CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B.

JD1-A

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, et al. v. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

Facts:
On December 3, 1992, Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp. is an operator of mini hotels and motels and on December 21, 1992, WLC
together with Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila.
The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of
the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it
is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. On appeal, CA ruled in favor of the City.

Issue:
Whether or not Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty.
The said Ordinance also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure and invades private rights. Not all who goes into
motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists
who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by
the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates
that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this
is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

MMDA v. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING and

PROMOTIONS, INC.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009

Facts:
In 1997, purauant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), the
Government through the Department of Transportation and Communications entered into a
build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited
(MRTC). MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own
MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the
Government.
In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.
(Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter
installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the
MRT3.
In 2001, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other
advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the
posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in
any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks
refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the respondent’s billboards and
similar forms of advertisement.
On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in RTC an injunction suit with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction. The RTC issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA
from dismantling or destroying Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertizing media and
in 2005, the RTC rendered its decision permanently.
On April 30, 2007, the CA denied the MMDA's appeal. Hence, this appeal by petition for
review.

Issue:
Whether or not MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards,
signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior
structures of the MRT3

Ruling:
NO. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power.
Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in
the MRT3 from its contract with MRTC. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of
the MRT3 during the time material to this case, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising
services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards,
signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the
areas as to which the prohibition applied.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000

Facts:
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a
business permit to operate in Iligan City. After consideration of petitioner's application and
hearing the sides of local optometrists, City Mayor Camilo Cabili issued Business Permit No.
5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an
optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and
similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot
sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an
independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the
public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise
optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is
allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI

lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set
forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On
July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of
Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner 3 months to wind up its affairs.

Issue:
Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police
power

Ruling:
NO. Although the mayor can definitely impose conditions in granting business permits but
he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise it would be an invalid exercise of
police power. The authority which allows local government units to issue or grant such licenses
or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation
of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the
business of running an optical shop and not a license to engage in the practice of optometry. A
business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function
is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to
supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. v. SECRETARY OF DSWD

G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013

Facts:
RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount
on certain establishments.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued
its own Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only
assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s
police power.

Issue:
Whether or not the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain

Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as
an exercise of police power of the State, has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation. It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an
exercise of police power or eminent domain. The proper approach, therefore, is to look at the
nature and effects of the challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are
less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in
need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from,
price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as
police power measures.
The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount
does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens.
Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be
properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which affect the
profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a
police power measure.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR

G.R. NO. L-78742 14 JUL 1989

Facts:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including the question of
constitutionality of RA No. 6657 also known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988”.

a.) In GR No. 79777, a petition questioning the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229
and RA 6657 on the grounds of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

B.) In GR No. 79310, a petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros
Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. They allege that the Proclamation 31 and EO
229 should be annulled for violation of just compensation, due process and equal protection.

C.) In GR No. 79744, the petitioner argues that EO No. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and that such orders were violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.

D.) In GR No. 78742, the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable
to enjoy their right of retention because the DAR has so far not issued the implementing rules of
decree. Therefore, they ask the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue
the said rules.

Issue:
Whether or not the the laws being challenged are valid exercise of police power or power of
eminent domain

Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power
and eminent domain and the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation 131
and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what
is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

PHILLIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-11994 May 22, 1195

Facts:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free print
space of not less than half of a page for the common use of political parties and candidates from
March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995. COMELEC Commisssioner sent letters to publishers informing
them of the same.
PPI seek to declare the resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking private
property without just compensation. TRO was enforced. On behalf of the respondent,
COMELEC, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its
implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as
an exercise of the police power of the State. COMELEC Chair stated that they will clarify the
resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and not to compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was
promulgated.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional

Held:
YES. The Supreme Court declared COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 as unconstitutional. It
held that, to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use.
The element of necessity for the taking has not been established by the respondents,
considering that the newspapers were not willing to sell advertising space for election purposes.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be
examined are:
1.) is the necessity for the taking;
2.) is the legal authority to effect the taking.

It has not been shown also that COMELEC has been granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that
power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by COMELEC must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of “just compensation.”
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

FORFORM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PNR

G.R. NO. 124795 December 10, 2008

Facts:
Forfom Development Corporation is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, and is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. President Ferdinand Marcos approved a project to be implemented
by PNR for the installation of railroads from San Pedro to Carmona.
During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private
individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the
commuter line passed was a 100,128 square-meter portion owned by Forfom.
On August 24, 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property
and/or Damages. PNR explained that former President Ferdinand Marcos approved what was
known to be the Carmona Project a 5.1 kilometer railroad extension line from San Pedro, Laguna
to San Jose, Carmona, Cavite to serve the squatters' resettlement area in said localities. Dr. Felix
Limcaoco, was not paid because he failed to present the corresponding titles to his properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due process of law and
without just compensation

