The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991

Page Intentionally Left Blank

SEMINAR STUDIES IN HISTORY

The Collapse of the Soviet Union,

1985–1991
DAVID R. MARPLES
First published 2004 by Pearson Education Limited

Published 2013 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

First issued in hardback 2015

Copyright © 2004, Taylor & Francis.

The right of David R. Marples to be identified as author

of this work has been asserted by him in accordance
with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or
by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission
in writing from the publishers.

Notices
Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience
broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical
treatment may become necessary.

Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in
evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In
using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of
others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility.

To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors,
assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products
liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products,
instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein.

ISBN 13: 978-0-582-50599-5 (pbk)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book can be obtained from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Marples, David R.
The collapse of the Soviet Union : 1985-1991 / David R. Marples.
p. cm. –– (Seminar studies in history)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-582-50599-5 (pbk)
ISBN 978-1-138-13077-7 (hbk)
1. Soviet Union––Politics and government––1985–1991. 2. Soviet Union––Economic
conditions––1985–1991. I. Title. II. Series.

DK288.M383 2004
947.085'4––dc22
2004044404
Set by 35 in 10/12.5pt Sabon
For Aya Fujiwara
Page Intentionally Left Blank
 CONTENTS

Introduction to the Series ix

Acknowledgements x
Maps xi
Chronology xv
Preface xx
Acronyms xxii

INTRODUCTION 1

PART ONE: BACKGROUND 7

1. GORBACHEV COMES TO POWER 9

Political Overview 9
Glasnost 16
Social, Environmental and Nuclear Power Issues 20

PART TWO: THE YEARS OF PERESTROIKA 25

2. PERESTROIKA IN ACTION 27
The Economy, 1985–90 27
Foreign Policy 39

3. THE NATIONAL QUESTION 48

The Submerged Dilemma 48
Nagorno-Karabakh 50
The Baltic States 52
Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus 57
The Plenum on National Policy, September 1989 60

4. DOMESTIC POLITICS, 1989 to MID-AUGUST 1991 65

The Congress of People’s Deputies and New Presidency 65
The 28th Party Congress and Aftermath 69
The Referendum of 17 March 1991 72
Toward a New Union Treaty 77

5. THE PUTSCH AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR 82

The Putsch, 18–21 August 1991 82
Administrative Changes 90
The Failure of the Union Treaty 91
viii Contents

Yeltsin Consolidates His Power 92

The Belavezha Agreement 93

PART THREE: ASSESSMENT 99

6. WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION COLLAPSE? 101

PART FOUR: DOCUMENTS 111

Glossary 138
Who’s Who 143
Guide to Further Reading 147
References 157
Index 158
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

Such is the pace of historical enquiry in the modern world that there
is an ever-widening gap between the specialist article or monograph,
incorporating the results of current research, and general surveys, which
inevitably become out of date. Seminar Studies in History is designed to
bridge this gap. The series was founded by Patrick Richardson in 1966
and his aim was to cover major themes in British, European and world
history. Between 1980 and 1996 Roger Lockyer continued his work,
before handing the editorship over to Clive Emsley and Gordon Martel.
Clive Emsley is Professor of History at the Open University, while
Gordon Martel is Professor of International History at the University
of Northern British Columbia, Canada, and Senior Research Fellow at
De Montfort University.
All the books are written by experts in their field who are not only
familiar with the latest research but have often contributed to it. They
are frequently revised, in order to take account of new information and
interpretations. They provide a selection of documents to illustrate
major themes and provoke discussion, and also a guide to further read-
ing. The aim of Seminar Studies in History is to clarify complex issues
without over-simplifying them, and to stimulate readers into deepening
their knowledge and understanding of major themes and topics.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:

Academic International Press for an extract adapted from USSR Documents

Annual 1991, Volume 2: Disintegration of the USSR; Andrew Nurnberg
Associates for an extract adapted from Against the Grain by Boris Yeltsin;
Basic Books Ltd. for extracts adapted from Ten Years That Shook the World:
The Gorbachev Era as witnessed by His Chief of Staff by Valery Boldin,
translated by Evelyn Rossiterre; Ed Victor Limited for a letter adapted from
Voices of Glasnost Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok Magazine
1987–1990; HarperCollins Publishers for an extract adapted from Perestrokia:
New Thinking for Our Country and the World by Mikhail Gorbachev;
HarperCollins Publishers and G. Merritt Corporation for an extract adapted
from The Man Who Changed the World: The Lives of Mikhail S. Gorbachev
by Gail Sheehy; The Pennsylvania State University Press for an extract adapted
from My Six Years with Gorbachev by Anatoly Chernyaev © 1995 The
Pennsylvania State University Press, translated and edited by Robert English
and Elizabeth Tucker; and Transworld Publishers and Doubleday, divisions
of The Random House Group Limited and The Random House Group Inc. for
an extract adapted from Mikhail Gorbachev: Memoirs by Mikhail Gorbachev
published by Doubleday © 1995 Mikhail Gorbachev, English translation
© Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag GmbH, Berlin.

Map 1 redrawn from map European Russia from http://www.lonelyplanet.com,

© Lonely Planet Publications Ltd. 2004, reprinted by permission of Lonely
Planet Publications Ltd.; Map 3 redrawn from map Europe, The Baltic States
from http://www.worldatlas.com, reprinted by permission of Graphic Maps;
Map 4 redrawn from map Moscow from http://www.lonelyplanet.com,
© Lonely Planet Publications Ltd. 2004, reprinted by permission of Lonely
Planet Publications Ltd.

In some instances we have been unable to trace the owners of copyright

material, and we would appreciate any information that would enable us to
do so.
Map 1 European republics of the former USSR
Source: Redrawn from map ‘European Russia’ from http://www.lonelyplanet.com, © Lonely
Planet Publications Ltd. 2004. Reprinted by permission of Lonely Planet Publications Ltd.
 Zangilan

Map 2 Nagorno-Karabakh
Source: Redrawn from http://www.osce.org.
Map 3 The Baltic States
Source: Redrawn from map ‘Europe, The Baltic States’ from http://www.worldatlas.com.
Reprinted by permission of Graphic Maps.
Map 4 Central Moscow
Source: Redrawn from map ‘Moscow’ from http://www.lonelyplanet.com, © Lonely Planet
Publications Ltd. 2004. Reprinted by permission of Lonely Planet Publications Ltd.
 CHRONOLOGY

1985
10 March Death of Konstantin Chernenko.
11 March Gorbachev becomes the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU.
26 April Warsaw Pact renewed for another twenty years.
2 July Eduard Shevardnadze appointed Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
November First summit meeting between Gorbachev and Ronald
Reagan in Geneva.
December Boris Yeltsin becomes Communist Party leader for
Moscow.

1986
February/March Gorbachev denounces Brezhnev era as ‘the Epoch of
Stagnation’ at the 27th Congress of the CPSU.
26 April Fourth nuclear reactor unit explodes at Chernobyl power
station north of Kyiv.
12 May Gospryomka (State Inspection of Production) created to
monitor quality of production.
July Gorbachev announces removal of six Soviet divisions
from Afghanistan by end of year.
October Gorbachev and Reagan discuss nuclear arms reduction
and end of testing at Reykjavic, Iceland.
December Andrey Sakharov allowed to return from exile; his wife
Yelena Bonner freed from prison; riots break out in
Kazakh capital of Alma-Ata.

1987
August Demonstrations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
2 November Gorbachev creates commission to rehabilitate Stalin’s
victims.
November Yeltsin dismissed as Moscow party leader.
December Gorbachev visits Washington for first time and agrees to
elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles.
xvi Chronology

1988
January Law about the State Enterprise reforms industrial
enterprises and reduces state subsidies.
February Demonstrations begin in Armenia to incorporate
Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia.
May The Soviet Union agrees to remove all troops from
Afghanistan by February 1989.
May/June Gorbachev and Reagan summit meeting in Moscow.
1 October Gorbachev elected chair of Supreme Soviet.
November First major reform demonstration held in Kyiv,
Ukraine.
6 December Gorbachev, addressing United Nations, declares
intention to reduce Soviet armed forces by 500,000 over
next two years.
December Supreme Soviet approves creation of Congress of
People’s Deputies.
Basic Criminal Code revised to reduce prison
sentences, the number of offences that could result
in death penalty and ending policy of deporting
dissidents.

