May  2010  
 
 
A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing  
 
This  guide  is  intended  for  investors  of  all  types  (fund  managers,  institutions,  and  
individuals)  that  seek  to  improve  the  performance  of  individual  equity  holdings  in  
their  diversified  portfolios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael  R.  Levin  
847.830.1479  
m.levin@theactivistinvestor.com  
 
 
©2008-­2010  Michael  R.  Levin  –  All  rights  reserved.  
      
Why  investor  activism?  
 
In  recent  years,  investors  have  expressed  their  views  more  and  more  vocally  about  how  
executives  of  firms  in  their  portfolios  invest  and  manage  investor  capital.  These  investors  
typically  do  this  when  a  portfolio  firm  underperforms  peers  to  that  firm,  or  perhaps  the  
overall  market.  
 
Frequently,  investors  become  active  when  they  find,  unexpectedly,  that  a  firm  in  their  
portfolio  has  underperformed.  Rather  than  merely  selling  the  investment,  investors  seek  
constructive  change  in  how  management  runs  the  business.  These  investors  cannot  or  
choose  not  to  exit  for  a  number  of  reasons:  
 
• Their  portfolio  requires  them  to  continue  to  hold  the  firm,  say  in  the  instance  of  an  
index  fund  that  must  hold  a  firm  in  order  to  replicate  an  index.  
• Their  investment  represents  a  sufficiently  large  proportion  of  outstanding  shares,  so  
exiting  would  depress  the  share  price.  
• The  cost  of  becoming  active  is  small  relative  to  the  potential  increase  in  value.  
 
A  few  investors  look  for  underperforming  firms  for  their  portfolio,  seeking  to  increase  the  
value  of  the  investment  through  an  activist  approach.  These  full-­‐time  activists  thus  adopt  
something  of  an  extreme  version  of  value  investing.  Rather  than  waiting  for  a  portfolio  firm  
to  naturally  or  organically  achieve  a  target  value,  the  investor  participates  actively  in  that  
firm’s  management.  
 
Occasionally,  one  investor  learns  that  another  investor,  say  a  full-­‐time  activist,  has  targeted  
a  firm  in  the  investor’s  portfolio.  Then  the  question  becomes,  how  does  the  investor  
respond?  Should  the  investor  support  the  activist  effort,  and  if  so  how?  
 
Either  as  an  accidental  or  deliberate  activist,  an  investor  has  a  range  of  strategies  and  tactics  
available  to  rectify  that  underperformance,  which  constitutes  the  remainder  of  this  
discussion.  
 
The  activism  that  I  have  in  mind  here  differs  from  the  activism  of  takeover  investors.  
Certain  investors  agitate  for  change  (mostly  related  to  governance)  so  they  may  acquire  
control  of  a  firm.  I  do  not  address  this  discussion  to  these  investors  (although  they  may  find  
it  interesting  and  useful).  If  instead  you  are  an  investor  that  has  an  underperforming  firm  in  
your  portfolio,  or  are  a  value  investor  that  would  rather  not  wait  for  management  or  market  
cycles  to  increase  the  value  of  your  investment,  or  are  an  investor  with  a  portfolio  firm  
targeted  by  a  full-­‐time  activist  investor,  this  discussion  is  for  you.  
 

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Types  of  activist  investors  
 
Activists  tend  to  come  in  three  types:  social,  governance,  and  business.  Some  investors  act  
in  more  than  one  type  of  capacity,  such  as  when  business  improvement  requires  changes  in  
corporate  governance.  
 
I  must  say  a  few  words  about  social  activism.  Some  investors  seek  to  persuade  firms  to  
abide  by  specific  ethical  standards  or  to  adopt  particular  policies  concerning  current  social  
issues.  Examples  include  investors  that  want  firms  to  adopt  environmentally-­‐friendly  or  
worker-­‐friendly  manufacturing  processes,  to  stop  using  genetically-­‐modified  raw  materials  
in  their  products,  or  to  end  the  manufacture  of  objectionable  goods  such  as  tobacco.    
 
