recognized it as the stick which the appellant used in getting guava fruits.
It should be noted, moreover, that prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Miguel Dayrit, had some
disagreements because the offended party suspected that the appellant was stealing his paddy piled up behind his house.
The offended party communicated his suspicions to the barrio lieutenant, who, together with the complainant, went to the
appellant's house, but the latter armed with a bolo, barred their way, saying that he would cut them to pieces, and that he
recognized no authority. This characteristic violence on the part of the appellant was also shown when, in pursuance of
this information, he was arrested; for he refused to give himself up.
The trial court held that the crime committed was only frustrated arson. We agree with the Attorney-General that the crime
was consummated. The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned.
With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for,
once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage
cause. This court has so held in the cases of United States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho (25 Phil., 187) and United
States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487).
The crime of arson having been consummated, as it appears from the facts thoroughly proved, article 549 of the Penal
Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of cadena temporal to life imprisonment. And as the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime must be taken into consideration, as having been doubtless sought by the appellant in order to
insure the commission of the crime, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.
In view of these considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, and in accordance with article 549 of the Penal
Code the appellant is found guilty of the crime of arson, committed in a dwelling, knowing that within it were the offended
party and his children; and, considering one aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the defendant is
sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessaries, and the costs.
The appellant is an old man, about 85 years of age, and in view of this, and of the fact that the damage caused was very
slight, the Attorney-General recommends that, in pursuance of the second paragraph of article 2 of the Penal Code, these
facts be explained to the Executive, for the exercise of his clemency to such an extent as he may deem proper. The
suggestion is accepted, and it is hereby ordered that the clerk forward a copy of this decision, once it becomes final, to the
Governor-General for consideration. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and
that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the
arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt,
she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally
and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have
the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section
4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed,
he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not
such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we
are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that
her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff
be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which
is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would
no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in
Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with
another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A
contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the
American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and
capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of theNational
law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as
the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still
married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid
on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under
her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an
American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned
was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in
Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with
another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A
contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the
American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and
capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of theNational
law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as
the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still
married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid
on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under
her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an
American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned
was NEVER put in issue.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40624 June 27, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO NEPOMUCENO, JR. Y BERNARDINO, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo C. Abaya and Solicitor Ma.
Rosario Quetulio-Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
Rosalino C. Barican for accused-appellant.
Porfirio L. Villaroman as private prosecutor.

ESGUERRA, J.:
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V (Sta. Maria), convicting accused Ricardo Nepomuceno,
Jr. y Bernardo of "Bigamy punishable under the provisions of Article 349, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to Six (6) Years
and Four (4) Months of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with costs", is now before Us for review because the Court of
Appeals (Division of Five Justices) in its Resolution of April 14, 1975, in CA-G.R. No. 12641-CR, by a four to one vote
ruled that only a question of law is involved in the appeal, and decision on the case is not dependent on factual findings to
be made so as to bring the case within the competence of the appellate court. The dissenting opinion holds that there is
no question of law involved as what is to be decided is the question of whether or not the information filed was defective
for not including the second wife as an accused and, hence, the Court of Appeals could have decided it on the merits by
affirming the decision of the lower court.
The uncontested facts are:
The Information dated December 8, 1969 reads as follows:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr. of the crime of
bigamy, penalized under the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of August, 1969, in the municipality of Norzagaray,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr., being then previously united in lawful marriage
with one Dolores Desiderio, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one
Norma Jimenez.
Contrary to law.
Malolos, Bulacan, December 8, 1969.
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO C.
BURGOS
Asst. Provincial Fiscal
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation in this case has been conducted by me in
accordance with Sec. 14, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court; that there is reasonable ground
to believe that the offense charged has been committed; and, that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO C.
BURGOS
Asst. provincial Fiscal
(Orig. Rec., p. 1)
Upon arraignment on February 4, 1970, accused pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded accordingly. After
the prosecution had presented one witness, the accused, on August 11, 1970, withdrew his plea of not
guilty and changed it into one of guilty. The case however proceeded for the reception of evidence on the
civil aspect.
