Dialogue on OCCASIONAL PAPERS

Globalization N EW YOR K

N° 45 / September 2009

Thomas G. Weiss, Tapio Kanninen, and Michael K. Busch

Sustainable Global Governance

for the 21st Century
The United Nations confronts
economic and environmental crises
amidst changing geopolitics
 Dialogue on Globalization

Dialogue on Globalization contributes to the international debate on globalization –

through conferences, workshops and publications – as part of the international work of
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Dialogue on Globalization is based on the premise that
globalization can be shaped into a direction that promotes peace, democracy and social
justice. Dialogue on Globalization addresses “movers and shakers” both in developing
countries and in the industrialized parts of the world, i.e. politicians, trade unionists, gov-
ernment officials, business people, and journalists as well as representatives from NGOs,
international organizations, and academia.

Dialogue on Globalization is co-ordinated by the head office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

in Berlin and by the FES offices in New York and Geneva. The programme intensively
draws on the international network of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – a German non-profit
institution committed to the principles of social democracy – with offices, programmes
and partners in more than 100 countries.

This Occasional Paper is published by the New York office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

September 2009

Table of Contents

Preface .......................................................................................................................................................3
1. Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................................5
2. Introduction: Strategic Repositioning, The Contemporary Context ........................................................7
3. Looming Global Threats: The Seminar’s Conversations ........................................................................10
4. Steps Forward: Key Recommendations ................................................................................................13
4.1 Intellectual Leadership Can Make a Difference............................................................................14
Recommendation 1: Transforming Human Resources and Providing
Finance for UN Research ............................................................................................................16
Recommendation 2: Policy Leadership by the Secretary-General during Crises ............................19
Recommendation 3: Establishing Independent Analytical Capacity .............................................20
4.2 Structural Integration Can Make a Difference .............................................................................24
Recommendation 4: Making Better Use of the UN System’s Policy Planning
and Research Capacities ............................................................................................................24
Recommendation 5: A Better Division of Labor among Multilateral Organizations ......................26
4.3 Thinking Big ...............................................................................................................................28
Recommendation 6: Towards a Third Generation World Body.....................................................29
Annex 1: Summary: “The Role of the UN in a New Financial Architecture” ................................................33
Annex 2: Summary: “Shifting Geopolitics” ...............................................................................................36
Annex 3: Summary: “Interrelated Challenges of Climate Change, Food and Water Security,
Energy and Changing Financial and Economic Policies” ..............................................................39
Annex 4: Summary: “Food and Water Security and Increasing Potential for Conflict over Resources” ........42
Annex 5: Summary: “The Energy Crisis and Reorganization of Economic and Social Policies” ....................44
Annex 6: List of Participants ......................................................................................................................46

ISSN 1614-0079
ISBN 978-3-86872-166-9

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 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Preface

On 7 December 2009, the world will gather in Copenhagen to negotiate an agree-

ment designed to combat the deleterious effects of climate change. Whatever the
outcome, the United Nations will play a critical role—for better or worse—in
managing these challenges, as well as those on the rapidly expanding menu of
other issues confronting world politics and global governance.

Against this backdrop, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Ralph Bunche
Institute for International Studies of The Graduate Center of The City University
of New York brought together experts from the UN Secretariat, diplomatic mis-
sions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academia in 2009 to reflect
on current and future political, economic, social, and environmental conditions
of the world—and how they are interrelated—as well as to formulate new ideas
and suggestions and, if possible, to articulate a new conceptual framework for UN
and multilateral efforts. The extensive discussions form the basis for an agenda
of action and reform for the world body following the Copenhagen Summit.

The planners of the seminar series decided to concentrate on the ongoing crises
in the economic, financial, and environmental arenas amidst rapid geopolitical
change, already an enormous task; and so they set aside considerations of inter-
national peace and security as well as human rights and humanitarian action.
Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, disarmament,
human rights, humanitarian action, and terrorism remain key issues of global
governance. At the same time, we believe that the topics of our seminars provide
a new, rapidly changing global context as well as an interrelated framework
within which the challenges for security and human rights could be better under-
stood.

We convened six sessions in winter, spring, and summer 2009—each of the first
five geared to examine a particular theme and introduced by two leading experts:
the role of the UN in a new financial architecture (James Galbraith and José
Antonio Ocampo); shifting geopolitics of power in the world (Mathew Burrows and
Alvaro de Soto); the interrelated challenges of climate change, food and water
security, energy, and changing financial and economic policies (Adnan Amin and
Jim Harkness); food and water security and increasing potential for conflicts over
resources (Adil Najam and Michael Klare); and the energy crisis and reorgani-
zation of economic and social policies (Ian Dunlop and Christopher Flavin). The
summaries of these lively discussions are found in Chapter 3 and in more detail
in Annexes 1–5.

The contents of this report are the exclusive responsibility of the authors: Thomas
G. Weiss, Tapio Kanninen, and Michael K. Busch. The authors have attempted to
summarize points of concern and consensus in the first four chapters of the report,
and have sought to capture the fuller range of views for each session in the annexes.
They proposed a series of recommendations to address the issues and concerns

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raised during the discussions, which were then considered by a group of partici-
pants who met in July 2009. The present report takes into account many sug-
gestions from that meeting, but the final recommendations were not formally
endorsed by the participants and should not be seen as reflecting their priorities
or perspectives.

Substantial time was devoted to planning this seminar series and to bringing
together senior and mid-level UN staff, diplomats, representatives of civil society,
and academia for discussions around very broad subjects. A core group attended
most of the sessions and brought continuity and focus to the discussions. We
believe the experiment worked well and is worth repeating in the future. We would
like to thank speakers and participants for their contributions, commitment, and
enthusiasm.

We would also like to express our sincere thanks to two individuals who—besides
the authors and the hardworking teams of our organizations—helped formulate
the concept of the series and its implementation through their unusual combined
experience at the UN and in academia: Georgios Kostakos, who is Senior Adviser
to the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), has worked in
the UN Secretary-General’s Office and in many UN departments and field missions
as well as a scholar in Greek think tanks; and James Sutterlin, who after being a
diplomat and Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the US State Department as
well as in the UN Secretary-General’s Office, became Chair of the Academic Coun-
cil of the UN System and took up teaching at Yale and Long Island University.

We hope that this publication contributes to a critical debate of our time: how best
can the United Nations position itself to manage the most vital issues mankind
has to face amidst turbulent world politics and unprecedented global change?

Werner Puschra Thomas G. Weiss

Director Presidential Professor and Director
FES New York RBIIS

August 2009

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1. Executive Summary

Time is running out for the United Nations to position itself to effectively manage
emerging issues in the midst of dramatically changing world politics and new
global challenges. This occasional paper and the seminar series which informed
its findings discuss some of the complexities of the challenges facing the United
Nations today. The report covers five of the most critical issues on which the world
body must take action: the ongoing economic and financial crisis; the changing
nature of the geopolitical order; the interrelated challenges of climate change,
food, and water security, and the need to reconfigure energy policy; the threat of
conflict over diminishing finite resources; and the reorganization of socioeco-
nomic policy in the face of energy crises. Responding to the dialogue and discus-
sions of the seminar series, the authors offer their analysis and a set of recom-
mendations on steps that the world body could take in order to exert meaningful
influence over what promises to be a complex and ever-expanding array of socio-
economic, environmental and political challenges in the twenty-first century.

This report argues that in order to situate itself appropriately in the new century The UN ought to tackle
of world politics, the UN ought to tackle certain shortcomings immediately, look certain shortcomings
to continuously strengthen itself in a host of areas over the course of the next immediately, look to
decade, and set a course to achieve long-range objectives in the fundamental continuously strengthen
transformation of global governance. Thus, it proposes steps that could and should itself in a host of areas
be acted upon in the short to medium term (i.e., before the end of the current over the course of the
Secretary-General’s first term) as well as in the long term. next decade, and set
a course to achieve
The section below first summarizes the general thrust of the discussions in the long-range objectives
seminar series and then outlines three sets of recommendations. The first, in the fundamental
“Intellectual Leadership Can Make a Difference,” is based on the firm belief that transformation of
the members of the United Nations system, and especially its Secretary-General, global governance.
have key roles to play in exerting intellectual leadership. The second, “Structural
Integration Can Make a Difference,” contains specific suggestions about moving
ahead to make better use of internal capacities and also to understand better the
comparative advantages of universal versus regional organizations. The third,
“Thinking Big,” reflects the authors’ conviction that periodic tinkering is inadequate
to make the United Nations capable of responding to the current interconnected
problems that were the basis for the seminar series.

General Conclusions

Virtually all the seminar presenters called attention to the precarious state of the A “global emergency”
world on the issues that they were discussing, a sentiment shared by many if not seems to be the most
the majority of participants. A “global emergency” seems to be the most accurate accurate way to describe
way to describe the current and certainly the future situation of our planet. UN the current and certainly
member states, its organizations and agencies, as well as its Secretary-General the future situation of
all have vital roles to play; and many recommendations were advanced to drasti- our planet.
cally enhance their ability to address the global interdependency and unprece-
dented and deepening threats of the twenty-first century.

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Recommendations

INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE

Recommendation 1:
Transforming Human Resources and Providing Finance for UN Research

The United Nations should drastically improve its capacities to manage critical
global issues in a comprehensive and credible way and, in particular, to exploit its
often neglected comparative advantages in information gathering, conceptual
thinking, problem solving, and policy analysis. Making better use of its competitive
edge in producing and nurturing world-class thinkers and practitioners on critical
global issues requires not only dramatic changes in human resources policy but
also more appropriate financing.

Recommendation 2:
Policy Leadership by the Secretary-General during Crises

For the ongoing global economic and financial crisis as well as for other potential
major emergencies, the Secretary-General should appoint a world-class thinker on
economic and financial issues as part of his inner circle. He should also have the
capacity to recruit a similar adviser on short notice for other emergencies (such as
a nuclear disaster or new pandemic) that require immediate global responses.

Recommendation 3:
Establishing Independent Analytical Capacity

The United Nations should have available an independent institution capable of

pulling together and synthesizing the host of relevant research and analysis being
produced by universities and think-tanks on global issues and of undertaking its
own focused research on complicated risk scenarios of the future.

STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE

Recommendation 4:
Making Better Use of the UN System’s Policy Planning and Research Capacities

The UN Secretary-General and the UN system as a whole should build on the

potential of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) to
respond quickly with new policies in future global crises.

Recommendation 5:
A Better Division of Labor between Multilateral Organizations

An independent international commission should be established to analyze by

region, by topic, and by time frame the possible and desirable range of activities
that should be undertaken either by the United Nations or by regional, sub-regional,
or other intergovernmental groupings of states, or by a combination.

THINKING BIG

Recommendation 6:
Towards a Third Generation World Body

The international community of states, in partnership with the private sector and
civil society, should recognize the character of the deepening global emergency
and convene a second UN Conference on International Organization. A major
overhaul of the United Nations and its relations to its partners is required rather
than continuing the unsatisfactory practice of more piecemeal UN reforms repeat-
edly but unsuccessfully tried over several decades.

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2. Introduction: Strategic Repositioning,

The Contemporary Context

Inis Claude distinguished between the role of the United Nations as an intergov-
ernmental arena and its identity as an international secretariat.1 The “first United
Nations” comprises the world organization’s 192 member states, which collec-
tively have decision-making power. The “second United Nations” forms a distinct
arena consisting of career international civil servants and staff members with the
Secretary-General at its head. These interdependent dimensions of the world body
are complemented by a “third United Nations,” comprising influential NGOs, aca-
demics, experts, commissions and other individuals who interact with and have
an impact on the first and second UN.2

The three United Nations are worth distinguishing, but this report focuses chiefly
on the second UN and its Secretary-General. The ranks of international civil serv-
ants who compose the second UN serve member states. However, the secretariats
and affiliated organizations also have independent capacities for action and are
capable of asserting significant leadership and influence in the international
arena more than is commonly recognized. The second UN offers considerable
room for maneuver and independence, especially when it comes to research and
advocacy. Secretariats frequently propose new ideas to address problems, deliber-
ate with governments, push for change, and seek to implement agreed upon
solutions.

In particular, the authors believe that the role and leadership of the UN Secretary- The leadership of the UN
General is critical in the twenty-first century. He or she is expected to be an Secretary-General is critical
honest broker, a respected world leader who can propose new ideas and bold in the twenty-first century.
action for the rapidly changing international system and at the same time work— He or she is expected to be
sometimes publicly, sometimes behind the scenes—towards finding solutions to an honest broker who can
unprecedented problems that humankind will face in the coming years and propose new ideas and
decades. UN member states are collectively in the driver’s seat and have respon- bold action and at the
sibility for policy making and agreeing on actions. While all states are de jure same time work towards
equal, there is obviously a de facto disparity in power among them; and leadership finding solutions to
is often lacking. A fact of life is that for 192 member states—or even for smaller unprecedented problems.
bodies such as the Security Council or the Group of 8 or 20—it would be a revolu-
tion in world affairs to agree quickly on drastic policy measures and demonstrate
leadership independent from national interests. Few national parliaments or
publics would support such departures.

This context cries out for leadership by the Secretary-General. He or she should
show that the first UN and the second UN, together with the private sector and
civil society, can be partners and take dramatic actions necessary to deal with the
global emergency described in this report.

UN Charter Article 99 already provides a mandate for the Secretary-General to

act independently. All Secretaries-General have undertaken independent initiatives

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although they are almost always challenged by some member states, with even
the least powerful often in a position to stymie initiatives. Some of the recom-
mendations in this report would directly enhance the Secretary-General’s leader-
ship potential. Implementing the last recommendation in particular—to convene
a Second World Conference of International Organization—would necessarily lead
to formal changes in the mandates of the head of the world body as well as the
heads of UN organizations.

With an eye toward bolstering the capacity of the second UN—especially critical
because current events demand a robust response—this report outlines a series
of recommendations. It draws on conversations among a group of diplomats,
academics, scientists, and other experts convened in the first half of 2009, the
flavor and content of which are outlined in Chapter 3 and Annexes 1–5. Chapter
4 offers the recommendations, which flow from the content of these conversations
but are the exclusive responsibility of the authors.

Mounting challenges As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, mounting chal-
facing the world are charac- lenges facing the world are characterized by the intensifying interconnectedness
terized by the intensifying of global and regional issues: political tensions; climate change; water shortages;
inter-connectedness of financial, economic and food crises; ecosystem disruptions; increasing inequality
global and regional issues: and persistent poverty. The food riots around the world in early 2008 were
political tensions; climate manifestations of this trend that blurs the boundaries between political, climate,
change; water shortages; energy, agriculture, trade, technology, and other factors. Later, the financial and
financial, economic and economic crisis demonstrated how quickly national calamities could spread and
food crises; ecosystem affect development strategies far beyond the financial and economic arena in one
disruptions; increasing country, requiring coordinated international responses. In all of these crises, the
inequality and persistent disjuncture between their global nature and the national centers of decision-
poverty. making was obvious.

