Civil Code - Annotated by Paras

Notebook: Persons and Family Relations

Created: 8/18/2019 10:13 PM Updated: 9/3/2019 3:52 PM
Author: pam.miraflr@gmail.com
URL: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

I. INTRODUCTION
ARTICLE II

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

ARTICLE XV 
THE FAMILY

SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

Ergo, marriage is the fundamental foundation of the nation

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
SECTION 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State
may also do so through just programs of social security.

B. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (RA

386)

CHAPTER 1 - PRELIMINARY TITLE

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

Article 1 - This act shall be known as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
    - created via Executive Order 48 on March 20, 1947
    - Roxas Code Commission
    - President Manuel Roxas, Dr. Jorge Bocobo (chairman), Judge Guillermo Guevarra,
Dean Pedro Yllagan, Francisco Capistrano
    - Arturo Tolentino was initially part of the committee, but withdrew for the
upcoming elections since he was running as congressman
    - Dr. Carmelino Alvendia took his place
    - The code was created on May 8, 1947 to December 15, 1947
    - January 26, 1949, the Civil Code was passed, "An Act to Ordain and Institute the
Civil Code of the Philippines"

Article 2 - Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided.
    - EO 200 amended this article during President Corazon Aquino's time
    - the law should be published either in Official Gazette and any general publication,
and the fifteen-day grace period will take effect
    - the clause "unless otherwise provided" refers to the 15-day grace period, and not
to the type of publication itself. 
 
Article 3 - Ignorance to the law excuses no one
    - established based on necessity (Zulueta v. Zulueta)
    - to allow someone to use ignorance as an excuse only instigate public disorder
    - only applies to mandatory and prohibitory laws
    - notice of publication would violate the maxim
    - ignorance of fact eliminates criminal intent as long as there is no negligence
    - ignorance to foreign law is only ignorance to fact

 processual presumption - if the foreign law is not properly alleged and without
proof, it will be presumed that it is the same with our law

    -  ignorance to facts or mistake of facts is excusable

a man who thought his first wife is dead and married a second wife is only
called for ignorance of fact

    - a mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be a basis for "good

faith". 

a land owner with a void contract is considered possessor in in good faith if the
law difficult to apply, and his penalties will be mitigated

Article 4 - Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided
    - statutes are to be constructed only to have a prospective nature to avoid injustice
    - you cannot waive future fraud or crime
    Exceptions:
     a. Retroactive effect is expressly permitted (but not ex post facto, as for criminal
laws)

     Family Code Art 256 states, "the law shall have a retroactive effect as long
as it doesn't impair vested rights"

     b. Penal Laws     

         Exception: Favorable to the accused
         Exception to the exception: not a habitual delinquent
     c. Remedial Laws
         - no substantive rights are involved
         - since there are no vested rights in the rules of procedure
     d. Urgent laws authorized by the police power
     e. Curative Laws
         Exception: must not impair vested rights      
     f. Substantive right declared first time 
         Exception: must not impair vested rights    

II. CIVIL PERSONALITY

A. PERSONS

BOOK 1 - PERSONS

Art. 37.  Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)

Person - any natural or artificial being capable of possessing legal rights and
obligation 

2 Types of Persons:

1. Natural Persons - human beings created by God through the intervention of

parents
2. Juridical Persons - created by law

CHAPTER II NATURAL PERSONS

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

Personality does not begin at birth, it begins at conception.

Presumptive Personality - personality at conception
Actual Personality - personality at birth
A fetus has a personality and legal rights since it is presumed to be born later.
     
In the case of abortive infants
        - parents who involve in abortion are entitled to MORAL DAMAGES ONLY
(disappointment of parental expectation, distress) and not to ACTUAL DAMAGES
(injury to the rights of the deceased

GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS 

Geluz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-16439, 20 July 1961

FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar Lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the
petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some
time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and
to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her
pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was
employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter
Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the
province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t
have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:
Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
RULING:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death
of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently alive.
Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly
indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead
of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only
he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining
a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000
attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.

A parent or guardian who refuse to screen their newbowns may do so provided that
they understand the risks of undiagnosed heritable conditions.

 
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

2 Types of Children:

1. Ordinary - has an intra-uterine life of at least 7 months

2. Extraordinary - intra-uterine life is less than 7 months, provided that the
newborn lives for 24 hours after birth

A conceived child may be acknowledged even before it is born. A person can donate
for an unborn child since it is presumed that the child will be born in the future.
However, if the unborn child dies, the donation will not be credited.

The requirement that the child should be in human form is eliminated since science
proved that no monster can be born out of a person.

 Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined
by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

Civil personality is only extinguished by death. Civil interdiction only restricts capacity
to act.

Effect of physical death is determined by:

1. Law
2. Contract
3. Will
If person A is a voluntary heir to person B but person A dies before person B, person
A cannot be represented by their heir.

Other legal effects of death:

1. Right to support ends

2. Marriage ends
3. Tenure of public office ends
4. The estate of a deceased shall be subject to taxes similar to when he was still
alive

The estate of the deceased becomes a "person" to continue the personality of the
deceased in order to settle debts.

PEOPLE VS. TIROL AND BALDESCO

Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to
the other. (33)

This article only applies in succession cases.