On December 9, 1970, a motion to quash was filed on the ground that the information is defective as it
charged only the accused for bigamy without including the second wife and such failure, according to
accused, conferred no jurisdiction on the lower court to try and decide the case. Said motion was denied
on February 22, 1971. On April 28, 1971, private prosecutor orally withdrew the claim for damages, which
the lower court granted. On May 25, 1971, the lower court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused RICARDO NEPOMUCENO, JR. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under the provisions of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Months and One (l) Day of Prision Correccional as
minimum, to Six (6) Years and Four (4) Months of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with
costs. (Orig. Rec. 201-202)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, accused cited as a single error the lower court's failure to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction. While awaiting completion of the records the private prosecutor filed a
motion to forward the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal involves a pure question
of law. Two other motions of the same nature were subsequently filed. In its resolution of May 11, 1973,
the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals resolved to give due course to the appeal, to consider it
submitted for decision, the same to he raffled immediately and to refer the motions to certify the case to
the Supreme Court to the Division to which the case may be raffled.
The case was eventually assigned to the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five Justices which promulgated the
resolution of April 14, 1975, forwarding the case to this Court for decision.
On the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not quashing the information because it was defective for not
including the second wife (not because of lack of jurisdiction), let us scrutinize the provision of Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proceedings. (Emphasis
for emphasis)
The crime of bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been judicially declared as presumptively dead. The facts of
this case clearly show that accused Nepomuceno married Dolores Desiderio on March 20, 1969, in Balagtas, Bulacan,
and that about five months later, or on August 16, 1969, he again married Norma Jimenez in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Accused undeniably contracted two marriages in the short span of five months, which he categorically admitted when he
pleaded guilty.
Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy entails the joint liability of two persons who marry each other, while the
previous marriage of one or the other is valid and subsisting is completely devoid of merit. Even a cursory scrutiny of Art.
349 of the Revised Penal Code will disclose that the crime of bigamy can be committed by one person who contracts a
subsequent marriage while, the former marriage is valid and subsisting. Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and
concubinage, wherein the law (Art. 344, first and third pars., Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court)
specifically requires that the culprits, if both are alive, should he prosecuted or included in the information. In the crime of
bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had
knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
Bigamy is a public offense and a crime against status, while adultery and concubinage are private offenses and are
crimes against chastity. In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the offended party will bar the prosecution of the case,
which is not so in bigamy. It is, therefore, clear that bigamy is not similar to adultery or concubinage.
When the accused raised the question of defective information for non-inclusion of the second wife as an accused for the
first time in a motion to quash, the lower court ruled:
The information is clear and it is only the accused Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr. who contracted a second
marriage, he being previously united in lawful marriage with one Dolores Desiderio, and without the same
having been legally dissolved, and there being no showing in the recitation of facts in the information to
the effect that Norma Jimenez, the second wife, had knowledge of the first marriage, and despite said
knowledge she contracted the second marriage with the accused; nor is there any showing that Norma
Jimenez had had a previous marriage of her of her own, we see no reason for the inclusion of Norma
Jimenez , the second wife, in the information. (Emphasis for emphasis)
Whether or not the second spouse, Norma Jimenez, should be included in the information is a question of fact that was
determined by the fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation in this case. That the fiscal did not include Norma
Jimenez in the information simply shows absence of evidence that could make her liable for the crime. Her non-inclusion
in the information as a co-accused of appellant Nepomuceno in the crime of bigamy is not a defect in the information filed
against Nepomuceno alone since her inclusion or not in said information depended upon available evidence against her.
The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the lower court committed no error when it refused to quash the information
against the accused, Nepomuceno, on the mere flimsy ground that the second wife was not included therein.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting the appellant, Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr. y Bernardino, and
sentencing him accordingly, as stated on pages one (1) and three (3) hereof, is affirmed with costs against the accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Muñoz Palma, JJ., is on leave.

SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999]
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents.
DECISION
"The question is not so much as who was aimed at as who was hit." (Pound, J., in Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merill Co., 228 N.Y.
58 [1920]).