The UN’s record in responding to these challenges has, to this point, been mixed.
In reacting to the reality of this century and changing world politics, the Secretary-
General has begun to play a role apart from his traditional good offices function
in political crises by spending part of his time on environmental and socio-eco-
nomic issues. Examples are the climate change negotiation process, in which he
The world’s multilateral has already participated and is expected to take further actions, and the world
institutions, with the food crisis, in response to which he has formed and chairs a UN task force to
UN at the center, are devise strategies and options. In the ongoing financial and economic crisis, how-
ill-equipped, unable, or ever, the Secretary-General has not been prominent, nor have the managing direc-
seemingly unwilling to tor of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the president of the World Bank,
take bold initiatives and and other heads of international or regional organizations. The world’s multi-
catalyze quickly necessary lateral institutions, with the UN at the center, are ill-equipped, unable, or seem-
and drastic action in the ingly unwilling to take bold initiatives and catalyze quickly necessary and drastic
face of major global crises. action in the face of major global crises.

This report offers a different approach for positioning the United Nations to respond
to and manage critical global issues amidst increasingly turbulent world politics.
Accomplishing such an ambitious objective demands a forward-looking agenda
anchored in achievable short-, medium-, and long-term goals. The strategy
advanced here, therefore, outlines steps to meet the objective of positioning the

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UN to more effectively manage critical issues amidst changing world politics in

the short to medium term (that is, in the next two to three years) as well as in the
longer term.

In order to act on the entire range of challenges confronting the world in the twenty- In order to act on the
first century, the world organization must change. The UN strategy should be: entire range of challenges
confronting the world in
• bold, responding to threats with speed and the confidence accorded by its the twenty-first century,
universal membership and legitimacy; the world organization
• idea driven, confronting challenges with imaginative proposals and fresh ini- must change. The UN
tiatives with transformative potential; strategy should be: bold,
• analytically robust, drawing on the world body’s comparative advantage in idea driven, analytically
analysis to take deliberate, informed action and bolster the leadership role of robust, structurally
the Secretary-General; integrated, reflective
• structurally integrated, establishing a working division of labor between the of reality,
world body, regional organizations, national and local actors for rapidly tackling
issues in a way that coordinates their respective capabilities and expertise;
and
• reflective of reality, pursuing objectives and reform that mirror the shifting
terrain of world politics.

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3. Looming Global Threats: The Seminar’s Conversations

Presently the world and the world organization confront a host of challenges
the combined magnitude of which has not been witnessed since the end of
World War II, which led to the founding of the United Nations. Not only do peren-
nial problems persist—international peace and security, human rights and
humanitarian action, and development—but they are compounded by a new set
The Secretariat, with the of peculiarly twenty-first century crises. The Secretariat, with the Secretary-
Secretary-General at the General at the center, does not have the luxury of passively permitting its member
center, does not have states to decide the fate of mankind on an à la carte basis according to their
the luxury of passively political preferences. Instead, it should embrace its leadership potential—derived
permitting its member from the UN’s universal legitimacy and membership—and confront head-on the
states to decide the fate new brand of threats and in particular their still poorly understood interconnec-
of mankind on an à la tions to international peace and security. To be sure, the mission is daunting.
carte basis according to Based on the discussions during five sessions, which are described in more detail
their political preferences. in Annexes 1–5, the world body will encounter the following five major problems,
all of which were heatedly debated in one or more sessions.

The Economic Crisis and the Need for New Financial Architecture

The global financial system has verged on collapse during the past year. The con-
ventional wisdom driving international economic decision making for the past two
decades led to ever more complex financial instruments, uncontrolled risk-taking,
and lack of regulation—characteristics that culminated in a major meltdown at
the end of 2008. The crisis threatens developed and developing countries, be they
Notwithstanding the well established and stable or in transition. Notwithstanding the considerable
considerable uncertainty uncertainty surrounding the future of international economic affairs, it is abun-
surrounding the future of dantly clear that current economic and financial arrangements are not sustainable,
international economic and the effects of the crisis will be long-standing. Yet the seminar reached con-
affairs, it is abundantly sensus that a business-as-usual mentality is present among many who believe
clear that current economic that matters will return to normal in the future, a situation all the more alarming
and financial arrangements as unpredictable sociopolitical forces are unleashed for which the world is unpre-
are not sustainable, and pared. To counter these trends, participants at the 23 February 2009 seminar
the effects of the crisis advocated a number of steps that could be taken by the international community,
will be long-standing. which are described in Annex 1.

Shifting Geo-politics

The so-called unipolar moment that followed the end of the Cold War lasted for
two decades but seems to have ended. China and India have been on the rise for
some time as major economic and political powers. Russia’s actions demonstrate
the intent to reassert influence around the globe. The United States has set aside
its multilateral leadership mantle since the attacks of 11 September, but the
administration of Barack Obama has exhibited a more multilateral bent than its
predecessor. Yet Washington’s attempts to recapture primacy will face stiff chal-
lenge from the likes of Europe, Japan, and increasingly a handful of emerging

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countries like the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as well as South Africa,
Indonesia, and Egypt. The Gulf countries have amassed large reserves, thanks to
oil revenues, and, together with China and India, have been buying Western banks
and other firms. Despite the rapidly changing contours of international relations, Despite the rapidly
such trends are poorly reflected in the structures and functioning of the multilat- changing contours of
eral system. Many seminar participants expressed concern that the arrangements international relations,
devised at the close of World War II have passed their use-by date. If this is the such trends are poorly
case, an enhanced, retooled institutional framework must be devised to better reflected in the structures
meet the needs of a world so fundamentally changed. Steps forward, as well as a and functioning of the
number of related challenges, were outlined during the 4 March 2009 seminar multilateral system.
and are described in Annex 2.

Interrelated Challenges of Climate Change, Food and Water Security,

Energy, and Changing Financial and Economic Policies

UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown could not have been clearer in outlining the
ramifications of failing to address the challenges associated with climate change
when he stated early in 2009 at Davos that “the costs of unchecked climate change
are far, far higher than the costs of combating it. If we do not reduce our emissions
from their present path—by at least half, globally, by 2050, with a peak in 2020—
we will bring upon ourselves a human and economic catastrophe that will make
today’s crisis look small. And it will be the poorest and the most vulnerable who A Copenhagen “protocol”
will suffer first and greatest.”3 Clearly, a broader reorientation of global production of some sort likely will be
and consumption patterns and economic and agricultural activity, but also a dras- reached in December; but
tic change from market fundamentalism to multi-nationalism, is needed to avoid if it is weak, or based on
irreversible damage to the environment and world population. Thus, the Septem- outdated scientific evidence,
ber 2009 high-level meeting in New York before the General Assembly and the 2009 will be remembered
negotiations at Copenhagen in December aim to achieve a global deal for the post- as the year the world
2012 period. But even if such a deal is reached, there is increasing scientific evi- suffered a collective failure.
dence that current emission targets under negotiation are insufficient. The 25
March 2009 session, described in fuller detail in Annex 3, outlined these alarming
trends and steps to counter them. A Copenhagen “protocol” of some sort likely
will be reached in December; but if it is weak, or based on outdated scientific
evidence, 2009 will be remembered as the year the world suffered a collective
failure.

Increasing Potential for Conflict over Resources

The world was treated to a preview in 2008 of what may lie ahead when food
riots exploded in dozens of countries across the globe. Participants at the 22 April
2009 meeting discussed whether conditions for resource riots will likely recur in
the future. Some felt that any optimism regarding a more peaceful future in this
respect is belied by the fact that a likely rise in the price of oil, bio-fuel production,
major drought forecasts, and declining purchasing power in the developing world
all threaten the security of food and water resources throughout the world,
developments that taken together paint a pessimistic portrait of a future of rising As conditions worsen, the
conflicts over dwindling access to the necessities of life. Others pointed out that world’s rich will not enjoy a
while the threat of conflict over resources is looming, there are points of potential buffer from the problems of the
conversion. Water, specifically, has proven to be a source of cooperation as well poor, as the two increasingly
as conflict.4 Either way, as conditions worsen, the world’s rich will not enjoy a share a common fate.

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buffer from the problems of the poor, as the two increasingly share a common
fate, issues discussed more fully in Annex 4 together with the steps the UN could
take to become a more critical actor for change.

The Energy Crisis and Reorganization of Socioeconomic Policies

Green technology currently The global oil supply has grown tighter, a situation thrown into sharp focus in
enjoys the status of being 2008 when fuel prices spiked to unprecedented heights. While they subsequently
a prominent and popular subsided, production levels have not increased since 2005, at least in part the
subject of study for the result of political calculations by oil-producing countries. But we have reached,
world’s most talented or are rapidly approaching, the peak of world supply. With carbon-based energy
young scientists. At the sources being finite, scenarios imagining alternatives are politically charged by
same time, however, the buzzwords such as “nuclear renaissance,” the “solar age,” or a “hydrogen econ-
clock is ticking on fully omy.” The good news, delivered to the seminar convened on 6 May 2009, is that
implementing alternatives green technology currently enjoys the status of being a prominent and popular
before non-renewable subject of study for the world’s most talented young scientists. At the same time,
resources run dry. however, the clock is ticking on fully implementing alternatives before non-
renewable resources run dry, as discussed in Annex 5.

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4. Steps Forward: Key Recommendations

In establishing an agenda, we originally asked presenters and participants to keep

in mind a tripartite framework for organizing their recommendations:

• actionable: issues for which progress can be made relatively easily and for
which no governmental decisions are required;
• achievable: issues that require strong diplomacy and bold action to achieve
objectives but are politically and operationally within reach; and
• untenable: issues that should not be addressed because they are so divisive or
impossible that action would be counterproductive.

While this formula worked well for an earlier effort by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
and the Ralph Bunche Institute at the outset of the current Secretary-General’s
tenure,5 participants noted early on that it would not be feasible for categorizing
recommendations about possible future actions by the UN to improve its overall
approach to the management of critical global issues about ongoing economic,
financial, and environmental crises amidst rapidly changing world politics. The
borders between categories were amorphous and fluid, and rarely was there
consensus about priorities or sequencing. Moreover, these topics are already large
enough that the group decided not to discuss the relationships to international
peace and security, human rights, and humanitarian affairs although linkages are
clear.

As a result, we listened closely to our speakers and the rich exchanges that fol-
lowed among participants and distilled and then elaborated what we judge to be
the most necessary and doable recommendations in the next two to three years.
Not all the recommendations received support from the entire roster of partici-
pants, but one or more undoubtedly would be acceptable to some or all.

But in light of the critical nature of the current state of the planet—a definite tone
of urgency and crisis was the background music for all five of our sessions—we
thought it better to proceed and boldly place them all in the report as our own.
We also added one recommendation for the longer term about global governance
and UN reform.

We benefited enormously from reactions and discussions with various members

of our core group—in planning the sessions, during the five conversations, and
then during a special sixth meeting at the end of the series to discuss a draft of
the current report—but responsibility for the following recommendations is
exclusively our own. Participants are identified at the end of the report because
we are obliged to them for having stimulated what follows, but they have not
signed off on individual items in this report. Discussions took place under Chatham
House rules, but we attempt to provide a flavor of the passionate conversations
that informed the recommendations.

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4.1 Intellectual Leadership Can Make a Difference

Participants were of one mind that the United Nations could and should provide
intellectual leadership about the fundamentally changed nature of crucial contem-
porary problems and their solutions, and seriously attempt to bridge the deepen-
ing gap between scientific knowledge and political decision-making. They also
were of one view that not all member states would necessarily welcome ideas that
did not coincide with conventional wisdom on the various issues under consid-
eration.

Ideas and concepts are Ideas and concepts are a main driving force in human progress and arguably one
a main driving force in of the most important contributions of the United Nations over the last six and a
human progress and half decades, according to the independent United Nations Intellectual History
arguably one of the most Project.6 During the seminar series, participants indicated a number of possible
important contributions ways that various UN secretariats could exploit their comparative advantage—
of the United Nations namely, universality and legitimacy—in analysis and advocacy. For instance, the
over the last six and a UN’s economic and social organizations and research units could:
half decades.
• identify and distinguish between the bad debt of the banking systems and
sovereign governmental debt, and advocate strategies that could address the
debt crisis internationally;
• project worldwide unemployment forecasts, and propose effective approaches
for dealing with it and its social and economic impacts;
• address pressing issues of climate change, energy, and environmental degrada-
tion in the context of the financial crisis;
• analyze possibilities for international taxation, including a currency tax as well
as options for a global currency fund as well as possible ways to assuage the
visceral negative reactions from major powers;
• advocate that more restricted forums (e.g., the G-20 and G-8) should include
issues not on their agenda and develop a new paradigm for development which
takes into account interrelated issues of financial, environmental, trade, energy,
and other international crises;
• identify those challenges best addressed at the regional level, and propose
possibilities for effective coordination between the UN, regional bodies, and
individual nation-states; and
• emphasize the increasing interconnectedness of today’s economic, social,
environmental and political problems and the urgency to act holistically on
them.

Nothing short of a However, nothing short of a quantum shift in thinking will suffice to institute sus-
quantum shift in thinking tainable global governance for the twenty-first century and beyond. The need for
will suffice to institute a dramatic change in strategic thinking echoed throughout the seminar series.
sustainable global The economic fundamentalism that has served as the ideological underpinning
governance for the for the management of world affairs clearly has proven to be lacking, and the
twenty-first century United Nations has the capacity to apply its multidisciplinary and multilateral
and beyond. research capacities to assess and plan more sustainable options for global govern-
ance. Intellectual leadership is desperately required to address the fundamen-
tally changed nature of contemporary problems and fill the gaps between scien-
tific knowledge and political decision-making.

14 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION
 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Repeated discussion throughout the seminars noted that traditional economic

thinking—which has been the basis for decision-making of governments, the
IMF, and the World Bank, as well as more exclusive groups like the G-8 and the
new G-20—is the dominant approach to economic and social management. This
doctrine is sometimes called, correctly or incorrectly, the “Washington Consensus,”
“market fundamentalism,” or the “economic philosophy of the rich.” It is not
necessary to deny positive results over the decades in order to point out that
recently this doctrine seems to have contributed to the ongoing financial and
economic crises with substantial negative impact on the poor, both in developed
and developing countries, causing inequality to grow across the planet.

