PEOPLE VS ARCHILLA
On March 6, 1959, defendants Jose Luis Archilla and Alfreda Roberts were charged with bigamy before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon province as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1958 in the Municipality of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Jose Luis Archilla alias Chino Santos, being previously united in
lawful marriage with the undersigned Luz Mat Castro de Archilla, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alfreda Roberts,
who likewise has previous knowledge that her co-accused Jose Luis Archilla's marriage with the undersigned is still valid
and subsisting.
After entering a plea of not guilty Alfreda Roberts, through a counsel filed a motion praying that the complaint be
quashed with regard to her on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute the offense charged. After the
prosecution has filed its opposition, the court, in sustaining the motion, ruled:
There being no allegation in the complaint that insofar as Alfreda Roberts is concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla
was her second marriage, it is clear that she has committed no offense and should be discharged from the complaint.
The allegation of the complaint that Alfreda Roberts who likewise has previous knowledge that her co-accused Jose Luis
Archilla's marriage with the undersigned is still valid and subsisting' is not a sufficient statement of an offense for which
this defendant may be prosecuted and convicted.
The denial to reconsider the above precipitated this appeal.
The prosecution contends that the lower court erred in quashing the information with regard to Alfreda Roberts
because although it is not alleged therein that her marriage to her co-accused was her second the former being still
valid, nevertheless, her act of contracting the second marriage with Archilla with knowledge of the fact that his former
marriage was still valid constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy which makes her
responsible as an accomplice. But appellee contends that, even if that were true, the quashing of the information
amounts to her acquittal which prevents the prosecution from taking appeal as it would place her in jeopardy of being
punished twice for the same offense. She prays that the appeal be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
Granting arguendo that appellee may be prosecuted for bigamy as an accomplice under the information filed by the
government prosecutor because it is alleged therein that she married her co-accused with knowledge of the fact that
the latter was previously married and the marriage was still subsisting, and that it was error for the lower court to quash
the information on the alleged ground that it does not allege all the elements necessary to constitute the offense
against appellee, the latter however cannot not be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the trial
court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words, appellee cannot adopt a
posture of double dealing without running afoul with the doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled that parties to a judicial
proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.1
Consequently, appellee is now estopped from invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that she could still
be convicted under an information which she branded to be insufficient in the lower court.
There is a parallelism between this case and that of People v. Acierto, G.R. Nos. L-2708 and L-3355-60, January 30, 1953.
Acierto was accused before a U.S. Court Martial for having defrauded the Government of the United States thru
falsification of a document, within a military base of the United States in the Philippines. Despite his objection to the
jurisdiction of said Court, he was tried and convicted. On review, the sentence was reversed by the Commanding
General, who did not sustain Acierto's conviction. Subsequently, accused of estafa and falsification of documents before
one of our courts of first instance, Acierto was again convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he raised the plea of
former jeopardy and want of jurisdiction alleging that the authority that had jurisdiction to try his case was the Court
Martial of the United States. In overruling this pretense this Court held:
This is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military trial. As stated, he there attacked the court
martial's jurisdiction with the same vigor that he now says the court martial did have jurisdiction; and thanks to his
objection, so we incline to believe, the Commanding General, upon consultation with, and the recommendation of, the
Judge Advocate General in Washington, disapproved the court martial proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Construction of the United States Military Law by the Judge Advocate General or the United States Army is entitled to
great respect, to say the very least. When such construction is a disclaimer of jurisdiction under the Bases Agreement,
the Philippine Government certainly is not the party to dispute it; the fewer the rights asserted by the United States the
more it enhanced the dignity of the Philippines and its interest promoted.
Irrespective of the correctness of the view of the Military authorities, the defendant was estopped from demurring to
the Philippine court's jurisdiction and pleading double jeopardy on strength of his trial by the court martial. A party will
not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result in brazen
deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith, for an
accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to
which he has been turned over that the first has committed error in yielding to his plea.
From another angle, it seems immaterial whether or not the court martial had jurisdiction of the accused and his crimes
under the terms of the Bases Agreement. Granting that it had, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City nevertheless
properly and legally took cognizance of the cases and denied the defendant's motion to quash. (Emphasis supplied)
With regard to the question whether the information filed against appellee she can be prosecuted for bigamy even if it
does not allege that her marriage to her co-accused is her second marriage, the authorities are clear that she can if it is
averred that she married her co-accused knowingly that the latter's former marriage is still valid and subsisting. (Viada,
Codigo Penal de 1870, p. 561; Francisco's Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 1515, Part 2, Book II; Guevarra's
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, pp. 757-758.)
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from dated May 5, 1959 is set aside, and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. No costs
FUJIKI VS MARINAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara got married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain
a judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC.
However, the trial court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of
the said rule provides for who may file such petition, to wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the legal personality to
file the petition. PETITION GRANTED
Valdez v. Republic
G.R. No. 180863, 8 September 2009
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued
constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house.
Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed
without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio
was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was
denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for
the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no
impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