BELLOSILLO, J.:
PERPETUALLY HAGRIDDEN as the public is about losing one of the most basic yet oft hotly contested freedoms of
man, the issue of the right of free expression bestirs and presents itself time and again, in cyclic occurrence, to inveigle,
nay, challenge the courts to re-survey its ever shifting terrain, explore and furrow its heretofore uncharted moors and valleys
and finally redefine the metes and bounds of its controversial domain. This, prominently, is one such case.
Perhaps, never in jurisprudential history has any freedom of man undergone radical doctrinal metamorphoses than his
right to freely and openly express his views.Blackstone's pontifical comment that "where blasphemous, immoral,
treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by English law . . . the liberty of the press, properly
understood, is by no means infringed or violated," found kindred expression in the landmark opinion of England's Star
Chamber in the Libelis Famosis case in 1603.[1] That case established two major propositions in the prosecution of
defamatory remarks: first, that libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man,
and second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true.
Until republicanism caught fire in early America, the view from the top on libel was no less dismal. Even the venerable
Justice Holmes appeared to waffle as he swayed from the concept of criminal libel liability under the clear and present
danger rule, to the other end of the spectrum in defense of the constitutionally protected status of unpopular opinion in free
society.
Viewed in modern times and the current revolution in information and communication technology, libel principles
formulated at one time or another have waxed and waned through the years in the constant ebb and flow of judicial
review. At the very least, these principles have lost much of their flavor, drowned and swamped as they have been bythe
ceaseless cacophony and din of thought and discourse emanating from just about every source and direction, aided no less
by an increasingly powerful and irrepressible mass media. Public discourse, laments Knight, has been devalued by its utter
commonality; and we agree, for its logical effect is to benumb thought and sensibility on what may be considered as criminal
illegitimate encroachments on the right of persons to enjoy a good, honorable and reputable name. This may explain the
imperceptible demise of criminal prosecutions for libel and the trend to rely instead on indemnity suits to repair any damage
on one's reputation.
In this petition for review, we are asked to reverse the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Wenceslao v. Arturo Borjal and
Maximo Soliven," CA-G.R. No. 40496, holding on 25 March 1996 that petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are
solidarily liable for damages for writing and publishing certain articles claimed to be derogatory and offensive to private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao.
Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now
PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal
was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular writers
of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker.
Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant
and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the
House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy.
During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-
Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies
concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT
was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The
conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through
solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual
delegates or participants.[2]
On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was
elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the
conference.
Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming
or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.Quoted hereunder
are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates they were published[3] -
31 May 1989
Another self-proclaimed hero of the EDSA Revolution goes around organizing seminars and conferences for a huge
fee. This is a simple ploy coated in jazzy letterheads and slick prose. The hero has the gall to solicit fees from anybody
with bucks to spare. Recently, in his usual straightforward style, Transportation Secretary Rainerio Ray Reyes, asked that
his name be stricken off from the letterheads the hero has been using to implement one of his pet seminars. Reyes said: I
would like to reiterate my request that you delete my name. Note that Ray Reyes is an honest man who would confront
anybody eyeball to eyeball without blinking.
9 June 1989
Another questionable portion of the so-called conference is its unauthorized use of the names of President Aquino and
Secretary Ray Reyes. The conference program being circulated claims that President Aquino and Reyes will be main
speakers in the conference. Yet, the word is that Cory and Reyes have not accepted the invitation to appear in this
confab. Ray Reyes even says that the conference should be unmasked as a moneymaking gimmick.
19 June 1989
x x x some 3,000 fund solicitation letters were sent by the organizer to every Tom, Dick and Harry and to almost all
government agencies. And the letterheads carried the names of Reyes and Periquet. Agrarian Reform Secretary on leave
Philip Juico received one, but he decided to find out from Reyes himself what the project was all about. Ray Reyes, in
effect, advised Juico to put the fund solicitation letter in the waste basket. Now, if the 3,000 persons and agencies
approached by the organizer shelled out 1,000 each, thats easily P3 million to a project that seems so
unsophisticated. But note that one garment company gave P100,000, after which the Garments Regulatory Board headed
by Trade and Industry Undersecretary Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was approached by the organizer to expedite the
garment license application of the P100,000 donor.
