GLOBE DOCTRINE

#1 MECHANICAL DEPART LABOR UNION v. CIR G.R. No. L- 28223 / 24 SCRA 925
Topic: Unit Severance and Globe Doctrine
FACTS:

The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent "Samahan ng

mga Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there were three unions
in the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the "Samahan", the
"Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company", and the Mechanical
Department Labor Union;

That no certification election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan
shops; that both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had
submitted different labor demands upon the management for which reason a
certification election was needed to determine the proper collective bargaining
agency for the Caloocan shop workers.

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical

Department Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously certified in
two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of
the PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated two bargaining agreements
with management in 1961 and 1963; that before the expiration of the latter, a
renewal thereof had been negotiated and the contract remained to be signed; that
the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January 1965; that the Caloocan
shops unit was not established nor separated from the Mechanical Department
unit;

That the "Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending
case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the petition was to
disturb the present smooth working labor management relations.

TRIAL COURT: reviewed the collective bargaining history of the Philippine National
Railways and allowed the establishment of new and separate bargaining unit in
one company, even in one department of the same company

the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning the
applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the
will of the employees in determining what union should represent them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employees at the Caloocan Shops can desire the
respondent union, "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be
separated from the Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a view to the
former being recognized as a separate bargaining unit, applying the Globe Doctrine
RULING: Yes, the Globe Doctrine is applicable in this case.
Yes because even though Appellant Mechanical contends that the application of
the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan shops
do not require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical
Department of the Railway Company. This question is primarily one of facts.
The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the
Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but
perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and
machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs. It is
easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require
special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them
apart from the rest of the workers.
In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated
by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence,
such agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper
elections, of a new bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).
As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng
Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the status
of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a
legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later
question whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should
be counted.
Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the
employer, during the pendency of the original petition in the Court of Industrial
Relations, should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan
shops is a question that should be first passed upon by the Industrial Court.

#2 SAN MIGUEL CORP. VS HON. LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES
LABOR UNION-INDEPENDENT
G.R. No. 100485. September 21, 1994

FACTS:
Private respondent union filed for a petition for certification election among
all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Area.
This was opposed by the petitioner and questioned the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit to be represented by the union. It claimed that its bargaining
history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining
unit for each sales office. During the hearing of the petition, the substitute lawyer
of the petitioner withdrew its opposition and agreed to consider one bargaining
unit in the mentioned sales office. Upon the order of the Mediator-Arbiter
certifying the union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular
sales personnel in the North Luzon area, the petitioner appealed to the Secretary
of Labor contending a mistake in the decision brought by its substitute lawyer. In a
petition for certiorari,the petitioner contends that the prior collective bargaining is
the most pervasive criterion in determining the approriateness of the CBA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the union represents an appropriate bargaining unit.

HELD:
 Yes. The court ruled in accordance with the tests in determining an
appropriate bargaining unit. The fundamental factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Court has
categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is
neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit.
Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The
employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have
substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as
evinced by the type of work they perform. In the case at bench, respondent union
sought to represent the sales personnel in the various Magnolia sales offices in
northern Luzon. There is similarity of employment status for only the regular sales
personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They have the same duties and
responsibilities and substantially similar compensation and working conditions. The
commonality of interest among he sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area
cannot be gainsaid. Further, the petitioner cannot insist that there should be one
bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager number
of sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union in the entire north
Luzon sales area consists only of approximately
fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these
employees if they would further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength in
number" is the very rationale underlying the formation of a labor union.
#3 Philips Industrial Development, Inc. vs NLRC