1989
January USSR declares direct rule over Nagorno-Karabakh
in order to end conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
9 April Soviet troops attack supporters of Georgian
independence, killing twenty marchers.
May Baltic reform movements meet in Tallinn to promote
economic and political sovereignty.
8 June Ryzhkov appointed chairman of USSR Council of
Ministers.
10 July Coal miners of Kuzbass coalfield go on strike.
30 July Radical deputies create the Interregional Group with
goal of moving USSR from totalitarianism to
democracy.
September CPSU Central Committee Plenum proposes reform of
political and economic terms of USSR federation.
November New governments replace communist regimes in
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; Berlin Wall
falls.
1 December Pope John Paul II receives Gorbachev in Vatican and
arranges for restoration of diplomatic relations between
Roman Catholic Church and the USSR.
 Chronology xvii

1990
January Time magazine declares Gorbachev ‘Man of the Decade’.
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic declares secession
from both Azerbaijan and USSR.
People of Tiraspol Raion vote in favour of
self-government and establishment of a Dnestr
Autonomous Republic.
19 January Soviet security forces sent into Baku, where they clash
with Azerbaijan People’s Front.
20 January Democratic Platform of Communist Reformers formed in
Moscow.
5–7 February Central Committee Plenum of CPSU resolves to create
presidential system in USSR.
7 February CPSU formally relinquishes monopoly on power.
17 February Armenia declares illegal the decision of USSR to make
Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan.
25 February Belarusian Popular Front holds demonstration attended
by 100,000 in Minsk.
27 February Supreme Soviet approves creation of a Soviet
presidency.
11 March Lithuanian Supreme Soviet issues declaration of
independence from USSR.
12 March Unofficial parliament convened in Estonia, demanding
immediate departure of Soviet troops.
15 March Moscow Congress rejects Lithuanian declaration of
independence.
March Elections in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus demonstrate
popular support for radical reformers.
Presidential Council established in Russian
Federation.
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet announces Chernobyl plant to
be phased out over next five years.
April Soviet government admits responsibility for deaths
of 15,000 Polish officers in Katyn forest massacre
of 1940.
29 May Yeltsin wins election for chairmanship of Supreme Soviet
of the RSFSR.
May/June Gorbachev and George Bush agree to reduce strategic
weapons at Washington summit meeting.
June Hungary announces intention to leave Warsaw Pact
before end of 1991.
July Donbas miners strike, demanding material improvements
and dismantling of party control over mines.
xviii Chronology

31 July Gorbachev and George Bush sign START Treaty in

Moscow.
September 500 Days program economic reforms outlined in public.

1991
7 January Soviet tanks and paratroopers enter Lithuania.
14 January Valentin Pavlov replaces Ryzhkov as prime minister
following the latter’s heart attack.
January Pavlov announces monetary reforms that include
freezing of savings accounts until currency reforms
instituted.
19 February Yeltsin calls for resignation of Gorbachev.
22 February 400,000 people attend demonstration in Moscow in
support of ‘Democracy and Glasnost’.
February Members of Warsaw Pact announce that it will cease
existence by end of March.
10 March Yeltsin, calling for Gorbachev’s resignation, inspires
demonstration of 500,000 in Moscow.
17 March Referendum on a renewed federation held in USSR;
99 per cent of Georgians voting in referendum support
independence.
28 March 100,000 people march in Moscow, supporting Yeltsin
and defying Supreme Soviet ban on political
demonstrations.
RCPD votes 532–286 to defy ban on demonstrations.
12 April USSR suspends rail and sea shipments to Georgia.
23 April The 1+9 agreement is signed between Gorbachev and
leaders of the nine republics.
26 April 50 million people stage one-hour strike protesting rising
prices and falling quality of life.
4 May Donbas miners end coal strike.
12 June Yeltsin elected Russian president.
1 July New Democratic Movement initiated by well-known
political figures.
12 July USSR Supreme Soviet approves draft Union Treaty.
20 July Yeltsin bans activities of political parties and public
organizations in entities belonging to the state.
18–21 August Putsch in Moscow attempts overthrow of Gorbachev.
24 August RSFSR recognizes independence of Latvia and Estonia.
Ukrainian parliament declares independence.
25 August Belarus declares independence and suspends Communist
Party.
27 August Moldavia declares independence.
 Chronology xix