Held:
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. The fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by
the Legislature and may be delegated to the local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. In the case at bar, PNR, under its charter, has the power of expropriation.
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent
domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or
otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
PNR's entry into the property of Forfom was with the approval of then President Marcos and
with the authorization of the PNR's Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring
around eleven hectares was devoted to public use - railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances
for use of the Carmona Commuter Service. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to
question the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR, has waived its
right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case
for expropriation that was commenced by PNR. The recovery of possession of the property by
the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of
public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public.
The PNR's occupation of Forfom's property for almost eighteen (18) years entitles the latter
to payment of interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent on the value of the land at the time of
taking until full payment is made by the PNR. However, since Forfom no longer appealed the
deletion by both lower courts of said prayer for exemplary damages, the same cannot be granted.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES AGUSTIN AND CANCIO

G.R. NO. 170147 January 30, 2009

Facts:
On January 15, 1979, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 which reserved
certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of EPZA for the
establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by
the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private
land.
Petitioner eventually laid out the development of the economic zone and subsequently leased
out respondents 47,540 sq. m. lot to an investor in the economic zone, Maitland Smith Inc.
(Maitland).
On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents lot at P1,100 per sq. m.
or P52,294,000 for the whole property. The letter containing the offer further instructed
respondents to consider and accept, otherwise we will initiate expropriation proceedings in the
proper court. Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against
Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property with
the RTC of Lapu Lapu City. It sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was
willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount or a total of P5,229,400 with the Land Bank of the
Philippines in accordance with Administrative Order No. 50.
Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA
8974, specifically Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an
amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of
a writ of possession.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable in this case or not

Held:
YES. RA 8974 is applicable to this case. RA 8974 applies to instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. Undeniably,
the economic zone is a national government project – a matter undisputed by both parties. Also,
the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the
law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this
case.
Regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession, the
court held that the payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property.
While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is
based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.
There is no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty the final amount of just
compensation in resolving the issue of a writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court
cannot exercise its discretion in order to arrive at the amount of the provisional value of the
property to be expropriated as the legislature has already fixed the amount under the
aforementioned provision of the law. It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional
amount to be paid that just compensation will be determined.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ

G.R. NO. 169008 August 14, 2007

Facts:
On November 16, 1993, pursuant to RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, the Department of Agrarian Reform acquired 62.5369-hectare land property by
respondent Martinez. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just
compensation, for which respondent rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance
with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering the LBP to
pay landowner-protestant Raymnuda Martinez for her property covered with the total amount of
Php12,179,492.50.
A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel before the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon. Meanwhile,
respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of the
PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on
November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash
the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash
was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September
28, 2004 dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution
despite the pendency of LBP's petition

Held:
NO. The court find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate
court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to
execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that
the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period.
Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just
compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond
the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well
issue the writ of execution.
“An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of
the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

HON. VICENTE EUSEBIO v. JOVITO LUIS

G.R. NO. 162474 October 13, 2009

Facts:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land taken by Pasig City to be used as a
municipal road in 1980. On 1993, a resolution authorizing payment for said land was passed.
However, respondents were not agreeable with the assessed value and went on to negotiate the
same. On 1994, a letter was addressed to the mayor calling his attention as a property in the same
area had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said
property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Counsel for respondents sent a demand letter on 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the
amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for
respondent’s property.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages praying that the property
be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per
square meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the
complaint until full payment, or in the event that said property can no longer be returned, that
petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for
sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12%
per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until full payment.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the CA
upon appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the
city government in the 1980s
2. In the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to
respondents be determined

Held:
The Court ruled that failure to question the taking of the property for a long period of time,
respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just
compensation as addressed in Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National
Railways.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled
jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings,
and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY

G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011

Facts:
National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant
Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
The said underground tunnel traversed the land property owned by Macabangkit Sangkay.
In 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for
just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place
for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents and awarded them Php 113,000,000.00 as just
compensation plus damages and attorneys fee equivalent to 15% of the awarded claim. CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

Held:
YES. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to
the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to
pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the
taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically
deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

ANUNCIACION VDA. DE QUANA, ET AL. V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 168770 February 9, 2011

Facts:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation, MCIAA's predecessor agency pursued a program
to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. NAC met and negotiated with the owner of the
properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A,
762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate.
As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, assured them that
they could re-purchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not
push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu
Airport.
Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right to re-
purchase. Others, however, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way
below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then CAA, as successor
agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746,
747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947.
On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered judgment for the
Republic, declaring the expropriation justified in and in lawful exercise of the right to eminent
domain. When Lahug Airport completely ceased operations prompted the former lot owners to
formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to
re-purchase.

Issue:
Whether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in
Cebu City has the right to re-purchase of their respective properties

Held:
The Ouano petition is deemed meritorious. The MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had
not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. r-1881 for
the purpose they were originally taken by the government. The Lahug Airport had been closed
and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation
for development as a commercial complex. it has been preponderantly established by evidence
that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners
that they would be entitled to re-purchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer
used for airport purposes.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORTIGAS and COMPANY

G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

Facts:
Respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property and reserved one portion for road
widening. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A-1 which was actually used for road widening and it was not
compensated for the use of its property.
Respondent filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government the
said lot and alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road widening
purposes.
Petitioner filed an opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas’ property can only be
conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of the
Philippines only by donation

Held:
No. It must be compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road
purposes. Petitioner’s reliance on the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. It contemplates
roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property
that was taken from an owner for public purpose.
As a rule, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the
property taken is entitled to be compensated. There is taking when the following elements are
present:
1. The government must enter the private property;
2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;
3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.