Facts:
- PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
electronic products. Since 1971, it had a total of 6 collective bargaining
agreements with private respondent Philips Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-
FFW), a registered labor union and the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees of PIDI.
- In the first CBA, the supervisors (referred to in RA 875), confidential employees,
security guards, temporary employees and sales representatives were excluded in
the bargaining unit. In the second to the fifth, the sales force, confidential
employees and heads of small units, together with the managerial employees,
temporary employees and security personnel were excluded from the bargaining
unit. The confidential employees are the division secretaries of light/telecom/data
and consumer electronics, marketing managers, secretaries of the corporate
planning and business manager, fiscal and financial system manager and audit and
EDP manager, and the staff of both the General Management and the Personnel
Department.
- In the sixth CBA, it was agreed that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of service
engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the coverage of the
bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration. The parties failed to agree on a
voluntary arbitrator and the Bureau of Labor Relations endorsed the petition to the
Executive Labor Arbiter of the NCR for compulsory arbitration.
- March 1998, Labor Arbiter: A referendum will be conducted to determine the will
of the service engineers and sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion
in the bargaining unit. It was also declared that the Division Secretaries and all staff
of general management, personnel and industrial relations department,
secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees are deemed
excluded in the bargaining unit.
- PEO-FFW appealed to the NLRC; NLRC declared PIDI's Service Engineers, Sales
Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and
Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems
are included within the rank and file bargaining unit, citing the Implementing Rules
of E.O 111 and Article 245 of the Labor Code (all workers, except managerial
employees and security personnel, are qualified to join or be a part of the
bargaining unit)

Issue:
-Whether service engineers, sales representatives and confidential employees of
petitioner are qualified to be part of the existing bargaining unit
- Whether the "Globe Doctrine" should be applied

Held:
NLRC decision is set aside while the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is
reinstated. Confidential employees are excluded from the bargaining unit while a
referendum will be conducted to determine the will of the service engineers and
sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion from the bargaining unit, but
those who are holding supervisory positions or functions are ineligible to join a
labor organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form a
separate labor organization of their own.

Ratio:
The exclusion of confidential employees:
The rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist
or join a labor union equally applies to confidential employees. With the presence
of managerial employees in a union, the union can become company-dominated
as their loyalty cannot be assured. In Golden Farms vs Calleja, the Court states that
confidential employees, who have access to confidential information, may become
the source of undue advantage.
As regards to the sales representatives and service engineers, according to the
OSG, there is no doubt that they are entitled to form a union as they are not
disqualified by law from doing so.
Globe Doctrine:
Globe Doctrine states that in determining the proper bargaining unit, the
express will or desire of the employees shall be considered, they should be allowed
to determine for themselves what union to join or form. The best way is through a
referendum, as decreed by the Executive Labor Arbiter. However, in this case,
since the only issue is the employees' inclusion in or exclusion from the bargaining
unit in question, the Globe Doctrine has no application in this case. The doctrine
applies only in instance of evenly balanced claims by competitive groups for the
right to be established as the bargaining unit. (many unions 'competing' to be the
bargaining representative?)

cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false

statement or fraud under the circumstances The union having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for THE
CORPORATION is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of
CLUP-THE CORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately
commence voluntary recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.

#4 Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (SLECC) v. Secretary of Labor

G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009

Facts:
On February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), instituted
a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of
petitioner and its affiliates. The Med Arbiter ordered the dismissal of the petition
due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. In the meantime, CLUP-Sta.
Lucia, reorganized itself and re-registered itself as CLUP- Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Workers Association (CLUP-SLECCAWA), limiting its membership to
the rank and file employees, and filed a petition. It was issued a Certificate of
Creation of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004. CLUP-SLECCSA alleged that
SLECC employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees
belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members. CLUP-SLECCWA claimed
that no certification election has been held among them within the last 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered with
DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 22 June 2001 covering the same employees,
namely the Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC), it has
not been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of SLECC’s employees.
The company (SLECC) filed a motion to dismiss and averred that it recognized the
the Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) as the
exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees and that the
collective bargaining negotiation already commenced. On November 2001, a CBA
was ratified between the company and the SMSLEC. CLUP-SLECCAWA opposed
the execution of CBA as the same is tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy.
Med Arbiter dismissed CLUP-SLECCAWA’s petition for direct certification on the
ground of contract bar rule. On appeal, Secretary of Labor (SOLE) reversed and
set aside Med Arbiter’s decision. The company filed a petition before the CA, the
CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC
with SMSLEC could bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election

Ruling:
NO. Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as "any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions
of employment." Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the
Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a
certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and
shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity
of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECCAWWA was a legitimate labor organization at
the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot,
by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECCAWWA represented an appropriate
bargaining unit. The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status
of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized
establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining
representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECCAWWA filed a petition for certification
election on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of 20 July
2001. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the
subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and
SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for certification
election.