Nowadays, the fate of the poor and the rich are linked. Another major theme of
the seminar series was the fact that the self-interest of the rich has to take the
well-being of the poor into account. Consequently, a deep change in economic
thinking would justify efforts to formulate a new theoretical basis for global gov-
ernance in the face of growing interdependence and a global emergency.

It was often mentioned that the UN’s multilateral and multidisciplinary thinking The United Nations
and research, at its best, is more balanced and comprehensive than that of the should play a critical role
prevailing economic doctrine of market fundamentalism. Different views—ranging in formulating alternative
from more regulation to larger concessional flows, from a new international ar- paths for developing
chitecture to an enhanced role for the United Nations—should become more vis- countries taking into
ible at the center of a new economic paradigm. From the start, it should take more account both lessons
adequately into account long-term environmental and social consequences of learned from previous
economic policies with legitimacy, universality, and equity as basic values. The economic policies and
United Nations should also play a critical role in formulating alternative paths for development efforts as
developing countries taking into account both lessons learned from previous eco- well as the precarious
nomic policies and development efforts as well as the precarious environmental environmental situation
situation of the planet. of the planet.

In many ways, all of our recommendations reflect the unfortunate gap between
rapidly evolving scientific knowledge and the use of the latest research, analysis,
and statistical data in political decision-making at the United Nations and else-
where. A new scientific paradigm for global governance should change the way
that research and analysis are used in decision-making, which is especially crucial
for responding sooner rather than later to the worldwide environmental emer-
gency already in its early stages.

A shift of this sort, however, will be ineffective if not complemented by an eco- The current crisis has
nomic paradigm shift as well. The current crisis has demonstrated the inadequa- demonstrated the
cy of the global economic architecture and highlighted the need for new ap- inadequacy of the global
proaches to ensuring the stability of developed and developing countries. Still, economic architecture
changing an economic paradigm usually takes a very long time. In the meantime, and highlighted the need
short-term steps—discussed in actionable recommendations below—could be for new approaches to
taken to promote a new multilateral and multidisciplinary approach to global ensuring the stability of
governance. The desperate need for a strategic reorientation underlies the recom- developed and developing
mendations for analysis and research that follow. countries.

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Recommendation 1:
Transforming Human Resources and Providing Finance for
UN Research

The United Nations should drastically improve its capacities to manage critical
global issues in a comprehensive and credible way and, in particular, to exploit its
often neglected comparative advantages in information gathering, conceptual
thinking, problem solving, and policy analysis. Making better use of its competitive
edge in producing and nurturing world-class thinkers and practitioners on critical
global issues requires not only dramatic changes in human resources policy but
also more appropriate financing.

Because research and ideas matter, the world organization should enhance its
ability to produce or nurture world-class public intellectuals, scholars, thinkers,
planners, and practitioners who could win Nobel and other such prizes. UN officials
are typically considered second-class citizens in comparison with the researchers,
thinkers, and practitioners from the international financial institutions (IFIs). This
notion partially reflects the resources devoted to research in these institutions as
well as their respective cultures, media attention, dissemination outlets and the
use of the research in decision making.

Some twenty-five Reality is often different. Nine persons with substantial experience within the UN
organizations, diplomats or and its policy discussions have won the Nobel Prize in economic sciences—Jan
statesmen associated with Tinbergen, Wassily Leontief, Gunnar Myrdal, James Meade, W. Arthur Lewis,
the United Nations have Theodore W. Schultz, Lawrence R. Klein, Richard Stone, and Amartya Sen—
also won a Nobel Peace whereas only one from the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has done so. But even he
Prize. No other organization resigned from his post at the Bank in protest and is now deeply associated with
comes even close to being the United Nations in New York. And this list is in addition to individual Nobel
such a center of excellence, Peace Prize winners who worked for years as staff members of the United Nations:
a fact missed by many Ralph Bunche, Dag Hammarskjold, Kofi Annan, Mohammed ElBaradei, and Martti
politicians, the media, and Ahtisaari. In total, some twenty-five organizations, diplomats or statesmen associated
a global public looking with the United Nations have also won a Nobel Peace Prize. No other organization
for answers to global comes even close to being such a center of excellence, a fact missed by many politi-
predicaments. cians, the media, and a global public looking for answers to global predicaments.

In order to have ideas and the people who produce them taken more seriously
within the context of the forward planning to the UN,7 a number of priority steps
should be taken to improve the world organization’s research, analytical, and
policy work that would permit the Secretary-General and the system as a whole
to play more important roles in world political, economic, social, and environmen-
tal decision making. To this effect, the world organization should revamp its human
resource policies and do the following:

• use borrowing and other staff exchanges from universities and think tanks for
original and synthetic research;
• create space within the UN system for truly independent research and ana-
lysis;
• increase interaction and exchange programs between the analytical staff of the
Bretton Woods institutions and the UN economic and social departments and
offices;

16 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION
 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

• ensure more effective outreach and media promotion activities so that the
economic and social research produced by the UN is held in greater esteem and
has more impact on the decisions of economic and finance ministers around
the world; and
• transform recruitment, appointment, promotion, and organization of respon-
sibilities as an integral part of a new human resources strategy to exert intel-
lectual leadership.

To be sure, the UN’s specialized agencies and related organizations have played
a prominent role in advancing new ideas and forward-looking approaches to
tackling global challenges. One need look no further than the UN Development
Programme’s annual Human Development Report to understand the potential of
agency-based intellectual output. Under the leadership of Mahbub ul Haq, the
UNDP began to issue these annual reports in 1990 that document the progress of
human-based development across the globe, thereby upending conventional
approaches which exclusively stressed GDP per capita. While the data and methods
of the Human Development Report are certainly open to criticism and refinement,
the UNDP has succeeded in generating and disseminating powerful, original
ideas that have changed the way governments formulate development policies,
carry them out, and measure results.

Despite this rich tradition of contributions from various UN agencies and organi-
zations, the full potential of the system’s capacity for research and analysis has
scarcely been tapped. Cross-agency collaboration is too rare; research staff in Despite this rich tradition
different parts of the world organization seldom venture beyond the walls of their of contributions from
departmental silos. Regular, mandatory gatherings for sharing research and various UN agencies and
ideas would reduce this institutional parochialism by bringing together repre- organizations, the full
sentatives from across the UN system. An inter-agency research council—com- potential of the system’s
prising lead analysts from each agency and meeting twice a year, and discussed capacity for research and
more in depth in recommendation #4—would greatly expand opportunities for analysis has scarcely been
information-sharing and collaboration, and reduce the chances of redundancy tapped.
and the pursuit of different projects at cross-purposes.

The UN should seek as many alliances as possible with centers of expertise and
excellence—in academia, think tanks, government policy units, and corporate
research centers. The UN is a prominent location for dialogue and for knitting
countries together, and so it should also be a place to network outstanding think-
ing. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was backed by a
research secretariat, a model for independent staff loosely affiliated with the UN
that should become a permanent feature of the organization but with frequent and
regular turnover in personnel. Kofi Annan also started a more systematic dialogue
with UN research organizations, outside scholars, and think tanks; and Ban Ki-moon
has continued to reach out to them. The results of this networking should be shared
to stimulate both research and its application in decision-making.

Human resources policy should also do more to foster an atmosphere that encour-
ages creative thinking, penetrating analysis, and policy-focused research of a high
intellectual and critical caliber. Improving the quality of staff members is essential,
which will depend on improvements and better professional procedures in recruit-
ment, appointment, promotion, and organization of responsibilities. Some progress

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has been made, such as the establishment of a system of national competitive

examinations for entry-level recruitment as well as internship and junior profes-
sional officer programs.8 But there could also be a continual infusion of young or
senior scholars for fixed periods to the United Nations. This could be brought
about through lending personnel or other exchange procedures from the univer-
sities and think tanks around the world, and not just those from the West. This
would benefit not only the UN while these visitors were in residence but also the
future research agendas of the scholars thereafter.

In addition to changing human resources policies, it is also essential for donors

to provide more financing with longer duration and more flexibility if research
and ideas are to matter. To state the totally obvious: whenever the world body
pursues a bold and forward-looking agenda, it is unable to please all 192 member
Calling into question states all of the time. Calling into question conventional or politically correct wis-
conventional or politically dom requires longer-term funding that should be taken into account by donors in
correct wisdom requires the next UN reform and before. The terms on which such financing is provided are
longer-term funding that of crucial importance, not only to ensure availability but sustained multi-year com-
should be taken into mitments without strings. The encouragement of free thinking and exploration of
account by donors in the ideas and approaches are vital but not cheap. It is thus a prerequisite that donors
next UN reform and ensure adequate funding for research and analysis, with no strings attached, ideally
before. through assessed contributions but more likely through voluntary funding.

Without such availability, messages typically are watered down to satisfy the low-
est common intergovernmental denominator. However, the example of the Human
Development Report provides optimism in that the process since 1990 suggests
that independent teams can be liberated from the need to check analyses before
publication with boards or donors. Given the UN’s current culture, this may well
require what participants described as “safety zones” within the system’s organ-
izations—where serious and independent analysis can take place not only away
from daily tasks but also without fearing the loss of income or publication because
one or more governments are irked. The tolerance for controversy should be far
higher; academic freedom should not be an alien concept for researchers within
a twenty-first century UN Secretariat.

An important institutional With better personnel and financing, the UN’s intellectual agenda would still need
challenge is rethinking to be designed for impact. Basic research is best done in universities, but many
and improving professional elements of applied research can and should be undertaken within the United
relations between the Nations. An important institutional challenge is rethinking and improving profes-
United Nations and IFIs in sional relations between the United Nations and IFIs in order to encourage a
order to encourage a better exchange of ideas and experiences and a less skewed allocation of interna-
better exchange of ideas tional resources toward the latter.
and experiences and a less
skewed allocation of Production of new ideas is one task, but the distribution and dissemination of key
international resources UN reports to academics, policy analysts, and the media are also crucial. Outreach,
toward the latter. including translation and subsidies for high-visibility reports, has at times been
very impressive. Still, too many quality analyses languish on book shelves or in
filing cabinets. Discussion should not only be in intergovernmental settings at
headquarters but also in capitals with governments, and among such diverse
constituencies as NGOs, business, the media, and civil society. This too has finan-
cial implications—if UN ideas are worthwhile, they should be widely circulated
and discussed in all working languages.

18 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION
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Recommendation 2:
Policy Leadership by the Secretary-General during Crises

For the ongoing global economic and financial crisis as well as for other potential
major emergencies, the Secretary-General should appoint a world-class thinker on
economic and financial issues as part of his inner circle. He should also have the
capacity to recruit a similar adviser on short notice for other emergencies (such as
a nuclear disaster or new pandemic) that require immediate global responses.

Notwithstanding the possible pitfalls of an overcrowded 38th floor—the Office of Notwithstanding the
the Secretary-General (OSG) in UN parlance—having expert advisers at the ready possible pitfalls of an
would bolster the UN head’s capacity for robust leadership in times of crisis. Far overcrowded 38th floor
from being a humble servant who does only what he or she is told, the Secretary- having expert advisers
General possesses significant power to offer direction in matters of policy and at the ready would bolster
emergency response. Kofi Annan demonstrated this when he challenged member the UN head’s capacity
states to reconcile the “two concepts of sovereignty” and then drew upon the for robust leadership in
entrepreneurial power of his office to promote the adoption of the responsibility times of crisis.
to protect at the 2005 World Summit.9 Although the traditional role of the Secre-
tary-General is in political negotiations and good offices, he or she need not be
confined to traditional peace and security concerns but should instead expand the
purview of his or her office to issues of finance and economics, energy and the
environment.

Under-Secretaries-General are on hand to advise the Secretary-General. But these

officials are political appointments and normally are not intellectual authorities
with publication records and reputations in their areas of responsibility. During
a major crisis that requires quick action, using them as a sole source of advice
can detract from ongoing work and exacerbate internal rivalries, and deploying
them does not enhance the credibility of the Secretary-General.

To his credit, Ban Ki-moon has sought to expand traditional practices by making To his credit, Ban Ki-moon
one of his priorities successful climate change negotiations. To this effect he has has sought to expand
created a special support team in his office with experienced staff. Both Kofi An- traditional practices
nan and Ban Ki-moon have also relied on visible US political scientists as Assist- by making one of his
ant Secretaries-General in the OSG to give advice on various new initiatives and priorities successful
specialized concerns (such as terrorism, relations with the private sector, UN climate change negotiations.
reforms, and overall strategic planning and coordination). This successful practice
is fine as an example but is inadequate for pooling advice needed in today’s com-
plicated world. Another relevant initiative that might serve as a model for a
transformed 38th floor is the Millennium Project, a specialized team headed by
Jeffrey Sachs.10 The series of reports issued in its name in the lead-up to the 2005
World Summit led to widespread discussion, if not results.

Some participants noted that the current Secretary-General has been largely ab-
sent amidst the ongoing financial and economic meltdown, an impression rein-
forced by the almost total lack of media attention irrespective of whether or not
he had been active behind the scenes. The General Assembly President assumed
a prominent role by creating a Commission of Experts in October 2008 on reform-
ing the international economic and financial system and convening the UN Confer-
ence on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development
in New York on 24-26 June 2009. But illustrating the formidable challenges to

OCCASIONAL PAPER N° 45 19
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becoming credible actors in world’s economic and financial matters that are faced
by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, the gathering
did not attract more than a handful of leaders and virtually no media attention.

The Secretary-General’s The Secretary-General’s moral authority affords an ideal platform—often called
moral authority affords an the “bully pulpit”—to highlight the plight of poor and rich countries, as well as to
ideal platform to highlight point to the obvious need for more international collaboration, and the dangers
the plight of poor and of basing solutions on the market fundamentalism of previous decades. Even the
rich countries, as well as few participants who argued that he had made an effort to issue public statements
to point to the obvious were unable to claim that this work was visible in the media. An active and con-
need for more international structive presence in addressing the interrelated problems of any international
collaboration, and the crisis affecting humankind is vital due to Secretary-General’s unique stature and
dangers of basing recognized legitimacy; and it would improve the UN’s public image as well. The
solutions on market UN can ill afford any absence by the Secretary-General and his or her visibility in
fundamentalism. any major future crises.

Being an active world leader in major financial and economic crises is an unu-
sual requirement placed on the shoulders of any Secretary-General. As an expe-
rienced diplomat and foreign policy practitioner, Ban Ki-moon’s experience is in
high politics. Currently he is without an experienced senior adviser in his own
office for advice on the crisis. The Under-Secretaries-General on economic and
related matters are not appropriate sources for continuous advice; they do not
ordinarily have the appropriate expertise and background in managing research,
and moreover they have their own departments or organizations to administer.
The adviser therefore should have world-class credibility in financial matters and
would preferably be a full-time staff member in the Secretary-General’s inner
circle, ready for day-to-day consultations along the lines of Lawrence Summers
in US President Barack Obama’s White House.

