HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses

RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not one
of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence,
but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,[2] in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was undisturbed. Not
long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite[3] with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu[4] which rendered a decision[5] approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. They further
agreed:

(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the
complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house
and lot jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;

(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person
or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husbands consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated;[6]

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree
that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.[7]
 Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00
to P20,000.00 a month[8] a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his childrens
expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because
she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children
would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her
husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children for the following reasons:

1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract
without the written consent of her husband;

2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States and
had been transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by Immigration
authorities, and

3. Her husband had divorced her.

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too
meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished
custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald
V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These
children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D.
Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of
Adoption shall:

(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though
they were in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners;

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and,

(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this Decree
of Adoption for registration purposes.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the lower court was impelled by these reasons:

(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties with the Clavano
family, especially their maternal uncle, petitioner Ronald Clavano.

(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press,
real estate business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in
Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.

(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed Menchu, approved
of the adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and
the fact that she could not provide them a secure and happy future as she
travels a lot.

(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as they
would go to church together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.

(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos
Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos
while the two younger ones were observed by the court to have snuggled
close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.

On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on a very
shaky foundation because of its findings that:

(1) Petitioner was morally unfit to be the father of his children on account of his
being an improvident father of his family and an undisguised Lothario. This
conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his
 two sons and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao,
Mandaue City.

(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of comparatively recent
dates were attempts at verisimilitude as these were joint deposits the
authenticity of which could not be verified.

(3) Contrary to petitioners claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with Anna
Marie was dim if not nil because it was petitioner who devised, engineered
and executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court.

(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner is now an alien from the
standpoint of Philippine laws and therefore, how his new attachments and
loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an open question.

Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:

Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a
ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P.
161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only
without the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141
Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Cal. 469, 63 P. 736, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170
Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349;
97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) [9]

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to
the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give
their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study
report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:

Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of
the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who
has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs.
Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment
connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish
parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary
affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first
error.

Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in
fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes
from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra,
obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the
divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly
support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to
show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled
dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the childrens names totalling $2,126.98. The
last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support
commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987,
oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No
other remittances were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of
this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And
since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable
conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary
to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different banks, as follows

Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank

July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings, Daly City, Cal.,
1) 118-606437-4 Oct. 29, 1987 U.S.A.

March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank of

2) 73-166-8 Oct. 26, 1987 Williamson, West Virginia, U.S.A.

December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National Bank, Daly

3) 564-146883
Oct. 29, 1987 City, Cal., U.S.A.

The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositors name as trustee for
Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts
are operated and the amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said
that they belong to the minors. The second is an `or account, in the names of Herbert
Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is
operable only by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.

The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence `the aim
and purpose of providing for a better future and security of his family.[10]

Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the
decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a
manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and
his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that
prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioners parents. Moreover, he
alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the joint complaint for
divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took
exception to the appellate courts findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay
claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he is
still a father to his children. As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he
had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither
was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was
residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of
Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given
weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother
of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a
witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of
the Clavanos to claim that they could love the children much more than he could.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this
Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides -

ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of
Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency under whose
care the child may be;

(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)
 On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:

ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving
counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social
Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement
agency;

(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed
child-placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child
may be;

(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. [12] As
such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the
applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code
provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality;

(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents;

(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents,
if living with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and
 (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Underscoring
supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:

SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to
the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent,
and by the childs spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if there are no
such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is
in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society or person,
by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons;
but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to
the adoption shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement
of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child [13] or that such
parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even
without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of
adoption. Thus, the Court declared:

x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption

proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts
relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested,
than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held
that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption
statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. [14]

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioners consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
father as follows:

3. That the childrens mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given
her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex
`A. Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page
2 of this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left
his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox
copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex `B) which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant. [15]

The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent
of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child
by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence[16] dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue
for determination.The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary
issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father
to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. [17] This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.[18] However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority
to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform
to the evidence on record.[19]
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[20] this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the
following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion [21] on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is
on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another,
hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim ones rights or
interests.[22] In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.[23]
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment.Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. [24] While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:

1. Exh. 1 a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to Dear Bert
on a C.Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had
been a long time since the last time youve heard from me excluding that of the
phone conversation weve had. She discussed petitioners intention to buy a
motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could be engendered
by Keiths use of it. She said that in the last phone conversation she had with
petitioner on the birthday of Ma, she forgot to tell petitioner that Keiths voice had
changed; he had become a bagito or a teen-ager with many fans who sent him
Valentines cards. She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative
almost dalaga who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how
pretty she was in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores
de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she
was worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved
clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was smart
for his age and quite spoiled being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton
was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She
admitted having said so much about the children because they might not have
informed petitioner of some happenings and spices of life about themselves. She
said that it was just very exciting to know how theyve grown up and very
pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters. She ended the
letter with the hope that petitioner was at the best of health. After extending her
regards to all, she signed her name after the word Love. This letter was mailed on
July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).

2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of a note
from Menchu on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that we wrote to
petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when
petitioner called up last time. She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from
Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine, who
 was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioners call because she also
wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that
Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts
and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were growing up
and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be very fatherly about the childrens
needs because those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a
subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he
would incur, she would replace these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that
Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored Sperry topsider shoes.

3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:

Dear Herbert,

Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.

By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. Its nice to be thought of at
Xmas. Thanks again.

Sincerely,

Menchu

4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc.

addressed to Dear Dad. Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother to
stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes start(s) on June 16. He
informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the
motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and well see what
youre (sic) decision will be. He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and
shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He
told petitioner that they had been going to Lahug with their mother picking them
up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his
mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 oclock in the evening.
He wished his father luck and the best of health and that they prayed for him and
their other relatives. The letter was ended with Love Keith.

5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the
Christmas card with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00 and the card of Joeton with $5.00
inside. He told petitioner the amounts following his fathers instructions and
promise to send money through the mail. He asked his father to address his letter
directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He informed petitioner
of activities during the Christmas season that they enjoyed eating, playing and
giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily schedule and that
their mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold their
blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become
very smart while Charmaine, who was also smart, was very demanding of their
mother. Because their mother was leaving for the United States on February 5,
they would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
things and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he would
make the sign of the cross even when they would pass by the Iglesia ni
Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead because he had seen
him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become
very maldita who was not always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton
was full of surprises. He ended the letter with Love your son, Keith. The letter
was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).

6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing suit,
key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She
reminded him of of her birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old.
She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had
fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9 although Keiths
classes had started on January 6. They would feel sad again because Mommy
would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them. She
signed, Love, Charmaine.

7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had not
been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila they
went to Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurels house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed
him that he got honors, Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had excellent
grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they
would be together in that school. He asked for his reward from petitioner and so
with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could
save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending them.
He said he missed petitioner and wished him the best. He added that petitioner
should call them on Sundays.

8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the latter.
She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the school and
something else. She promised not to spend so much and to save some. She said
she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said hi! to petitioner. After ending the
letter with Love, Joeton and Charmaine, she asked for her prize for her grades as
she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been writing
him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them; that he
learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around; that he would be
going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived
Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the official altar boy. He asked
petitioner to write them soon.

10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner that
he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the only one in
his group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty
and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised
petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of topsider
shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he was a member of the basketball
team and that his mom would drive for his group. He asked him to call them often
like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they
could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and
heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him so
long to write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked
petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that
the latter should buy something for Mommy.

11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card For My Wonderful Father dated October 8, 1984
from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.

12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, Our Wish For You with the year 83 written on
the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.

13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even when
their Mom was there where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked
petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to buy him a
motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed
petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their grades
were all good with Joeton receiving stars for excellence. Keith wanted a bow and
arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner would
come and visit them someday.

14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date January
1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that the latter sent
them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and
Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more
clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress to
match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make her look sexy. He
 intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was already ashamed
to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even though his mother had told him
not to be shy about it.

Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for
the benefit of his children.[25] Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the
children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards the
bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below attached a
high premium to the prospective adopters financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings
towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that
Keiths testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would
certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to
sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their
presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones act of snuggling close to
private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their
father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their
succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for
his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, [26] the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother. The Court said:

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent
promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a
decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.

In Celis v. Cafuir[27] where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother
and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered
by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the
opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride
and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make
her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to
be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might
yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with regret
consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of
taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother
who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her
associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood
count. x x x.

In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court stated that (I)n ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said:

A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel
are more intent on emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother separated from her
children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key
issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived
of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the
welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. (Italics supplied) [29]

Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.[30] The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children
would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he
received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie
between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their
whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems
and triumphs.
 The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioners meager
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his
family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the
process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not
exactly the paramount consideration that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally hamper her
job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her
because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. [31] In his testimony,
private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and
came home twice or three times, [32] thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left
her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children
when he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed
the adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Maries
brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the
task upon private respondents.[33]
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman,
private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. [34] Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could take care of the children while their parents are away, [35] thereby
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the childrens surname changed to
Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult
for them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. [36] To be sure, he also testified that
he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to
keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption
was allegedly the state of Anna Maries health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and
suffers from a heart ailment.However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not that
serious as she could still take care of the children. [37] An eloquent evidence of her ability to
physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles [38]- she
could not have been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos
attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he
was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would never be
at ease with the wife of their father.[39]
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to
the sons of Wilma Soco.[40] As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine
society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in
orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the
baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a
premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting
them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be
taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.
[41]
Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a bad husband does not
necessarily make a bad father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly
speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority
over the children.[42] Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he
took the trouble of sending a telegram[43] to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the
adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the
case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in
the United States.[44]
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement
with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United
States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to
refute petitioners testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal home,
[45]
pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. Hence, it
can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of his family,
particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to
show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family
money, no matter how meager.
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child
arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond
the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. [46] The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is
not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural
rights of the parents over the child.[47]
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the
basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents counsel, [48] the authority
given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was
all embracing[49] and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion
is however, anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to
enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis
as private respondents apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with
petitioners consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing
the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the exercise of
parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to
the childs services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions
regarding his care and control, education, health and religion.[50]
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of
which is vested by the law upon the parents,[51] as

x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose
of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental
authority, `there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. [52] (Italics
supplied)

As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived
of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation
case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of
the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise,
there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an
[53]

irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are
grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation
case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back
to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Maries motion for reconsideration
thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner,
such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.[54]
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for
adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption.[55] But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the
issue of petitioners abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escao[56] that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not
recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, [57] a case involving the
visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.

Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care
of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the
discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry
Adoption[58] and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of
Filipino children.[59]
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:

(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards
the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. [60]

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her
interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set
forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. [61]

(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s).[62]

Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of
particularrelevance to instant case are the following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
present Convention.[63]

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis, except if it is contrary to the childs best interests. [64]

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a
regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts
with both parents . . .[65]

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction
to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child.[66]

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes
with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best
interests of the child.This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right
of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--vis that
of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and
harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall
be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding
their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. [67] Said
petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law
and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
Balalong, respondents.
 DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document
itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or
destruction.Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the
marriage contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August
24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being

more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated
05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto. [2]

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision[3] is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein

Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:

a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract excluded under the best
evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L.
MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased

Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates
of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and
the deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of

Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by
then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case
No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-
appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate
as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity
of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim as the
legal heir of Alfredo.

The following issues were raised in the court a quo:

a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob
was valid;

b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr.
Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution
of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:

1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing
officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to,
nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his thumbmark on
said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a
Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged
date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as
husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial
 court concluded that the thumbmark was logically not genuine. In other words, not of
Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss of the
Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly gave the
copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. And as admitted by
appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the
date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed
Marriage Contract, it was one Benjamin Molina who signed on top of the typewritten name
of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of
records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally
adopted son of Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge

Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas signature in

the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken
at his residence on 01 October 1990.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then
presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from glaucoma.