Few  executives  take  social  activist  investors  seriously.  They  tend  to  view  such  investors  as  
owning  shares  of  the  firm  for  the  sole  purpose  of  expressing  their  particular  views.  I  object  
to  this  subversion  of  the  corporate  governance  process  and  US  securities  laws.  In  my  view,  a  
serious  activist  investor  (indeed,  any  investor  at  all)  should  have  no  other  agenda  other  
than  to  create  a  profitable  investment.  
 
Thus,  there  remain  two  types  of  appropriate  activism:  governance  and  business.  
Governance  relates  to  how  the  firm  conducts  its  relations  with  investors.  It  tends  to  have  
four  elements:  
 
• Board  of  directors  structure,  membership,  and  operation  
• Executive  compensation  
• Transaction  restrictions  (i.e.,  poison  pill)  
• Corporate  mechanics  (i.e.,  amending  bylaws).  
 
Most  executives  should  find  it  difficult  to  object  to  the  range  of  governance  changes  that  
investors  advocate.  While  they  may  argue  the  detail  about  whether  one  or  another  specific  
proposal  makes  sense  for  a  given  firm  (say,  a  staggered  board  or  separate  chairman  and  
chief  executive  positions),  most  governance  propositions  make  sense,  in  theory,  for  most  
firms.  
 
The  problem  lies  in  the  effectiveness  of  these  types  of  proposals.  Academics  and  investors  
alike  have  researched  extensively  the  correlation  between  governance  changes  and  overall  
business  performance,  with  at  best  inconclusive  results.1  
 
Business  activism  pertains  to  the  structure,  management,  and  operation  of  a  firm.  You  
probably  have  opinions  about  various  elements  of  firm  performance,  including  overall  
business  direction  and  strategy,  expense  levels,  or  even  wasteful  or  counterproductive  
business  practices.  At  its  extreme  business  activism  extends  to  whether  management  
should  sell  given  assets,  a  business  unit,  or  the  entire  firm.    
 

                                                                                                               
1
Gompers,  P.,  Ishii,  J.,  Metrick,  A.,  2003,  “Corporate  governance  and  equity  prices.”  Quarterly  
Journal  of  Economics  118,  107-­‐155;  Brov,  Alon,  Wei  Jiang,  Frank  Partnoy,  Randall  Thomas,  
2008,  “Hedge  Fund  Activism,  Corporate  Governance,  and  Firm  Performance.”  Journal  of  
Finance  63,  1729-­‐1775.  
 

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Business  activism  can  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  a  firm.  On  many  occasions  
investors  agitated  for  a  sale  of  a  business  unit  or  the  entire  firm,  and  made  substantial  gains  
that  would  otherwise  take  incumbent  management  many  years  to  achieve.2  However,  unlike  
the  logic  and  common  sense  of  governance  changes,  management  and  investors  frequently  
disagree  deeply  on  whether  one  or  another  investor  idea  for  a  business  will  actually  achieve  
the  desired  result.  For  what  it’s  worth,  executives  resent  your  meddling  in  business  
decisions,  and  argue  that  you  hire  them  to  research,  make,  and  monitor  these  very  
decisions.  
 
Let  me  explain  a  fourth,  new  type  of  activism,  related  to  risk  taking  and  risk  aversion.  This  
pertains  to  the  alignment  of  investor  and  management  views  of  risk.  It  begins  with  the  
observation  that  most  executives  are  more  risk  averse  than  investors.  This  wasteful  risk  
aversion  manifests  itself  in  many  interesting  and  unexpected  areas  of  firm  strategy  and  
tactics,  including  balance  sheet  structure,  cash  balances,  insurance  and  hedging,  asset  
purchases,  and  internal  controls.  Risk  activists  seek  to  align  executive  risk  behavior  with  
investor  risk  appetite,  through  many  of  the  activist  strategies  and  tactics  discussed  below.  
 