The times require that the The times require that the Secretary-General respond to any global crisis. The
Secretary-General respond welfare of the planet may hang in the balance. The OSG’s analytical capacity should
to any global crisis. The also be markedly improved to manage the interconnected global emergencies
welfare of the planet may facing the planet as elaborated in the recommendation that follows.
hang in the balance.

Recommendation 3:
Establishing Independent Analytical Capacity

The United Nations should have available an independent institution capable of

pulling together and synthesizing the host of relevant research and analysis being
produced by universities and think-tanks on global issues and of undertaking its
own focused research on complicated risk scenarios of the future.

Improving the capacity of the Secretary-General and the UN system for high-
quality research, scenario-building, analysis, and ability to draw lessons from past
successes and mistakes was a repeated theme. There are basically two options:
develop this capacity either inside or completely outside the world organization.
The latter was the clear preference of a large number of participants who argued
that due to previous unsuccessful experiences with attempting to pull together an
in-house capacity, creating an external capacity might be more fruitful.

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The first effort to create such a unit inside the UN was likely Javier Pérez de
Cuéllar’s decision to establish the Office for Research and the Collection of Infor-
mation (ORCI) in 1988. ORCI reported directly to the Secretary-General, and
senior UN officials with inside experience were appointed to head it. Monitoring
global trends was also included in the mandate of the office although efforts
mainly revolved more around speech-writing than research. But Boutros Boutros-
Ghali abolished the office in 1992. In the mid-1990s, Kofi Annan created the
Strategic Planning Unit in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, and
other similar units were also established elsewhere in the system. Planning units
do not, however, conduct research but are tasked largely with tackling practical
policy and management issues, and like their predecessors drafting reports and
speeches.

Outside the Secretariat proper, but supposedly with close links, was the 1965
establishment of the UN Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR). The origins
of the idea to create a RAND-type think tank for the Secretary-General originated
within the US State Department.11 The purpose was to create a world-class research
organization in New York to assist the Secretary-General. Selecting the head was
politicized by the General Assembly and consequently UNITAR never attained
the status planned nor received acknowledgement among the academic world. It
has recently concentrated on training activities although the “R” remains in its
acronym.

In addition, governments created the United Nations University (UNU) in Tokyo

in 1969, which now has some sixteen research institutions around the world.12
A few have contributed to research that is cited by academics worldwide—the
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) comes immedi-
ately to mind—and a handful of commissioned edited volumes or authored ones
by staff have also been widely reviewed. However, part of UNU’s problem is—
besides dependency on government funding from a small number of countries
and the bureaucratic procedures constraining all UN organizations—the distance
between its research institutions and the Secretary-General’s office. That said, the
UNU Office in New York has sought to disseminate core publications.

Improving the UN Secretariat’s research and planning capacity has also occasion-
ally been proposed by high-level bodies or member states themselves but without
notable success. For instance, the so-called Brahimi Panel proposed in 2000 that
information and news gathering and political analysis and strategic planning
should be consolidated to one entity, the Information and Strategic Analysis
Secretariat for the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (EISAS).13 Simi- Although the UN has some
larly, General Assembly resolution 57/26 of November 2002 urged “the strength- early warning and analysis
ening of cooperative mechanism for information-sharing, planning and the devel- capacity scattered among
opment of preventive measures… [and] the development of a comprehensive plan different organizations
for a revived early warning and prevention system for the United Nations.” and departments, the
Secretary-General has not
The High–level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change went further in its 2004 been able to establish a
report, but again nothing happened. It noted that prevention requires early warn- properly-resourced unit
ing and analysis that is based on objective and integrated research. Although the able to integrate inputs
UN has some early warning and analysis capacity scattered among different from these offices.

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organizations and departments the panel recognized that the Secretary-General

has not been able to establish a properly-resourced unit able to integrate inputs
from these offices for early-warning reports and strategic options for purposes of
decision-making. The panel then recommended that the best option for creating
a coherent capacity for developing strategic options is to strengthen the OSG
through the creation of the Deputy-Secretary-General for Peace and Security.14

The Secretary-General as The Secretary-General—in order to be responsive under Charter Article 99—as
well as other senior well as other senior officials in the UN system need an objective research and an
officials in the UN system analytical entity able to quickly mobilize the best scientific and analytical advice
need an objective research on global problems and their interconnections. This body’s research agenda would
and an analytical entity adhere closely to the evolving needs of the Secretary-General, but it should conduct
able to quickly mobilize its investigations and analyses from a distance. Among the requisite functions
the best scientific and would be to:
analytical advice on
global problems and • give confidential advise to the UN Secretary-General on a regular basis and
their interconnections. undertake research or organize discreet brainstorming sessions upon his or
her request;
• prepare scenarios of interconnected world trends and how the Secretary-
General should be prepared to show leadership in various situations of sudden
challenge. As a recent model of this practice in one UN agency, global modeling
groups prepared alternative scenarios on selected world trends for UN Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), which published them in its fourth Global Environ-
ment Outlook in 200715; and
• prepare public reports, with the help of outside research communities world-
wide, on global trends, threats, and solutions.

Participants benefitted from a presentation about the operation of a similar capac-

ity within the US government. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) and its
long-range, strategic research staff confidentially advise the US president and
other high-level governmental officials on sensitive national security matters. But
they also produce public assessment reports, which are supposed to provoke wide
debates, change the framework and parameters of currents policies, and influence
the perception of US policy priorities. A recent and visible publication was Global
Trends 2025,16 whose findings generated wide discussion not only in the United
States but also worldwide.

NIC staff members are not political appointments but experts, substantially in-
creasing the credibility of their research and findings. Most participants in the
seminar series thought that any new independent capacity for research and
analysis to benefit the Secretary-General should follow similar appointment prac-
tices in order to avoid the politicization of findings.

Establishing such a capacity inside the UN system would not be desirable. Funding
from the General Assembly—with its inevitable demands for oversight and politicized
appointments—would compromise independence and quality. For an entity outside
the UN, the funding should probably come from a number of governments, foun-
dations, the private sector, and individuals but, importantly, without strings attached.
Some examples of similar arrangements that have worked well in the past—
although more restricted in scope—are described below.

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The International Peace Institute (IPI) exists independently from the UN system
but has attained semi-UN status with close cooperative arrangements with the
Secretary-General and UN departments in the areas of international peace and
security. Its location is across First Avenue from the UN, and Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon is honorary chair of the board. Established in 1970, the board and
international advisory council each consists of respected individuals from a wide
variety of backgrounds. Seventy percent of its funding comes from governments,
20 percent from foundations, and the rest from corporations and individuals.17
One of the chief pillars supporting IPI’s work is its convening role, organizing a
series of gatherings each year to promote strategic responses and policy proposals
for issues related to peace and security. These meetings bring together preeminent
scholars, policy advisors, and members of the private sector and civil society.

The Security Council Report (SCR) is a relatively new but authoritative, not-for-
profit research organization, which is tasked with filling the void of high-quality,
publically available information on Security Council activity. Such a “watch dog”
provides another relevant model. SCR too receives a mix of funding from member
states and private foundations, and its timely and objective analysis is read by UN
officials and relied upon by governments, especially those of smaller states.18

Another example outside the UN system is the New York-based Conflict Prevention
and Peace Forum of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). It convenes meet-
ings and undertakes studies exclusively at the request of the United Nations. Its
Advisory Board consists of UN staff and academics; and its funding comes from
governments, foundations, and other institutions.19

In the area of groundbreaking cooperation between the private sector, academic

institutions, NGOs, and governments, the World Economic Summit has instituted
a global risks network and publishes various annual and other publications.20 But
it does not cooperate explicitly with the United Nations despite the fact that the
Secretary-General often attends the yearly summits.

These examples are listed to indicate not only that independent convening and No independent research
research efforts are feasible, but they also highlight that no independent research institution currently is
and analytical institution currently is available to understand and deal with the available to understand
totality of interconnected world problems and to work closely with the Secretary- the totality of intercon-
General and other UN entities. And yet the global interrelatedness of political, nected world problems
economic, social, environmental, and other trends—and the dangers their syner- and to work closely with
gistic impacts create as discussed in the seminar series—is key to the world or- the Secretary-General and
ganization’s work. other UN entities. And yet
the global interrelatedness
If the independent capacity for research and analysis is instituted outside the UN of political, economic,
system, it should work in close cooperation with the Office of the Secretary- social, environmental, and
General and also serve other world leaders and organizations such as G-8, G-20, other trends is key to the
the Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77, regional organizations, the World world organization’s work.
Economic Summit, and the World Social Summit. Time will tell how ambitious the
exercise could be. The initial step would be a feasibility study discussing, among
other things, various ways to make the entity acceptable and fundable and propos-
ing whether or not it should be one organization or a network of organizations
with a secretariat and with special links to the Secretary-General.

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4.2 Structural Integration Can Make a Difference

Participants pointed to the clear need to take full advantage of capacities dispersed
within the UN system as well as to think more concretely about relations with
other intergovernmental bodies. Getting more from existing resources inside the
system, and establishing work programs based on comparative advantages
between universal and regional organizations are therefore essential.

Recommendation 4:
Making Better Use of the UN System’s Policy Planning and Research
Capacities

The Secretary-General and the UN system as a whole should build on the potential
of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) to respond quickly
with new policies in future global crises.

The interconnected nature of today’s global challenges examined in the seminar

series often led, not surprisingly, to suggestions for coordinated responses by a
more coherent UN system. Many also pointed to numerous solid policy, research
and analytical capacities across the system that remain too frequently in institu-
tional silos rather than more widely available.

The Chief Executives The Chief Executives Board for Coordination was identified by some participants
Board for Coordination as a potential mechanism for bringing about better coherence, unity of purpose,
was identified as a and concerted action by the specialized agencies and other bodies that comprise
potential mechanism the UN system. Under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General but with the
for bringing about better presence of the heads of the Bretton Woods institutions and other agency heads,
coherence, unity of the CEB has an unrealized potential for global policy leadership during crises.
purpose, and concerted
action by the specialized Eyes glaze over at the thought of UN “coordination,” but the topic was inevitable
agencies and other bodies at the seminars as it is elsewhere. Discussion throughout the sessions high-
that comprise the UN lighted the following problems—as well as opportunities—regarding the manage-
system. ment of global emergencies in the present system:

• The actual heads of agencies that comprise the CEB meet under the chairman-
ship of the Secretary-General once every six months. The main inter-agency
committees that report to the CEB also meet a few times a year, although work-
ing groups or special task forces under them may meet more often. The CEB
mechanism has been planned around the need for UN system-wide information
exchange and knowledge sharing, harmonization of long-term policies and
practices, and personal familiarization of staff around the system. But cer-
tainly it is not a response mechanism for rapidly evolving global crises. A recent
review21 of the CEB finds that it gives prominence to the identification of emerging
issues of system-wide concern, yet there have been no plans for major adjustments
in existing mechanisms and procedures to implement conclusions.
• Key policy and operational issues are not necessarily brought before or discussed
in a decision-making sense in the CEB. An example was the formulation of the
policy and operational decisions during the 2008-2009 economic and financial
crisis. The CEB discussed it in broad terms, and press statements were issued;
but key concerns were not brought to the CEB in advance for input and coor-
dination by the IMF or the World Bank. Clearly the CEB is not perceived to have

24 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION
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a credible crisis-management capacity. Yet the repercussions of decisions

taken by both have a major impact on the work of the entire UN system. The
possible leverage from a coherent system-wide response and leadership was
absent during the crisis.
• The Secretary-General’s leadership is hardly a foregone conclusion on many
issues because many heads of even UN bodies are not appointed by him and
have their own governing bodies and constituencies.

The CEB has an unrealized potential to respond to major and linked global crises To operationalize this
by bringing the weight of the entire UN system to bear on problems. It could potential, the Secretary-
prompt data collection and early warning; develop quick and well-thought-through General could have two
responses; and implement decisions consistently and efficiently. To operationalize cabinets during a crisis:
this potential, the Secretary-General could have two cabinets during a crisis: one one with his or her
with his or her Under-Secretaries-General and another with UN agency heads. Under-Secretaries-General
But at the moment, the CEB’s structures and practices are too heavy and slow for and another with UN
this kind of crisis management, and the Secretary-General does not seem inclined agency heads.
to use the machinery to that effect.

The shortcomings of the current arrangement might be remedied in part through

a structural renovation that would assign responsibility for the CEB to the Deputy
Secretary-General. The January 1998 General Assembly resolution 52/12B sought
explicitly to ensure systemic coherence. The CEB could help meet this objective
and its mandate to “support the Secretary-General in elevating the profile and
leadership of the United Nations in the economic and social spheres, including
further efforts to strengthen the United Nations as a leading centre for develop-
ment policy and development assistance.”

An overhaul of this sort would benefit significantly from the creation of an inter-
agency research council comprising members from the various research depart-
ments throughout the UN system. Regularly convened gatherings would provide
opportunities for departmental researchers to share information, coordinate
agendas where appropriate, identify areas of overlap, and enhance the standing
of the CEB. Particularly important to this endeavor would be participation by such
groups as the United Nations University and the United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development (UNRISD) whose comparative advantage should be produc-
ing independent, multidisciplinary research and disseminating critical analysis
for policy consideration. Kofi Annan started a tradition, together with UN Office
in Geneva and UNU, to have regular meetings of planning and research units of
the UN system. An interagency research council could build upon these efforts
and similar initiatives taken by Ban Ki-moon.

Although the CEB system is at present inadequate for complex crisis management,
some participants argued that it usually works well in planning and implementing
long-range changes in the UN system when there is enough time to make detailed
preparations and conduct elaborate inter-agency consultations. Participants wel-
comed the increasing emphasis on delivery at the regional and country levels,
notably through UN country teams. Steps towards harmonization of business
practices of the various UN entities involved was expected to make practical
cooperation and delivery on the ground less complex in terms of budgeting,
funding disbursement and human resources management, among other areas.

OCCASIONAL PAPER N° 45 25
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Participants also noted that the coordination of secretariats across the UN system
could not replace the need for coherence in the decisions made, mandates issued,
and resources provided by the various intergovernmental organs of the system.
Member states are not monolithic, and so their positions often are internally in-
consistent as well as across the system’s various forums. Such issues as climate
change, therefore, are difficult to address meaningfully in all aspects—from envi-
ronmental, agricultural, and health-related dimensions, to developmental, finan-
cial, humanitarian elements. The CEB and secretariats of the UN system should
more assertively bring such inconsistencies publicly to the attention of member
states.