Doctrine of Judicial Stability

REBECCO PANLILIO, ERLINDA PANLILIO and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, petitioners, vs.
HON. JOSEFINA G. SALONGA, Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati Branch 149 and FE V.
FEDERIS, respondents. G.R. No. 113087 June 27, 1994
FACTS: • Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio is said to be the natural child of petitioner
Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and private respondent Fe V. Federis while principal
petitioners Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio are the natural grandparents of the minor,
being the parents of Jose Marcel E. Panlilio. • Owing to the so-called cruelty, moral
depravity and gross neglect of private respondent, the grandparents felt obliged to
exercise substitute parental authority over the minor which apprehension led to
the initiation of special proceedings geared towards securing their appointment as
guardians ad litem of the ward. • RTC of Naic, Cavite: It is to the best interest of
the minor Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio, the natural grandson of petitioners, for
Spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio who are presently in custody of the minor, to
be appointed guardian ad litem pending determination of the merits of this case. •
A petition for habeas corpus was submitted by private respondent and later
assigned to Branch 149 of the RTC in Makati. • The Makati court immediately
ordered the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. • Petitioners moved to dismiss
the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis pendentia as well as lack of cause of
action while herein private respondent filed her own motion to dismiss in the
Cavite custody case anchored on improper venue and the existence of a prejudicial
question.
HELD: Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. — If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court of judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed . . .

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an
insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the
habeas corpus case on account of the previous assumption of jurisdiction by the
Cavite court, and the designation of petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward.
Verily, the existence of an anterior suit, such as the termination of private
respondent's parental authority in the Cavite court, coupled with the order
appointing principal petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward, is sufficient to
momentarily stave off private respondent's short-cut and subtle attempt to regain
custody of her son at another forum, by reason of the corollary principle that initial
acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its
own jurisdiction. • It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it
is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
courts". • In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent
jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority
continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and
completely disposed of, and that no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to
interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal
prosecutions, and to courtsmartial. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted
and the Honorable Josefina G. Salonga, Presiding Judge of Branch 149 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby directed to dismiss the habeas corpus
case.
ARTEMIO INIEGO, Petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, City of Manila, and FOKKER C. SANTOS, Respondents. G. R. No. 166876
March 24, 2006 FACTS: • PR Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and
damages against Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and
against petitioner Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. • The
complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident when a freight truck allegedly being
driven by Pinion hit PR’s jitney which PR was driving at the time of the accident. •
PR filed a Motion to Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the latter
to file his answer. • Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the cause of action of the case. • Public respondent Judge Purganan (RTC) denied
the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and the Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default of PR because it gave merit to IÑEGOwhi alleged that he never received
the Order. • PR: RTC has exclusive jurisdiction because the cause of action is the
claim for damages, which exceeds P400,000.00. The complaint prays for actual
damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding
attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being
claimed is P490,000.00. • RTC: This court is of the view that the main cause of
action is not the claim for damages but quasi-delict. But since fault or negligence
(quasidelicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation, this court has
exclusive jurisdiction. • CA: affirmed. • PETITIONER: Actions for damages based on
quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the
jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the municipal courts or the Regional Trial
Courts, depending on the value of the damages claimed. Further, that the moral
and exemplary damages claimed by PR be excluded from the computation of the
total amount of damages for jurisdictional purposes

because the said moral and exemplary damages arose, not from the quasi-delict,
but from the petitioner’s refusal to pay the actual damages. HELD: Respondent
Judge concluded that since fault or negligence in quasi-delicts cannot be the
subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
affirmed respondent Judge in this respect. • Respondent Judge’s observation is
erroneous. • It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. • A
cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff." • The "subject matter
of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands,
chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict
or wrong committed by the defendant." • Actions for damages based on quasi-
delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for
the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The
damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury
caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by
the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely
incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. • We therefore rule that the subject
matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary
estimation. Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict,
claims for damages arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the
fault or negligence of the defendant) should not be included in the computation of
the jurisdictional amount. • We cannot give credence to petitioner’s arguments. •
The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-
delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more
apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from the same
cause of action: the quasi-delict.
•

All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as
many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d)
of said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action
are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the
test of jurisdiction. Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are
based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total
amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the
RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and
exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.

In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of
pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or
the municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. In this case,
the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the
claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of
courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different
causes of action. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.