Risk  activism  differs  from  the  other  three  areas  in  ways  that  should  generate  less  
controversy  and  more  executive  cooperation.  Excessive  risk  aversion  represents  an  
interesting  example  of  inferior  business  performance,  and  might  prompt  the  same  deep  
disagreement  as  other  business  activism  efforts.  Yet,  many  of  the  potential  improvements  
that  align  executive  risk  behavior  with  investor  risk  appetite  are  more  specific  and  targeted  
than  investor  proposals  for  improved  business  strategy  and  management.  Business  activism  
frequently  entails  fundamental  and  controversial  restructuring  of  a  business,  or  sensitive  
headcount  and  expense  reduction  initiatives.  In  contrast,  risk  activism  typically  entails  
refinements  to  a  firm’s  capital  structure,  or  elimination  of  or  reduction  in  less  prominent  
financial  (hedging  or  insurance)  transactions.  The  main  challenge  to  executives  is  to  think  in  
new,  different  ways  about  risk.  
 
This  table  summarizes  the  different  types  of  activism:  
 
Type   Advantage   Disadvantage  
Social   None   Not  taken  seriously  
Governance   Logical,  common  sense   Inconclusive  relation  to  increased  value  
Business   Direct  results   Open  to  reasonable  debate  with  management  
Risk   Direct  results   Requires  unconventional  thinking  
Logical,  common  sense  
 

                                                                                                               
2  Greenwood,  Robin  and  Michael  Schor,  2008,  “When  (not)  to  Listen  to  Activist  Investors.”  

Harvard  Business  Review,  January  2008  

May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   4.  

 
      
How  to  become  an  activist  
 
The  first  and  possibly  most  important  step  is  to  have  the  will  to  do  it.  Too  many  
investors  have  grown  accustomed  to  passive  investing,  in  which  you  only  hold  or  
sell  an  underperforming  firm.  US  securities  law,  and  indeed  the  principles  of  public  
equity  ownership,  gives  you  an  important  say  in  how  executives  manage  the  capital  
that  you  entrust  to  them.  Once  investors  understand  that  management  works  for  
them  and  no  one  else,  they  confidently  can  become  active  in  the  direction  and  
operation  of  a  firm  using  the  strategies  and  tactics  explained  below.  
 
The  other  steps,  then,  follow  a  straightforward  logic:  business  assessment,  business  
improvement  planning,  and  activism  planning.  
 
Business  Assessment  
Business  assessment  and  a  business  improvement  plan  should  be  familiar  to  any  
good  investor,  so  I  will  not  devote  much  space  here  to  these  subjects.  Business  
assessment  reproduces  and  updates  the  very  analyses  that  prompted  you  to  invest  
in  the  firm  in  the  first  place.  Such  an  assessment  might  include  review  of  markets  
and  competitors,  relevant  assets,  and  internal  structure  and  processes.  An  update  of  
these  analyses  should  reveal  the  nature  and  extent  of  underperformance,  and  
identify  the  various  improvements  needed  to  return  the  firm  to  the  profitability  that  
motivated  the  original  investment.  
 
Business  Improvement  Plan  
The  business  improvement  plan  follows  the  business  assessment.  It  identifies  the  
specific  changes  that  the  investor  thinks  the  firm  should  undertake.  These  could  
include  expense  management  initiatives,  asset  sales,  or  process  improvements.  
Sometimes  the  identified  problems  relate  globally  to  management  competence,  so  
hiring  or  firing  of  one  or  more  executives  is  in  order.  Specific  changes  can  extend  to  
sale  of  entire  businesses  or  divisions,  or  even  sale  of  the  firm.  
 
You  may  also  target  wasteful  practices,  such  as  excessive  perks  or  large  corporate  
staff.  These  days,  with  improved  SEC  disclosure  and  increased  penalties  for  these  
sorts  of  things,  investors  thankfully  find  less  of  this  than  before.  Still,  plenty  of  firms  
make  themselves  an  inviting  target  for  this  particular  kind  of  improvement.  
 