Recommendation 5:
A Better Division of Labor among Multilateral Organizations

An independent international commission should be established to analyze by

region, by topic, and by time frame the possible and desirable range of activities
that should be undertaken either by the United Nations or by regional, sub-
regional, or other intergovernmental groupings of states, or by a combination.

In addition to improving analytical capacities and improving collaboration inside

the UN system, participants in the seminar series often broached the essential
principle of a better division of intergovernmental labor outside the UN system.
As is customary, the mention of “subsidiarity” within the context of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter was on the table, but this concept is as easy to support as it is
tough to implement. As in other gatherings, participants were not able to go far
beyond the agreement that it was urgent to establish a working division of labor
between the world organization and regional bodies for attacking issues most
suitable to their capabilities and expertise. In light of the variable capacities of
particular institutions—past and current if not necessarily future—it is essential
to move beyond facile generalizations to specifics.

While it is clear that While it is clear that solutions for many of the problems discussed at the seminar
solutions for many require worldwide cooperation (e.g., halting climate change or pandemics), aspects
problems require world- of that cooperation (e.g., information gathering and monitoring) may best be ac-
wide cooperation, aspects complished at lesser levels. Furthermore, some problems may best be addressed
of that cooperation may below the UN’s universal level (e.g., insecurity resulting from food shortages, mass
best be accomplished at migrations prompted by environmental degradation).22 Moreover, institutional and
lesser levels. financial capacities of regional or functional bodies vary enormously, making
cooperation not only complicated but also having quite different feasibilities for
different problems and time horizons.

An essential part of the puzzle would be to evaluate recent experiences between

the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organizations. For instance,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali—who had written his doctoral dissertation on regional
organizations—started a new practice in 1994 of conducting regular high-level
meetings with heads of regional and other international organizations. Kofi Annan
continued and considerably deepened this tradition,23 but Ban Ki-moon has not
yet organized his first summit. Various models of cooperation have been tried
during the past fifteen years but with mixed results.

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One important tool in moving beyond conventional thinking about issues and One important tool in moving
institutions has been using independent commissions of experts, who are less beyond conventional thinking
subject to the usual and predictable constraints of intergovernmental diplomacy. has been using independent
In addition to NGOs, they represent some of the loudest and most challenging commissions of experts, who
voices in the Third UN. This type of expertise—combining knowledge with politi- are less subject to the usual
cal punch and access to decision makers—has been influential in formulating and and predictable constraints
nourishing ideas. Commissioners speak in their individual capacities and can of intergovernmental
move beyond what passes for received wisdom in governments and secretariats. diplomacy.
Visible individuals, who made careers as senior governmental or intergovern-
mental or nongovernmental officials are subsequently—as independent and usually
prominent elders—sometimes willing to voice criticisms at higher decibel levels
and make more controversial but still perceptive recommendations than when
they occupied official positions.

The reports are normally presented to the Secretary-General, who can point to
their multinational composition and multi-perspective consensus and thus use the
findings and recommendations more easily than ideas emanating from inside the
Secretariat. Research teams for these commissions and panels are often led by
academics and usually located “outside” the Secretariat and often temporarily in
their employment. The researchers play an important role not only by supporting
the commissioners’ deliberations with necessary documentation, but also by
providing an entry point for ideas that eventually get carried forward by the com-
missioners and the published panel reports.

Since the so-called Pearson Commission, headed by former Canadian Prime

Minster, Lester B. Pearson, issued its 1969 report, Partners in Development,24
numerous other such groups have been convened including most recently, as part
of the lead-up to the UN’s 60th anniversary, the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change and, as an element of the follow-up to the September 2005
World Summit, the High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the areas
of development, humanitarian aid, and the environment. In between were a host
of others, including commissions on development issues chaired by former Ger-
man Chancellor Willy Brandt (1980 and 1983); on common security by former
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme (1982); on the environment and development
by serving Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (1987); on human-
itarian problems by Iranian and Jordanian princes, Sadruddin Aga Khan and
Hassan bin Talal (1988); on South-South cooperation by serving Tanzanian
President Julius Nyerere (1990); on global governance by former Swedish Prime
Minister Ingvar Carlsson and the Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath
Ramphal (1995); on humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty by former
Australian Minister of External Affairs Gareth Evans and former Algerian Ambas-
sador to the UN Mohamed Sahnoun (2001); on human security by Sadako Ogata
and Amartya Sen (2003); and on civil society by former Brazilian President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (2004). There were also commissions recalled more
by their sponsors’ names rather than those of their chairs—for example, the first
report to the Club of Rome (1972) and the report of the Carnegie Commission on
preventing deadly conflict (1997).

Among the many commissions,25 a short list of the most influential ones in the
main working areas of the United Nations would include the World Commission

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on Environment and Development and the International Commission on Interven-

tion and State Sovereignty.26 Both led to conceptual advances that subsequently
changed not only the language of statecraft but also found their way into national
and international decisions as well as into the policies and programs of govern-
mental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations.

The establishment of The establishment of what could be called the “International Commission on the
what could be called the Division of Labor between the UN and Other Multilateral Organizations” would
“International Commission be an opportunity to catalyze debate about the preferred shape of an alternative
on the Division of Labor multilateral division of labor. The purview of the commission would include not
between the UN and just regional organizations but also agencies, clubs, forums such as the World
Other Multilateral Economic Forum, and sub-regional bodies for tasks to be tackled over the next
Organizations” would five to twenty-five years. The legitimacy and even the relevance of the G-8, and
be an opportunity to now increasingly the G-20+, as a financial manager of the world’s economic and
catalyze debate about the financial crisis and global governance generally, was an oft-repeated concern
preferred shape of an during discussions. At its thirty-fifth meeting in Italy in July 2009, the members
alternative multilateral of the restricted club found themselves joined by representatives of some forty
division of labor. countries representing about 90 percent of the world economy along with repre-
sentatives of several international organizations. When Chinese President Hu
Jintao left to deal with the upheaval in Xinxiang, a side-bar on the summit in the
New York Times did the confusing math, “G-8 + 5 +1 +5 -1.”27

This equation underlines that the need for such a commission is increasingly
obvious. In addition to the ad hoc sub-contracting by the Security Council to
various regional groups for international peace and security, the need for a better
division of labor is equally strong for economic and environmental affairs. Unlike
the work of many commissions that were formed to examine issues for which
there were few ready consumers, the proposed International Commission on the
Division of Labor between the UN and Other Multilateral Organizations would take
on issues for which there is a clear demand. The immediate impact is thus likely
to resemble the more successful past commissions on sustainable development
and the responsibility to protect.

The proposed international commission thus would be demand-driven and well

suited to offer nuts-and-bolts assessments that specifically delineate a division of
labor between the UN, regional organizations, and other appropriate agencies
and forums. A commission of the sort recommended here would identify which
regional organizations are best suited to tackle which problems and under which
conditions as well as when it is most appropriate to make use of the universal
United Nations. The result would be a blueprint for action of the UN and others.

4.3 Thinking Big

This final recommendation grows from the discussions at the seminar series, but
it goes further by building logically upon the clear disconnect between the nature
of the current challenges (that is, unparalleled and urgent) that virtually all par-
ticipants espoused versus the modest and mundane (that is, “realistic”) solutions
that seemed plausible to many of them individually or as a group. But the tone
and passion of the conversations in the seminars about contemporary related
crises leads us to put forward an idea that has been on the fringes of NGO activities
for years and should move closer to the mainstream in UN policy-making circles.

28 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION
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Recommedation 6:
Towards a Third Generation World Body

The international community of states, in partnership with the private sector and
civil society, should recognize the character of the deepening global emergency and
convene a second UN Conference on International Organization. A major overhaul
of the United Nations and its relations to its partners is required rather than con-
tinuing the unsatisfactory practice of more piecemeal UN reforms repeatedly but
unsuccessfully tried over several decades.

As existential threats to the survival of the planet continue building, it has become
clear that periodically repeated managerial and policy tinkering by successive
Secretaries-General and the General Assembly are inadequate to respond to the
interlinked challenges of today and tomorrow. The discussion of “UN reform” in
this seminar and others often reminded us of Albert Einstein’s widely reported
quip that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again with the expecta-
tion of a different result. Consequently, world leaders and members of the United
Nations should give more serious consideration to convening a contemporary
version of the Conference on International Organization that assembled in April
1945 in San Francisco. The challenges of the twenty-first century require thinking
big; moving to a third generation of international organizations is as desperately
needed as it is hard to imagine.28

The legal justification is found in UN Charter Article 109 providing for a review Charter Article 109 foresaw
conference, as well as numerous General Assembly resolutions asking the review a constitutional review of
to take place under “auspicious international conditions” and “at an appropriate the world organization
time.”29 Charter Article 109 foresaw a constitutional review of the world organiza- no later than 1955, but a
tion no later than 1955, but a two-thirds quorum in the General Assembly has two-thirds quorum in the
never been assembled to convene such a gathering. There were those who hoped General Assembly has never
that ten years would suffice to demonstrate that the UN was not up to the chal- been assembled to convene
lenges facing the international system. So it may seem hazardous now to assert such a gathering.
that we have reached a point that states will understand the need to return to the
drawing boards. But if not now, when? Only following a global ecological, health,
nuclear or financial catastrophe? Or worse still, a combination of these or other
major disasters, comparable to the disruption of World War II?

Virtually all the speakers in the seminar series called attention to the planet’s
precarious state on the issues that they were discussing, a sentiment shared by
many if not by the majority of participants. A “global emergency” seems to be the
most accurate way to describe the current and certainly the future condition of
what could be considered a “failing planet” or what one participant provoca-
tively called our “Third World planet.”

One former UN official recalled discussions when Secretary-General Boutros

Boutros-Ghali took office after the Cold War and compared the period to those
following the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. A conference of
world leaders was convened for every previous such historic moment in order to
design institutions for a changed world order. The result was an unprecedented
Heads of State and Government Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31
January 1992, which set the stage for the Secretary-General’s bold, at least for

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the world organization, formulations in June of An Agenda for Peace.30 But few
of the proposals were implemented; a “business as usual” mentality took hold
quickly after initial enthusiasm.

Business is no longer usual. But business is no longer usual. Several speakers and participants highlighted the
The contemporary period interconnected nature of various crises as well as their mutually reinforcing char-
appears qualitatively and acter that appears to be intensifying their global impact in unprecedented ways.
quantitatively distinct from The contemporary period appears qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from
other watershed moments other watershed moments in previous centuries. Participants referred to the Club
in previous centuries. of Rome’s Limits to Growth projections of 1972.31 After being dismissed at the
time of its publication as overblown, their projections currently seem broadly
accurate in describing the negative and compound effects of population and
industrial growth, resource depletion, pollution, and environmental degradation.
A 2008 study published by the national science agency of Australia found the
basic scenario of the 1972 projections quite close to today’s situation.32 The fun-
damental message of Limits to Growth was that humankind would enter a period
of drastic global disruptions between 2010 and 2030 with catastrophic effects if
governmental policies did not change. The three authors—Donella Meadows,
Dennis Meadows, and Jorgen Randers—published Limits to Growth: The 30-Year
Update33 in 2004 confirming that the basic thrust of their projections was still
valid. Their book, however, received nothing like the media coverage as the
original volume; in fact, it paled in comparison with that of Bjorn Lomborg’s
The Skeptical Environmentalist three years earlier.34

The Charter’s Preamble starts with the following declaration of purpose: “We the
peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war which in our lifetime has twice brought untold sorrow to man-
kind…have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these ends.” A solid
case could be made that two recent events—11 September 2001 and the eco-
nomic and financial crisis of 2008—have also caused untold sorrow and suffering,
particularly for the world’s poor. Consequent deaths through hunger, disease, and
violent conflict may in fact approach the horrors of two world wars, which gave
rise to the United Nations. Even still, had the 2001 and 2008 events not taken
place, higher economic growths rates would have meant a much higher pace of
global warming. Either way, the fact remains: our planet is in crisis.

UN reforms often take place like clock-work, every five to ten years, more often
than not propelled by the start of a newly-elected Secretary-General’s tenure—this
was the case, for instance, in 1992, 1997, and 2002, though not in 2007. They
have not, however, typically produced much change, and certainly not adequate
structural measures required to address the interconnected global problems fore-
seen and discussed in this seminar series.35 Some reforms have languished for
decades such as Security Council reform, which started in earnest for the second
time in 1994 (four additional non-permanent members were added in 1965) with
no outcome in sight. Financial crises of the UN are also a periodic phenomenon,
and General Assembly working groups and committees have tried to find a
longer-lasting solution without success.

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 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

At the same time, a clear disconnect exists between the world body and the A clear disconnect exists
international financial institutions underpinning the global economic order. between the world body
The Washington Consensus usually refers to economic policies advocated in and the international
general by “official” Washington—mainly the IMF, the World Bank and the US financial institutions
Treasury. 36 Many argue that there is in fact little consensus and certainly as much underpinning the global
confusion as accord. Moreover, some fundamental issues like the unbalanced economic order.
influence and power relationship among the IFIs, ECOSOC, and the General
Assembly—or more broadly between the Washington-based financial institutions
and the UN proper—had not been discussed in any institutionalized format until
the General Assembly president established a Commission of Experts, chaired by
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, on the reforms of the international monetary and
financial systems in October 2008.37 The distance and division between the
analyses in Washington and New York and the respective decision-making between
the IFIs and the UN were one of the main themes running throughout our sessions
as well.

Among the calls to solve the financial crisis of the UN once and for all through a
“grand bargain” was the 2004 report from the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change.38 But efforts to link trade, aid, finance, and the environ-
ment with international peace and security (more specifically new permanent and
non-permanent members to the Security Council) have failed, most recently in the
September 2005 World Summit.39 The perceived stakes have not been high
enough.

Our proposal, using Charter Article 109 to convene a world conference on inter- But tinkering with the
national organization, goes further than any grand bargaining so far proposed or system once again may
attempted. Its implementation is not without risks. Stephen Schlesinger eloquent- satisfy no one and could
ly relates how difficult the 1945 negotiations were and how close they came to leave the United Nations
breaking down.40 Even the ratification process for Charter amendments is difficult largely irrelevant or un-
enough that only three have taken place in six-and-a-half decades. But tinkering able to respond effectively
with the system once again may satisfy no one and could leave the United Nations to looming major global
largely irrelevant or unable to respond effectively to looming major global crises. crises. Treading water is
Treading water is not a solution if the tide is taking the UN out to sea. not a solution if the tide is
taking the UN out to sea.
A major problem of the United Nations are its slow and tentative responses to
early warning and new scientific research findings which are changing very rap-
idly in an interconnected world.41 UN-sponsored governmental negotiations and
the gathering of evidence of accelerating climate change by the scientific com-
munity often resemble “two different boats passing each other by,” according to
one presenter. But the UN and scientific communities must be close to being on
the same page; wise intergovernmental action in a global emergency should be
based on science, and not on the politics of what is deemed desirable.

