G.R. No.

218534, September 17, 2018 - POLICE DIRECTOR

GENERAL RICARDO C. MARQUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) (IN LIEU OF
FORMER PNP OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, POLICE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL LEONARDO A. ESPINA), Petitioner, v. PO2 ARNOLD P.
MAYO, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 218534, September 17, 2018

POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RICARDO C. MARQUEZ, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) (IN LIEU OF FORMER PNP
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, POLICE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL
LEONARDO A. ESPINA), Petitioner, v. PO2 ARNOLD P.
MAYO, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

The pivotal question to be resolved in this case is, whether the

penalty of dismissal from the service against a police officer
imposed by the Chief of the PNP is immediately executory,
even when an appeal has been seasonably filed.

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (With Prayer for

the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order), under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Police Director General Ricardo C. Marquez, as the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), assailing the Decision2 dated
March 18, 2015 and the Order3 dated June 1, 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 of the City of Manila, in Civil Case No.
15-132998. The said Decision granted herein respondent PO2
Arnold P. Mayo's (PO2 Mayo) petition for injunction and declared
as void Special Order (S.O.) No. 9999 of the PNP dismissing him
from the service, effective October 11, 2013 for grave misconduct.

Factual Antecedents

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by

Annaliza F. Daguio (Annaliza) before the Office of the Chief, PNP,
against the respondent for grave misconduct, docketed as NHQ-
AC-363-011413 (DIDM-ADM-13-04). The complaint alleged that
on January 25, 2012, at about 9:00 a.m., respondent PO2 Mayo,
together with SPO3 Menalyn Turalba (SPO3 Turalba) who was in
civilian attire, PO3 Jose Turalba (PO3 Jose), SPO3 Turalba's
husband, and PO1 Elizalde Visaya (PO1 Visaya), went to Annaliza's
iron workshop at No. 4 Daisy Street, Purok 6-C, Lower Bicutan,
Taguig City, where they tried to dismantle a bomb wrapped in red
cloth with the use of a pipe wrench, but failed to do so. SPO3
Turalba and Annaliza told respondent PO2 Mayo and the other
officers to discontinue as it could cause the bomb to explode. The
police officers then left but came back around 2:00 p.m. At this
juncture, the police officers requested Cruzaldo Daguio (Cruzaldo),
Annaliza's husband, to spot the bomb with a welding torch.
Cruzaldo refused, saying that the bomb might explode, but the
police officers persuaded him stating that it will not explode
considering they are bomb experts. While Cruzaldo was spotting
the tip of the bomb, it suddenly exploded, killing Cruzaldo and PO1
Visaya on the spot and wounding nine (9) civilians.4 Respondent
PO2 Mayo, PO3 Jose, and Liza Q. Grimaldo (Grimaldo) were rushed
to the hospital but PO3 Jose and Grimaldo were pronounced dead
on arrival. Furthermore, various properties were destroyed.5

Respondent PO2 Mayo failed to file his answer or counter-affidavit

despite having been served with summons and Notices of Pre-
Hearing Conference at his office at the PNP Special Action Force
(SAF).
In a Decision6 dated October 11, 2013, Police Director General Alan
La Madrid Purisima, then Chief of the PNP, found respondent PO2
Mayo guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the extreme penalty
of dismissal from the PNP service, aggravated by taking advantage
of his official position as a member of the Explosive Ordnance
Disposal of the SAF, and that the incident happened during office
hours.

Respondent PO2 Mayo filed a Motion for Reconsideration on

January 2, 2014, arguing that: he was denied due process and was
not given an opportunity to present his evidence; he was not given
a chance to answer the accusations hurled against him; and to
have a fair trial. He also argued that the Chief of the PNP had no
jurisdiction over the case under the "Principle of Exclusivity",
as the first disciplinary authority to acquire jurisdiction was the
Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the SAF.7

In a Resolution8 dated November 26, 2014, respondent's motion

for reconsideration was denied. The Office of the Chief, PNP, found
no merit in the allegation of denial of due process, stating that
respondent was duly notified of the proceedings as he was served
with summons and notices, but still failed to file his answer or
counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the "Principle of Exclusivity" does
not apply in this case as the IAS is not a disciplinary
authority.9 Undaunted, respondent lodged an appeal before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) National Appellate Board
on January 27, 2015, seeking the reversal of the Decision and the
Resolution of the Office of the Chief, PNP.10

Meanwhile, pursuant to the Decision dated October 11, 2013 and

the Resolution dated November 26, 2014, the PNP issued S.O. No.
999911 dated December 29, 2014, dismissing respondent PO2
Mayo from the service effective October 11, 2013. Respondent PO2
Mayo alleged that he only became aware of the said SO on January
30, 2015 when he was not allowed to have his PNP identification
card renewed, due to problems with the administrative case
against him.12 As the said SO was about to be implemented,
respondent PO2 Mayo filed a Petition13 for Injunction with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of the City of Manila. The
case was raffled to Branch 32 and was docketed as Civil Case No.
15-132998.