Investor  concerns  about  risk  aversion  can  lead  to  a  particular  set  of  business  
improvements.  These  include  returning  surplus  cash  to  investors,  issuing  floating  
rate  debt  instead  of  fixed  rate,  and  ending  wasteful  hedging  and  insurance  
programs.  I  have  included  as  an  appendix  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  managerial  
risk  aversion  as  a  target  for  investor  activism.    
 
Activism  Plan  
You  might  hope  and  trust  that  a  sound  business  assessment  and  a  targeted  business  
improvement  plan  would  suffice.  Say,  send  copies  of  the  assessment  and  plan  to  the  

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CEO,  perhaps  meet  once  or  twice  to  explain  your  ideas  and  answer  any  questions,  
and  watch  returns  increase  as  management  implements  the  plan.  As  numerous  
activist  investors  know,  it  seldom  works  that  way.  Executive  ego  leads  to  cordial  but  
fruitless  discussions  of  your  ideas,  and  more  likely  to  indifference,  or  even  willful  
defiance.  So,  an  investor  that  wants  to  see  management  implement  a  business  
improvement  plan  should  also  create  an  activism  plan  for  engaging  executives  (and  
potentially  other  investors,  the  SEC,  and  even  the  media)  in  the  process.  
 
An  activist  investor  can  choose  from  numerous  strategies  and  tactics.  Above  all,  the  
activism  plan  should  follow  logically  from  the  business  improvement  plan.  That  
seems  sensible  and  even  obvious.  Yet,  too  many  times  an  investor  becomes  
frustrated  with  the  performance  of  a  portfolio  firm,  and  even  creates  a  compelling  
business  improvement  plan,  but  stalls  by  becoming  active  in  the  wrong  ways.  High  
expense  levels  do  not  necessarily  require  an  investor  to  demand  a  board  seat,  or  a  
revamped  executive  compensation  system  may  not  necessarily  follow  from  the  
suggested  sale  of  a  failing  division.  
 
All  the  available  strategies  and  tactics,  then,  revolve  around  doing  whatever  it  takes  
to  persuade  or  force  management  to  implement  the  business  improvement  plan.  
One  way  to  think  about  the  strategy  and  tactics  entails  how  you  escalate  the  
pressure  on  management  to  do  this.  I  think  of  this  as  a  rough  continuum:  
 
management   other  
publicity   governance  
interaction   investors  
 
 
Management  interaction:  typically  the  first  step,  of  course.  You  should  almost  
always  begin  by  engaging  current  executives  in  the  business  assessment  and  
improvement  plan.  Perhaps  one  or  more  private  meetings,  to  present  and  discuss  
your  views  of  the  firm,  will  suffice.  It  might  involve  only  detailed  analysis  of  the  
current  business  prospects,  or  extend  as  far  as  a  civil  yet  serious  discussion  of  the  
activism  plan  that  you  have  designed.  How  this  goes  depends  on  your  existing  
relationship  with  these  executives,  your  credibility  in  assessing  the  workings  of  the  
business,  and  management’s  ability  and  willingness  to  listen  to  your  perspectives.  
 
Other  investors:  you  may  need  or  want  to  bring  other  current  investors  in  the  firm  
to  the  discussion.  There  is  strength  in  numbers.  For  a  sufficiently  compelling  
assessment,  you  might  even  persuade  others  to  invest  in  the  firm  for  the  very  
purpose  of  supporting  your  case.  You  generally  can’t  lose  by  engaging  other  
investors.  However,  a  large-­‐scale  assault  can  intimidate  or  threaten  management,  
which  you  may  in  fact  desire  depending  on  how  poorly  management  responds  to  
your  plan.  
 