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document

Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya
and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and
significant fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing
between the questioned and the standard signature and concluded that the questioned
and the standard signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one and the same
person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature, appellee
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former
NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two
(32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures
examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of
significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of
writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and
concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961
granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.

Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of
Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine
and authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and
declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. [4] (citations
omitted, emphasis in the original)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6,
par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed by
the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract.

And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be

established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be
proved. For it is the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of such document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of
the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence
of the contents of the reconstructedcontract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently
establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.

With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was
genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the
performance of his regular duties.

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a
rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of
forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification
is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the
fitness of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will
not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in
determining qualifications of this case.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the
Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored
by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there
exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual
findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially
when established by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence. [5] (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.[6]

The Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. [7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents adoption has not
been sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may
be assailed only in a direct proceeding. [8] Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent
Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio,
because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. [9] We cannot sustain this
contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the
parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that
Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. [10] An affidavit
to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. [11] Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.[12] The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

 It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be
proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses.[13] Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost,
without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.[14]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded
the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the
following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the
letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the
Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of
Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
[15]
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution
are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter
of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss,
has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.

xxxxxxxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral
or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the
weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis
ours)
 The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.[16] But even there, we said that marriage may be prove[n] by
other competent evidence.[17]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. [18] The Court has also
held that [t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one
who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.[19]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were
certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained. [20] Even if we were to
agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must
emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.

Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias[21], we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent
and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage."[22] (emphasis supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,[23] we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure

to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented
to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated
this principle in Trinidad v. CA,[24] in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract,
we accepted testimonial evidence in its place.[25]
 Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975
in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO).[26] He finds it quite bizarre for petitioner to have waited three years
before registering their marriage.[27] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the
first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
the marriage.[28] In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar.Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.[29]

Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of

marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio -- Always presume marriage.[30] (emphasis supplied)

This jurisprudential attitude[31], 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.31
towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [32] Given the
undisputed, even accepted,[33] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife,[34] we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court
also gave credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for the assessment of the
credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court x x x.[35]
 We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is
not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not
the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined
the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. [36] Hence, the
present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in
petitions under Rule 45.[37]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas signature on the
questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses
were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly
on respondents expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. [38] Respondent
Pilapil justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He
contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and
cites the following portion as proof:[39]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges testimony out of its
context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moyas statements contained no
ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.[40]
The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was
declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the
Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued this
Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I cant
make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.[41]
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of
the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. [42] Indeed, we find no reason and the
respondent has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
 Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document
Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L.
Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings that I would
point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of
letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter J. [43]
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought
without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent
Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.[44]
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not
dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. [45] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts
that he performed thereafter.[46] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management [47] in Manila
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,[48] issued Certifications that
there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. [49]
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows
[50]

that the alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed
adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other
name would smell as sweet?

This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 in JDRC Case No. 2964.
[1]

Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a
petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein
[2]

the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption,
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the
circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed
minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for
the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same
being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition,
and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends
since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence. [3]

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder
[4]

of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as
two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties,
the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for
all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the
legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of
the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and
executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of
the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child,
which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born.
Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. [5]

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by

petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications
under the law to be adopters, and have amply complied with the procedural
[6]

requirements for the petition for adoption, with the findings of the trial court
[7]

being recited thus:

To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March
16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was published in the March 31,
April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general
circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record
(Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child
Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl
finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through
Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:

Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly
individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit, spiritually and financially
capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron Joseph.

Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share
their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously
provide him a happy and secure home life.

Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the
Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the
Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with
Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.

We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran
aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized. [8]

It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower
court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are
accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the
[9]

court below granting the petition for adoption.