Respondent PO2 Mayo argued that the SO was void as the Decision
dated October 11, 2013 was not yet final and executory and he has
still a pending appeal before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate
Board. He further argued that it was in violation of the provisions
of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 2007-001 (NMC No.
2007-001) which provides that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal shall stay the execution of the
disciplinary action sought to be reconsidered.14

The RTC issued an Order15 dated February 9, 2015, granting

respondent PO2 Mayo's application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) pending resolution of the main action for
injunction. The PNP, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order,
which was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated March 3, 2015.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered its Decision in the main case dated
March 18, 2015, granting respondent's petition for injunction and
declaring S.O. No. 9999 void. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant
petition for injunction and declaring Special Order No. 9999 as
void.

SO ORDERED.17
In its Decision in favor of herein respondent, the RTC ruled in this
wise:
At this juncture, this court finds it apt to quote Section 45 of the
Republic Act No. 6975 cited by the respondents to bolster their
claims, thus:
Section 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. - The disciplinary action
imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory;
Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional
director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the
service may be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board within
ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision;
Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the
Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed
to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof; Provided, furthermore, That the Regional or National
Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal
within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided,
finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate Board to act
on the appeal within the said period shall render the
decision final and executory, without prejudice, however, to
the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(underscoring and emphasis supplied)

It is true that the initial provision of the foregoing rule indicates

that disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal imposed
upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory. However,
it is crystal clear from its provisos that the final and executory
nature of the decision/order/resolution assumes a different
character when an appeal is filed with the appellate board. This
interpretation can reasonably be inferred from the provision that
failure of the appellate board to act on the appeal within the
period sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal shall
render the decision final and executory.

If the meaning ascribed by the respondents to the rules is to be

taken, this question begs answer [sic]: why is there a need for a
declaration in the law that the disciplinary action shall become
final and executory if the appellate board failed to act on the
appeal within the given period if, in the first place, the same
(decision) is already final and executory [sic].

Palpably, the disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal

embodied in the decision/order/resolution shall not be
immediately executory by the mere fact of its rendition because it
shall only be so if no motion for reconsideration or appeal is filed
AND if appeal was taken and it was not acted upon within the
given period.
Thus, an appeal with the appellate board, under the foregoing
rule, should stay execution of the assailed
decision/order/resolution unless it was not acted upon by the
appellate board within the period of sixty (60) days.

Further, while it is also true that under the provision of Section

23, Rule 17, Part II of Napolcom Memorandum Circular (NMC)
2007-001 it is provided that "the filing of a motion for
reconsideration shall stay the execution of the disciplinary action
sought to be reconsidered", this provision, by its very wordings
and taken in the light of the other provisions of this law, does not
give exclusivity to the filing of motion for reconsideration as the
only mode by which the assailed decision could be stayed.

To give emphasis, it is apropos to quote Section 23, Rule 17, Part

II of NMC 2007-001, viz:
Section 23. Motion for Reconsideration. - The party adversely
affected may file a motion for reconsideration from the decision
rendered by the disciplinary authority within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of the decision on the following grounds:

xxxx

The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall stay the execution

of disciplinary action sought to be reconsidered. Only one (1)
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed and the same shall be
considered and decided by the disciplinary authority within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.
Notable in the aforementioned rule is the absence of limiting
words or terms which would consider the filing of a motion for
reconsideration as the only remedy which could stay the
execution of the disciplinary action.

It is also important to give emphasis to the following provisions of

NMC 2007-001 to unearth the real intendment of the rules:

1. Section 1 (e) - There is finality of Decision when upon the

lapse of ten (10) days from receipt, or notice of such decision, no
motion for reconsideration or APPEAL has been filed in
accordance with these Rules;

II. Section 24, Certificate of Finality. - The disciplinary authority

or appellate body shall issue a certificate of finality of the decision
or resolution finally disposing of the case when no motion for
reconsideration or APPEAL is filed within the prescribed period.

Verily, to ascribe merit to respondents' contention that the

disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal to a member of
the PNP is final and executory will definitely run counter to the
aforementioned rules which emphatically declare that the decision
shall only become final and, thus, executory, when upon the
lapse of the ten (10) days from receipt, or notice of such
decision, no motion for reconsideration or APPEAL has been filed.