Presumptions on Survivorship under the Rules of Court

The following are the determiners of survivorship if two persons perish without
knowing who died first:

1. If both were under 15 years, the older is presumed to have survived.

2. If both were above 60, the younger is presumed to have survived.
3. If one is under above 60 and other is under 15, the younger is presumed to have
survived.
4. If bother is under under 60 and higher that 15, (a) the male is presumed to have
survived if both are of different sexes and (b) the older is presumed to have
survived if they are both the same sex
5. If one is under 15 or above 60, then the other is somewhere between 15-60, the
latter is presumed to have survived.

JOAQUIN VS NAVARRO

FACTS: During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following
sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70);
Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son
Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The building was set on
fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave the
building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and
neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and
rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many
people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and Francisco sought refuge
in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On February 10, 1945, on their way to
St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed.
The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son
outlived his mother.

ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.

[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If mother died
first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit]

HELD: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This
presumption was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence on which civil cases are to be decided, this inference
should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect, circumstantial or
inferential

Doctrine of Preponderence - evidence that is more probable than not

B. JURIDICAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY TO ACT

Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act

fitness to be the subject of legal

power to do acts with legal effect
relations
 Inherent Acquired

Passive Active

Lost through death but may be restricted

Lost only through death
by some other causes

Can exist without capacity to act Cannot exist without Juridical Capacity

Capacidad Juridica Capacidad de Obrar

to holld and enjoy rights attitute to exercise those rights

always limited

Full or Complete Civil Capacity - union of 2 kinds of capacity

                                                     - plena capacidad civil
                                                     - a 1 yr old child does have juridical capacity but no
capacity to act, when he reaches 18 he obtains Complete Civil Capacity

1.Presumption of Capacity
A person is presumed to have capacity to act unless otherwise proven.

Standard Oil v. Arenas, G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, 1911

FACTS: Standard Oil sued 5 debtors for payment, including appellant Vicente
Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. CFI Manila ordered the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. While the judgment was in the course of
execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente, appealed and alleged that her husband
was declared insane.

ISSUE: W/N suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion
that the person does not have capacity to act

HELD: Villanueva possess the capacity to act. No evidence that a person suffering
from a monomania of wealth is really insane and incapable of binding himself in a
contract. Capacity to act must be presumed to attach to every person who has not
been previously declared to be incapable, and to continue until the contrary is proven

NOTES:

FACTS: 

December 8, 1908
Juan Codina Arenas, Francisco Lara del Pino. Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto
Villanueva, Siy Ho
Signed a bond to pay jointly and severally an amount Php3,305.76 at 3 months
from date with a Php1 interest per month
April 5, 1909- Standard Oil Company of New York sued the 5 debtors to pay
the amount with the interest therein
During the execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, wife of one of the Apellant
Vicente Sixto de Villanueva, appeared to court and declared that:
1. His husband was declared insane by the CFI Manila 
2. She was assigned as the guardian
3. She declared that her husband was already insane when he signed the
bond
4. She asked to relieve her husband from the case

RULING:
Every person is presumed to have the capacity to act unless otherwise proven. In
this case, Mr. Villanueva was held to possess the capacity to act since there was no
evidence that a person suffering from monomania is not capable of binding a
contract.

Mental health can restrict capcity to act:

1. Seriousness
2. The sole cause
3. There must be antecedence 

If we cannot prove it through the abovementioned, then we proceed to the presumption of

capacity to act
2.Restriction on the Capacity to Act:
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from
his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

A. Minority -  18 years old RA 6809

                - a minor who entered into a contract makes the contract voidable UNTIL
ANNULED
                - it is incorrect to say that minors don't have the capacity to act, their
capacity to act is just limited
                - unenforceable contract (canot go to court) - 2 minors in a contract
                - a minor must reimburse money if they benefitted from it
                - a verification of age is a must 

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law. (n)

i. Effect on Contracts

RULE 92, RULES OF COURT 

Sec. 1. Where to institute proceedings. - Guardianship of the person or estate of a

minor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the
province, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal
court of the chartered city where the minor or incompetent person resides, and if he
resides in a foreign country, in the Court of First Instance of the province wherein
his property or part thereof is situated; provided, however, that where the value of
the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace or municipal court, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Court of
First Instance.
In the City of Manila, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.

Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the word "incompetent"
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are
of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

Incompetent- those who suffer civil interdiction

 A minor cannot create a trust of any kind
A minor of at least 14 years old must give written consent to make a legal
adoption valid

Republic Act No. 6809             

December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN
YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

    "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless

otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
    "Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life, save the exceptions                 established by existing laws in special cases.
    
    "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

    "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or

responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second         and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code."

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations,
grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and
provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

NEW CIVIL CODE

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

CHAPTER 7
VOIDABLE CONTRACTS

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court.
They are susceptible of ratification. (n)

Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are
thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable
cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those
who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or
caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the 
contract. (1302a)

Art. 1398. An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore
to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with
their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
(1303a)

Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except
insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. (1304)

CHAPTER 8
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
    (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given
no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
   
    (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable
by action, unless the same,             or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in
writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore,
of the agreement cannot be received without the writing,          or a secondary
evidence of its contents:

            (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from
the making thereof;
            (b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
            (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual
promise to marry;
            (d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price
not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such
goods and chattels, or                         the evidences, or some of them, of such things
in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is
made by auction and entry is made by the                                         auctioneer in his
sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms
of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is       
                 made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
             (e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein;
             (f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

       (3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Title III. - NATURAL OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1423. Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a right of action to
compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but
on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their
performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural
obligations are set forth in the following articles.

Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the
annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to
demand the thing or price thus returned

Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily
pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation,
there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or
consumed it in good faith. (1160A)

CHAPTER 2
CAPACITY TO BUY OR SELL

Art. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may
enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the following
articles.
Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without
capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those
referred to in Article 290. (1457a)

Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,

clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he
completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even
beyond the age of majority. (124a)

Case Digest- Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215

FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the
defendant) and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha
Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their consent into the contract of
sale of the land they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister
of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of contract
asserting that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that
they were of legal age.

HELD:
The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and
entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court stated that they
will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled.
The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123,
Section 6 paragraph A which states that “whenever a party has, by its own
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe
a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

ESTOPPEL - rule of law that prohibits a person to deny something that they
previously said

BAMBALAN v MARAMBA
FACTS:
Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died
leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced
Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell their land as payment for the loan.
Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were threatening his
mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalan’s first cedula to
acknowledge the document.
ISSUE:
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.

RATIO:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution.
The Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this
case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him
as a minor.

Important Statutes:

Civil Code, Article 38.

Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.

Civil code, Art. 1327.

The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

Civil code, Art. 1390.

The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been
no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.

BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE

FACTS:
Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per
annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war.
Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first
instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they
signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were
ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for
consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract
of loan they have signed.
RATIO:
The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because
the minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3
of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them
similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous
sources in Jurisprudence – “in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual
and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract
as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of
deceit.”
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay
the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the
written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make
restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this
case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money
is equivalent to P1,166.67.

THE DEFENSE OR MINORTY WILL NEVER LAPSE

ii. Effects on Marriage

FAMILY CODE

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the

fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

iii. Effect on Crimes

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are
exempt from criminal liability:

    1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval

    When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established         for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same

     2. A person under nine years of age

     3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 80      of this Code.

     When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in

conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit
him to the care and custody of         his family who shall be charged with his
surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80 of this Code
    
      4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
      5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
      6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury
      7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful insuperable cause.
Chapter Two
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances;

    1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to
justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 
    2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the
case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions
of Art. 80

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either

sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave
felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further
proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care,
correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or
to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to
visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or
representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools
or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed hereinbelow until
such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court
may deem proper.
The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration
the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment
to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or
denomination to which they belong.
The Director of Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the
superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose
custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four
months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or bad
conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him.
The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by
the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his authorized
representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his
representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or
not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not. The
provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by
those contained herein.
If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions
mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of
Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law
may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the
care of a responsible person.chanrobles virtual law library
If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed
upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he
shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release.
In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the
institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him
when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be
found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he
shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment
corresponding to the crime committed by him.
The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to
which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or
relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the
discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those persons
liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are found
indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was
committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the
municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne
by the National Government: Provided, however, That whenever the Secretary of
Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses above
mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne by the
National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in
case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which
may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in settlement of said
indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and eighty-eight of the
Administrative Code.

    3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
    4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act.
    5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to
the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by
affinity within the same                 degrees.
    6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
    7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority
or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to
the presentation of the         evidence for the prosecution;
    8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his
fellow beings.
    9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of
the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
    10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to
those above mentioned

Chapter Four
APPLICATION OF PENALTIES
Section One. — Rules for the application of penalties
to the persons criminally liable and for the graduation of the same.

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When
the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
        1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted
from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty             shall be imposed, but always lower by
two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
        2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either

sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less
grave felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all
further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public
or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the
care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent
children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other
place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any
of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent
of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed
hereinbelow until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less
period as the court may deem proper. 

The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration
the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his
commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the
religious sect or denomination to which they belong

The Director of Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the
superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose
custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four
months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or
bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him.

The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened

by the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his
authorized representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his
representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good
or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not.
The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected
by those contained herein.

If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions
mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of
Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law
may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under
the care of a responsible person.

If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed
upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article,
he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release.

In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the
institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon
him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he
should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be
inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the
judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him.

The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution
to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or
relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the
discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those
persons liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are
found indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the offense
was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the
municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne
by the National Government: Provided, however, That whenever the Secretary of
Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses
above mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne
by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses;
and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue
allotments which may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in
settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and
eighty-eight of the Administrative Code.

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law 

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which
each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately,

or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the
inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in
the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be
no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that
part of their property exempt from execution.

RA 9344 :  https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2006/ra_9344_2006.html
RA 10630:  https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2013/ra_10630_2013.html

vi. Effect on Quasi-Delicts (unintentional mistake)

dELICTS- CRIMES

vICARIOUS Liability

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage  done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is  governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability  arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the  defendant.(n)

Article 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-
delict. (n)

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But  if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the  plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of  persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live  in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their  company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the  service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their  assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the  official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or  apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a  good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)

Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or  delivered in satisfaction of the
claim. (1904)
Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor or insane person shall be  answerable with his own property in
an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

B. Insanity or imbecility

Insanity - when a person's mind is sick

Imbecility - feeble-mindedness
                 - when a person thinks like a small child   

Insanity in one thing (movie stars, for example) is not necessarily insanity in
other things
Monomania - obsessions 
If a person is under guardianship because of insanity, he is of course presumed
insane if he should enter into a contract. But this presumption is only prima
facie orrebuttable. If it can be shown that he was acting during a lucid interval,
the contract will be considered valid

i. Effect on Contracts

New Civil Code

Section 1 - Consent
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
        (1) Unemancipated minors;
        (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to
write. (1263a)

Article 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts
agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a  hypnotic spell are voidable. (n)