21 June 1989
A 'conference organizer' associated with shady deals seems to have a lot of trash tucked inside his closet. The Jaywalker
continues to receive information about the mans dubious deals. His notoriety, according to reliable sources, has reached
the Premier Guest House where his name is spoken like dung.
xxx
The first information says that the 'organizer' tried to mulct half a million pesos from a garment producer and exporter who
was being investigated for violation of the rules of the Garments, Textile, Embroidery and Apparel Board. The 'organizer'
told the garment exporter that the case could be fixed for a sum of P500,000.00. The organizer got the shock of his life
when the exporter told him: 'If I have that amount, I will hire the best lawyers, not you.' The organizer left in a huff, his thick
face very pale.
xxx
Friends in government and the private sector have promised the Jaywalker more 'dope' on the 'organizer.' It seems that
he was not only indiscreet; he even failed to cover his tracks. You will be hearing more of the 'organizers' exploits from
this corner soon.
22 June 1989
The scheming 'organizer' we have been writing about seems to have been spreading his wings too far. A congressional
source has informed the Jaywalker that the schemer once worked for a congressman from the North as some sort of a
consultant on economic affairs. The first thing the organizer did was to initiate hearings and round-the-table discussions
with people from the business, export and -- his favorite -- the garments sector.
xxx
The 'organizers' principal gamely went along, thinking that his 'consultant' had nothing but the good of these sectors in
mind. It was only later that he realized that the 'consultant' was acting with a burst of energy 'in aid of extortion.' The
'consultant' was fired.
xxx
There seems to be no end to what a man could do to pursue his dubious ways. He has tried to operate under a guise of a
well-meaning reformist. He has intellectual pretensions - and sometimes he succeeds in getting his thoughts in the inside
pages of some newspapers, with the aid of some naive newspaper people. He has been turning out a lot of funny-looking
advice on investments, export growth, and the like.
xxx
A cabinet secretary has one big wish. He is hoping for a broad power to ban crooks and influence-peddlers from entering
the premises of his department. But the Cabinet man might not get his wish. There is one 'organizer' who, even if
physically banned, can still concoct ways of doing his thing. Without a tinge of remorse, the 'organizer' could fill up his
letterheads with names of Cabinet members, congressmen, and reputable people from the private sector to shore up his
shady reputation and cover up his notoriety.
3 July 1989
A supposed conference on transportation was a big failure. The attendance was very poor and the few who participated in
the affair were mostly leaders of jeepney drivers groups. None of the government officials involved in regulating public
transportation was there. The big names in the industry also did not participate. With such a poor attendance, one
wonders why the conference organizers went ahead with the affair and tried so hard to convince 3,000 companies and
individuals to contribute to the affair.
xxx
The conference was doomed from the start. It was bound to fail. The personalities who count in the field of transportation
refused to attend the affair or withdrew their support after finding out the background of the organizer of the
conference. How could a conference on transportation succeed without the participation of the big names in the industry
and government policy-makers?
Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the organizer
alluded to in petitioner Borjals columns.[4] In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, private respondent refuted the
matters contained in petitioner Borjals columns and openly challenged him in this manner -
To test if Borjal has the guts to back up his holier than thou attitude, I am prepared to relinquish this position in
case it is found that I have misappropriated even one peso of FNCLT money. On the other hand, if I can prove that Borjal
has used his column as a hammer to get clients for his PR Firm, AA Borjal Associates, he should resign from the STAR
and never again write a column. Is it a deal?[5]
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for
unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public
relations firm, AA Borjal Associates.[6] In turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent
not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for character assassination.[7]
Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against
petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor
handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by the Department of
Justice and later by the Office of the President.