Thus, it is fitting to enunciate, at this point, the doctrinal principle

that "a law must be read in its entirety and no single provision
should be interpreted in isolation with respect to the other
provisions of the law."

To reiterate, this court, guided by the existing rules and

jurisprudence on the matter, finds that the appeal interposed by
the petitioner with the National Appellate Board stayed the
decision and resolution rendered by the Chief of the PNP
dismissing him from the service.

Perforce, the Special order No. 9999 issued by Police Deputy

Director General Marcelo Poyaoan Garbo, Jr., PNP, dismissing the
petitioner from the PNP service effective October 11, 2013 should
be declared void considering that the decision of even date
rendered by the Chief PNP is not yet final and executory.18
The PNP sought reconsideration of the said Decision but its
Motion for Reconsideration dated April 16, 2015 was denied in an
Order dated June 1, 2015, finding no cogent reason for the Court
to disturb or set aside its findings in its Decision.19 Hence, the
PNP interposed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court raising a pure question of law.

Ruling of the Court

As aptly raised by herein petitioner, the sole issue to be resolved

by this Court is, whether S.O. No. 9999, which imposes upon
herein respondent the penalty of dismissal from the service,
pursuant to the Decision dated October 11, 2013 and the
Resolution dated November 26, 2014 of the Office of the Chief,
PNP, is immediately executory, pending respondent's appeal with
the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that NAPOLCOM Memorandum

Circular (M.C.) No. 2007-001 has been repealed by NAPOLCOM
M.C. No. 2016-002.20 Nevertheless, We shall continue to apply
the provisions of NMC No. 2007-001, as this was the prevailing
rule during the pendency and resolution of the present case.

Petitioner argues that the RTC erred in holding that S.O. No.
9999 is void, for the following reasons: (1) there is nothing in
Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975, as amended, that
states that the failure of the National Appellate Board to act on
the appeal within 60 days shall render the decision final and
executory; (2) NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001 is clear that only the
filing of a motion for reconsideration shall stay the execution of
the disciplinary action sought to be reconsidered; (3) PNP Circular
No. 2008-013 allows execution of S.O. No. 9999, dismissing PO2
Mayo from the police service pending the latter's appeal with the
National Appellate Board.

Respondent PO2 Mayo, in his Comment/Opposition,21 argued that

the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic by the
subsequent issuance of S.O. No. 2158 which cancelled S.O. No.
9999. Moreover, by the issuance of said S.O. No. 2158,
respondent argues that petitioner is estopped from arguing for
the validity and implementation of S.O. No. 9999 considering
that, it was also the one who caused its cancellation.
Furthermore, he reiterates his argument that under NMC Circular
No. 2007-001 in relation to PNP Circular No. 2008-013, decisions,
orders or resolutions of PNP disciplinary authorities may only be
implemented upon issuance of a certificate of finality, finally
disposing of the case when there is no motion for reconsideration
or appeal filed within the prescribed period.

The Court finds no merit in respondent PO2 Mayo's assertion that

the case has been rendered moot, and that the petitioner is
estopped from asserting the validity of S.O. No. 9999, by the
subsequent issuance of S.O. No. 2158 dated March 23, 2015,
which cancelled his dismissal from the service. A reading of S.O.
No. 2158 reveals that the cancellation of respondent's dismissal
from the service, was primarily because of the injunction issued
by the RTC. Petitioner cannot be faulted for doing so, considering
that judgments in actions for injunction are executory even
pending appeal22 and implementing respondent's dismissal which
was enjoined by the court could have made them liable for
indirect contempt.

Before We discuss the main issue at hand, this Court also takes
the opportunity to correct the pronouncement made by the RTC
that an appeal with the appellate board shall stay execution of
the decision, order, or resolution, unless it was not acted upon
within a period of sixty (60) days. Under Section 45 of R.A. No.
6975, the last proviso only pertains to the Regional Appellate
Board (RAB). It is not applicable in the present case considering
that respondent filed his appeal of the Decision and Resolution of
the Chief of the PNP before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate
Board (NAB), and not the RAB.

The Decision and Resolution of the Chief of the PNP is not

immediately executory

This Court rejects the position of the petitioner that the Decision
and the Resolution of the Chief of the PNP is immediately
executory, pending respondent's PO2 Mayo's appeal before the
NAB. Nevertheless, supervening events compels this Court to
reverse the judgment of the RTC, and dissolve the writ of
injunction it issued as will be explained below.