Many participants viewed the UN’s Nobel-winning Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) as a possible model for a better scientific basis for the work
of the world organization. But that too is not without problems, as assessments
of the IPCC—official baselines for negotiations—are three to four years old. Nego-
tiations are, therefore, based on outdated scientific information as new data is
constantly being generated. But an even deeper difficulty is that often even solid

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Unfortunately major scientific evidence of a likely catastrophe is not enough to move politicians. How-
governments and ever, when governments see existential threats as a result of drastic threats—9/11
international organizations and the 2008 economic and financial crisis come to mind—no cost seems too high
tend to wait until major and the usually elusive political will not only present but mobilized quickly.
disruptions are already
evident and only then It was thought by many participants that the Secretary-General in particular should
scramble together an wake up the world’s citizenry to the upcoming major dangers of the future for
ad hoc response as they which mankind is not yet prepared. U Thant sounded such an alarm forty years
did in the financial crisis ago, a call featured prominently in the introduction to Limits to Growth.42 Unfor-
of 2008–2009. tunately, however, major governments and international organizations tend to
wait until major disruptions are already evident and only then scramble together
an ad hoc response as they did in the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The disap-
pointing results of the summits and in June 2009 of the UN Conference of the
World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development are only the
latest illustrations.

Ideas that seem Ideas that seem outlandish yesterday often become part of tomorrow’s mainstream.
outlandish yesterday Based on the content and tenor of discussions during this seminar series, the
often become part of agenda for a review conference could include:
tomorrow’s mainstream.
• Establishing a new and more powerful, ministerial-level, economic and social
council, entirely distinct from ECOSOC, with an enhanced relationship with the
Bretton Woods institutions and political status and operational power like the
Security Council’s. Such an upgrading could diminish the wish of more countries
to join the Security Council as permanent members, as joining the new council
could be as, or perhaps even more, important.43 The transformation of the feeble
Human Rights Council into an effective third and powerful council should also
be on the agenda.
• Reviewing the principal organs—including the functioning and structure of the
Security Council, the purpose of the Trusteeship Council, and the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
• Finding solutions for alternative funding for the United Nations in the face of
the increasing volume of voluntary, pick-and-choose contributions.
• Reviewing the coordination mechanisms, including substantial consolidation,
between the UN and its organs, agencies, funds, and programs as well as the
between the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organizations and
groupings—such as the G-8 and G-20—as well as academia, think tanks, and
civil society.
• Changing the appointment processes and the mandates for the UN Secretary-
General, deputy, and heads of other UN organizations and specialized agen-
cies.
• Improving mechanisms that bring objective, scientific knowledge to guide the
work of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions.

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Annex 1:

Summary of

“The Global Financial System after Meltdown—Roles for the

United Nations in a New Financial Architecture?”

February 23, 2009

Presenters:
James K. Galbraith
Professor of Economics, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas
José Antonio Ocampo
Director, Programme in Economic and Political Development,
Columbia University, Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Setting the Stage

With the world economy teetering on the brink of collapse at the start of 2009 and
waiting for an absolutely necessary reform of the global financial system, neither
the United Nations nor the Bretton Woods institutions were initially prominent.
As they are currently organized, neither is equipped, able, or willing to take
initiatives and catalyze necessary and sometimes even drastic action. This session
explored possible roles for the United Nations in a reconfigured international
economic architecture. A host of proposals surfaced during the discussion, and a
number of key themes emerged.

Breaking the Mold of Pre-crisis Thinking

Perhaps the most significant roadblock to progress in dealing with the current
economic and financial crisis continues to be the belief—on the part of economists,
think tanks, and governments—that things will soon return to normal. A funda-
mental task, one the UN system could usefully undertake, is that of breaking the
mold of pre-crisis thinking. Up to now, policymakers have fallen into the trap of
using the crisis to advance formulas for recovery that may have been useful in the
past, but which are no longer relevant or helpful. At the same time, the severity
of the crisis, which is not fully recognized, will force the world to ultimately rethink
the international financial and economic structure. The UN and its associated
agencies could use their universal legitimacy to sound a wake-up call to the world,
that we are experiencing a sever crisis of extended duration, and promote the
notion that “business-as-usual” band-aids will no longer suffice.

Pressing the Advantage

The UN should draw on its comparative advantages in universal membership and
legitimacy to take a more active role in reacting to economic crises. The world
body’s unique representative character as center of the multilateral universe is its
strongest asset. Yet recent years have witnessed powerful states turn to alter-
native, exclusive bodies like the Group of 8 and the newer Group of 20 to coordi-
nate economic decision making. Such a development is an inappropriate response
to the challenges at hand. All countries will have to have a say in the world’s
management of the crisis.

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Filling Gaps
One way to promote confidence in the world body as a robust source for the
coordination of economic decision making is for the UN to fill gaps left by groups
and regional organizations. While these organizations tend to tackle macroeco-
nomic policy and monetary issues, there are numerous areas that are weakly
represented or entirely absent from their agendas. At the same time, they are
often the issues that could push the frontiers of debate in coming years. The UN’s
comparative advantage in membership and legitimacy could be meaningfully
employed to discuss issues such as an international debt resolution mechanism
and international taxation that are not be debated in any other forum.

Asserting Leadership
If the United Nations is to position itself to manage critical issues related to the
ongoing financial and economic crisis, the Secretary-General should lead the
charge. Until recently, however, some participants thought that he has been
largely absent, and his public presence is still unremarkable. The Secretary-
General possesses tremendous potential to take an active role as a representative
of both poor and rich nations, improve the world body’s public image as a con-
structive force in addressing the crisis, and raise issues and foster negotiations
on critical topics in need of redress.

Tightening Family Bonds

In order to press its comparative advantages, the UN will also have to draw on
the vast resources of the entire galaxy of its agencies and affiliated institutions.
The Bretton Woods institutional family is particularly important in this regard,
but the relationship between the United Nations and the Washington-based finan-
cial institutions needs to be further developed. Reform of this relationship should
therefore be a matter of priority. Of special import is the need for revitalizing the
IMF and reorienting its international mandate. Methods for dramatically increas-
ing the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights and expanding its capacity as a development
bank should be explicit. The IMF could be made more robust if it begins acting as
a forum for the creation of a network of regional monetary reserve funds, similar
to the way in which the European Central Bank serves Europe. A network of this
nature would help fortify the larger international financial structure. The UN’s
Chief Executives Board is best positioned to serve as the primary mechanism of
centralized coordination.

Sharpening the UN’s Edge in Economic Analysis

Perhaps the lynchpin that could facilitate the achievement of these objectives lies
in further strengthening the UN’s ability to undertake first-class research, collect
information, give advice, and coordinate action in addressing issues produced by
the financial and economic crisis. Contrary to the claims of many, the UN holds
a distinct comparative advantage in economic analysis and data collection. The
organization could mobilize for the purpose of proposing solutions swiftly, and
strategizing their implementation across variously organized economic arrange-
ments.

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A New Economic and Social Council?

The issue of greatest disagreement was whether the UN should create strong
social and economic council entirely separate and distinct from ECOSOC. The
world desperately needs an authoritative forum for effective economic and finan-
cial coordination, and a new council could fill that void. Such a council would
convene often at the ministerial level and would include IMF and World Bank
participation. The spats over even the location of the discussion convened by the
President of the General Assembly on the world’s financial architecture reflected
the need for such a mechanism. A priority agenda for this council would be outlin-
ing an accountability mechanism for all international financial transactions, which
would be designed to ensure coherence and coordination between the different
forums and organizations. An international system with strong regional institu-
tions is a robust one and the new council should have adequate links to or repre-
sentation from the regions. While the body might have the virtue of greater
representation, decisions may prove difficult amongst a large group. Any new
council stands a chance of falling victim to lobbying which would undermine its
very purpose. Clearly, designing a new council would be time consuming and
fraught.

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Annex 2:
Summary of

“Shifting Geopolitics of Power in the World”

March 4, 2009

Presenters:
Mathew Burrows
Principal Author of the US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025
Alvaro de Soto
Senior Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies,
Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Setting the Stage

Major changes have recently taken place in the relative power and influence of
key players in the international community of states. But to what extent are these
trends reflected in the structures and the functioning of the multilateral system?
How long can arrangements devised at the end of World War II, as prominently
reflected in the Security Council, continue to enjoy legitimacy in their present
form? Can a better institutional framework be found that will better meet the
needs of a world so fundamentally changed? Taking stock of current world politics
and interrogating related issues, a number of geopolitical trends were identified
during the discussion, and ideas for ways in which the United Nations might
successfully reposition itself to meet political reality were also advanced.

Waning American Power

As more countries continue to grow, the foundational pillars currently supporting
the system—largely reflecting American power—will become increasingly
anachronistic. US military power will remain preponderant but of limited use in
securing American interests; the dollar will likely not continue to serve as the
exclusive reserve currency. Matters will be further complicated as traditional
European partners of the United Sates become more domestically focused in order
to meet the challenges of supporting their aging populations and integrating
larger flows of immigrants.

The Rise of Schizophrenic States

Meanwhile, as the unprecedented balance of power shifts from West to East con-
tinues, rising powers will take on a dual identity. As they become increasingly
rich, economic growth—combined with a boom in population growth—will place
pressure on increasingly scarce resources and force them to focus on domestic
issues. Emerging powers will take their seats at the international high-table of
politics but may not be able to shoulder the attendant burdens that accompany
economic privilege. This phenomenon could produce instability in rising powers,
as well as the international system more broadly.

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Funhouse Mirror Multilateralism

Compounding matters further, current trends in world politics are often distorted
in international multilateral institutions. It is increasingly clear that the major
challenges facing the world are interconnected, but the UN is more disjointed and
institutionally segmented than ever. There exists no better example of the dis-
torted reflection of international power embodied by the United Nations than the
Security Council’s Permanent Five. While the power dynamics of international
politics are changing, the Council so far has not.

Reforming the World Order

If the United Nations is to represent more than the sum of its parts internation-
ally, decisive action should be taken to improve the system’s response to simulta-
neous, multiple crises. Often major disasters result in drastic institutional change.
Is it time to call for a conference of states as was the case after major wars in
Europe? The world is also in need of a new or revived ideology for international
cooperation with multilateralism as a key value. Yet, despite almost universal
acknowledgment that the multilateral universe, with the Security Council at its
center, demands reform, efforts to effect change fail miserably time and again.
Indeed, charting the web of state antagonisms that frustrate attempts at reform
has become a parlor game of sorts among diplomats. Would an expanded Secu-
rity Council reflect a more orderly world, or would decision making there simply
become all the more unwieldy?

Independent UN Secretary-General and Collegial Secretariat

Procedures for choosing Secretaries-General could use an overhaul. The Secretary-
General is the symbolic leader of the world. Yet the selection process guarantees
dependence on powerful state interests. Nothing short of the UN system’s health
is at stake on this count, as the role of the Secretary-General as an honest broker
of world politics is under threat. In addition, the world body needs to foster a
healthier institutional culture. Greater collegiality and willingness to cooperate
would greatly enhance the integration of action across agencies, something which
is largely absent from today’s arrangement.

Independent UN Capacity for Analysis

The UN has a mixed record in drawing lessons from mistakes made and best
practices. Establishing an independent research and analysis unit on intercon-
nected issues within the UN is in order. An independent body might issue regular
reports, advise the Secretary-General and his staff, frame public debates and
increase political pressure on domestic decision-makers to counter narrow na-
tional interests. An independent unit might also serve to bring together the vari-
ous segments of the United Nations and mobilize them more effectively in common
purpose. Knowledge is power: world-class analytical help close to the Secretary-
General might increase his or her leadership and credibility to tackle the most
difficult, interlinked global issues of the future. At the same time, recent history
suggests that any intelligence is highly susceptible to manipulation and faulty
interpretation. What would prevent the Secretary-General’s independent analysis
unit from falling into similar traps? Should this unit be inside or outside the UN?
While difficult questions, some thought that the staff could and should be recruited
without political interference.

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Regional Responsibilities and a Broader International Architecture

Regional organizations complement the United Nations. Since the end of the Cold
War, the world organization has increasingly relied on regional groups that may
be better positioned to address certain challenges. However, there are issues and
problems that cannot be addressed at the regional level. And some issues are not
dealt with equally effectively by all regional organizations. The effectiveness of
regional groups depends almost entirely on the shape of regional architecture, as
well as sensitivity to what issues are best suited to regional remediation. One size
does not fit all. We also require a division of labor between UN organs and
organizations, clubs of states, regional bodies, and a recharged relationship
between the Bretton Woods institutions and ECOSOC. Whether the former should
be brought back under the shelter of the latter’s umbrella of influence should be
considered in any new architecture of global governance.

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Annex 3:
Summary of

“Inter-related Challenges of Climate Change, Food and Water Security,

Energy, and Changing Financial and Economic Policies”

March 25, 2009

Presenters:
Adnan Amin
Director, UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB),
Former UNEP Director
Jim Harkness
President, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy

Setting the Stage

To avoid “runaway” climate change which puts humankind on the verge of an
irreversible destabilization of global ecosystems, a broader reorientation of pro-
duction and consumption patterns and of economic activity as a whole around the
globe is needed. This, however, cannot come about solely through negotiations
among environment ministers. Bold decisions and swift actions encompassing
environmental, economic, financial, food, and energy policies are necessary. The
December 2009 climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC could yield a
global deal for the post-2012 period. Even if such a deal is reached in a timely man-
ner, there is increasing scientific evidence from the IPCC and other bodies that cur-
rent emission targets under negotiation are insufficient. Are countries therefore
advised to adapt to the effects of climate change already now, and if so, how? Con-
versely, what could and should be done outside the negotiations towards the 2009
Copenhagen meeting to change emission patterns? Would it be feasible, at what cost,
to create new comprehensive policies within the next few years? How will such
strategies be affected by the global economic downturn? The links were obvious
between the issues of climate change, food and water security, energy, and chang-
ing economic policies. Operating from this consensus, the seminar discussed the
role of the UN before, during, and after the Copenhagen gathering.