Article 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to  make any restitution except
insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. (1304)

ii. Effects on Crimes

Revised Penal Code

 
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are
exempt from criminal liability:
    1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
    When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the  court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established         for persons thus afflicted,  which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
    2. A person under nine years of age.
    3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such  minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 80     of this Code.
    When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in
conformably with the provisions of  this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit
him to the care and custody of         his family who shall be charged  with his
surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person  mentioned in said Art. 80.
    4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault  or intention of causing it.
    5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
    6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury.
    7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful insuperable cause.
iii. Effect on Marriage

contracts are voidable unlike in the case of minors which is VOID

THE FAMILY CODE

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following gauses, existing at
the  time of the marriage:
    1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was  eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage
was  solemnized without the Consent     of the parents, guardian or person
having  substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the  age of twenty-one, sugh party freely cohabited with the other     and
both lived  together as husband and wife;
    2. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason,  freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
    3. That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party  afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely 
cohabited with the other as husband             and wife;
    4. That the consent of either party was obtained by forge, intimidation or
undue  influence, unless the same having disappeared or geased, sugh party
thereafter  freely gohabited with the             other as husband and wife;
    5. That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the  other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
    6. That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to
be  serious and appears to be incurable. (85a);

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the
following  persons and within the periods indicated herein:
    1. For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45, by the party whose parent
or  guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age
of  twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of
the  minor, at any time before such party reaches the age of twenty-one;
    2. For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse who
had  no knowledge of the other’s insanity; by any relative, guardian or person
having  legal charge of the insane,             at any time before the death of either
party; or by the  insane, spouse during a lugid interval or after regaining sanity;
    3. For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five  years after the discovery of the fraud;
    4. For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five  years from the time of the forge, intimidation or undue
influence disappeared  or ceased;
    5. For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45 by the injured party,
within  five years after the marriage. (87a)

iv. Effect on Quasi-Delicts

Quasi-delicts

Vicarious liability
 
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of  persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live  in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their  company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the  service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their  assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the  official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or  apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a  good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)

Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or  delivered in satisfaction of the
claim. (1904)

Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor or insane person shall be  answerable with his own property in
an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

Carillo vs Jaojoco , 46 Phil. 957

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity toact:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality,family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on accountof religious belief or political
opinion.

Facts:

Adriana Carillo, nine days afterwards was declared mentally incapacitated by

the Court of first Instance (CFI) which later on died.
 Miguela Carrillo, sister of Adrianna Carrillo and was appointed judicial
administratrix of the said estate brought action to the CFI for the annulment of
the said contract of sale.
The defendants were absolved from the complaint and from this judgment the
plaintiff appealed. Nov. 13, 1918
On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo was confined in “Hosppital de San
Juande Dios by reason of having a cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia
(Paralysisaffecting only one side of the body.), and there she was attended by
Doctor Ocampo until she left on December 18, 1918.o According to Dr. Ocampo,
the hemiplegia did not affect Adrianna’s headbut only one-half of her body.
Marcos Jaojoco and his father Justiniano, defendant-appellees, nephew
andbrother-in-law, respectively to the deceased, were the ones who took her to
thehospital and cared for her. Om December 18, 1918, Adrianna called a notary
public to execute the contractof sale of land (eleven parcels of land, situated in
the barrio of Ulong-Tubig,municipality of Carmona Province of Cavite)
containing an area of 330,409square meters, for the price of P4,000.
Nine days later, she dies and Miguela is appointed judicial administratrix of
saidestate. (It is interesting to note that Miguela was the surety of her sister
when the latter acquired it from her husband in January 1917.)

Issue: Whether or not Adriana was mentally incapacitated at the time the document
of sale was executed.

Held: No. The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that Adriana was mentally deranged was
insufficient.Being confined in a hospital does not prove insanity. Her doctor testified
that hersickness did not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Documents produced
beforethe Court before the execution of the document of sale, shows complex tasks
done by Adriana which couldn’t be done by a mentally incapacitated person It must
likewise benoted that the other witnesses of the plaintiff, who testified to the
incapacity of AdrianaCarrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time,
when according to them,she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is
proven by documents andthe testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the
case, it cannot be held thaton December 9, 1918, when Adriana Carrillo signed the
document, she was mentallyincapacitated. The fact that nine days after the execution
of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court
does not prove that shewas so when she executed the contract. After all, this can
perfectly be explained bysaying that her disease became aggravated subsequently.
Our conclusion is that priorto the execution of the document in question the usual
state of Adriana Carrillo was thatof being mentally capable, and consequently the
burden of proof that she was mentallyincapacitated at a specified time is upon him
who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficientproof to this effect is presented, her
capacity must be presumed.

US v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil 88
FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and daughter, as well as
injuring other persons with a bolo. Witnesses testified that he appeared to be insane
prior to the commission of the crime. Alleged evidence of defendant’s insanity was
shown when his eyes were very big and red and he looked like crazy.

ISSUE: W/N Vaquilar is suffering from insanity during the commission of the crime

HELD: Evidence was insufficient. Being crazy is not equal to being insane.

DUMAGUIN VS REYNOLDS
FULL: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1952/sep1952/gr_l-3572_1952.html

Weather or not 
C. State of Being Deaf-Mute

i. Effect 

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

to be witness, you must have the ability to perceive and communicate what you have
perceived
same ruling for minors

SUBSECTION 3. Forms of Wills

Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will,
if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two  persons to read it and
communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)
 

SUBSECTION 4. -Witnesses to Wills

Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more,
and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and  write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code. (n)

deaf mute cannot be a witness to signing a will kay basi naay

a person must be able to see and hear while the testator is 
PEOPLE VS. SASOTA FULL: 
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1928octoberdecisions.php?id=116

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS.