The provision of law governing the finality of disciplinary actions

against police officers is Sec. 45 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended,
also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government
Act of 1990, to wit:
Section. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. - The disciplinary
action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the
regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal
from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of
decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed
by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be
appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, The regional or
National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the
appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate
board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the
decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the
filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
The same provision is reproduced in Rule 17, Section 22 of
NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001:
Section 22. Finality of Decision. - The disciplinary action imposed
upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided,
that a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by
the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be
appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided,
further, that the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the
PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the
National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided, furthermore, that the Regional or National
Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal:
Provided, finally, that the decisions of the National Appellate
Board and Regional Appellate Board may be appealed to the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.
In the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) v. P/Inp. John A. Mamauag,23 this
Court held that Section 45 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended,
provides that a disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the
PNP shall be final and executory, and disciplinary actions are
appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal from
the service. The second proviso which renders disciplinary actions
involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the
Chief of the PNP qualifies the general statement that disciplinary
actions imposed upon a member of the PNP is final and
executory. Petitioner's contention that only a motion for
reconsideration can stay the execution of a disciplinary action is
misplaced. As correctly held by the RTC, the wording of Rule 17,
Section 2324 of NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001 that "the filing of a
motion for reconsideration shall stay the execution of the
disciplinary action sought to be reconsidered", does not foreclose
other modes of staying the execution of a disciplinary action. As a
general rule, only judgments which have become final can be
executed. Executions pending appeal are exceptions to the
general rule, and as such, must be strictly construed.25 While
these principles are applicable to execution of judgments under
the Rules of Court, this Court finds the same applicable to the
present case considering that the Rules of Court are suppletorily
applicable by express provision of NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-
001.26 Thus, the fact that disciplinary actions imposed by the
Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed
to the NAB, which only renders the same not immediately final,
but also not immediately executory when an appeal has been
seasonably filed with the NAB.

This Court is aware of its pronouncement in Jenny Zacarias v.

National Police Commission27 that summary dismissals from the
service imposed by the Chief of the PNP under Section 4228 of
R.A. 6975, as amended, are immediately executory. The ruling
in Zacarias, however, was based on NAPOLCOM MC No. 92-006,
which expressly provided for the immediately executory nature of
the decisions of the PNP summary dismissal authorities which
includes the Chief of the PNP.29 NAPOLCOM MC No. 92-006 was
amended by NAPOLCOM MC No. 94-021,30 and both MCs were
repealed by NAPOLCOM MC No. 96-010.31NAPOLCOM MC No. 96-
010 was, in turn, repealed by NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-
001.32 Unlike the previous MCs, NAPOLCOM MC No. 2007-001 and
the subsequent NAPOLCOM MC No. 2016-002 do not expressly
provide for immediately executory nature of the decisions of the
PNP summary dismissal authorities.

Dismissal of Respondent's Appeal before the Secretary of

the Department of Interior and Local Government is
executory pending appeal

The Court notes the petitioner's Manifestation and Motion33 dated

August 11, 2017, stating that, in an Order dated February 10,
2017, the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) has dismissed respondent's PO2
Mayo's Appeal Memorandum. Said DILG Order assailed the
Decision dated November 5, 2015 and the Resolution dated June
17, 2016 of the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board
which affirmed the Decision dated October 11, 2013 and
the Resolution dated November 26, 2014 of the Office of
the Chief, PNP.34 DILG Secretary Ismael D. Sueno denied herein
respondent's PO2 Mayo's appeal for the latter's failure to file a
Notice of Appeal before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate
Board.35 Furthermore, in another Manifestation and
Motion36 dated February 5, 2018, herein petitioner stated that
DILG Officer-in-Charge Catalino S. Cuy has denied respondent
PO2 Mayo's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
February 10, 2017, in an Order dated October 30, 2017.37

By dismissing respondent's PO2 Mayo's appeal, the Secretary of

the DILG, in effect, confirmed respondent's PO2 Mayo's dismissal
from the service. Such dismissal from the service is executory,
pursuant to Section 47 of Book V, Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292, or the Administrative Code of 1987. This provision of the
Civil Service laws is also applicable to the PNP,38 which states:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -

xxxx

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,

provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the
same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

xxxx

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension
during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
With respondent PO2 Mayo's appeal already resolved unfavorably,
and such resolution being executory, this Court finds no
impediment in reversing the Decision and the Resolution of the
RTC and lifting the injunction that it issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

March 18, 2015 and the Order dated June 1, 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32 of the City of Manila are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, C. J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo,
and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 12-31.