The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized
mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the
prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor
adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there
was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given
or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed
by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely,
a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of
the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under
Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be
complied with. [10]

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws
and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for
change of name. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the
[11]

change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with

that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted,
with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
[12]

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for

adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules
against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the
conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the
court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. [13]

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding

change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a
system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice. Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal
[14]

construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the
adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding. [15]

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that

Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron
Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced
by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set
forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing
fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the
grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.

The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin
Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual
obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any
immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to
reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the
action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on
the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published
together with the petition for adoption.
[16]

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate
and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
 Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for
by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used
in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court
[17]

orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded

in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and
cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible,
a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to
which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change) [18]

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register
is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional
trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name
resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change
of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of
hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It
is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition
and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court
may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall
furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
[19]

proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it

cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial
law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which
[20]

taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on
the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al. and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. is
[21] [22]

misplaced.
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action
would, therefore, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
[23]

two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may
under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or
rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
[24]

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally

not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory
in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of
action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder
rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to
[25]

avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice

wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To
achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. [26]

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party

litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be
joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature
and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in
one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation
between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the
disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so
as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of
the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally
construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties
may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of
[27]

justice.
[28]

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is

to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a
standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or
equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the
[29]

rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there
should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
authorized. [30]

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso

subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented.
[31]

effectively disallows unlimited joinder.[32]

 Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they
present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant
their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings
which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is
individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings
involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate
the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee
properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is
the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of
name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).

xxx xxx xxx

x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and
determined for neither action is dependent on the other. [33]

The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed
only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).

These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our
Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in
nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation
between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed
adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may
only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying
a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of
a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that
the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be
improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one
petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4,
Comment).

We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of
intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to
pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer
the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of
heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land
subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of
relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for
adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the
case at bar.

Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was,
in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and
instead remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the
pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of
the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more
emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where
the conditions are not satisfactorily met.[34]

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will
make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous
grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As
already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and
substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee.The
policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately
related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most
expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial
proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding
reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. , the Court clarified the rule on
[35]

permissive joinder of causes of action:

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no
positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join
all his causes of action and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present
rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several
causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified.This,
therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the causes of action shall be joined
in the same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or
refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or
causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics supplied.)

The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with
the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers
alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative
justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that
[36]

strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. [37]

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may

be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important
in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly
and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority
they acknowledge. [38]

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own

wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be
administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et
[39]

al. that:
[40]

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each
other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of
fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each
other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance
of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

xxx xxx xxx

x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x
x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean
that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the
orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice
eschews anarchy.

Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its

proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the
court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules. [41]

We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put
to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to
his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would
justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and
in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation
of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the
proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the
merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such
questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid
down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public
policy. They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be
[42]

changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an

action for their singular convenience. [43]
 In Garcia vs. Republic, we are reminded of the definiteness in the
[44]

application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:

x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or
misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of the
proper remedy.

Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at

achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his
prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and
jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition
for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the
only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the
adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been
known since he came to live with private respondents. [45]

Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon

the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name
as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely
echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was
symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as
much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their
adopted child. [46]

The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled
on this point in this manner:

As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than
for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of
giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the
grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
[47]

We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated

ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word
or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as
well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an
individual has two parts:

The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name
is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
[48]

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the
civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a
[49]

person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code
seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on
the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. [50]

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376
[51]

of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name
that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. [52]

It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a

privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of
name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a
person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name
or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register,
he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which
may justify such change. [53]

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being

sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. [54]

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one
was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which
he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change
[55]

of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different
[56]

name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to
legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church
[57]

records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at

variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name. [58]

The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such
rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to
justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been
baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and
known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with
private respondents. Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious
[59]

entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name
has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases
chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as
unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use
his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would
be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. [60]
 The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his
assailed order that

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law x x x.