Publicity:  you  can  do  this  in  many  ways.  News  media  is  a  favorite,  through  press  
releases,  interviews,  paid  advertising,  and  the  like.  You  can  attract  publicity  merely  

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through  SEC  filings,  particularly  13D  disclosures.  Sometimes  a  proposal  at  the  
annual  meeting  gets  noticed,  especially  by  individual  investors  and  mutual  funds  
that  must  vote  on  the  proposal,  although  winning  a  spot  in  the  annual  meeting  proxy  
materials  usually  is  difficult.  And,  if  you  succeed  in  placing  such  a  proposal  on  the  
annual  meeting  agenda,  proxy  advisors  must  then  analyze  that  proposal,  potentially  
validating  your  business  assessment  and  improvement  plan.  By  whatever  means,  
public  disclosure  and  promotion  of  the  plan  increases  the  pressure  on  management  
to  consider  it,  especially  after  customers,  suppliers,  and  other  stakeholders  hear  
about  it.  
 
Governance:  a  range  of  governance  changes  can  prompt  management  to  consider  
and  adopt  your  improvement  plan.  These  are  largely  the  same  mechanisms  that  one  
finds  under  the  earlier  “governance  activism”  discussion,  but  with  a  subtly  different  
goal.  Governance  activists  want  firms  to  adopt  these  measures  for  their  own  sake.  
Business  activists  want  them  as  a  way  to  force  executives  to  implement  business  
improvements.  For  this  reason,  you  must  aim  specific  governance  changes  at  the  
particular  business  problems  of  the  firm.  These  mechanisms  generally  fall  into  four  
categories:  
 
• Board  of  Directors  structure,  membership,  and  operation  
o Term  of  membership,  including  whether  the  board  has  staggered  
terms  
o Number  of  members,  including  insiders  and  outsiders  
o Separate  Chairman  from  CEO,  or  need  for  and  role  of  Lead  
Independent  Director  
o Number  of  meetings  
o Type  of  committees  
o Election  to  Board,  including  role  and  operation  of  Nominating  
Committee,  and  qualifications  for  Board  membership  
o Board  member  compensation  structure  and  amount.  
 
• Executive  compensation  
o Overall  compensation  system,  including  cash  and  equity  components  
o Non-­‐cash  perquisites  and  benefits  
o Post-­‐employment  (retirement  and  termination)  compensation  
o Process  of  analysis,  approval,  and  oversight  of  executive  
compensation  through  the  Board  of  Directors.  
 
• Transaction  limits  
o Process  for  initiating,  analyzing,  and  approving  purchase  and  sale  of  
assets,  business  units,  or  firm  
o Shareholder  rights  (poison  pill)  provisions  in  bylaws.  
 
• Corporate  mechanics  
o Shareholder  voting,  including  broker  votes  
o Bylaws  amendment.  
May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   7.  
 
      
 
Of  all  the  governance  changes  available,  perhaps  the  most  extreme  is  running  for  
one  or  more  seats  on  the  Board  of  Directors.  Management  usually  (and  wrongly)  
considers  Board  membership,  and  the  nominating  and  election  process,  as  their  
prerogative,  or  at  least  the  prerogative  of  the  existing  Board  members  through  the  
Nominating  Committee.  Challenging  that  prerogative  will  almost  certainly  lead  to  a  
very  public  and  spirited  battle  for  what  management  views  as  control  over  the  firm.  
It  will  also  lead  to  serious  costs,  related  to  retaining  an  independent  proxy  
solicitation  firm  and  publicity  efforts.  Again,  depending  on  how  poorly  management  
responds  to  a  business  assessment  and  improvement  plan,  you  may  desire  that  
exact  response.  
 