ABELARDO: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/may1961/gr_l-12777_1961.html

D. Prodigality (the state of squandering money or property with a morbid desire to

prejudice the heirs of a person).

MARTINEZ VS
MARTINEZ: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_198694_2013.html
E. Civil Interdiction - the court's deprivation of a right (subsidiary liablity, or
additional penalty, this only takes effect in higher penalties)

Examples:

To have marital or parental authority

To be the guardian or a person and property of a ward
To dispose of his property by an act inter vivos 
To manage his own property

Effect in general of the restrictions:

    (a) The restrictions in Art. 38 do not extinguish capacity to act. They merely restrict
or limit the same. Thus, an insane person’s contract is merely voidable, not void.
    (b) The incapacitated person is not exempt from certain obligations arising from
his acts.

Example: If he commits a crime, his property may still be held liable.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of  parental authority, or guardianship, either as to
the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to  manage his
property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance
inter vivos.

FAMILY CODE
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any
other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent
court to be made a party thereto. (123a)

F. Family Relations

FAMILY CODE
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from
the  beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
    1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
    2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full- or half-blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:
    1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to
the  fourth givil degree;
    2. Between step-parents and step-children;
    3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
    4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
    5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted ghild;
    6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
    7. Between an adopted ghild and a legitimate child of the adopter;
    8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
    9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other  person’s spouse or his or her own spouse. (82a).

A father has an obligation to give support to his family and children.

Where no improper or unlawful motivation — such as the presence of a
personal grudge against the accused — is shown, mere blood or family
 relationship with the victim does NOT render the clear and positive testimony
of witnesses less worthy of full faith and credit.

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, diregt or indiregt,

between the spouse during the marriage shall be void, exgept moderate gifts whigh
the spouses may give eagh other on the oggasion of any family rejoiging. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage

Article 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though
there be a separation of property agreed upon inthe marriage settlements or by
judicial decree.

Article 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:
    (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements;
or
    (2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under article 191.
(1458a)

G. Absence

NEW CIVIL CODE

CHAPTER 4 - PRESUMPTION OF DEATH

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for  all purposes, except for those of
succession.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

The wife has to wait for 

H. Gender

NEW CIVIL CODE

Article 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is
governed by this Code, even if her marriage was  celebrated under the former laws.
(n)

Juana married Pedro in 1947. Is her capacity to execute

acts and contracts governed by the new Civil Code?

ANSWER: Yes, under Art. 2259 which provides that the

capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts
is governed by the new Civil Code, even if her marriage was
celebrated under the former laws.

RULES OF PROCEDURE
RULE 3 
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties.
            Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
SILVERIO VS
REPUBLIC: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html
RP vs
CAGANDAHAN: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_166676_2008.html

CHAPTER III - JURIDICAL PERSONS

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)

Two kinds of Juridical Persons

1. Public Juridical Person

1. The State itself
2. Public corporations like the province and the city (these corporations are
formed for the Government or the State)
2. Private Juridical Persons
1. Private corporations (formed for the private benefit or aim)
2. Partnerships
3. Foundation

Personality of Private Juridical Persons

-starts when issued with a CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
-it is not separate with the personality of its people since it would result to injustice    
-e.g. Postal Savings Bank, Philippine Normal University, Private Hospitals

Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are
governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)

Nationality of a corporation depends upon where it is registered.

A corporation must have Philippine-based capital of 60% to enjoy rights to
public utilities,to acquire land and properties, etc.
During war, the Philippines can pierce the veil of corporate identity and freeze
all assets of the foreign corporation. 

Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. (38a)

Rights of Juridical Persons:

1. Acquire and posses property of all kinds

2. Incur obligations
3. Bring civil actions

Stockholders of a particular corporation can be held for the obligations of the

corporation if it is found out that stockholders use the corporation as an alter ego

Partnerships and Corporations

 A corporation cannot form a partnership since the relationship of trust and
confidence found in partnerships are absent in corporations. But is can join
other corporations as long as it has the same principles and character.

Foreign Entities

A religious corporation owned by foreigners cannot acquire lands in the PH. 

American citizens can acquire lands in the PH through Parity Amendment,
provided that in his state Filipinos are granted the same parity rights.

Estoppel 

a person who contracts with a corporation cannot later deny his personality
an agent of a non existing corporation can be sued personally since the
corporation doesn't have juridical personality because of its noon-existence

Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for
public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other
assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If
nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be
applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or
municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal
benefits from the same. (39a)

For Public Corporations/Associations:

assets will be distributed according to its provisions. If no provisions exist, the

assets will be divided to the place where it gave its principal benefits before the
dissolution

A corporation can only exercise it powers and do transactions through board of

directors, agents, and officers when permitted by its by laws.