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than
for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions
of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon
grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.

and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the
case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the
change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption
granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon
reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname
from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He
adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment
and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese
ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his
surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This
Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere
incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given
name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose
with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the
imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed
procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being

named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is
previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently
sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there
is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the childs first
name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A.,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721).
In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their
capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right
to name the child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents
have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted by private
respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a
right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling
grounds. [61]

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to
the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that
the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
[62]

misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the

contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the
proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the
purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered
save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate
proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption
and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of
concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the proper
or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this
time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is
conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and
satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of
respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y
Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.
In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P.
CARANTO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; RULE 108 OF THE RULES
OF COURT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - With regard to the second
assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court erred in granting private respondents prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the
trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this- case and
because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and
without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule
108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil
status of persons. This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of
name. Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of
the Civil Code - to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of
Court in 1964 - covers those harmless and innocuous changes, such as
correction of a name that is clearly misspelled. Thus, in Yu v. Republic (21
SCRA 1018 [1967]) it was held that to change Sincio to Sencio which
merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name into the
vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. In Labayo-Rowe
v. Republic (168 SCRA 294 [1988]) it was held that the change of
petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is
appropriate. Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE CIVIL REGISTRAR AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND TO GIVE NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF
THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY RENDERS THE
PROCEEDING OF THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID; CASE AT
 BAR. - The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding.He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is
void. The absence of-an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual
all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published
as required by Rule 108, 4 which reads: 4. Notice and publication. - Upon
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. While there was
notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for
adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the
prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was, mentioned that
in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar -was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The necessary consequence
of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to
render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry
was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as
to the subject matter.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Encarnacion, De Guzman & Associates Law Office for respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

[1]

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of

Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private
respondents petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the
correction of the minors first name Midael to Michael.
The petition below was filed on September 2, 1988 by private respondents
spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent
Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents
were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that
judgement be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that
the first name which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to
MICHAEL.

The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice
thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Cavite and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the
correction of the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued that
although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error,
it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the
correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondents Zenaida
Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor
testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor,
being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the
opposition of the Solicitor General. on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies
only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited
Rule 108, 1, which provides that any person interested in an act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of the persons which has been recorded
in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto. It held that the correction of names in the civil
registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, 2 as entries subject
to cancellation or correction. According to the trial court, the error could be
corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of
actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and
declaring that:

1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by adoption of
petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minors name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his original name of
Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is hereby
directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate, of said minor; and
4. This judgement shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of the herein
petition.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his

contention that the correction of names cannot be affected in the same
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Case for adoption because in the
notice published in the newspaper, the name given was Michael, instead of
Midael, which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23,1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic,
invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial court did not
[2]

acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case
involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the
petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name would entail
additional time and expenses for them as. well as for the Government and the
Courts.
Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to
comment. Despite opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any
comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the private respondents petition for adoption. Petitioners contention is
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor
child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for
[3]

adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name
of the child -(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her name in the record of birth
(Rosanna E. Bucoy). it was held that this was a substantial defect in the
petition and the published order of hearing. Indeed there was a question of
identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different
person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.
 The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the
name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves
merely the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears
as Midael as given name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child
from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any
confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same
rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The purpose of the publication
requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the
adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for
adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming
the decision of the trial court, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private
respondents prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil
registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of
the minor, is void and without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only
to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, 2
plainly states:

2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name. Indeed, it
has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to
implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 - covers
those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled. Thus, in Yu vs. Republic it was held that to change Sincio
[4] [5]

to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first
name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic it was held that the change of petitioners name
[6]

from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere

innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate.
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule
provides:

3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,

the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the

proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less
[7]

given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indenpensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceeding
subsequent to the filling of the complaint including the judgment. [8]

Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required
by Rule 108, 4 which reads:

4. Notice and publication. - Upon filling of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of
the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice
only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned
that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently,
of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as
an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concered, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as
to party and as to the subject matter. [9]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court the order to the local civil registrar to change the name MIDAEL to
MICHAEL in the birth certificate of the child. In other respects relating to the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by G.R. No. 175080
TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, Present:
MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN CORONA, C.J.,
GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. Chairperson
ANGELA S. REYES, VELASCO, JR.,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,* and
PEREZ, JJ.
-versus-

Promulgated:
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO
(deceased) and LEONIDA F. November 24, 2010
MAURICIO,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Subject of this petition is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 10
August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July
1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred
twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT
No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of
Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now deceased,
and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as
parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with
damages.

Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo
Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio
through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his
death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and
introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit,
strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G.
Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary
Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read
nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age,
illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of
the Kasunduanrendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject
property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and
for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of
damages.[2] During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed
between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.[3]

Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and

respondents. He clarified that Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was
based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing
a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He
maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her
signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the
document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day
of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the
DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the
contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also
asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. [4]

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial

Adjudicator[5] concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada,
being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the
subject land.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant
Eugenio R. Reyes and order is hereby issued:

1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;

2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein
plaintiff Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein
defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.[6]
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB,
namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties; and (2)
whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and
enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses
Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and
Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of their late parents as
the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover,
the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold
contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy
relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as void by
relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of
Librada to enter into such a contract.[7]

Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB on 28
September 2004.[8]
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case. [9] On 10 August 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It sustained
the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy relation between
Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the Kasunduan.[10]

Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no tenancy
relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that the Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo and Susana in 1993
giving the former the right to occupy and cultivate the subject property is
unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into without his knowledge
and consent. Eugenio further asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio
with respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed between the
parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship such as personal cultivation and the subject land being
agricultural.Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into
between him and Librada wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property,
in that it was voluntarily entered into and the contents thereof were mutually
understood by the parties.[11]

In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for failure to
show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its challenged
decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised as
factual. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration by Eugenio, this
Court reinstated the petition and required respondent Leonida to comment on the
petition.[12]

In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of facts.[13]
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of
law may be raised.[14] Absent any of the obtaining exceptions[15] to this rule, the
findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and
especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.

The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo and
the Mauricios came about, thus:

This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is

convinced that the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the
herein Defendant-Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit H which is the Tax
Declaration of the property in controversy proves that upon the death of
the parents of Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter
of their extra-judicial partition/settlement and this property was initially
under the ownership of the appellants sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes
until the same property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of
Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the
Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed
the Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the
property and to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-
interest of Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x
x. The Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan alleging that their tenancy
relationship began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental
shall remain until further revised.[16]

This is a contest of Kasunduans. Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of

tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.

Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since
1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which
reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject land. On the other hand, Eugenio
disputes the claims of Librada and presented another Kasunduan executed between
him and Librada on 28 September 1994 which effectively terminates the leasehold
tenancy when the latter allegedly agreed to vacate the subject premises in exchange
of monetary considerations.

This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its

disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:

x x x Insofar as this Kasunduan is concerned, and after reading the

transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this
Board is convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject
her from the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to return the
money she received because the contents of the document was never
explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This
Board is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the
testimonies that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties
in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig,
Metro Manila, thus, the Notary Public was not in a position to explain
much less ascertain the veracity of the contents of the
alleged Kasunduan as to whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee Librada
Mauricio had really understood the contents thereof. This Board further
adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute its own evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses with that of the personal evaluation of the
Adjudicator a quo who, in the case at bar, had the best opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio while testifying
on the circumstances relevant to the execution of the
alleged Kasunduan. Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that
in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, mental
weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this
Board) must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In
the case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old
who can neither read nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with
her thumbmark.[17]

Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this
Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by
DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to closely
examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand.
 Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is
void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy
relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a
leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of
the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy
Act provides:

SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. The tenancy relationship

is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate
farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the
agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed
by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land does not of
themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the
purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of
the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the
landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and
obligations. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms

of the Philippines) likewise provides:

SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by

Expiration of Period, etc. The agricultural leasehold relation under this
Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Emphasis
supplied)

As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed

by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the
death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.[18]
 We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.[19]

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. [20] Well-

known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as

a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity
of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more
clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made
in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they
refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the
present articles.[21]

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,[22] the

Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.[23]

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,[24] this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate.
[25]
Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,[26] the Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.[27]

Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida
from the case for annulment of the Kasunduan that supposedly favors petitioners
cause.
 WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 8552 February 25, 1998

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF

FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that
every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. Only
when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child's
extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned.