Again,  the  continuum  is  quite  rough.  You  might  find  that  you  need  to  elect  a  Board  
member  sooner  rather  than  later,  or  wait  to  engage  other  investors  until  you  take  
some  other  steps.  It  all  depends  on  the  business  improvements  that  you  desire.  But,  
there  are  some  general  links  between  governance  and  business  improvements:  
 
  Board  structure   Executive   Transaction   Board  seat  
Compensation   limits  
High  expense     Provide  incentive  to     Investor  
levels   executives  to   monitors  
manage  expenses   expenses  
Executive   Structure  Board   Structure     Investor  
competence   to  allow   compensation   monitors  and  
independent   system  to  attract   changes  
monitoring   suitable  executives   executive  team  
Wasteful   Structure  Board       Investor  
practices   to  allow   monitors  
independent   practices  
monitoring  
Asset,   Structure  Board     Structure   Investor  
business  unit,   to  consider  sale   bylaws  to   monitors  sale  
or  firm  sale   allow  sale  
Risk  aversion     Allow  executives  to     Investor  
diversify  personal   monitors  risk  
assets   behavior  
 

May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   8.  

 
      
Cost  of  Investor  Activism  
 
It  varies,  of  course,  and  can  be  surprisingly  inexpensive  or  costly.  At  its  most  basic,  it  
costs  only  your  time  –  for  business  assessment  and  an  improvement  plan,  and  for  
meetings  and  interaction  with  management,  and  perhaps  other  investors.  Other  
costs  can  include:  
 
Public  relations:  for  promoting  the  business  assessment  and  improvement  plan  
through  the  media  and  other  channels.  This  might  start  at  $5,000  per  month  to  
retain  a  firm  for  simple  efforts,  and  reach  over  $50,000  per  month  for  very  
sophisticated  and  elaborate  campaigns.  
 
Advertising:  paid  advertising,  usually  print  media,  in  national  and  local  newspapers  
and  (sometimes)  magazines.  A  full-­‐page  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal  can  cost  $25,000  
or  more,  and  may  need  to  appear  weekly  or  even  more  for  the  duration  of  an  
activism  program.  For  activist  efforts  that  require  it,  figure  $100,000  to  $200,000  
per  month  for  a  couple  of  months  around  the  time  of  a  key  event,  say  an  annual  
meeting.  
 
Legal:  mostly  for  reviewing  SEC  filings,  but  also  useful  for  assuring  that  public  
relations  and  advertising  campaigns  remain  within  the  boundaries  of  securities  
laws.  This  could  average  $20,000  per  month  for  the  duration  of  an  activist  effort.  
 
Proxy  solicitor:  relatively  rare,  and  used  only  for  a  proxy  fight,  when  an  investor  
seeks  votes  for  their  Board  member,  proposed  transaction,  or  annual  meeting  
proposal.  That’s  good,  too,  because  it  can  cost  millions  of  dollars  for  a  single  effort.  

May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   9.  

 
      
Appendix  
Risk  Activism  
 
Investor  and  Management  Risk  Preferences  
 
As  a  general  rule,  investors  (both  institutional  and  individual)  tend  to  seek  risk.  
They  expose  themselves  and  their  assets  to  variability,  because  they  believe  that  
over  time  and  in  the  aggregate  over  enough  different  investments,  they  will  earn  an  
appropriate  return  on  those  assets.    
 
A  given  investor’s  preferred  level  of  variability  (or  risk  preference)  can  change  over  
time,  and  different  investors  prefer  different  levels  of  risk.  And,  the  risk  that  
investors  seem  to  be  willing  to  absorb  appears  to  have  increased  in  the  past  few  
years.  Overall,  though,  investors  can,  should  and  do  tolerate  a  degree  of  risk  in  the  
value  of  their  assets.  
 
As  much  as  investors  want  and  like  risk,  executives  dislike  it.  Of  course,  few  
executives  will  admit,  to  others  or  even  to  themselves,  to  having  this  attitude.  But,  
for  some  perfectly  natural  reasons,  they  do  not  desire  the  same  level  of  risk  in  asset  
values  as  investors  desire.  Scholars  have  researched  and  debated  extensively  this  
difference  in  risk  preference,  with  some  general  conclusions  emerging  related  to  
how  investors  can  diversify  their  holdings  in  ways  that  executives  cannot3.  
Nonetheless,  the  difference  does  exist,  and  can  cause  an  otherwise  decent  
investment  to  underperform  dramatically.  
 