2
Penned by Presiding Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina; id. at 35-43.

3
Id. at 44.

4
May F. Mendizabal, Angelica Leah Paz M. Coven, Jorelle Lance B.
Lariosa, Olive R. Birion, Annalyn D. Aquino, Ronalyn N. Ben-Ben,
Aaron N. Aquino, Romeo P. Tagono, Jr., and Keniefielda Mabilog.
As stated in the Decision dated October 11, 2013 of the Office of
the Chief, PNP; id at 45.

5
Id. at 14-15 and 45-46.

6
Id. at 45-46.

7
Id. at 47.

8
Id. at 47-48.

9
Id. at 47.

10
Id. at 50-62.

11
Id. at 49.

12
As alleged by respondent PO2 Mayo in his Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed before the Regional
Trial Court of City of Manila, Id. at 65.

13
Id. at 63-69.
14
Rollo, p. 66.

15
Id. at 70-76.

16
Id. at 100.

17
Id. at 43.

18
Id. at 39-42.

19
Id. at 44.

20
Rule 24, Section 1. Repealing Clause. - Memorandum Circular
Numbers 93-024, 96-010, 98-014, 99-006, 99-014, 2002-010,
2002-013 and 2007-001 are repealed. All other NAPOLCOM
issuances or portions thereof inconsistent with this Memorandum
Circular are hereby superseded or modified accordingly.

21
Rollo, pp. 109-120.

22
Rule 39, Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. Judgments
in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and
support, and such other judgments as are now or may
hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall
be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed
by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by
the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its
discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of
support.

The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or

otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied)

23
504 Phil. 186 (2005).
24
Rule 17, Sec. 23. Motion for Reconsideration. - The party
adversely affected may file a motion for reconsideration from the
decision rendered by the disciplinary authority within ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy of the decision on the following
grounds:

a) Newly discovered evidence which, if presented, would

materially affect the decision rendered; or

b) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial

to the substantial rights and interest of the movant.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall stay the execution

of the disciplinary action sought to be reconsidered. Only one (1)
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed and the same shall be
considered and decided by the disciplinary authority within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.

25
Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 615
(1999), citing City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 281 Phil. 408
(1991).

26
Rule 1, Sec 4. Nature of Proceedings. - The investigation and
hearing before the administrative disciplinary authorities and the
IAS shall be summary in nature and shall not strictly adhere to
the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable in
judicial proceedings. The provisions of the Civil Service Law,
Rules and Regulations as well as the Revised Rules of
Court shall be suppletolily applicable. (Emphasis supplied)

27
460 Phil. 555 (2003).

28
Section 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and
Regional Directors. - The National Police Commission, the Chief of
the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary
hearings, may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent
PNP member in any of the following cases:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is
strong;

(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly

charged and there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is
guilty of the charges; and

(c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a

police officer.

Any member or officer of the PNP who shall go on absence

without official leave (AWOL) for a continuous period of thirty
(30) days or more shall be dismissed immediately from the
service. His activities and whereabouts during the period shall be
investigated and if found to have committed a crime, he shall be
prosecuted accordingly.

29
Rule II, Section 8 of NAPOLCOM MC No. 92-006 provides:
Finality of Decision/Resolution. The decision of the PNP Summary
Dismissal Authorities imposing upon respondent a penalty of
dismissal from the service shall be immediately executory.
However, in the event that the respondent is exonerated on
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under suspension
during the pendency of the appeal, with entitlement to back
salaries and allowances.

30
Rule IV, Section 1 Repealing Clause. - Memorandum Circular
No. 92-006 series of 1992 and amended Circular No. 94-021
series of 1994 and all rules and regulations and other issuances,
or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Memorandum Circular
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

31
Part H, Section 1 Repealing Clause. - Memorandum Circular No.
92-006 series of 1992 as amended by Memorandum Circular No.
94-021 and Circular No. 94-022 series of 1994 and all rules and
regulations and other issuances, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Memorandum Circular are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
32
Rule 24, Section 1 Repealing Clause. - Memorandum Circular
Numbers 93-024, 96-010, 98-014, 99-006, 99-014, 2002-010,
2002-013 are repealed. All other NAPOLCOM issuances or
portions thereof inconsistent with this Memorandum Circular are
hereby superseded or modified accordingly.

33
Rollo, pp. 168-169.

34
Id.

35
Id. at 174-175.

36
Id. at 177-178.

37
Id. at 183-185.

38
Section 91 of R.A. No. 6975 provides: Application of Civil
Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules
and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.