(c) It shall also be a State policy to:

(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her
parental authority over his/her child;

(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s);

(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and custody
over his/her adopted child.

Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or

judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as "legally available for adoption"
and his/her custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to
any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be
authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child;
 (iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive
environment for adoption;

(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector agencies to
handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications, and offer adoption-related
services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling; and

(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and culture in his/her
native land, and only when this is not available shall intercountry adoption be considered as
a last resort.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as:

(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.

(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing
or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his/her biological parent(s) or
guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.

(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly relinquishes
parental authority to the Department.

(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial,
continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.

(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or
whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and
has been judicially declared as such.

(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial
relationship.

(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to
provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving
applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents, and preparing the
adoption home study.

(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that
provides twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected,
or voluntarily committed children.

(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her biological mother,
causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
 ARTICLE II
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES

Section 4. Counseling Service. – The Department shall provide the services of licensed social
workers to the following:

(a) Biological Parent(s) – Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the
birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before
the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological
parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the
decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to
the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.

Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all
alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.

(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) – Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars,
among others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible
adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.

(c) Prospective Adoptee – Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she
understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on
adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.

Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). – It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-
placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.

Section 6. Support Services. – The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program which shall
include, among others, the above mentioned services.

ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY

Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
 his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouse; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However,
that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially
declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of

legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings
shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).

Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
 (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with
said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE

Section 10. Hurried Decisions. – In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that
the biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried
decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain that all measures to
strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own
home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.

Section 11. Case Study. – No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social
worker of the Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing
or child-caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as
the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the matter to the court
hearing such petition.

At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall confirm with
the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was
not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the concerned social worker to
ensure that the adoptee is registered.

The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and that
the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s)
shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child.

The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case
studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and
records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by the Department.

Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. – No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the
adopter(s) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months
within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and
establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in
the adopter(s).

The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to
be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However,
for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial custody except for those
enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a
pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with the
prospective adopter(s).

Section 13. Decree of Adoption. – If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been
complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the
case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the
court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would redound to
the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of
the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies
before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is to be known.

Section 14. Civil Registry Record. – An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil
Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. The original certificate of birth shall be
stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place
and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee
shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.

Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in adoption cases
shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.

If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes
connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the
court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may
be used.

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

Section 16. Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

Section 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.

Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.

ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s)
and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and
restore his/her original birth certificate.

Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of
judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.

All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES

Section 21. Violations and Penalties. – (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:

(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper
material inducement, or other similar acts;

(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or

(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.

(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a
person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).

Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall
cooperate in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein prescribed
and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.

Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of
records, documents, and communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or
a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.

A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves
two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall
merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the
unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided, shall be in addition to any
other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other laws, ordinances,
executive orders, and proclamations.

When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and
perpetually excluded from entry to the country.

Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the
provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-
prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until
the resolution of the case.

Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. – A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this
Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of
birth was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered
and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for
correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the
procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the
Department.

ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. – There shall be established an Adoption
Resources and Referral Office under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor the
existence, number, and flow of children legally available for adoption and prospective adopter(s) so
as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information and educational campaign on
domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption proceedings; (d) generate resources to help child-
caring and child-placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in
collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be
manned by adoption experts from the public and private sectors.

Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months from the promulgation
of this Act, the Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil Registry
General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, and two (2) private individuals
representing child-placing and child-caring agencies shall formulate the necessary guidelines to
make the provisions of this Act operative.
Section 25. Appropriations. – Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law and thereafter.

Section 26. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.

Section 27. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.

Section 28. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in any newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.

Approved: February 25, 1998