29 August USSR Supreme Soviet bans activities of CPSU in all

regions of USSR.
1 September Gorbachev announces that he and leaders of ten
republics agree to sign treaty on a Union of Sovereign
States.
21 September 99 per cent of voters in referendum in Armenia support
secession from USSR.
1 December 90 per cent of voters in referendum in Ukraine support
secession from USSR; Leonid Kravchuk elected first
president of independent Ukraine.
8 December Meeting of presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk (Russia
and Ukraine) and Belarusian parliamentary leader
Shushkevich agrees to form Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS).
10 December Parliaments in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine approve
formation of CIS.
26 December USSR Supreme Soviet votes to dissolve itself.
27 December Yeltsin and colleagues seize Gorbachev’s office in
Kremlin.
31 December Soviet flag on Kremlin replaced by Russian tri-coloured
flag.
 PREFACE

Like any scholar who works on the USSR and post-Soviet republics, I find the
events of the recent past very difficult to assess because I feel part of them.
I have attended dozens of lectures and talks on the fall of the Soviet Union and
indeed delivered not a few as well. I can recall the euphoria among Western
analysts with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 and the
possibilities for change that his elevation seemed to augur. The next six years
were so tumultuous that to confine them within the pages of a small book
seems inappropriate. During that period there was a remarkable outpouring
of analyses in the West and of revelations within the Soviet Union. Over the
past twelve years, however, that period seems to have been confined to the
more distant past than the Stalin years (events of which are still commem-
orated in most republics) or even the revolutions of 1917. Visiting former
Soviet regions one can only be struck by the rapidity of change and the
thoroughness with which the physical symbols of the Soviet era have been
removed. It may be time therefore to revisit them and offer a new assessment.
It is not an easy task. As with any such venture, this manuscript is bound to
contain controversial statements. The two main actors, Gorbachev and Yeltsin,
are still alive; both maintain supporters and critics. Both have written several
books defending their actions of 1985–91 (and afterward in Yeltsin’s case)
and neither, frankly, has received an altogether critical press.
In the interim of twelve years, many of the participants in the events
of 1985–91 have written memoirs – those translated into English have been
included in the bibliography. Collections of documents have been made avail-
able on the Internet. Yet the debates continue: over Gorbachev and his relative
success or failure; the roots of the August 1991 putsch; the role of the national
republics in the fall of the USSR; the relative significance of the economic
crisis, and the role of the main adversary, the United States in the Cold War
and the downfall of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. I should
confess to a certain bias, in that I have long felt that the national question was
of key significance, and conversely that the arms build-up and Cold War
conflict were overrated as factors in the dissolution of the Soviet state. In
writing this book I also came to the conclusion that the role of personalities
was of much greater importance than had initially appeared to be the case.
Personal friendships and animosities often played a critical role, as did mis-
 Preface xxi

conceptions of political alliances and intrigue. In my view there was nothing

inevitable about the events of 1991 and I would not pretend to have dis-
covered any kind of definitive truth about why things happened as they did.
This book was written with the aid of a grant from the Support for the
Advancement of Scholarship, Faculty of Arts at the University of Alberta,
which permitted research trips to Moscow and to the archives of the Open
Society at the Central European University in Budapest (RFE/RL Archives).
These latter proved invaluable and I owe a debt to the various writers of
RFE/RL, sometimes for citations that are too brief to be acknowledged here:
Alexander Rahr, Elizabeth Teague, John Tedstrom, Keith Bush, Vera Tolz,
Roman Solchanyk, Saulius Girnius, Dzintra Bungs and others monitored
events in the Soviet Union and its constituent republics assiduously for many
years. In the late 1990s in Minsk, I interviewed Stanislau Shushkevich, the
former leader of Belarus about the events of Belavezha, and I have used some
excerpts of that interview in my interpretation of the events of early December
1991.
I would like to thank Anna Yastrzhembska, who provided advice, ideas,
and proofread the manuscript in its initial form; and Ilya Khineiko, one of my
PhD students in the Department of History and Classics at the University of
Alberta, who was my research assistant during the latter stages of prepara-
tion. Thanks are due also to the series editor, Dr Gordon Martel, for his keen
attention to the manuscript, and to Casey Mein and Melanie Carter at Longman
for their prompt responses and advice. I also thank my wife Lan for their
constant support, as well as my two sons Carlton and Keelan.