Disappointing Reactions to Climate Change

While the December 2007 conference in Bali made some progress by articulating
a “roadmap” to Copenhagen, it was unfortunately riddled with fundamental prob-
lems. Scientific evidence is changing by the day and very little has been achieved
in implementing the Kyoto Protocol. One of the major issues continuing to plague
efforts to combat climate change is a failure of conception. The problem is popu-
larly cast as a local one, but there are many interrelated political and economic
dimensions as well. There is also a strong conviction that equity has to be better
taken into account. By drawing on its comparative advantage in legitimacy, com-
prehensive analysis and data collection, the UN Secretary-General and the UN
system should examine these interrelated challenges closely, and articulate policy
frameworks acceptable to all in advance of and during the Copenhagen confer-
ence. The arrival of the Barack Obama administration offered hope for productive
discussions in preparations for Copenhagen.

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Crisis in Agriculture
Current industrial-type agriculture, based on high-yield production focusing on
maximizing output, is unsustainable in the long run as it ignores issues such as
water shortages, overuse of pesticides, genetic engineering, monoculture, and the
destruction of rural societies. Focus has so far centered on narrow thinking in the
global economy and getting rid of sources of “friction” such as regulation and
sovereign oversight of resources. But as challenges and solutions are interrelated
the multifunctional nature of the international food and agricultural infrastructure
gives us the opportunity to tackle numerous problems simultaneously.

Reassert Multilateral Primacy

The role of states and multilateral institutions should be increasing, not retreating.
In order to correct this trend, the United Nations should be promoting itself as the
forum for multilateral negotiations and state decision making on the issues of the
environment, food security and clean water. The Secretary-General has made
climate change a matter of priority in his public appearances, but environmental
threats have not yet become central to agencies within the UN system. Indeed,
outside organizations currently compete and try to outperform the world body on
climate change issues. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) should be
the prime movers behind designing and financing adaptation programs and do
more research on critical issues.

Economic Market Fundamentalism Still in Charge

There is an ideological crisis in multilateral dealings with interrelated issues of
climate, food, water, energy, and economy. Up until recently, states were seen to
be barriers to progress but at the deeper level, the market fundamentalism that
drove that thinking itself has proved wrong and unsustainable. But all fundamen-
talisms die hard. Climate change is still seen as a market externality by many in
the West. The Club of Rome’s 1972 report Limits to Growth should be revisited as
its line of thinking is very different from standard economics. Its systems analy-
sis focus is a productive corrective to the reductive, narrowly-focused analysis that
is still driving economic problem-solving.

Copenhagen’s Critical Issues

Copenhagen’s most formidable challenges consist of developing a common vision
for long-term action. State leaders must develop a universal architecture to guide
future decision making in answer to the current crop of problems, as well as
related ones which will surely develop in the future. The Adaptation Fund, which
was created to help finance and support developing countries meet their obliga-
tions within the Kyoto Protocol framework, is grossly under-funded. Progress by
developing countries necessitates greater resources. Many experts now suggest
that the world has roughly a decade in which to act radically on the environment.
Yet ten years seems like too little time to properly institutionalize, for instance, a
meaningful cap-and-trade framework.

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Looking Ahead to Copenhagen

If agreement is to be reached, the United States must assert leadership and accept
compromise. A deal will be reached at Copenhagen, no matter how poorly patched
together. But if a weak agreement is finalized, it will represent a singular, collec-
tive failure of multilateral negotiations, to the peril of all.

Continuing Challenges
One of the outstanding problems in need of redress concerns funding. In the cor-
ridors of the United Nations, there is increasing awareness that environmental
problems—related to interlinked issues of climate, food, water, energy and
finance—are quickly mounting. While the need for coordinated action is great,
ECOSOC is weak and ineffective. Does the CEB have potential? When the UN does
succeed in coordinating an issue, funding remains in short supply. Donors should
realize that they cannot continue making demands on a system in which they
refuse to invest, nor engage in funding certain projects but not others. Lack of
financing, and issue-area cherry picking undermine the UN’s organization coher-
ence, and contribute to its fragmentation and demise.

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Annex 4:
Summary of

“Food and Water Security and Increasing Potential

for Conflicts over Resources”

April 22, 2009

Presenter:
Michael Klare
Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies, and
Director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies
Adil Najam
Frederick S. Pardee Professor of Global Public Policy, Director of the
Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University

Setting the Stage

With the decline of oil and food prices, addressing patterns of global food produc-
tion seems to have lost some of its urgency for the industrialized world. Neverthe-
less, the largest part of the world population will continue to see its access to food
and water heavily and negatively influenced by changes in climate, human food
consumption, and agricultural production. Even more, scarcity of water and food
may directly lead to increasing potential for conflicts, and threats to domestic
populations and international order. A major roadblock for addressing these con-
cerns is the misconception of leaders and populations about the connections be-
tween food and water security and potential conflict. Strategies that the United
Nations could employ to reorient the way it conceives these issues emerged during
the discussion.

Rising Levels of Conflict

Although the World Bank argues that the price of food will continue to drop, con-
ditions that produced 2008 food riots are likely to recur. Rapidly declining yields
from existing oil fields will reduce supply in the near future forcing prices to rise.
The current economic crisis has led oil companies to withdraw from planned
investments in new energy projects. World demand is peaking in particular in
emerging economies and a transition to bio fuels will eat away available land for
farming. Finally, global warning and recurrence of severe drought in parts of the
world will force decline in the production of wheat and cereals.

Third World Planet

A “country report” on planet earth makes clear that the globe is a deprived third
world country when taken as a whole: poor, extremely divided, environmentally
degraded, insecure, and poorly governed. Poor people pay more money in real
terms than the rich for commodities and other necessities for survival, in their
time and health, and are disproportionally affected by the effects of resource
conflicts. But increasingly the rich cannot insulate themselves from the problems
of the poor as meaningful solutions have become interconnected.

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Thinking Big
A silver lining may be found in the gathering clouds if the United Nations is able
to move beyond traditional responses to emerging threats and state discomfort
with vigorous action. The sheer complexity and seriousness of the current menu
of challenges may have convinced key actors that the time has arrived to go beyond
conventional wisdom and leave their comfort zones. The United Nations could
lead the charge if it redefines the terms of international debate, and emerges as
an informed, legitimate and entrepreneurial force on these issues. For instance,
climate change has been largely cast as an energy issue but should be also refined
as a water issue; and food security, cast as a market issue, in turn should be recast
as a governance issue.

Redefining the Terms of the Debate

Current discussions about international security operate on outdated notions.
Security is still too often discussed in terms of state security, with the threat of
interstate conflict looming in the background. And yet, this intellectual framework
papers over the essential question of insecurity. The United Nations, and particu-
larly the Secretary-General, could play an important role in recasting the idea of
security in ways most appropriate to the multiple and interconnected threats that
we will likely face as rising energy costs, adverse climate change effects and eco-
nomic crisis deepen.

Perception of Existential Threats

When societies are faced with what are perceived as life-threatening catastro-
phes—such as terrorism after 11 September—their governments act quickly to
protect their populations with little consideration as to the costs. Climate change
is clearly not yet perceived as an existential threat by populations and their
governments in the industrialized Global North or in the Global South. The UN
could usefully engage in ideational entrepreneurship on the issue, recasting climate
change and its attendant challenges as direct threats to international security. Al
Gore successfully brought the problem of global warming to a wide audience.
Since then, climate change has seemingly been supplanted in the popular imagi-
nation by other crises and issues. Given its relative advantages as a universally
representative international body, the UN could effectively take action, and con-
struct ideas and concepts of international security taking into account the legitimate
interests of vulnerable populations.

Institutionalizing Independent Analysis

In order to exercise authority in the construction of updated notions of inter-
national security, it will have to draw on reserves of expert analyses. Among the
possibilities for institutionalizing research and analysis within the UN, an inde-
pendent analysis unit could serve as a useful counterweight to the often short-
sighted work of the IMF and World Bank stressing the interconnected nature of
today’s problems. In addition, it would invest the Secretary-General with a greater
degree of legitimacy as an informed advocate on these critically complex security
threats.

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Annex 5:
Summary of

“The Energy Crisis and Reorganization of Economic and Social Policies”

May 6, 2009

Presenters:
Ian Dunlop
Australian Institute of Company Directors, the Australasian Institute of
Mining and Metallurgy, and the Energy Institute (UK), Former Royal
Dutch Shell manager
Christopher Flavin
President, Worldwatch Institute

Setting the Stage

If the energy demands of the expanding middle class of China, India, and other
emerging markets continue to grow as expected, the nonrenewable energy sup-
plies of the globe will be insufficient to meet the demands within a relatively short
period of time. The slowdown in the world economy has delayed this prospect,
but the requirement to reorient global energy politics is looming. How will the
world and its major and minor powers adjust? How will this adjustment process
affect the environmental, economic and social conditions and policies in the
regions? The problems of peak oil supplies and harnessing the potential of renew-
able energy resources as well as productive roles for the United Nations emerged
as key issues as the world draws closer to Copenhagen in December 2009.

World Hit by Many Crises

The energy crisis and reorganization of economic and social policies are likely
among the most important issues that humanity will confront with over the com-
ing decades. “Crisis” seems to be the flavor of the month in recent international
affairs: first, the climate crisis, then the oil crisis, and finally the financial crisis.
But what singles out the current moment seems to be a convergence of these
various challenges, an unprecedented phenomenon. Scenarios proposed by the
Club of Rome forty years ago are coming to pass. The world is reaching its limits
with conventional notions of growth no longer sustainable.

Another Looming Oil Crisis

The fact that we have reached the point of peak oil is increasingly recognized by
scientists and the oil industry. Production levels have not increased since 2005,
and oil supplies will probably drop off markedly by 2030. Plans for alternative energy
are urgent as a switch will take at least a decade to implement. A switch to coal would
be environmentally devastating in spite of industry advertising to the contrary. All
of this demonstrates the interconnectedness of global challenges and the inadvisabil-
ity of keeping them in silos. A quantum shift in thinking is needed.

Renewable Energy Offers Hope

The world could change to more energy efficient systems and also rely more on
renewable energy. Such a shift will reduce costs and increase efficiency by at least
two thirds through such services as solar and wind. These resources are pro-
vided in abundance on the planet and technology is very rapidly progressing. Oil

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has in fact been a “resource curse” to many countries and international stability
in general. Renewable resources are more widely distributed and developing
countries tend to be better positioned for a world dependent on renewable energy
than the highly industrial countries of the North.

Getting Out the “Global Emergency” Message

In order to meaningfully combat the widening menu of challenges facing the world,
political leaders should recognize that these problems obviously are bigger than
any single state and its capabilities. Productive conversations moving forward will
take place only if states understand that they will have to abdicate certain dimen-
sions of their sovereignty for the common good and their own. The UN could play
a critical role in this regard by initiating an honest discussion among states and
their own outlining the sheer size of the problem currently confronting us, as well
as by emphasizing the message of emergency to the world’s actors. Ban Ki-moon
has begun to do so, but the effort should be markedly enhanced.

Advancing New Ideas

As countries begin to work together on issues of energy and the environment, a
framework outlining effective steps is necessary. Developing countries, for exam-
ple, need to be convinced that the development path ahead cannot be the same
as that taken by developed countries. At the same time, they will need assistance
in formulating alternative roads to economic development and security. The UN
could play a critical role in this regard as well as in responsibly managing technol-
ogy transfers allowing developing countries to leapfrog ahead.

Managing Technology Transfers

The UN is well-positioned to help responsibly manage the transfer of new tech-
nologies to developing countries. Efforts are already underway in partnership with
the recently formed International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and they
should continue to support the body’s activities. The new agency will help sub-
stantially in developing new technologies, disseminating them widely, coordinat-
ing assistance to developing nations, and outlining best practices as countries
transition to renewable energy sources.

Developing a “Marshal Plan” for the Environment

The world has reached a moment that will ultimately usher in transformative
change and is faced with the opportunity—but only an opportunity if quickly
acted upon—to harness its resources for the purpose of initiating and controlling
the changes that are soon to come. A “Marshall Plan,” if properly decentralized,
designed to tackle the interconnected problems of climate change and energy could
spark the sort of domestic projects—such as new transportation networks and
building designs—needed to meet the challenges of climate change. Any such plan
would need a component agreement at the international level to make sure that
domestic changes occur quickly and evenly among all states.

Developing a “Copenhagen Protocol”

An international agreement could indeed emerge at December’s Copenhagen
gathering. A “Copenhagen Protocol” designed to structure genuine change in the
face of world crisis, should contain such essential features as carbon emissions
limits, built-in national policy commitments, significant financial assistance for
technological development, and language that can be usefully mobilized to build
social sentiment for change.

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Annex 6: List of Participants

The following persons attended one or more sessions. Current affiliations are
given for identification purposes only.