All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner construction of a road — a
permanent structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the use of the general public is an
obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ part. Given that the road was
constructed for general public use gives it public character, and coursing the entry through the
DPWH gives it a color of legal authority. As a result, respondent may not anymore use the
property for whatever legal purpose it may desire. In other words, respondent was effectively
deprived of all the bundle of rights attached to ownership of property.
Hence, respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of the Philippines
with just compensation.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF BORBON

G.R. NO. 165354 July 12, 2015

Facts:
The National Power Corporation entered a private property located in Barangay San Isidro,
Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the said property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in
the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City,, seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of
way over a portion of the property.
The respondents contended that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering
the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered no
objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion
sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if
not totally lost, due to the project.
In the course of the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable
agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public
purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used
thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the
State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal

Held:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper,
but must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable. In the case at bar,
NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the
transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired. The
retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the
element of public use. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings
and requires the return of the property to the respondents.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to
the respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying actual or other compensatory damages. The compensation must be based
on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of
its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court treats the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for
damages.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH LANTION

G.R. NO. L-139465 October 17, 2000

Facts:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that
the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.

Issue:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad
duties under a treaty

Held:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. Under the Doctrine of Incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited
constitutional provision.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to
or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land,
such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA v. GUILLERMO PURGANAN

G.R. NO. 148571 September 24, 2002

Facts:
In accordance to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government an extradition request of Mark B.
Jimenez, known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Jimenez then sought and was granted a TRO to prohibit the DOJ from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition which was later on assailed by the SOJ. The Court initially dismissed
the petition, but later on reversed its decision when it filed its Motion for Reconsideration and
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. In order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Respondent Jimenez then filed an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, praying for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set a date for
hearing. When the arrest warrant was issued, he was granted bail for his temporary liberty in the
amount of one million pesos in cash.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest
2. Whether or not the respondent entitled to bail
3. Whether or not there is a violation of due process of law

Held:
1. No. Under Extradition Law, the word immediate was used to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the
arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and
arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.
Also under the Constitution, Section 2 Article III does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It only requires examination under oath or affirmation
of complaints and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
2. No. Extradition case is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. Article III, Section
13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Jimenez should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.
3. No. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on
the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010

Facts:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en Banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.; it was delisted because it
failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading,
the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the
Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion for lack of merit.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI
2. Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated

Held:
1. No. The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it:
(a)fails to participate in the last two preceding elections; or
(b)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the
law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.
2. No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for it was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of COMELEC resolution. The
essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. It is obvious that under the
attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

SUYAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 189644 July 2, 2014

Facts:
On November 22, 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of six years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On the same date,
he filed his application for probation. On February 16, 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order
covering a period of six years.
While on probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically on
September 2 and October 20, 1999 for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two
separate Information were filed against him, both of which were filed with the RTC of Dagupan
City.
On December 1, 1999, Atty. Simplicio A. Navarro, Jr., then the Chief Probation and Parole
Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation (Motion to Revoke). Atty. Navarro
alleged that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The
former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other
offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof. Atty. Navarro also
pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the conditions of the
latter's probation, in view of his incarceration.
On December 15, 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and
directing him to serve the sentence imposed upon him. It denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the probation was validly revoked
2. Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process

Held:
1. Yes. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full
obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily
for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having
the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another
offense is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly
outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law.

2. No. Based on record, he had enough opportunity to refute the allegations contained in the
Violation Report.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be
heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances,
then his cry for due process must fail.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A

EMILIO RAMON EJERCITO v. COMELEC et al.

G.R. No. 212398 Nov. 25, 2014

Facts:
On May 10, 2013, three days prior to the 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification
was filed by Edgar San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon Ejercito, the
incumbent governor of Laguna and who was his fellow gubernatorial candidate. The petition
alleged Ejercito distributed orange card to influence voters in his favor; and Ejercito exceeds
the amount of expenditures necessary.
After election, Ejercito was proclaimed Governor. The COMELEC First Division issued
a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal of the petition
which was improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election offenses, thus, the
case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, and if with probable
cause, file with proper court.
The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. The
COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that the petition of San
Luis is an action to disqualify Ejercito.
Ejercito filed before the Court grave abuse of discretion against COMELEC and
contends that it violated the right of petitioner of due process when it ruled for
disqualification of petitioner even it was not prayed for disqualification. Moreover, there was
yet no finding of guilt by competent court that he committed election offense.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Held:
NO. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an
independent action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition
filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for
disqualification as well. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the specific rule governing the
disqualification of candidates.
Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall be disqualified
from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from holding the office. An election
offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect may proceed independently
of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines
whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is
the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists.
If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown
hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result
in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a
future public office. The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of
the electoral aspect of a disqualification case.
CORTEZ, JEDDEL GRACE B. JD1-A