David R. Marples
Edmonton, Canada
October 2003
 ACRONYMS

BPF Belarusian Popular Front

CC Central Committee
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CNS Committee of National Salvation (Lithuania)
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GRU State Military Intelligence
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IRG Interregional Group (parliamentary deputies)
KGB Committee of State Security
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP New Economic Policy
NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs
OMON Special police troops
RBMK Graphite-moderated nuclear reactor
RCPD Russian Congress of People’s Deputies
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
SDI Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars)
START Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
 INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union was largely unpredicted and today there are
various interpretations of the event. Similarly, the rule and legacy of Mikhail
Sergeevich Gorbachev are much debated, both in Russia and the outside world.
Gorbachev came to power at a time when the Cold War seemed to have been
reignited. In 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007
and then denied responsibility. The Soviet leaders were also incensed when
Ronald Reagan termed their country an ‘evil empire.’ For decades, the Soviet
media had hidden from its citizens economic statistics, and venerated the ageing
group of leaders in power. It seemed to be a country living within a shell, cut
off from the outside world, yet potentially very dangerous as a nuclear power
that had attained by the late 1970s theoretical parity with the United States
after a lengthy arms race. The years 1985–91 thus constitute something very
different: a time of unparalleled change and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet
system. The figure of Gorbachev is tied irrevocably to these events. Initially,
Western observers regarded him with skepticism, then wonder, and finally
delight, so that in the United States and other countries he had become prac-
tically a cult figure by 1990, the recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize and a man
unlike any other Soviet leader for his love of the camera and public appearances.
Historians and political scientists thus faced two interrelated questions.
First, how far apart were the perceptions of Gorbachev and the reality? And
second, what were the main causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union? The
latter question needs to take into account a variety of factors and interpreta-
tions: the ending of the Cold War; an economic crisis and virtual collapse; the
rise of the national republics, which were making more and more demands on
the centre, and in some cases lapsing into ethnic conflicts that predated Soviet
power; and political in-fighting within the leadership. The events of 1991,
though cataclysmic, are also puzzling. How could the world’s largest remain-
ing empire fall so suddenly? How could the new republics essentially maintain
the same ruling personnel as in the Soviet period? What did this signify? Was
it a revolution or merely a change of name and the replacement of communist
states with nationalist ones without really altering the existing structure?

1
2 Introduction

Dealing with the first question, the problem may derive from Western
misconceptions about the new leader. Here some background comments are
necessary. The Soviet Union, by and large, was a totalitarian state. True, it
experienced some periods of thaw or liberalism, most notably during the later
years of Lenin’s leadership and the early years of Khrushchev’s. But the defin-
ing period was that of Stalin (1928–53), and his appalling legacy of slaughter,
deportation, internment, and purges. During the 1930s and 1940s it became
difficult for Western observers to delineate an accurate picture of life and
events in the USSR. With the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, it
became almost impossible. The Soviet authorities presented a single version of
events and official images. The United States reacted in similar fashion – or so
it seems now – overreacting to the intrusion of real and alleged Communists
into American society. The very nature of the Cold War belied interpreta-
tion: was it a war for freedom against tyranny, or was it a defensive war of
communism against capitalist expansion? Both the main protagonists were
ideological states, and the United States took over Britain’s mantle as the main
power of the capitalist world.
Western writings on the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be divided,
simply, into liberal and conservative. The liberal school considered Stalin a
monster, but admired Lenin, and believed that the Soviet Union had achieved
some benefits for its population. The conservatives believed that a quest for
world Communism was a fight to the death that would result in the total defeat
of one side or the other. Ultimately, the conservatives probably expressed their
case more successfully, largely because of the collapse of the Communist regimes
of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991. Peaceful coexistence,
the great watchword of Soviet foreign policy, was no longer necessary. The
West had won. This perspective continues to permeate many works about the
Gorbachev and post-Gorbachev periods – in my opinion, falsely. However,
this is to advance too quickly. The key issue was not how people saw the
USSR, but the way in which they gleaned their information. How does one
analyze a state that is secretive by nature, has muzzled its media, and much of
which is off-limits to foreigners, including government officials and reporters?
Certainly some information was available from refugees, or underground liter-
ature (samizdat), and during the war the Germans captured an entire archive
in Smolensk that revealed some of the inner workings of the Soviet Union, and
these materials came into the hands of the Americans at the end of the war.
In terms of the leadership, however, the prevailing pseudo-science was
termed Kremlinology, or ‘Kremlin-watching.’ It required detailed analyses of
all official announcements and speeches; reading between the lines; observing
the way the leaders were listed in official publications; or seeing who had pride
of place at a major parade or public function. It was, clearly, made up mostly
of guesswork. It led to the division of the Soviet hierarchy into ‘hawks’ and
‘doves’ (much as the US leadership had been categorized during the Vietnam
 Introduction 3