This  difference  in  risk  appetite  manifests  itself  in  interesting  and  unexpected  ways.  
Investors  typically  label  an  executive  “risk-­‐averse”  when  he  or  she  avoids  new  or  
different  business  ventures,  or  resists  expanding  a  business  into  new  markets.  Most  
astute  investors  can  probably  think  of  numerous  examples  where  executives  exhibit  
that  sort  of  behavior.  Investors  seek  to  encourage  appropriate  levels  of  risk-­‐taking  
through  various  means,  including  appropriate  pay  incentives  or  changes  in  a  firm’s  
organization  and  culture.  
 
There  is  a  subtler,  yet  potentially  more  wasteful  manifestation  of  executive  risk  
aversion.  Executives  that  at  first  glance  appear  to  take  all  sorts  of  interesting  risks  
may  also  negate  that  risk-­‐taking  by  how  they  manage  those  risks.  Risk  management  
activities  take  on  one  or  all  of  three  forms:  
 
Hedging  activities  that  transfer  risk  to  others,  including  customers,  
suppliers,  or  counterparties.  This  includes  hedging  of  a  variety  of  financial  
risks  (for  instance,  foreign  currency,  interest  rate,  and  credit  risks),  

                                                                                                               
3
Shapira,  Zur,  1994.  Risk  Taking:  A  Managerial  Perspective.  New  York:  Russell  Sage  
Foundation.  

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commodity  risks  (usually  related  to  the  price  of  commodity  inputs  to  the  
firm’s  products  and  services),  and  insurable  risks  (including  property  and  
casualty  and  employee  benefits  insurance).  
 
Control  activities  that  affect  a  firm’s  internal  processes.  These  include  the  
size  and  nature  of  specific  internal  control  functions,  such  as  internal  
auditing  and  compliance  departments,  as  well  the  overall  attitude  and  
philosophy  (and  attendant  headcount  and  vendor  costs)  related  to  assuring  
that  management  has  complete  control  over  their  operations.  
 
Capital  structure  decisions.  A  firm’s  capital  structure  reflects  executive  risk  
preference  through  its  approach  to  liquidity  (through  its  levels  of  cash  and  
working  capital,  and  through  its  use  of  standby  or  contingency  liquidity  
facilities)  and  attitude  toward  fixed  and  floating  rate  debt.  
 
In  all  three  areas4,  evidence  of  executive  risk  aversion  continues  to  mount.  Investors  
can  measure  the  cost  of  that  risk  aversion  both  directly,  in  terms  of  excessive  
expenses  in  these  areas,  and  indirectly,  in  terms  of  lost  opportunities  for  more  
profitable  investments.  
 
Possible  changes  in  risk  management  that  would  increase  a  firm’s  value  include  
elimination  or  modification  of:  
 
• hedging  of  interest  rate  risk,  such  as  using  swaps  or  other  derivatives  
• hedging  of  foreign  currency  transaction  and  translation  risk,  using  various  
currency  derivatives  
• liquidity  protection,  including  standby  credit  facilities  and  reserves  of  cash  
and  cash  equivalents  
• hedging  of  commodity  price  risk,  such  as  various  derivative  products  related  
to  agricultural,  energy,  or  other  raw  materials  production  inputs  
• corporate  insurance  programs,  including  property  and  casualty  policies,  
employee  benefit  stop  loss  insurance,  and  other  similar  transactions  
• hedging  of  credit  risk  through  factoring  and  similar  credit  derivative  
transactions  
• active  management  of  equity  investments,  such  as  pension  asset  portfolios,  
relative  to  indexed  investment  strategies  
• purchased  warranties  for  capital  and  office  equipment,  and  other  similar  
transactions  designed  to  reimburse  companies  for  costs  related  to  damage  to  
such  equipment  
• certain  internal  control  functions,  such  as  internal  audit,  regulatory  
compliance,  safety  and  security,  and  similar  corporate  control  mechanisms.  
 