 On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject
of the instant case.[8] In their answer, petitioners interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorneys fees and costs. After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent
Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify private respondent P1,000,000.00 for actual and
compensatory damages, in addition toP200,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, P200,000.00
for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of the monetary award
to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. In a 20-page
Decision promulgated 25 March 1996, the appellate court ruled inter alia that private respondent was sufficiently identifiable,
although not named, in the questioned articles; that private respondent was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing
him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked
inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that petitioners claim of privilege communication was
unavailing since the privileged character of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation;
that petitioner could have performed his office as a newspaperman without necessarily transgressing the rights of
Wenceslao by calling the attention of the government offices concerned to examine the authority by which Wenceslao acted,
warning the public against contributing to a conference that, according to his perception, lacked the univocal indorsement
of the responsible government officials, or simply informing the public of the letters Wenceslao wrote and the favors he
requested or demanded; and, that when he imputed dishonesty, falsehood and misrepresentation, shamelessness and
intellectual pretentions to Wenceslao, petitioner Borjal crossed the thin but clear line that separated fair comment from
actionable defamation.
Private respondent manifested his desire to appeal that portion of the appellate courts decision which reduced the
amount of damages awarded him by filing with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition and a Motion
for Suspension of Time to File Petition.[9] However, in a Resolution dated 27 May 1996, the Second Division denied both
motions: the first, for being premature, and the second, for being a wrong remedy.
On 20 November 1996 when the First Division consolidated and transferred the present case to the Second Division,
there was no longer any case thereat with which to consolidate this case since G.R. No. 124396 had already been disposed
of by the Second Division almost six (6) months earlier.
On their part, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution
of 12 September 1996. Hence the instant petition for review. The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in
ruling that private respondent Wenceslao was sufficiently identified by petitioner Borjal in the questioned articles; (b) in
refusing to accord serious consideration to the findings of the Department of Justice and the Office of the President that
private respondent Wenceslao was not sufficiently identified in the questioned articles, this notwithstanding that the degree
of proof required in a preliminary investigation is merely prima facie evidence which is significantly less than the
preponderance of evidence required in civil cases; (c) in ruling that the subject articles do not constitute qualifiedly privileged
communication; (d) in refusing to apply the "public official doctrine" laid down in New York Times v. Sullivan; (e) in ruling
that the questioned articles lost their privileged character because of their publication in a newspaper of general circulation;
(f) in ruling that private respondent has a valid cause of action for libel against petitioners although he failed to prove actual
malice on their part, and that the prosecutors of the City of Manila, the Department of Justice, and eventually, the Office of
the President, had already resolved that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the existence of libel; and, (g)
assuming arguendo that Borjal should be held liable, in adjudging petitioner Soliven solidarily liable with him. Thus,
petitioners pray for the reversal of the appellate courts ruling, the dismissal of the complaint against them for lack of merit,
and the award of damages on their counterclaim.
The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although
it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.[10] Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar.
In ruling for private respondent, the Court of Appeals found that Borjal's column writings sufficiently identified
Wenceslao as the "conference organizer." It cited the First National Conference on Land Transportation, the letterheads
used listing different telephone numbers, the donation of P100,000.00 from Juliano Lim and the reference to the "organizer
of the conference" - the very same appellation employed in all the column items - as having sufficiently established the
identity of private respondent Wenceslao for those who knew about the FNCLT who were present at its inception, and who
had pledged their assistance to it.
We hold otherwise. These conclusions are at variance with the evidence at hand. The questioned articles written by
Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of the Jaywalker articles
which appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was the
person referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and
anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his 9 June
1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal
organizers are not specified" (italics supplied).[11] Neither did the FNCLT letterheads[12] disclose the identity of the
conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private respondent Francisco Wenceslao
was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. [13] The printout[14] and tentative
program[15] of the conference were devoid of any indication of Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an
article entitled "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's name, while the tentative program
only denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer.
No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had several organizers and that he was only a part
of the organization, thus -
I would like to clarify for the record that I was only a part of the organization. I was invited then because I was the head of
the technical panel of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy that took care of congressional
hearings.[16]
 Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The
former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the subject articles.[17] His
letter to the editor published in the 4 June 1989 issue of The Philippine Star even showed private respondent Wenceslao's
uncertainty -
Although he used a subterfuge, I was almost certain that Art Borjal referred to the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (June 29-30) and me in the second paragraph of his May 31 column x x x [18]
Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of
the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal
but from private respondent himself when he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had
private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would
have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of identifiability alone the case
falls.