War), or ‘hard liners’ and ‘liberals.’ It was a science of speculation and fore-
casting. These comments are not meant to denigrate those who took up this
kind of occupation. Indeed it was possible to make some deductions from
these analyses, but it was also likely to result in some significant misconceptions
and misplaced hopes. This book has suggested that the first misconceptions
pertained to Gorbachev himself, i.e. that he was a ‘liberal’ bent on ‘reforms,’
and curtailing the tyrannies of Communism in the face of the old Brezhnev
supporters in the Politburo. Gorbachev, it is postulated, was neither to the
‘right’ nor ‘left’ of the Soviet political spectrum. He was a provincial leader
who had risen rapidly through making important contacts and remaining
essentially loyal during what was subsequently termed ‘the time of stagnation’
under Brezhnev. In one sense he was revolutionary: he adhered to the prin-
ciples laid down for the Bolshevik Party by V.I. Lenin.
The image of Gorbachev, especially in works published during the early
years of his leadership, thus tends to be misleading. Too much was expected of
him. His relative approachability and openness suggested a new style of Soviet
leader, though any figure under the age of 60 and able to walk unaided would
have made a similar impression. Not only was the image of Gorbachev
misleading, but the Western media tended to focus on the individual rather
than the ruling group. By the late 1980s headlines like ‘Man of the Century’
continued to follow Gorbachev’s name like an epithet. By that same time, the
Soviet public had already become quite cynical. The man of the people did not
get along with the people. He was ill at ease with workers; he was patently
uncomfortable whenever anyone opposed his point of view in the Congress of
Deputies, notwithstanding the fact that Gorbachev had done more than any-
one to establish that body and empower the legislature in order to overcome
his opponents in the Communist Party. Nonetheless, he retained his links with
the latter organization and wielded enormous power within it. In 1991 he was
manifestly unwilling to relinquish his position of General Secretary even when
his closest allies willed him to do so. Gorbachev, then, was a man of his time,
a committed Communist and follower of Lenin, who tried to reform a system
through what was termed ‘restructuring’ (not revolution) and honesty and
self-criticism in reporting.
In this mission – and very few Western analysts make such a comment
outright even today – he failed; honorably perhaps, but catastrophically. No
one in March 1985 could have predicted what the country might look like in
1991: strikes among the workforce; demonstrations in major cities; fighting in
the Caucasus; near uprisings in the Baltic States; and an empire destroyed by
the loss of Eastern Europe, the satellite states established under Soviet occupa-
tion in the aftermath of the Second World War. At the same time, a dramatic
fall in the living standards of the population only exacerbated matters. In
these circumstances the sight of Gorbachev and his well-dressed wife Raisa at
foreign summits served to infuriate the Soviet public, which now regarded him
4 Introduction

as one of the most disastrous leaders in living memory. Even Brezhnev had
maintained near full employment, civil peace, and the solidity of the Warsaw
Pact, albeit with dangerous sideshows such as the invasion of Afghanistan.
Yet at the very moment that Soviet citizens were growing disillusioned with
Gorbachev, through his unilateral military cuts, the Soviet leader was cement-
ing his image in the Western world. Here was a leader who put into practice
Soviet rhetoric about peace initiatives; one who did not wait for the United
States to reciprocate. Small wonder that some Kremlin watchers saw no
danger to Gorbachev’s authority in 1990 and even late 1991! In this way, and
from the perspective of 12 years, it is evident that Western writers often
presented a false image of Gorbachev, overestimating his abilities, and also his
impact on Soviet society.
The second major question under review is: why did the Soviet Union
collapse? The problem continues to elicit discussion. The simplistic view is
that the West won the Cold War, which ended the Warsaw Pact and ultimately
led to the dissolution of the USSR. Gorbachev, in some interpretations, abetted
the process by dismantling the Communist Party, which he had come to see as
an obstacle to further progress. An integral facet of this perspective is that the
arms race took on new dimensions in an era of high technology. Simply put:
the Communists could not keep up with the West. The SDI research program
forced the Soviet side to try to match Western escalation, thereby leading the
country to virtual bankruptcy. Gorbachev had the wisdom to end this contest
by giving up, making concession after concession to the West and turning on
the party that had nurtured him. Like all theories about the Soviet period, it
may contain an element of truth without revealing the whole picture. Through-
out post-Second World War history, the Soviet side had been behind and then
made a supreme effort to catch up, often without attaining the sort of quality
of weaponry that would have made them a truly formidable adversary. But
there is no clear indication that the Soviet Union fell because the Cold War
ended. Indeed the end of foreign challenges might also have led to internal
stability, ostensibly the main goal of Gorbachev’s ‘peace initiative.’
This leads naturally to the second theory: that the Soviet Union collapsed
economically from within. This theory is more plausible than the Cold War
explanation, but prompts an immediate question: how then did countries
such as Russia and Ukraine, which emerged from the former Soviet state,
manage to survive an even greater drop in living standards in the period 1992–
98, leading in Russia’s case to an almost fatal economic collapse? At what
point does economic decline constitute a danger to the political order? Analysts
do not dispute the existence of an economic crisis. But during revolutions,
there is a tight link between the crisis and the group advocating a state
takeover. What happened in 1991 was rather different: if there was truly an
economic crisis, it was one between the republics and the centre; when repub-
lics, and particularly Russia, were failing to contribute to the state budget
 Introduction 5