Family or Close Corporation

a family corporation should serve as a rallying point for family unity and
prosperity and not as a flashpoint for familiar strife.
the decision on the business is directed on the board and not in the courts

Dissolved Corporations

a dissolved corporation can still sue or be sued for the next three years through
its counsel

III. MARRIAGE
A. DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

Marriage - special contract

                - status or a relation in an institution
                - inviolable

1. Relevant Provisions 
FAMILY CODE

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance  with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is  the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed  by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage  settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within  the limits provided by
this Code. (52a)

ARTICLE XV PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

The Family

SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

2. Breach of Promise to Marry

WASSMER VS VELEZ

Facts:

Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez applied for a license to contract marriage
on August 23, 1954 and was subsequently issued.
They decided to get married on September 4, 1954
On September 2, 1954, Velez left a note to his fiance, saying that they have to
postpone the wedding since his mother is against it.
The next day, September 3, 1954, Velez sent another telegram to her, saying
that he shall return soon. However, he did not appear on the wedding.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages but Velez filed no answer
April 29, 1955, judgement was rendered and Velez was charged Php2000
(actual damages), Php25,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and Php2500
for attorney's fees
Defendant asserts that the damages awarded to him were excessive and that
there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of
promise to marry

Issue: Whether or not moral and exemplary damages should be solicited when a
breach of promise to marry occurs?

Ruling:
        Yes. While breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, the plaintiff
can still solicit for moral and exemplary damages

Article 21 of the Family Code provides that any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another shall give compensation for the damages incurred
 In the case at bar, since the wedding was already set, invitations, dresses and
other paraphernalia were already purchased.
It was asserted that this is not a case of breach of promise to marry, but a case
of fraud since the defendant suddenly left after everything is already prepared.

TANJANCO vs CA

Facts:

Apolonio Tanjanco and Araceli Santos were in a relationship. Araceli Santos

gave Apolinio her "carnal access" since he promised to marry her. 
Araceli became pregnant and she resigned from her job in IBM Philippines to
avoid embarrassment.
Apolonio refused to marry Araceli, in contrary to what he promised her
As a result, she was unable to support herself and her child and thereby
suffered mental anguish
Araceli filed a suit against Apolonio to recognize the unborn and to pay her not
less that Php430 per month to support the baby, plus Php100,000 moral and
exemplary damages and Php10,000 attorney's fees
CFI dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action
Santos appealed to the Court of Appeals, and it ruled that there is a cause of
action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code
Tanjanco appealed to the CA and asserts that pleading for the actions for
breach of a promise to marry is not permissible in this jurisdiction

Issue: Whether or not moral and exemplary damages can be solicited to the person
who seduced the other party to agree to marry but reneges afterwards

Ruling:  No. Breach of promise to marry is technically not punishable by law. 

Although the aggrieved party was morally tormented, she doesn't have the right to
action.

Seduction to agree to marriage connotes deceit and fraud. However, in the

case at bar, Araceli was not seduced since she dated Apolonio for a year, and
the she voluntarily subimitted herself. There is no such evidence that she was
forced or seduced to give Apolonio her "carnal access". Therefore, the decision
of the CA was reversed and the decision of the CFI was affirmed.

DE JESUS VS SYQUIA

Facts:

Antonia Loanco de Jesus, a cashier at a barber shop, had an amorous

relationship with Cesar Syquia, who is a frequent in the barber shop where
Antonia worked since his brother owns tha shop
Antonia became pregnant and Cesar supported her needs. Cesar even
acknowledged the child through a letter that he gave to the priest who
presided the Christening of the child
Antonia and Cesar lived together with their "junior". However, then Antonia
conceived their second child, Cesar's  ardor abated then he suddenly married
another woman

Issue: Whether or not Syquia should be liable for the breach of promise of marriage
since he married another woman while recognizing Ismael as his son

Ruling: No. Syquia cannot be liable for breach of promise to marriage since he did
not expressly acknowledge Ismael as his son

Art. 135 of the Family Code provides that the father may be compelled to
acknowledge his natural child when there is an indisputable paper that
 indicates his acknowledgement as the father of the child and when the child
has uninterrupted connection or possession with the father
In the case at bar, while Cesar left a note to the priest recognizing Ismael, it was
not clear who the "creature born in June" is. The note was vague and it cannot
be held as evidence at court
The said child also did not enjoy the uninterrupted possession with his father
Therefore, Syquia cannot be liable.

3. On Private Contracts

IN RE ATTY ROQUE SANTIAGO

Facts:

Ernesto Baniquit sought legal advise to Atty Roque Santiago, an attorney and
notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros
Ernesto was living separated from his wife for 9 years, and he wants to seek for
second marriage
Atty Roque Santiago assured Ernesto that he can grant his request
Atty Roque Santiago prepared a contract stating that the two authorize each
other to remarry, and that they renounce their right to action they might have
against the other party remarrying. Both parties agreed and signed the
contract
Ernesto Baniquit then married Trinidad Aurelio
Atty Roque Santiago realized that what he did what morally wrong so he asked
both parties to sign the cancellation of contract he created to declare the
previous contract void

Issue: Can a married couple agree to remarry using a private contract?

Ruling: No. 

Under Article 1 of the Family Code, marriage is deemed as inviolable. Marriage

should be protected because it is the foundation of the family.
Article 221 of the New Civil Code also declares that any contract for personal
separation of husband and wife shall be void
Any lawyer who forges an instrument that destroys the inviolability of marriage
shall be disbarred

SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA

Facts: 

Judge Alejandro Mendoza was charged for extrajudicially liquidating the

conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife and authorizing the other
spouse to commit infidelity
Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband
and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the

           marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).