The above disquisitions notwithstanding, and on the assumption arguendo that private respondent has been
sufficiently identified as the subject of Borjal's disputed comments, we now proceed to resolve the other issues and pass
upon the pertinent findings of the courts a quo.
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth assigned errors all revolve around the primary question of whether the disputed articles
constitute privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability.
The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles are privileged in character
under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which state -
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the exceptions described in the above-
quoted article since these were neither "private communications" nor "fair and true report x x x without any comments or
remarks." But this is incorrect.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec.
11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre
belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal
Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report
without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.[19] As early as 1918,
in United States v. Caete,[20] this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected
by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the
legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez[21] and
reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals[22] -
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing
violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice
Malcolm in Bustos: Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine
of privilege.
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be
protective of public opinion. This closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-
determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self- expression which, in the words of
Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss,[23] makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political
culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision exempting
from liability only private communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than
promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy
effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made
is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity,
it is not necessarily actionable.In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either
be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based
on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.[24]
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. In his testimony, private
respondent spelled out the objectives of the conference thus -
x x x x The principal conference objective is to come up with a draft of an Omnibus Bill that will embody a long term land
transportation policy for presentation to Congress in its next regular session in July. Since last January, the National
Conference on Land Transportation (NCLT), the conference secretariat, has been enlisting support from all sectors to
ensure the success of the project.[25]
Private respondent likewise testified that the FNCLT was raising funds through solicitation from the public -
Q: Now, in this first letter, you have attached a budget and it says here that in this seminar of the First National
Conference on Land Transportation, you will need around One million eight hundred fifteen thousand pesos, is that
right?
A: That was the budget estimate, sir.
Q: How do you intend as executive officer, to raise this fund of your seminar?
A: Well, from sponsors such as government agencies and private sectors or organizations as well
as individual transport firms and from individual delegates/participants.[26]
The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which
it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. An organization
such as the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country and seeking to source its funds
for the project from the public at large cannot dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot but
invite close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and of the
qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it.
This in effect is the strong message in New York Times v. Sullivan[27] which the appellate court failed to consider or,
for that matter, to heed. It insisted that private respondent was not, properly speaking, a "public offical" nor a "public figure,"
which is why the defamatory imputations against him had nothing to do with his task of organizing the FNCLT.
New York Times v. Sullivan was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1960s at the height of the bloody rioting in
the American South over racial segregation. The then City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of Montgomery, Alabama, sued New
York Times for publishing a paid political advertisement espousing racial equality and describing police atrocities committed
against students inside a college campus. As commissioner having charge over police actions Sullivan felt that he was
sufficiently identified in the ad as the perpetrator of the outrage; consequently, he sued New York Times on the basis of
what he believed were libelous utterances against him.
The U. S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. ruled against Sullivan holding that honest
criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom
of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth
of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be
deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether
it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to prove it.[28]
In the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the New York Times ruling. At
any rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong[29] as -
x x x x a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage. He is, in other
words, a celebrity. Obviously, to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes
and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Great Exalted Ruler of the lodge. It includes,
in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person.
The FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government and
the private sector, and organized by top government officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media
mileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. As its Executive
Director and spokesman, private respondent consequently assumed the status of a public figure.
But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the FNCLT, would
not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even
if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a
matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest
is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct,
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.[30]
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A reading of the imputations of
petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and
his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position which included
solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the
management and coordination of the various activities of the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and
competence. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public
character of the conference itself.
Concededly, petitioner Borjal may have gone overboard in the language employed describing the "organizer of the
conference." One is tempted to wonder if it was by some mischievous gambit that he would also dare test the limits of the
"wild blue yonder" of free speech in this jurisdiction. But no matter how intemperate or deprecatory the utterances appear
to be, the privilege is not to be defeated nor rendered inutile for, as succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan in New
York Times v. Sullivan, "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public officials.[31]
The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice is always presumed in the publication of defamatory matters in the
absence of proof to the contrary, the question of privilege is immaterial.