so that state coffers were empty. Yet this occurred at a relatively late stage,
and behind the scenes. The economic argument needs to be examined more
thoroughly and receives treatment below, but by itself it does not seem to be a
convincing explanation for the demise of the Soviet empire, particularly one
that had undergone a similar experience in the late 1970s with the declining
revenues from oil and gas.
Historians have begun to pay significant attention to the Soviet republics
and the rise of nationalism. Indeed in the early 21st century, the topic seems to
be reaching a peak. Few serious analysts would attempt to construct a theory for
the dissolution of the Soviet Union that does not include the national question.
Some observers, such as Taras Kuzio of the University of Toronto, have long
argued that the Western academic world was incurably Russo-centric and
tended to ignore events in the non-Russian republics. Added to that is the fact
that Moscow and Leningrad were undoubtedly the main centres for the Western
media. Many republics lacked a foreign correspondent, and newspapers would
have their Moscow man (or woman) make occasional trips to the periphery of
the empire, only to return with instant observations and deductions. This is
not to suggest that the non-Russian republics were totally neglected – in fact
there was a growing interest in Ukraine, while the Baltic States had never been
accepted as an integral part of the USSR – but like the focus on Gorbachev, the
concentration on the Moscow centre to the detriment of the republics did not
always allow for a broad perspective on events in the Soviet Union as a whole.
Who, other than Azeri or Armenian specialists, for example, could have
predicted the depth of feeling over the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh? Or that
Kazakhs would protest en-masse in the streets of Alma-Ata in December 1986
with the appointment of a Russian as the new party leader?
Western analysts were not the only ones to neglect the national question.
Gorbachev, it seems, did not have a national policy, despite the fact that he
grew up in the Caucasus among dozens of different national groups. Given the
rise of the national republics to sovereignty, and then the mass ‘flight’ to
independence in the summer of 1991, it is evident that national issues must
have been at the forefront of the collapse of a federal centre like Moscow.
That the response to events in Moscow was so rapid adds weight to that state-
ment. But then another question arises: would the national problem alone
explain the dissolution of Gorbachev’s government? And what was the rela-
tionship between growing national sentiment in the various republics and the
disaffection with the centre of the Russian Federation? How did Russia relate
to the national question? Attention here needs to be centred on the events of
1991: from the March referendum to the failed Putsch in August, and the con-
sequent independent path of Russia under its new president, Boris Yeltsin.
The latter, incidentally, has elicited the same sort of extremes of opinion as
Gorbachev. The West (especially new US president George Bush) at first
seemed reluctant to embrace Yeltsin, but later came to regard him as the best
6 Introduction