Judge Mendoza asked for a compassionate view in his case since he served the
public for 43 years already and that by the time he was designated in court, the
New Civil Code was not yet passed

Issue: Whether or not a married couple can divide their properties after marriage in
the grounds of mutual agreement
           Whether or not the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void  

Ruling: No. Liquidating the conjugal property constitutes to the nullification of

marriage which is prohibited by law

Article 221 Paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code declares that "Every extra-judicial
agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of  property between husband and wife
shall be void and of no effect"

B. REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

FAMILY CODE

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing

officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided  for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

REVISED PENAL CODE

ARTICLE 350. Marriage Contracted Against Provisions of Laws. — The penalty of

prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article,
shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

1. Essential Requisites

1. Legal Capacity: Male and Female

                        a. Vernmont Act No. 91

                          b. Netherlands Act of 21 December 2000

   Civil marriage Civil marriage (‘huwelijk’) is regulated by Book 1 of the Civil Code
(Burgerlijk Wetboek = CC). Since 1 April 2001 art. 30(1) of Book 1 states that a
‘marriage can be contracted by two persons of different sex or of the same sex ’. On
that date civil marriage was opened up to same-sex couples by the amendment of
this article (and some others) by the law of 21 December 2000 (Staatsblad 2001, nr.
9). Also on 1 April 2001 the possibility of adoption was opened up to same-sex
partners, whether married, registered as partners or only cohabiting (law of 21
December 2000, Staatsblad 2001, nr. 10). Summary-translations into English of parts
of these laws can be found at www.emmeijers.nl/waaldijk. See also the translation of
Book 1 of the Civil Code, by Sumner & Warendorf, cited above. There are only two
legal differences between a marriage of two people of the same sex and a marriage
of two people of different sexes. One exception concerns intercountry adoption,
which is only available to married different-sex couples (see item A5, below). The
other exception is the presumption of paternity: when a child is born to a woman
married to a man, the man is deemed to be the father of the child. That rule does not
apply when a child is born to a woman married to another woman (see item A1,
below). However, since 2002 a new rule provides that when a child is born in a
marriage of two women, both women automatically get joint parental authority over
the child, unless a man has acknowledged the child as his own before its birth (see
items A1 and A3).

                        c. Frank Malilong's article:  https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/10652

                        d. Jones vs Hallahan 

                        Facts: 

The appellants, each of whom is a female person, seek review of a

judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they were
not entitled to have issued to them a license to marry each other.
Appellants argue that denying them license to marry each other
equates to denying them three basic constitutional rights: right to
marry, right of association, right to exercise freedom of religion
The sections of Kentucky statutes relating to marriage do not
include a definition of that term. But common dictionaries would
define marriage as, "legal union of man and woman"

                

                        Issue: Whether or not appellants are entitled to the license of marriage
since both are females

                      Ruling: No. Appellants are not entitled to the license to marry since
both are incapable of achieving it

Marriage is expressly defined as a civil union between a man

and woman, the appellants are not qualified with the
requisites of marriage
The claim of religious freedom cannot be extended to make
the professed doctrines superior to the law of the land and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself

                        e. Goodridge vs. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309

                        Facts: 

The plaintiffs are fourteen individuals from five Massachusetts

counties.
In March and April, 2001, each of the plaintiff couples attempted to
obtain a marriage license from a city or town clerk's office.
Their request was denied since Massachusetts does not recognize
same sex marriage 
On April 11, 2001, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court
against the department and the commissioner seeking a judgment
that denying them the marriage license violates Massachusetts law.
Department of Public Health concluded that prohibiting same-sex
marriage rationally furthers the Legislature's legitimate interest in
safeguarding the "primary purpose" of marriage, "procreation."
DOPH added that heterosexual marriages provide the healthiest
environments to raise children
The trial court ruled in favor of the DOPH

                        Issue: Is the denial of marriage to same-sex couples a violation of
the Massachusetts Constitution? 

                        Ruling: Yes. 

There is no evidence that the purpose for marriage is to procreate

or that children living in households with heterosexual parents
 grow up in a healthier environment                than children who
group in households with homosexual parents. 

Similarly, Massachusetts does not have laws deny or provide aid

dependent on a couple’s marital status.                                         
Because the DOPH has not provided a rational basis to prevent
same sex couples from marriage, the decision of the lower courts
are reversed.

                        f. Baker vs State of Vermont

                        Facts:

Three same-sex couples who have lived together for a significant

period of time assails the statute regarding marriage, that it
should be interpreted broadly to include same sex-couples
Plaintiffs argue that denying them of marriage is unconstitutional
since it deprives them of benefits and protections that adheres to
marriage
Plaintiffs also add that the purpose of marriage is to protect and
encourage the union of committed couples
State argues that 

2. Consent Freely Given

            FAMILY CODE

            Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal  requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall                 not affect  the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible  for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and  administratively liable. (n)

            Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the  following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
            (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the  facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other                                     as husband and wife;

            
            PEOPLE VS. FELIPE SANTIAGO

             Facts:

On November 23, 1926, Felipe Santiago raped his deceased wife's niece,
Felicita Masilang
Felipe Santiago then took her to his brother's house
His brother fetched a protestant minister and officiated the marriage of
Felicita and Felipe

             Issue: Whether or not the marriage officiated by the protestant minister was
void since the other party was a minor

             Ruling: No. Marriage was not valid since

1. There was no bonafide intention of making her his wife

2. Felicita Masilang was a minor, it lacks consent
 3. The marriage was procured with force so as to escape from punishments
of rape

            EIGENMANN VS GUERRA

            
            Facts:

Eduardo Eigenmann was married to Maryden Guerra on 1957

Two years later, Eduardo filed to annul his marriage on the grounds that
he was still a minor at the time of the ceremony
That there was no consent from the parents of Eduardo to proceed to
the ceremony

            
            Issue: Whether or not implied consent can be grounds of nullification of
marriage

            Ruling: No. Eduardo's marriage cannot be annuled

Eduardo asserts that he was still a minor when the marriage was
procured. If so, parental consent must be present
Parental consent can be written, oral, or even implied
In the case at bar, Eduardo's mother was present during the ceremony,
and she did not object thereto. It is therefore implied that there was a
parental consent for the marriage to happen

            REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS

            Facts: 

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004

Marriage happened before the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong
December 6, 2006, Liberty filed for annulment of the marriage since she
only did it to acquire US citizenship
They never complied with their marital obligations because they did not
intend to marry in the first place

            Issue: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring

American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?