We reject this postulate. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of
a communication destroys the presumption of malice.[32] The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private
respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as
the true motive of his conduct.[33]
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. [34] Malice is bad faith or bad motive.[35] It is the
essence of the crime of libel.[36]
In the milieu obtaining, can it be reasonably inferred that in writing and publishing the articles in question petitioner
Borjal acted with malice?
Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire
to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or thatthe articles were written and published without good motives or justifiable
ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded
by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public
deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but
we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedom.
Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published
with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not.[37] "Reckless disregard of
what is false or not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, [38]or that he
possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. [39]
The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these are false or
in reckless disregard of what is false or not. This is not to say however that the very serious allegations of petitioner Borjal
assumed by private respondent to be directed against him are true. But we nevertheless find these at least to have been
based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal interviews and after considering the
varied documentary evidence provided him by his sources. Thus, the following are supported by documentary evidence: (a)
that private respondent requested Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then head of the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB),
to expedite the processing and release of the import approval and certificate of availability of a garment firm in exchange
for the monetary contribution of Juliano Lim, which necessitated a reply from the office of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
explaining the procedure of the GTEB in processing applications and clarifying that all applicants were treated equally; [40] (b)
that Antonio Periquet was designated Chairman of the Executive Committee of the FNCLT notwithstanding that he had
previously declined the offer;[41] and, (c) that despite the fact that then President Aquino and her Secretary of Transportation
Rainerio Reyes declined the invitation to be guest speakers in the conference, their names were still included in the printout
of the FNCLT.[42] Added to these are the admissions of private respondent that: (a) he assisted Juliano Lim in his application
for a quota allocation with the GTEB in exchange for monetary contributions to the FNCLT; [43] (b) he included the name of
then Secretary of Transportation Rainerio Reyes in the promotional materials of the conference notwithstanding the latter's
refusal to lend his name to and participate in the FNCLT;[44] and, (c) he used different letterheads and telephone numbers.[45]
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove
actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with
good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only
by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our
democracy.[46] In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel[47] we held -
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in
which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal
or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility
prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing
liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for
the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure
may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement.
At any rate, it may be salutary for private respondent to ponder upon the advice of Mr. Justice Malcolm expressed
in U.S. v. Bustos,[48] that "the interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the
wound may be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comments upon his official acts.
The foregoing disposition renders the second and seventh assigned errors moot and academic, hence, we find no
necessity to pass upon them.
 We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to
and demanded by their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free speech and
press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it,
is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature
where life is short, nasty and brutish.Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly
comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that which
is limned by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the press? It is in
this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
has warned, "[W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of
injustice."[49]
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in which expression freely flourishes and
operates. For we have always strongly maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is man's birthright -
constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor
fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master,
of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.[50]
On petitioners counterclaim for damages, we find the evidence too meager to sustain any award. Indeed, private
respondent cannot be said to have instituted the present suit in abuse of the legal processes and with hostility to the press;
or that he acted maliciously, wantonly, oppressively, fraudulently and for the sole purpose of harassing petitioners, thereby
entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary, private respondent acted within his rights to protect his honor from what he
perceived to be malicious imputations against him. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victim to
damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, nor should counsels fees be awarded
every time a party wins a suit.[51]
For, concluding with the wisdom in Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.[52] -
Every man has a right to discuss matters of public interest. A clergyman with his flock, an admiral with his fleet, a general
with his army, a judge with his jury, we are, all of us, the subject of public discussion. The view of our court has been thus
stated: It is only in despotisms that one must speak sub rosa, or in whispers, with bated breath, around the corner, or in
the dark on a subject touching the common welfare. It is the brightest jewel in the crown of the law to speak and maintain
the golden mean between defamation, on one hand, and a healthy and robust right of free public discussion, on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 25 March 1996 and its Resolution
of 12 September 1996 denying reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages against
petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Martinez, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., in the result.