                                                                                                               
4
Meulbroek,  Lisa;  “Total  Strategies  for  Company-­‐Wide  Risk  Control”;  Financial  Times,  May  
9,  2000,  p.  S1  

May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   11.  

 
      
Impact  of  Risk  Management  
 
A  firm’s  risk  management  approach  affects  its  financial  results  in  two  distinct  but  
related  ways:  
 
• it  entails  some  sort  of  cost  (both  direct  expense  and  indirect  cost)  that  
reduces  current  cash  flow  
• it  reduces  variation  in  financial  performance,  which  is  reflected  in  the  
amount  of  economic  capital  that  the  firm  requires  from  investors.  
 
In  our  view,  risk  management  at  most  firms  leads  to  a  material  cost  and  reduction  in  
cash  flow,  without  a  material  (to  investors)  decrease  in  variance  of  financial  
performance  and  corresponding  reduction  in  economic  capital.  It  may  also,  
indirectly,  hide  unprofitable  projects  from  investors.  
 
The  direct  impact  on  cash  flow  entails  the  cost  to  the  firm  of  the  individual  
components  and  programs.  These  costs  include  premiums  paid  for  options  and  
insurance,  fees  paid  to  vendors,  and  the  cost  of  internal  headcount  and  systems  for  
managing  these  risks.  Costs  also  include  unnecessary  diversion  of  cash  flow,  such  as  
interest  expense  under  fixed  rate  debt  when  floating  rate  debt  would  cost  less.  
 
The  impact  on  economic  capital  follows  from  how  much  this  approach  reduces  
variance  in  financial  results.  Now,  these  various  risk  management  programs  in  fact  
reduce  a  firm’s  variance  in  financial  results,  at  least  by  a  slight  amount.  However,  it  
appears  that  the  actual  reduction  is  not  material  to  investors,  and  hence  the  impact  
on  economic  capital  is  slight.  
 
The  indirect  impact  is  difficult  to  quantify,  but  may  be  significant.  At  least  one  
scholar  has  identified  a  possible  agency  cost  related  to  risk  management,  in  which  
executives  use  risk  management  programs  to  stabilize  cash  flows  in  their  firm.  This  
reduces  the  likelihood  of  needing  to  obtain  funds  from  investors  for  less-­‐than-­‐
optimal  projects.5  
 
An  analysis  of  firms  reveals  how  significant  risk  aversion  affects  financial  results.  
Based  on  this  analysis,  these  firms  could  add  as  much  as  10-­‐15%  to  their  share  price  
by  eliminating  or  at  least  limiting  most  risk  management  programs.6  
 

                                                                                                               
5
Tufano,  Peter,  1998.  “Agency  Costs  of  Corporate  Risk  Management”,  Financial  
Management,  Vol.  27,  No.  1  (Spring),  pp.  67-­‐77.  
6
Proposal  for  McDonald’s  Corporation  2008  Annual  Meeting  agenda

May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   12.  

 
      
 
The  Activist  Investor  
 
Resources  and  Advisory  Services  
 
The  Activist  Investor  serves  as  a  comprehensive  resource  for  equity  investors  that  
seek  to  enhance  returns  of  poorly-­‐performing  portfolio  companies.  We  provide  a  
range  of  professional  services  to  assist  investors  with  their  activist  efforts.  
 
Management  listens  to  the  Activist  Investor  
 
 
For  further  information,  or  to  discuss  a  specific  turnaround  situation,  please  contact:  
Michael  R.  Levin  
m.levin@theactivistinvestor.com  
847.830.1479  
www.theactivistinvestor.com  
 

May  2010   A  Concise  Guide  to  Activist  Investing   13.