            Ruling: No. The intention of both parties to marry is immaterial, as long as
they consent to the marriage.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood

the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and
46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.
Marriage remains valid

3. Formal Requisites
 1. Authority of the Solemnizing Officer

    
                        Article 7 - Family Code 
                        Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
                        
                        (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the  court's jurisdiction;

                        (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect
duly authorized by his church or religious  sect and registered with the civil
registrar general, acting within                                 the  limits of the written authority
granted by his church or religious  sect and provided that at least one of the
contracting parties  belongs to the solemnizing officer's church                             or
religious sect;

                        (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case  mentioned in
Article 31;

                        (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain  is assigned,
in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article  32;

                        (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in
Article 10. (56a)

                        REVISED PENAL CODE

                        ARTICLE 352. Performance of Illegal Marriage Ceremony. — Priests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall
perform or authorize any illegal                         marriage ceremony shall be punished
in accordance with the provisions of the marriage law.

                        Local Government Code of 1991

                        Chapter 3, Article 1, Section 444    

                        Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding;

                        Absence of Authority

                    Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal  requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

                        A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect  the validity
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible  for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally                                                     and  administratively liable. (n)

                          NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY  

                          Facts:

Judge Hernando Domagtoy allegedly solemnized unlawful

marriages and was charged for fross misconduct and ignorance to
the law
The marriages were:
1. Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja (Sept 27, 1994). Gaspar was
living separately with his wife Ida Penaranda. Judge
Domagtoy presumed that the wife was dead
2. Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario. He
solemnized their marriage at his residence (40-50km away
from MCTC)
                           Issue: Did Judge Domagtoy acted with gross misconduct for
solemnizing the marriage of Gaspar and Arlyn without requisite summary
proceeding on Gaspar's first marriage?
                                       Did Judge Domagtoy acted with gross misconduct for
solemnizing the second marriage not which is not within his jurisdiction 

                           Ruling: Yes. Judge Domagtoy shall be liable for his gross misconduct

 According to the Article 41 of the Family Code, presumption

of death for pusposes of marriage needs a summary
proceeding. Affidavits that the wife was lost for 7 years is
not enought evidence

                                        Yes. Judge Domagtoy violated Article 8 of the Family Code

Under the Article 8 of the Family Code, "The marriage shall

be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church,  chapel or temple, or in the office
the consul-general, consul or  vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote  placesin
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both  of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which  case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
place  designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect."
Sumaylo & del Rosario were not under any of these
conditions.
Only appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire
country. Judges with specific jurisdictions can only officiate
within those areas.

                      

                        ARANES VS OCCIANO

                           Facts: 

Judge Occiano solemnized the wedding of Aranes and

Domindaor Orobia on February 17, 2000
The ceremony was held at the couple's residence in Nabua,
Camarines Sur
Judge Occiano refused to conduct the ceremony at first
since they lack marriage license
The couple filed their application of marriage license on
January 5, 2000 but failed to claim it afterwards
There was also no record of the alleged marriage at the Civil
Registrar
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding
might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the
assurance of the couple that they will provide the license
that same afternoon.
Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is
valid.

                          Issue: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial
jurisdiction.

                            Ruling: Yes. 

The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent

judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
 His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia
in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. 
Even though he did it out of compassion, he is still liable for
violating the law on marriage
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

                           PERFECTO VS ESIDERA 

                            Facts: 

On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative

Complaint against Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera of
Branch 20 of the RTC of Catarman, N. Samar for falsification
of public document and dishonesty.
The complainant Perfecto alleged that Judge Desales-
Esidera was first married to Richard Tang Tepace on May 7,
1987 at the Metropolitcan Trial Court of Manila.
On Oct. 3, 1990, she gave birth to a daughter with Renato
Verano Esidera.
Her marriage to Richard Tang Tepace was later declared
void on January 27, 1992. Judge Desales-Esidera married
Renato Verano Esidera on June 3, 1992.
Judge falsified her daughter's birth certificate to make it
appear that she and Renato Verano Esidera were married on
March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child.
Judge in her defense says that the allegations are personal
and not judicial.

                            Issue: Following the separation of the church and of the state, did
Judge Desales-Esidera commit bigamy?

                            Ruling: No. Judge Desales-Esidera's marriage which was solemnized
by Fr. David was only for sacramental rites.

Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a

sacramental marriage and it has no legal effect.
Their solemnizing officer was not licensed to solemnize
marriage from the National Archives or from the civil
government. Under our law, respondent judge's marriage in
1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer's lack of
authority.
Religious marriages are recognized in and may be governed
by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements.
Religious marriages that lack some or all the requirements
under the law are invalid.
Therefore, Judge Desales-Esidera did not commit bigamy
since the second marriage was invalied in the eyes of the law