hope for preserving ‘democracy’ in Russia. The Russian president aided his own
case by penning three volumes of memoirs, a feat matched only by Gorbachev’s
publication of a single volume that equalled in size all three of those of his
rival. Whereas Gorbachev was distant from the Soviet public, Yeltsin was a
populist, very much at home with workers or peasants.
In the area of high-level politics, a controversy developed between what
might loosely be called the Gorbachev and Yeltsin schools. Thus, one group
of scholars maintains that Gorbachev was practically thrown out of office by
Yeltsin in a virtual coup in the latter part of 1991. Yeltsin took over the reins
of power while Gorbachev was under house arrest at his villa in Foros. The
opposing group has come close to accusing Gorbachev of outright collabora-
tion with the leaders of the Putsch – he, after all, had appointed all the leaders
of the so-called Emergency Committee. This second school perceives Yeltsin
rather than Gorbachev as the bearer of democratic values; the man who
almost single-handedly defied the plotters and at every stage of his rise to
power subjected himself to elections and judgment by his peers and public.
Gorbachev, in contrast, remained within the comfort of the party circle,
unelected by the people, and clung to power long after his popularity had
waned. Often overlooked during these analyses is the depth of the bitterness
of this rivalry – though it is obvious enough from Yeltsin’s memoirs – and
how far Yeltsin would be prepared to go to take power. Analysts also have
to measure the extent of the correlation between the actions of Yeltsin and
those of the Russian Federation per se. Russia was also the centre of the sort
of hard-line Communists who carried out the coup, and even in the presid-
ential election of 1991, Yeltsin received less than 60 per cent of the vote.
The issues are thus complex and it seems unlikely that there will be a con-
sensus on why the Soviet Union fell, at least in the near future. The events are
also too recent for any unity of opinion. Many of the players are still alive
(Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Shevardnadze, Kryuchkov, and others), though
relatively few are in positions of prominence today. At the time of writing,
there is a minor but fractious border dispute taking place between Ukraine
and Russia. The disintegration of the empire may have been relatively peaceful
but it has produced many problems that still require resolution. However,
what is clear is that no party in any republic is advocating a return of the
Soviet Union. The events of 1985–91 proved to be the decisive death knell of
the Bolshevik regime. Gorbachev may have been unlucky or he may have
taken on too much, or he may have been a leader who was simply not up to
the task of reforming a Communist system that was essentially defunct in
many respects. This volume, while outlining the various areas of significance
and the possible factors behind the collapse, will offer an assessment concern-
ing the plausibility of each theory. Ultimately, it is posited, the empire fell
because of a particular combination of factors and circumstances rather than
any one specific cause.
 References 157

REFERENCES

Breslauer, George W. (2002) Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders. Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press.
Bush, Keith (1991) Pavlov’s Anticrisis Program. Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 20,
17 May: 1–6.
Chernyaev, Anatoly (2000) My Six Years with Gorbachev. University Park, Penn-
sylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Dunlop, John B. (1993) The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Foye, Stephen (1991) Gorbachev Denies Responsibility for Crackdown. Report on the
USSR, Vol. 3, No. 4, 25 January: 1–3.
Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) Memoirs. New York: Doubleday.
Hanson, Philip (1990) The Shatalin Plan and the Future of the Soviet Presidency.
Unpublished paper, 2 October, Krasnyi Arkhiv, Central European University,
Budapest.
Khasbulatov, Ruslan. (1993) The Struggle for Russia, edited by Richard Sakwa.
London: Routledge.
Matlock, Jack F. Jr (1995) Autopsy of an Empire: the American Ambassador’s
Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union. New York: Random House.
McNeill, Terry (1988) Gorbachev’s First Three Years in Power: Not So New Political
Thinking in Foreign Policy. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL75/88, 2 March:
1–4.
Palazchenko, Pavel (1997) My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: the Memoir
of a Soviet Interpreter. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Rutland, Peter (1990) Abalkin’s Strategy for Soviet Economic Reform. Report on the
USSR, Vol. 2, No. 21, 25 May: 3–6.
Tatu, Michel (1986) The Central Committee Elected at the Twenty-seventh Congress.
RFE/RL Research Bulletin, 10 March.
Tedstrom, John (1991) Gorbachev the Economist. Report on the USSR, Vol. 3,
No. 35, 30 August: 11–12.
Voices of Glasnost: Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok Magazine, 1987–1990,
Selected and edited by Christopher Cerf and Marina Albee with Lev Gushchin;
consulting editor, Lynn Visson; translator, Hans Fenstermacher; with an introduc-
tion by Vitaly Korotich. London: Kyle Cathie Limited, 1990.
White, Stephen (1990) Gorbachev in Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yeltsin, Boris (1994) The View from the Kremlin. London: HarperCollins.

157