Adnan Amin (presenter, session 3), UN System Chief Executives Board for Coor-
dination
Sami Areikat, UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs
Adiyatwidi Adiwoso Asmady, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN
Oktay Ay, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Mathew Burrows (presenter, session 2), US National Intelligence Council
Michael K. Busch (rapporteur), Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
Eva Busza, UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General
Anne Carlsen, UN Development Programme
Christopher Coleman, UN Department of Political Affairs, Policy Planning and
Mediation Support Unit
Francisco del Campo, Permanent Mission of Chile to the UN
Amitabh Desai, The William J. Clinton Foundation
Alvaro de Soto (presenter, session 2), Ralph Bunche Institute for International
Studies
Omar Dia, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Ian Dunlop (presenter, session 5), Australian Coalition for Peak Oil
Mohamed Edrees, Permanent Mission of Egypt to the UN
Christopher Flavin (presenter, session 5), Worldwatch Institute
James K. Galbraith (presenter, session 1), University of Texas
Eduardo Gálvez, Permanent Mission of Chile to the UN
Harris Gleckman, Benchmark Environmental Consulting
Kartika Handaruningrum, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN
Jim Harkness (presenter, session 3), Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
Eric Heeze, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Warren Hoge, International Peace Institute
Martin Hoppe, Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN
Benito Jimenez, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN
Tapio Kanninen (moderator), Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
Olav Kjorven, UN Development Programme, Bureau for Development Policy
Michael Klare (presenter, session 4), Hampshire College
Li Kok, Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN
Georgios Kostakos, UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
Richard Kozul-Wright, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Alischa Kugel, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Roy Lee, Columbia University
Volker Lehmann, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Yuyin Liu, Permanent Mission of China to the UN
Diego Malpede, Office of the President of the General Assembly
Modest Mero, Permanent Mission of Tanzania to the UN

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Adil Najam (presenter, session 4), Boston University

Marty Natalegawa, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN
José Antonio Ocampo (presenter, session 1), Columbia University
Denis Onyango, World Food Programme
Rachid Ouali, Office of the President of the General Assembly
James Paul, Global Policy Forum
Marina Ploutakhina, Secretary-General’s Climate Change Support Team
Werner Puschra, (moderator), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Insa Reimers, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Zazie Schafer, Executive Office of the Secretary-General
Pedro Serrano, European Union Council Secretariat’s Liaison Office to the UN
Anwar Shaikh, New School University
Sofia Soromenho-Ramos, International Monetary Fund
Jakob Ström, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN
James Sutterlin, Yale University
Jorge Tagle, Permanent Mission of Chile to the UN
Gelila Terrefe, Secretary-General’s Climate Change Support Team
Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir, International Peace Institute
Robert Vos, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Dewi Wahab, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN
Thomas G. Weiss (moderator), Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
Evamaria Weisser, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Peng Wu, Permanent Mission of China to the UN
Ye-Min Wu, Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN
Suhayfa Zia, Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN

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Notes

1 Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords Into Ploughshares: The Problems and Prospects of International Organization (New York:
Random House, 1956); Inis L. Claude Jr., “Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations,”
Global Governance 2, no. 3 (1996): 289-298.
2 Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly, “The ‘Third’ United Nations,” Global Governance 15, no.
1 (2009): 123-142.
3 Remarks by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Davos, 30 January 2009, available at www.number10.gov.uk/
Page18201.
4 See also Nils Petter Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordas, and Idean Salehyan, Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration
Link (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), Coping With Crisis Working Paper Series.
5 Thomas G. Weiss and Peter J. Hoffman, A Priority Agenda for the Next UN Secretary-General (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2007), Occasional Paper No. 28.
6 Details available at www.unhistory.org.
7 This list draws upon Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas That Changed the World (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 248-252.
8 See Thomas G. Weiss, “Reinvigorating the International Civil Service,” Global Governance 16, no. 1 (2010): forth-
coming.
9 See Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 27-32. See also Gareth Evans, The Respon-
sibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008).
10 Millennium Project, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (New
York: United Nations Development Program, 2005).
11 Maxwell Seymour Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign
Policy (Teaneck, NJ: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1988), 151-153.
12 See C. V. Narasimhan, History of the United Nations University: A Personal Perspective (Tokyo: United Nations Uni-
versity Press, 1994).
13 “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN document A/55/305- S/2000/809, 21 August 2000,
section G.
14 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York:
United Nations, 2004), 36-37.
15 United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environmental Outlook 4 (New York: United Nations Environment
Programme, 2007), chapter 9.
16 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Council‘s 2025 Project (Washington,
DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008).
17 For additional information, see www.ipinstitute.org.
18 See www.securitycouncilreport.org.
19 For additional information, see www.cppf.ssrc.org.
20 See Geoffrey Allen Pigman, The World Economic Forum: A Multi-stakeholder Approach to Global Governance
(London: Routledge, 2007).
21 Annual Overview Report of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 2008/09
(E/2009/67), 7 May 2009.
22 See Koko Warner, Charles Ehrhart, Alex de Sherbinin, Susana Adamo, and Tricia Chai-Onn, In Search of Shelter:
Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement (New York: Center for Interna-
tional Earth Science Information Network, 2009).
23 The history of these efforts are described in the Secretary-General’s report for the first ministerial meeting of the
Security Council on the cooperation with regional organizations held in September 2006, United Nations, 28 July
2006, A Regional-Global Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities, The Report of the Secretary-General, UN
document A/61/204 – S/2006/590, 4 and in more detail in. Tapio Kanninen “UN-Regional High-level Process: Can
Regionalism Promote Democracy?” in Models of Regional Governance for the Pacific: Sovereignty and the Future
Architecture of Regionalism, ed. Kennedy Graham (Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury University Press, 2008),
99-113. See also Kennedy Graham and Tania Felicio, Regional Security and Global Governance (Brussels: Brussels
University Press, 2008).
24 Commission on International Development, Partners in Development (New York: Praeger, 1969).
25 For an analysis, see Ramesh Thakur, Andrew Cooper, and John English, eds., International Commissions and the
Power of Ideas (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005),
26 For the reports, see World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibil-
ity to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
27 Peter Baker and Rachel Donadio, “Group of 8 Is Not Enough, Say Outsiders Wanting In,” New York Times, 10 July
2009.
28 See Thomas G. Weiss, “Toward a Third Generation of International Institutions: Obama’s UN Policy,” Washington
Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2009): 343-364; and a longer argument in What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to
Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).
29 See, for example, General Assembly resolution 992(X), November 1955.
30 An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/47/277 and S/24111, 17 June 1992.

48 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION
 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

31 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, The Limits To Growth (New
York, University Books, 1972).
32 Graham Turner, A Comparison of the Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality (Canberra, Australia: Common-
wealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, 2008), CSIRO Working Paper Series 2008-09.
33 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows and Jorgen Randers, Limits to Growth: The 30-Yer Update (White River
Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2004).
34 Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
35 The periodic nature of the UN reforms, and in fact those in large organizations in general, is discussed in Tapio Kan-
ninen, Leadership and Reform: The Secretary- General and the UN Financial Crisis of the Late 1980s (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1995), chapter. 2, 3.1 and annex. The discussion on UN reforms began in the earliest days
of the organization with very similar themes—getting out of duplication, outdated mandates, under-performing
staff, etc—–which have resurfaced more or less in all subsequent reforms.
36 See John Richardson, ed., Latin America Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1990), and “The Washington Consensus Revisited,” in Economic and Social Development
into the Twenty-first Century, ed. Louis Emmerij (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 48-61. See also
Moisés Naim, “Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?” Third
World Quarterly, 21, no. 3 (2000): 505-528. For additional commentary, see Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and
Thomas G. Weiss, Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2001) and UN Ideas That Changed the World.
37 The panel’s final report was published on 21 May 2009, available at www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/finan-
cialcrisis/PreliminaryReport210509.pdf.
38 See also the Secretary-General’s views in Kofi A. Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, UN document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005; and a set of critical essays about these documents
and the prospects for reform is Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff, eds., Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Na-
tions in the 21st Century (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2005).
39 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN document A/60/1, 24 October 2005.
40 Stephen C. Schlesinger Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
41 See also Oli Brown and Alec Crawford, Climate Change and Security in Africa (Winnipeg: International Institute for
Sustainable Development, 2009), 23.
42 “I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secre-
tary-General, that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their
ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to
defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to development efforts. If such a global
partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will
have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control.” U Thant 1969, quoted
both in The Limits to Growth and Limits to Growth: The 30 Years Update, 13.
43 See also: Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on Reform of the Interna-
tional Monetary and Financial System, preliminary draft, dated 24-26 June 2009.

OCCASIONAL PAPER N° 45 49
 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Further Occasional Papers: N° 17 / April 2005 N° 31 / May 2007

Maria Floro and Hella Hoppe Joseph E. Stiglitz and
N° 1 / December 2002 Engendering Policy Coherence for Stephanie Griffith-Jones
New Steps to Faster and Broader Debt Development – Gender issues for the Growth and Responsibility in a
Relief for Developing Countries global policy agenda in the year 2005 Globalized World.
Findings of the “Shadow G8“
N° 2 / January 2003 N° 18 / May 2005
Pedro Morazán: Dirk Messner, Simon Maxwell, N° 32 / June 2007
Deuda externa: Franz Nuscheler, Joseph Siegle Aileen Kwa
Nuevas crisis, nuevas soluciones? Governance Reform of the Bretton Rethinking the Trading System
Woods Institutions and the
N° 3 / March 2003 UN Development System N° 33 / August 2007
Money Laundering and Tax Havens: Meghna Abraham
N° 19 / May 2005 Building the New Human Rights
The Hidden Billions for Development
Luke Eric Peterson Council – Outcome and analysis of
N° 4 / April 2003 The Global Governance of Foreign Direct the institution-building year
Michaela Eglin Investment: Madly Off in All Directions
The General Agreement on Trade in N° 34 / September 2007
N° 20 / August 2005 Daniel Platz and Frank Schroeder
Services (GATS) – A Background Note
Nils Rosemann Moving Beyond the Privatization Debate
N° 5 / April 2003 The UN Norms on Corporate Human Rights Different Approaches to Financing Water
Sophia Murphy Responsibilities. An Innovating Instrument and Electricity in Developing Countries
The Uruguay Round Agreement on to Strengthen Business‘ Human Rights
Agriculture and its Renegotiation Performance N° 35 / November 2007
Nahla Valji
N° 6 / May 2003 N° 21 / October 2005 Gender Justice and Reconciliation
Eva Hartmann / Christoph Scherrer: Christoph Zöpel
Negotiations on Trade in Services – Global Democracy in the Nexus of N° 36 / November 2007
The Position of the Trade Unions on GATS Governments, Parliaments, Parties and Karen Brounéus
Civil Cociety Reconciliation and Development
N° 7 / July 2003 Background study prepared for the
Brigitte Young / Hella Hoppe N° 22 / April 2006 International Conference
The Doha Development Round, Gender Theodor Rathgeber Building a Future on Peace and Justice
and Social Reproduction UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations N° 37 / November 2007
N° 8 / July 2003 Barnett R. Rubin / Alexandra Guáqueta
N° 23 / July 2006
Eric Teo Chu Cheow Fighting Drugs and Building Peace
Privatisation of Water Supply Felix Kirchmeier
Towards Policy Coherence between
The Right to Development – where do
Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building
N° 9 / October 2003 we stand? State of the debate on the
Katherine A. Hagen Right to Development N° 38 / January 2008
Policy Dialogue between the International Jack Boorman
N° 24 / August 2006
Labour Organization and the A Agenda for Reform of the
Jochen Steinhilber
International Financial Institutions: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
China – A new actor in the Middle East
The Search for Convergence
and North Africa Region N° 39 / May 2008
N° 10 / October 2003 David Kinley & Hai Nguyen
N° 25 / September 2006
Jens Martens Viet Nam, Human Rights and Trade
Jochen Steinhilber
Perspectives of Multilateralism after Implications of Viet Nam’s Accession
„Bound to Cooperate?“ Security and
Monterrey and Johannesburg to the WTO
regional cooperation
N° 11 / October 2003 N° 25 / September 2006 N° 40 / October 2008
Katherine A. Hagen Jochen Steinhilber Ramesh Thakur, Jane Boulden and
The International Labour Organization: „Bound to Cooperate?“ Sicherheit und Thomas G. Weiss
Can it Deliver the Social Dimension of regionale Kooperation Can the NPT Regime be fixed or
Globalization? should it be abandoned?
N° 26 / November 2006
N° 12 / March 2004 Luke Eric Peterson N° 41 / February 2009
Jürgen Kaiser / Antje Queck South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf
Odious Debts – Odious Creditors? Treaties – Implications for Development Christiane Gerstetter
International Claims on Iraq and Human Rights Trade and Climate Change
Triggers or Barriers for Climate Friendly
N° 13 / January 2005 N° 27 / November 2006 Technology Transfer and Development?
Federico Alberto Cuello Camilo Mahnaz Malik
What makes a Round a ‘Development Time for a Change: Germany’s Bilateral N° 42 / April 2009
Round‘? The Doha Mandate and the WTO Investment Treaty Programme and Re-Defining the Global Economy
Trade Negotiations Development Policy Introduction: Joseph Stiglitz
Dean Baker, Peter Bofinger,
N° 14 / January 2005 N° 28 / December 2006 Kemal Derviş, John Eatwell,
Thomas G. Weiss Thomas G. Weiss and Peter J. Hoffman Eric Helleiner, Stanislaw Kluza,
Overcoming the Security Council A Priority Agenda for the Next José Antonio Ocampo,
Reform Impasse. UN Secretary-General Arturo O’Connell, Prabhat Patnaik,
The Implausible versus the Plausible Avinash Persaud, Tony Porter,
N° 29 / December 2006
N° 15 / February 2005 Jens Martens Damon Silvers
Gert Rosenthal Multistakeholder Partnerships – N° 43 / May 2009
The Economic and Social Council of the Future Models of Multilateralism? Maria S. Floro and Mieke Meurs
United Nations. An Issues Papier Global Trends in Women’s Access
N° 30 / April 2007
N° 16 / March 2005 Robert Howse and Ruti G. Teitel to “Decent Work”
Thomas Greven Beyond the Divide N° 44 / June 2009
Social Standards in Bilateral and Regional The Covenant on Economic, Social and Jürgen Kaiser, Irene Knoke, Hartmut Kowsky
Trade and Investment Agreements – Cultural Rights and the World Trade Towards a Renewed Debt Crisis?
Instruments, Enforcement, and Organization Risk Profiles of the poorest countries in the
Policy Options for Trade Unions light of the global economic slowdown

OCCASIONAL PAPER N° 45 51
About the Authors:

Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The CUNY Graduate Center and Director
of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, where he is co-director of the United Nations Intel-
lectual History Project. He is President of the International Studies Association (2009–10) and Chair of the
Academic Council on the UN System (2006–9). He was editor of Global Governance, Research Director of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Research Professor at Brown Univer-
sity’s Watson Institute for International Studies, Executive Director of the Academic Council on the UN
System and of the International Peace Academy, a member of the UN secretariat, and a consultant to
several public and private agencies. He has written or edited some 40 books and 150 articles and book
chapters about multilateral approaches to international peace and security, humanitarian action, and
sustainable development. His latest authored book is What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to
Fix It (2009).

Tapio Kanninen is Senior Research Fellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. A
long-time UN staff member, he was Chief of Policy Planning Unit in the Department of Political Affairs
(1998–2005) and Head of the Secretariat of Kofi Annan’s five summits with regional organizations. He has
worked on several UN reforms: as secretary and research focal point of the high-level drafting group of
Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace and convener of the interdepartmental task force to imple-
ment its recommendations; secretary of General Assembly Working Groups on An Agenda for Peace
(1992–1994); of Strengthening of the UN System (1995); and of Security Council reform (1994–1999).
His Ph.D. dissertation, an insider’s view of Pérez de Cuéllar’s efforts at comprehensive UN reform, was
published as Leadership and Reform (1995). He has also worked on conflict prevention, democracy, rule
of law, recruitment planning, and environmental statistics at the UN and in Finland’s Statistical Agency and
Academy of Science.

Michael K. Busch is Research Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies and adjunct
professor of Political Science at the City College of New York, where he is also Project Coordinator of the
Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies. He has written extensively on international peace and security and
Latin American politics for a variety of publications, including contributions to World Politics Review and
Foreign Policy in Focus, and writes regularly for PolicyNet, an online think tank co-sponsored by Princeton
University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Center for International
Governance Innovation. He is currently working on his doctorate in International Relations at The Graduate
Center, The City University of New York.

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